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This article, part of the History of Chile series, covers the period of the presidency of Salvador Allende.

Salvador Allende was President of Chile from November 1970 until his removal from power and death in September 1973. As President, Allende carried out a controversial democratic socialist program, and his term was marked by civil unrest, strikes and lockouts, U.S. economic sanctions, complaints from the Chilean Supreme Court, a attempted coup in June 1973, the Resolution of August 22, 1973 in which the majority of Chile's Chamber of Deputies called for the military to restore order, and finally a successful coup on September 11, 1973, during which Allende committed suicide. Commander of the Army Gen. Augusto Pinochet removed the Allende government and established a military dictatorship.

Allende becomes president

In the 1970 election, Allende, running with the Unidad Popular (UP or Popular Unity) coalition, received a plurality with 36.3% of the vote. Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic won 27.9% with a very similar platform to Allende's. Both Allende and Tomic promised to further nationalize the mineral industry and redistribute land and income among other new policies. Conservative former president Jorge Alessandri received slightly under 35.8% of the vote.

According to the constitution, Congress had to decide between the two candidates who had received the most votes. The precedent set on the three previous occasions this situation had arisen since 1932 was for Congress simply to choose the candidate with the largest number of votes; indeed, former president Alessandri had been elected in 1958 with 31.6% of the popular vote.

In this case, however, there was an active campaign against Allende's confirmation by Congress, including clandestine efforts to prevent him taking office, and his presidency was ratified only after he signed a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees". It has been argued than given that less than the majority of the voters voted for him, Allende did not have a clear "mandate" to embark in the policies put forward on his program. But the legality of the election itself is not in dispute.

"The Chilean Way to Socialism"

In office, Allende pursued a policy he called "La vía chilena al socialismo" ("The Chilean Way to Socialism"). This included nationalization of certain large-scale industries (notably copper), of the health care system, continuation of his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva's policies regarding the educational system, a program of free milk for children, and land redistribution. The previous government of Eduardo Frei has already partly nationalised copper by acquiring a 51 percent share in foreign owned mines. Allende expropriated the remaining percentage without compensating the U.S. companies that owned the mines.

Chilean presidents were allowed a maximum of 6 years, which may explain Allende's haste to restructure the economy. Not only did he have a significant restructuring program organised, it had to be a success if a successor to Allende was going to be elected.

At the beginning there was broad support in Congress to expand the government's already large part of the economy, as the Popular Unity and Christian Democrats together had a clear majority. But the government's efforts to pursue these policies led to strong opposition by landowners, some middle-class sectors, the rightist National Party, financiers, and the Roman Catholic Church (which in 1973 was displeased with the direction of the educational policy ). Eventually the Christian Democrats united with the National Party in Congress.

The land-redistribution that Allende highlighted as one of the central policies of his government had already begun under his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, who had expropriated between one-fifth and one-quarter of all properties liable to takeover . The Allende government's intention was to seize all holdings of more than eighty basic irrigated hectares . Allende also intended to improve the socio-economic welfare of Chile's poorest citizens; a key element was to provide employment, either in the new nationalised enterprises or on public works projects.

Towards the end of 1971, Fidel Castro toured Chile extensively during a four-week visit. This gave credence to the belief of those on the right that "The Chilean Way to Socialism" was an effort to put Chile on the same path as Cuba.

Economics

In the first year of Allende's term, the short-term economic results of Minister of the Economics Pedro Vuskovic's expansive monetary policy were unambiguously favorable: 12% industrial growth and an 8.6% increase in GDP, accompanied by major declines in inflation (down from 34.9% to 22.1%) and unemployment (down to 3.8%). However, these results were not sustained and in 1972 the Chilean escudo had runaway inflation of 140%. From December 1972 to December 1973, the inflation rate was a catastrophic 508% - an example of hyperinflation . The average Real GDP contracted between 1971 and 1973 at an annual rate of 5.6% ("negative growth"), and the government's fiscal deficit soared while foreign reserves declined . The combination of inflation and government-mandated price-fixing led to the rise of black markets in rice, beans, sugar, and flour, and a "disappearance" of such basic commodities from supermarket shelves.

In addition to the earlier-discussed provision of employment, Allende also raised wages on a number of occasions throughout 1970 and 1971. These rises in wages were negated by continuing increases in prices for food. Although price rises had also been high under Frei (27% a year between 1967 and 1970), a basic basket of consumer goods rose by 120% from 190 to 421 escudos in one month alone, August 1972. In the period 1970-72, while Allende was in government, exports fell 24% and imports rose 26%, with imports of food rising an estimated 149% . Although nominal wages were rising, there was not a comensurate increase in the standard of living for the Chilean population.

The falls in exports were mostly due to a fall in the price of copper. Chile was at the mercy of international fluctuations in the value of its single most important export. As with almost half of developing countries, more than 50 per cent of Chile's export receipts were from a single primary commodity . Adverse fluctuation in the international price of copper negatively affected the Chilean economy throughout 1971-2. The price of copper fell from a peak of $66 per ton in 1970 to only $48-9 in 1971 and 1972 . This fall in the value of copper would combine with a lack of economic aid to bring about the economic conditions that led to events later in 1973.

Despite declining economic indicators, Allende's Popular Unity coalition actually slightly increased its vote to 43 percent in the parliamentary elections early in 1973. However, by this point what had started as an informal alliance with the Christian Democrats was anything but: the Christian Democrats now leagued with the right-wing National Party to oppose Allende's government, the two parties calling themselves the Confederación Democrática (CODE). The conflict between the executive and legislature paralyzed initiatives from either side.

Soviet Union promotion of Allende

According to the Mitrokhin Archives of KGB files, Allende had been codenamed "LEADER" as a KGB contact, had been supplying the Soviet Union with information since the 1950s, and had received $30,000 from the Soviets for "solidifying trusted relations" and providing "valuable information". KGB archives record that Svyatoslav Kuznetsov, its case officer in Chile, was instructed by headquarters to "exert a favourable influence on Chilean government policy," and that Allende "was made to understand the necessity of reorganising Chile's army and intelligence services, and of setting up a relationship between Chile’s and the USSR’s intelligence services."

"Kuznetsov arranged his regular meetings with Allende through the President’s personal secretary, Miria Contreras Bell, known as La Payita and codenamed Marta by the KGB. La Payita was Allende’s favourite mistress during his presidency. Kuznetsov reported that Allende was spending 'a great deal of time' in her company. 'His relationship with his wife has more than once been harmed as a result.' Despite Allende’s affairs, however, his wife, Hortensia, remained intensely loyal to him. Kuznetsov did his best to cultivate her as well as her husband." (The Times extract from the Mitrokhin Archive volume II, by Mitrokhin and historian Christopher Andrew).

United States opposition to Allende

The U.S. administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon, then embroiled in the Vietnam War and Cold War with the Soviet Union, was openly hostile to the possibility of a second Marxist regime (after Cuba) in the Western Hemisphere. There were clandestine efforts by the U.S. government to prevent Allende from taking office after election: On October 16, 1970, a formal instruction was issued to the CIA base in Chile, saying in part, "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October, but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end, utilizing every appropriate resource. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden..."

Regarding the botched attempted-kidnapping and manslaughter of Chilean Army Commander René Schneider on October 22, 1970 (Schneider was a constitutionalist opposed to the idea of a coup preventing Allende from taking office or removing him after the fact), the Church Committee observed: "The CIA attempted, directly, to foment a military coup in Chile. It passed three weapons to a group of Chilean officers who plotted a coup. Beginning with the kidnaping of Chilean Army Commander-in-Chief Rene Schneider. However, those guns were returned. The group which staged the abortive kidnap of Schneider, which resulted in his death, apparently was not the same as the group which received CIA weapons." However, the group which killed Schneider had previously been in contact with the CIA. The agency later paid that group $35,000, according to the Hinchey report, "in an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons." CIA documents indicate that while the CIA had sought his kidnapping, his killing was never intended. Public outrage over the killing of Schneider cooled sentiments for a coup, and neither the U.S. nor Chilean military attempted other removal actions in the early years of the Allende administration. On October 26, President Eduardo Frei (Salvador Allende was inaugurated November 3) named General Carlos Prats as commander in chief of the army in replacement of René Schneider. Carlos Prats was also a constitutionalist.

Immediately after the Allende government won office the U.S. began high-level planning to ensure the Marxist experiment would not succeed. This would be achieved by, among other strategies, massive reduction in economic aid. Declassified U.S. National Security Council documents, include decision memorandum no. 93, dated November 9, 1970, written by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and addressed to the heads of diplomatic, defense and intelligence departments. This document stated that pressure should be placed on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests, specifically, the President has directed no new bilateral economic aid commitments be undertaken with the government of Chile .

In 1973, the CIA was notified by contacts of the impending Pinochet coup two days in advance, but contends it "played no direct role in" the coup. After Pinochet assumed power, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told Nixon that the U.S. "didn't do it" (referring to the coup itself) but had "created the conditions as great as possible."

Crisis and Coup

October 1972 saw the first of what were to be a wave of confrontational strikes by some of the historically well-off sectors of Chilean society. A 24-day wave of strikes by truck-owners, small businessmen, some (mostly professional) unions, and student groups occurred. Other than the inevitable damage to the economy, the chief effect of the strike was to bring the head of the army the head of the army, general Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister. The truckers' strike was, at least indirectly, financed via the CIA.

On June 29, 1973, a tank regiment under the command of Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the presidential palace (la Moneda) in a violent but unsuccessful coup attempt. That failed coup was followed by a further strike at the end of July, joined this time by the copper miners of El Teniente as well. On August 9, General Prats was made Minister of Defense, but this decision proved so unpopular with the military that on August 22 he was forced to resign not only this position but his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Army; he was replaced in the latter role by Pinochet.

For some months now, the government had been afraid to call upon the national police known as the carabineros, for fear of their lack of loyalty. In August 1973, a constitutional crisis was clearly in the offing: the Supreme Court publicly complained about the government's inability to enforce the law of the land and on August 22, the Chamber of Deputies of Chile (with the Christian Democrats now firmly uniting with the National Party) accused Allende's government of unconstitutional acts, and called on the military ministers to "put an immediate end" to what they described as "breach the Constitution...with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of Law and ensuring the constitutional order of our Nation and the essential underpinnings of democratic coexistence among Chileans." They accused Allende's government of a "breakdown of the Rule of Law by means of the creation and development of government-protected armed groups which...are headed towards a confrontation with the Armed Forces." Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and police (which he clearly had reason to fear in their then-current forms) were characterized as "notorious attempts to use the Armed and Police Forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks." (See 1973 coup in Chile.)

Two days later (August 24, 1973), Allende responded (See 1973 coup in Chile; full text of the response is at in Spanish, in English), responding point-by point to their accusations and, in turn, accusing Congress of "facilit the seditious intention of certain sectors" and promoting a coup or a civil war by "invoking the intervention of the Armed Forces and of Order against a democratically elected government". He pointed out that the declaration had failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority constitutionally required to bring an accusation against the president and argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role.

"Chilean democracy," he wrote, "is a conquest by all of the people. It is neither the work nor the gift of the exploiting classes, and it will be defended by those who, with sacrifices accumulated over generations, have imposed it… With a tranquil conscience… I sustain that never before has Chile had a more democratic government than that over which I have the honor to preside." He concluded by calling upon "the workers, all democrats and patriots" to join him in defense of the constitution and of the "revolutionary process."

In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the crisis with a plebiscite. However, the Chilean Army under Augusto Pinochet seized the initiative of the CoD's August 22 Resolution (which had implored Allende's military removal) to oust Allende on September 11, 1973. As the Presidential Palace was surrouded and bombed, Allende committed suicide. Two days later, rather than return rule to civilian government, Pinochet staged a bloodless coup d'état to establish a junta.

See also

• 1970 Chilean presidential election
• 1973 coup in Chile
• Augusto Pinochet
• Salvador Allende
• Carlos Altamirano (secretary general of the Chilean Socialist Party)
• Chile under Pinochet - aftermath of the coup
• Chilean nationalization of copper
• Declaration of the Breakdown of Chile’s Democracy
• History of Chile
• Project FUBELT - codename for CIA operations to undermine Allende
• U.S. intervention in Chile

Notes

1. http://www.josepinera.com/pag/pag_tex_quiebredemoc_en.htm
2. http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1a.htm
3. http://www.iglesia.cl/iglesiachile/2003/1973/aplenenu.html
4. ^ Cite error: The named reference Mabry was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
5. http://www1.lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/1971/
6. ^ http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1c.htm
7. The Times extract from the Mitrokhin Archive volume II, by Mitrokhin and historian Christopher Andrew
8. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch05-01.htm
9. ^ Church Report: Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973.
10. Hinchey Report, September 18, 2000.
11. ^ Kristian C. Gustafson, Reexamining the Record: CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970
12. Mark Falcoff, Kissinger and Chile
13. Andrew J. Rhodes, Chilean Civil-Military Relations
14. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/index.htm#chile
15. http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1b.htm
16. http://literature.rebelyouth.ca/educhile_1970s/tanquetazo.html
17. Jose Pinera's archive of the CoD's Resolution

References

• Simon Collier & William F. Sater (1996). A History of Chile: 1808-1994. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Julio Faundez (1988). Marxism and democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the fall of Allende, New Haven: Yale University Press.

• Anke Hoogvelt (1997). Globalisation and the postcolonial world, London: Macmillan.

• Henry Kissinger (1970). National Security Decision 93: Policy Towards Chile, Washington: National Security Council.

• Alec Nove (1986). Socialism, Economics and Development, London: Allen & Unwin.

• Don Mabry (2003). Chile: Allende's Rise and Fall.

External links

• An extensive Spanish-language site providing a day-by-day chronology of the Allende era. This is clearly a partisan, pro-Allende source, but the research and detail are enormous.
• The August 22, 1973 document under which the Chamber of Deputies called on the military to overthrow the Allende regime. This is a solid translation of the document, although the introductory note is clearly that of an apologist for the coup.
• Allende's August 24, 1973 response
• National Security Archive's Chile Documentation Project which provides documents obtained from FOIA requests regarding U.S. involvement in Chile, beginning with attempts to promote a coup in 1970 and continuing through U.S. support for Pinochet
• Allende first speech to Chilean parliament following the 1970 election

• History of Chile
• Politics of Chile