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The 1999-2000 battle of Grozny was the action of conquering the Chechen capital Grozny during the Second Chechen War, lasting from throught the late 1999 to early 2000.

Siege

Even while Chechen capital of Grozny was surrounded by November 1999, more than two additional weeks of shelling and bombing were required before Russian troops were able to claim a foothold within any part of the heavily fortified city. With approximately 100,000 troops supported by a powerful air force, the Russian army vastly outnumbered and outgunned the Chechen defence militia, comprising several thousand fighters, and was considerably larger than the Russian force that had been defeated in Chechnya during the previous war. In addition, Russia's tactics in this second campaign were drastically different. The strategy in 1999 was to hold back tanks, vulnerable armoured personnel carriers (APC) and infantry and subject the entrenched Chechens to an intensive barrage of heavy artillery and aerial bombardment before engaging them.

In November, the Kremlin appointed Beslan Gantamirov, former mayor of Grozny, as head of the pro-Moscow Chechen State Council. Gantamirov was just pardoned by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and released from a 6-year sentence for embezzling federal funds to rebuild Chechnya in 1995-1996; he was chosen to lead a pro-Russian Chechen militia force in the upcoming battle. Gantamirov soon locked horns with the then interior minister, Vladimir Rushailo, who refused to supply Chechen troops with APCs, mortars or sniper rifles, limiting their combat arsenal to "obsolete AK-47s which jammed after a few shots". In the wake of the Grozny siege, Rushailo publicly accused Gantamirov of accepting "any volunteers into the ranks of the Chechen militia including rebel fighters". However, the Chechen militia went on to play a pivotal role in the siege of Grozny, suffering more than 700 casualties during the fighting. On 30 May 2000, Russia's main official in Chechnya, Nikolai Koshman, said his deputy, Gantemirov was dismissed for "non-fulfilment of his duties." Koshman also said that the pro-Moscow Chechen militia has lost 295 out of its remaining 353 members for absenteeism.

As many as 40,000 civilians, many of them ethnic Russians, remained trapped in Grozny during the Russian siege of the city, suffering from the bombing, cold and hunger. Civilian motorcades attempting to leave besieged areas via Russian-guarded safe corridors were fired on at Russian police checkpoints, wounded survivors reported.

Grozny itself was transformed into a fortress under the leadership of Chechen field commander Aslambek Ismailov. The Chechen fighters in the capital put up a fierce resistance to the Russians throughout the months of November and December. Grozny's Chechen defenders built a system of bunkers behind apartment buildings, laid mines throughout the city, placed snipers on rooftops, and withstood the heavy Russian bombardment for the chance to finally come to grips with the enemy in an environment of their choosing.

Ultimatum and international condemnation

In December Russian general staff began dropping leaflets in Grozny announcing that everyone who did not leave would be considered bandits and terrorists and would subsequently be destroyed by aviation and artillery. In the face of international outrage by the United States, the European Union and human rights groups, Russia withdrew the ultimatum, but the campaign against Grozny continued with renewed vigour. By January 2000, Russia's heavy bombardments had finally begun to take their toll. Using multiple rocket launchers and massed tank and artillery fire, the Russians flattened most of Grozny in preparation for a mass assault. Meanwhile, dozens of soldiers were killed when a a column of Russian troops was ambushed and trapped in Minutka Square.

On January 3, Russian General Valentin Astaviyev said on state television that Russian forces had suffered only three dead in the past 24 hours; but the commander of an Interior Ministry unit in Grozny told AFP news agency that 50 men had been killed in the previous 48 hours. An undercover investigation by NTV has reported that up to 50 Russian soldiers are being killed in Chechnya daily; the figure was compiled from reports from witnesses, morgue officials, railway workers and coroner's assistants. On January 4, Chechen fighters in Grozny had launched counter attacks and broken through Russian lines in at least two places, temporarily seizing the village of Alkhan-Kala. Both sides accused each other of launching chemical attacks.

Rebel counteroffensive

On Monday, 10 January 2000, Chechen forces outside Grozny launched a major counter-offensive, briefly recapturing major towns of Shali, Argun and Gudermes, and opening a new supply corridor to the besieged capital; they also ambushed and destroyed a supply convoy near Dzhalka, on the Argun-Gudermes road. The commander for the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, said mistakes by "soft-hearted" Russian interior ministry officials had allowed the rebels to counter-attack; he said from now on only boys under 10, old men over 60 and girls and women would be considered as refugees. An interior ministry spokesman said 26 Russian soldiers had died in the past 24 hours, the heaviest one-day official death toll since fighting began last September. On January 19, Russian Major-General Mikhail Malofeyev was killed in Grozny; his body was found only 4 days later. The Russian command said small bands of rebel fighters were cutting off Russian units from the main forces; on January 21, 20 members of a Russian regiment were killed in north-west Grozny when rebels snuck through sewage tunnels to attack them from the rear.

On January 26, the Russian government announced that 1,173 servicemen had been killed since October - a more than double rise from 544 killed reported 19 days earlier, on January 6, with just 300 killed reported on January 4.

By mid-January, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers began an advance on central Grozny from three directions. With their supply routes interdicted by an increasingly effective Russian blockade, ammunition running low and their losses mounting, the Chechen leadership began to contemplate an escape. It was decided that taking on the Russians in frontal combat was becoming too costly. As the Russian army closed in on their positions, the Chechen commanders decided on a desperate gamble; success was not assured, for the city was encircled by mine fields and three layers of Russian forces.

Rebel breakout

The Chechens began to escape on the last day of January and first day of February under intense Russian bombardment. As the Chechen fighters broke out, moving in a southwesterly direction, they were met with artillery fire. One of the main retreating units, led by Shamil Basayev, hit a minefield between the city and the village of Alkhan-Kala. As Russian artillery fire homed in on their position, several of the Chechens' field commanders personally led their retreating soldiers in a charge across the minefields. Volunteers were asked to run ahead of the main force to clear a path for their retreating comrades. Scores of Chechen shaheed were killed as well as several prominent Chechen commanders, including generals Khunkarpasha Israpilov and Aslambek Ismailov, the mastermind behind the defense of Grozny, and the city mayor Lecha Dudayev. In addition to these commanders, many rank-and-file Chechen fighters were apparently killed in the bloody escape. The Russians later claimed to have killed 200 Chechen fighters. Another 200 were maimed, including Basayev.

A rebel post-operative war council was held in Alkhan-Yurt, where it was decided that the Chechen forces would retreat into the inaccessible Vedeno and Argun gorges in the southern mountains to carry on a guerrilla war against the Russians. The Russian army's last chance to destroy the rebels in a concentrated position was thus lost, and the Chechens scattered into the southern mountains to continue the war.

In Grozny itself, the Russian generals initially refused to admit that the Chechens had escaped from the blockaded city, saying that fierce fighting continued within the city. Russian spokesman and Putin's aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky said, "If they left Grozny, we would have informed you."

It was not until February 6 that the Russians were able to raise the Russian flag above the city centre. In March, the Russian army began to allow residents to return to the city.

See also

• 1994-95 battle of Grozny

References

1. "'Russians fired on refugees'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
2. "'Russia will pay for Chechnya'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
3. "Russians ambushed in Grozny". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
4. "Chechens 'break Grozny siege'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
5. "Russian army battered in Grozny". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
6. "Chechens 'break Grozny siege'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
7. "Chechens use tunnels, snipers to stop Russians in Grozny". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
8. "'Russia admits heavy casualties'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
9. "'Russian army battered in Grozny'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
10. "Russia media criticise Chechen campaign". Retrieved 2006-06-10.
11. "'Chechen fighters abandon Grozny'". Retrieved 2006-06-10.

• Battles of Russia
• Second Chechen War
• Sieges
• Urban warfare