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Revision as of 23:47, 17 December 2004 by Itai (talk | contribs)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)Turkey formally applied to join the European Community, the organisation that has since developed into the European Union, on April 14, 1987. It was officially recognised as a candidate for membership on December 10, 1999 at the Helsinki summit of the European Council, having been an Associate Member since 1963. It has been invited to start negotiations from October 3, 2005, a process which is likely to take at least a decade to complete. Its possible future accession is now the central controversy of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union.
History
Turkey first applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community in 1957, and finally signed an Association Agreement in 1963. This provided for the future possibility of full membership. Turkey made such an application on 14 April 1987. Though this application was rejected by the Commission in 1989, on the basis of its poor economy and human rights record, Turkey's eligibility for membership was confirmed.
During the 1990s Turkey proceeded with a closer integration with the European Union by agreeing to a Customs Union in 1995 (in effect since 1996). Moreover the Helsinki European Council of 1999 again stated that Turkey was a candidate for full membership on the same basis as other candidates, namely the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.
Another significant aspect of this summit was that Greece for the first time withdrew its longstanding objections over giving Turkey official candidate status. In return, Turkey agreed to cooperate for a solution on the problem of divided Cyprus, while the European Union pledged that such a solution would not however be a prerequisite on the future accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the Union. Around this time a strong and wide-reaching reform program was also initiated under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a popular pro-European party with Islamist roots.
The next significant step in Turkish-EU relationships came with the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council. According to it "The EU would open negotiations with Turkey 'without delay' if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria."
Turkey also backed the latest EU-supported UN plan to reunite Cyprus in 2004, although its military occupation of northern Cyprus continued. At the same time a three decade long period of hyperinflation ended, with inflation being reduced to 6% in recent years from annual levels of 75% during the mid-90s.
Also the political reform program of the Erdogan government continued. Some specific favourable developments during this time included:
- Turkey ratified the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and signed the 13th Protocol, meaning it has abolished the death penalty for all peace-time crimes and intends to abolish it for war-time crimes.
- The AKP government has lifted a small part of the large-scale ban on the teaching of Kurdish— now there are two private schools teaching Kurdish – although it does not yet accept the use of Kurdish in regular education (as required by European conventions in those areas historically and currently inhabited by Kurds).
In response to these favorable developments, the European Commission recommended that the negotiations should begin in 2005, but also added various precautionary measures. The EU's leaders agreed on 16 December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey from 3 October 2005. The country's eventual accession now faces democratic approval processes in European and member states legislative procedures.
One of the recommendations of the Commission's report was that the EU will need to define its financial perspective for the period from 2014 before negotiations can be concluded. Though it is as yet unknown when Turkey will actually join, this clarified somewhat the timeframe: it may be unlikely to happen before 2015—while some EU officials have discussed 2019 as a potential end-date.
Concerns and opposition to Turkey's entry
The main EU concerns about Turkey have traditionally been the Turkish human rights record, the refusal to recognise the Armenian Genocide and the involvement of the military in Turkish politics.
Opposition to Turkey's entry into the EU varies among the public of the current EU member states, as does political support or opposition to the entry bid. The issues mentioned by some of those objecting to Turkey's EU candidacy can be divided among those inherent to Turkey's situation, those that involve internal issues about human rights democracy and related maters, and those concerning Turkey's open external disputes with its neighbours.
Inherent issues
- Most of Turkey's territory is not European but Asian. Turkey's membership would mean that the European Union's external borders would now reach Middle-eastern nations such as Syria, Iraq and Iran.
- Turkey's large size, combined with the poor state of its economy, lends to arguments that the European Union would not be able to support Turkey or absorb the possibly large number of workers that might leave it for the other member states of the Union.
- Turkey's enormous political power once in the Union. Its almost 70 million inhabitants will bestow it the second largest number of representatives in the European Parliament, after Germany. With the current rate of population increase some fear it might even surpass Germany by the time of adhesion.
- The perceived difference in values and lifestyle between a predominantly Muslim and Asian country with predominantly Christian European nations that make-up the current EU.
Human rights, democracy, and other internal issues
- Severe doubts on the democratic and secular nature of Turkey. The involvement of the military in Turkish politics is a continuing concern.
- Many have continuing doubts on the commitment of the Turkish state to democracy and human rights, and its ability to reach European standards in these and other issues such as gender equality and minority rights (especially as regards the Kurdish population). Freedom of political speech is another area in which some concerns have arisen (e.g. 'Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession', p. 36 and others). Some decry the recent recognition of the Kurdish language by Turkish authorities as a cosmetic operation. Kurdish education is provided through only a few private schools, while TV in Kurdish is only for a few hours a week and over a limited geographic area.
- Many have continuing doubts on the commitment of the Turkish state to democracy and human rights, and its ability to reach European standards in these and other issues such as gender equality and minority rights (especially as regards the Kurdish population). Freedom of political speech is another area in which some concerns have arisen (e.g. 'Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession', p. 36 and others). Some decry the recent recognition of the Kurdish language by Turkish authorities as a cosmetic operation. Kurdish education is provided through only a few private schools, while TV in Kurdish is only for a few hours a week and over a limited geographic area.
- The issue of church and state separation is another concern. Islam continues to enjoy large-scale privileges in Turkey, with thousands of imams in state employment, while Turkish clerics from other religions are not paid at all. The Greek Orthodox Church has not yet been able to re-open the Theological School of Chalki as has been its request. Turkey also continues to post state-financed imams to EU member states. Some EU citizens resent this as interference in the domestic affairs of their states.
- Moreover, some religious traditions are a concern, as they may be at odds with official equality policy – for example the continued consecration of polygamous marriages by state-paid imams, or recent police instructions on public behaviour that follow strict Islamic lines, such that even holding hands would be punishable.
- Turkey so far refuses to recognize the Armenian Genocide, something which France has recently demanded Turkey to do.
Relations with neighbours
- The Cyprus dispute– the island is still divided after Turkey's 1974 invasion of the island following a Greek coup d'etat against the Cypriot government, with Turkey occupying and supporting the internationally unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey continues to officially recognise only the TRNC and not the Republic of Cyprus, which is an EU member (currently exerting sovereignty only over the southern part of the island).
- The Aegean crisis, a series of unresolved geostrategical issues in the Aegean sea between Greece (a present EU member) and Turkey, which are sources of a great number of military provocations by the part of Turkey versus Greece.
- The economic embargo and closure of border currently maintained against Armenia (because of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh). In this conflict Turkey has sided with its ethnically and religiously close Azerbaijan over Armenia, with which Turkey has many other disputes. EU reports 3, p.8 state that Turkey should take active measures to resolve this situation before eventual accession, while then-President of the Commission, Romano Prodi said: "Personally, I do not like that the Armenian-Turkish border gate is closed. I do not exclude that the issue of closed borders could be one of the preconditions for Turkey's membership.".
Turkey and others' arguments for entry
Turkey stresses its involvement in European history for about 500 years, mostly through the Ottoman Empire. It considers itself a European state. A prevalent point of view in Turkey, echoed by its prime minister Erdogan, is that the EU seems to be a Christian club, that the EU has anyway no right to consider itself that way, and that this causes reluctance to accept a Muslim state into the Union.
The Turks consider their state a strongly secular one, just as the EU defines itself (for example with the abandonment of the proposals to make reference to Europe's Christian heritage in the draft European Constitution).
Outside Turkey, Atlanticist countries such as the United Kingdom believe that Turkey, having been a staunch NATO ally, would help counteract France's usually independent stance towards the United States. Germany has long-lasting historical ties to Turkey and a considerable Turkish minority is supportive of Turkish membership.
Many in the West believe that Turkish membership would cement its alignment with the West. Turkey is a strong regional military power that could potentially be capable of intervening in hotspots like Syria, Iraq or Iran. Alternatively some believe that conditional Turkish membership would encourage moves towards more stable economic growth and democratic government. This could potentially provide a model of secular democracy for the rest of the middle east, comparable to the role played by Western Europe in the Cold War.
Likelihood of Accession
EU member states must unanimously agree to Turkish membersip for Turkish accession to be succesful. A number of nations could oppose it, notably Austria, who historically served as a bulwark for Christian Europe against the Ottoman Empire, and France, who is fearful of the prospect of another wave of Muslim immigrants (especially given the poor integration of its existing, mainly Arab, Muslim minority). President Chirac has already suggested that he may hold a referendum within France on the acceptance of Turkey.
Developments within Turkey could also freeze accession talks such as interference of the skeptical military in civilian rule or the rise to power of a hard-line Islamic or Nationalist government.