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Revision as of 15:18, 1 December 2004 by Wasabie (talk | contribs) (→Strength)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)| Military of the Republic of China | |
|---|---|
| Military manpower | |
| Military age | 19 years of age |
| Availability | males age 15-49: 6,554,373 (2000 est.) |
| Fit for military service | males age 5,017,643 (2000 est.) |
| Reaching military age annually | males: 201,413 (2000 est.) |
| Military expenditures | |
| Dollar figure | $8.042 billion (FY98/99) |
| Percent of GDP | 2.8% (FY98/99) |
The Republic of China (ROC) maintains a large military establishment, which will account for 16.8 % of the central budget in FY 2003. The military is historically continuous with the forces that fled to Taiwan with the Kuomintang at the end of the Chinese Civil War.
The military's current foremost mission is the defense of Taiwan, a defense primarily against the People's Republic of China, which is seen as the predominant threat and which has not renounced the use of force against the ROC. Until the 1970s, the military primary mission was to retake the Mainland.
Strength
The ROC's armed forces number approximately 300,000, and reserves reportedly total 3,870,000. Conscription remains universal for qualified males reaching age 18. Force streamlining programs under way since 1997 are combining redundant institutions and steadily reducing the military to 270,000 personnel by 2012. However, even then there would be compulsary basic training for all males reaching 18. As the size of the force decreases, Taipei intends to gradually expand the number of volunteer soldiers with the eventual goal of forming an all volunteer military. Two defense reform laws implemented in 2002 granted the civilian defense minister control over the entire military and expanded legislative oversight authority for the first time in history. Acquisitions over the next several years will emphasize modern C 4 ISR equipment that will vastly improve communications and data-sharing among services. These and other planned acquisitions will gradually shift the island’s strategic emphasis to offshore engagement of invading Chinese forces. It is hoped that this will serve to reduce civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure in the event of armed conflict.
The ROC's armed forces are equipped with weapons obtained primarily from the United States which has supplied it with 150 F-16A/B Block-20 MLU fighters and Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. The United States has also authorized the sale of eight diesel submarines although it is not clear if and how these subs are to be delivered since the United States does not build diesel submarines and other nations are unlikely to sell these weapons because of PRC pressure.
The ROC has also procured submarines from the Netherlands and 60 Mirage 2000-5Di/Ei fighters from France. These sales were made in the late 1980s and because of PRC pressure, future sales from Europe appear unlikely.
The military has also stressed military "self-reliance," which has resulted in the growth of indigenous military production in certain fields most notably the Indigenous Defense Fighter. The ROC's efforts at arms purchases have consistently been blocked by PRC. In addition the PRC has consistently attempted to block communications between the ROC military and other militaries and this has led some observers to fear that this is causing ROC's military to fall behind doctrinally.
Because of the historical legacy having once controlled Mainland China, the army has traditionally been the most important of Taiwan's military forces, although this has declined in recent years with the realization that the army's role in defending against a PRC invasion is limited. For the same reason, more emphasis is being placed on the development of the navy and air force.
A series of computer simulations conducted by the ROC Ministry of National Defense in 2004 predicted that, in the event of a full scale invasion by the PRC, Taipei would fall after almost three weeks. It also showed that the ROC Air Force would be eliminated by about the fifth day. However, the simulation results indicate that the PRC would lose about two-thirds of all its military forces in the process. The results of the simulation are hotly debated since they came at a time when the Legislative Yuan was debating one of the largest arms procurement packages in recent years.
Military branches
- Republic of China Army
- Republic of China Navy
- Republic of China Air Force
- Republic of China Coastal Patrol and Defense Command
- Republic of China Armed Forces Reserve Command
- Republic of China Combined Service Forces
Nuclear weapons program
The development of nuclear weapons by the ROC has been a contentious issue, as it is one of the reasons over which the PRC has pledged to attack Taiwan. The U.S., hoping the avoid escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, has continually opposed arming Taiwan with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the ROC adheres to the principles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has stated that it does not intend to produce nuclear weapons. Past nuclear research by the ROC makes it a 'threshold' nuclear state.
In 1967, a nuclear weapons program began under the auspices of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. The ROC was able to acquire nuclear technology from abroad (including a research reactor from Canada and low-grade plutonium from the United States) allegedly for a civilian energy system, but in actuality to develop fuel nuclear weapons.
After the International Atomic Energy Agency found evidence of the ROC's efforts to produce weapons-grade plutonium, Taipei agreed in September 1976 under U.S. pressure to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Though the nuclear reactor was soon shut down and the plutonium mostly returned to the U.S., work continued secretly.
A secret program was revealed again when Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, deputy director of nuclear research at INER, defected to the U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. General Hau Pei-tsun claimed that scientists in Taiwan had already produced a controlled nuclear reaction. Under pressure from the U.S., the program was halted yet again.
During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, then ROC President Lee Teng-hui proposed to reactivate the program, but was forced to back down a few days later after drawing intense criticism.