Holodomor genocide question

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Holodomor
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Holodomor Memorial Day National Museum of the Holodomor-Genocide
Historical backgroundFamines in the Soviet Union Soviet famine of 1932–33 Kazakhstan famine of 1932–1933 Soviet institutions All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Communist Party of Ukraine (Soviet Union) Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Secret police (OGPU) Policies First five-year plan Collectivization Dekulakization Law of Spikelets Reversal of Ukrainization policies Propaganda in the Soviet Union
Responsible partiesSoviet Union Joseph Stalin Vyacheslav Molotov Lazar Kaganovich Pavel Postyshev Stanislav Kosior Vlas Chubar
Investigation and understanding 1984 International Commission 1985 USA Commission Causes of the Holodomor Holodomor denial Genocide question Holodomor in modern politics
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The Holodomor genocide question refer to attempts to determine whether the Holodomor was an ethnic genocide against Ukrainians The famine killed about 4 to 10 million ethnic Ukrainians

Scholars continue to debate whether the Holodomor was (on one extreme) man-made, intentional, and genocidal and (on the other) nature-made, unintentional, and ethnicity-blind. Whether the Holodomor is a genocide is a significant issue in modern politics and there is no international consensus on whether Soviet policies would fall under the legal definition of genocide.

Scholarly debate

Robert Conquest

Historian Robert Conquest originally stated that "it certainly appears that a charge of genocide lies against the Soviet Union for its actions in the Ukraine" in his 1986 book, The Harvest of Sorrow. However, according to historians Stephen Wheatcroft and R. W. Davies, Conquest later wrote in a letter to them that "Stalin purposely inflicted the 1933 famine? No. What I argue is that with resulting famine imminent, he could have prevented it, but put "Soviet interest" other than feeding the starving first thus consciously abetting it."

Robert Davies

Professor of history R. W. Davies and his coauthor Wheatcroft conclude the famine was unintentional but man-made. They analyze previously unavailable archival data to demonstrate that a combination of rapid industrialization and two successive bad harvests (1931 and 1932) were the primary reason of the famine. However, Davies and Wheatcroft agree that Stalin's policies towards the peasants were brutal and ruthless and do not absolve Stalin from responsibility for the massive famine deaths. In their 2006 article, "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33", Davies and Wheatcroft:

e regard the policy of rapid industrialisation as an underlying cause of the agricultural troubles of the early 1930s, and we do not believe that the Chinese or NEP versions of industrialisation were viable in Soviet national and international circumstances.

In the 2016 version of their book, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933, Davies and Wheatcroft write:

In our own work we, like V.P. Kozlov, have found no evidence that the Soviet authorities undertook a programme of genocide against Ukraine. It is also certain that the statements by Ukrainian politicians and publicists about the deaths from famine in Ukraine are greatly exaggerated. A prominent Ukrainian historian, Stanislas Kul'chitskii, estimated deaths from famine in Ukraine at 3-3.5 million; and Ukrainian demographers estimate that excess deaths in Ukraine in the whole period 1926-39 (most of them during the famine) amounted to 3.5 million. Nevertheless, Ukrainian organisations continue, with some success, to urge Canadian schools to teach as a fact that excess deaths were 10 million during the 1932-33 famine. This does not mean that Ukraine did not suffer greatly during the famine. It is certainly the case that most of the famine deaths took place in Ukraine, and that the grain collection campaign was associated with the reversal of the previous policy of Ukrainisation.

Ellman critiqued Davies and Wheatcroft's view of intent as too narrow:

According to them , only taking an action whose sole objective is to cause deaths among the peasantry counts as intent. Taking an action with some other goal (e.g. exporting grain to import machinery) but which the actor certainly knows will also cause peasants to starve does not count as intentionally starving the peasants. However, this is an interpretation of 'intent' which flies in the face of the general legal interpretation.

Michael Ellman

Professor of economics Michael Ellman states that Stalin's behavior constituted crimes against humanity but not genocide. In his 2007 article "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 Revisited", he writes:

Team-Stalin’s behaviour in 1930 – 34 clearly constitutes a crime against humanity (or a series of crimes against humanity) as that is defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court article 7, subsection 1 (d) and (h) Was Team-Stalin also guilty of genocide? That depends on how ‘genocide’ is defined. The first physical element is the export of grain during a famine. The second physical element was the ban on migration from Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The third physical element is that ‘Stalin made no effort to secure grain assistance from abroad’ If the present author were a member of the jury trying this case he would support a verdict of not guilty (or possibly the Scottish verdict of not proven). The reasons for this are as follows. First, the three physical elements in the alleged crime can all be given non-genocidal interpretations. Secondly, the two mental elements are not unambiguous evidence of genocide. Suspicion of an ethnic group may lead to genocide, but by itself is not evidence of genocide. Hence it would seem that the necessary proof of specific intent is lacking.

Ellman asserts that if Stalin were guilty of genocide in the Holodomor, then "any other events of the 1917–53 era (e.g. the deportation of whole nationalities, and the 'national operations' of 1937–38) would also qualify as genocide, as would the acts of ." However, Ellman asserts that the "national operations" of the NKVD, particularly the "Polish operation", may qualify as genocide even under the strictest definition, but there has been no ruling on the matter.

Stephen Kotkin

Professor of history Stephen Kotkin states that documents prove that Stalin's policies caused the famine, but also prove the famine's deaths were unintentional. Extensive documents exist demonstrating Stalin's intent for other mass killings (eg, the Great Purge), but none exist for this one. Moreover, other documents demonstrate that Stalin repeatedly provided (ultimately insufficient) food aid. As he states in a 2017 interview:

We have an unbelievable number of documents showing Stalin committing intentional murder, with the Great Terror, as you alluded to earlier, and with other episodes. However, there is no documentation showing that he intended to starve Ukraine, or that he intended to starve the peasants. On the contrary, the documents that we do have on the famine show him reluctantly, belatedly releasing emergency food aid for the countryside, including Ukraine. Eight times during the period from 1931 to 1933, Stalin reduced the quotas of the amount of grain that Ukrainian peasants had to deliver, and/or supplied emergency need. These are the decisions that, once again, were made grudgingly, and they were insufficient—the emergency aid wasn’t enough. Many more people could have been saved, but Stalin refused to allow the famine to be publicly acknowledged. Had he not lied and forced everyone else to lie, denying the existence of a famine, they could have had international aid, which is what they got under Lenin, during their first famine in 1921-23. Stalin’s culpability here is clear, but the intentionality question is completely undermined by the documents on the record.

Stanislav Kulchytsky

Stanislav Kulchytsky and Hennadiy Yefimenko state that the famine mostly harmed people based on rural status, not ethnicity. The distribution of all-cause mortality among ethnicities in the Ukraine closely reflects the ethnic distribution of the rural population of Ukraine. The more-rural Moldavian, Polish, German, and Bulgarian populations of Ukraine suffered in the same proportion as the rural Ukrainian population, while the more-urban Russians and Jews survived the famine more successfully.

This becomes clear when comparing Kulchytsky's table on all-cause mortality by ethnicity and the 1926 population of the Ukraine SSR in the 1926 Census:

Nationality	1926 Census Count	1926 Census Proportion	1933 Mortality Count	1933 Mortality Proportion	Mortality Proportion / Census Proportion
Total	29018187	1.0000	1909000	1.000	1.0000
Ukrainians	23218860	0.8001	1552200	0.8131	1.0162
Russians	2677166	0.0923	85000	0.0445	0.4826
Jews	1574391	0.0543	27000	0.0141	0.2607
Poles	476435	0.0164	20700	0.0108	0.6604
Germans	393924	0.0136	13200	0.0069	0.5094
Moldavians	257794	0.0089	16100	0.0084	0.9493
Greeks	104666	0.0036	2500	0.0013	0.3631
Bulgarians	92078	0.0032	7700	0.0040	1.2712

Raphael Lemkin

Professor of law and coiner of the term "genocide" Raphael Lemkin states that the famine was man-made and the Holodomor was a genocide. In his 1953 article "Soviet Genocide in Ukraine", he states that the Holodomor was the "third prong" of Soviet "Russification" of Ukraine:

What I want to speak about is perhaps the classic example of Soviet genocide, its longest and broadest experiment in Russification — the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. The third prong of the Soviet plan was aimed at the farmers, the large mass of independent peasants who are the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, the national spirit, of Ukraine. As a Soviet politician Kosior declared in Izvestiia on 2 December 1933, ‘Ukrainian nationalism is our chief danger’, and it was to eliminate that nationalism, to establish the horrifying uniformity of the Soviet state that the Ukrainian peasantry was sacrificed. The crop that year was ample to feed the people and livestock of Ukraine, though it had fallen off somewhat from the previous year, a decrease probably due in large measure to the struggle over collectivization. But a famine was necessary for the Soviet and so they got one to order, by plan, through an unusually high grain allotment to the state as taxes.

Snyder states that, during the 1948 convention to define genocide, the Soviets "made sure that the term genocide, contrary to Lemkin's intentions, excluded political and economic groups." Thus the Ukrainian famine could be presented as "somehow less genocidal because it targeted a class, kulaks, as well as a nation, Ukraine."

James Mace

Professor of political science James Mace stated that the Holodomor was genocide. In his 1986 article "The man-made famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine", Mace writes:

For the Ukrainians the famine must be understood as the most terrible part of a consistent policy carried out against them: the destruction of their cultural and spiritual elite which began with the trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, the destruction of the official Ukrainian wing of the Communist Party, and the destruction of their social basis in the countryside. Against them the famine seems to have been designed as part of a campaign to destroy them as a political factor and as a social organism.

However, Bilinsky notes that Mace has been inconsistent on his position of whether the Holodomor is a genocide or not.

Norman Naimark

Professor of East European studies Norman Naimark states that the Holodomor's deaths were intentional and thus were genocide. In his 2010 book Stalin's Genocides, Naimark writes:

There is enough evidence − if not overwhelming evidence — to indicate that Stalin and his lieutenants knew that the widespread famine in the USSR in 1932–33 hit Ukraine particularly hard, and that they were ready to see millions of Ukrainian peasants die as a result. They made no efforts to provide relief; they prevented the peasants from seeking food themselves in the cities or elsewhere in the USSR; and they refused to relax restrictions on grain deliveries until it was too late. Stalin's hostility to the Ukrainians and their attempts to maintain their form of "home rule" as well as his anger that Ukrainian peasants resisted collectivization fueled the killer famine.

Steven Rosefielde

Professor of comparative economic systems Steven Rosefielde states that most deaths came from state action, not the poor harvest. In his 2009 book Red Holocaust, he writes that:

There was a famine (widespread health-impairing food shortage) 1932–33 caused by two bad harvests in 1931 and 1932 attributable partly to collectivization and partly to weather (although Kondrashin and Penner contest the explanation), but it didn’t cause the killings. Grain supplies were sufficient to sustain everyone if properly distributed. People died mostly of terror-starvation (excess grain exports, seizure of edibles from the starving, state refusal to provide emergency relief, bans on outmigration, and forced deportation to food-deficit locales), not poor harvests and routine administrative bungling.

Timothy Snyder

Professor of history Timothy Snyder stated that the starvation was "deliberate" and that several of the most lethal policies applied only, or mostly, to Ukraine. In his 2010 book, Bloodlands, Snyder stated:

In the waning weeks of 1932, facing no external security threat and no challenge from within, with no conceivable justification except to prove the inevitability of his rule, Stalin chose to kill millions of people in Soviet Ukraine. It was not food shortages but food distribution that killed millions in Soviet Ukraine, and it was Stalin who decided who was entitled to what.

In a 2017 Q&A, Snyder said that:

If you asked me, is the Ukrainian Holodomor genocide? Yes, in my view, it is. In my view, it meets the criteria of the law of genocide of 1948, the Convention – it meets the ideas that Raphael Lemkin laid down. Is Armenia genocide? Yes, I believe legally it very easily meets that qualification. I just don't think that means what people think it means. They think it means the attempt to kill every man woman and child, and the Armenian genocide is closer to the Holocaust than most other cases, right, but it's not the same thing.

Mark Tauger

Professor of history Mark Tauger states that the 1932 harvest was 30-40% smaller than official statistics and that the famine was "the result of a failure of economic policy", not "a 'successful' nationality policy against Ukrainians or other ethnic groups". In his 1991 article "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933", Tauger writes:

Western and even Soviet publications have described the 1933 famine in the Soviet Union as "man-made" or "artificial." Proponents of this interpretation argue, using official Soviet statistics, that the 1932 grain harvest, especially in Ukraine, was not abnormally low and would have fed the population. New Soviet archival data show that the 1932 harvest was much smaller than has been assumed and call for revision of the genocide interpretation. The low 1932 harvest worsened severe food shortages already widespread in the Soviet Union at least since 1931 and, despite sharply reduced grain exports, made famine likely if not inevitable in 1933. Thus for Ukraine, the official sown area (18.1 million hectares) reduced by the share of sown area actually harvested (93.8 percent) to a harvested area of 17 million hectares and multiplied by the average yield (approximately 5 centners) gives a total harvest of 8.5 million tons, or a little less than 60 percent of the official 14.6 million tons. A similar calculation of the sown area in the Soviet Union (99.7 million hectares), reduced by 7 percent (based on the TsUNKhU data) to 92.72 and multiplied by the NKZ average yield of 5.4 centners, gives a total Soviet harvest of 50.06 million tons, almost 30 percent below the official figure of 69.87 -- within the range that Schiller predicted.

Davies and Wheatcroft criticize Tauger's methodology in the 2004 edition of The Years of Hunger. Tauger criticized Davies and Wheatcroft's methodology in a 2006 article. In the 2009 edition of their book, Davies and Wheatcroft apologized for "an error in our calculations of the 1932 yield" but still conclude grain yield was "between 55 and 60 million tons, a low harvest, but substantially higher than Tauger's 50 million."

James Mace states that Tauger's argument "is not taken seriously by either Russians or Ukrainians who have studied the topic." David R. Marples states that Tauger is incorrect because there "is no such thing as a 'natural' famine, no matter the size of the harvest. A famine requires some form of state or human input."

Stephen Wheatcroft

Professor of Soviet economic studies Stephen G. Wheatcroft, a coauthor with Davies, states that that the Holodomor was primarily caused by economic reasons and that the Holodomor is best classified as "man-made on accident", not "man-made on purpose". In his 2018 article, "The Turn Away from Economic Explanations for Soviet Famines", Wheatcroft writes:

We all agreed that Stalin’s policy was brutal and ruthless and that its cover up was criminal, but we do not believe that it was done on purpose to kill people and cannot therefore be described as murder or genocide. Davies and I have (2004) produced the most detailed account of the grain crisis in these years, showing the uncertainties in the data and the mistakes carried out by a generally ill-informed, and excessively ambitious, government. The state showed no signs of a conscious attempt to kill lots of Ukrainians and belated attempts that sought to provide relief when it eventually saw the tragedy unfolding were evident. But in the following ten years there has been a revival of the ‘man-made on purpose’ side. This reflects both a reduced interest in understanding the economic history, and increased attempts by the Ukrainian government to classify the ‘famine as a genocide’. It is time to return to paying more attention to economic explanations.

Wheatcroft also critiques authors like Anne Applebaum for "ignor economic explanations":

The food problems that were explained by Alec Nove, Moshe Lewin, E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies, and which most specialists used to think were responsible for creating the circumstances in which extreme policies were formulated from 1927 to 1933, are largely ignored or misunderstood by Appelbaum and by many of the current generation of specialists, who see no role for economic history. Anne Appelbaum’s treatment of grain availability in Ukraine epitomises the dangers of misunderstanding the data. She uses the official grain production figures of the time (for 1930–2) as if they were reliable indicators of the scale of production. She then (for the years after 1933) switches to the official Soviet post 1954 series of data which were 20 to 30 per cent lower than those officially used at the time. This provides her with the startling, but unjustifiable, conclusion that the level of grain production in 1931 and 1932 was about the same as in 1933 and that therefore there was no grain shortage in these years. This is incorrect.

Non-scholarly debate

Despite lack of academic experience, the views of several non-scholars have gained notable attention.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

Author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn attacked Ukrainian politicians who categorized the Holodomor as genocide:

During a similar great famine in Ukraine and in the Kuban in 1932-1933, the Communist leadership (which, by the way, included quite a few Ukrainians), acted as silently and secretively as before. And no one was clever enough to realise that the fervent Communist and Komsomol activists were in fact planning the extermination of Ukrainians. This provocative outcry about "genocide" started to germinate decades later - first secretly, in the musty chauvinistic minds fiercely predisposed against the Moskals , and now it has been elevated to the top government level in contemporary Ukraine - does this mean that they have outdone even the Bolshevik propaganda mongers with their rakish juggling?

The Guardian writer Luke Harding states that Solzhenitsyn's "later statements have demonstrated an increasingly nationalist anti-western tone, and he appears to be a fan of President Vladimir Putin, who gave him a literary award last summer.

Douglas Tottle

Trade-union activist Douglas Tottle wrote Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard in 1987. Tottle claims that while there were severe economic hardships in Ukraine, the idea of the Holodomor was fabricated as propaganda by Nazi Germany and William Randolph Hearst to justify a German invasion.

References

Robert William Davies, Stephen G. Wheatcroft, Challenging Traditional Views of Russian History Palgrave Macmillan (2002) ISBN 978-0-333-75461-0, chapter The Soviet Famine of 1932–33 and the Crisis in Agriculture p. 69 et seq.
"Russian lawmakers reject Ukraine's view on Stalin-era famine". Russian News & Information Agency. 2008-04-02.
David R. Marples. Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine. p.50
Наливайченко назвал количество жертв голодомора в Украине [Nalyvaichenko called the number of victims of Holodomor in Ukraine] (in Russian). LB.ua. 14 January 2010. Retrieved 21 July 2012.
^ Davies, Robert; Wheatcroft, Stephen (2016). The years of hunger: Soviet agriculture, 1931–1933. Springer. ISBN 9780230273979.
"Resolution of the Kyiv Court of Appeal, 13 January 2010". Retrieved 2 February 2019. The Conclusions of the forensic court demographic expertise of the Institute of Demography and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, dated November 30, 2009, state that 3 million 941 thousand people died as a result of the genocide perpetrated in Ukraine. Of these, 205 thousand died in the period from February to December 1932; in 1933 - 3,598 thousand people died and in the first half of 1934 this number reached 138 thousand people;v. 330, p.p. 12-60
David Marples (30 November 2005). "The great famine debate goes on..." ExpressNews (University of Alberta), originally published in the Edmonton Journal. Archived from the original on 15 June 2008.
Kuchytsky, Stanislav (17 February 2007). Голодомор 1932 — 1933 гг. как геноцид: пробелы в доказательной базе [Holodomor 1932-1933 as genocide: gaps in the evidence]. Den (in Russian). Archived from the original on 9 February 2008. Retrieved 27 November 2008.
Conquest, Robert (1986). The harvest of sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195051803.
Wheatcroft, Stephen (June 2006). "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: A Reply to Ellman" (PDF). Europe-Asia Studies. 58 (4): 625–633 – via JSTOR.
Wheatcroft, Stephen G.; Davies, R. W. (2016). The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 441. ISBN 9780230273979.
Davies, Robert; Wheatcroft, Stephen (June 2006). "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: A Reply to Ellman". Europe-Asia Studies. 58 (4): 625–633. doi:10.1080/09668130600652217.
^ Ellman, Michael (June 2007). "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 Revisited". Europe-Asia Studies. 59 (4). Routledge. doi:10.1080/09668130701291899.
Kotkin, Stephen (November 8, 2017). "Terrible Talent: Studying Stalin". The American Interest (Interview). Interviewed by Richard Aldous.
Kulchytsky, Stanislav; Yefimenko, Hennadiy (2003). Демографічні наслідки голодомору 1933 р. в Україні. Всесоюзний перепис 1937 р. в Україні: документи та матеріали [Demographic consequences of the 1933 Holodomor in Ukraine. The all-Union census of 1937 in Ukraine: Documents and Materials]. Kiev: Institute of History. ISBN 978-966-02-3014-9. Archived (PDF) from the original on 31 October 2019. Retrieved 6 November 2019. Статистичні таблиці, створювані на основі даних, що збиралися органами ЗАГС, непереконливі, коли йдеться про кількість жертв голоду. Проте вони дають відповідь на питання про національну приналежність померлих. Статистика смертності в національному розрізі за 1933 р. виглядає таким чином: Аналізуючи цю таблицю, слід пам'ятати, що в ній подається як природна смертність, так і смертність від толоду. Спрямований проти українського села терор голодом захопив усіх, хто проживав у ньому. У формах звітності за національною ознакою була зареєстрована більша кількість смертей, ніж у формах природного руху (1850,3 тис. чоловік). Частка українців серед загиблих приблизно відповідає їх питомій вазі у сільському населенні республіки. Молдавське, польське, німецьке і болгарське населення майже повністю проживало в селах. Тому воно постраждало від голоду в таких же пропорціях, як українці. Євреї мешкали більшою частиною у містах. Тому смертність серед них мало відрізнялася від нормальної. Переважна більшість росіян теж проживала в містах. Серед порівняно нечисленного населення в російських селах зареєстрована основна частина померлих. Треба прийняти до уваги, що облік смертності в містах майже не зазнав деформацій і тому був відносно повним. Навпаки, в селах органи ЗАГС спромоглися зареєструвати менше половини смертних випадків. Все це вказує на те, що терор голодом цілив своїм вістрям не в етнічних українців, а в сільське населення.
Lemkin, Raphael (2008) . "Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine" (PDF). In Luciuk, Lubomyr; Grekul, Lisa (eds.). Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine. Kashtan Press. ISBN 978-1896354330.
^ Snyder, Timothy (2010). Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-00239-9.
Mace, James (1986). "The man-made famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine". In Serbyn, Roman; Krawchenko, Bohdan (eds.). Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. ISBN 9780092862434.
Bilinsky, Yaroslav (1999). "Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?". Journal of Genocide Research. 1 (2): 147–156. doi:10.1080/14623529908413948.
Naimark, Norman (2010). Stalin's Genocides (Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity). Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-14784-0.
Rosefielde, Steven (2009). Red Holocaust. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-77757-5.
Snyder, Timothy (6 April 2017). The Politics of Mass Killing: Past and Present (Speech). 15th Annual Arsham and Charlotte Ohanessian Lecture and Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies Symposium Keynote Address. University of Minnesota College of Liberal Arts.
Tauger, Mark (1991). "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933". Slavic Review. 50 (1): 70–89. doi:10.2307/2500600. JSTOR 2500600.
Davies, Robert; Wheatcroft, Stephen (2004). The years of hunger: Soviet agriculture, 1931–1933. Vol. 5. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780333311073.
Wheatcroft, Stephen (2004). "Towards explaining Soviet famine of 1931-3: Political and natural factors in perspective". 12 (2). Food and Foodways: 107–136. doi:10.1080/07409710490491447. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
Tauger, Mark (2006). "Arguing from errors: On certain issues in Robert Davies' and Stephen Wheatcroft's analysis of the 1932 Soviet grain harvest and the Great Soviet famine of 1931-1933". 58 (6). Europe-Asia Studies: 975. doi:10.1080/09668130600831282. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
Davies, Robert; Wheatcroft, Stephen (2009). The years of hunger: Soviet agriculture, 1931–1933. Vol. 5. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780333311073.
Mace, James (October 21, 2003). "Intellectual Europe on Ukrainian Genocide". The Day. Archived from the original on January 5, 2012.
Marples, David (July 14, 2002). "Analysis: Debating the undebatable? Ukraine Famine of 1932-1933". The Ukrainian Weekly. Vol. LXX, no. 28.
^ Wheatcroft, Stephen (2018). "The Turn Away from Economic Explanations for Soviet Famines". Contemporary European History. 27 (3): 465–469. doi:10.1017/S0960777318000358.
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr (April 3, 2008). "Swallowing shameless lies". The Guardian.
Harding, Luke (April 2, 2008). "Solzhenitsyn attacks Bush over Ukraine". The Guardian.
Tottle, Douglas (1987). Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: the Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard. Toronto: Progress Books. ISBN 978-0-919396-51-7.

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