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Lord's Resistance Army insurgency

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The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), formed in 1987, is a rebel paramilitary group operating in northern Uganda, and is currently engaged in an armed conflict against the Ugandan government. It is led by Joseph Kony, who proclaims himself a spirit medium and apparently wishes to establish a state based on his unique interpretation of Biblical millenarianism. The rebels have been accused of many atrocities in the area, including kidnapping children to train as soldiers or use as sex slaves. Enforced prostitution and enlisting children under the age of 15 into armed groups are both war crimes. The group abducts its members primarily from the Acholi people, but it lacks widespread support among the Acholis, who have been the victims of many of its tactics. The insurgency has been mainly contained to the region known as Acholiland, consisting of the districts of Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader, though the most recent violence has overflowed into other districts, including Lira, Moyo and Adjumani.

Approximately 1.5 million civilians are currently internally displaced persons (IDPs), often in camps clumped around towns and trading centers. It is estimated that nearly 9000 children were abducted by the LRA between June 2002 and May 2003, and fear of continuing LRA attacks and abductions created a widespread refugee problem. Thousands of families had to leave their towns and villages for the safety of larger settlements, where they slept on street corners and open spaces. Despite these nocturnal and longer term migrations, the plight of the Acholi people received little media coverage in the developed world, prior to November 2003, nor was the subject discussed by the United Nations. A ceasefire called in November 2004 to hold peace talks collapsed on 31 December 2004. While the LRA now appears to consist of less than two thousand combatants that are under intense pressure from the Ugandan military, the government has been unable to end the insurgency so far.

Kitgum, Gulu and Pader encompass most Acholi

The LRA has been known by a number of different names, including The Lord's Army (1987-8) and the Uganda Peoples’ Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA) (1988-1992) before settling on the current name in 1992. Some academics have included the LRA under the rubric "Lakwena Part Two". For simplicity's sake, this article will refer to all of these various manifestations as "The Lord's Resistance Army".

The origins of the LRA (January 1986 - June 1988)

The overthrow of President Tito Okello, an ethnic Acholi, by the National Resistance Army (NRA) of Yoweri Museveni, from the southwest of Uganda, in January 1986 marked a period of intense turmoil. The Acholi feared the loss of their traditional dominance of the national military, and retribution for the brutal counter-insurgency, particularly the actions of the army in the Luwero Triangle.

In January 1987 Joseph Kony made his first appearance as a spirit medium. Few took notice as numerous mediums claiming to be the torch-bearers of a holy war emerged after the initial success of the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Auma. Throughout 1987, Kony gained military strength by absorbing small Uganda People's Democratic Army units and through violent competition with other Acholi rebel groups for resources and fighters. In late 1987, he agreed to join the UPDA in attacking Gulu Town, but then betrayed them by attacking the UPDA headquarters in retaliation for UPDA attempts to steal food being delivered by Kony’s supporters.

Around this time, Kony changed the name of his group to The Lord's Army, reflecting the increased importance he placed on the religious aspects of his insurgency. At the beginning of 1988, a prominent ex-soldier, Otunu Lukonyomoi, joined LRA, where he was gained popularity for his high moral standards for the conduct of LRA rebels, especially in their treatment of civilians. This resulted in a rivalry with Kony, but they managed to reconcile before it led to a split in the organization.

In June 1988, when it became clear that the Uganda People's Democratic Army would sign a peace accord with the National Resistance Army, Joseph Kony wrote a letter to an NRA officer requesting a meeting, but was attacked before talks could be held, allegedly due to a miscommunication between NRA units. The NRA leadership also found the mysticism of the LRA to be baffling. The end result was that Kony's attempt to engage in talks with the government died stillborn.

A small domestic insurgency (June 1988 - March 1994)

The June 1988 peace accord between the UPDA and the NRA, as well as the defeat the year before of the Holy Spirit Movement, left the group led by Joseph Kony as the only significant rebel force operating in Acholiland. The former commander of the UPDA, Odong Latek, and some of his soldiers refused to accept the accord and joined the LRA. Odong Latek gained a lot of influence in the organization, and convinced Kony to adopt conventional guerilla tactics. Prior to this, LRA forces normally attacked in a cross-shaped formation with designated persons sprinkling holy water, much like the Holy Spirit Movement. Tactics since consist primarily of surprise attacks on “soft targets,” (a term that is often used as a euphemism for civilian targets) such as villages, by highly mobile groups of 15 that split into groups of three to six to disperse after the attack. The changes were reflected in the adoption of yet another organizational name, the Uganda Peoples’ Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA). In October 1988, the highly-respected Otunu Lukonyomoi was killed in an NRA ambush, following which a number of rebels left to join the NRA, greatly weakening the LRA’s fighting strength.

In mid-1988, President Museveni created the position of “Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda, Resident in Gulu,” to which he assigned the Acholi Betty Oyella Bigombe, who was tasked with convincing insurgents to abandon their struggle. Protests at the connotation of the word “pacification” led to the revision of the title to “Minister of State in the Office of the Prime Minister, Resident in Northern Uganda.” Nevertheless, in late 1988 the LRA gave the NRA a number of defeats. Until 1991 the LRA continued to operate in small bands as a classic insurgency and raided the populace for the supplies, which were carried away by villagers who were abducted for short periods. The fact that some units of NRA soldiers were known for their brutal actions ensured that the LRA were given at least passive support by segments of the population.

Operation North (1991-1992)

March 1991 saw the start of a massive government attempt to destroy the LRA, later known as “Operation North.” The whole of Northern Uganda was locked down and all humanitarian organizations were forced to leave in preparation for counter-insurgency operations. Operation North combined efforts to destroy the combatants while cutting away its roots of support among the population through heavy-handed tactics, including arbitrary arrests, torture and extralegal executions. While Operation North was prompted partially by the activities of the LRA, the World Bank had made a loan available for reconstruction of Northern infrastructure, which could not be implemented in an insecure environment.

As part of Operation North, Minister Bigombe created “Arrow Groups”, mostly armed with bows and arrows, as a form of local community defense. As the LRA was armed with modern weaponry, the bow-and-arrow groups were hopelessly overpowered. Nevertheless, the creation of the Arrow Groups angered Kony, who began to feel that he no longer had the support of the population, and the LRA mutilated numerous Acholi who they believed to be government supporters, cutting off their hands, noses and ears, padlocking their mouths shut through holes cut in their lips, or simply hacking them to death with machetes. While the Arrow Group strategy, as well as Operation North was a whole, was a failure, the LRA reaction caused many Acholi to finally turn against the insurgency, though this was tempered by the deep-seated antagonism towards the occupying government forces.

The Bigombe talks (1993-1994)

After the failure of Operation North, Minister Bigombe on her own accord initiated contact with Joseph Kony through an LRA sympathizer in June 1993. This led to the most promising diplomatic efforts of the entire insurgency. Following the reply of Kony that he would be willing to talk, Bigombe informed the military and President Yoweri Museveni, who approved further negotiations though he stated that military operations would continue.

In November 1993, the first face-to-face meeting between representatives of the LRA and government took place under an agreed ceasefire at Pagik in Gulu District. Bigombe represented the government and brought several Acholi elders as well as the commander of the Fourth Division, Col. Samuel Wasswa, which was responsible for military operations in the North, while the LRA sent members of Kony’s inner circle. The LRA asked for a general amnesty for their combatants and stated that they would not surrender, but were willing to "return home." Bigombe reassured the LRA that they would not be treated as a vanquished foe and Wasswa agreed to a cease-fire to allow the negotiations to continue.

However, several influential officers within the NRA felt that the government was caving in to rebel demands. Bigombe’s immediate superior, the Prime Minister, refused to support the peace process publicly or logistically, possibly because of a struggle over who would claim credit for a final peace deal. The ambiguous stance of the senior political leadership was also problematic. At a second meeting on 10 January 1994, Kony himself arrived and gave a four-hour speech in which he blamed the Acholis as "responsible for the war that had backfired with terrible results that everyone now blamed Kony for,” after which Bigombe and Kony held one-on-one talks in which he asked for six months to regroup his troops.

The Bigombe talks collapse (February 1994)

This demand for six months was widely perceived as excessive. It was later revealed that the military had learned that Kony was negotiating with the Sudanese government for support while talking to Bigombe, and felt that Kony was simply trying to buy time. Regardless, the sight of LRA combatants traveling openly and peacefully had created an expectation among the Acholi that a final peace was at hand. However by early February the tone of the negotiations was growing increasingly acrimonious as the LRA negotiating team felt that the NRA officers were acting arrogantly as victors accepting terms from a defeated foe, contrary to the understanding reached at the first meeting, and traded harsh words over the negotiating table. Bigombe apparently also felt caught between her dual role as government representative and chief mediator, and believed that she was not received adequate support from the government as a whole. Following a meeting on 2 February the LRA broke off negotiations stating that they felt that the NRA was trying to entrap them. Four days later, President Yoweri Museveni spoke to a crowd in Gulu and announced a seven-day deadline for the LRA to surrender; otherwise the government would pursue a military solution. Whatever the reason, and regardless of whether or not the LRA was negotiating in good faith, this ultimatum irrevocably scuttled the talks.

An international conflict (March 1994 - March 2002)

Two weeks after Museveni delivered his ultimatum, LRA fighters were reported to have crossed the border and established bases in southern Sudan. The end of the Bigombe initiatives and the start of a flow of supplies from, and granting of sanctuary by, the Khartoum government marks a fundamental shift in the character of the Lord's Resistance Army, which is estimated to have consisted of 3000-4000 combatants at this time. This is the turning point in which the LRA becomes essentially the organization that operates today.

Sudanese support expands the scale of the conflict

Prior to Sudanese support in response to Ugandan support for the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) operating in southern Sudan, the LRA could be treated as a minor irritant in the outskirts of the country. Now it also had to be considered a proxy force of the Khartoum government. Sudanese support allowed the LRA to increase the intensity of its operations beyond the level it was previously capable of. Not only was a safe haven granted from which the LRA could launch attacks into Uganda, but Sudan also gave a large amount of arms, ammunition, land mines and other supplies. In return, the LRA was expected to deny territory to the SPLA and periodically participate in joint operations with the Sudanese army. The increased intensity of attacks through proxy forces led Uganda and Sudan to the brink of open hostilities in 1995.

Acholi civilians as targets

Just as important as the change in the material circumstances of the LRA, was the change in how the LRA perceived the conflict. Having become convinced that the Acholi were now collaborating with the Museveni government, Kony began to target the civilians using his increased military strength. Mutilations such as those carried out in the wake of the Arrow Group strategy became commonplace, and 1994 saw the first mass forced abduction of children and young people. Other militant groups, such as the West Nile Bank Front, joined the LRA in their goals and tactics of abductions and raids. The strategy of forced recruitment was prompted by the lack of new volunteers to continue the conflict, and the fact that the young could be indoctrinated to support the LRA much more easily than adults. Furthermore, the LRA no longer had to spend much of its energies in the search for basic supplies now that they were supported by Sudan. The moral rationale was that since the Acholi adults had proven themselves untrustworthy, the LRA must cleanse the land of them and create a new society with the children. This philosophical approach, similar to that taken by the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, has been referred to as "auto-genocide."

The attacks on civilians have at least two strategic objectives. First, to deny the government information about its movements by forcing the rural population to flee. Second, to gather resources from the looted villages. Third and most bizarrely, to show the populace that the government is unable or unwilling to provide protection, and thus encourage people to support to the LRA. While the lack of security has certainly embittered many Acholi, this has not translated into support for the LRA forces that are attacking them.

"Protected villages" created in 1996

The creation of government ‘protected villages beginning in 1996 further deepened the antagonistic attitude that many Acholi have toward the government. While many Acholi were already displaced by the conflict, they resented being ordered into camps. A strategy of resettlement, or ‘villagization’ is a common anti-insurgent technique, used extensively by the United States throughout the Indian Wars to isolate Native Americans in reservations. It is intended to free up troops that would otherwise be attempting to defend innumerable small communities and to deny the rebels access to resources. Nevertheless, the population continues to be attacked by the LRA even within the ‘protected camps,’ which are crowded, unsanitary, miserable places to live.

A culture of peace and a gradual subsiding

The bloodshed in 1995-1996 appears to have finally convinced the population at large that a negotiated solution was the only acceptable option, what one writer calls the emergence of “a culture of peace.” As most of the LRA combatants are abducted children, a military solution is widely seen by the Acholi as a massacre of victims, and government attempts to destroy the rebels is viewed as another cause for grievance by the Acholi. The moral ambiguity of this situation, in which abducted young rebels are both the victims and perpetrators of brutal acts, is vital in understanding the current conflict.

Meanwhile, in 1997 the Sudanese government of the National Islamic Front had begun to back away from its previous hard-line stance. This was prompted by the leadership of new President Omar al-Bashir, as well as a more pro-active stance by the U.S. against the National Islamic Front government. U.S. pressure on and observation of Sudan drastically intensified following the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by al-Qaeda operatives thought to have links to Sudan. Over the next several years, Khartoum is believed to have substantially curtailed aid to the LRA. In 1999 the Carter Center mediated the Nairobi Accord between Uganda and Sudan, which restored diplomatic relations in 2001.

In 2000, the Parliament of Uganda passed the Amnesty Act, which pardons rebels who give up, renounce violence, and report themselves to the Amnesty Commission. While it did not end the insurgency, it did prove effective enough, especially in some of the other regions of the country that had experienced rebellion, to be maintained.

The sudden appearance of LRA units in June 2001 who contacted local government officials to discuss the possibility of dialogue created a flurry of speculation that the LRA was tiring of their insurgency. The Uganda People's Defense Force—the renamed NRA— created a demilitarized zone for the talks, a measure that apparently had the approval of President Museveni. While the talks eventually lost impetus and the LRA units returned to Sudan, analysts believe that they were initiated at the behest of Kony and indicated the most promising diplomatic environment since the collapse of the Bigombe talks in 1994.

Following the al-Qaeda attacks upon the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the U.S. on 11 September 2001, the relationship between Sudan and Uganda abruptly changed. The NIF government was anxious to avoid any blame that may be attached to them for their offering of sanctuary to al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden for several years in the 1990s. Also, following the classifying of the LRA as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department, it agreed to stop supplying aid to the LRA.

Cross-border tensions were dialed down as support to proxy forces fell and the LRA appeared to have settled into their camps and only periodically crossed the border. Some of the hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced by the war began to return to their homes and people began to talk openly of the day when the “protected camps” would be disbanded.

The insurgency flares (March 2002 - ongoing)

Areas affected by the LRA insurgency after "Operation Iron Fist"

In March 2002, the Uganda People's Defense Force launched a massive military offensive, named “Operation Iron Fist” against the LRA bases in southern Sudan. The National Islamic Front government agreed to the entry of the Ugandan military into its borders, albeit below the so-called "red line" consisting of the Juba-Torit highway, as a means to broadcast its new status as an engaged member of the international community. This agreement, coupled with the return of forces that had been deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo upon the official end of the Second Congo War, created what the Ugandan government felt was an ideal situation in which to end a conflict that had become both an embarrassment and political liability.

This attempt at a heroic finish to the conflict failed in a spectacular manner. After several months of uncertainty, LRA forces began crossing back into Uganda and carrying out attacks on a scale and of a brutality not seen since 1995-1996. The LRA then began to move into areas outside of Acholiland, apparently in search of support. However, when the local populace began to resist, the LRA extended its combat operations, resulting in widespread displacement and suffering in regions that had never previously been touched by the insurgency. Part of the failure of Operation Iron Fist is undoubtedly due to the large stockpile of supplies that the LRA had accumulated during the period that it was supported by the Sudanese government. However, it also appears that the government failed to completely destroy all of the LRA positions in Sudan, resulting in a fluid low-intensity conflict affecting a significant area of both southern Sudan and northern Uganda. There has also been troubling reports that at least some elements in the Sudanese government are continuing to provide supplies to the LRA, which would negate predictions of its imminent destruction which are predicated on its supposed isolation.

The former head of the UPDF, Maj. Gen. James Kazini estimated LRA strength at 1,500 in May 2002. The UPDF spokesman, Maj. Shaban Bantariza, put the figure at 900 fighters in mid-2003. These numbers are not necessarily contradictory if the first number includes non-combatants such as abducted "wives" and children too young to handle weapons. However, Human Rights Watch in a July 2003 report put the figure at 4,500. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in its 2002/03 report said LRA has 1,500 fighters. IISS added, however, that only 200 of the LRA troops are inside Uganda, the rest are in Sudan.

Half-hearted peace initiatives (Early 2003)

In the spring of 2003, there were several diplomatic initiatives that died stillborn. Diplomatic efforts between the two sides have historically failed because of an inability for the LRA to define an agenda and negotiate terms credibly, while the government has shown a predilection for abandoning diplomatic efforts in favor of military solutions. However the repeated failed attempts at peace talks appear to have poisoned the relationship between the two sides. The government, using the simultaneous negotiations by the LRA with both Bigombe and Sudan in 1994 as a baseline for predicted behavior, has acted as if any LRA proposal is an attempt to achieve temporary military respite. Meanwhile, the LRA, on the basis of a number of occasions where units in a declared ceasefire zone were attacked, believes that the government is not credible. The UPDF has declared that it has learned from past mistakes and is now certain to defeat the LRA. These proclamations have been made before, and many observers are skeptical.

Armed local militias created

The Ugandan army has struggled to defend many towns and villages from LRA attacks, and the Government has now started to foster and arm Acholi militias against the LRA. Although the militias are called "Arrow Groups", the government apparently learned a lesson from the Arrow Group fiasco in the early 1990s and has armed these militia with assault rifles. Some observers fear that the introduction of more weapons in north Uganda will create more problems in the longer term.

International organizations become involved

In December 2003, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni referred the LRA to the International Criminal Court to determine if the LRA is guilty of international war crimes and ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo formally opened an investigation in January 2004. Some local Ugandan groups have criticized this move, as an ICC conviction of Joseph Kony and his senior lieutenants is seen to make a negotiated end to the conflict nearly impossible. In November 2004, President Yoweri Museveni was reported to be exploring ways to withdraw the referral made to the International Criminal Court, which was seen as a complication to what appears to be a significant movement towards a negotiated peace. The human rights group Amnesty International protested the move.

On 14 April 2004, the UN Security Council condemned the atrocities committed by the LRA and expressed concern about the plight of the displaced children. This followed a field visit to Uganda in November 2003 by UN under secretary general for humanitarian affairs Jan Egeland who had stated, "I cannot find any other part of the world that is having an emergency on the scale of Uganda, that is getting such little international attention."

Late-2004 peace talks fail again (15 November - 31 December 2004)

From the middle of 2004 on, rebel activity dropped markedly under intense military pressure and there were reports of significant numbers of LRA rebels taking advantage of the government Amnesty Act. On 15 November 2004 the government declared a unilateral seven day ceasefire, subsequently extended, during which substantial numbers of rebels gathered in government-designated zones to discuss a government proposal from August 2002, where Museveni offered to talk to the LRA, saying his government would, under certain conditions, halt operations against the LRA and open talks to end the conflict. These steps were taken apparently after numerous LRA commanders contacted either the government or third parties and expressed a willingness to end the conflict. Senior LRA commander Brigadier Sam Kolo has stated that Joseph Kony has granted him the authority to negotiate on behalf of the rebels. If talks progressed, Betty Bigombe, who currently works for the World Bank, was expected to be named lead mediator.

In mid December 2004 a number of civilians were killed by bands of LRA operating near the Sudanese town of Juba, who have purportedly lost contact with their chain of command under the ongoing government assault. Also, the Ugandan government reported that it had attacked a band led by Joseph Kony himself outside of the declared cease-fire zones, nearly killing him. Sam Kolo has stated that the continued government attacks make it difficult to establish a minimal basis of trust to progress with the peace talks.

On 31 December 2004, the extended 47-day truce expired without an agreement. On 1 January 2005, rebels attacked an army supply truck in Alero, Gulu. UPDF spokesperson Maj. Shaban Bantariza stated that the LRA had used the time to regroup. In response, President Museveni declared that military "operations will not cease ever again until the Kony group irreversibly commit themselves to come out of the bush." Stating that negotiating attempts would continue, Museveni predicted, "The combination of both the military option and dialogue will bring peace in northern Uganda."

Prominent incidents

Attacks, raids and abductions by the Lord's Resistance Army are a commonplace occurrence in northern Uganda, and rarely are reported outside the country. During periods of heightened activity, such as 1996-7 and 2002-4, murders and abductions are reported almost daily. While it would be impractical to list every such attack (and it is unlikely that every incident has been documented), the following is a partial list of incidents that are exceptional either because of the large number of victims, the identity of the victims, or the circumstances of the incident.

Atiak massacre (22 April 1995)
Atiak Trading Center in northern Gulu attacked and the Local Defense Forces routed. Over the course of the day between 170 and 220 civilians killed without resistance from victims or governnment forces.
Helicopter gunship incident (31 August 1995)
Thirteen civilians, some with their hands tied behind their backs, killed in a government gunship attack on an LRA column near Lokung, northwest Kitgum. Sixteen LRA combatants killed. Critics charge reckless disregard for abductee lives; the government claims the killing were accidental and unintentional.
Karuma/Pakwach convoy attack (8 March 1996)
A civilian convoy of over 20 vehicles with a military escort of fourteen soldiers traveling west on the Karuma-Pakwach road ambushed. Between 50 and 110 civilians killed, most after the escort had been overcome. Some executed; others killed after they refused to exit their buses and explosives were thrown inside.
Death of two Acholi elders (8 June 1996)
Mr. Okot Ogony of Cwero, eastern Gulu, Chairman of the Peace Commission of the Council of Acholi Chiefs, and Mr. Olanya Lacony, a respected elder from Kac-Goma, southwestern Gulu, murdered near Cwero in still unexplained circumstances. They were the leaders of a local initiative to restart the peace talks that had collapsed in February 1994 and had the approval of the President of Uganda and an invitation from the LRA. Some blame the LRA while others point to several NRA officers.
Achol-pi Refugee Settlement massacre (13-14 July 1996)
Three separate attacks upon a settlement of Sudanese refugees in southern Kitgum (now Pader District) administered by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Approximately 100 refugees killed.
Gulu Town mob killings (16 August 1996)
Four LRA suspects turned over to an Acholi mob that beat them to death. The suspects were under government custody and are reported to have been turned over to the mob in the presence of senior Uganda Fourth Division officers.
St. Mary's College/Aboke abductions (10 October 1996)
At about 2AM about 200 armed men broke into St. Mary's College in Aboke, northern Apac District, and abducted 152 secondary school girls between 13 and 16 years of age before leaving at about 5 AM. At 7 AM, a nun from the college pursued the rebels and negotiated the release of 109 of the girls.
Lokung/Palabek massacre (7-12 January 1997)
Up to 412 civilians killed in and around the subcounties of Lokung and Palabek in northwest Kitgum. There were no opposing forces and most victims were bludgeoned or hacked to death.
Achol-pi Refugee Settlement attacked (5 August 2002)
Twenty refugees killed in the second major attack on the settlement in central Pader District. The 24,000 Sudanese refugees are transferred elsewhere and the settlement disbanded.
Barlonyo massacre (21 February 2004)
Over 200 civilians at a IDP camp in Barlonyo near Lira Town murdered. (Photos)
Lira riots (25 February 2004)
Street protests and riots, apparently protesting the government's failure to adequately protect civilians, cause at least nine deaths. The violence seems to have been motivated to some degree by animosity towards the Acholi, who many Langi collectively blame for the LRA insurgency. At the same time, the army announced it had killed 21 LRA members in battle.
IDP camp fires (21-23 January 2005)
A series of fires ravaged dry and cramped IDP camps. A fire in Agweng camp in northern Lira district, with 26,000 residents, killed six and left ten thousand homeless on 21 January. The next day 278 homes were burnt down in Apac district's Abok camp. On Sunday, 23 January a fire at Acet camp in Gulu District affected six of seven zones, killing three and burning 4000 huts, leaving 20,000 homeless. Donor agencies noted that paying for fire prevention measures would be cheaper than emergency relief supplies.

Links and references

References

  • Behrend, H. (M. Cohen, trans.) Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda, 1985-97, James Currey, 2000. ISBN 0821413112. (Originally published as Behrend, H. 1993. Alice und die Geister: Krieg in Norden Uganda. Trickster, Munich.)
    • "War in Northern Uganda: The Holy Spirit Movements of Alice Lakwena, Severino Lukoya and Joseph Kony (1986-1997)", in Clapham, C. ed. African Guerillas. James Currey, Oxford, 1998.
  • Doom, R. and K. Vlassenroot. "Kony's message: a new koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," African Affairs 98 (390) 1999.
  • Gingyera-Pincywa, A.G. "Is there a Northern Question?" in K. Rupesinghe, ed. Conflict Resolution in Uganda, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1989.
  • Jackson, P. "The March of the Lord's Resistance Army: Greed or Grievance in Northern Uganda?" Small Wars and Insurgencies 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 29-52.
  • Ofcansky, T. "Warfare and Instability Along the Sudan-Uganda Border: A Look at the Twentieth Century" in Spaulding, J. and S. Beswick, eds. White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala. Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, NJ: 195-210, 2000.
  • Ward, K. "'The Armies of the Lord': Christianity, Rebels and the State in Northern Uganda, 1986-1999", Journal of Religion in Africa 31 (2), 2001.

External links

The University of British Columbia has a Human Security in Northern Uganda project site with extensive links from before mid-2004

Reports and news articles (chronological)

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