Misplaced Pages

Part of a series on
War (outline)
History Prehistoric Ancient Post-classical castles Early modern military revolution pike and shot napoleonic warfare Late modern industrial warfare fourth-gen warfare
Military Organization Command and control Defense ministry Army Navy Air force Marines Coast guard Space force Reserves Ranks Specialties: Staff Engineers Intel Recon Medical Police Diving Pilot Land units: Infantry Armor Cavalry Artillery Special forces Signal corps Naval units: Warships Submarines Aircraft carriers Landing craft Auxiliary ships Air units: Fighters Bombers Command Close air support Electronic-warfare Reconnaissance Combat systems: Fire-control system Fire-control radar Director (military) Combat information center Sonar Radar Historical: Ship gun fire-control Gun data computer Torpedo data computer Development: Basic training Military manoeuvrers Combat training
Battlespace Aerospace Aerial Airborne Space Land Cold-region Desert Fortification Jungle Mountain Urban Subterranean Tunnel Sea Amphibious Blue Brown Green Surface Underwater Seabed Cyber Information
Weapons Air defence Armor Artillery Barrage Biological Camouflage Cavalry Horses Air cavalry Chemical Combined arms Conventional Cyber Denial Disinformation Drone / Robot Electromagnetic Infantry Loitering Missile Music Nuclear Psychological Radiological Submarine Unconventional
TacticsList of military tactics Aerial Airlift Air assault Airbridge Airdrop Anti-aircraft Anti-sub Anti-tank Battle Cavalry Charge Counterattack Counterinsurgency Convoy Defeat in detail Foxhole Drone Envelopment Formation Guerrilla Naval Rapid dominance Encirclement Investment Siege Swarm Screen Tactical objective Target saturation Trench Withdrawal
Operational Military operation Special Operations research Blitzkrieg Expeditionary Deep operation Maneuver Operational manoeuvre group Raid Covert Stay-behind
StrategyList of military strategies and concepts Military campaign Anti-access Attrition Commerce raiding Counter-offensive Culminating Defence in depth Fabian Empty fort Mosaic Deception Defensive Depth Goal Nuclear Naval Offensive Scorched earth
Grand strategy Asymmetric Blockade Broken-backed Class Cold war Colonial Conquest Containment Divide and conquer Economic Endemic Fleet in being Irregular Liberation Limited Network-centric New generation Perpetual Political Princely Proxy Religious Resource Strategic Succession Technology Theater Total war World war
Administrative Branch Policy Staff Training Service Sociology
Organization Area of responsibility Chain of command Command and control Doctrine Order of battle Principles of war Economy of force Medicine Engineers Intelligence Ranks Technology and equipment
Personnel Recruitment Conscription Mobilization Training Specialism Soldier Morale Volunteer Women Children Transgender Harassment Conscientious objector Counter-recruitment
Logistics History War economy Arms industry Materiel Supply-chain management Military–industrial complex Base MOB FOB Outpost
Science Power projection Loss-of-strength gradient Lanchester's laws Force multiplication
Law Occupation Armistice Ceasefire Court-martial Desertion Geneva Conventions Geneva Protocol Islamic rules Justice Lawful / Unlawful combatant Perfidy Jewish laws on war Rules of engagement Martial law War crime
Theory Air supremacy Appeasement Command of the sea Deterrence theory Full-spectrum dominance Overmatch Unrestricted Warfare Just war theory Principles of war Philosophy of war Security dilemma Tripwire force Wargaming Simulation Exercises
Non-warfare Arms control Counter-insurgency deterrence Disaster response Grey-zone Gunboat diplomacy Humanitarian aid Law enforcement Low-intensity conflict Military engineering Peacekeeping Peacebuilding Peace through strength Show of force
Culture Awards and decorations Battle cry Warrior War film Military science fiction War novel Anti-war movement Foot drill War song Uniform Wargame
Related Women in war War resister War studies Horses in warfare Wartime sexual violence Fifth column Mercenary Privateer Private military company
Lists Battles Military occupations Military terms Operations Sieges War crimes Wars Weapons Writers
v t e

AirLand Battle was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces. AirLand Battle replaced 1976's "Active Defense" doctrine, and was itself replaced by "Full Spectrum Operations" in 2001.

Background

DePuy reforms and Active Defense

The basic concept of the Blitzkrieg and similar doctrines was for the attacker to secretly concentrate his forces across a limited frontage to gain a local superiority over the defenders, culminating in an attack with at least tactical surprise leading to a breakthrough, which is then rapidly exploited to threaten the rear areas and destabilize the entire defensive position.

Conventional war

As the Vietnam War wound down, the US Army started studying their organization and structure, looking for ways to better align it with real-world conflicts. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), under the direction of General William E. DePuy, was formed in 1973 to study these issues and produce updated doctrine for Army forces.

TRADOC concluded that there were two main possibilities for future conflicts, a major armored conflict in Europe, or a primarily infantry fight in other locations around the world. The latter possibility led to the Rapid Deployment Force, and in time, the formation of United States Central Command. The former was more problematic given the Warsaw Pact's massive numerical superiority, especially given the ending of the draft.

Rapid wars, forward defense

When the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973, it demonstrated a new lethality of conventional weapons, especially the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). The new vulnerability of tanks, combined with the improved defensive power of the infantry, led to a revolution of thought within the US Army—that a war in Europe was winnable with conventional weapons. Impressed by the new weapons, DePuy started the process of re-arming the heavy divisions with weapons that would dramatically improve their firepower.

In DePuy's view, firepower had increased so much that war would be won or lost almost immediately, in the first few massive battles. As Field Manual 100-5 noted, "The US Army must above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war."

Since forces from the rear could not move forward quickly enough to take part in the titanic battles being envisioned, everyone had to be placed as close to the front lines as possible. The result was a new battlefield organization that moved the vast majority of US and allied forces much closer to the border between East and West Germany, in what became known as "Forward Defense". As reinforcements from the US could play only a minor role, the war was a "come as you are" affair. Air power was key; as the battle increased in tempo and the Soviet forces attempted to break through the defenders, channels would naturally form that would be attacked by air.

A 1975 study showed that:

• The main battle tank and attack helicopter are highly compatible weapons systems that are best employed using offensive principles where their mobility, firepower, and survivability can be optimized.
• The bi-dimensional mobility capabilities and overlapping firepower characteristics of the main battle tank and attack helicopter are desirable and enhance the ability to achieve a favorable exchange ratio on the battlefield.
• The main battle tank, complemented by the attack helicopter, will remain a decisive antiarmor weapons system for the foreseeable future.

One problem that was noted soon after the introduction of the 1976 version of FM 100-5 was how to deal with the enemy's reserve forces in the rear. There was the possibility that the US could win the first battle, only to meet a second unattrited reserve force soon after. A solution to this problem was not immediately forthcoming.

The results of war gaming the Active Defense doctrine was that by using this doctrine "you would lose every time."

Military historian Gwynne Dyer also criticized the defence strategy as militarily senseless, used only because an effective defense in depth doctrine was considered politically unacceptable to West Germany since that would mean much of the country would have been overrun by Warsaw Pact forces in an invasion before they could be stopped. As a result of the political compromise, a concerted Warsaw Pact invasion would likely have been able to break through the thin defensive zone with their numerically superior conventional forces easily, which would have soon forced NATO to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to counter it, which would have likely escalated the war to a full-scale global nuclear war. Furthermore, the doctrine was considered by the Warsaw Pact to be a threatening policy, which they feared would have meant an inverted in-depth defence by NATO in an aggressive fashion which could have entailed invading the Warsaw Pact as a pre-emptive move to create the defensive buffer zone in Soviet territory necessary to prevent a Soviet incursion, thus increasing the possibility that Warsaw Pact forces could have decided to make the first aggressive move themselves to forgo that attack, thus increasing the risk of war.

Patterns of Conflict

In 1976 Colonel John Boyd presented Patterns of Conflict, a study outlining a number of historical matchups in which the victor was able to disrupt the "observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop" of their enemy. This, he stated, made them "appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder". His primary example of such action was the Blitzkrieg, where highly mobile forces were quickly concentrated at small points and then used to force a number of simultaneous thrusts through the front. Blitzkrieg aimed at forcing the enemy into a continuous battle of maneuver instead of an outright fight, bypassing any strongly defended areas and extending into their rear. To guarantee supply movement and avoid being encircled, the enemy is forced to retreat in an attempt to reform continuous defensive lines.

The traditional method of dealing with an armored breakthrough was to pick away at its sides, forcing it to maneuver away to find less-defended areas of advance. If these spoiling attacks can be set up on both sides of the route of attack, the armored spearhead is forced into an ever-decreasing frontage, eventually being pinched off and losing the ability to maneuver. The classic example of a successful anti-Blitzkrieg was during the Battle of the Bulge, where US units repeatedly forced the German spearhead inward, eventually pinching it off just short of the Meuse River. However, this approach required the forces to be deployed in depth, and the massive numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact was the reverse of the numbers during the Bulge. Additionally, the concentration of low-mobility forces that formed the channelizing groups would invite nuclear strikes.

Instead of meeting the Blitzkrieg head-on, Boyd suggested what he called the "counter-blitz", where small groups of equally mobile forces would pick away at the lines of thrust and then move on to the next in a series of hit-and-run attacks. There was no necessity to retain any sort of front line, and the attacks deliberately moved from point to point to avoid being bogged down or getting trapped. The idea was not to force the blitz to lose its ability to maneuver, but instead upset its ability to understand where it should be maneuvering to—the attacker would have no idea which of these counteroffensives represented a real threat, and would have to respond to all of them. The key idea was to "Smash blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of counter-blitz combat teams as basis for shifting of forces and quick focus of air and ground effort to throttle momentum, shatter cohesion, and envelop blitz in order to destroy adversary's capacity to resist." The battle was less about the weapons than it was about the ability to command them; it was believed that the U.S.' devolved command structure would be able to react to changes on the battlefield more quickly than their Soviet counterparts, overwhelming the Soviets ability to maintain cohesion as their higher-echelon commanders became overwhelmed with reports from so many small actions.

Whereas Active Defense envisioned the Army units moving from one blocking position to another in a series of largely static defenses, in the counter-blitz they would be far more mobile, conducting a series of limited offensives instead. Another difference was the role of the reserves; under Active Defense their role was very limited and even battlefield reserves were expected to be placed directly in the front, but under Patterns the reserves could be introduced where and when they became available, and be just as effective as the troops that had been there from the start. Boyd felt that the continual pattern of harassment and shifting positions could continue throughout a conflict, as opposed to attempting to win the entire war at the front in a single battle.

When Boyd introduced the concept, the Pentagon was being led by power groups that new inductees considered hidebound and moribund. As illustrated in The Pentagon Wars, Boyd and like-minded up-and-comers formed the "Reform Movement" and sought to overturn existing chains of command and introduce new weapons and tactics across the entire armed forces.

Extended battlefield

The major driving force in the evolution of AirLand Battle was General Donn A. Starry, who had taken over TRADOC from DePuy in 1977 and had been the primary force in implementing Active Defense. Since its introduction Starry had been attempting to find solutions to the problems of the enemy's reserves, and had been developing the concept of the "extended battlefield". This was a far more aggressive strategy, and required of the Army to fly its own CAS attack aircraft like the A-10 and the AH-64, as well as to better integrate USAF high-boy capabilities. It also gave birth to HIMARS, Bradley IFV, M109 Paladin, Patriot missile, M1 Abrams, and the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk. President Carter approved the novel weapons programs.

The extended battlefield noted that different commanders had different views of the battlefield in geographical terms. The brigade commander had to consider actions beyond the immediate front lines, up to 15 km into the enemy's rear where his artillery was operating. The division commander considered the battlefield as far as 70 km out, while the corps commander had a field of view out to 150 km. Starry introduced the idea that there was not only a geographical dimension to the battlefield organization, but a time dimension as well; the brigade had perhaps 12 hours to respond to actions, while the division had 24 and the corps 72. It was this coordination both in space and time that defined the extended battlefield.

The reason that the time dimension was important was the result of studies in nuclear weapon employment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in December 1979. These studies demonstrated that interdiction in the enemy's rear could seriously delay the movements of the rear echelon forces and create "time windows" during which the US would have the tactical advantage. By ensuring that the command structure was aware of the time dimension of the battlefield, they would be better prepared to take advantage of these windows when they occurred.

FM 100-5 draft

When Active Defense had been introduced in 1976 it faced a wave of criticism, both from within the Army, and from highly influential civilian advisers outside. Having witnessed this first-hand, Starry took measures to ensure this would not happen a second time. Foremost in these efforts was the early dissemination of the concept through briefings and wide circulation of Fort Leavenworth's draft of the new FM 100–5 in 1981. These were well received, especially its newly offensive orientation, which it summed up neatly with this statement:

... once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win something—else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations can not be simply to avert defeat—but rather it must be to win.

AirLand Battle became the primary battleplan of US forces in 1982, and NATO forces in 1984, with the help of SACEUR General Bernard W. Rogers. Its roll-out required upgrades to the CI equipment of all branches of the military, along with similar changes in the command and control structures to take advantage of the massive amounts of information the new C3I assets would be generating.

AirLand Battle

Prior to the 1970s the air forces had been seen primarily as for strategic bombing, delivery of tactical nuclear weapons, or for attacks on enemy air forces. Their counterpart to FM 100-5 listed only eight missions, only one of which required direct interaction with the Army forces in the field.

During the Vietnam War much of the US air power had been directed against supply buildup and movement points; roads, bridges, supply depots and the like. Attacking these targets with conventional weapons was an expensive process, requiring considerable amounts of ordnance to be expended to guarantee a "hit". In the late 1960s and early 1970s the introduction of smart weapons allowed conventional forces to directly attack point targets like bridges and roads, dramatically improving the ability to interdict the enemy, while at the same time allowing the aircraft to operate from safer, higher altitudes. These had little real impact during Vietnam when they were still very new, but their potential was obvious.

Starting in the early 1970s the Air Force took its first steps at looking at a conventional war in Europe. In late 1975, RAND Corporation completed a study that examined the merits of additional crewed aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, and stand-off munitions for improving air-ground capability in NATO. A follow-up two-day workshop at RAND studied what vulnerabilities the Warsaw Pact might have to NATO airpower, which was followed by a series of additional studies that clearly demonstrated their reliance on the continued movement of supplies. Air planners were beginning to look for ways to best employ these new weapons at the same time Starry was working on the extended battlefield concepts. Simultaneously, the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Bill Perry was interested in "stealth, precision and speed"; and one of their developments was the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk, an airplane designed to evade detection by the Soviets and strike ground targets such as tanks, anti-aircraft radar systems and missile complexes.

Starry emphasized the close coordination between the Army and Air Force to produce an integrated attack plan that would use the land forces in a counter-blitz while air power, artillery and special operation forces stopped the movement of the reserves toward the front line. To achieve this, both the Army and Air Force embarked on equipment modernization programs. The Army's effort was collectively called the "Big Five": the M1 Abrams, the Bradley Fighting/Cavalry Vehicle, the AH-64 Apache, the UH-60 Black Hawk, and the MIM-104 PATRIOT missile system. In addition to the aforementioned F-117, the Air Force's requirements for air interdiction against enemy rear-echelon forces would lead to the development of systems such as the Enhanced Tactical Fighter (or Dual-Role Fighter which would result in the F-15E) with LANTIRN for deep strike and Advanced Tactical Fighter (which would result in the F-22) to ensure air superiority for enabling those strikes. The result would stretch out the Warsaw Pact's advance in time, allowing the smaller NATO forces to continually attrit the enemy all along the battlefield while the reinforcements arrived piecemeal. The result was a single AirLand Battle.

Although the focus of AirLand Battle was on conventional warfare, it did not ignore the threat of nuclear or chemical warfare. It suggested planning for nuclear strikes or chemical weapons use from the beginning of combat, using them as a threat from the start that would force the enemy to disperse his forces or run the risk of a nuclear strike as they concentrated. The plans did, however, suggest they only be used if first attacked in kind.

The overall message conveyed by the AirLand Battle concept of 1981 was that the Army must leave behind the restricted notion of winning the fight only in the traditional "main battle area." AirLand Battle was first promulgated in the 1982 version of FM 100-5, and revised for the FM 100-5 version of 1986, which added the Follow-on Forces Attack concept.

The doctrine, unbeknownst at the time, turned out to be a success psychologically on the Warsaw Pact. In 1992, after the USSR had collapsed, at a friendly dinner of old adversaries an East German general said to an American diplomat that "We had no options left" after the doctrine had been understood across the Iron Curtain. Marshal Gorkov knew that the Soviets were in trouble.

DTRA chief Jim Tegnelia opines that AirLand Battle was the child of "the marriage of a policy problem, a good strategy and technology. When they are put together in resonance can create very synergistic and revolutionary effects with regard to military operations."

From 1993 onward, the Pentagon embraced a new doctrine: network-centric warfare, made possible by the Digital Revolution.

In popular culture

"AirLand Battle" stands as part of the title of the sequel to Wargame: European Escalation, Wargame: AirLand Battle. The game is set in the Cold War when AirLand Battle was a major strategy of NATO, and pits the player playing as either a NATO commander or Warsaw Pact general leading military engagements against the other alliance. The sequel introduces fixed-wing aircraft units to the game that was previously limited to land units and helicopters.

See also

• AirSea Battle

Citations

1. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 1–14 – 1–17.
2. Fahrenbach, MAJ Christopher T. (May 2011). Full Spectrum Operations: Is This the Science of Victory? (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College.
3. ^ Doughty, pp. 40
4. Winton
5. Romjue, The DePuy Reforms
6. Doughty, pp. 41
7. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, US Army, 1 July 1976
8. William P. Mako, "U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe" (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 113.
9. Phillip A. Karber, "The Strategy: In Defense of Forward Defense," Armed Forces Journal International 121 (May 1984)
10. Geary, Patrick Joseph (May 1987). "NATO battlefield strategy for the conventional defense of Central Europe". University of Richmond.
11. Ebitz, Curtis V. (6 June 1975). The Tank-Attack Helicopter in the European Mid-Intensity Conflict Environment: An Operational Effectiveness Analysis of Competitiveness/Compatibility (PDF). FORT LEAVENWORTH KS: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE.  This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army.
12. ^ Suprin, John (25 October 2012). "Yom Kippur War & The Development of U.S. Military Doctrine". The Dole Institute of Politics. YouTube.
13. Dyer, Gwynne (1985). War. Crown Publishers Inc. pp. 185–6.
14. Boyd, Blitzkrieg
15. Boyd, Counter-Blitz
16. Lt Col Harold E. Raugh, Jr, "The Pentagon Wars: Reformers Challenge the Old Guard" Archived 4 February 2008 at the Wayback Machine, Defense Journal, May 2002
17. DiMarco, Lou (6 May 2021). "Donn Starry, Active Defense, and AirLand Battle". The Dole Institute of Politics. YouTube.
18. ^ Wagner, Rich; Tegnelia, Jim. "Technology-Strategy Seminar: NATO's AirLand Battle Strategy and Future Extended Deterrence". Center for Strategic & International Studies Center for Strategic & International Studies.
19. Donn A. Starry, "Extending the Battlefield", Military Review, March 1981, pp. 31–50
20. Headquarters, Department of the Army (4 September 1981). FM 100–5, Operations (Final Draft). Type: Final Draft, but not Release. Washington, DC: GPO.
21. Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (25 March 1981). TRADOC Pam 525-5, Military Operations: Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations — 1986. Signed by Donn A. Starry. Fort Monroe, VA: GPO. p. 2. OCLC 8519684. b. The concept emphasizes the all too frequently ignored or misunderstood lesson of history—that once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win something—else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations cannot be simply to avert defeat—but rather it must be to win.
22. ^ Laughbaum, R. Kent (January 1999). "Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle" (PDF). Air University Press.
23. ^ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer (2014) The NATO-Warsaw Pact competition in the 1970s and 1980s: a revolution in military affairs in the making or the end of a strategic age?, Cold War History, 14:4, 533–573, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2014.950250
24. KORPAL, EUGENE S. (January–February 1986). "Deep Battle: Right Place at the Right Time" (PDF). Field Artillery Journal.
25. ^ Grant 2001.
26. Cappelli, R. (2020). The Deep Battle, the CIA, and the Sorrows of General Rogers, International Journal of Military History and Historiography, 40(2), 278–308.
27. Winton, Forming the Partnership, 1973–1979
28. Lt. Gen. Dubik, James M. (22 January 2019). "A Dual Approach to Military Innovation". Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).
29. Aronstein, David C. and Michael J. Hirschberg. Advanced Tactical Fighter to F-22 Raptor: Origins of the 21st Century Air Dominance Fighter. pp. 45-54, 72. Arlington, Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics, 1998. ISBN 978-1-56347-282-4.
30. Canan, James (1 April 1988). "Sorting Out the AirLand Partnership". Air Force Magazine. Colorado Springs, Colorado: Air Forces Association.
31. Message 291305Z January 1981, Commander TRADOC: to distribution, subj: "The AirLand Battle"
32. Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr. A History of Operational Art Military Review, November–December 2018.
33. Blythe 2010, p. 1.
34. Blythe 2010, p. 2.

Bibliography

• Resources in your library
• Resources in other libraries

• Blythe, Wilson C. Jr. (March 2010). AirLand Battle: The Development of a Doctrine (PDF) (MA). Eastern Michigan University.
• Boyd, John R. "Patterns of Conflict" (PPT file)
• Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76, DIANE Publishing, 2001, ISBN 1-4289-1602-4
• Geary, Patrick Joseph (May 1987). "NATO battlefield strategy for the conventional defense of Central Europe". University of Richmond.
• Grant, Rebecca (1 June 2001). "Deep Strife". Air & Space Forces Magazine.
• Romjue, John L. "The Evolution of the Airland Battle Concept" Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine, Air University Review, May–June 1984
• Romjue, John L. (1998). American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War. DIANE Publishing.
• Sinclair, Edward J. "Attack Helicopters: Airland Battle Future's Sword of Vengeance", School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 1991
• Skinner, Douglas W. (September 1988). "Airland Battle Doctrine" (PDF). CENTERFORNAVAL ANALYSES.
• Spiller, Roger B. (1992). Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press.
• Wilson, John B. (1998). Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. U.S. Army Center of Military History.
• Winton, Harold R. "Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and Desert Shield", Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 100–19

• United States Department of Defense doctrine