Misplaced Pages

Al-Qaeda safe houses, Karachi

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
(Redirected from Al Qaida guest house, Karachi)
This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
Find sources: "Al-Qaeda safe houses, Karachi" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (May 2011) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

The American intelligence analysts who compiled the justifications for continuing to detain the captives taken in the "war on terror" made dozens of references to al Qaida safe houses, in Karachi, Pakistan.

Some of the references:

  • refer to instances when important documents, particularly various lists of individuals, were captured in al Qaida safe houses, or al Qaida guest houses, in Karachi. A list of 324 Arabic names, associated with senior al Qaida operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, being one of the most commonly referenced.
  • refer to instances when suspects were captured in an al Qaida safe house in Karachi. The bin Attash brothers, who were interrogated in the CIA's archipelago of covert black sites, were captured in a Karachi safe house.
  • refer to instances when a suspect temporarily stayed in a Karachi safe house or guest house.

According to the 9/11 Commission, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed rented a safe house in Karachi specifically to house the men who would later hijack the jetliners on September 11, 2001. The 9-11 Commission reported that Mohammed rented the safe house with funds from Osama bin Laden.

Captured in a Karachi safe house or guest house

American and Pakistani counter-terrorism officials conducted an extensive series of raids, across Pakistan, on September 11, 2002, the first anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Suspected safe houses and guesthouses in Karachi and Faisalabad were particular targets. Several of the captives captured on September 11, 2002, were of sufficient intelligence value that they were interrogated first in one of the CIA's archipelago of black sites, in particular the dark prison.

Some other captives were captured in suspect safe houses or guest houses in Karachi on other dates. And yet other captive's documents state that they were captured in a Karachi safe house or guest house, without specifying the date it occurred. Captives said to have been captured in a Karachi safe house include: Shawki Awad Balzuhair, Ha Il Aziz Ahmed Al Maythali Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash, Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi

Listed on a suspicious document seized in Karachi

Many of the captives in Guantanamo learned from the allegations they faced during their Combatant Status Review Tribunals or Administrative Review Board hearings that their continued detention was being justified because their name, or "known alias", was found on a suspicious list. The ambiguous wording American intelligence analysts used when describing the suspicious lists leaves open to speculation how many lists there actually were.

Captives whose names were alleged to have been found on a list captured in a Karachi safe house include: Omar Rajab Amin, Yusif Khalil Abdallah Nur Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi Yusef Abdullah Saleh Al Rabiesh Buad Thif Allah Al Atabi Khalid Abd Jal Jabbar Muhammad Juthman Al Qadasi Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu Al Haj Al Radai Ziyad bin Salih bin Muhammad Al Bahooth Rami Bin Said Al Taibi Abdullah Kamel Abdullah Kamel Al Kandari Faiz Al Kandari Walid Said Bin Said Zaid Abdul Hakim Abdul Rahman Abdulaziz Al Mousa.

Karachi safehouses managed by Abdul Al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani

Abdul Al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, a Guantanamo captive transferred to Guantanamo in 2004, after two years in CIA custody, faced over two dozen allegations associated with his management of six safe houses in Karachi between 2000 and his capture on September 11, 2002. Intelligence analysts alleged the safe houses he managed were used as underground hospitals for fighters injured in Afghanistan. They alleged the safe houses had been used as an underground factory for the manufacture of the timers for time-bombs, and that five of the USS Cole bombers and seventeen of the nineteen hijackers in the September 11 attacks had stayed there.

Connection to the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl

Yosri Fouda, Al Jazeera's London bureau chief, interviewed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in April 2002 in a Karachi safe house. According to Jane Mayer, writing for The New Yorker, Fouda was "astounded" at the lack of concern Mohammed showed for his personal security, during and after the interview. She reported that Mohammed escorted Fouda downstairs and onto the street, following the interview. During this interview in the Karachi safe house Mohammed gave Fouda an unedited copy of the video of the beheading of American journalist Daniel Pearl. Pearl had been kidnapped and beheaded by jihadists in February 2002, in Karachi, two months prior to the interview. While Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was, eventually, to confess to beheading Pearl, when subjected to "extended interrogation methods" in CIA custody, he did not take credit for the beheading when interviewed by Fouda.

In July 2002 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed lived in a four bedroom safe house in Karachi. It contained three laptops and five cell phones.

Saud Memon, a wealthy Karachi industrialist owned the building where Pearl was held, killed and buried. He disappeared while living outside Pakistan in March 2003. He was found near his family home in Karachi four years later on April 28, 2007. He was emaciated, infected with meningitis, and unable to speak, or to recognize members of his family. He died three weeks later, on May 18, 2007, without offering an account of his missing four years. He was widely reported to have been apprehended by American security officials.

References

  1. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Walid Said Bin Said Zaid Administrative Review Board - page 14
  2. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2011-06-04 at the Wayback Machine of Abdullah Kamel Abdullah Kamel Al Kandari Administrative Review Board - pages 11-13
  3. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2016-06-21 at the Wayback Machine of Khalid Abd Jal Jabbar Muhammad Juthman Al Qadasi Administrative Review Board, April 28, 2005 - page 14
  4. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2007-12-04 at the Wayback Machine of Khalid Mallah Shayi Al Jilba Al Qahtani Administrative Review Board, March 31, 2005 - page 2
  5. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Salman Yahya Hassan Mohammed Rabeii Administrative Review Board - 28 January 2005 - page 65
  6. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2016-06-21 at the Wayback Machine of Bader Al Bakri Al Samiri Administrative Review Board - March 7, 2005 - page 75
  7. "Chapter 5: AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND". 9/11 Commission. Archived from the original on 16 August 2009. Retrieved 2009-08-30. Upon completing the advanced training at Mes Aynak, Hazmi, Khallad, and Abu Bara went to Karachi, Pakistan. There KSM instructed them on Western culture and travel. Much of his activity in mid-1999 had revolved around the collection of training and informational materials for the participants in the planes operation. For instance, he collected Western aviation magazines; telephone directories for American cities such as San Diego and Long Beach, California; brochures for schools; and airline timetables, and he conducted Internet searches on U.S. flight schools. He also purchased flight simulator software and a few movies depicting hijackings. To house his students, KSM rented a safehouse in Karachi with money provided by Bin Ladin
  8. Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) Archived 2006-07-31 at the Wayback Machine prepared for Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - November 9, 2004 - page 274
  9. OARDEC (18 October 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Balzuhair, Shawki Awad" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 28. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2008-01-08.
  10. OARDEC (19 October 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Maythali, Ha Il Aziz Ahmed" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 31–32. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 August 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-20.
  11. Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Sabri Mohammed Ebrahim Al Qurashi's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 187
  12. OARDEC (2005-02-28). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Nur, Yusif Khalil Abdallah". United States Department of Defense. Retrieved 2009-08-01.
  13. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2016-06-21 at the Wayback Machine of Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi Administrative Review Board - pages 81-82 18 April 2005
  14. OARDEC (2005-03-10). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Rabiesh, Yusef Abdullah Saleh" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 84–86. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-31.
  15. OARDEC (January 20, 2006). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Atabi, Bijad, Thif Allah" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 97–99. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-03.
  16. OARDEC (April 28, 2005). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Qadasi, Khalid Abd Jal Jabbar Muhammad Juthman" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 14–16. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-05.
  17. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2008-07-16 at the Wayback Machine of Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu Al Haj Al Radai Administrative Review Board - page 34
  18. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2016-06-21 at the Wayback Machine of Ziyad bin Salih bin Muhammad Al Bahooth Administrative Review Board, May 19, 2005 - page 38
  19. CSRT Summary of Evidence memoranda (.pdf) Archived 2006-07-31 at the Wayback Machine prepared for Rami Bin Said Al Taibi's Combatant Status Review Tribunals - October 1, 2004 - page 68
  20. OARDEC (27 April 2005). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Kamel, Abdullah Kamel Abdullah" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 9–11. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 March 2008. Retrieved 2008-03-13.
  21. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) Archived 2011-06-29 at the Wayback Machine of Faiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari Administrative Review Board - page 31
  22. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Walid Said Bin Said Zaid Administrative Review Board - page 14
  23. Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) Archived 2006-07-31 at the Wayback Machine prepared for Abdul Hakim Abdul Rahman Abdulaziz Al Mousa's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - September 22, 2004 - page 211
  24. OARDEC (2004-11-10). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Gulam Rabbani, Abu Rahim Moulana" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 August 2008. Retrieved 2008-08-12. The detainee either operated or resided at six al Qaida safehouses in Karachi with a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
  25. OARDEC (2005-10-07). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Gulam Rabbani, Abu Rahmi Moulana". United States Department of Defense. Retrieved 2009-08-29.
  26. OARDEC (2006-08-21). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Abdul Rahman, Abdul Rabbani". United States Department of Defense. Retrieved 2009-08-29.
  27. OARDEC (2007-12-20). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Gulam Rabbani, Abu Rahmi Moulana". United States Department of Defense. Retrieved 2009-08-29.
  28. S. Abdallah Schleifer (2002). "Covering Al-Qa'ida, Covering Saddam" (PDF). Transnational Broadcasting Studies. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-07-06.
  29. ^ Jane Mayer (2007-08-13). "The Black Sites: A rare look inside the C.I.A.'s secret interrogation program" (PDF). The New Yorker. Retrieved 2009-08-29. In April, 2002, Mohammed arranged to be interviewed on Al Jazeera by its London bureau chief, Yosri Fouda, and took personal credit for the atrocities. "I am the head of the Al Qaeda military committee," he said. "And yes, we did it." Fouda, A who conducted the interview at an Al Qaeda safe house in Karachi, said that he was astounded not only by Mohammed's boasting but also by his seeming imperviousness to the danger of being caught. Mohammed permitted Al Jazeera to reveal that he was hiding out in the Karachi area. When Fouda left the apartment, Mohammed, apparently unarmed, walked him downstairs and out into the street.
  30. Rohan Gunaratna (May 2003). "Al Qaeda's trajectory in 2003" (PDF). Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-02-22. It was Khalid who always communicated with these assets and not the other way around. Although he knew the weaknesses and limitations of technologies in conducting terrorist operations, he intelligently exploited the technologies available to him. In July 2002, the four-bedroom apartment he was living in Karachi, Pakistan, had three laptops and five mobile phones.
  31. Syed Saleem Shahzad (2007-05-23). "Mystery 'missings' haunt Pakistan". Asia Times. Archived from the original on 2010-11-01. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
  32. Azaz Syed, Abbas Naqvi (2007-05-19). "Saud Memon dies in hospital". Daily Times (Pakistan). p. 1. Archived from the original on 2008-02-03. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
  33. "Link found between Pearl's killers, Muslim charity". Daily Times (Pakistan). 2005-04-19. p. 7. Archived from the original on 2011-06-06. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
  34. Jay Solomon, Steve LeVine (November 12, 2007). "Suspect in Pearl Murder Was Held, Covertly Questioned Before Death". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 2012-11-08. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
  35. "Suspect in Pearl's killing dies after interrogation: report". Agence France Presse. November 13, 2007. Archived from the original on 2011-05-20. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
Al-Qaida and Taliban guest or safe houses in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Afghanistan
Pakistan

Categories: