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Bilateral relations
Argentina-Chile relations
Map indicating locations of Argentina and Chile

Argentina

Chile

International relations between the Republic of Chile and the Argentine Republic have existed for decades. The border between the two countries is the world's third-longest international border, which is 5,300 km (3,300 mi) long and runs from north to south along the Andes mountains. Although both countries gained their independence during the South American wars of liberation, during much of the 19th and the 20th century, relations between the countries were tense as a result of disputes over the border in Patagonia. Despite this, Chile and Argentina have never been engaged in a war with each other. In recent years, relations have improved. Argentina and Chile have followed quite different economic policies. Chile has signed free trade agreements with countries such as China, the United States, Canada, South Korea, as well as European Union, and it's a member of the APEC. Argentina belongs to the Mercosur regional free trade area. In April 2018, both countries suspended their membership from the UNASUR.

Historical relations (1550–1989)

Rule under Spain and Independence

El abrazo de Maipú (English: The embrace of Maipú) between the independence heroes José de San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins after the defeat of royalists in the Battle of Maipú

The relationship between the two countries can be traced back to an alliance during Spanish colonial times. Both colonies were offshoots of the Viceroyalty of Peru, with the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (which Argentina was a part of) being broken off in 1776, and Chile not being broken off until independence. Argentina and Chile were colonized by different processes. Chile was conquered as a southward extension of the original conquest of Peru, while Argentina was colonized from Peru, Chile and from the Atlantic.

Argentina and Chile were close allies during the wars of independence from the Spanish Empire. Chile, like most of the revolting colonies, was defeated at a point by Spanish armies, while Argentina remained independent throughout its war of independence. After the Chilean defeat in the Disaster of Rancagua, the remnants of the Chilean Army led by Bernardo O'Higgins took refuge in Mendoza. Argentine General José de San Martín, by that time governor of the region, included the Chilean exiles in the Army of the Andes, and in 1817 led the crossing of the Andes, defeated the Spaniards, and confirmed the Chilean Independence. While he was in Santiago, Chile a cabildo abierto (open town hall meeting) offered San Martín the governorship of Chile, which he declined, in order to continue the liberating campaign in Peru.

In 1817 Chile began the buildup of its Navy in order to carry the war to the Viceroyalty of Perú. Chile and Argentina signed a treaty in order to finance the enterprise. But Argentina, fallen in a civil war, was unable to contribute. The naval fleet, after being built, launched a sea campaign to fight the Spanish fleet in the Pacific to liberate Peru. After a successful land and sea campaign, San Martín proclaimed the Independence of Peru in 1821.

War against the Peru–Bolivian Confederation

Main article: War of the Confederation

From 1836 to 1839, Chile and Argentina united in a war against the confederation of Peru and Bolivia. The underlying cause was the apprehension of Chile and Argentina against the potential power of the Peru-Bolivia bloc. This resulted from concern over the large territory of Peru-Bolivia as well as the perceived threat that such a rich state would represent to their southern neighbors. Chile declared the war on 11 November 1836 and Argentina on 19 May 1837.

In 1837 Felipe Braun, one of Santa Cruz's most capable generals and highly decorated veteran of the war of independence, defeated an Argentine army sent to topple Santa Cruz. On 12 November 1838 Argentine representatives signed an agreement with the Bolivian troops. However, on 20 January 1839 the Chilean force obtained a decisive victory against Peru-Bolivia at the Battle of Yungay and the short-lived Peru-Bolivian Confederation came to an end.

Chincha's war

Main article: Chincha Islands War

A series of coastal and high-seas naval battles between Spain and its former colonies of Peru and Chile occurred between 1864 and 1866. These actions began with Spain's seizure of the guano-rich Chincha Islands, part of a strategy by Isabel II of Spain to reassert her country's lost influence in Spain's former South American empire. These actions prompted an alliance between Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Chile against Spain. As a result, all Pacific coast ports of South America situated south of Colombia were closed to the Spanish fleet. Argentina, however, refused to join the alliance and maintained amicable relations with Spain and delivered coal to the Spanish fleet.

War of the Pacific

On 6 February 1873, Peru and Bolivia signed a secret treaty of alliance against Chile. On 24 September, Argentine president Domingo Faustino Sarmiento asked the Argentine Chamber of Deputies to join Argentina with the alliance. The Argentine chamber assented by a vote of 48–18. The treaty made available a credit of six million pesos for military expenditures. However, in 1874, after the delivery of the Chilean ironclad Almirante Cochrane and the ironclad Blanco Encalada, the Argentine Senate postponed the matter until late 1874, and Sarmiento was prevented signing the treaty. Consequently, Argentina remained neutral during the war; and the Argentines signed a Border Treaty with Chile in 1881.

Claims on Patagonia

See also: East Patagonia, Tierra del Fuego and Strait of Magellan Dispute; Boundary treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina; and Treaty of Arbitration between Chile and Argentina of 1902
Territorial losses of the Republic of Chile de jure (by law) according to Chilean historiography.

Border disputes continued between Chile and Argentina, as Patagonia was then a largely unexplored area. The Border Treaty of 1881 established the line of highest mountains dividing the Atlantic and Pacific watersheds as the border between Argentina and Chile. This principle was easily applied in northern Andean border region; but in Patagonia drainage basins crossed the Andes. This led to further disputes over whether the Andean peaks would constitute the frontier (favoring Argentina) or the drainage basins (favoring Chile). Argentina argued that previous documents referring to the boundary always mentioned the Snowy Cordillera as the frontier and not the continental divide. The Argentine explorer Francisco Perito Moreno suggested that many Patagonian lakes draining to the Pacific were in fact part of the Atlantic basin but had been moraine-dammed during the quaternary glaciations changing their outlets to the west. In 1902, war was again avoided when British King Edward VII agreed to mediate between the two nations. He cleverly established the current Argentina-Chile border in Patagonia by dividing many disputed lakes into two equal parts. Several of these lakes still have different names on each side of the frontier, such as the lake known in Chile as Lago O'Higgins and in Argentina as Lago San Martín. A dispute that arose in the northern Puna de Atacama was resolved with the Puna de Atacama Lawsuit of 1899.

1893 Border protocol

The 1893 Boundary Protocol between Argentina and Chile, also known as the Errázuriz-Quirno Costa Protocol, was an agreement signed by Isidoro Errázuriz Errázuriz Errázuriz representing Chile and Norberto Camilo Quirno Costa representing Argentina on May 1, 1893 in Santiago, Chile. It was signed to solve problems that arose during the demarcation of the boundary on the basis of the 1881 Treaty.

This protocol ratified the principle of “Chile to the Pacific and Argentina to the Atlantic” from which, later on, discrepancies arose regarding the limit of both oceans, and whether the principle applies to the south of parallel 52° or not, according to the protocol, it applies to the north of parallel 52° only. In addition, the principle of the “main chain” of the Andes Mountains was established. The areas affected by the protocol were: the Seno Ultima Esperanza and the Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego.

Southern Patagonian Ice Field border definition in 1898 by experts from both countries

This section is an excerpt from Southern Patagonian Ice Field dispute § Delimitation.
Map of the 1902 award between Argentina and Chile in the area of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field (which was not affected by it)
Argentine map of 1912 showing historical boundary markers agreed upon by the Argentine and Chilean experts (Fitz Roy, Huemul, Campana, Agassiz, Heim, Mayo, and Stokes/Cervantes)

The area was delimited by the Treaty of 1881 between Argentina and Chile

The boundary between Chile and the Argentine Republic is, from North to South, up to the fifty-second parallel of latitude, the Andes Mountain Range. The boundary line shall run in that extension along the highest peaks of said Cordillera dividing the waters, and shall pass between the slopes that break off on one side and the other. The difficulties that may arise due to the existence of certain valleys formed by the bifurcation of the Cordillera and where the dividing line of the waters is not clear, shall be resolved amicably by two experts appointed, one from each party. In case they do not reach an agreement, a third Expert appointed by both Governments shall be called upon to decide them. Of the operations carried out by them, a record shall be drawn up in duplicate, signed by the two Experts, on the points on which they have agreed, and also by the third Expert on the points decided by him. These minutes shall take full effect as soon as they have been signed by them and shall be considered firm and valid without the need for any other formalities or formalities. A copy of the minutes shall be sent to each of the Governments.

On 20 August 1888, an agreement was signed to carry out the demarcation of the limits according to the 1881 treaty, appointing the experts Diego Barros Arana for Chile and Octavio Pico Burgess for Argentina. In 1892, Barros Arana presented his thesis according to which the 1881 treaty had fixed the limit in the continental divortium aquarum, which was rejected by the Argentine expert.

Experts have shown that it is always convenient to take the mountain as a support for the boundary and not the watershed. Rey Balmaceda tells an anecdote of Perito Moreno, who diverted the course of the Fénix River, with the help of a crew of laborers, so that it would stop heading toward the Pacific and would swell the waters of the Deseado River. With this, Moreno wanted to demonstrate that the true basis for drawing a solid and efficient line is the mountains and not the course of the waters.

Because differences arose on several points of the border on which the experts could not agree, the demarcation was suspended in February 1892, until the Boundary Protocol between Chile and Argentina 1893 was subscribed, which in its article 1 provides:

Article One of the Treaty of July 23, 1881, stipulating that "the boundary between Chile and the Argentine Republic is from North to South up to the 52nd parallel of latitude, the Andes Cordillera", and that "the boundary line shall run along the highest peaks of the said Cordillera, dividing the waters, and that it shall pass between the slopes that break off on either side", the Experts and the Sub-Commissions shall have this principle as the invariable rule of their proceedings. Consequently, all lands and all waters, namely: lakes, lagoons, rivers and parts of rivers, streams and slopes east of the line of the highest peaks of the Andes Mountains dividing the waters, shall be considered in perpetuity as property and absolute domain of the Argentine Republic, and all lands and all waters, namely: lakes, lagoons, rivers and parts of rivers, streams and slopes east of the highest peaks of the Andes Mountains dividing the waters, shall be considered as property and absolute domain of Chile: lakes, lagoons, rivers, and parts of rivers, streams, slopes, which are found to the west of the highest peaks of the Andes Mountains that divide the waters.

This protocol is of particular importance, as the retreat of the glaciers could allow Pacific fjords to penetrate into Argentine territory.

In January 1894, the Chilean expert declared that he understood that the main chain of the Andes was the uninterrupted line of peaks that divide the waters and that form the separation of the basins or tributary hydrographic regions of the Atlantic to the east and the Pacific to the west. The Argentine expert Norberto Quirno Costa (Pico's replacement) replied that they had no authority to define the meaning of the main chain of the Andes as they were only demarcators.

In April 1896, the agreement to facilitate territorial delimitation operations was signed, which appointed the British monarch to arbitrate in case of disagreements. In the minutes of 1 October 1898, signed by Diego Barros Arana and Francisco Moreno (Quirno Costa's replacement, who resigned in September 1896) and by his assistants Clemente Onelli (from Argentina) y Alejandro Bertrand (from Chile), the experts:

agree with the points and stretches indicated 331 and 332 , resolv to accept them as forming part of the dividing line between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile .

On the attached map, point 331 is Fitz Roy and 332 is Mount Stokes, both being agreed as boundary markers, although the former is not on the watershed and was taken as a natural landmark. As the experts did not access the area, they established the caveat that if the geographical principle did not run where they had supposed it did, there could be modifications.

When the experts could not agree on different stretches of the border, it was decided in 1898 to resort to Article VI paragraph 2 of the 1881 Boundary Treaty and request Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom for an arbitration ruling on the issue, who appointed three British judges. In 1901, one of the judges, Colonel Thomas Holdich, traveled to study the disputed areas.

The Argentine government argued that the boundary should essentially be an orographic boundary along the highest peaks of the Andes and the Chilean government argued for a continental watershed. The tribunal considered that the language of the 1881 treaty and the 1893 protocol was ambiguous and susceptible to various interpretations, the two positions being irreconcilable. On 20 May 1902, King Edward VII issued the sentence which divided the territories of the four disputed sections within the boundaries defined by the extreme claims on both sides and appointed a British officer to demarcate each section in mid-1903. The award did not issue on the ice field, for, in its article III, it sentenced:

From Mount Fitz Roy to Mount Stokes the boundary line has already been determined.

The award thus considered that in that area the high peaks are water dividing and therefore there was no dispute. Both experts, Francisco Moreno from Argentina and Diego Barros Arana from Chile agreed on the border between Fitz Roy and Stokes. Since 1898, the demarcation of the border in the ice field, between the two mountains, was defined on the next mountains and their natural continuity: Fitz Roy, Torre, Huemul, Campana, Agassiz, Heim, Mayo, and Stokes (nowadays Cervantes). In 1916, the Mariano Moreno range was visited by an expedition; however, Francisco Moreno already knew of its existence.

Puna de Atacama dispute (1889-1898)

This section is an excerpt from Puna de Atacama dispute.

The Puna de Atacama dispute, sometimes referred to as Puna de Atacama Lawsuit (Spanish: Litigio de la Puna de Atacama), was a border dispute involving Argentina, Chile and Bolivia in the 19th century over the arid high plateau of Puna de Atacama located about 4500 meters above the sea around the current borders of the three countries.

The dispute originated with the Chilean annexation of the Bolivian Litoral Department in 1879 during the War of the Pacific. That year, the Chilean Army occupied San Pedro de Atacama, the main settlement of the current Chilean part of Puna de Atacama. By 1884, Bolivia and its ally Peru had lost the war, and Argentina communicated to the Chilean government that the border line in the Puna was still a pending issue between Argentina and Bolivia. Chile answered that the Puna de Atacama still belonged to Bolivia. The same year, Argentina occupied Pastos Grandes in the Puna.

Bolivia had still not signed any peace treaty with Chile until the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904. In the light that influential Bolivian politicians considered the Litoral Province to be lost forever, the adjacent Puna de Atacama appeared to be a remote, mountainous and arid place that was difficult to defend. That prompted the Bolivian government to use it as a tool for to obtaining benefits from both Chile and Argentina. That led to the signature of two contradictory treaties in which Bolivia granted Argentina and Chile overlapping areas:

  • On May 10, 1889, a secret treaty between the Argentine minister Norberto Quirno Costa and the Bolivian envoy Santiago Vaca Guzmán was signed in Buenos Aires. The treaty established that Argentina renounced to its claims on Tarija in exchange of all the Bolivian Puna de Atacama.
  • On May 19, 1891, the Matta-Reyes Protocol was signed between Chile and Bolivia. It recognised the Bolivian territories occupied by Chile since the War of the Pacific as ceded to Chile, including those in the Puna de Atacama, in exchange of defaulting some debts.

On November 2, 1898, Argentina and Chile signed two documents in which they decided to convene a conference to define the border in Buenos Aires with delegates of both countries. If there was no agreement, a Chilean and Argentine delegate and the United States minister to Argentina, William Buchanan, would decide. As foreseen, there was no accord at the conference, and Buchanan proceeded with the delegates of Chile, Enrique Mac Iver, and Argentina José Evaristo Uriburu, to define the border.

Of the 75,000 km in dispute, 64,000 (85%) were awarded to Argentina and 11,000 (15%) to Chile.

Arms race and foreign policy cooperation

See also: ABC countries

Dreadnought race

Main article: South American dreadnought race

At the start of the 1900s a naval arms race began amongst the most powerful and wealthy countries in South America: Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It began when the Brazilian government ordered three formidable battleships whose capabilities far outstripped older vessels after the Brazilian Navy found itself well behind the Argentine and Chilean navies in quality and total tonnage.

Baltimore Crisis

Main article: Baltimore Crisis

During the Baltimore Crisis which brought Chile and the United States to the brink of war in 1891 (at the end of the 1891 Chilean Civil War), the Argentine foreign minister Estanislao Zeballos offered the US-minister in Buenos Aires the Argentine province of Salta as base of operations from which to attack Chile overland. In return, Argentina asked the U.S. for the cession of southern Chile to Argentina. Later, Chile and the United States averted the war.

Pactos de Mayo and 1902 Andes Boundary Case

Main article: Pactos de Mayo See also: Argentine-Chilean naval arms race
1902 Andes Boundary Case.

The Pactos de Mayo are four protocols signed in Santiago de Chile by Chile and Argentina on 28 May 1902 in order to extend their relations and resolve its territorial disputes. The disputes had led both countries to increase their military budgets and run an arms race in the 1890s. More significantly the two countries divided their influence in South America into two spheres: Argentina would not threaten Chile's Pacific Coast hegemony, and Santiago promised not to intrude east of the Andes.

This section is an excerpt from 1902 Arbitral award of the Andes between Argentina and Chile.

The 1902 Arbitral award of the Andes between Argentina and Chile (Spanish: Laudo limítrofe entre Argentina y Chile de 1902) was a British arbitration in 1902 that established the present-day boundaries between Argentina and Chile. In northern and central Patagonia, the borders were established between the latitudes of 40° and 52° S as an interpretation of the Boundary treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina.

As result of the arbitration, some Patagonian lakes, such as O'Higgins/San Martín Lake, became divided by a national boundary. Additionally the preferences of settled colonists in a cultivated part of the area in dispute had been canvassed. The boundary proposed in the arbitration was a compromise between the boundary preferences of the two disputing governments, which strictly followed neither the alignment of highest peaks nor the fluvial watershed, and was published in the name of King Edward VII.

Snipe incident

Main article: Snipe incident

In 1958 the Argentine Navy shelled a Chilean lighthouse and disembarked infantry in the uninhabitable islet Snipe, at the east entrance of the Beagle Channel.

Laguna del Desierto dispute (1949-1994) and the killing of Hernán Merino Correa

Main articles: Laguna del Desierto incident and Hernán Merino
Chilean Carabineros Lieutenant Hernán Merino Correa

The Laguna del Desierto incident, in Argentina called also Battle of Laguna del Desierto occurred between four members of Carabineros de Chile and 90 members of the Argentine Gendarmerie and took place in zone south of O'Higgins/San Martín Lake on 6 November 1965, resulting in Lieutenant Hernán Merino Correa killed and Sergeant Miguel Manríquez injured, both members of Carabineros, creating a tense atmosphere between Chile and Argentina.

Encuentro River-Alto Palena boundary dispute (1913-1966)

The Encuentro River-Alto Palena boundary dispute was a territorial dispute between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile over the delimitation of the boundary between milestones XVI and XVII of their common border in the valleys located north of Lake General Vintter/Palena (formerly Lake General Paz), which was resolved on November 24, 1966 by means of an arbitration decision of Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom.

The ruling divided the disputed territory between the two countries, which was distributed between the commune of Palena in the province of Palena, Región de Los Lagos in Chile and the department of Languiñeo in the province of Chubut in Argentina.

Beagle conflict (1904-1984) and the Argentinian invasion plan "Operation Soberanía"

Main article: Beagle conflict See also: Direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina in 1977–1978 and Operation Soberanía

Trouble once again began to brew in the 1960s, when Argentina began to claim that the Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands in the Beagle Channel were rightfully theirs, although this was in direct contradiction of the 1881 treaty, as the Beagle Channel Arbitration, and the initial Beagle Channel cartography since 1881 stated.

Both countries submitted the controversy to binding arbitration by the international tribunal. The decision (see Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration) recognized all the islands to be Chilean territory. Argentina unilaterally repudiated the decision of the tribunal and planned a war of aggression against Chile.

Direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina in 1977-78 failed and relations became extremely tense. Argentina sent troops to the border in Patagonia and in Chile large areas were mined. On 22 December, Argentina started Operation Soberanía in order to invade the islands and continental Chile, but after a few hours stopped the operation when Pope John Paul II sent a personal message to both presidents urging a peaceful solution. Both countries agreed that the Pope would mediate the dispute through the offices of Cardinal Antonio Samoré his special envoy (See Papal mediation in the Beagle conflict).

On 9 January 1979 the Act of Montevideo was signed in Uruguay pledging both sides to a peaceful solution and a return to the military situation of early 1977. The conflict was still latent during the Falklands War and was resolved only after the fall of the Argentine military junta.

A number of prominent public officials in Chile still point to past Argentine treaty repudiations when referring to relations between the two neighbors.

Falklands War

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Main article: Falklands War See also: Events leading to the Falklands War

During the Falklands War in 1982, with the Beagle conflict still pending, Chile and Colombia were the only South American countries to abstain from voting in the TIAR.

The Argentine government planned to seize the disputed Beagle Channel islands after the occupation of the Falkland Islands. Basilio Lami Dozo the then Chief of the Argentine Air Force, disclosed that Leopoldo Galtieri told him that:

" have to know what we are doing now, because they will be the next in turn.

Óscar Camilión, the last Argentine Foreign Minister before the war (29 March 1981 to 11 December 1981) has stated that:

"The military planning was, after the solution of the Falklands case, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle. That was the determination of the Argentine Navy."

These preparations were public. On 2 June 1982 the newspaper La Prensa published an article by Manfred Schönfeld explaining what would follow Argentina's expected victory in the Falkland Islands:

"The war will not be finished for us, because after the defeat of our enemies in the Falklands, they must be blown away from South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, and all Argentine Austral archipelagos."

Argentine General Osiris Villegas demanded (in April 1982) after the successful Argentine landing in the Falklands that his government stop negotiations with Chile and seize the islands south of the Beagle. In his book La propuesta pontificia y el espacio nacional comprometido, (p. 2), he asked:

no persistir en una diplomacia bilateral que durante años la ha inhibido para efectuar actos de posesión efectiva en las islas en litigio que son los hechos reales que garantizan el establecimiento de una soberanía usurpada y la preservación de la integridad del territorio nacional.

This intention was probably known to the Chilean government, as the Chileans provided the United Kingdom with 'limited, but significant information' during the conflict. The Chilean Connection is described in detail by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his book The Official History of the Falklands Campaign.

Post-Pinochet democratic governments in Chile have given greater support to the Argentine claim on the Falkland Islands.

In June 2010 (as in 2009 and years before) Chile has supported the Argentine position at the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization calling for direct negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom concerning the Falkland Islands dispute.

Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984

Main article: Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1984 between Chile and Argentina

This important treaty (Spanish: Tratado de Paz y Amistad de 1984 entre Chile y Argentina) was an agreement signed in 1984 between Argentina and Chile establishing friendly relations between the two countries. Particularly, the treaty defines the border delineation and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Magellan and gives possession of the Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands and sea located south of Tierra del Fuego to Chile, but the most part of the Exclusive Economic Zone eastwards of the Cape Horn-Meridian to Argentina. After that, other border disputes were resolved by peaceful means.

The 1984 treaty was succeeded by the Maipu Treaty of Integration and Cooperation (Tratado de Maipú de Integración y Cooperación) signed on 30 October 2009.

Post-1990 relations

Argentine support for Bolivia

Despite the Pactos de Mayo agreement, in 2004 Argentina proposed to establish a "corridor" through Chilean territory under partial Argentine administration as a Bolivian outlet to sea. After talks with Chilean ambassador to Argentina, the Kirchner government pulled out of the proposal and declared the issue as "concerning Chile and Bolivia" only.

Border issues

Main article: Southern Patagonian Ice Field dispute § Boundary area of pending demarcation
This map shows the current border of the Southern Patagonian Ice Field, the B Section is pending delineation since 1998.

In 1898 the border in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field was defined and wasn't objected during the 1902 Arbitral award of the Andes which defined most of the border on the current Province territory. Both experts, Francisco Pascasio Moreno from Argentina and Diego Barros Arana from Chile agreed on the border between Mount Fitz Roy and Cerro Daudet. However the border started being questioned by Argentina later on which started the dispute between both countries.

In the 1990s, relations improved dramatically. The dictator and last president of the Argentine Military Junta, General Reynaldo Bignone, called for democratic elections in 1983, and Augusto Pinochet of Chile did the same in 1989. As a consequence, militaristic tendencies faded in Argentina. The Argentine presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando de la Rúa had particularly good relations with Chile. In a bilateral manner, both countries settled all the remaining disputes except Laguna del Desierto, which was decided by International Arbitration in 1994. That decision favoured Argentine claims.

According to a 1998 negotiation held in Buenos Aires, a 50 km (31 mi) a border redraw is agreed, being pending to this day the part between Mount Fitz Roy and Cerro Murallón, however a new border was drawn between Cerro Murallón and Cerro Daudet.

In 2006, president Néstor Kirchner invited Chile to define the border in the pending area, but Michelle Bachelet's government left the invitation unanswered. The same year, the Chilean government sent a note to Argentina complaining that Argentine tourism maps showed the boundary claimed by Argentina in the Southern Patagonian Ice Field prior to the 1998 agreement, placing most of the area in Argentina.

In the maps published in Argentina, until today, the region continues to be shown without the white rectangle, as can be seen in a map of Santa Cruz on a website of an official Argentine agency. While in the official Chilean maps and most tourist maps, the rectangle is shown and it is clarified that the boundary is not demarcated according to the 1998 treaty.

Officially Chile is a neutral party in the Argentine claim on the Falkland Islands. Although Chile acknowledges the Argentine claim as legal, it does not support any special party continuously calling for peaceful negotiations to resolve the matter.

Overlapping Argentine and Chilean Antarctic claims on Antarctica (1946–present).

Geopolitics over Antarctica and the control of the passages between the south Atlantic and the south Pacific have led to the founding of cities and towns such as Ushuaia and Puerto Williams, both of which claim to be the southernmost cities in World. Currently, both countries have research stations in Antarctica, as does the United Kingdom. All three nations claim the totality of the Antarctic Peninsula.

See also: Argentine Antarctica and Chilean Antarctic Territory

Dispute over the extended continental shelf

Map of the dispute.
This section is an excerpt from Dispute over the extended continental shelf in the Southern Zone Sea between Argentina and Chile § History.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of April 30, 1982, which entered into force on November 16, 1994, established the regime of the continental shelf in Part VI (Articles 76 to 85), defining in Article 76, paragraph 1 what is understood as a continental shelf.

Argentina ratified the convention on January 12, 1995, and it came into force for the country on December 31, 1995.

On August 25, 1997, Chile signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and it entered into force for the country on September 24, 1997.

In 2009, Argentina submitted a presentation to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which was accepted in 2016 by the UNCLOS. The map in the submission included the disputed territories with the United Kingdom, such as the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands, a crescent-shaped area south of Argentina's territorial sea as defined in the 1984 treaty with Chile. This area was also claimed by Chile as part of its presential sea, and the sea surrounding the Antarctic Peninsula, which is claimed by all three aforementioned countries. That same year, on May 8, Chile submitted its Preliminary Report to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

In 2020, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies unanimously approved the outer limit of the Argentine Continental Shelf in Law 27,557.

That same year, on December 21, Chile submitted to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf the partial report on the extended continental shelf in Easter Island and Salas y Gómez.

In 2021, Chilean President Sebastián Piñera signed Supreme Decree No. 95, which outlined the continental shelf east of the 67º 16' 0 meridian as part of Chile's continental shelf (not the extended one) area projected from the Diego Ramírez Islands, also claiming the crescent area that Argentina considers part of its extension achieved under the extended continental shelf principle. This was reflected in the SHOA Chart No. 8 and prompted a response from the Argentine Foreign Ministry against Chile's measure.

In February 2022, Chile submitted its second partial presentation regarding the Western Continental Shelf of the Chilean Antarctic Territory. In August of the same year, Chile made the oral presentations of both partial submissions during the 55th Session of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at the United Nations in New York.

In 2023, Chile, through SHOA, made available an illustrative graphic showing all the maritime areas claimed by the country, which was once again rejected by Argentina.

In July 2023, the International Court of Justice ruled on the priority of a Continental Shelf over a Extended Continental Shelf in the case of the territorial and maritime dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua.

Economy and energy

Trade between the two countries is made mostly over the mountain passes that have enough infrastructure for large scale trade. The trade balance shows a great deal of asymmetry. As of 2005, Chile is the third export trading partner for Argentina, behind Brazil and the United States. Significant import products from Argentina to Chile include cereal grains and meat. Recently, significant Chilean capital has been invested in Argentina, especially in the retail market sector.

In 1996, Chile became an associate member of Mercosur, a regional trade agreement that Argentina and Brazil created in the 1990s. This associate membership does not convey full membership to Chile, however. In 2009, approvals were granted for a $3-billion Pascua Lama project to mine an ore body on the border of the two countries. In 2016, Argentina's exports to Chile amounted to US$2.3 billion, while Chile's exports to Argentina amounted to US$689.5 million.

Gas

Argentine president Carlos Menem signed a natural gas exportation treaty with Chilean president Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle in 1996. In 2005, President Néstor Kirchner broke the treaty due to a supply shortage experienced by Argentina. The situation in Argentina was partly resolved when Argentina increased its own imports from Bolivia, a country with no diplomatic relations with Chile since 1978. In the import contract signed with Bolivia it was specified that not even a drop of Bolivian gas could be sold to Chile from Argentina.

Sports

In 2003, Argentine AFA's president suggested that both countries launch a joint bid for the 2014 FIFA World Cup but was abandoned in favor of a CONMEBOL unified posture to allow the tournament be hosted in Brazil.

Beginning in 2009, the Dakar Rally began to be held in South America, and both Argentina and Chile have collaborated in organizing the annual cross-border event multiple times.

Host country Chile and Argentina contested the 2015 Copa America final and Chile was declared Champion after penalty shots. Copa America 2016 trophy was also for Chile against Argentina once again in the penalty shots.

Argentina's and Chile's clash in Pool D of the 2023 Rugby World Cup in France marked the first ever encounter between two South American teams since the inception of the tournament in 1987. Los Pumas went on to defeat Los Cóndores 59 points to 5. The encounter is considered a milestone in the development of rugby in South America.

Technology

Argentina announced on 28 August 2009 the election of the Japanese/Brazilian ISDB-T digital television standard with Chile following the same direction on 14 September.

Military integration

Since the 1990s, both militaries have begun a close defense cooperation and friendship policy. In September 1991 they signed together with Brazil, the Mendoza Declaration, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transfer —directly or indirectly— chemical or biological weapons.

Joint exercises were established on an annual basis in the three armed forces alternately in Argentina and Chile territory. An example of such maneuvers is the Patrulla Antártica Naval Combinada (English: Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol) performed by both Navies to guarantee safety to all touristic and scientific ships that are in transit within the Antarctic Peninsula.

Both nations are highly involved in UN peacekeeping missions. UNFICYP in Cyprus was a precedent where Chilean troops are embedded in the Argentine contingent. They played a key role together at MINUSTAH in Haiti and in 2005 they began the formation of a joint force for future United Nations mandates. Named Cruz del Sur (English: Crux), the new force began assembly in 2008 with headquarters alternately on each country every year.

In 2005, while the Argentine Navy school ship ARA Libertad was under overhaul, Argentine cadets were invited to complete their graduation on the Chilean Navy school ship Esmeralda and in another gesture of confidence, on 24 June 2007, a Gendarmeria Nacional Argentina (Border Guard) patrol was given permission to enter Chile to rescue tourists after their bus became trapped in snow.

Chilean earthquake

On 13 March 2010, following the Chilean earthquake the benefit concert Argentina Abraza Chile (English: Argentina Hugs Chile) was hosted in Buenos Aires, and an Argentine Air Force Mobile Field Hospital was deployed to Curicó.

On 8 April 2010 the newly elected Chilean president Sebastián Piñera made his first trip abroad a visit to Buenos Aires where he thanked president Cristina Fernández for the help received. He also stated his commitment to an increased cooperation between the two countries.

Argentina protects fugitive of Chilean justice

In September 2010, CONARE (the Argentine National Refugee Commission, a department of the Argentine Interior Ministry) granted asylum to Chilean citizen Galvarino Apablaza. Apablaza now lives in Argentina where he is married to journalist Paula Chain, and is father to three Argentine-born children. Chain has worked for the Argentine Government press office since 2009. Apablaza is accused by Chile of being involved in the murder of Chilean Senator Jaime Guzmán in 1991, during the government of Patricio Aylwin, as well as the kidnapping of the son of one of the owners of the El Mercurio newspaper. The asylum status has been universally rejected by the Chilean government, as well as by the Argentine political opposition. Some Argentine media and journalists have pointed out that the Argentine government ignored a ruling of the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice allowing the extradition of Apablaza. Chilean state attorney Gustavo Gené has pointed out that there was no question of the Chilean legal system's authority or grounds by the Argentine Commission, and that the reasons for granting political asylum were based exclusively on "humanitarian grounds".

The Argentine decree 256/2010 about the Strait of Magellan

On 17 February 2010 the Argentine executive issued the decree 256/2010 pertaining to authorisation requirements placed on shipping to and from Argentina but also to ships going through Argentine jurisdictional water heading for ports in the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. This decree was implemented by disposition 14/2010 of the Prefectura Naval Argentina. On 19 May 2010 the United Kingdom presented a note verbale rejecting the Argentine government's decrees and stipulating that the UK considered the decrees "are not compliant with International Law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ”, and with respect to the Straits of Magellan the note recalls that "the rights of international shipping to navigate these waters expeditiously and without obstacle are affirmed in the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Chile and Argentina with respect to the Straits of Magellan".

Article 10 of the 1984 Treaty states "The Argentine Republic undertakes to maintain, at any time and in whatever circumstances, the right of ships of all flags to navigate expeditiously and without obstacles through its jurisdictional waters to and from the Strait of Magellan".

Resident diplomatic missions


  • Embassy of Argentina in Santiago Embassy of Argentina in Santiago
  • Consulate-General of Argentina in Santiago Consulate-General of Argentina in Santiago
  • Consulate-General of Argentina in Valparaïso Consulate-General of Argentina in Valparaïso
  • Embassy of Chile in Buenos Aires Embassy of Chile in Buenos Aires
  • Consulate-General of Chile in Buenos Aires Consulate-General of Chile in Buenos Aires
  • Consulate-General of Chile in Comodoro Rivadavia Consulate-General of Chile in Comodoro Rivadavia

See also

References

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Sources

External links

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