Battle of Zabłocie | |||||||
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Part of during the Polish–Ukrainian ethnic conflict in the World War II | |||||||
The 348th Platoon “Kirgiz” of the Peasant Battalions | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Peasant Battalions Home Army |
Third Reich Ukrainian Auxiliary Police 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen–SS “Galicia” | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Stanisław Basaj Mieczysław Olszak | Unknown | ||||||
Units involved | |||||||
Unknown | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
140 men | About 350 men | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
3 killed 5–7 wounded |
27 killed many wounded |
The Battle of Zabłocie (Polish: Bitwa pod Zabłocami, Ukrainian: Бій під Заблоцями; 14 February 1944) was fought between the 348th Platoon “Kirgiz” and Battalion “Ryś” of the Peasant Battalions and Platoon “Hardy” of the Home Army under the command of Stanisław Basaj and Mieczysław Olszak against the Third Reich, Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen–SS “Galicia” in the Hrubieszów County of the Lublin Voivodeship.
An armed clash in 1944Background
Prior to the battle, the Ryś Battalion, reinforced by a detachment of Volhynians under the command of Jan Ochman, aka. Kozak, planned to strike at the Ukrainian self defense and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Ukrainian police base in Sahryń. The Volhynians unit, well-armed, went over to the BCh side with its own equipment, including machine guns and grenades. However, plans for an attack were aborted when, on the morning of 14 February, German SS forces supported by Ukrainian auxiliary police launched an offensive in the Zabłoko area. The Germans, numbering around 270 soldiers, surrounded the village, forcing the partisans to defend themselves.
Battle
Unsuccessful attack by Polish forces and Counterattack
The attack began with an onslaught of German columns from three directions: Hrubieszów, Łasków and Kryłów. In the village of Zabłocie the defence was carried out by the 4th platoon of Szczygiel (40 soldiers) and a team of Volhynians with a Maxim machine gun. However, at the initial stage of the fighting, the partisans did not have enough machine guns at their disposal, as most of the equipment was earmarked for the planned action in Sahryń. Under the pressure of the overwhelming German forces, the defenders were forced to withdraw to the Małkowski forest. There, there was a regrouping and concentration of Peasant Battalions and Home Army units, which gathered two operational machine guns by an Home army team from Prehoryłe. From the Małkowski forest, the partisans attempted a counter-attack, moving on Zabłocie with shouts of "Hurra". Initially, they managed to occupy an area of several hundred metres, but the open field and heavy German fire from behind the ruins and buildings meant that the assault failed. The partisans, pressed by machine fire, suffered heavy losses, making it impossible to continue the fight.
At a critical moment for the Polish forces, the commander Ryś organised a support group, which set out to help the less well-armed partisans defending Zabłocie. The Ryś unit, consisting of about 25 soldiers equipped with three erkaemes, reached the vicinity of the Górki colony, where fierce fighting was taking place.
The unit was divided into two groups. The first, larger one, was commanded by Kozak, who took up positions on the right flank, closer to the Mircze colony. The smaller group, headed by Ryś, moved to the left flank, with the intention of reaching the eastern part of the Górki colony. Positions were taken along the route to Kryłów, where the partisans deployed an erkaem to cover the movements of their forces. During the march, Ryś spotted two German soldiers setting fire to buildings in the colony. Both were eliminated in precise sniper actions. The group then took up positions in the buildings, where a machine gun was set up and prepared for battle. To the west of Ryś position, about 50 Germans were grouped, who initially did not notice the Polish partisans. Taking advantage of the element of surprise, the partisans attacked. Erkaem Ryś, together with the carbines of the remaining soldiers, successfully attacked the enemy, who was momentarily disoriented and dazed.
Although surprise initially gave the Polish partisans the advantage, the Germans quickly responded with massive machine-gun fire. The position of the German soldiers, although numerically stronger, was difficult - the right wing of the partisans, commanded by Kozak, was to close their retreat route towards Mircze. It is not clear whether Kozak's manoeuvre was successfully carried out. The final results of this phase of the battle remain uncertain, although the Polish partisans certainly showed courage and effectiveness against a more numerous opponent.
Retreat of the Germans and Ukrainians
Under the pressure of the Polish partisans, the Germans began to retreat westwards, heading towards the Laskowski forest through the Szczur buildings. Kozak's unit clashed with the German guard, but despite their losses (’Kozak’ was wounded, and several partisans were killed or wounded), the Polish partisans shattered the enemy's defences. Unfortunately, they failed to close the retreat route towards Mircz, allowing the Germans to split into two groups. The encircled group of German soldiers (about 50 men) was cornered in the eastern cauldron between the forces of Szczygiel from the south-east, Ryś from the east and part of the right wing of Kozak from the west. The Germans tried to break out of the encirclement to the south-west, in the direction of the Łaski forest. At the same time, a second cauldron formed on the Kryłów-Mircze route. A group of Germans, who tried to retreat along the route towards Mircze, clashed with a partisan barrage near Brzozowski's mill. Despite heavy shelling, the Germans managed to break out of the encirclement, heading north. The remaining German soldiers defended themselves in the meadows of the Mircze colony, where they took up positions along a deep ditch.
The partisans, attacking the German positions, took advantage of numerical superiority and surprise. The attack was led by the Modrin Independent Section, supported by the fire of a Browning wz. 30 operated by Pampuch. During the fighting, a German MG gunner managed to wound ‘Pampuch’, causing temporary chaos in the Polish ranks. The panicked horses pulled back the heavy machine gun, depriving the leading unit of fire support.
Aftermath
Once the fighting was over, several serious tactical errors and misunderstandings came to light which affected the outcome of the clash. Instead of carrying out the planned encircling manoeuvre and blocking the Germans' path of retreat from the cauldrons, Hardy's platoon mistakenly attacked its own barrage group. As a result of this chaos, the third German group managed to get out of the western cauldron and escape north-east towards Rolikówka and Szychowice. Although it numbered more than 100 partisans and had one or two erkas, this group did not take an active part in the battle. Located in the Mircza forest to the west of the Mircza-Waręż road, it could have blocked the retreating German troops and destroyed their vehicles, which stood almost unprotected on the road. Instead, it passively watched events unfold. Only pressure from the erkaemist Maszynista (Stefan Macybula) induced her to cross the highway once the fighting had stopped. Despite the partisans' initial advantage and success in several sections of the fighting, a lack of synchronisation between groups and erroneous command decisions meant that the Germans managed to avoid total defeat. The battle of Zabłocie and Gorka demonstrated both the combat potential of the Polish resistance and the need for better command and coordination.
References
- Motyka 1999, p. 184.
- Jaroszyński, Kłembukowski & Tokarczuk 2020, p. 216.
- Jaroszyński, Kłembukowski & Tokarczuk 2020, p. 225.
- ^ Jaroszyński, Kłembukowski & Tokarczuk 2020, p. 226.
- Jaroszyński, Kłembukowski & Tokarczuk 2020, p. 227.
- Jaroszyński, Kłembukowski & Tokarczuk 2020, p. 228.
- Jaroszyński, Kłembukowski & Tokarczuk 2020, p. 229.
Bibliography
- Motyka, Grzegorz (1999). Tak było w Bieszczadach (in Polish). Warsaw: Volumen. ISBN 8372330654.
- Jaroszyński, Wacław; Kłembukowski, Bolesław; Tokarczuk, Eugeniusz (2020). Łuny nad Huczwą i Bugiem (PDF) (in Polish). Światowy Związek Żołnierzy Armii Krajowej Okręg Zamość. ISBN 978-83-951832-2-5.
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