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Center of gravity (COG) is a military concept referring to the primary source of strength, balance, or stability necessary for a force to maintain combat operations. Centers of gravity can be physical, moral, or both, and exist for all belligerents at all tactical, strategic, and operational levels of war simultaneously. COGs play a central role in military planning, though exact definition has been elusive, with interpretations varying substantially over time, across forces, and between theorists. Generally, a COG can be thought of as an essential part of a combatant's warfighting system, interference with which would result in disproportionate impact on their combat effectiveness.

The concept was first developed by Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, in his work On War. After the end of the Vietnam War, interest in the idea was revitalized, resulting in several competing conceptualizations. Although the framework is used by armed forces around the world, there is widespread controversy regarding its definition and utility. Present academic literature on the subject generally agrees the term needs further clarification and careful application, while some theorists call for its complete removal from military doctrine.

United States

This section needs expansion with: Analysis of a conventional force's COG(s). This should be placed at the end of the section near existing text regarding that of an insurgency. You can help by adding to it. (August 2024)

The United States Department of Defense defines a COG as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act", although there has been a significant and widespread push to revert to a more classical, Clausewitzian interpretation of the phrase. There are twelve qualities of COGs the Joint Chiefs of Staff have doctrinally recognized:

1. Exists at each level of warfare
2. Mostly physical at operational and tactical levels
3. Is a source of leverage
4. Allows or enhances freedom of action
5. May be where the enemy's force is most densely concentrated
6. Can endanger one's own COGs
7. May be transitory in nature
8. Linked to objective(s)
9. Dependent upon adversarial relationship
10. Can shift over time or between phases
11. Often depends on factors of time and space
12. Contains many intangible elements at strategic level

Because the COG is one or multiple root enablers of a combatant's ability to interfere with the objectives of an opponent, friendly force composition plays just as significant a role in how this concept is interpreted as that of the opponent. As such, each of the various United States Armed Forces Service branches understand the concept through a unique lens specific to that branch's structure and operational priorities and capabilities. Due to the size and scale of the United States Army, it tends to recognize a COG as a combatant's strongest characteristic, capability, or locality. Conversely, due to the lower personnel count of the United States Marine Corps, they tend to view a COG as the weakness of a combatant. On the other hand, the United States Air Force takes a "targeting" approach to warfare, meaning they often treat COGs as a series of bombable strategic and operational-critical targets.

This means, in the case of an insurgency, the U.S. military may define their opponent's COG as the entire host population, a core group of leaders/believers, or an external nation's material, financial, or political support.

Center of gravity analysis

COG analysis helps to identify vulnerabilities and how an actor's will might be influenced to achieve objectives. Most modern systems of COG analysis rely on Joseph Strange's assessment framework of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of a combatant's mission. Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Defense University and Joint Forces Quarterly discuss three approaches to assessment of these critical factors:

• Critical Factors Analysis (CFA)
• Eikmeier method
• Godzilla method

Both the Eikmeier and Godzilla methods provide testable criteria for measuring and assessing various factors in the analysis. Meanwhile, CFA uses a subjective system of "means, ways, and ends" to assess critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. CFA is the only system officially recognized by Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Publications.

Critical Factors Analysis

When using CFA, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies the characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat. It is the only COG analysis system officially recognized in Joint Publications.

Eikmeier method

There are six steps involved in Eikmeier's method of COG analysis:

1. Identify the organization's desired ends or objectives.
2. Identify the possible “ways” or actions that can achieve the desired ends. Select the way(s) that the evidence suggests the organization is most likely to use. Remember: Ways are actions and should be expressed as verbs. Then select the most elemental or essential action—that selection is the critical capability. Ways = critical capabilities.
3. List the organization's means available or needed to execute the way/critical capability.
4. Select the entity (noun) from the list of means that inherently possesses the critical capability to achieve the end. This selection is the center of gravity. It is the doer of the action that achieves the ends.
5. From the remaining items on the means list, select those that are critical for execution of the critical capability. These are the critical requirements.
6. Complete the process by identifying those critical requirements vulnerable to adversary actions.

Godzilla method

In the Godzilla method, the critical strengths of the system are listed. Planners then evaluate the hypothetical impact of Godzilla "destroying" each item on the list. When a force is no longer able to achieve its operational objectives because of the neutralization or destruction of a single element within the system, that element is the center of gravity.

See also

• Military strategy
• United States Army Strategist

Notes

References

1. ^ Joint Chiefs of Staff (2020-12-01). "Chapter IV: Operational Design". Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (2020 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. pp. IV-23, IV-24–IV-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
2. ^ Angstrom, Jan; Widen, J. J. (2014-07-17). Contemporary Military Theory: The dynamics of war. Routledge. pp. 60–64. ISBN 978-1-136-16920-5.
3. ^ Šlebir, Miha (2022-10-01). "Re-examining the center of gravity: Theoretical and structural analysis of the concept". Revista Científica General José María Córdova. 20 (40): 1025–1044. doi:10.21830/19006586.979. ISSN 2500-7645.
4. Clausewitz, Carl Von (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside Press LLC. pp. 144, 151, 253, 331–4, 413–4, 430–1, 437, 444. ISBN 978-1-4344-0496-1.
5. ^ Meyer, Eystein L. (2022-07-03). "The centre of gravity concept: contemporary theories, comparison, and implications". Defence Studies. 22 (3): 327–353. doi:10.1080/14702436.2022.2030715. ISSN 1470-2436.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017-03-01). Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. 33. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
7. United States Marine Corps (1997-06-20). MCDP 1 Warfighting (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps. pp. 45–49, 77, 82, 92. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
8. ^ Strange, Joseph L. (1996). Centers Of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building On The Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak The Same Language (PDF). 4 (2nd ed.). Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University. pp. ix–xvi, 2, 43. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018-10-22) . Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (PDF) (Change 1 ed.). Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. Retrieved 2023-09-27.
10. Strange, Joseph L.; Iron, Richard (October 2004). "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (35). Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies: 20–27. Retrieved 2023-09-01 – via National Defense University.
11. Echevarria, Antulio J. (2003). "Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: It's Not What We Thought". Naval War College Review. 56. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College. Archived from the original on 2023-09-27. Retrieved 2023-09-27.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
12. Echevarria, Antulio J. II (2002-09-01). Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine--Again!. United States Army War College Press. Retrieved 2023-09-27. Clausewitz's military CoG and the CoG of the mechanical sciences share many of the same properties: neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, but rather a focal point where physical (and psychological) forces come together.
13. United States Department of the Army (2014-05-13). "Chapter 7: Planning and Operational Considerations". FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (PDF). Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Army. p. 7-6. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
14. Army University (2011). Cox, Dan; Bruscino, Thomas (eds.). Population-Centric Counterinsurgency: A False Idol? (PDF). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combined Arms Center. pp. 93, 102, 120–121. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
15. NATO (2022-12-19). AJP-01 (PDF) ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (F ed.). NATO Standardization Office. p. 106. STANAG 2437. Retrieved 2023-09-26.
16. Smith, Daniel J.; Jeter, Kelley; Westgaard, Odin (July 2015). "Three Approaches to Center of Gravity Analysis: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (PDF). Joint Force Quarterly (78). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 129–135. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
17. Eikmeier, Dale C. (September 2007). "A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Combined Arms Center: 62–66. Retrieved 2023-09-27 – via Army University.
18. Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2010). "Redefining the Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (59). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 156–158. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
19. Eikmeier, Dale C. (October 2016). "Let's Fix or Kill the Center of Gravity Concept" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly (83). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 109–115. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
20. Eikmeier, Dale C. (May 2017). "The Center of Gravity: Still Relevant After All These Years?" (PDF). Military Review. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University: 7. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
21. Butler, James P. (January 2014). "Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly ( This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.) (72). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 26–30. Retrieved 2023-11-09.

External links

• Echevarria, Antulio J. II (Summer 2003). "'Reining in' the Center of Gravity Concept". Air and Space Power Journal. 17 (2). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-04-23. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
• Sidoti, Anthony F. "The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in Operation Iraqi Freedom". Air and Space Power Journal. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-02-26. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
• Kornatz, Steven D. (2016-07-01). "The Primacy of COG in Planning: Getting Back to Basics" (PDF). Joint Forces Quarterly. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University: 91–96. Retrieved 2023-11-09.
• Eikmeier, Dale C. (2015-10-13). Operational Art, Design and the Center of Gravity (Video). United States Army Command and General Staff College – via YouTube.
• Heerwagen, Belinda (2007-03-30). "Carl Von Clausewitz and His Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist" (PDF). Strategy Research Project. United States Army War College.

• Military strategy
• Carl von Clausewitz