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Republic of Iraq(2003–2004) جمهورية العراق Jumhūriyyat al-ʽIrāq
2003–2004
Top: Flag of Iraq Bottom: Flag of the United States Seal of the Coalition Provisional Authority
Motto: "Security, Liberty, Equality, Justice"
Anthem: Mawtini (de jure) (English: "My Homeland") "The Star-Spangled Banner" (de facto)
The CPA exercised its influence over Iraq.
Status	Transitional government under United States military occupation
Capitaland largest city	Baghdad
Common languages	Arabic Kurdish English (de facto)
Government	Transitional government
• President of the United States	George W. Bush (2003–2004)
• American Administrator	Jay Garner (2003) Paul Bremer (2003–2004)
• President of the Governing Council of Iraq	Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum (2003, 2004) Ibrahim al-Jaafari (2003) Ahmed Chalabi (2003) Iyad Allawi (2003) Jalal Talabani (2003) Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim (2003) Adnan Pachachi (2004) Mohsen Abdel Hamid (2004) Massoud Barzani (2004) Ezzedine Salim (2004) Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer (2004)
Legislature	Iraqi Governing Council
Historical era	Iraq War
• Saddam Hussein and Ba'ath Party deposed	21 April 2003
• CPA established	16 May 2003
• Investment in post-invasion Iraq	23 October 2003
• Interim government	28 June 2004
Currency	Iraqi dinar United States dollar (USD)
ISO 3166 code	IQ
Preceded by Succeeded by Ba'athist Iraq Iraq
Today part of	Iraq

Coalition Provisional Authority
Sultat Alaitilaf Almuaqata
تحالف السلطة المؤقتة

Seal of the CPA
Abbreviation	CPA
Predecessor	Revolutionary Command Council of Ba'athist Iraq
Successor	Iraqi Interim Government of Iraq
Formation	16 May 2003
Type	Provisional authority
Purpose	Deliberative assembly deliberative democracy
Headquarters	Baghdad
Location	Iraq
Official language	Arabic English
American Administrator	Jay Garner (2003) Paul Bremer (2003–2004)
American Deputy Administrator	Richard Jones
President of the Governing Council of Iraq	Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum (2003, 2004) Ibrahim al-Jaafari (2003) Ahmed Chalabi (2003) Iyad Allawi (2003) Jalal Talabani (2003) Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim (2003) Adnan Pachachi (2004) Mohsen Abdel Hamid (2004) Massoud Barzani (2004) Ezzedine Salim (2004) Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer (2004)

The Coalition Provisional Authority (Arabic: سلطة الائتلاف المؤقتة, romanized: Sultat Alaitilaf Almuaqata; Kurdish: دەسەڵاتی کاتی هاوپەیمانی, romanized: Desteya Demkî ya Hevbendiyê, abbr. CPA) was a transitional government of Iraq established following the invasion of the country on 19 March 2003 by U.S.-led Coalition forces. The invasion marked the fall of the Ba'athist regime led by Saddam Hussein.

Citing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and the laws of war, the CPA was established in May 2003 and vested itself with executive, legislative, and judiciary authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA's inception on 21 April 2003 until its dissolution on 28 June 2004.

The CPA was admonished for its mismanagement of funds allocated to the reconstruction of post-invasion Iraq, with over $8 billion of these unaccounted for, including over $1.6 billion in cash that emerged in a basement in Lebanon.

History of the CPA

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The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (Arabic: مكتب إعادة الإعمار والمساعدة الإنسانية, romanized: Maktab 'ieadat al'iiemar walmusaeadat al'iinsania; Kurdish: فەرمانگەی ئاوەدانکردنەوە و هاوکاری مرۆیی, romanized: Ofîsa Nûavakirin û Alîkariya Mirovî, abbr. ORHA) was established on 20 January 2003 by the United States government two months before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was intended to act as a caretaker administration in Iraq until the creation of a democratically elected civilian government.

Retired United States Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed as the Director of ORHA, along with three deputies, including British Major-General Tim Cross, in 2003. Upon the dissolution of ORHA and the creation of the CPA, he then became the first chief executive of the CPA. Due to his past military experiences in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and his reconstruction efforts in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, Garner's credentials and close ties to the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made him an obvious choice for the task. His term, however, lasted only from 21 April 2003 until he was replaced abruptly less than a month later by Paul Bremer on 11 May 2003.

Garner's swift dismissal from his post by U.S. authorities came as a surprise to many within the CPA. In an interview with the BBC program Newsnight Garner publicly stated that his preference was to put the Iraqi people in charge as soon as possible and to do it with some form of elections.

Upon assuming the post of chief executive of the CPA in May 2003, Paul Bremer also assumed the title of U.S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq. He was frequently called Ambassador by numerous media organizations and the White House because it was the highest government rank he had achieved (Ambassador to Netherlands). But Bremer was not ambassador to Iraq, and there was no U.S. diplomatic mission in Iraq until June 2004, after the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. At the CPA, Bremer moved quickly to install opaque and corruption-prone methods for the withdrawal and transportation of extremely large amounts of cash often transported from the US to Iraq by C-17 transport plane.

The CPA was created and funded as a division of the United States Department of Defense, and as Administrator, Bremer reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. Although troops from several of the coalition countries were present in Iraq at this time, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was the primary military apparatus charged with providing direct combat support to the CPA to enforce its authority during the occupation of Iraq.

While many of Saddam Hussein's ornate palaces were looted in the days immediately following the invasion, most of the physical structures themselves survived relatively intact. It is in these numerous palaces situated throughout the country that the CPA chose to set up office in order to govern. Several of these palaces were retained by the U.S. government even after the transition of power back to the Iraqi people. The administration was centered in a district of Baghdad known as the Green Zone, which eventually became a highly secure walled-off enclave.

The CPA was also responsible for administering the Development Fund for Iraq during the year following the invasion. This fund superseded the earlier UN Oil-for-food programme, and provided funding for Iraq's wheat purchase program, the currency exchange program, the electricity and oil infrastructure programs, equipment for Iraq's security forces, Iraqi civil service salaries, and the operations of the various government ministries.

The first act of the CPA under Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1, was to order the de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society. On 23 May, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 formally disbanded the Iraqi army, as well as other public servants including nurses and doctors and eventually led to the direct unemployment of more than 500,000 Iraqi citizens. On 22 July 2003, the CPA formed the Iraqi Governing Council and appointed its members. The Council membership consisted largely of Iraqi expatriates who had previously fled the country during the rule of Saddam Hussein and also with many outspoken dissidents who had been persecuted by the former Ba'athist regime. The CPA under Bremer then went on to privatise and sell off publicly owned assets and companies to multinational companies, whilst setting about issuing unilaterally developed decrees such as Order 37 and Order 39, which reduced Iraq's corporation tax from 40% to 15% and allowed foreign entities to enjoy 100% ownership of Iraqi assets.

Though still subordinate to the CPA, the Iraqi Governing Council had several key responsibilities of its own: appointing representatives to the United Nations, appointing interim ministers to Iraq's vacant cabinet positions, and drafting a temporary constitution known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which would be used to govern Iraq until a permanent constitution could be written and approved by the general electorate.

In the late afternoon of 14 December 2003, the CPA held a press conference at the Iraqi Forum convention center within Baghdad's Green Zone to announce that former President of Iraq Saddam Hussein had been taken into custody the previous night from a foxhole in a town near Saddam's home town of Tikrit, Iraq. Present at the announcement was Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez of the U.S. Army, Administrator Bremer, members of the British and American intelligence agencies, several members of the Iraqi Governing Council, and a large room full of journalists representing news organizations from around the world.

In order to defeat possible insurgent planning and under pressure from the Bush White House which wanted the occupation to end by the 2004 presidential election, the CPA transferred power to the newly appointed Iraqi Interim Government at 10:26 AM local time on 28 June 2004. The transfer of power was originally scheduled for 30 June 2004, but because of a concern that the transfer would lead to insurgent attacks the ceremony was held, unannounced, two days ahead of schedule. The transfer took place behind closed doors with little fanfare. With the CPA disbanded, Bremer left Iraq that same day.

The United States hoped that Iraq could be reconstructed and democratized in much the same way as Japan and Germany were after the Second World War, using them as "examples or even models of successful military occupations."

Structure of the CPA

The CPA was divided into four geographic regions. CPA North was headquartered in the northern Iraqi city of Erbil, CPA Central in Baghdad at Saddam's former Republican Palace, CPA South Central in the Iraqi city of Hillah near the ruins of Babylon and CPA South in the southern Iraqi city of Basra. Each region operated semi-autonomously, and all four had the same common goals for reconstruction of the country. Throughout the existence of the CPA, the security situation and levels of civil unrest throughout the country varied by region, and these variances were reflected in the different levels of program successes within the CPA divisions.

Non-government organizations and private charities and the CPA

Role of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB)

United Nations resolution 1483 transferred the authority to authorize expenditures from Iraq's oil revenue from the United Nations to the Coalition Provisional Authority—under certain conditions, including:

• The expenditures were made in an open, transparent manner.
• The expenditures were subject to the supervision of a blue ribbon panel of international financial experts, the IAMB.
• Spending decisions were to be made with meaningful Iraqi input.

The International Advisory and Monitoring Board consisted of senior financial experts from the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development.

The IAMB had serious concerns over the CPA's lack of transparency and lack of adequate financial controls, which were never resolved. The IAMB still exists and is playing a role in the investigations into the CPA's financial management.

The CPA's Program Review Board

The Program Review Board (PRB) was an eleven-member board that consisted of ten staff members from the CPA and one member of the Iraqi Governing Council. The chair of the board was also the CPA's senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance.

It was the board's responsibility to review and make recommendations to the CPA administrator on which contracts should be awarded. In order to ensure transparency, all key discussions regarding the pros and cons of the programs under consideration were to be made public. The CPA administrator was supposed to make decisions on the awarding of contracts only after receiving a recommendation from this committee.

The Notes on Internal Control from KPMG's audit of DFI expenditures was particularly critical of PRB record-keeping's failing to fulfill the CPA's transparency obligation. In particular:

• Meetings were held in which attendance was not recorded.
• Meetings were held in which decisions were made in the absence of quorums.
• The Program Review Board never recorded the motions to approve expenditures, who seconded motions, or which members were for or against those motions.
• In the 43 meetings held in 2003, the single Iraqi member of the board attended only two meetings.
• The minutes failed to contain sufficient detail for readers to understand why programs were approved.
• Program decisions that had been tabled were later approved informally outside the meetings, with no recording of the reasoning behind the decision.
• The board chair refused to certify the accuracy of the Board's bookkeeping.

Privatization of Iraq's economy

Prior to US occupation, Iraq had a centrally planned economy. Among other things, it prohibited foreign ownership of Iraqi businesses, ran most large industries as state-owned enterprises, and imposed large tariffs to keep out foreign goods. After the invasion of Iraq, the CPA quickly began issuing many binding orders privatizing Iraq's economy and opening it up to foreign investment.

CPA Order 39, entitled "Foreign Investment," provided that "A foreign investor shall be entitled to make foreign investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor," and that "he amount of foreign participation in newly formed or existing business entities in Iraq shall not be limited...." Additionally, the foreign investor "shall be authorized to... transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment, including shares or profits and dividends....". Critics assert that the CPA drastically altered Iraq's economy, allowing virtually unlimited and unrestricted foreign investment and placing no limitations on the expatriation of profit. However, these policies were in accord with current international standards on foreign direct investment to which most of the developed world adheres. The order concluded, "Where an international agreement to which Iraq is a party provides for more favorable terms with respect to foreign investors undertaking investment activities in Iraq, the more favorable terms under the international agreement shall apply." According to critics, this order was designed to create as favorable an environment for foreign investors as possible, thereby allowing American and multinational corporations to dominate Iraq's economy. Others argue the CPA considered free market reform essential for Iraq's oil wealth to generate sustainable growth and development, instead of consigning Iraq to a resource trap by maintaining the laws of the previous totalitarian regime.

CPA Order 17 granted all foreign contractors operating in Iraq immunity from "Iraqi legal process," effectively granting immunity from any kind of suit, civil or criminal, for actions the contractors engaged in within Iraq. CPA Order 49 provided a tax cut for corporations operating within Iraq. It reduced the rate from a maximum of 40% to a maximum of 15% on income. Corporations working with the CPA were exempted from owing any tax. CPA Order 12, amended by Order 54, suspended all tariffs, thus removing the advantage that domestic Iraqi producers had over foreign producers. However, a 5% "reconstruction levy" on all imported goods was later reimposed to help finance Iraqi-initiated reconstruction projects.

CPA Order 57 provided for the appointment of "Inspectors General" to operate within each Iraqi government ministry, for the purposes of rooting out corruption. These Inspectors General were to be "appointed to a 5-year term by the Administrator ," and were given sweeping powers "to conduct investigations, audits, evaluations, inspections, and other reviews...." Critics contend this is a mechanism for ensuring continuing American influence in Iraqi governance even after the transfer of all sovereignty to the country.

Legitimacy under international law

Critics contend that the controversial policies are fundamentally anti-democratic, or illegal under international law, because significant economic reform can only be legitimate if passed initially by an elected Iraqi government free of foreign occupation and domination, and because an occupying power is prohibited from rewriting the laws of the occupied country.

The CPA argued that imposing Order 39 was permitted under Resolution 1483, because it required the CPA to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory," and to create "conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future." Proponents of this position state Resolution 1483 necessarily requires radical economic restructuring, so it allowed an exception to international law regarding occupation. However, others point out that Resolution 1483 "calls upon all concerned to comply with international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949", which would require an occupying force to respect the laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented.

Criticism of financial management

The numbers are so large that it doesn't seem possible that they're true. Who in their right mind would send 363 tonnes of cash into a war zone?

In May 2003, the CPA took over the responsibility for administering the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). Established from the earlier UN oil-for-food program, the CPA was authorized to manage the DFI, which took in approximately $20 billion in the year after the invasion. The CPA also administered $18.4 billion that the United States Congress allocated for Iraqi reconstruction in November 2003, known as the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). By June 2004, the CPA had spent, or allocated, $19.1 billion of the DFI funds—while spending only $400 million from the IRRF. Critics suggest that Bremer selectively spent from the DFI because it was more free from accounting oversight by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

This balance between DFI and IRRF expenditures might be justifiable by the argument that the IRRF was not intended to finance the Iraqi government ministries or the Public Distribution System (state food rations from the Oil-for-food program), which the DFI was intended to cover. The $18.4 billion authorized by the U.S. congress was intended to finance large reconstruction projects such as power and sewage plants, not to provide the day-to-day operating expenses of the Iraqi government. Expenditure on the IRRF projects could be seen as delayed by the projects being in their planning and early site preparation stages and it could be said that it is not surprising that little money had been disbursed at that point, or that so much of the Development Fund for Iraq had been expended as that fund was the primary source of revenue the Iraqi government had. However, by reviewing reports from Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and other reviews and audits, it becomes clear that DFI funds were expended on projects that clearly would have been appropriate for management under IRRF. What has been troubling to auditors and inspectors general is that large amounts of DFI funding is as yet unaccounted for and was expended in reconstruction projects that failed to provide a return on investment for the Iraqi people. By funding projects under DFI the CPA avoided legal requirements to comply with US Federal Acquisition Regulations (USFARS) as required for the administration of IRRF and other US taxpayer provided funding. It is also pertinent that expenditures under IRRF were also not administered strictly according to USFARS thereby causing severe waste, fraud and abuse as documented by SIGIR and other auditing agencies.

Audits of the CPA's expenditures of Iraqi funds

When authority to manage the revenue from Iraq's oil on behalf of the Iraqi people through United Nations resolution, that authority was transferred under certain conditions.

• The funds were to be managed in an open, transparent fashion.
• The CPA was to submit to oversight from the International Advisory and Monitoring Board, a blue ribbon panel of senior international banking experts.

The IAMB tried to insist on certain financial controls, with limited success.

With input from the IAMB accounting firm KPMG was appointed to audit the CPA's expenditures from the DFI.

On 20 June 2005 the staff of the Committee on Government Reform prepared a report for Congressman Henry Waxman on the CPA's expenditures from the DFI that raised additional causes for concern. Further criticism was leveled at the CPA when it was revealed that $12 billion of cash had been delivered by C-130 planes on shrinkwrapped pallets of $100 bills. The cash deliveries were described in a memo prepared for the United States House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which concluded that "Many of the funds appear to have been lost to corruption and waste.... Some of the funds could have enriched both criminals and insurgents...." Henry Waxman, the chair of the House committee commented, "Who in their right mind would send 363 tons of cash into a war zone?" A single flight to Iraq on 12 December 2003 which contained $1.5 billion in cash is said to be the largest single Federal Reserve payout in US history according to Henry Waxman.

In 2011, a new American audit found that almost all of the missing $6.6 billion had been transferred to the Central Bank of Iraq. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen said that "Any doubts about how the money was handled after it left U.S. control is an Iraqi -- not U.S. government -- question".

Reconstruction

Although the CPA awarded contracts for essential reconstruction to American firms, some critics claim those firms did relatively little work. Bechtel, for instance, was awarded the contract to repair the Iraqi sewage and drinking water plants. Yet today many Iraqis remain without safe drinking water or adequate supplies of electricity. Coalition military forces were too heavily tasked to provide requisite security for all contractors in Iraq. Contract funds therefore had to be partially shifted from reconstruction activities to meet security requirements that had not been envisioned when the contracts were initially let. Moreover, progress in reconstruction frequently faced setbacks due to insurgency activities designed to disrupt rebuilding of the infrastructure. This insurgent activity significantly slowed reconstruction and required adjustment of project goals due to funds consumed by providing necessary security in excess of that originally planned.

According to USAID, as of October 2003, peak electrical generation had reached pre-war levels of 4,500 MW, and they were then collaborating with Bechtel as well as the Iraqi Interior Ministry and others on some 2,000 MW of projected capacity. The CPA set a goal of 6,000 MW generation capacity for the summer of 2004, which has never been reached. Peak generation capacity of 5,365 MW was achieved in August 2004, six weeks after the transfer of sovereignty. Current generation stands at approximately 13,000 MW. Weekly updates and financial summaries are provided by USAID's Iraq homepage as currently as is possible.

Administrators of the CPA

• Jay Garner (21 April 2003 – 12 May 2003)
  as Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
• Paul Bremer (12 May 2003 – 28 June 2004)
  • Richard Jones (U.S. diplomat), Deputy Administrator
  • Rear Admiral David J. Nash, U.S. Navy (ret.), Director of the Program Management Office
  • Major General Ronald L. Johnson, U.S. Army, Deputy Director of the Program Management Office
  • Lawrence Crandall, U.S. Agency for International Development, Deputy Director of the Program Management Office
  • Stuart W. Bowen Jr., Inspector General of the Program Management Office
  • Rear Admiral Larry L. Poe, U.S. Navy (ret.), Deputy Inspector General of the Program Management Office

See also

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483
• Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
• Reconstruction of Iraq
• Provisional governments
• Development Fund for Iraq
• Coalition Provisional Authority Program Review Board
• International Advisory and Monitoring Board
• KPMG audit of the Development Fund for Iraq

Notes

1. Wetzel, Dan (24 August 2004). "One last chance". Yahoo! Sports. Yahoo!. Archived from the original on 4 December 2017. Retrieved 4 December 2017. The song is 'My Country.' It is relatively short, contains no words and was composed by a man named Lewis Zanbaka...
2. ^ Schaffer, Edward; Scotland, Jan; Popp, Reinhard (2017). "Iraq (1958-1965, 2003-2004)". National Anthems. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017. Retrieved 30 November 2017. Immediately after the fall of the Sadam Hussein government in 2003, 'My Country' was used again for a brief time as an interim anthem until a new one was adopted. (The title of this anthem is identical to the title of the anthem that replaced it in 2004).{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
3. "Archived copy" (PDF). iraqcoalition.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 February 2004. Retrieved 11 January 2022.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
4. "So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go?". TheGuardian.com. 6 July 2005.
5. "Stuart Bowen". 30 November 2006.
6. Ackerman, Spencer (6 March 2013). "Over $8B of the Money You Spent Rebuilding Iraq Was Wasted Outright". Wired. ISSN 1059-1028. Archived from the original on 17 May 2023. Retrieved 23 May 2024.
7. Carroll, Rory (12 October 2014). "Billions set aside for post-Saddam Iraq turned up in Lebanese bunker". the Guardian. Retrieved 27 October 2021.
8. Thomas E. Ricks (journalist) (2006) Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq: 81
9. Chiefs of Mission: Iraq, US State Department
10. "War and Occupation in Iraq - Chapter 9 English". archive.globalpolicy.org. Retrieved 27 October 2021.
11. CPA Order number 2 Dissolution of Entities Archived 1 July 2004 at the Wayback Machine Iraq Coalition.org. Accessed 8 February 2014.
12. "Naomi Klein | Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in pursuit of a neo-con utopia". Retrieved 27 October 2021.
13. ^ "CPA Iraq". govinfo.library.unt.edu. Retrieved 27 October 2021.
14. Dower, John (April 2003). "Don't expect democracy this time: Japan and Iraq". United Kingdom: History & Policy. Archived from the original on 14 April 2010. Retrieved 9 December 2010.
15. "Iraq's economy: Past, present, future". Archived from the original on 20 October 2006. Retrieved 4 July 2005.
16. oecd.org/~restrictions on foreign ownership WTO Archived 17 October 2005 at the Wayback Machine. None.
17. Microsoft Word - wp20043.doc Archived 17 October 2015 at the Wayback Machine. (PDF) .
18. iraqcoalition.org/regulations/~Foreign_Investment_.pdf. (PDF) .
19. Whyte, Dave (March 2007). "The Crimes of Neo-Liberal Rule in Occupied Iraq". The British Journal of Criminology. 49 (2): 177–195. doi:10.1093/bjc/azl065. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
20. Henderson, Anne Ellen (April 2005). The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Learned (PDF). 1200 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036: United States Institute of Peace. p. 3. Retrieved 18 March 2022.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
21. iraqcoalition.org/~Status_of_Coalition_Rev_with_Annex_A.pdf. (PDF) .
22. iraqcoalition.org/~Tax_Strategy_of_2004_with_Annex_and_Ex_Note.pdf Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine. (PDF) .
23. "Account Suspended" (PDF). www.iraqcoalition.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 September 2013. Retrieved 9 June 2014.
24. iraqcoalition.org/~Trade_Liberlization_Policy_2004_with_Annex_A.pdf Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine. (PDF) .
25. Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force Archived 18 September 2016 at the Wayback Machine. Trade.gov.
26. "Account Suspended" (PDF). www.iraqcoalition.org. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 June 2005. Retrieved 1 July 2005.
27. Richards, Imogen (2020). Neoliberalism and neo-jihadism: Propaganda and finance in Al Qaeda and Islamic State. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-1526143228.
28. Mate, Aaron (7 November 2003). "Pillage is forbidden". the Guardian. Archived from the original on 21 March 2018. Retrieved 20 March 2018.
29. WAR: TRADE BY OTHER MEANS: How the US is getting a free trade agreement minus the negotiations Archived 29 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine. Zmag.org.
30. "Iraq: Responsibilities of the occupying powers". 15 April 2003. Archived from the original on 22 November 2018. Retrieved 21 November 2018.
31. Ho, James C (2003). "International law and the Liberation of Iraq". Tex. Rev. Law & Pol. 79 (83).
32. "Resolution 1483". United Nations Security Council. 22 May 2003. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
33. Grant, Thomas D (June 2003). "Iraq: How to reconcile conflicting obligations of occupation and reform". ASIL Insight.
34. "Resolution 1483". United Nations Security Council. 22 May 2003. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
35. ZWANENBURG, MARTEN (December 2004). "Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the law of occupation" (PDF). International Review of the Red Cross. 86: 750. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
36. ^ David Pallister (8 February 2007). "How the US sent $12bn in cash to Iraq. And watched it vanish". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 8 February 2007.
37. Administrator. "Resolution 1483". Archived from the original on 8 July 2005. Retrieved 6 July 2005.
38. Development Fund for Iraq Statement of Cash Receipts and Payments For the period from 22 May 2003 to 31 December 2003 (with Independent Auditors' Report) Archived 17 October 2005 at the Wayback Machine. (PDF) .
39. "U.S. Mismanaged Iraqi Funds". United States House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Archived from the original on 27 December 2006. Retrieved 8 February 2007.
40. Gray, Sadie. "How US lost billions in Wild West gamble to rebuild Iraq - Times Online". The Times. London. Archived from the original on 18 February 2008. Retrieved 16 April 2011.
41. "Iraq War’s ’Missing’ $6.6 Billion Is Discovered in Central Bank." Archived 2 December 2016 at the Wayback Machine Bloomberg News, 26 October 2011.
42. "Iraq's water and sanitation crisis adds to dangers faced by children and families". UNICEF. Archived from the original on 1 March 2019. Retrieved 28 February 2019.
43. About. Export.gov.
44. Official website Archived 28 June 2005 at the Wayback Machine

Further reading

• Who's Who in the Coalition Provisional Authority, The Washington Monthly, December 2003.
• Coalition Provisional Authority Archived site carrying CPA news releases, mission statements and budgets.
• USAID Assistance for Iraq Homepage (See right column for weekly updates.)
• Overview of CPA Orders Affecting Iraq's Commercial Law
• Coalition Provisional Authority - Development Fund for Iraq Introduction, 12 July 2010.
• Iraq Project and Contracting Office Website
• Global Justice Project: Iraq
• Iraq's Economy Past, Present and Future Archived 20 October 2006 at the Wayback Machine
• Crossed Wires Deprived Iraqis of Electric Power: War Plans Ignored Worn Infrastructure, The Washington Post, 23 September 2003.
• Iraq - Transitional Administrative Law, an English translation of Iraq's Interim Constitution.
• Foreign Direct Investment Restrictions in OECD Countries, an explanation of current common national practices regarding foreign direct investment and foreign ownership in OECD nations, including WTO regulations.
• Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD, 2004.
• U.S. Tightens Grip On Iraq's Future: the Wall St Journal on Iraq's looming "independence". (13 May 2004).
• In Iraq, the Job Opportunity of a Lifetime: Managing a $13 Billion Budget With No Experience The Washington Post, 22 May 2004.
• Boston Globe article that recounts questionable fiscal management on the part of the CPA Archived 20 November 2016 at the Wayback Machine.
• U.S. Funds for Iraq Are Largely Unspent The Washington Post, 4 July 2004.
• A Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments (to 30 June 2006).
• Video Seminar on Iraq Coalition Politics: 20 April 2005, sponsored by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois.
• Rules and Cash Flew Out the Window Los Angeles Times, 20 May 2005.
• Iraq too dependent on Oil Revenue - govt, Reuters, 5 June 2005.
• Iraqis Look at Cuts in Payroll Los Angeles Times, 6 June 2005.
• Bechtel Iraq Reconstruction Contracts Page
• Bechtel's Dry Run (.pdf), an independent review of the Bechtel water rehabilitation work.
• So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go?, The Guardian, 7 July 2005.
• U.S. Using Cash as a Defensive Weapon, The Washington Post, 26 July 2004.
• U.S. Presidential Discussion of War on Terror and Upcoming Iraqi Election, 12 December 2005.
• Tony Sodaro's "Iraqi Blog" after CPA, 03 October 2008
• Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, Ties to GOP Trumped Know-How Among Staff Sent to Rebuild Iraq, The Washington Post, 17 September 2006.
• Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority The RAND Corporation, 2009. By James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, Sidd harth Mohandas.
• Rathmell, Andrew, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, eds. Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience. MG-365-OSD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

External links

• Official Web Page of the Coalition Provisional Authority
• CPA Changes to Iraqi Law imposed after 2003 invasion

v t e Iraq War (2003–2011)
Beginning of the Iraqi conflict
Prelude Background Pre-1990 17 July Revolution Iranian Revolution 1979 Ba'ath Party Purge Iran–Iraq War British / U.S. support for Iraq Chemical attacks against Iran Anfal campaign Iran–Contra affair 1990–2003 Gulf War Invasion of Kuwait Nayirah testimony Sanctions against Iraq No-fly zones 1991 uprisings UNSCOM Arms-to-Iraq affair Oil-for-Food Programme Investigations September 11 attacks Aftermath War on terror 2001 anthrax attacks U.S. War in Afghanistan Invasion Rationale WMD claims Yellowcake uranium Aluminum tubes Biological weapons Chemical weapons "Curveball" Mobile weapon labs Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory Anthrax claims Prague Ricin claims Oil as a possible rationale Issues American imperialism Bush Doctrine Wolfowitz Doctrine Colin Powell's UN presentation Disarmament crisis UNMOVIC Failed peace initiatives Iraq resolution / UK parliament's support for invasion Iraqi–Kurdish conflict Legality Legitimacy of the invasion Media coverage Military analyst program Rapid response operation Saddam's alleged shredder Preemptive war Saddam Hussein and human rights Dossiers and memos Habbush letter Downing Street memo September Dossier Vilnius letter Letter of the eight Bush–Blair 2003 memo February Dossier Bush–Aznar memo
Overview Key events Invasion (2003) Occupation (2003–2011) Insurgency 2003–06 period Anbar campaign Fallujah Capture of Saddam Hussein Interrogation Trial Execution / Reactions 2006 al-Askari mosque bombing Civil war (2006–08) 2007 U.S. troop surge timeline U.S. withdrawal Status of forces agreement Invasion (2003) Timeline Preparations for invasion Multi-National Force Battle of Nasiriyah Fall of Baghdad Battle of Debecka Pass Firdos Square statue Mission Accomplished speech US public opinion Occupation (2003–2011) Occupation of Ramadi De-Ba'athification 100 Orders CPA Order 2 CPA Order 17 U.S. military bases Blackwater Reconstruction Development Fund Economic reform UNAMI Al Qa'qaa high explosives U.S. kill or capture strategy Replacement governments Coalition Provisional Authority Iraqi Governing Council Interim Government 2005 parliamentary elections Transitional Government Constitution Ratification
Participants Countries Australia Ba'athist Iraq Denmark Georgia Iran Italy Japan Poland South Korea Thailand Ukraine United Kingdom United States Insurgent groups Sunni groups Islamic Army in Iraq 1920 Revolution Brigades Jaish al-Rashideen Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance Hamas of Iraq Jeish Muhammad Mujahideen Shura Council Islamic State of Iraq Al-Qaeda in Iraq Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan Black Banner Organization Wakefulness and Holy War Abu Theeb's group Abu Bakr Al-Salafi Army Mujahideen Army Shia groups Mahdi Army Abu Deraa's militia Badr Organization Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Sheibani Network Soldiers of Heaven Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Promised Day Brigade Kata'ib Hezbollah Ba'ath loyalists Fedayeen Saddam Al-Awda Popular Army Al-Abud Network Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
Battles and operations Operations 2003 Ancient Babylon Catalyst Desert Scorpion Desert Thrust Falconer Iron Hammer Iron Justice Ivy Blizzard Northern Delay Airborne Dragon Panther Squeeze Peninsula Strike Planet X Capture of Saddam Hussein (Red Dawn) Telic 2004 Baton Rouge Bulldog Mammoth Iron Saber New Dawn (Al Fajr) Phantom Fury Phantom Linebacker Plymouth Rock Vigilant Resolve Warrior's Rage 2005 Able Rising Force Able Warrior Cyclone Iron Hammer Matador New Market Spear (Romhe) Squeeze Play Steel Curtain 2006 Al Majid Gaugamela Guardian Tiger Iron Triangle River Falcon Sinbad Swarmer Together Forward 2007 Alljah Arbead II Ardennes Black Eagle Commando Eagle Forsythe Park Imposing Law Leyte Gulf Marne Avalanche Marne Torch Mawtini Phantom Strike Phantom Thunder Polar Tempest Purple Haze Saber Guardian Sledgehammer Stampede 3 Tiger Hammer Valiant Guardian (Harris Ba'sil) 2008 Defeat Al Qaeda in the North Augurs of Prosperity Phantom Phoenix 2009–2011 New Dawn Battles 2003 Invasion Umm Qasr Al Faw Basra I Nasiriyah Karbala I Haditha Dam Najaf I Samawah I Karbala II Al Kut Hillah Karbala Gap Debecka Pass Baghdad I Majar al-Kabir Ramadan Offensive 2004 Spring fighting Karbala City Hall Fallujah I Siege of Sadr City Ramadi I Good Friday ambush Baghdad International Airport Husaybah Danny Boy Najaf II CIMIC House Samarra Fallujah II Mosul 2005 Lake Tharthar Abu Ghraib Al-Qa'im Hit convoy Haditha Tal Afar 2006 Baghdad II Ramadi II Diwaniya Al Rumaythah Amarah Turki 2007 Haifa Street Karbala provincial HQ Najaf III Shurta Nasir Basra II Baqubah Route Bismarck Donkey Island Karbala III 2008 Spring fighting Iraqi Day of Ashura Nineveh Basra III Al-Qaeda offensive 2009–2011 Palm Grove (2010) Related events Turkish incursions into northern Iraq 2007 2008 Abu Kamal raid
War crimes Occupation forces Killings and massacres During the 2003 invasion U.S. killings of journalists Fallujah killings Killing of Nadhem Abdullah (2003) Murder of Muhamad Husain Kadir Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre (2004) Haifa Street helicopter incident (2005) Tal Afar shootings (2005) Basra prison incident (2005) Haditha massacre (2005) Mahmudiyah rape and killings (2006) Ishaqi massacre (2006) Baghdad detainee killings (2006) Hamdania incident (2006) Iraqi bodyguard killing (2006) Iron Triangle Murders (2006) Baghdad airstrike (2007) Nisour Square massacre (2007) Iraq War Logs (2010) Chemical weapons Use of white phosphorus by the United States (2004–05) Torture and abuse Abu Ghraib prison (2003–06) Camp Bucca (2003–09) Camp Nama (2003–04) Balad Air Base (2003–2011) Death of Nagem Hatab (2003) Killing of Baha Mousa (2003) Death of Abed Hamed Mowhoush (2003) Killing of Manadel al-Jamadi (2003) Death of Fashad Mohamed (2004) § Other killings and bombings 2003 Jordanian embassy Canal Hotel Imam Ali mosque bombing Baghdad October 2003 2004 Erbil 2004 Ashura massacre Basra 2004 Mosul 2004 2004 church bombings Baghdad bombings 14 September 30 September Karbala and Najaf bombings Baqubah 2004 Kufa mosque bombing 2005 Al Hillah 2005 Erbil 2005 Musayyib bombing Baghdad bombings August September Balad 2005 Khanaqin bombings 2006 Karbala and Ramadi Al-Askari mosque 2006 Buratha mosque bombing Sadr City bombings July November Hayy Al-Jihad massacre 2007 Mustansiriya University Baghdad bombings 22 January 3 February 12 February 18 February 29 March 18 April 26 July 1 August Al Hillah 2007 Tal Afar 2007 Iraqi Parliament 2007 Karbala mosque bombings Massacres of Yazidis April massacre Qahtaniyah bombings Makhmour Abu Sayda Al-Askari mosque 2007 Al-Khilani mosque bombing Amirli bombing Kirkuk 2007 Al Amarah bombings 2008 Bagdad bombings February March June Balad 2008 Karbala 2008 Al-Karmah Dujail bombing Balad Ruz bombing Attacks on Christians in Mosul 2009 Bagdad bombings March 6 April June August October December Baghdad–Miqdadiyah Taza bombing Kirkuk 2009 Tal Afar 2009 2010 Nationwide attacks 10 May 25 August Bagdad bombings January February April August September November Baqubah 2010 Baghdad church massacre 2011 Nationwide attacks January August Bagdad bombings January August October Arba'een bombings Tikrit assault Al Hillah 2011 Samarra bombing Al Diwaniyah bombing Taji bombings Karbala 2011 Basra 2011 Other war crimes Raid on Camp Ashraf (2011) Archaeological looting Chlorine bombings Torture by the Wolf Brigade (2004–2011) Prosecution United States and the International Criminal Court Hague Invasion Act Prosecution for the 2003 invasion Abtan v. Blackwater Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Saleh v. Bush Taguba Report § All attacks listed in this group were either committed by insurgents, or have unknown perpetrators
Impact General Casualties Iraq Body Count Iraq Family Health Survey Lancet surveys ORB survey Damage to Baghdad Al-Aimmah Bridge disaster Human rights Humanitarian crisis 2007 cholera outbreak Financial cost Refugees Iraqi Christians Mandaeans Violence against Iraqi academics Political controversies Post-invasion WMD conjecture Iraq scandal in Finland Dixie Chicks comments Plame affair Hood event Death of David Kelly Hutton Inquiry Kidnapping of Angelo dela Cruz 2004 document leak Al Jazeera bombing memo Scott Thomas Beauchamp controversy MoveOn.org ad controversy Six Days in Fallujah Role of Canada War resisters Investigations Senate Report on WMD Intelligence Duelfer Report Chilcot Inquiry Reactions Pre-war Pre-war international reactions Khuy Voyne! Saddam Hussein interview Views on the invasion U.S. public opinion Opposition Criticism United Nations Oprah's Anti-war series Iraqi map pendant Winter Soldier: Iraq & Afghanistan Photo Op A Responsible Plan to End the War in Iraq Bush shoe-throwing incident Protests Halloween 2002 February 15, 2003 March 20, 2003 Bring Them Home Now Tour January 20, 2005 September 24, 2005 January 27, 2007 March 17, 2007 2007 Port of Tacoma September 15, 2007 March 19, 2008 Aftermath in Iraq The rise of ISIL Insurgency (2011–13) War in Iraq (2013–17) War against ISIL (2014–present) U.S.-led intervention in Iraq (2014–2021) Insurgency (2017–present)
Miscellaneous Terminology Axis of evil Outposts of tyranny "Baghdad Bob" "Chemical Ali" Coalition of the willing Dead checking Embedded journalism Freedom fries Friedman Unit "Mother of All Bombs" "Mrs. Anthrax" Old Europe and New Europe Regime change Shock and awe "Sixteen Words" "Smoking gun / mushroom cloud" Star Spangled Ice Cream Strategic reset "There are unknown unknowns" Triangle of Death "Yo, Blair" Critical Global arrogance Inverted totalitarianism "The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time" Memorials Afghan–Iraqi Freedom Memorial (Salem, Oregon) Al-Shaheed Monument Iraq and Afghanistan Memorial (London) Northwood Gratitude and Honor Memorial Old North Memorial Garden Saving Iraqi Culture Lists Assassinations Aviation shootdowns and accidents Bombings Coalition military operations Documentaries Iraqi security forces fatality reports Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards Private contractor deaths Timeline 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Related Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Chelsea Manning CIA black sites Efforts to impeach George W. Bush "Enhanced interrogation techniques" Torture in the United States Extraordinary rendition Green Zone Guantanamo Bay detention camp Gulf of Tonkin incident Resolution Military–industrial complex Neoconservatism Patriot Act Petrodollar warfare theory Post-9/11 Special Relationship The Iraq War: A Historiography of Misplaced Pages Changelogs Unilateralism Unitary executive theory U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East WikiLeaks Ba'ath Party archives
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v t e Iraqi governments 1932-present
Cabinets Faisal I Ghazi Faisal II Muhammad Najib ar-Ruba'i Abdul Salam Arif Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz Abdul Rahman Arif Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr Saddam Hussein Coalition Provisional Authority Iraqi Interim Government Iraqi Transitional Government Al Maliki I Al Maliki II al-Abadi Abdul Mahdi Al-Kadhimi
Formations 2006 2010

v t e Iraq topics
History Chronology Ubaid period Hassuna culture Halaf culture Halaf-Ubaid Transitional period Samarra culture Uruk period Jemdet Nasr period Sumer Subartu Akkadian Empire Gutian dynasty Neo-Sumerian Empire Isin-Larsa period First Babylonian Empire Old Assyrian Period Middle Assyrian Empire Kassite dynasty of the Babylonian Empire Simurrum culture Babylonia Assyria Neo-Assyrian Empire Neo-Babylonian Empire Babylonian captivity Fall of Babylon Achaemenid Assyria Seleucid Babylonia Parthian Babylonia Sassanid Asorestan 638–1958 Muslim conquest of Mesopotamia Umayyad Caliphate Abbasid Caliphate Buyid dynasty Qara Qoyunlu Aq Qoyunlu Safavids Ottoman Iraq (incl. Mamluk dynasty) Mandate for Mesopotamia Mandatory Iraq Kingdom of Iraq Kings Arab Federation Republic 1958–1968 1968–2003 2003–2011 2011–present Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region (National Command) Saddam Hussein Iraqi–Kurdish conflict 1974–1975 Shatt al-Arab clashes 1977 Shia uprising in Iraq 1979–1980 Shia uprising in Iraq Weapons of mass destruction Iran–Iraq War Operation Opera Invasion of Kuwait Gulf War 1991 uprisings Sanctions Iraq War U.S. invasion Iraqi insurgency U.S. troop withdrawal Insurgency (2011–2013) War (2014–2017) Fall of Mosul Mosul liberation Insurgency 2019–2021 protests 2021–2022 Iraqi political crisis
Geography Faw peninsula Upper Mesopotamia Lower Mesopotamia Borders Euphrates river Hamrin Mountains Iraqi Kurdistan Lakes Islands Mesopotamia Mesopotamian Marshes Persian Gulf Places Shatt al-Arab Syrian Desert Tigris river Umm Qasr Zagros Mountains Wildlife Sinjar Mountains
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