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Islamic Resistance Movement حركة المقاومة الإسلامية
Emblem of Hamas' political wing
Chairman of the Political Bureau	Temporary committee leadership (acting)
Deputy Chairman of the Political Bureau	Khalil al-Hayya
Chairman of the Shura Council	Abu Omar Hassan
Leader in the Gaza Strip	Yahya Sinwar †
Military commander	Mohammed Deif X
Founder	Ahmed Yassin X Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi X ... and others Mahmoud al-Zahar Mohammad Taha Imad al-Alami Abdul Fatah Dukhan Ibrahim Fares Al-Yazouri 'Isa al-Nashshar Ibrahim Quqa Mohammed Hassan Shama'a Hassan Yousef
Founded	10 December 1987; 37 years ago (10 December 1987)
Headquarters	Gaza City, Gaza Strip
Military wing	Qassam Brigades
Ideology	Palestinian nationalism Islamic nationalism Islamic fundamentalism Islamism Anti-Zionism
Religion	Sunni Islam
International affiliation	Axis of Resistance (informal)
Political alliance	Alliance of Palestinian Forces
Colours	Green
Palestinian Legislative Council	74 / 132
Party flag
Website
hamasinfo.info
Politics of Palestine Political parties Elections

The Islamic Resistance Movement, abbreviated Hamas (an Arabic acronym from Arabic: حركة المقاومة الإسلامية, romanized: Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah), is a Palestinian nationalist Sunni Islamist political organisation with a military wing called the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. It has governed the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip since 2007.

The Hamas movement was founded by Palestinian Islamic scholar Ahmed Yassin in 1987, after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation. It emerged from his 1973 Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas secured a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council by campaigning on promises of a corruption-free government and advocating for resistance as a means to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation. In the Battle of Gaza (2007), Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip from rival Palestinian faction Fatah, and has since governed the territory separately from the Palestinian National Authority. After Hamas's takeover, Israel significantly intensified existing movement restrictions and imposed a complete blockade of the Gaza Strip. Egypt began its blockade of Gaza in 2007. This was followed by multiple wars with Israel, including those in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and an ongoing one since 2023, which began with the 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel.

Hamas has promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context. While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel. Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution, while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews. It has been debated whether the charter has reflected an actual change in policy.

In terms of foreign policy, Hamas has historically sought out relations with Egypt, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey; some of its relations have been impacted by the Arab Spring. Hamas and Israel have engaged in protracted armed conflict. Key aspects of the conflict include the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, water rights, the permit regime, Palestinian freedom of movement, and the Palestinian right of return. Hamas has attacked Israeli civilians, including using suicide bombings, as well as launching rockets at Israeli cities. A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. In 2018, a motion at the United Nations to condemn Hamas was rejected.

Etymology

Hamas is an acronym of the Arabic phrase حركة المقاومة الإسلامية or Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, meaning "Islamic Resistance Movement". This acronym, HMS, was glossed in the 1988 Hamas Covenant by the Arabic word ḥamās (حماس) which itself means "zeal", "strength", or "bravery".

History

Hamas was established in 1987, and allegedly has its origins in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood movement, which had been active in the Gaza Strip since the 1950s and gained influence through a network of mosques and various charitable and social organizations. Unlike other Palestinian factions, after the Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1967, the Brotherhood in Gaza refused to join the resistance boycott against Israel. In the 1980s, it emerged as a powerful political factor, challenging the influence of the PLO, whose Fatah faction it had played a core role in creating. In December 1987, the Brotherhood adopted a more nationalist and activist line under the name of Hamas. Hamas was initially discretely supported by Israel as a counter-balance to the secular PLO. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the organization conducted numerous suicide bombings and other attacks against Israel.

In the Palestinian legislative election of January 2006, Hamas gained a large majority of seats in the Palestinian Parliament, defeating the ruling Fatah party. After the elections, conflicts arose between Hamas and Fatah, which they were unable to resolve. In June 2007, Hamas defeated Fatah in a series of violent clashes, and since that time Hamas has governed the Gaza portion of the Palestinian Territories, while at the same time they were ousted from government positions in the West Bank. Israel and Egypt then imposed an economic blockade on Gaza and largely sealed their borders with the territory.

After acquiring control of Gaza, Hamas-affiliated and other militias launched rocket attacks upon Israel, which Hamas ceased in June 2008 following an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire. The ceasefire broke down late in 2008, with each side accusing the other of responsibility. In late December 2008, Israel attacked Gaza, withdrawing its forces in mid-January 2009. Since 2009, Hamas has faced multiple military confrontations with Israel, notably the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars, leading to substantial casualties. Hamas has maintained control over Gaza, often clashing with the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah. Efforts at reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah have seen limited success. Hamas continued to face international isolation and blockades, while engaging in sporadic rocket attacks and tunnel construction activities against Israel.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian militants attacked Israel killing nearly 1,200 Israelis, about two thirds of them civilians. Approximately 250 Israeli civilians and soldiers were taken back to the Gaza Strip, with the aim of securing the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel (as part of a prisoner swap). Hamas said its attack was in response to Israel's continued occupation, blockade of Gaza, and settlements expansion, as well as alleged threats to the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the plight of Palestinians. There are also reports of sexual violence by Hamas militants, allegations that Hamas has denied. Israel responded by invading the Gaza Strip, killing over 42,000 Palestinians, 52% of them women and children according to the Gaza Ministry of Health.

On 31 July 2024, Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, after attending the inauguration ceremony of Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian. In August 2024, Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, was elected chairman of the group, replacing Haniyeh. Per Hamas officials, he was elected due to his considerable popularity in the Arab and Islamic worlds following the 7 October attacks and his strong connections with Iran and the "Axis of Resistance," an informal Iranian-led political and military coalition. On 16 October 2024, IDF troops killed Sinwar during a routine patrol and a chance encounter in southern Rafah.

Policies towards Israel and Palestine

Hamas' policy towards Israel has evolved. Historically, Hamas envisioned a Palestinian state on all of the territory that belonged to the British Mandate for Palestine (that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea). In 2006, Hamas signed the Palestinian Prisoners' Document which supports the quest for a Palestinian state "on all territories occupied in 1967". This document also recognized authority of the President of the Palestinian National Authority to negotiate with Israel. Hamas also signed the Cairo Declaration in 2005, which emphasized the goal of ending the Israeli occupation and establishing a Palestinian state. On 2 May 2017, Khaled Mashal, chief of the Hamas Political Bureau, presented a new Charter, in which Hamas accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state "on the basis of June 4, 1967" (West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem) acceptable. But the new Charter did not recognize Israel nor relinquish Palestinian claims to all of historical Palestine. Many scholars saw Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders as a tacit acceptance of another entity on the other side while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

Truce proposals

Hamas has repeatedly offered Israel a hudna, Arabic word for armistice, of varying durations (50 years, even a 100 years). During the hudna both the Israelis and Palestinians would refrain from any violent attacks on the other. Under Islamic international law, a hudna is a binding and the Qur'an prohibits its violation. Hamas's spokesperson, Ahmed Yousef, said that a "hudna" is more than a ceasefire and it "obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences."

Hamas first proposed Israel with a hudna, long-term armistice, in 1999. In exchange Israel would have to end the occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip and release all Palestinian prisoners. But the 1999 proposal omitted two difficult issues: the issue of Palestinian refugees and the recognition of Israel. The idea was that Israel and Hamas would use the period of calm to continue negotiating these two difficult issues until they reached a final peace agreement, at which point the temporary peace would convert into a permanent peace agreement.

In 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, shortly after being elected as Prime Minister, sent messages both to US President George W. Bush and to Israel's leaders, offering a long-term truce. Neither Israel nor the United States responded. Haniyeh's proposal reportedly was a fifty-year armistice with Israel, if a Palestinian state is created along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. A Hamas official added that the armistice would renew automatically each time. In mid-2006, University of Maryland's Jerome Segal suggested that a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a truce for many years could be considered Hamas's de facto recognition of Israel. A similar proposal was once again offered by Hamas to Israel in November 2006.

In November 2008, in a meeting, on Gaza Strip soil, with 11 European members of parliaments, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh re-stated that Hamas was willing to accept a Palestinian state "in the territories of 1967" (Gaza Strip and West Bank), and offered Israel a long-term truce if Israel recognized the Palestinians' national rights; and stated that Israel rejected this proposal. A Hamas finance minister around 2018 contended that such a "long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same".

Mkhaimer Abusada, a political scientist at Al Azhar University, wrote in 2008 that Hamas talks "of hudna , not of peace or reconciliation with Israel. They believe over time they will be strong enough to liberate all historic Palestine." Some scholars have noted that alongside offering a long-term truce, Hamas retains its objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. Hamas originally proposed a 10-year truce, or hudna, to Israel, contingent on the creation of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin indicated that such truce could be extended for 30, 40, or even 100 years, but it would never signal a recognition of Israel. A Hamas official explained that having an indefinite truce with Israel doesn't contradict Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel, comparing it to the Irish Republican Army's willingness to accept a permanent armistice with the United Kingdom without recognizing the UK's sovereignty over Northern Ireland.

Recognition of Israel

Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated. Hamas leaders have emphasized they do not recognize Israel, but indicate they "have a de facto acceptance of its presence". According to some scholars, Hamas accepted the 1967 borders and thus acknowledged the existence of another entity on the other side, implicitly recognizing Israel and "drop the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto." Other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained in 2011, that while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed). He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel.

According to Martin Kear, Israel treats "any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism", and therefore responds to any resistance with extraordinary force. In contrast, writes Kear, Hamas operationalizes "...its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor..." However, Kear goes on to note that without expressly stating it Hamas agreed to respect the Oslo Accords, and by extension Israel's existence: "The signing of the 2007 Mecca Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements."

Graham Usher said that while Hamas did not consider Israel to be legitimate, it accepted Israel as political reality. According to Tareq Baconi, Hamas' implicit recognition of Israel is in contrast to most Israeli political parties who have long opposed the idea of a Palestinian state.

Allegations of antisemitism

The 1988 Hamas charter proclaims that jihad against Jews is required until Judgement Day. The "governing" 1988 charter of Hamas was said, in 2018, to "openly dedicate(s) Hamas to genocide against the Jewish people", referring to the Hamas 1988 charter, article 7. More authors have characterized the violent language against all Jews in the original Hamas charter as genocidal, incitement to genocide, or antisemitic. The charter attributes collective responsibility to Jews, not just Israelis, for various global issues, including both World Wars.

The American Interest magazine has wrote that the charter "echoes" Nazi propaganda in claiming that Jews profited during World War II. Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic magazine, has compared statements in the 1988 charter with those that appear in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Hamas has called for the annihilation of Israel, and has stated that to be necessary for creating a pan-Islamic empire.

On the other hand, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the anti-Semitic language, saying that their struggle is against Zionism and not Jews, while also advancing goals for a Palestinian state which are seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution. Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, said in a 1988 interview, reacting to accusations that 'Hamas hate Jews':

"We don't hate Jews and fight Jews because they are Jewish. They are a people of faith and we are a people of faith, and we love all people of faith. If my brother, from my own mother and father and my own faith takes my home and expels me from it, I will fight him. I will fight my cousin if he takes my home and expels me from it. So when a Jew takes my home and expels me from it, I will fight him. I don't fight other countries because I want to be at peace with them, I love all people and wish peace for them, even the Jews. The Jews lived with us all of our lives and we never assaulted them, and they held high positions in government and ministries. But if they take my home and make me a refugee like 4 million Palestinians in exile? Who has more right to this land? The Russian immigrant who left this land 2000 years ago or the one who left 40 years ago? We don't hate the Jews, we only ask for them to give us our rights."

Evolution of positions

1988–1992 (first charter)

In its early days, Hamas functioned as a social-religious charity center. Its members armed themselves for the ongoing resistance against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and in August 1988 published their first charter in which Hamas stated that "Israel" should be "eliminated" through a "clash with the enemies", a "struggle against Zionism" and "conflict with Israel". They wrote that 'Palestine', that is all of the territory that belonged to the British Mandate for Palestine (that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea), should be "liberated" from "Zionism" and transformed into an Islamic Waqf (Islamic charitable endowment) in which "followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety". Practically speaking, Hamas is and was at war with Israel's army (later also attacking Israeli civilians) since the spring of 1989, initially as part of the First Intifada, a general protest movement that gradually turned more riotous and violent.

1992–2005

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas, who died in 2004 (killed by Israel), has at unreported date offered Israel a ten-year hudna (truce, armistice) in return for establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Yassin later added, the hudna could be renewed, even for longer periods, but would never signal a recognition of Israel.

In 2005, Hamas signed the Palestinian Cairo Declaration, which confirms "the right of the Palestinian people to resistance in order to end the occupation, establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty with Jerusalem as its capital" (etc.), aiming to reconcile several Palestinian factions but not describing specific steps or strategies towards Israel.

2006–2007: 1967 borders and a truce

In March 2006, after winning an absolute majority in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Hamas published its government program in which Hamas claimed sovereignty for the Palestinian territories but did not repeat its claim to all of mandatory Palestine, instead declared their willingness to have contacts with Israel "in all mundane affairs: business, trade, health, and labor". The program further stated: "The question of recognizing Israel is not the jurisdiction of one faction, nor the government, but a decision for the Palestinian people." Since then until today, spokesmen of Hamas seem to disagree about their attitudes towards Israel, and debates are running as to whether the original 1988 Hamas charter has since March 2006 become obsolete and irrelevant or on the contrary still spells out Hamas's genuine and ultimate goals (see: 1988 Hamas charter, § Relevance).

The March 2006 Hamas legislative program was further explained on 6 June 2006 by Hamas' MP Riad Mustafa: "Hamas will never recognize Israel", but if a popular Palestinian referendum would endorse a peace agreement including recognition of Israel, "we would of course accept their verdict".

Also on 6 June 2006, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and at that time Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, sent a letter to US President George W. Bush (via University of Maryland's Jerome Segal), stating: "We are so concerned about stability and security in the area that we don't mind having a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders and offering a truce for many years", and asking Bush for a dialogue with the Hamas government. A similar message he sent to Israel's leaders. Haniyeh had reportedly proposed a fifty-year armistice. Neither Washington nor Israel replied. Nuancing sheikh Ahmed Yassin's statements before 2004 about a hudna (truce) with Israel (see above), Hamas's (former) senior adviser Ahmed Yousef has said (at unknown date) that a "hudna" (truce, armistice) is more than a ceasefire and "obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences."

On 28 June 2006, Hamas signed the second version of (originally) 'the Palestinians' Prisoners Document' which supports the quest for a Palestinian state "on all territories occupied in 1967". This document also recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people", and states that "the negotiations" should be conducted by PLO and President of the Palestinian National Authority and eventual agreements must be ratified by either the Palestinian National Council or a general referendum "held in the homeland and the Diaspora". Leila Seurat also notes that this document "implicitly recognized the June 1967 borders, agreed on the construction of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as a capital and accepted limitations to the resistance in the territories occupied in 1967", and was produced following consultations with the entire Political Bureau.

In an August 2006 interview with The New York Times, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and then Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, said: "We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm."

In February 2007, Hamas signed the Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement, stressing "the importance of national unity as basis for (...) confronting the occupation" and "activate and reform the PLO", but without further details about how to confront or deal with Israel. At the time of signing that 2007 agreement, Mousa Abu Marzook, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, underlined his view of the Hamas position: "I can recognize the presence of Israel as a fait accompli (amr wâqi') or, as the French say, a de facto recognition, but this does not mean that I recognize Israel as a state". More Hamas leaders, through the years, have made similar statements.

In June 2007, Hamas ousted the Fatah movement from the Gaza Strip, took control there, and since then Hamas occasionally fired rockets from the Gaza Strip on Israel, purportedly to retaliate Israeli aggression against the people of Gaza.

2008–2016

In April 2008, former US President Jimmy Carter met with Khaled Mashal, the recognized Hamas leader since 2004. Mashal said to Carter, Hamas would "accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders" and accept the right of Israel "to live as a neighbour" if such a deal would be approved by a referendum among the "Palestinians". Nevertheless, Mashal did not offer a unilateral ceasefire (as Carter had suggested him to do). The US State Department showed utter indifference for Mashal's new stance; Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert even refused to meet with Carter in Jerusalem, not to mention paying attention to the new Hamas stance.

On 19 June 2008, Hamas and Israel agreed to a six-month cease-fire, which Hamas declared finished at 18 December amidst mutual accusations of breaching the agreed conditions.

Meanwhile, in November 2008, in a meeting with 11 European members of parliaments, Hamas senior official Ismail Haniyeh repeated what he had written in June 2006 to U.S. President George W. Bush but with one extra condition: Hamas was willing to accept a Palestinian state "in the territories of 1967" and offered Israel a long-term truce if Israel recognized the Palestinians' national rights – which he said Israel had declined.

In September 2009, Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, wrote to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon – like he had told the New York Times in August 2006: "We would never thwart efforts to create an independent Palestinian state with borders June 4, 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital."

In May 2010, Khaled Mashal, chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau (thus Hamas' highest leader), again stated that a state "Israel" living next to "a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967" would be acceptable for Hamas – but only if a referendum among "the Palestinian people" would endorse this arrangement. In November 2010, Ismail Haniyeh, also proposed a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, though added three further conditions: "resolution of the issue of refugees", "the release of Palestinian prisoners", and "Jerusalem as its capital"; and he made the same reservation as Mashal in May 2010 had made, that a Palestinian referendum needed to endorse this arrangement.

On December 1, 2010, Ismail Haniyeh (senior Hamas leader, see above), in a news conference in Gaza, repeated his November 2010 message: "We accept a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the resolution of the issue of refugees," but only if such arrangement would be endorsed by "a referendum" held among all Palestinians: in Gaza, West Bank, and the diaspora.

In May 2011, Hamas and Fatah signed an agreement in Cairo, agreeing to form a ('national unity') government and appoint the Ministers "in consensus between them", but it contained no remarks about how to confront or deal with Israel. In February 2012, Hamas and Fatah signed the Fatah–Hamas Doha Agreement, agreeing (again) to form an interim national consensus government, which (again) did not materialize.

Still in February 2012, according to the Palestinian authority (either the Fatah branch in West Bank or the Hamas branch in Gaza), Hamas forswore the use of violence against Israel ("ceasefire", an Israeli news website called it), followed by a few weeks without violence between Hamas and Israel. But violence between Israel and Palestinian militant groups, in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel, also involving Hamas, would soon resume.

2017– 6 Oct. 2023 (new charter)

On 1 May 2017, in a press conference in Doha (Qatar) presenting a new charter, Khaled Mashal, chief of the Hamas Political Bureau (thus acknowledged as to be highest Hamas leader), declared that, though Hamas considered the establishment of a Palestinian state "on the basis of June 4, 1967" (West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem being not under Israeli reign) acceptable, Hamas would in that case still not recognise the statehood of Israel and not relinquish their goal of liberating all of Palestine from "the Zionist project".

Around 2018, a Hamas finance minister has suggested that a "long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same". In 2021 Hamas organized and financed a conference among 250 Gaza citizens about the future management of the State of Palestine following the takeover of Israel which was predicted to come soon. According to the conclusions of the conference, the Jewish Israeli fighters would be killed, while the peaceful individuals could be integrated or be allowed to leave. At the same time the highly skilled and educated would be prevented from leaving. In 2020 Ismail Haniyeh said in an interview that one of the principles of Hamas was "Palestine from the sea to the river." In 2022, Yahya Sinwar cautioned Israelis that Hamas would one day "march through your walls to uproot your regime."

7 Oct. 2023–present

In a flash attack on 7 October 2023, Hamas and associates murdered 767 civilians and killed a further 376 security personnel of the state of Israel. Israel retaliated with warfare in the Gaza Strip, aiming at Hamas militants but also harming much civilian infrastructure and directly killing tens of thousands of civilians, as admitted even by Israel (not counting the presumed multiple number of indirect deaths). A number of conflicting statements since then were made by Hamas senior leaders regarding the Hamas policy towards Israel.

On 24 October, Ghazi Hamad—member of the decision-making Hamas Political Bureau—explained the 7 October attack: "Israel is a country that has no place on our land. We must remove that country because it constitutes a security, military and political catastrophe to the Arab and Islamic nation". "We are called a nation of martyrs and we are proud to sacrifice martyrs". Hamad called the creation of the Jewish state "illogical": "(...) We are the victims of the occupation. Therefore, nobody should blame us for the things we do".

On 1 November 2023, Ismail Haniyeh, then incumbent highest Hamas leader (but assassinated by Israel 31 July 2024), stated that if Israel agreed to a ceasefire in the Israel–Hamas war, if humanitarian corridors would be opened, and aid would be allowed into Gaza, Hamas would be "ready for political negotiations for a two-state solution with Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine". Haniyeh also praised the support of movements in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon for the Palestinian struggle.

In January 2024, Khaled Mashal, top Hamas leader until 2017 and now heading the Hamas diaspora office – in contradiction with Haniyeh's proclamation from November 2023 – repeated his stance from 1 May 2017: a (preliminary) Palestinian state "on the 1967 borders", that is "21 per cent of Palestine", would be accepted by Hamas but not as the permanent "two-state solution" which "The West" since a long time envisions and promotes; "our Palestinian project" remains "our right in Palestine from the sea to the river", which Hamas will not give up, therefore Hamas will not recognise the legitimacy of "the usurping entity ".

Hamas Member of Parliament Khalil al-Hayya, also deputy chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, told the Associated Press in April 2024 that Hamas is willing to agree to a truce of five years or more with Israel and that it would lay down its weapons and convert into a political party if an independent Palestinian state is established along pre-1967 borders. The Associated Press considered this a "significant concession", but presumed that Israel would not even want to consider this scenario following the October 2023 attack.

Hamas top leader Haniyeh in November 2023 suggested that Hamas was willing and "ready for negotiations for a two-state solution". Former Hamas leader Mashal in January 2024 slighted "The West", saying that returning to their talk about "the two-state solution" in which "Palestine" would only get "21 per cent of ... its land ... this cannot be accepted", claiming "our right in Palestine from the sea to the river". although he reiterated that Hamas "accepts a state on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, with complete independence and with the right of return without recognising the legitimacy of the Zionist entity."

Comments from non-Hamas-members

The vision that Hamas articulated in its original 1988 charter resembles the vision of certain Zionist groups regarding the same territory, as noted by several authors. This may suggest that Hamas's views were inspired by those Zionist perspectives.

Several (other) authors have interpreted the 1988 Hamas charter as a call for "armed struggle against Israel".

In 2009, Taghreed El-khodary And Ethan Bronner wrote in the New York Times, that Hamas' position is that it doesn't recognize Israel's right to exist, but is willing to accept as a compromise a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.

Imad Alsoos stated that Hamas has both a short and long-term objective: "The short-term objective aims to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank, while the long-term objective still strives to liberate Mandate Palestine in its entirety. Establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (as part of a hudna deal) would be Hamas's interim solution, during which Israel would not be formally recognized.

In mid-2006, University of Maryland's Jerome Segal suggested that a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a truce for many years could be considered Hamas's de facto recognition of Israel.

As of January 2007, Israeli, American and European news media considered Hamas to be the "dominant political force" within the Palestinian territories.

Journalist Zaki Chehab wrote in 2007 that Hamas's public concessions following the 2006 elections were "window-dressing" and that the organisation would never recognise Israel's right to exist.

As to the question whether Hamas would be capable to enter into a long-term non-aggression treaty with Israel without being disloyal to their understanding of Islamic law and God's word, the Atlantic magazine columnist Jeffrey Goldberg in January 2009 stated: "I tend to think not, though I've noticed over the years a certain plasticity of belief among some Hamas ideologues. Also, this is the Middle East, so anything is possible".

Professor Mohammed Ayoob in his 2020 book, while discussing the 2017 Hamas charter, stated that “acceptance of the 1967 borders can be interpreted as a de facto acceptance of the preconditions for a two-state solution”.

Religious policy

Gaza Strip

Hamas' Change and Reform electoral list for the 2006 Palestinian legislative election included a Palestinian Christian candidate, Hosam al-Taweel, running as an independent for the Christian reserved seat in Gaza City. Israeli media were surprised by the team. Hosam al-Taweel won the seat, one of six seats reserved for Palestine's Christian minority, with the highest winning vote of the six elected, due to the endorsement of Hamas and other nationalist groups.

The gender ideology outlined in the Hamas charter, the importance of women in the religious-nationalist project of liberation is asserted as no lesser than that of males. Their role was defined primarily as one of manufacturing males and caring for their upbringing and rearing, though the charter recognized they could fight for liberation without obtaining their husband's permission and in 2002 their participation in jihad was permitted. The doctrinal emphasis on childbearing and rearing as woman's primary duty is not so different from Fatah's view of women in the First Intifada and it also resembles the outlook of Jewish settlers, and over time it has been subjected to change. A few were worried about imposition of Islamic dress codes, but most Christians in the Gaza Strip said these worries were baseless were not worried about the Hamas government.

In 1989, during the First Intifada, a small number of Hamas followers campaigned for polygamy, and also insisted women stay at home and be segregated from men. In the course of this campaign, women who chose not to wear the hijab were verbally and physically harassed, with the result that the hijab was being worn 'just to avoid problems on the streets'. The harassment dropped drastically when, after 18 months, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) condemned it, though similar campaigns reoccurred. Polygamy is practised in some Bedouin communities in Israel, and some Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, particularly in the Negev desert (Arabic pronunciation: Naqab) surrounding the Gaza Strip.

Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, some of its members have attempted to impose Islamic dress or the hijab head covering on women. The government's "Islamic Endowment Ministry" has deployed Virtue Committee members to warn citizens of the dangers of immodest dress, card playing, and dating. There are no government laws imposing dress and other moral standards, and the Hamas education ministry reversed one effort to impose Islamic dress on students. There has also been successful resistance to attempts by local Hamas officials to impose Islamic dress on women. Hamas officials deny having any plans to impose Islamic law, one legislator stating that "What you are seeing are incidents, not policy," and that Islamic law is the desired standard "but we believe in persuasion".

In 2013, UNRWA canceled its annual marathon in Gaza after Hamas prohibited women from participating in the race.

In the West Bank

In 2005, the human rights organization Freemuse released a report titled "Palestine: Taliban-like attempts to censor music", which said that Palestinian musicians feared that harsh religious laws against music and concerts will be imposed since Hamas group scored political gains in the Palestinian Authority local elections of 2005.

The attempt by Hamas to dictate a cultural code of conduct in the 1980s and early 1990s led to a violent fighting between different Palestinian sectors. Hamas members reportedly burned down stores that stocked videos they deemed indecent and destroyed books they described as "heretical".

In 2005, an outdoor music-and-dance performance in Qalqiliya was suddenly banned by the Hamas-led municipality, for the reason that such an event would be "haram", i.e. forbidden by Islam. The municipality also ordered that music no longer be played in the Qalqiliya zoo, and mufti Akrameh Sabri issued a religious edict affirming the municipality decision. In response, the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish warned that "There are Taliban-type elements in our society, and this is a very dangerous sign."

The Palestinian columnist Mohammed Abd Al-Hamid, a resident of Ramallah, wrote that this religious coercion could cause the migration of artists, and said "The religious fanatics in Algeria destroyed every cultural symbol, shattered statues and rare works of art and liquidated intellectuals and artists, reporters and authors, ballet dancers and singers—are we going to imitate the Algerian and Afghani examples?"

Erdoğan's Turkey as a role model

Some Hamas members have stated that the model of Islamic government that Hamas seeks to emulate is that of Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The foremost members to distance Hamas from the practices of the Taliban and to publicly support the Erdoğan model were Ahmed Yousef and Ghazi Hamad, advisers to Prime Minister Hanieh. Yusuf, the Hamas deputy foreign minister, reflected this goal in an interview with a Turkish newspaper, stating that while foreign public opinion equates Hamas with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the analogy is inaccurate. Yusuf described the Taliban as "opposed to everything", including education and women's rights, while Hamas wants to establish good relations between the religious and secular elements of society and strives for human rights, democracy and an open society. According to professor Yezid Sayigh of King's College in London, how influential this view is within Hamas is uncertain, since both Ahmad Yousef and Ghazi Hamad were dismissed from their posts as advisers to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh in October 2007. Both have since been appointed to other prominent positions within the Hamas government. Khaled al-Hroub of the West Bank-based and anti-Hamas Palestinian daily Al Ayyam added that despite claims by Hamas leaders that it wants to repeat the Turkish model of Islam, "what is happening on the ground in reality is a replica of the Taliban model of Islam."

Charter and policy documents

1988 charter

Hamas published its charter in August 1988, wherein it defined itself as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its desire to establish "an Islamic state throughout Palestine". The foundational document was written by a single individual and made public without going through the usual prior consultation process. It was then signed on August 18, 1988. It compares Israeli attacks on civilians to that by Nazi Germany. The charter also claims all of historical Palestine but promises religious coexistence under Islam's rule. Article 6 states that the movement's aim is to "raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned". The charter rejects a two-state solution, stating that the conflict cannot be resolved "except through jihad".

Many scholars have pointed out that both the 1988 Hamas's charter and the Likud party platform sought full control of the land, thus denouncing the two-state solution.

2017 document of principles

In May 2017, Hamas published a document titled "A Document of General Principles and Policies". While this policy document was much shorter than the 1988 charter, and Hamas leaders stated that it did not replace the 1988 charter, it covers some of the same topics and is referred to as the "2017 charter". It accepted a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, without recognizing Israel, which is seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution, while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine. The charter also argued that armed resistance to occupation is supported by international law. Hamas has described these changes as adaptation within a specific context, as opposed to abandonment of its principles.

While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic, Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews. Some sources maintain its condemnation of Zionists is antisemitic: it describes Zionism as the enemy of all Muslims and a danger to international security, what author J.S. Spoerl in 2020 has disqualified as "hardly (...) a serious repudiation of anti-Semitism".

Organization

Leadership and structure

Hamas inherited from its predecessor a tripartite structure that consisted in the provision of social services, of religious training and military operations under a Shura Council. Traditionally it had four distinct functions: (a) a charitable social welfare division (dawah); (b) a military division for procuring weapons and undertaking operations (al-Mujahideen al Filastinun); (c) a security service (Jehaz Aman); and (d) a media branch (A'alam). Hamas has both an internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and an external leadership, split between a Gaza group directed by Mousa Abu Marzook from his exile first in Damascus and then in Egypt, and a Kuwaiti group (Kuwaidia) under Khaled Mashal. The Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles began to receive extensive funding from the Gulf States after its leader Mashal broke with Yasser Arafat's decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the Invasion of Kuwait, with Mashal insisting that Iraq withdraw. On May 6, 2017, Hamas' Shura Council chose Ismail Haniyeh to become the new leader, to replace Mashal.

The exact structure of the organization is unclear as it is shrouded in a veil of secrecy in order to conceal operational activities. Formally, Hamas maintains the wings are separate and independent, but this has been questioned. It has been argued that its wings are both separate and combined for reasons of internal and external political necessity. Communication between the political and military wings of Hamas is made difficult by the thoroughness of Israeli intelligence surveillance and the existence of an extensive base of informants. After the assassination of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi the political direction of the militant wing was diminished and field commanders were given wider discretional autonomy over operations.

Shura Council and Political Bureau

Hamas's overarching governing body is the Majlis al-Shura (Shura Council), based on the Quranic concept of consultation and popular assembly (shura), which Hamas leaders argue provides for democracy within an Islamic framework. As the organization grew more complex and Israeli pressure increased, the Shura Council was renamed the General Consultative Council, with members elected from local council groups. The council elects the 15-member Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi) that makes decisions for Hamas. Representatives come from Gaza, the West Bank, leaders in exile and Israeli prisons. The Political Bureau was based in Damascus until January 2012, when Hamas's support for the Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian civil war led to the office's relocation to Qatar.

Finances and funding

Hamas, like its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed the administration of Gaza's waqf properties, endowments which extend over 10% of all real estate in the Gaza Strip, with 2,000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts, together with numerous shops, rentable apartments and public buildings.

In the first five years of the 1st Intifada, the Gaza economy, 50% of which depended on external sources of income, plummeted by 30–50% as Israel closed its labour market and remittances from the Palestinian expatriates in the Gulf countries dried up following the 1991–1992 Gulf War. At the 1993 Philadelphia conference, Hamas leaders' statements indicated that they read George H. W. Bush's outline of a New World Order as embodying a tacit aim to destroy Islam, and that therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad, which also means zeal for social justice, in the occupied territories. Hamas became particularly fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its respective branches of activity—military, political and social services. It has had a holding company in East Jerusalem (Beit al-Mal), a 20% stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm, the Sunuqrut Global Group and al-Ajouli money-changing firm.

By 2011, Hamas's budget, calculated to be roughly US$70 million, derived even more substantially (85%) from foreign, rather than internal Palestinian, sources. Only two Israeli-Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004, while the other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the United States, United Arab Emirates, Italy and France. Much of the money raised comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians, but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant, with Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter. Matthew Levitt claims that Hamas also taps money from corporations, criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror. It is also alleged that it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling, multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud. The United States, Israel and the EU have shut down many charities and organs that channel money to Hamas, such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief. Between 1992 and 2001, this group is said to have provided $6.8 million to Palestinian charities of the $57 million collected. By 2001, it was alleged to have given Hamas $13 million, and was shut down shortly afterwards.

About half of Hamas's funding came from states in the Persian Gulf down to the mid-2000s. Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget of $50 million in the early 2000s, but, under US pressure, began to cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004, which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory, stepped in to fill the shortfall. Saudi funding, negotiated with third parties including Egypt, remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA, the electoral loser, when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its monetary aid. During the 1980s, Iran began to provide 10% of Hamas's funding, which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied $30 million. It accounted for $22 million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s. According to Matthew Levitt, Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks. Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through Hezbollah. After 2006, Iran's willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom. The US imposed sanctions on Iran's Bank Saderat, alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas. The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the Foz do Iguaçu area of the tri-border region of Latin America, an area long associated with arms trading, drug trafficking, contraband, the manufacture of counterfeit goods, money-laundering and currency fraud. The State Department adds that confirmatory information of a Hamas operational presence there is lacking.

After 2009, sanctions on Iran made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the Rafah Border Crossing. These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running the al Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria, Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150 million in 2012 to $60 million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran's role in the Yemeni Civil War.

In 2017, the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza, including, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees, as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip. The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but after a year partially backtracked. The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled on a regular basis through Israel to Hamas, to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that letting the money go through Israel meant that it could not be used for terrorism, saying: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."

According to U.S. officials, as of 2023 Hamas has an investment portfolio that is worth anywhere from 500 million to US$1 billion, including assets in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates. Hamas has denied such allegations.

In 2024, financial activity in Gaza is mainly carried out via money changers in order to bypass the international financial authorities.

Social services wing

Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. For Hamas, charity and the development of one's community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance. In Islamic tradition, dawah (lit. transl. "the call to God") obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works, and typically the latter centre on the mosques which make use of both waqf endowment resources and charitable donations (zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam) to fund grassroots services such as nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions. In the 1990s, some 85% of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services. Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine. By 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and, with other Islamic charities, by 2005, was supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza. Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories, which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services, and is widely viewed as corrupt. As late as 2005, the budget of Hamas, drawing on global charity contributions, was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes, which extended from the supply of housing, food and water for the needy to more general functions such as financial aid, medical assistance, educational development and religious instruction. A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations, permitting transfer from one to the other.

The dawah infrastructure itself was understood, within the Palestinian context, as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower. In this regard it differs from the rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad which lacks any social welfare network, and relies on spectacular terrorist attacks to recruit adherents. In 2007, through funding from Iran, Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of $60 million, monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 workers, and a similar sum for 3,000 fishermen laid idle by Israel's imposition of restrictions on fishing offshore, plus grants totalling $45 million to detainees and their families. Matthew Levitt argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas, with those linked to terrorist activities receiving more than others. Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes, whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial, one-time grant varying between $500–$5,000, together with a $100 monthly allowance. Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less.

Until 2007, these activities extended to the West Bank, but, after a PLO crackdown, now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip. After the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority, but without success.

Military wing

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is Hamas' military wing. While the number of members is known only to the Brigades leadership, Israel estimates the Brigades have a core of several hundred members who receive military style training, including training in Iran and in Syria (before the Syrian Civil War). Additionally, the brigades have an estimated 10,000–17,000 operatives, other sources say 15,000–40,000 militants, forming a backup force whenever circumstances call for reinforcements for the Brigade. Recruitment training lasts for two years. The group's ideology outlines its aim as the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Palestinian rights under the dispensations set forth in the Qur'an, and this translates into three policy priorities:

To evoke the spirit of Jihad (Resistance) among Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims; to defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its manifestations; to liberate Palestinians and their land that was usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers.

According to its official stipulations, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades' military operations are to be restricted to operating only inside Palestine, engaging with Israeli soldiers, and in exercising the right of self-defense against armed settlers. They are to avoid civilian targets, to respect the enemy's humanity by refraining from mutilation, defacement or excessive killing, and to avoid targeting Westerners either in the occupied zones or beyond.

Down to 2007, the Brigades are estimated to have lost some 800 operatives in conflicts with Israeli forces. The leadership has been consistently undermined by targeted assassinations. Aside from Yahya Ayyash (January 5, 1996), it has lost Emad Akel (November 24, 1993), Salah Shehade (July 23, 2002), Ibrahim al-Makadmeh (March 8, 2003), Ismail Abu Shanab (August 21, 2003), Ahmed Yassin (March 22, 2004), and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (April 17, 2004).

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades groups its fighters in 4–5 man cells, which in turn are integrated into companies and battalions. Unlike the political section, which is split between an internal and external structure, the Brigades are under a local Palestinian leadership, and disobedience with the decisions taken by the political leadership have been relatively rare.

Although the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are an integral part of Hamas, the exact nature of the relationship is hotly debated. They appear to operate at times independently of Hamas, exercising a certain autonomy. Some cells have independent links with the external leadership, enabling them to bypass the hierarchical command chain and political leadership in Gaza. Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, likening Hamas's relationship with the Brigades to the political party Sinn Féin's relationship to the military arm of the Irish Republican Army, quote a senior Hamas official as stating: "The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade is a separate armed military wing, which has its own leaders who do not take their orders from Hamas and do not tell us of their plans in advance."

Gaza forces, October 2023

During the 2023 Gaza war, the IDF published its intelligence about the Hamas military in the Strip. They put the strength of the Qassam Brigades there at the start of the war at 30,000 fighters, organised by area in five brigades, consisting in total of 24 battalions and c. 140 companies. Each regional brigade had a number of strongholds and outposts, and included specialised arrays for rocket firing, anti-tank missiles, air defenses, snipers, and engineering.

Media

Al-Aqsa TV

Al-Aqsa TV is a television channel founded by Hamas. The station began broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on January 9, 2006, less than three weeks before the Palestinian legislative elections. It has shown television programs, including some children's television, which deliver antisemitic messages. Hamas has stated that the television station is "an independent media institution that often does not express the views of the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh or of the Hamas movement", and that Hamas does not hold antisemitic views. The programming includes ideologically tinged children's shows, news talk, and religiously inspired entertainment. According to the Anti-Defamation League, the station promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis. Al-Aqsa TV is headed by the controversial Fathi Ahmad Hammad, chairman of al-Ribat Communications and Artistic Productions—a Hamas-run company that also produces Hamas's radio station, Voice of al-Aqsa, and its biweekly newspaper, The Message. Hamad has made a number of controversial comments, including a speech in which he reportedly stated: 'you have Jews everywhere and we must attack every Jew on the globe by way of slaughtering and killing'

Al-Fateh magazine

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Al-Fateh ("the conqueror") is the Hamas children's magazine, published biweekly in London, and also posted in an online website. It began publication in September 2002, and its 108th issue was released in mid-September 2007. The magazine features stories, poems, riddles, and puzzles, and states it is for "the young builders of the future".

According to the Anti-Defamation League, al-Fateh promotes violence and antisemitism, with praise for and encouragement to become suicide bombers, and that it "regularly includes photos of children it claims have been detained, injured or killed by Israeli police, images of children firing slingshots or throwing rocks at Israelis and children holding automatic weapons and firebombs."

Social media

Hamas has traditionally presented itself as a voice of suffering of the Palestinian people. According to Time magazine, a new social media strategy was employed in the wake of the October 7 attack: Hamas asserted itself as the dominant resistance force in the Middle East by recording and broadcasting the brutality of their attacks.

According to Dr. Harel Horev, historian and researcher of Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University, Hamas has used social media to dehumanize Israelis/Jews. According to his research, Hamas took over the most popular accounts on Palestinian networks in a covert manner that did not reveal its involvement. This control gave it the ability to significantly influence the Palestinian discourse online through content that denies the humanity and right to life of Israelis. These included posters, songs and videos glorifying threats; computer games that encourage the murder of Jews; training videos for carrying out effective and indiscriminate stabbing and shooting attacks; and anti-Semitic cartoons as a central means of dehumanizing the Israeli/Jew in the Palestinian online discourse.

Internal security

The General Security Service, formally part of the Hamas political party, operates akin to a governmental body within Gaza. Under the direct oversight of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, it conducts extensive surveillance on Palestinians, compiling files on various individuals including journalists and government critics. This secret police force relies on a network of informants and employs tactics such as censorship and surveillance to maintain control. Before the conflict with Israel, the unit reportedly had a monthly budget of $120,000 and consisted of 856 personnel, including more than 160 individuals paid to spread Hamas propaganda and conduct online attacks against opponents.

Other powerful internal security bodies in Gaza include Military Intelligence, which focuses on Israel, and the Internal Security Service, an arm of the Interior Ministry.

Symbols

The flag of Hamas is a green field (a traditionally respected color in Islam) charged in the middle with the writing of the Shahada, an Islamic statement of faith, in white calligraphic script: "There is no god but God" and "Muhammad is the messenger of God".

The emblems of their political and military wings are distinctly different. The emblem of Hamas' political wing features Islamic and militaristic motifs. It shows two crossed swords in front of the central building of the Al-Aqsa mosque complex, in Jerusalem. The mosque is framed by two Palestinian flags that feature the two statements that comprise the Shahada. Above Al Aqsa is a map of Palestine, matching the borders of Mandatory Palestine. Immediately below the Dome it reads "Palestine" and below that in the green banner: "Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas". The emblem of their Al-Qassam Brigades militant wing does not include a map or a Palestinian flag, the militant wing emblem is a cartoon drawing of a man holding a gun and a Quran, with his face mostly covered by a black and white Palestinian keffiyeh. He is standing in front of a green flag and the golden dome of the Al-Aqsa mosque, but the building is more stylised than it is in the political wing emblem.

Violence

Hamas has used both political activities and violence in pursuit of its goals. For example, while politically engaged in the 2006 Palestinian Territories parliamentary election campaign, Hamas stated in its election manifesto that it was prepared to use "armed resistance to end the occupation". Hamas has repeatedly justified its violence by arguing "People under occupation have a right to resist that occupation". Hamas also argues its armed resistance only started after decades of Israeli occupation.

From 2000 to 2004, Hamas was responsible for killing nearly 400 Israelis and wounding more than 2,000 in 425 attacks, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2001 through May 2008, Hamas launched more than 3,000 Qassam rockets and 2,500 mortar attacks into Israel.

Attacks on civilians

Hamas have committed massacres targeting Israeli civilians. Hamas's most deadly suicide bombing was an attack on a Netanya hotel on March 27, 2002, in which 30 people were killed and 140 were wounded. The attack has also been referred to as the Passover massacre since it took place on the first night of the Jewish festival of Passover at a Seder.

Hamas has defended suicide attacks as a legitimate aspect of its asymmetric warfare against Israel. In 2003, according to Stephen Atkins, Hamas resumed suicide bombings in Israel as a retaliatory measure after the failure of peace talks and an Israeli campaign targeting members of the upper echelon of the Hamas leadership. but they are considered as crimes against humanity under international law. In a 2002 report, Human Rights Watch stated that Hamas leaders "should be held accountable" for "war crimes and crimes against humanity" committed by the al-Qassam Brigades.

In 2008, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, offered that Hamas would attack only military targets if the IDF would stop causing the deaths of Palestinian civilians. Following a June 19, 2008, ceasefire, the al-Qassam Brigades ended its rocket attacks and arrested Fatah militants in Gaza who had continued sporadic rocket and mortar attacks against Israel. The al-Qassam Brigades resumed the attacks after the November 4 Israeli incursion into Gaza.

During the 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Hamas infiltrated homes, shot civilians en masse, and took scores of Israeli civilians and soldiers as hostages into Gaza. According to Human Rights Watch, the deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate attacks, and taking of civilians as hostages amount to war crimes under international humanitarian law. During its October 2023 offensive against Israel, Hamas massacred 364 people at the Re'im music festival, while abucting others. During the same offensive, it also was reported that Hamas had massacred the population of the Kfar Aza kibbutz. About 10 percent of the residents of the Be'eri kibbutz were killed. Hamas militants attacked the Psyduck festival, that took place near kibutz Nir Oz, killing 17 Israeli partygoers. Video footage shows children being deliberately killed during the kibbutz attacks, as well as what appears to be an attempt to decapitate a living person using a garden hoe. Forensic teams who examined bodies of victims said many bodies showed signs of torture as well as sexual and gender-based violence, and testimonies to this effect were also collected by Israeli police. Haaretz later reported that forensic pathologists who examined bodies of some 25 percent of the victims taken the Shura Base for identification found "no signs on any of those bodies attesting to sexual relations having taken place or of mutilation of genitalia."

Rocket attacks on Israel

Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel
A rocket fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel, 2008
By year (list)
2001 2002–2006 2007 2008 2008 ceasefire Gaza War 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Groups responsible
Fatah Hamas Islamic Jihad PFLP DFLP PRC Ansar al-Sunna Force 17 Army of Islam Tawhid wal-Jihad Abdullah Azzam Brigades Mujahideen Shura Council
Rocket types
Mortar Qassam Al-Quds Katyusha Grad Fajr-5
Cities affected
Ashdod Ashkelon Beersheba Eilat Gedera Kiryat Gat Kiryat Malakhi Netivot Sderot Ofakim Yavne Tel Aviv Jerusalem
Regional Council areas affected
Hof Ashkelon Karmia Netiv HaAsara Yad Mordechai Zikim Eshkol Nir Oz Nirim Yesha Sha'ar HaNegev Kfar Aza Nahal Oz Nir Am Sdot Negev Alumim Sa'ad Merhavim Be'er Tuvia Yoav Bnei Shimon Gush Etzion
Settlements affected (evacuated)
Atzmona Dugit Elei Sinai Gadid Ganei Tal Katif Kfar Darom Morag Netzarim Netzer Hazani Neve Dekalim Nisanit Rafiah Yam Slav
Defense and response
Civil defense in Israel Red Color Iron Dome ZAKA
See also
Rocket attacks on Eilat Projectile attacks from Lebanon
v t e

Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have launched thousands of rockets into Israel since 2001, killing 15 civilians, wounding many more, and posing an ongoing threat to the nearly 800,000 Israeli civilians who live and work in the weapons' range. Hamas officials have said that the rockets were aimed only at military targets, saying that civilian casualties were the "accidental result" of the weapons' poor quality. According to Human Rights Watch, statements by Hamas leaders suggest that the purpose of the rocket attacks was indeed to strike civilians and civilian objects. From January 2009, following Operation Cast Lead, Hamas largely stopped launching rocket attacks on Israel and has on at least two occasions arrested members of other groups who have launched rockets, "showing that it has the ability to impose the law when it wants". In February 2010, Hamas issued a statement regretting any harm that may have befallen Israeli civilians as a result of Palestinian rocket attacks during the Gaza war. It maintained that its rocket attacks had been aimed at Israeli military targets but lacked accuracy and hence sometimes hit civilian areas. Israel responded that Hamas had boasted repeatedly of targeting and murdering civilians in the media.

According to one report, commenting on the 2014 conflict, "nearly all the 2,500–3,000 rockets and mortars Hamas has fired at Israel since the start of the war seem to have been aimed at towns", including an attack on "a kibbutz collective farm close to the Gaza border", in which an Israeli child was killed. Former Israeli Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi stated that "Hamas has expressed pride in aiming long-range rockets at strategic targets in Israel including the nuclear reactor in Dimona, the chemical plants in Haifa, and Ben-Gurion Airport", which "could have caused thousands" of Israeli casualties "if successful".

In July 2008, Barack Obama, then the Democratic presidential candidate, said: "If somebody was sending rockets into my house, where my two daughters sleep at night, I'm going to do everything in my power to stop that, and I would expect Israelis to do the same thing." On December 28, 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a statement: "the United States strongly condemns the repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israel." On March 2, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the attacks.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas claimed responsibility for a barrage of missile attacks originating from the Gaza Strip.

Guerrilla warfare

Hamas has made great use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank. It has successfully adapted these techniques over the years since its inception. According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party, Hamas had smuggled between several hundred and 1,300 tons of advanced rockets, along with other weaponry, into Gaza.

Hamas has used IEDs and anti-tank rockets against the IDF in Gaza. The latter include standard RPG-7 warheads and home-made rockets such as the Al-Bana, Al-Batar and Al-Yasin. The IDF has a difficult, if not impossible, time trying to find hidden weapons caches in Palestinian areas—this is due to the high local support base Hamas enjoys.

Extrajudicial killings of rivals

In addition to killing Israeli civilians and armed forces, Hamas has also murdered suspected Palestinian Israel collaborators and Fatah rivals. According to the Associated Press, collaborating with Israel is a crime punishable by death in Gaza. Hundreds of Palestinians were executed by both Hamas and Fatah during the First Intifada. In the wake of the 2006 Israeli conflict with Gaza, Hamas was accused of systematically rounding up, torturing and summarily executing Fatah supporters suspected of supplying information to Israel. Human Rights Watch estimates several hundred Gazans were "maimed" and tortured in the aftermath of the conflict. Seventy-three Gazan men accused of "collaborating" had their arms and legs broken by "unidentified perpetrators", and 18 Palestinians accused of helping Israel were executed by Hamas security officials in the first days of the conflict. In November 2012, Hamas's Izzedine al-Qassam brigade publicly executed six Gaza residents accused of collaborating with Israel. According to the witnesses, six alleged informers were shot dead one by one in Gaza City, while the corpse of the sixth victim was tied by a cable to the back of a motorcycle and dragged through the streets. In 2013, Human Rights Watch issued a statement condemning Hamas for not investigating and giving a proper trial to the six men. Their statement was released the day before Hamas issued a deadline for "collaborators" to turn themselves in, or they will be pursued "without mercy". During the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, Hamas executed at least 23 accused collaborators after three of its commanders were assassinated by Israeli forces, with Amnesty International also reporting instances of torture used by Hamas forces. An Israeli source denied that any of the commanders had been targeted on the basis of human intelligence.

Frequent killings of unarmed people have also occurred during Hamas-Fatah clashes. NGOs have cited a number of summary executions as particular examples of violations of the rules of warfare, including the case of Muhammad Swairki, 28, a cook for Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas's presidential guard, who was thrown to his death, with his hands and legs tied, from a 15-story apartment building in Gaza City. Hamas security forces reportedly shoot and torture Palestinians who opposed Hamas rule in Gaza. In one case, a Palestinian had criticized Hamas in a conversation on the street with some friends. Later that day, more than a dozen armed men with black masks and red kaffiyeh took the man from his home, and brought him to a solitary area where they shot him three times in the lower legs and ankles. The man told Human Rights Watch that he was not politically active.

On 14 August 2009, Hamas fighters stormed the Mosque of extremist cleric Abdel-Latif Moussa. The cleric was protected by at least 100 fighters from Jund Ansar Allah ("Army of the Helpers of God"), an Islamist group with links to Al-Qaeda. The resulting battle left at least 13 people dead, including Moussa and six Hamas fighters, and 120 people injured.

According to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, during 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, Hamas killed more than 120 Palestinian youths for defying house arrest imposed on them by Hamas, in addition to 30–40 Palestinians killed by Hamas in extrajudicial executions after accusing them of being collaborators with Israel. Referring to the killing of suspected collaborators, a Shin Bet official stated that "not even one" of those executed by Hamas provided any intelligence to Israel, while the Shin Bet officially "confirmed that those executed during Operation Protective Edge had all been held in prison in Gaza in the course of the hostilities".

Terrorist designation

The United States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation in 1995, as did Canada in November 2002, and the United Kingdom in November 2021. In May 2021, the Organization of American States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation. The European Union so designated Hamas's military wing in 2001 and, under US pressure, designated Hamas in 2003. Hamas challenged this decision, which was upheld by the European Court of Justice in July 2017. Japan and New Zealand have designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organisation. The organisation is banned in Jordan. In late February 2024, New Zealand re-designated the entire Hamas organisation as a terror entity. In September 2024, Switzerland approved a draft law on to ban the group.

Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organisation by Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Russia, Norway, Turkey, China, Egypt, Syria, and Brazil. "Many other states, including Russia, China, Syria, Turkey and Iran consider the (armed) struggle waged by Hamas to be legitimate."

Tobias Buck, a journalist with the British Financial Times newspaper wrote in 2012 that Hamas is "listed as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and the EU, but few dare to treat it that way" and in the Arab and Muslim world it had lost its pariah status with its emissaries welcomed in capitals of Islamic countries. In the early 2010s, Hamas was considered a terrorist group by some governments and academics, others regarded Hamas as a complex organisation, with terrorism as only one component.

Criticism

Aside from its use of political violence in pursuit of its goals, Hamas has been widely criticised for a variety of reasons, including the use of antisemitic hate speech by its representatives, frequent calls for the military destruction of Israel, its reported use of human shields and child combatants as part of its military operations, its restriction of political freedoms within the Gaza Strip, and human rights abuses.

After the start of the 2023 war, the European Parliament passed a motion stating the need for Hamas to be eliminated, with US President Biden having expressed the same sentiment. Hamas was accused of having committed genocide against Israelis on 7 October 2023 by 240 legal experts, including jurists and academics.

Electoral performance

Legislative Council

In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the party won 44.45% of the vote, becoming the largest party of the Legislative Council.

Support

Israeli policy towards Hamas

Benjamin Netanyahu had been Israel's prime minister for most of the two decades preceding the 2023 Israel–Hamas war, and was criticized for having championed a policy of empowering Hamas in Gaza. This policy was part of a strategy to sabotage a two-state solution by confining the Palestinian Authority to the West Bank and weakening it, and to demonstrate to the Israeli public and western governments that Israel has no partner for peace. This criticism was leveled by several Israeli officials, including former prime minister Ehud Barak, and former head of Shin Bet security services Yuval Diskin. Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority were also critical of Israel under Netanyahu allowing suitcases of Qatari money to be given to Hamas, in exchange for maintaining the ceasefire. The Times of Israel reported after the Hamas attack that Netanyahu's policy to treat the Palestinian Authority as a burden and Hamas as an asset had "blown up in our faces".

Public support

A poll conducted in 2021 found that 53% of Palestinians believed Hamas was "most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people". Only 14% preferred Abbas's Fatah party. At the same time, a majority of Gazans also saw Hamas as corrupt, but were frightened to criticize the group. Polls conducted in September 2023 found that support for Hamas among Palestinians stood at around 27–31%.

Public opinions of Hamas deteriorated after it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Prior to the takeover, 62% of Palestinians had held a favorable view of the group, while a third had negative views. According to a 2014 Pew Research survey just prior to the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, only about a third had positive opinions, and more than half viewed Hamas negatively. Furthermore, 68% of Israeli Arabs viewed Hamas negatively. In July 2014, 65% of Lebanese viewed Hamas negatively. In Jordan and Egypt, roughly 60% viewed Hamas negatively, and in Turkey, 80% had a negative view of Hamas. In Tunisia, 42% had a negative view of Hamas, while 56% of Bangladeshis and 44% of Indonesians had a negative opinion of Hamas.

Hamas popularity surged after the war in July–August 2014 with polls reporting that 81 percent of Palestinians felt that Hamas had "won" that war.

Following the Hamas-led attack on Israel in October 2023 and the Israel–Hamas war that followed, Hamas's popularity in Gaza fell while increasing in the West Bank. A May 2024 poll by the Arab World for Research and Development, a West Bank-based independent organization, only a quarter of Gazans supported Hamas, while 76% of Palestinians in the West Bank views Hamas positively. Views on the attack among Gazans plummeted from 50% support to 24% in favor from a poll taken in November 2023 to the May 2024 poll. According to the poll conducted by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy from November 14 to December 6, 2023, 40% of Saudi participants expressed a positive view of Hamas.

Foreign relations

After winning the Palestinian elections, Hamas leaders made multi-national diplomatic tours abroad. In April 2006, Mahmoud al-Zahar (then foreign minister) visited Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt. He met the Saudi foreign minister Prince Faysal. In Syria he held talks on the issue of Palestinians stuck on the Syrian-Iraqi border. He also stated that he unofficially met officials from Western Europe in Qatar who did not wish to be named. In May 2006, Hamas foreign minister visited Indonesia, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and Iran. The minister also participated in China–Arab States Cooperation Forum. Ismail Haniyeh in 2006 visited Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Hamas has always maintained leadership abroad. The movement is deliberately fragmented to ensure that Israel cannot kill its top political and military leaders. Hamas used to be strongly allied with both Iran and Syria. Iran gave Hamas an estimated $13–15 million in 2011 as well as access to long-range missiles. Hamas's political bureau was once located in the Syrian capital of Damascus before the start of the Syrian civil war. Relations between Hamas, Iran, and Syria began to turn cold when Hamas refused to back the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Instead, Hamas backed the Sunni rebels fighting against Assad. As a result, Iran cut funding to Hamas, and Iranian ally Hezbollah ordered Hamas members out of Lebanon. Hamas was then forced out of Syria, and subsequently has tried to mend fences with Iran and Hezbollah. Hamas contacted Jordan and Sudan to see if either would open up its borders to its political bureau, but both countries refused, although they welcomed many Hamas members leaving Syria.

From 2012 to 2013, under the short-lived leadership of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, Hamas had the support of Egypt. After Morsi was removed from office, his successor Abdul Fattah al-Sisi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and destroyed the tunnels Hamas built into Egypt. In 2015, Egypt declared Hamas a terrorist organization. But this decision was overturned by Egypt in June of the same year. There was a rapprochement between Hamas and Egypt, when a Hamas delegation visited Cairo on 12 March 2016. Hamas has assisted Egypt in controlling the insurgency in Sinai. Hamas denied Egypt's request to deploy its own militants in the Sinai leading to tensions between the two.

Egypt has occasionally served as mediator between Hamas and Fatah, seeking to unify the two factions. In 2017, Yahya Sinwar visited Cairo for 5 weeks and convinced the Egyptian government to open the Rafah crossing, letting in cement and fuel in exchange for Hamas committing to better relations with Fatah; this subsequently led to the signing of the 2017 Fatah–Hamas Agreement.

The United Arab Emirates has been hostile to Hamas designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and Hamas was at the time viewed as the Brotherhood's Palestinian equivalent.

Hamas enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia in its early years. Saudi Arabia funded most of its operations from 2000 to 2004, but reduced its support due to US pressure. In 2020, many Hamas members in Saudi Arabia were arrested. In 2022, Saudi Arabia began releasing Hamas members from prison. In April 2023, Ismail Haniyeh visited Riyadh, a sign of improving relations. Haniyeh had long sought to visit Saudi Arabia, and his requests to do so had been long ignored up until then.

Despite its Sunni Islamist ideology, Hamas has been flexible and pragmatic in its foreign policy, moderating and toning down its religious rhetoric when expedient; it has developed strong ties with Iran, and has also established relations with constitutionally secular states such as Syria and Russia. Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence, has accused Russia of supporting Hamas by supplying the group with stolen Ukrainian weaponry, and the National Resistance Center of Ukraine alleged that the Russian Wagner Group trained Hamas militants ahead of the October 7 attacks.

North Korea supplies Hamas with weaponry. Ali Barakeh, a Hamas official living in Lebanon, claimed the two are allies.

Hamas leaders reportedly re-established relations with Kuwait, Libya and Oman, all of which reportedly have not had warm relations with Fatah. The cool relationship between Fatah and Kuwait owed to Arafat's support for Saddam during the First Gulf War, which lead to the Palestinian exodus from Kuwait (1990–91). This rapproachment is in part due to Hamas's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Mahmoud al-Zahar stated that Hamas does not "play the game" of siding with one Arab nation against another (e.g. in the Gulf War). When Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and other Sunni ulema, called for an uprising against Assad's regime in Syria, Mahmoud al-Zahar maintained that taking sides would harm the Palestinian cause.

After the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas congratulated the Syrian people for achieving their "aspirations for freedom and justice," and expressed hope that the new Syrian government would continue "its historical and pivotal role in supporting the Palestinian people."

Qatar and Turkey

According to Middle East experts, now Hamas has two firm allies: Qatar and Turkey. Both give Hamas public and financial assistance estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Qatar has transferred more than $1.8 billion to Hamas. Shashank Joshi, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, says that "Qatar also hosts Hamas's political bureau which includes Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal." Meshaal also visits Turkey frequently to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdogan has dedicated himself to breaking Hamas out of its political and economic seclusion. On US television, Erdogan said in 2012 that "I don't see Hamas as a terror organization. Hamas is a political party."

Qatar has been called Hamas' most important financial backer and foreign ally. In 2007, Qatar was, with Turkey, the only country to back Hamas after the group ousted the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip. The relationship between Hamas and Qatar strengthened in 2008 and 2009 when Khaled Meshaal was invited to attend the Doha Summit where he was seated next to the then Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who pledged $250 million to repair the damage caused by Israel in the Israeli war on Gaza. These events caused Qatar to become the main player in the "Palestinian issue". Qatar called Gaza's blockade unjust and immoral, which prompted the Hamas government in Gaza, including former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, to thank Qatar for their "unconditional" support. Qatar then began regularly handing out political, material, humanitarian and charitable support for Hamas.

In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama personally requested that Qatar, one of the U.S.'s most important Arab allies, provide a base for the Hamas leadership. At the time, the U.S. were seeking to establish communications with Hamas and believed that a Hamas office in Qatar would be easier to access than a Hamas bureau in Iran, the group's main backer.

In 2012, Qatar's former Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, became the first head of state to visit Gaza under Hamas rule. He pledged to raise $400 million for reconstruction. Sources say that advocating for Hamas is politically beneficial to Turkey and Qatar because the Palestinian cause draws popular support amongst their citizens at home.

Speaking in reference to Qatar's support for Hamas, during a 2015 visit to Palestine, Qatari official Mohammad al-Emadi, said Qatar is using the money not to help Hamas but rather the Palestinian people as a whole. He acknowledges that giving to the Palestinian people means using Hamas as the local contact. Emadi said, "You have to support them. You don't like them, don't like them. But they control the country, you know." Some argue that Hamas's relations with Qatar are putting Hamas in an awkward position because Qatar has become part of the regional Arab problem. Hamas says that having contacts with various Arab countries establishes positive relations which will encourage Arab countries to do their duty toward the Palestinians and support their cause by influencing public opinion in the Arab world. In March 2015, Hamas has announced its support of the Saudi Arabian-led military intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In a controversial deal, Israel's government under Benjamin Netanyahu supported Qatar's payments to Hamas for many years, in the hope that it would turn Hamas into an effective counterweight to the Palestinian Authority and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.

In May 2018, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tweeted to the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a resistance movement that defends the Palestinian homeland against an occupying power. During that period there were conflicts between Israeli troops and Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip, due to the decision of the United States to move their embassy to Jerusalem. Also in 2018 the Israel Security Agency accused SADAT International Defense Consultancy (a Turkish private military company with connections to the Turkish government) of transferring funds to Hamas.

In February 2020, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh met with Turkish President Erdoğan. On 26 July 2023, Haniyeh met with Erdoğan and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Behind the meeting was Turkey's effort to reconcile Fatah with Hamas. On 7 October 2023, the day of the Hamas attack on Israel, Haniyeh was in Istanbul, Turkey. On 21 October 2023, Haniyeh spoke with Erdoğan about the latest developments in the Israel–Hamas war and the current situation in Gaza. On 25 October 2023, Erdoğan said that Hamas was not a terrorist organisation but a liberation group fighting to protect Palestinian lands and people.

See also

• Hamas war crimes
• Hamastan
• History of Hamas
• List of leaders of Hamas
• List of political parties in the State of Palestine
• Politics of Palestine
• Israeli support for Hamas

Notes

1. Consists of Khaled Mashal, Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, Muhammad Ismail Darwish, and an unnamed senior member of Hamas.
2. The assassination of Deif was claimed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). However, it was denied by Hamas.
3. UK: /həˈmæs/ hə-MASS, US: /həˈmɑːs/ hə-MAHSS; Arabic: حَمَاس, romanized: Ḥamās, IPA: [ħaˈmaːs]
4. commonly Arabic: حركة حماس, romanized: Haraka Hamas, lit. 'Hamas Movement'.
5. A two-thirds majority was required for the motion to pass. 87 voted in favour, 58 against, 32 abstained and 16 did not vote.
6. Haniyeh at the time was the (overall) Prime Minister of the State of Palestine but as such dismissed by his President Abbas in 2007; nevertheless still head of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip
7. The notion of "Palestine from the river to the sea" is nothing but the boundaries of Eretz Israel as imagined by the first Zionists. The notion was enshrined in the founding charter of the Likud party which states that "between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty." One can thus entertain the chilling irony that Hamas owes its cherished slogan to the Zionists. After all, what is "free Palestine from the river to the sea" but a utopian parody of "Greater Israel"?
8. His name has been spelled: Hussam al-Tawil, Hossam Al-Tawil, or Hosam al-Taweel.
9. 'The Charter was written in early 1988 by one individual and was made public without appropriate general Hamas consultation, revision or consensus, to the regret of Hamas's leaders in later years. The author of the Charter was one of the 'old guard' of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, completely cut off from the outside world. All kinds of confusions and conflations between Judaism and Zionism found their way into the Charter, to the disservice of Hamas ever since, as this document has managed to brand it with charges of 'anti-Semitism' and a naïve world-view' Hamas leaders and spokespeople have rarely referred to the Charter or quoted from it, evidence that it has come to be seen as a burden rather than an intellectual platform that embraces the movement's principles.'
10. 'The second major component in Palestine's sanctity, according to Hamas, is its designation as a waqf by the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab. When the Muslim armies conquered Palestine in the year 638, the Hamas Charter says, the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab decided not to divide the conquered land among the victorious soldiers, but to establish it as a waqf, belonging to the entire Muslim nation until the day of resurrection.'
11. 'In a 1995 lecture, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, a party to the foundation of Hamas and a senior member of its West Bank leadership, expounded the importance of Hamas' dawa infrastructure as the soil from which militancy would flower.'
12. 'Consistent attacks on army units by Hamas activists are as new as the use of anti-tank missiles against civilian homes by the Israeli military.'
13. Matthew Levitt on the other hand claims that Hamas's welfare institutions act as a mere façade or front for the financing of terrorism, and dismisses the idea of two wings as a 'myth'. He cites Ahmed Yassin stating in 1998: "We can not separate the wing from the body. If we do so, the body will not be able to fly. Hamas is one body."
14. 'This ceasefire ended when Israel started targeting Hamas leaders for assassination in July 2003. Hamas retaliated with a suicide bombing in Israel on August 19, 2003, that killed 20 people, including 6 children. Since then Israelis have mounted an assassination campaign against the senior leadership of Hamas that has killed 13 Hamas members, including Ismail Abu Shanab, one of the most moderate leaders of Hamas. ... After each of these assassinations, Hamas has sent a suicide bomber into Israel in retaliation.'
15. "In 2006, Norway explicitly distanced itself from the EU proscription regime, claiming that it was causing problems for its role as a 'neutral facilitator.'"

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32. Gelvin 2014, p. 226
33. Seurat 2019, pp. 17–19: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012."
34. ^ *Baconi 2018, pp. 114–116: " enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *Roy 2013, p. 210: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."
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37. Sources that believe that Hamas' 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders:
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    • Mohammed Ayoob. The Many Faces of Political Islam, Second Edition. University of Michigan Press. p. 133.
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• Beinart, Peter (2012). The Crisis of Zionism. Melbourne University Press. ISBN 978-0522861761.
• Brenner, Björn (2017). Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1786731425.
• Brenner, Björn (2022). Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-0755634392.
• Chehab, Zaki (2007). Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1845113896.
• Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya (2008). "Hamas and Politics in Palestine:Impact on Peace-Building". In Abhyankar, Rajendra Madhukar (ed.). West Asia and the Region: Defining India's Role. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. ISBN 978-8171886166.
• Clarke, Colin P. (2015). Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1440831041.
• Dalacoura, Katerina (2012). "Islamist Terrorism and National Liberation: Hamas and Hizbullah". Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 66–96. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511977367.004. ISBN 9780511977367. LCCN 2010047275. S2CID 150958046.
• Davis, Jessica (2017). Women in Modern Terrorism: From Liberation Wars to Global Jihad and the Islamic State. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1442274990.
• Davis, Joyce (2004). Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 100. ISBN 978-1403966810.
• Davis, Richard (2016). Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East: Insurgency in the Holy Land. Routledge. ISBN 978-1317402589.
• Dunning, Tristan (2016). Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy: Reinterpreting Resistance in Palestine. Routledge. ISBN 978-1317384946.
• Filiu, Jean-Pierre (Spring 2012). "The Origins of Hamas: Militant Legacy or Israeli Tool?". Journal of Palestine Studies. 41 (3): 54–70. doi:10.1525/jps.2012.xli.3.54. JSTOR 10.1525/jps.2012.xli.3.54.
• Gelvin, James L. (2014). "The Palestinian National Movement Comes of Age". The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (3rd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 226. ISBN 978-1-107-61354-6.
• Gerner, Deborah J. (2007). "Mobilizing Women for Nationalist Agendas". In Moghadam, Valentine M. (ed.). From Patriarchy to Empowerment: Women's Participation, Movements, and Rights in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. Syracuse University Press. pp. 17–39. ISBN 978-0815631118.
• Gleis, Joshua L.; Berti, Benedetta (2012). Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study. Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 111. ISBN 978-1421406718.
• Guidère, Mathieu (2012). Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 978-0810878211.
• Gunning, Jeroen (2007). "Hamas: Harakat al-Muqamama al-Islamiyya". In Marianne Heiberg; Brendan O'Leary (eds.). Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 134–. ISBN 978-0812239744.
• Haspeslagh, Sophie (2016). ""Listing terrorists"; the impact of proscription on third-party efforts to engage armed groups in peace processes- a practitioner's perspective'". In Tellidis, Ioannis; Toros, Harmonie (eds.). Terrorism: Bridging the Gap with Peace and Conflict Studies: Investigating the Crossroad. Routledge. pp. 189–207. ISBN 978-1317665595.
• Herrick, Julie C. (2011). "Non-State Actors: A Comparative Analysis of Change and Development Within Hamas and Hezbollah". In Korany, Bahgat (ed.). The Changing Middle East: A New Look at Regional Dynamics. Oxford University Press. pp. 167–95. ISBN 978-9774165139.
• Hueston, Harry Raymond; Pierpaoli, Paul G.; Zahar, Sherifa (2014). "Hamas". In Roberts, Priscilla (ed.). Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Essential Reference Guide. ABC-CLIO. pp. 67–71. ISBN 978-1610690683.
• Hroub, Khaled (2006). Hamas: A Beginner's Guide. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0745325910.
• Jefferis, Jennifer (2016). Hamas: Terrorism, Governance, and Its Future in Middle East Politics. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1440839030.
• Kabahā, Muṣṭafá (2014). The Palestinian People: Seeking Sovereignty and State. , Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1588268822.
• Kass, Ilana; O'Neill, Bard E. (1997). The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process. University Press of America/National Institute for Public Policy. ISBN 978-0761805359.
• Kear, Martin (2018). Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood. Routledge. ISBN 978-0429999406.
• Levitt, Matthew (2006). Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300122589.
• Levitt, Matthew (2008). Negotiating Under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0742565661.
• Litvak, Meir (2004). "Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism:Hamas". In Hughes, Matthew; Johnson, Gaynor (eds.). Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age. Frank Cass. pp. 156–72. ISBN 978-1135753641.
• Mukhimer, Tariq (2012). Hamas Rule in Gaza: Human Rights Under Constraint. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1137310194.
• Najib, Mohammad; Friedrich, Roland (2007). "Non-Statutory Armed Groups and Security Sector Governance". In Friedrich, Roland; Luethold, Arnold (eds.). Entry-points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform. DCAF. pp. 101–127. ISBN 978-9292220617.
• O'Malley, Padraig (2015). The Two-State Delusion: Israel and Palestine – A Tale of Two Narratives. Penguin Publishing Group. pp. 126–. ISBN 978-0698192188.
• Phillips, David L. (2011). From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in Transition. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1412812016.
• Robinson, Glenn E. (2004). "Hamas as a Social Movement". In Wiktorowicz, Quintan (ed.). Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Indiana University Press. pp. 112–39. ISBN 978-0253216212.
• Roy, Sara (2013). Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector (2 ed.). Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691124483.
• Rubenberg, Cheryl (2001). Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1555879563.
• Seurat, Leila (2019). The Foreign Policy of Hamas. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781838607449.
• Seurat, Leila (2022). The foreign policy of Hamas: ideology, decision making and political supremacy. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 9781838607456.
• Shitrit, Lihi Ben (2015). Righteous Transgressions: Women's Activism on the Israeli and Palestinian Religious Right. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1400873845.
• Slater, Jerome (2020). Mythologies Without End: The US, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1917–2020. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0190459086.
• Stepanova, Ekaterina (2008). Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects (PDF). SIPRI / Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199533558. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 March 2016. Retrieved 5 May 2015.
• Vittori, Jodi (2011). Terrorist Financing and Resourcing. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0230117716.
• Zartman, Jonathan K. (19 March 2020). Conflict in the Modern Middle East. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-4408-6502-2.

Journal articles

• Abu-Amr, Ziad (Summer 1993). "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background". Journal of Palestine Studies. 22 (4): 5–19. doi:10.2307/2538077. JSTOR 2538077.
• Gunning, Jeroen (March 2004). "Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation". International Affairs. 80 (2). Royal Institute of International Affairs: 233–55. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00381.x. JSTOR 3569240.
• Herzog, Michael (March–April 2006). "Can Hamas Be Tamed?". Foreign Affairs. 85 (2): 83–94. doi:10.2307/20031913. JSTOR 20031913.
• Hroub, Khaled (Summer 2006b). "A 'New Hamas' through Its New Documents". Journal of Palestine Studies. 35 (4): 6–27. doi:10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6. JSTOR 10.1525/jps.2006.35.4.6.
• Litvak, Meir (January 1998). "The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas". Middle Eastern Studies. 34 (1): 148–63. doi:10.1080/00263209808701214. JSTOR 4283922.
• Roy, Sara (Summer 1993). "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration". Journal of Palestine Studies. 22 (4): 20–31. doi:10.2307/2538078. JSTOR 2538078.

Other

• "Hamas West Bank leader given six-month detention without trial". Arab News. Agence France-Presse. 8 April 2019.
• Assi, Seraj (16 December 2018). "Hamas Owes Its 'Palestine From the River to the Sea' Slogan to Zionism". Haaretz.
• Barzak, Ibrahim (11 June 2011). "Muhammad Hassan Shama, little-known Hamas founder". The Boston Globe.
• "UN General Assembly rejects US resolution to condemn Hamas". Deutsche Welle. 7 December 2018.
• Dalloul, Motasem A (14 December 2017). "Interview with Dr Ibrahim Al-Yazouri, a founder of Hamas". Middle East Monitor.

External links

• Official website (in Arabic)
• Official website (in English)
• Hamas leaders CFR
• Hamas Charter of 1988
• Hamas 2017 Document of General Principles & Policies (English translation published by Hamas, via Internet Archive)
• The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) (includes interpretation)
• Hamas Shifts From Rockets to Public Relations The New York Times, July 23, 2009
• 22 years on the start of Hamas Al-Qassam Brigades' Information Office
• Sherifa Zuhur, Hamas and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics (PDF file) December 2008
• Fatah and Hamas Human Rights Violations in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in 2007 by Elizabeth Freed of Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group
• "Hamas threatens attacks on US: Terrorist warns 'Middle East is full of American targets'" Ynetnews. December 24, 2006. Accessed July 20, 2014.

v t e Hamas
History	Hamas Charter (revised) Fatah–Hamas conflict Takeover of the Gaza Strip 25th anniversary of Hamas (2012)
Political wing	List of leaders of Hamas Hamas government in the Gaza Strip Hamas temporary committee Islamic Salvation Party Khaled Mashal Ismail Haniyeh Yahya Sinwar Basem Naim Ali Baraka Mousa Abu Marzook Zaher Jabarin Essam al-Da'alis Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi hospital Women: Jamila Abdallah Taha al-Shanti Umm Nidal Elections 2005 presidential 2006 legislative
Law and order	Interior Minister of the Gaza Strip Ihab al-Ghussein Police Faiq Mabhouh Palestinian Executive Force [ar] Said Seyam Palestinian law Executions
Military wing	Palestinian Joint Operations Room Al-Qassam Brigades Nukbha Ayman Nofal al-Aqsa Flood Vanguards unit People Leader: Mohammed Deif Spokesperson: Abu Obaida Marwan Issa Yahya Ayyash Adnan al-Ghoul Salah Shehade Mazen Faqha Wa'el Nassar Ahmed Jabari Imad Abbas Emad Akel Nidal Farahat Yunis Al Astal Ahmed Ghandour Women Reem Riyashi Fatma Omar An-Najar Operations Murder of Yaron and Efrat Ungar Sbarro restaurant suicide bombing 2001 Immanuel bus attack 2004 Ashdod Port bombings IDF outpost bombing 2006 Gaza cross-border raid Gaza War (2008–2009) August 2010 West Bank shooting attack 2012 Gaza War 2014 Gaza War 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis 2023 attack on Israel Israel–Hamas war Weapons Al-Bana Batar Qassam rocket Yasin (RPG)
Social services	Islamic University of Gaza Mujama al-Islamiya Palestinian Authority Martyrs Fund
Media	Al-Aqsa TV Tomorrow's Pioneers Al-Aqsa Voice Radio Al-Quds TV Shehab News Agency Al-Watan (defunct)
Foreign relations	Support from (Iran Israel Qatar Turkey) Russia Lebanon
Related articles	Criticism of Hamas Hamas war crimes Hamas most wanted playing cards
Category:Hamas

• Hamas
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