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Political Science approach to manipulate decision making process for winning
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Heresthetic is an approach to understanding how political actors manipulate the decision-making process so they can win. Heresthetic is a positive political theory, including aspects of game theory, public choice theory, rational choice theory, and social choice theory to political science. Political scientist William H. Riker is considered the creator and one of the most prominent supports of theory.

Description

Riker argues that herestheticians win because they compel or persuade others to join them in voting or political coalitions. Heresthetic focuses both on the use of rhetoric and political strategy. Riker argues that there are three vital components to heresthetic.

  1. Agenda control: political agents may structure debate in ways that highlight favorable or eliminate undesirable policy alternatives. Depending upon the order that policy options are discussed, debate can produce different outcomes, including outcomes that are not preferred by the heresthetician. The order of choice matters. Riker's concept of agenda control differs from conventional accounts of agenda-setting involving policy-makers, which focus on how policy-makers’ agendas are influenced by exogenous factors, such as the media and public opinion. Riker's focus is on how policy-makers affect the ordering of items on the political agenda, and how that ordering can be manipulated.
  2. Strategic voting: in deliberative settings herestheticians can take advantage of voting procedures to influence outcomes. For example, agents may vote against their own interest in the short-term to secure a better long-term position. Another element of strategic voting is vote trading. Policy-makers may informally trade votes with others in exchange for future votes or benefits. Strategic voting is common in legislative settings because of open rules and sequential voting procedures.
  3. Dimension manipulation: herestheticians can manipulate the dimensionality of political decision-making by introducing new dimensions or modifying existing framing. Dimension manipulation can either expand a decision-making space by reconfiguring acceptable topics of debate and policy alternatives, or shrink dimensions by eliminating certain topics or alternatives. The manipulation of dimensions is important because once an agent manipulates framing, it cannot be removed from debate.

These components allow herestheticians to manipulate political outcomes by structuring debate, rhetorically or structurally, to be more advantageous to their preferred position.

Example

The British Parliament is scheduling upcoming referendum votes to determine Scottish independence from the United Kingdom and if the UK should remain a member of the European Union. A member of parliament who has influence on how the votes will be structured, has a preference that Scotland will remain in union with the UK and that the UK will leave the EU. Scottish independence and the UK remaining a member of the EU is an undesirable outcome for the MP. While polling indicates that a majority of Scottish voters do not support independence, voters are more likely to support independence if the UK leaves the EU. In order to receive his preferred outcome, the MP seeks for the referendum votes to be held in a sequence in which Scottish independence is determined first, and then UK withdrawal from the EU. This voting sequence demonstrates how herestheticians can manipulate the decision-making process so they can win.

See also

References

  1. ^ Riker, William H. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  2. Eamonn Butler (2012). Public Choice—A Primer (PDF) (PDF). London: Institute of Economic Affairs. p. 36.
  3. McLean, Iain C. (2002). "William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s)". British Journal of Political Science. 32 (2): 535–558. doi:10.1017/S0007123402000224. JSTOR 4092252.
  4. Riker, William H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  5. ^ Smith, Alex P.; Phillips, Stephen C. (2021). "Ways and Means: Teaching Political Strategy and Heresthetic by Simulating the Budget Process". Journal of Political Science Education. 17: 1–11. doi:10.1080/15512169.2021.1897602. S2CID 236762572.
  6. Stoker, Gerry (2017). Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. New York: Palgrave.
  7. Rogers, Everett; Dearing, James (1988). "Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has It Been, Where Is It Going?". Annals of the International Communication Association. 11 (1): 555–594. doi:10.1080/23808985.1988.11678708.
  8. Epstein, Lee; Shvetsova, Olga (2002). "Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court". Journal of Theoretical Politics. 14 (1): 93–122. doi:10.1177/095169280201400106. S2CID 154391466.
  9. Enelow, James M.; Hinich, Melvin J. (1990). Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  10. Riker, William H. (1982). Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
  11. "Vote-Trading Ethics". The Washington Post. 2004-10-05. Retrieved 2021-02-25.
  12. Edwards, Damian (2004). "Divide and Conquer: Heresthetic in the Antipodes". Political Science. 56 (2): 65–74. doi:10.1177/003231870405600208. S2CID 145158963.
  13. Robertson, David B. (2006). "A Pivotal Politician and Constitutional Design". American Political Science Review. 100 (2): 303–308. doi:10.1017/S0003055406062186. S2CID 145452373.
  14. Kiviniemi, Marc T.; Snyder, Mark; Johnson, Bethany C. (2008). "Motivated Dimension Manipulation in the Processing of Social Comparison Information". Self and Identity. 7 (3): 225–242. doi:10.1080/15298860701275873. PMC 3805978. PMID 24163591.
  15. Paine, Scott C. (1989). "Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension". Journal of Politics. 51 (1): 36–49. doi:10.2307/2131608. JSTOR 2131608. S2CID 144765660.
  16. "Brexit Has Reignited Scotland's Push for Independence". Foreign Policy. 2020-09-21. Retrieved 2021-02-25.
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