Misplaced Pages

Liikanen report

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.

The Liikanen Report or "Report of the European Commission’s High-level Expert Group on Bank Structural Reform" (known as the "Liikanen Group") is a set of recommendations published in October 2012 by a group of experts led by Erkki Liikanen, governor of the Bank of Finland and ECB council member. On 3 July 2013, by large majority the European Parliament adopted an own initiative report called "Reforming the structure of the EU banking sector" that welcomes structural reform measures at Union level to tackle concerns on Too big to fail banks, that led to the publication of a proposal of Regulation on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions in January 2014. This proposal was withdrawn in July 2018.

Formation and objectives

The Liikanen Group was molded after the UK's Independent Commission on Banking: EU Internal Markets Commissioner Michel Barnier set up the group in November 2011 in the context of the European sovereign-debt crisis and great recession. Its mandate was to determine whether structural reforms of EU banks would strengthen financial stability, improve efficiency and consumer protection in addition to the regulatory reform of the EU bank sector. Regulatory reform had been ongoing since 2009 and culminated in the adoption of the European Banking Authority in October 2013.

The Liikanen Group

According to the EU Commission, the 11 members of the ad hoc “Liikanen Group” were appointed solely on the basis of their technical expertise and professional merit. The group held monthly meetings, invited different stakeholders, and invited the public to comment on their draft in May 2012. It was composed of:

Filling the regulatory gap

European scholars had discussed the need for an EU-wide banking law in light of the European sovereign-debt crisis. In France SFAF and World Pensions Council (WPC) banking experts have argued that, beyond fragmented national legislations, statutory rules should be adopted and implemented within the broader context of separation of powers in European Union law.

This perspective gained ground after the Libor scandal broke news in June 2012, with mainstream opinion leaders such as Financial Times editorial writers in the UK and the Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants (CJD), a Business Federation in France calling as in 2008, for adoption of an EU-wide "Glass Steagall II". Likewise, former Citigroup Chairman and CEO Sandy Weill, considered one of the driving forces behind the financial deregulation and “mega-mergers” of the 1990s, surprised financial analysts in Europe and North American July 25, 2012, by “calling for splitting up the commercial banks from the investment banks. In effect, he says: "bring back the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which led to half a century, free of financial crises.”

Final report

The 153 page final version of the report was published October 2, 2012. The recommendations combined key features of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the UK’s 2011 "Vickers Report" by the Independent Commission on Banking.

The report recommended actions in the following 5 areas:

  1. Mandatory separation of proprietary trading and other high-risk trading;
  2. Additional separation of activities, conditional on the recovery and resolution plan (RRP);
  3. Amendments to the use of bail-in instruments as a resolution tool;
  4. Toughening of capital requirements on trading assets and real estate related loans (i.e. mortgages), aka fractional reserve banking;
  5. Strengthening bank governance and control of banks, including measures to rein in or bail-in bonuses.

The report gives an overview of the structure and evolution of the EU banking sector with its tradition of universal banking, and assesses banking reforms in the European post-debt crisis era. It lists a range of proposals to remedy deficits in bank reforms, such as improving of already existing regulations in risk management under the Basel III rules, corporate governance, bank resolution mechanisms, management and strengthening of supervision and compensation rules for bank staff. It advocates for a better alignment of executive pay with long term corporate and national interests, by raising the fixed income or “debt” component of bankers’ bonuses, meaning the bonuses could be decreased if short-term profits yield long-term troubles, paying bonuses with bonds. The Swiss bank UBS adopted the latter so called "bail-in bonds". 2/5/13.

Re 1) Mandatory separation of high-risk trading activities i.e. compartmentalization, or “ring-fencing” of proprietary and third-party trading activities, without breaking banks up is to include risk management and capital allocation: “the trading division will have to hold its own capital, meaning that it stands or falls by its own activities and cannot, in theory at least, knock over the bread-and-butter retail banking operations." Universal banks with very large trading arms either in absolute terms (over €100bn-£80bn-$130bn-¥10.2tr-Y821bn) or in proportion to the rest of the bank (greater than 15%-25%) should be forced to hold separate capital for its trading operations.

Re 2)-5) Mechanisms to allow a bank to enter bankruptcy instead of the public having to rescue it: "The idea is to get taxpayers off the hook by ensuring that governments do not have to step in to safeguard deposits if traders blow a hole in their balance sheet”.

During a 6-week public comment period, closed on 11/13/2012, 89 responses mainly by financial organizations were received, summarized on 6 pages

On 17 May 2013, the Liikanen report's conclusion was its public discussion in a European Commission meeting on Bank Structural Reform. The main points are concisely summarized on 4 pages.

Reception by the financial industry

  • Christian Clausen, president of the European Banking Federation, head of the Swedish bank Nordea, called the proposal “unnecessary” and “completely wrong.”
  • The German bank lobby, the Bundesverband deutscher Banken claimed, proposals amounted to "overregulation, would ruin Germany’s reputation as a location for finance and thus could damage the German economy" in the BdB press statement 10/2/12
  • The World Savings Banks Institute's European Savings Banks Group called the report "Excess of financial regulation" in its 9-page response from 11/2012.

Media Coverage

  • "The Liikanen report decoded" Financial Times, 10/2/2012.
  • "The Liikanen banking reform proposals" OnlyStrategic. UK Financial Newslink. 10/5/12.
  • "The Liikanen review. Into the ring. A European report recommends yet another way to ring-fence banks." The Economist, 10/6/2012.
  • "Liikanen Report: Half-hearted attempt to solve the “too big to fail” problem." By Peter Wahl
  • "Liikanen’s Bank-Separation Proposal Sparks Opposition, EU Says" Bloomberg News 12/20/12.

References

  1. Liikanen; et al. (October 2, 2012). "High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector" (PDF). EU. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 October 2012. Retrieved 4 Oct 2012.
  2. "EUR-Lex - 52014PC0043 - EN - EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu. 2014.
  3. "EUR-Lex - 52018XC0704(03) - EN - EUR-Lex". eur-lex.europa.eu. 2018.
  4. "Banking structural reform (follow-up to the Liikanen report)". Archived from the original on 2014-01-10. Retrieved 2014-01-10. accessdate Jan 10, 2014
  5. European Commission, The EU Single Market, Financial Services: Banking Union website http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/banking-union/index_en.htm#srm accessdate Jan 10, 2014
  6. Thomas, David (Feb 23, 2012). "Meet Michel Barnier's regulation team". Financial News. Retrieved 28 Aug 2012..
  7. "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-01-10. Retrieved 2013-03-15.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  8. "José Manuel Campa". Archived from the original on 2013-08-15. Retrieved 2013-03-15.
  9. "Monique Goyens". Archived from the original on 2012-11-13. Retrieved 2013-03-15.
  10. "Home". securetrustbank.com.
  11. "Protect - Speak up stop harm. - The Whistleblowing Charity".
  12. KBC's CSR report of 2011 "A word from our CO". Archived from the original on 2012-05-14. Retrieved 2013-03-15.
  13. "Home". Circle Economy.
  14. Firzli, M Nicolas (January 2010). "Bank Regulation and Financial Orthodoxy: the Lessons from the Glass-Steagall Act" (PDF). Revue Analyse Financière (in French) (34): 49–52. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 February 2010. Retrieved 14 July 2012.
  15. Lepesant, Marie (June 11, 2012). "Le Modèle des Banques Françaises en Question". Le Parisien (in French). Retrieved 12 June 2012. - Quoting M. Nicolas Firzli of the World Pensions Council (WPC).
  16. Editorial, Page (July 3, 2012). "Restoring trust after Diamond". Financial Times. Retrieved 15 July 2012. quoting FT Editorial Page.
  17. "Objectif Oïkos: 12 Propositions pour 2012". Propositions du CJD (in French). November 2011 – June 2012. Retrieved 12 June 2012. p. 98.
  18. Denning, Steve (July 25, 2012). "Rethinking Capitalism: Sandy Weill Says Bring Back Glass-Steagall". Forbes. Retrieved 25 July 2012. Quoting interview on CNBC’s Squawk-Box.
  19. Definition: sometimes known as "living wills" of an institution. Recovery plans, which come into play when a firm falls under extreme stress, outline actions to maintain the firm as a going concern. Resolution plans would be resorted to in the event of failure of a financial institution and aim to manage its resolution in a controlled manner with minimum cost and systemic disruption.
  20. "UBS reveals new tool to claw back bonuses - CNN.com". CNN. 6 February 2013.
  21. Burgis, Tom (Oct 2, 2012). "The Liikanen report decoded". Financial Times: n.a. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
  22. ec.europa.eu https://web.archive.org/web/20140110192436/http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/hleg-banking/replies-summary_en.pdf. Archived from the original on 2014-01-10. {{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  23. "Banking structural reform (follow-up to the Liikanen report)". Archived from the original on 2014-01-10. Retrieved 2014-01-10. accessdate January 10, 2014
  24. EBF 13 page comments to EU, 11-13-12. http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/D1994D-2012-Final%20EBF%20consultation%20response%20for%20the%20final%20report%20from%20the%20Liikanen%20HLEG.pdf
  25. "Trennbanken kein geeigneter Weg zur Erhöhung der Finanzstabilität in Deutschland". Archived from the original on 2013-02-09. Retrieved 2013-03-15.
  26. "German push for Liikanen consensus could help Deutsche Bank". Reuters. 2013-01-16. Retrieved 2023-05-11.
  27. "ESBG common response to the European Commission consultation on the Liikanen Report recommendations" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-01-10. Retrieved 2013-03-15. accessdate 3-15-13
  28. Burgis, Tom (2 October 2012). "The Liikanen report decoded". Financial Times.
  29. "The Liikanen banking reform proposals". www.onlystrategic.com.
  30. "Into the ring". The Economist. 6 October 2012.
  31. "Liikanen Report: Half-hearted attempt to solve the "too big to fail" problem". Archived from the original on 2013-01-06. Retrieved 2013-03-15.
  32. "Liikanen's Bank-Separation Proposal Sparks Opposition, EU Says". Bloomberg.
Categories: