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Mizo National Front uprising
Part of Insurgency in Northeast India
Map of Mizoram state (formerly Mizo District)
Date 28 February 1966 – 25 March 1966 Location Mizo District, Assam, India. (present-day Mizoram) Result Uprising crushed Mizoram Peace Accord Territorial changes No territorial change: Indian Government recaptures the territories seized by MNF
Belligerents
India	Mizo National Front Supported by:  China  Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh Lt. Gen. Sam Manekshaw	President Laldenga Vice President Lalnunmawia Defence Secretary R. Zamawia Gen Secy. S.Lianzuala Foreign secy. Lalhmingthanga Aizawl Town Zero Hour Operation Leaders Lalkhawliana Lalnundawta Vanlalhruaia
Units involved
1st Battalion, Assam Rifles 5th Battalion, BSF 8th Battalion, Sikh Regiment 2nd Battalion, 11 Gorkha Rifles 3rd Battalion, Bihar Regiment	Mizo National Army Mizo National Army Volunteers
Casualties and losses
59 killed 126 wounded 23 missing	95 killed 35 wounded 558 captured

The Mizo National Front uprising (Mizo: Rambuai) was a revolt against the government of India aimed at establishing a sovereign nation state for the Mizo people, which started on 28 February 1966. On 1 March 1966, the Mizo National Front (MNF) made a declaration of independence, after launching coordinated attacks on the Government offices and security forces post in different parts of the Mizo district in Assam. The government retaliated and recaptured all the places seized by the MNF by 25 March 1966.

In the initial response of the government operations to suppress the rebellion in 1966, the Indian Air Force carried out airstrikes in Aizawl; this remains the only instance of India carrying out an airstrike in its own civilian territory. Counter-insurgency operations continued over the next two decades, although the intensity of the rebellion diminished over time progressively. In 1986, the government and the MNF signed the Mizoram Peace Accord, thereby ending the rebellion.

Background

Before the formation of the Mizoram state in 1987, the Mizo-dominated areas in India were a part of the Mizo district of the Assam state. The Mizo organisations, including the Mizo Union, had long complained of step-motherly treatment at the hands of the Assam Government, and demanded a separate state for the Mizos.

Every 48 years, a cyclic ecological phenomenon called Mautam leads to widespread famine in this region. When such a famine started in 1959, the Mizos were left disappointed by the Assam Government's handling of the situation. The introduction of Assamese as the official language of the state in 1960, without any consideration for the Mizo language, led to further discontent and protests.

The growing discontent with the Government ultimately resulted in a secessionist movement led by Mizo National Front (MNF), an organisation that had evolved out of a famine relief team. While the Mizo Union's demand was limited to a separate state for the Mizos within India, the MNF aimed at establishing a sovereign independent nation for the Mizos.

MNF's plan for armed uprising

The extremist section within MNF advocated the use of violence to seek independence from India. A special armed wing called the Mizo National Army (MNA) was created for the purpose. The MNA consisted of eight infantry "battalions" organised on the pattern of the Indian army. One of the battalions was named after Joshua, while the rest were named after the legendary Mizo heroes: Chawngbawla, Khuangchera, Lalvunga, Saizahawla, Taitesena, Vanapa and Zampui Manga. The Lion Brigade (Chawngbawla, Khuangchera, Saizahawla and Taitesena battalions) operated in the northern half of the district, while the Dagger Brigade (Joshua, Lalvunga, Vanapa and Zampui Manga) operated in its southern half. MNA consisted of around 2000 men, supported by another group called the Mizo National Volunteers (MNV), which comprised an equal number of irregulars.

In the early 1960s, the MNF leaders including Pu Laldenga visited East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), where the Government of Pakistan offered them supply of military hardware and training. Laldenga and his lieutenant Pu Lalnunmawia were arrested by the Government of Assam on the charge of conspiring against the nation, but were released in February 1964 after an undertaking of good conduct by Laldenga. However, shortly after their release, MNF intensified its secessionist activities. The MNF members forcibly collected donations from the Mizo people, recruited volunteers and trained them with arms supplied by Pakistan. By the end of 1965, the MNF weapon cache consisted of the plastic explosives stolen from the Border Roads Organisation, rifles and ammunition obtained from the 1st Battalion, Assam Rifles (1 AR) headquartered at Aizawl, crude bombs and Sten guns.

The Indian armed forces, fresh from the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, were focused on the Indo-Pakistan and Indo-China borders. The extremist MNF leaders wanted to take advantage of this situation by starting an armed rebellion to establish an independent Mizo nation. The rehabilitation of the pro-government Chakma refugees from East Pakistan in the Mizo district further instigated them.

Accordingly, a plan (codenamed "Operation Jericho") was created to systematically capture the power in the Mizo district. The MNF aimed at taking over the treasuries and the petrol pumps, neutralising the police force and capturing all the important non-Mizo ("Vai") officials. The MNF flag was to be hoisted at Aizawl on 1 March 1966, followed by a victory parade on 2 March 1966. The MNF arsenal would be supplemented by capturing the armouries of 1 AR, the Border Security Force (BSF) and the local police. The MNF leaders had hoped that they would have a large number of sympathisers among the local police, the government officials and the AR, which would make the takeover peaceful. They also hoped that if they could keep their flag flying in Aizawl for 48 hours, other countries such as Pakistan would recognise the Mizo territory as a sovereign nation and take up their case in the United Nations. The volunteers and the sympathisers of MNF were promised a prosperous future in the proposed sovereign state.

The plan was kept in strict secrecy. As a cover, the MNF leaders indulged in public propaganda advocating use of "non-violent means" to achieve independence for Mizos. The MNF commander Lt. Col. Laimana, who was suspected of being a government informant, was assassinated on 1 January 1966.

On 27 February 1966, Pu Laldenga and some other MNF leaders decided that the armed insurrection would start on 1 March. The instructions were sent to launch simultaneous attacks on the posts of the 1st AR and the BSF. In case the attack failed, an alternate plan of concentrating near the Indo-Pak border was also made.

The government authorities did get some indications of the upcoming armed action, but failed to anticipate its intensity. On the night of 27 February, Rokima, the brother of the MNF lieutenant Pu Lalnunmawia was killed in an apparently accidental blast, which was noticed by the AR personnel. All AR posts were alerted to keep a watch on the movements of MNF members.

Armed action by MNF

The security forces stationed in the Mizo Hills district included the 1st Battalion, Assam Rifles (1 AR) headquartered at Aizawl, the 5th Battalion, Border Security Force (5 BSF) and the local police. On the night of 28 February/1 March 1966, the MNF launched a series of simultaneous attacks on the 1 AR garrisons at Aizawl, Lunglei and Champhai and the 5 BSF posts at Chawngte, Demagiri, Hnahlan, Marpara, Tipaimukh, Tuipang, Tuipuibari, Vaphai and Vaseitlang.

Lunglei

The first attack by MNF began at about 10:30 pm IST on 28 February 1966, at the sub-treasury at Lunglei. A group 500–1000 strong attacked the camp of the security forces and the AR post. The attack was repulsed, leaving two AR personnel and a few MNF militants dead, and three more AR personnel wounded. The AR camp was surrounded and starved by the MNF militants for three days. The IAF Helicopter at last flew over the camp to supply the prior needs of Assam Rifles. On 5 March, the insurgents kidnapped R.V. Pillai, the Sub-divisional Officer. By 7 March, they had captured the AR post as well as the Border Roads Task Force camp at Lunglei.

Aizawl

The MNF insurgents entered Aizawl on the night of 28 February 1966. The same day, the Mizo district administration came across the copies of the two-page declaration of independence distributed among the MNF leaders. Since the insurgents had cut all the telephone lines, the local authorities could not seek immediate help from Shillong or Silchar. Later, the commanding officer of the Border Roads Organisation managed to send a wireless message to Silchar.

At 02:00 IST, on 1 March 1966, the insurgents attacked the telephone exchange at Aizawl. An hour later, around 150 insurgents led by Pu Lalnundawta, attacked the Aizawl District Treasury and looted money, arms and .303 ammunition. Within a few hours, the insurgents took control of all the important centres of the Mizo district, paralysing the civil administration. They also seized all the vehicles in the town. The law and order situation went beyond the control of the local Police and the small units of AR posted in the district. T S Gill, the Deputy Commissioner of the Mizo district, took shelter in the AR headquarters. The insurgents attacked the 1 AR headquarters in Aizawl unsuccessfully. They also attacked the AR post at Chhimluang on the Aizawl-Silchar road, but were repulsed by the Riflemen. To stop any reinforcements from Silchar, they created several roadblocks and damaged the only bridge on the road.

Around this time, several MNF leaders had gathered in Aizawl on the pretext of a General Assembly. A few of the MNF leaders strongly opposed the violence, and asked Laldenga to withdraw his orders for an armed action. However, it was too late to discontinue the operation, as the rebels had already attacked multiple places including Lunglei, Champhai and Demagiri.

On 1 March, Laldenga made a declaration of independence, and exhorted all the Mizos to join the revolt against the "illegal Indian occupation" of the Mizo territory.

On 2 March, the insurgents ambushed a patrol of 1 AR, and inflicted heavy casualties on them. After 1 AR at Aizawl refused to surrender, the MNF suicide squad launched an attack on them at 9:00 on 4 March. They lost 13 men in a counter-attack by the Assam Rifles soldiers. Two helicopters with reserves, ammunition and water sent by the Government to help the Riflemen could not land due to constant firing by the insurgents. Some of the air drops meant for the riflemen fell into the hands of MNF members.

The same day, the insurgents released all the prisoners from the Aizawl jail, who looted the shops of the non-Mizos ("Vai"s), and also burned several huts in the Aizawl bazaar. Due to the AR's refusal to surrender, the victory parade proposed to be held on 2 March was postponed to 10 March.

On 5 March, the insurgents led by Pu Hruaia plundered the Public Works Department office in Aizawl, looting items for the "Mizoram Sawrkar" ("Mizoram Government") Office. On 11 March, the insurgents burned the houses of the senior officials of the Mizo Union.

Other places

At about 01:30 IST on 1 March 1966, around 150 insurgents armed with lathis surrounded the sub-divisional officer of the Public Works Department at Vairengte and asked him to get out of the district. They also took over the departmental stores and the jeep. Similar incidents were reported from Coinluang and Chawngte. On the same day, the insurgents easily captured the AR post at Champhai, with help from their sympathisers in the security forces.

At Kolasib, the insurgents took around 250 civil officials, the policemen, the intelligence personnel and the road builders as captives, and kept them without food and water. The women and children were also taken as captives and kept separately in a small building. None of the civilian officials and government servants were hurt, as MNF expected their support in running the administration of the proposed sovereign state.

Government response

According to a statement made by the Chief Minister of Assam Bimala Prasad Chaliha, on 1 March, the insurgents who attacked the Aizawl treasury and Lunglei numbered around 10,000. The Indian Home Minister Gulzari Lal Nanda, in the Indian parliament on 3 March, stated the total number of rebels in Aizawl, Lunglei, Vairengte, Chawngte and Chhimluang as 800–1300.

On 2 March 1966, the Government of Assam invoked the Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 1955 and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, proclaiming the entire Mizo district as "disturbed". Bimala Prasad Chaliha condemned Laldenga for his "betrayal", while Gulzari Lal Nanda promised "stern action" with "all the force" at the Government's command. A 24-hour curfew was imposed in Aizawl on 3 March, and reinforcements were sent for 1 AR by helicopters.

Airstrikes

The IAF was asked to carry the troops in Mi-4 helicopters into the besieged AR camp, accompanied with fighter escorts, but failed due to heavy and accurate fire by the insurgents. The Toofani fighters of 29 Squadron operating from Kumbhirgram and Hunter fighters of 17 Squadron operating from Jorhat undertook independent missions to escort the troop reinforcements and to suppress the insurgents. Later, when the GOC Eastern Command, Lt. Gen. Sam Manekshaw, flew over parts of Mizoram in 1968, his helicopter was fired at by the insurgents.

On the afternoon of 4 March 1966, the IAF jet fighters strafed the MNF targets in Aizawl using machine guns, allegedly causing few civilian casualties. The next day, a more extensive airstrike was carried out for about five hours. According to some Mizos, the planes used incendiary bombs, resulting in fires that destroyed several houses in the Dawrpui and Chhinga Veng areas. According to some other accounts, the houses were destroyed in the fires started by the prisoners released from the Aizawl jail by the insurgents. Apart from Aizawl, the neighbouring villages of Tualbung and Hnahlan were also allegedly bombarded. Most of the civilian population fled Aizawl, and took refuge in the remote villages in the adjacent hills.

In the history of independent India, this remains the only instance of the Government of India resorting to air strikes in its own territory. Locals claim that Rajesh Pilot and Suresh Kalmadi were among the IAF pilots who dropped the bombs. Pu Zoramthanga, who went on to become the Chief Minister of Mizoram in 1998, once said that the main reason he joined the MNF and became a rebel was the "relentless bombing of Aizawl in 1966". The people of Mizoram now observe Zoram Ni ("Zoram Day") to commemorate the air raids.

Ground operations

The operations were overseen by HQ Eastern Command under Lt. Gen. Sam Manekshaw. The local responsibility for the army operations was given to 101 Communication Zone under Maj. Gen. Sagat Singh. 311 (Independent) Infantry Brigade was located at that point of time in Silchar. An additional formation, 61 Mountain Brigade (under Brig. R.Z. Kabraji) was moved from Agartala to Aizawl. Subsequently, a regular division, HQ 57 Mountain Division was raised at Masimpur, near Silchar which oversaw counter-insurgency operations in Mizoram in the later stages. The leading battalion of 61 Mountain Brigade, the 8th battalion, Sikh Regiment (8 Sikh) advanced from Silchar into the disturbed area on 3 March. The forces could reach Aizawl only on 6 March, due to the roadblocks caused by the militants. On 7 March, they relieved the besieged AR garrison at Aizawl. On 8 March, the 2nd battalion, 11 Gorkha Rifles (2/11 GR) moved towards Champhai and the 3rd battalion, Bihar Regiment (3 Bihar) towards Lunglei. By 15 March, all of 61 Brigade with its four battalions and supporting arms and services had moved into Mizoram and by the end of the month had regained control of Mizoram.

Withdrawal of MNF forces

The insurgents had managed to capture all the posts of 1 AR except their headquarters at Aizawl. Their chances of capturing the AR headquarters were low after the IAF airstrikes. When the MNF leaders heard about the likely arrival of the Indian Army in Aizawl on 7 March, they decided to retreat to Lunglei, which was under the MNF control.

The security forces threatened to bomb Lunglei, but two Christian clergymen – H. S. Luaia and Pastor C.L. Hminga – requested them to avoid it in order to prevent loss of civilian lives. The two also persuaded the MNF not to attack the army. After some resistance, the MNF rebels withdrew from Lunglei on 13 March, taking away some arms, ammunition and vehicles with them. The security forces secured Lunglei on 14 March, and Champhai on 15 March. The 5th battalion, Parachute Regiment (5 Para), was flown in by helicopters to Lunglei on 14–15 March, set out for Demagiri and secured it on 17 March. By the 25th, all the important towns and the posts had been freed from the MNF control.

By the end of March 1966, the Indian security forces had captured 467 muzzle loading guns, 332 shotguns, 175 rifles, 57 pistols/revolvers and about 70,000 rounds of ammunition from MNF. However, MNF had also managed to obtain a large amount of ammunition from the captured security forces posts. Its weapon cache consisted of: around 1500 shotguns, 600 rifles (mostly .303 bore), 75 sten-guns, 30 revolvers/pistols, 25 carbines and 20 light machine guns.

The MNA headquarters, originally located in Aizawl was moved multiple times during the conflict: first to South Hlimen (on 3 March), then to Reiek (on 18 March) and finally to the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan.

Insurgency

The Mizo Union leaders blamed the MNF for the loss of civilian life, and condemned the armed insurrection. The MNF accused the Indian Government of "indiscriminate bombing on civilian population" during the airstrikes in Aizawl. Two MLAs of the Assam state, Stanley DD Nichols Roy and Hoover H Hynniewta, visited the Mizo district to take a stock of the situation. Later in April, Roy moved a motion in the Assam Legislative Assembly on the Aizawl air attack, calling the use of air force "excessive".

By the end of 1966, reinforcements were sent to the district by the Government in form of:

• two Indian Army battalions
  • 18th battalion, Punjab Regiment (18 Punjab)
  • 9th battalion, Bihar Regiment (9 Bihar)
• three Assam Rifles battalions (6th, 18th and 19th)
• four armed police battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)

The MNF insurgents dispersed in smaller units, merged with the local population and continued to carry out armed attacks against the security forces in the district. The villagers suffered from both sides as the insurgents would kill those resisting their entry into the villages while the villages suffered reprisals from the security forces in case ambushes had taken place in their vicinity.

The Mizo National Front was outlawed in 1967. The same year, the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School was set up at Vairengte to train the soldiers in fighting with the rebels in the North-East India.

Operation Accomplishment

As the insurgents found security and refuge in the large number of tiny hamlets from which they would launch attacks on the patrols of the security forces and later merge into the civilian population, the military need was felt to deny the militants access to the common people. To solve the problem, the Government of India resorted to a "grouping" policy in the Mizo district, starting in January 1967. The plan was initially proposed by Lt. Gen Sam Manekshaw and the Government of Assam to an initial rejection from the central government before intense lobbying by the army granted the scheme to be executed. The grouping policy was subsequently named Operation Accomplishment.

Under the grouping policy, nearly 80% of the rural population was shifted from their villages and resettled along the highways. The old villages were burnt, and the new settlements were kept under the control of the security forces until 1970. The Indian Army got greater freedom of action and succeeded in isolating the insurgents from the people and cutting the insurgents' supply chain. This grouping of villages resulted in a great deal of suffering for the indigenous populace as their farms and houses were burnt, and they could not have enough farmland while being interred in these camps. Animal husbandry was limited, and food rations were kept within the PPVs to prevent sympathizers from providing the MNF with food. A curfew was enforced for seven years, which limited the working distance of Jhum cultivations and errands for economic stimulation. Confiscation of arms also limited the capacity of grouped communities to procure food sources. From 1967 to 192, farming output went down a cliff and people had to face near-famine conditions. In one year, farming output was 35,000 tonnes for a demand of 75,000 tonnes. The grouping policy also impacted the cultural values of Mizo society in relation to jhumming, such as the obsolescence of Tlawbawk (huts on the jhum land for camping and harvest). Inconsistent policies in the PPV, such as the stopping of the food ration system in 1968, increased prices of basic commodities such as rice and sugar, which further exacerbated starvation among the population.

This grouping has also been said to be the beginning of social evils in Mizoram. The villagers were forced to move to these camps and agreement papers were often signed at gunpoint. Multiple phases of displacement and regrouping were planned.

The first stage of grouping was called Protective and Progressive Villages (PPVs). These were built in 10 weeks along the Silchar-Kolasib-Aizawl-Lungleh national highway. A total of 106 villages were grouped together into 18 grouping centres of a total of 52,210 people. In February 1967, the centres were placed under civilian administration while security matters and daily maintenance was placed in the responsibility of Indian security forces. The civilian administration was led by a member of Assam civil service deleted as administrative officer or area administrative officer.

The second phase of grouping was called the New Grouping Centre. It was established in August 1969 under the Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act 1953 (AMPOA). It managed five population sectors, mainly the Tripura border, Lungleh-Lawngtlei road, Darngawn-Bungzung North, Vanlaiphai-Serchhip Road and Seling-Champhai Road. It involved 184 villages grouped together into 40 grouping centres with a total population of 97,339.

The third phase, Voluntary Grouping Centres, was established in August 1970 under the AMPOA. It was responsible for several villages in different parts of the Mizo Hills and consisted of 26 grouping centres for a total population of 47,156.

The fourth and final phase was called Extended Loop Areas ordered in 1970 under AMPOA. It planned for 63 villages with a population of 34,219 into 17 grouping centres. The third and fourth phases of regrouping were challenged in Chhuanvawra versus the State of Assam and others.

The orders of Operation Accomplishment were challenged on the basis of violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which led to a suspension of the grouping operation. Upon scrutiny by the Gauhati High Court to justify the continuation of the policy, the Government of Assam assured no further implementation of the operation which prevented the third and fourth phase from being carried out. Despite the grouping of villages under the operation, the intensity of the insurgency continued until 1970 with significant military skirmishes continuing up to 1976. The implementation of the policy also harmed agricultural output and caused near-famine conditions, prompting villagers to return to their previous settlements to cultivate crops, further showing the failure of the policy.

While insurgency continued at lower levels, the space for political negotiations was created and led to Mizoram becoming a Union Territory and the entry of the MNF into mainstream politics.

Peace Neogtiations

Amnesty

In August 1968, the Government of India offered amnesty to the insurgents, which resulted in the surrender of 1524 MNF members. This was followed by more amnesty offers during 1969–70. In 1976, Laldenga was called to New Delhi for peace talks with the government. Failure on the terms of the negotiation led to banning of MNF in January 1982. Along with some relatives, Ladenga was arrested and expatriated in April.

Developments in Bangladesh

Later, the Mizo Union's negotiations with the Union Government resulted in the Mizo district gaining the status of a Union Territory as "Mizoram" on 21 January 1972. After the Bangladesh Independence War, the administrative unit of East Pakistan was dissolved. The dissolution of this strategic region and partnership crippled the insurgency's ability to evade government forces and be resupplied with weapons and resources to continue their fight. As early as December 1971, the National Emergency Committee was formed while Laldenga worked in Pakistan for foreign affairs. As early as December 1972 upon the Independence of Bangladesh, the NEC under Malsawma Colney met with leader of the Union Territory of Mizoram to begin initiating talks with India. In 1975 the Assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the subsequent junta government prompted laldenga and the MNF to re-establish bases in Bangladesh to evade Indian counter-insurgency. The MNF also founded the Tripura National Volunteers which they trained. Indira Gandhi raised concerns over the rise of the golden triangle drug trade and the possibility of the MNF using it as a funding source.

1976 Accord

Following a series of meetings with RAW agents, Laldenga visited Delhi with his family in 1976 to begin the first official rounds of talk with the Government of India. On 6 February 1976, an accord was signed where the MNF accepted that Mizoram is an integral part of India and acknowledged to accept the settlement of the problem within the framework of the Indian constitution. Other terms included the hand over of arms and ammunition and an end to violent activity. However, internal struggle in the party over Laldenga's direction divided the party apparatus to have cohesion in foreign policy conduct for a few years, hence delaying the opportunity for peace. In particular, Laldenga's general in Burma, Biakchunga, was opposed to a peace settlement with India. Furthermore, the agreement was kept secret until June. After the Lieutenant-Governor of Mizoram ceased counter-insurgency operations, Laldenga repudiated the agreement and retracted his obligations. Laldenga eventually purged opponents of peaceful cooperation in his party through demotion and expulsions, which united the party direction for the settlement with India. After Laldenga's self-imposed exile to London, Laldenga had lost control of the party apparatus. Laldenga began to especially harbour caution to Biakchunga who had gained increased control over the Mizo National Army. Biakchunga possessed a hawkish perspective on the direction of the movement and lacked political foresight regarding Laldenga. Chatterjee argues that Laldenga repudiated the agreement on the basis that going against Biakchunga would have led to a disintegration of the movement.

President's Rule

Chief Minister Chhunga's cabinet resigned on 9 May 1978. Mizoram was placed under President's rule. The imposition of the President's rule in Mizoram led MNF rebels to establish themselves in Burma to evade arrest. The success of counter-insurgency led to many captures of MNF participants. Laldenga chose to resign as president of the Mizo National Front and government in the face of mounting unpopularity in June 1978. Biakchunga was subsequently elected to replace Laldenga. However, due to his lack of political experience, Biakchunga was made to resign shortly after. Biakchunga was charged with violation of the constitution of the Mizo National Front. Kawlvela, an ally of Laldenga had demanded Biakchunga's resignation. Biakchunga believed in continuing the underground movement. His ideals consisted of militancy, gun-running and Maoist dogmas and an uncompromising attitude to complete independence and secession from India. Laldenga wanted to use the prospect of secession to collect political concessions and maximise autonomy for the Mizos in the framework of the Indian constitution. On 27 October 1978, Laldenga was expelled from the MNF in a meeting in Burma. Thangchuaka was elected president of the MNF and the underground government.

President's rule was set to expire and the electoral commission established election for 1978. Sailo's People's Party, won 23 out of 30 seats. Sailo had campaigned on economic development, protection of religious and cultural identity of the Mizos. Laldenga had requested the Mizos to boycott the election but the request was not heeded. Laldenga subsequently declared the election illegal and derecognised the Sailo government of Mizoram. The MNF and Laldenga saw Sailo as a supporter of Indian imperialism in Mizoram. The MNF cooperated with the opposition party the Mizo Congress to bring down Sailo. Sailo cooperated with the church and encouraged MNF rebels to return to normal life and to contribute in nation building Mizoram. He offered economic assistance to further encourage repentance for participation in the insurgency. Figures such as General Biakchunga took up the offer and returned to normal life from the underground movement.

Sailo's policy of anti-corruption also led to unpopularity from careerists in the government. On 13 October 1978, 8 out of 23 seats of his party withdrew support for Sailo. Thangridema, the speaker of assembly joined the opposition wing of the People's Party. The opposition parties such as Mizo Congress, Janata Party and Independents formed a new party known as the United Legislature Party. Sailo was accused of rigging the election and was demanded to be ousted and have his cabinet resign. The Lieutenant-Governor discussed the matter with the President Neelam Sanjiva Reddy of imposing President's rule which was granted. A second President's rule was established on 11 November 1978. The assembly was dissolved. Despite doubts on resumption of election, the electoral commission declared 24 April 1979 as the next assembly election.

T. Sailo's Government

With the Janata Party coming to power, Morarji Desai committed to peace talks and cooperated closely with Brig T. Sailo. The MNF's violence and the Mizo congress's opportunism had caused disillusionment in the Mizo population, who began to support Brig T. Sailo and the People's Party. T. Sailo supported the counter-insurgency against the Mizo National Front. Despite establishing a human rights commission of the army's atrocities, T. Sailo blamed the civilians for the lack of cooperation for the excesses committed. T. Sailo blamed the insurgency for stalling economic development and did not represent the people's best interests. Sailo's own son joined the underground MNF and justified the violence and virtues espoused.

The elections after the second president's rule period, saw Sailo's party come back to power. His previous detractors saw a decrease in overall results for forming the rival faction that dissolved the government prior.

Morarji Desai was pressured to cooperate with Laldenga over his preferred candidate of Sailo from media reports on Laldenga's escalations. Laldenga had increased attacks on non-mizo civilians such as the chakma and foreigners. Ministers in Morarji's cabinet such as George Fernandes even requested Morarji to hold a meeting with laldenga. Desai's meeting with Laldenga requested acceptance of Indian citizenship and a written pledge to end violent activities. Laldenga demanded Morarji to dismiss Sailo's cabinet and government and for him to be instated as chief of Mizoram under the claim he was the sole legitimate representative of the Mizo people. Desai rebuffed Laldenga, similar to a meeting with Zapu Phizo that he had no interest in discussing an Indian problem with someone who didn't consider themselves Indian. Due to this, the talks drifted, and the negotiations failed within a few minutes. Laldenga held a second meeting with Desai. He repeated his demand to be placed chief minister of Mizoram. Laldenga placed the argument as the only method to peace in Mizoram. However, due to the failure of Laldenga's political promises such as the 1976 accord, Desai simply told Laldenga "I do not trust you." and ordered him to leave. Afterwards, Laldenga attempted to convince Prime Minister Charan Singh but failed.

The Home minister later in the Rajya Sabha stated that Laldenga should follow the signed accord of 1976 under Indira Gandhi. it was further stated that effective measures of surrendering arms must be implemented before he can be assigned chief minister, or else no more talks will be made with Laldenga, citing lack of fulfilment. During this time, T. Sailo began to cooperate with Laldenga. Sailo offered to step down on the condition that peace returns to Mizoram. Laldenga, distrusting of Sailo, refused to entertain the proposition. The central government becoming hesitant to settle peace outside of a constitutional framework convened an all-party conference in Aizawl, where the results favoured cooperation between the MNF and the Indian government.

Quit Mizoram Notices

On 3 June 1979, the Mizo National Front issued a Quiz Mizoram notice. Previous notices had been issued in March 1966 and December 1974, but this was the first notice where the chief minister of Mizoram challenged it. Brigadier T. Sailo issued a strong warning to the Mizo National Front in an All India Radio Aizawl speech the following day. The MNF spread these notices to many educational institutions. Teachers that refused to abide by their orders were instead killed.

Chatterjee argues that the rise of All Assam Students' Union due to the Assam agitation of Bangladeshi immigrants, also encouraged the MNF to follow suit. This action was supported by the Mizo Zirlai Pawl and extended their cooperation. Another offered perspective corresponds to the Anti-Mizo riots in Silchar. On 3 June 1979, R.K Chaudary, the subdivisional officer of Champhai public works department was killed by MNF extortionists. The return of his body to his hometown of Silchar led to a wave of communal violence and destruction of Mizo property on 7 June 1979. The MNF retaliated and the Assam government sealed the border between Mizoram and Cachar as a result.

The Quit Mizoram movement saw an increase of violence in MNF participants. On 2 July 1979, the MNF attacked the All India Radio broadcast in Aizawl and damaged the transmitter. Assassination attempts were repeatedly made on inspector general of police Ved Mehra and his deputy R.S Chopra. A covert Assam rifles lorry carrying families of Assam rifles soldiers were being transported in civil dress before the MNF ambushed them with automatic weapons on 27 February 1980. A total of 6 died and 11 were injured. Another infamous case of the Quit Mizoram campaign was the execution of a naturalized teacher in rural Mizoram known as Dutta. Drunken MNF participants demanded his wife for him and executed him in foreceful entry with an Ak 47 rifle and hung a Quit Mizoram notice in the room of the murder. Several murders occurred sporadically soon after with the killing of female labourers. The escalation of violence harmed the reputation and public support of the MNF and even led to Zoramthanga condemning the abuses and executions.

Laldenga's imprisonment

Laldenga was interned in his residence at Gulmohar Park. He was charged with the procurement of a fake passport under the identity of 'Samuel Sen'. The charges were also spread to Laldenga's son David. Due to this he was transferred to Tihar Jail in August 1978. With the decline of the Janata government, the political parties of India condemned the decision to imprison laldenga. The Congress party argued heavily with prominient supporters such as Indira Gandhi and George Fernandes finding it conunter-productive to peace talks. Desai was blamed for the arrest despite it being under Charan Singh's prime ministership.The political actors of the time described the imprisonment as a breach of faith for Laldenga coming to Delhi for peace talks. Swaraj Kaushal, an advocator of the Supreme Court, secured a writ for the release of Laldenga. In apology the government compensated Laldenga with a flight West Germany and other expenses associated. Foreign press outlets in Pakistan, China and Tory politicians both questioned the decisions of the Indian government.

Laldenga was arrested briefly in July 1979 and bailed out. The cases against him were revoked by Indira Gandhi on the intervention and appeal of the Mizo Congress Party on 30 June 1980. Laldenga would subsequently on 3 July 1980 make an announcement that the MNF would agree to peace within the framework of the constitution of India. Previous tactics of violence and terrorism was condemned by Laldenga as counter-productive to their cause. He also commented on the Quit Mizoram movement as a movement disrupting unity in Mizoram. He justified that the Quit Mizoram idea was an outdated discredited relic of Naga rebels that conflicts with the social fabric of Mizo society. He offered guarantees of cessation of violence and punishment for spoilers who continue hostilities. Laldenga signed an agreement with Indira Gandhi for a ceasefire.

Continued peace negotiations

Peace talks began once more in 1980 and Indira Gandhi sent Yashpal Kapur to promise statehood to Mizoram on Christmas in return for surrender of all arms. Laldenga negotiated a 'free zone' for the arms dumps and chose Chhimpuitui. However, Laldenga also demanded the dissolution of the Union Territory of Mizoram with an interim government headed under the Mizo National Front, which was unable to be fulfilled by both the central government and Brig T. Sailo's local government. The Home ministry did not agree to the free zone citing complications and Sailo refused to give up his position as Chief Minister. Laldenga finally sent Delhi a peace charter with 36 demands. The biggest demand was statehood for Mizoram with protections similar to Kashmir and incorporation of territory from neighbouring states for a greater Mizoram. The territorial demands would affect Tripura, Assam and Manipur. Indira Gandhi obliged initially to discuss the terms before the mass immigration of Bengali refugees took away her attention to the Mizo peace negotiations. Laldenga threatened to repudiate the agreement unless peace talks resumed by November 1981. Despite the ban on the MNF being listed, Laldenga continued to increase recruitment, propaganda and train guerilla rebels. With a breakdown in peace negotiations, the MNF was declared illegal in January 1982. Gandhi would subsequently comment that the demands were difficult but she had continued to hope for an end to the violence and to continue negotiations. In 1984, the Mizo Congress Party would to power and reopened channels for peace talks, which eventually culminated towards the 1986 Mizo Accord.

Pressure continued to mount on Sailo to resign by student associations, opposition parties and other supporters of peace. However, Sailo refused to step down. The failure of the peace talks in 1980 led to the Indian government sending Laldenga and his wife to London on 21 April 1982.

Mizo Accord Negotiations

Concerns were raised by Chief Minister T. Sailo over the violent incidents by the MNF in breach of the 1976 agreement. Sailo continued to go against the central government and refused to cooperate with Laldenga as he perceived the MNF movement to be decaying and Laldenga's influence waning. Sailo and Laldenga began a feud that soured the chance for peace. Laldenga accused Sailo of recruiting ex-MNF rebels to kill rebels. Sailo brought countercharges accusing Laldenga of causing instability and permitting hostile actions. Public resentment led to student marches and shutting down of educational institutions. However many organizations actively supported an end to the violence. The Students Joint Action Committee (SJAC) organised support for the peace talks by performing a general strike for two days from 3–4 June 1986 and requesting the stepping down of Lal Thanhawla to secure a peaceful transition of power. The Mizoram Church Leaders Committee (MCLC) was a coalition of church denominations consisting of Presbyterians, Baptists, Salvation Army, Roman Catholics, Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, Assembly of God, Lairam Baptist and Isua Krista Kohran supporting non-violence and return to peace. The MCLC actively participated in organising peace channels, convening an all-party meeting and submitting a memorandum for peace talks in good faith. Chief Minister Lal Thanhawla expressed cooperation for peace talks upon his inauguration, but this became severely delayed following the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Laldenga would return from London on 31 October 1984 on the day of her death. Rajiv Gandhi continued with negotiations with encouragement from Church leaders in 1985.

The election of Lalthanhawla saw a popular government in Mizoram who saw economic growth and cooperation with the MNF rebels for a peace opening. The success of the Assam Accord under Rajiv Gandhi also created confidence for a Mizo Accord to be signed. Negotiations continued and public press coverage irritated Laldenga who accused the media of sabotaging the peace process. Laldenga worked with Rajiv's representatives and only met with Rajive for 15 minutes to outline a discussion on 23 December 1985. Lalthanhawla continued his promise but outlined the need for him to step down rather than be removed as this would reflect badly on the Mizo Congress party. Laldenga views Lalthanhawl's hesitation as a sabotage for this reason.

The Mizo National Front under Laldenga and the Indian National Congress with the political affairs cabinet and Arjun Singh under Rajiv Gandhi present, signed a political settlement on 25 May 1986, which was finalised as the Mizo Accord on June 30, 1986. The agreement outlined the incumbent Chief Minister Lal Thanhawla to vacate his position in favour of Laldenga, and to perform duties as a Deputy Chief Minister under a coalition government. The Mizo National Front laid down their arms, suspended ties with groups such as the Tripura National Volunteers and People's Liberation Army of Manipur. The MNF also conceded their desire and goal for a greater Mizoram encompassing Souther Manipur and Chin State. The first election for the State Legislative Assembly took place in February 1987, leading to an MNF victory and the inauguration of Mizoram as a fully-fledged state.

Human Rights Abuses under the AFSPA

The Armed Forces Special Powers Act was extended to cover Mizoram as a disturbed area in 1966. The act encompasses wide-ranging powers to security forces in counter-insurgency operations. Powers granted include allowing commissioned military personnel to use lethal force if it is felt necessary for the maintenance of public order, empowerment to destroy property suspected of insurgency operations, arresting without warrants with any amount of force necessary to enforce, and immunity to military personnel from legal proceedings against acts under the AFSA unless permitted by the central government.

Security officers, after the events of the MNF uprising, engaged in detainment of men, looting of property, mass rapes of women, unjustified killings and torture in settlements such as Kolasib and Kawnpui. Closely after Kolasib, detainment and starvation of communities over the course of several days took place in Kelkang by being confided in their Church with no food and water. Officers of the Army would also abuse their power and demand women from village councils or engage in rape, which would-be underreported due to cultural stigma and shame. An incident in Champhai recounts Indian security forces grouping the men and women separately into schools and churches. Men would be tortured for links to the Mizo National Front while women were sexually assaulted, sometimes in public view. Some officials would hold the women back for weeks with them as an extension.

The grouping policies of Operation Accomplishment oversaw the settlement of Protected and Progressive Villages (PPV), which unfolded many human rights violations and abuses. Evacuation from old village settlements often required signing consents at gunpoint. Freedom of movement was curtailed with military oversight and registries, and the distribution of rations was implemented. Forced labour was utilised in these camps, and resistance was punished physically. Crimes rates were high both within the Mizo communities confined in PPVs and offences from military personnel.

The arrival of Brig T. Sailo curtailed the atrocities committed by the security forces. T. Sailo established a Human Rights Committee in 1974 and submitted 36 cases to Indira Gandhi for accountability of the Army's conduct. T. Sailo highlighted how the burning of villages, burning of churches and mass rapes as a counter-insurgency policy prompted a need for such intervention. As a result, T. Sailo developed his party the Mizoram People's Conference. However, he has been criticised for sidelining the violations against women during the counter-insurgency upon coming to power. T. Sailo's intervention created caution with security forces actions and his military background afforded officers to maintain discipline.

In 2010, there was a strong public outcry regarding the human rights violations of the Indian Army and security personnel and demands for an official apology from the Indian Government. The apology was demanded to also cover the bombing of Aizawl in the wake of the Mizo National Front uprising. Current investigations and interviews of victims of sexual assault have been difficult due to the current stigma and personal concerns of being named and losing their honour. Physical assault of male labourers was also common for failing to do tasks such as supplying water or firewood, and the punishment would extend to their families. Under AFSPA, the ability to detain individuals with little to no reason also led to common physical deformities when released.

Legacy

Emergence of Rambuai Literature

The events of the Mizo uprising and insurgency led to the creation of a literary genre unique to Mizoram known as Rambuai. Rambuai translated means 'troubled land'. The writings explore several perspectives from the artocoties of the Indian army, the underground movement and the violence and trauma of the period.

Remembrances

• 20 February, the "State Day" is an annual public holiday in Mizoram.
• 1 March, the day of the declaration of independence, is commemorated by MNF as "Mizo National Day."
• 5 March, the day of major bombarding in 1966, is known as "Zoram Ni" (the day of Zoram).
• 30 June, the day of signing the Mizo peace accord in 1986, is officially observed by the government of Mizoram as "Remna Ni" (the day of peace).
• 20 September is observed by MNF as the "Martyr's Day" to memorialise the deaths of MNF soldiers during the insurgency period.

See also

• Insurgency in Northeast India

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External links

• The Mizo Uprising: Assam Assembly Debates on the Mizo Movement, 1966-1971 by Dr. J. V. Hluna and Rini Tochhawng, Cambridge Scholars Publishing

• History of Mizoram
• Rebellions in India
• Separatism in India
• Conflicts in 1966
• 1966 in India
• Mizo
• Insurgency in Northeast India