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Hwasong-7
Type	Medium-range ballistic missile
Place of origin	North Korea
Service history
In service	1998−Present
Used by	See operators
Production history
Produced	1990–present
Specifications
Length	15.6 m (51 ft)
Diameter	1.25 m (4 ft 1 in)
Warhead	Conventional Possibly nuclear
Warhead weight	700–1,000 kg (1,500–2,200 lb) (est.)
Propellant	TM-185 (20% gasoline 80% kerosene) / AK-27I (27% N 2O 4 73% NHO 3)
Operational range	1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi) (est.)
Flight altitude	160 km (99 mi) if in lofted trajectory which reduces the operating range to 650 km (400 mi)
Guidance system	Inertial
Accuracy	190–1,000 m (210–1,090 yd) CEP

The Hwasong-7 (Korean: 《화성-7》형; Hanja: 火星 7型; spelled Hwaseong-7 in South Korea, lit. Mars Type 7), also known as Nodong-1 (Hangul: 로동(North),노동(South) 1호; Hanja: 蘆洞 1號), is a single-stage, mobile liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Developed in the mid-1980s, it is a scaled-up adaptation of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missiles, more commonly known by its NATO reporting name "Scud". The inventory is estimated to be around 200–300 missiles. US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 fewer than 100 launchers were operationally deployed.

It influenced the design of Pakistan's Ghauri-1 missile, as well as the Iranian Shahab-3. Western designations for the Hwasong-7 include: Nodong, Rodong, Scud-D, Scud Mod-D, Nodong-A, and Nodong-1.

Overview

It is believed North Korea obtained R-17 designs from Egypt, and possibly modified designs from China, allowing them to reverse-engineer them into a larger and longer-distance weapon. United States reconnaissance satellites first detected this type in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri test launch facility, in northeastern North Korea.

The precise capabilities and specifications of the missile are unknown; even the fact of its production and deployment are controversial. It is a larger variant of the R-17, scaled up so its cross-sectional area is about doubled, with a diameter of 1,250 millimetres (4 ft) and a length of 15,600 millimetres (51.2 ft).

Its aerodynamic design is stable, reducing the need for modern active stabilization systems while the missile is flying in the denser lower atmosphere. It can only be fueled when vertical, therefore it cannot be fueled before transport as is normal for modern missiles. Its range is estimated as 900 km (960 mi) with a 1,000 kg payload to a range of between 1,000 km to 1,500 km. North Korea test-fired three Hwasong-7 missiles consecutively on 5 September 2016 and they all flew for about 1000 km, landing in the Japan air defense identification zone.

It has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of one or two kilometers. With GPS guidance, accuracy is believed to be between 190 metres (210 yd) and 1 kilometre (0.62 mi). North Korea is believed to possess some 300 Hwasong-7 missiles and fewer than 50 mobile launchers.

The Hwasong-7's technology has been exported to foreign nations (such as Iran and Pakistan) in secrecy on the basis of mutual exchange of technologies, with Iran being one of the largest beneficiaries of such technology. Successful variants were tested and deployed by Iran after developing the Shahab-3 which is roughly based on Hwasong-7. Some press reports (including The Sunday Telegraph, Jerusalem Post, and Janes) claimed that Libya signed a contract for a total of 50 Nodong systems in October 1999, with the first batch delivered in July 2000, however such rumors proved to be false when Libya voluntarily dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs in December 2003 and invited foreign inspectors to verify the disarmament process. In that same year, US inspectors learned that Iraq attempted to buy Nodong missiles, but the North Koreans never delivered the missiles and refused to refund the $10 million down payment.

Pakistan, however, suffered with repeated failure initially due to flawed design given in exchange but succeeded in reevaluating the missile's conceptual design and its electronic system in 1998 through reverse engineering. The Ghauri (missile) was later (independently) developed by Kahuta Research Labs and eventually entered in to active military service in 2003.It is believed that it is redesigned/ reverse engineered model of Rodong-1.

A few Hwasong-7 missiles were launched in the 2006 North Korean missile test, and a further two in a 2014 test over a range of 650 km.

Although it has an estimated range of 1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi), launches in March 2014 flew only 650 km (400 mi). Their range was shortened by firing at a higher launch angle. The missiles flew to an altitude of 160 km (100 mi) at Mach 7. U.S. and South Korean Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors are more specialized to hit ballistic missiles up to 40 km high.

On 5 September 2016, North Korea fired three consecutive Rodong-1 missiles into the Sea of Japan and at a range of about 1,000 km. This marked the Rodong-1 as a credible and matured missile suitable for operational deployment since its first successful launch in 1993. The United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea's missile launches.

To enable interception at higher altitudes, South Korea is indigenously developing the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM), and on 8 July 2016 the U.S. agreed to deploy one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in Seongju County, in the south of South Korea, by the end of 2017.

Operators

Current

•  Iran − Shahab-3 used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force
•  North Korea − Used by the Korean People's Army Strategic Force
•  Pakistan − Hatf 5 Ghauri used by the Army Strategic Forces Command

Unconfirmed

•  Egypt − Reportedly was interested in buying Nodong missiles, but photographic evidence only shows Scud-Bs or possibly Scud-Cs in use
•  Syria − Developed a localized version of the Nodong missile. Reportedly received 50 missiles and 7 TELs from North Korea in 2000. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Syrian Arab Army doesn't operate MRBMs as of 2024

Failed bids

•  Iraq − Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Baghdad placed an order for Nodong missiles and made a $10 million down payment, but North Korea never delivered the missiles

See also

• Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea)
• North Korean missile tests
• North Korean defense industry
• Military of North Korea

References

1. ^ Kim, Dueyon (1 July 2013). "Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs". The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Archived from the original on 18 June 2016. Retrieved 5 November 2024.
2. "Egypt's Missile Efforts Succeed with Help from North Korea". Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. 1996. Archived from the original on 2016-01-23.
3. ^ Markus Schiller (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. TR-1268-TSF. Retrieved 19 January 2013.
4. ^ "No-Dong 1 - North Korea". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
5. ^ "NK's March missile test aimed at evading interceptor systems: sources". Yonhap News Agency. 19 June 2014. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
6. ^ IISS 2024, p. 282.
7. "South Korea's military to increase number of Hyunmoo missiles, says report | Jane's 360". Archived from the original on 2017-07-30. Retrieved 2017-07-13.
8. DIBMAC 2017, p. 25.
9. "North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation". 38 North. 2016-09-22. Retrieved 2021-03-06.
10. ^ Brügge, Norbert (2 May 2020). "The North-Korean/Iranian Nodong-Shahab missile family". Archived from the original on 10 September 2016. Retrieved 30 June 2020.
11. U.S. Department of Defense (2001). Proliferation: Threat and Response (PDF). DIANE Publishing. p. 38. ISBN 1-4289-8085-7.
12. Cordesman, Anthony H.; Hess, Ashley (2013). The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Missile, DPRK and ROK Nuclear Forces, and External Nuclear Forces. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 10. ISBN 978-1-4422-2520-6.
13. "How potent are North Korea's threats?". BBC News Online. 15 September 2015.
14. Bluth, Christoph (July 31, 2011). Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Potomac Books Inc. ISBN 9781597975773. Retrieved 17 March 2017.
15. ^ North Korea fires 3 ballistic missiles; Japan calls it 'serious threat' Archived 9 September 2016 at the Wayback Machine – CNN, 2337 GMT 5 September 2016
16. John Schilling, Henry (Long) Kan (2015). The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems (PDF) (Report). US-Korea Institute at SAIS. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 April 2015. Retrieved 30 April 2015.
17. Around 70% of N.K. missiles target S. Korea - Koreaherald.com, 4 March 2013
18. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (PDF). National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Report). Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency. April 2009. NASIC-1031-0985-09.
19. DIBMAC 2017, p. 23.
20. Pinkston 2008, pp. 20, 70.
22. "North Korea test-fires 'ballistic' missiles". BBC. 26 March 2014. Retrieved 26 March 2014.
23. Choe Sang-Hun (25 March 2014). "North Korea Launches Two Midrange Missiles". New York Times. Retrieved 31 March 2014.
24. UN council condemns N Korea missile launches, vows new measures Archived 17 September 2016 at the Wayback Machine – CNA, 27 August 2016.
25. Yoo Seungki (4 August 2016). "Shift in THAAD site in S. Korea nothing to solve controversies". Xinhua. Archived from the original on August 5, 2016. Retrieved 4 August 2016.
26. IISS 2024a, p. 354.
27. IISS 2024, p. 301.
28. Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt's Scuds soldier on". Military Balance Blog. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Retrieved 6 November 2024.
29. Cordesman, Anthony H.; Nerguizian, Aram; Popescu, Inout C. (2008). Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. pp. 204−205. ISBN 978-0-313-35521-9.
30. IISS 2024a, p. 386.
31. Pinkston 2008, p. 20.

Bibliography

• Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Report). Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee. 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
• International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2024). "Chapter Five: Asia". The Military Balance. 124 (1): 218–327. doi:10.1080/04597222.2024.2298593. ISSN 0459-7222. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
• International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2024). "Chapter Six: Middle East and North Africa". The Military Balance. 124 (1): 328–395. doi:10.1080/04597222.2024.2298594. ISSN 0459-7222. Retrieved 6 November 2024.
• Pinkston, Daniel A. (2008). The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. ISBN 978-1-58487-342-6.

External links

• CSIS Missile Threat - No-Dong 1
• CNS report North Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities 2006
• Center for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program
• National Threat Initiative, Nodong: Overview and Technical Assessment

• Ballistic missiles of North Korea
• Medium-range ballistic missiles
• Medium-range ballistic missiles of North Korea
• Military equipment introduced in the 1990s