Misplaced Pages

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
Вооружённые си́лы Росси́йской Федера́ции
Emblem of the Russian Armed Forces
Banner of the Russian Armed Forces
Founded	2 November 1721; 303 years ago (2 November 1721)
Current form	7 May 1992
Service branches	Ground Forces  Navy Aerospace Forces Strategic Rocket Forces Airborne Forces Special Operations Forces
Headquarters	Ministry of Defence, Moscow
Leadership
Supreme Commander-in-Chief	Vladimir Putin
Minister of Defence	Andrey Belousov
Chief of the General Staff	Valery Gerasimov
Personnel
Military age	18
Conscription	12 months
Active personnel	1,500,000 (September 2024 Decree) (ranked 4th)
Reserve personnel	c. 2,000,000
Expenditure
Budget	US$86.4 billion (2023) (ranked 3rd)
Percent of GDP	4.1% (2023)
Industry
Domestic suppliers	See list: Rostec Rosatom United Aircraft Corporation United Shipbuilding Corporation Russian Helicopters Tactical Missiles Corporation Almaz-Antey High Precision Systems Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology Kalashnikov Concern Military Industrial Company Uralvagonzavod Kurganmashzavod KAMAZ
Foreign suppliers	Belarus (MZKT)  Italy (Iveco)  Iran (HESA)  Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Annual imports	US$905 million (2010–2021)
Annual exports	US$74.535 billion (2010–2021)
Related articles
History	Military history of the Russian Federation
Ranks	Army ranks Navy ranks Aerospace Forces ranks

Russian Armed Forces
Ministry of Defence
Staff
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Services (vid)
Russian Ground Forces Russian Aerospace Forces Russian Navy
Independent troops (rod)
Strategic Rocket Forces Russian Airborne Forces
Special operations force (sof)
Special Operations Forces
Other troops
Logistical Support
Military districts
Leningrad Military District Moscow Military District Southern Military District Central Military District Eastern Military District
History of the Russian military
Military history of Russia History of Russian military ranks Military ranks of the Soviet Union
v t e

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commonly referred to as the Russian Armed Forces, are the military of Russia. They are organized into three service branches—the Ground Forces, Navy, and Aerospace Forces—two independent combat arms (the Strategic Rocket Forces and Airborne Forces), and the Special Operations Forces Command.

The Russian Armed Forces are the world's fifth largest military force, with 1.15 million active-duty personnel and close to two million reservists. They maintain the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, possess the world's second-largest fleet of ballistic missile submarines, and are the only armed forces outside the United States and China that operate strategic bombers. As of 2024, Russia has the world's third-highest military expenditure, at approximately US$130 billion, or over six percent of GDP, compared to approximately to US$86.5–$109 billion the year before. Its military budget is set to expand by 30 percent, to US$145 billion, in 2025.

The Russian military is a hybrid system that combines conscripts with contracted volunteers; with certain exceptions, Russian law mandates one year of military service for all male citizens aged 18–27. Despite efforts to professionalize its ranks since the early 2000s, it remains heavily reliant on conscripts, with contract soldiers being concentrated in cadre and elite units. Russia plans to expand its active personnel to 1.5 million by the end of 2024, which will make it the second largest active military force after China.

Despite its perceived military strength, deficiencies have been noted in Russia's overall combat performance and its ability to effectively project hard power. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has exposed weaknesses such as endemic corruption, rigid command and control structure, inadequate training, and poor morale; Russian Armed Forces have experienced successive losses of occupied/annexed territory, the large-scale destruction and squandering of their equipment, and a notably high casualty rate. Researchers from the U.S.-funded RAND Corporation have observed that Russia continues struggling with military professionalization, but remains capable of rapidly reconstituting its capabilities.

Directly controlled by the Security Council of Russia, the Russian Armed Forces form part of the country's defence services under Russian law, fulfilling this capacity alongside the Border Guard of the Federal Security Service, the National Guard, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Protective Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations.

Service branches

Armed forces under the Ministry of Defence are divided into:

• The three branches of Armed Forces: the Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Navy
• The two separate troop branches: the Strategic Rocket Forces and Airborne Forces
• The special forces of Armed Forces: the Special Operations Forces
• The Logistical Support of the Russian Armed Forces, which has a separate status of its own

There are additionally two further separate troop branches, the National Guard and the Border Service. These retain the legal status of "Armed Forces", while falling outside of the jurisdiction of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The National Guard is formed on the basis of the former Internal Troops of Russia. The new structure has been detached from the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a separate agency, directly subordinated to the President of Russia. The Border Service is a paramilitary organization of the Federal Security Service, the country's main internal intelligence agency. Both organizations have significant wartime tasks in addition to their main peacetime activities and operate their own land, air and maritime units.

The number of personnel is specified by decree of the President of Russia. On 1 January 2008, a number of 2,019,629 units, including military of 1,134,800 units, was set. In 2010 the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that the Russian Armed Forces numbered about 1,027,000 active troops and in the region of 2,035,000 reserves (largely ex-conscripts). As opposed to personnel specified by decree, actual personnel numbers on the payroll was reported by the Audit Chamber of Russia as 766,000 in October 2013.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2005–2009 and 2010–2014, Russian exports of major weapons increased by 37 percent; Russia spent $66.4 billion on arms in 2015, then $69.2 billion in 2016, having taken 3rd place (after the U.S. and China).

History

1991-2022

The Soviet Union officially dissolved on 25 December 1991. For the next year various attempts to keep its unity and to transform it into the military of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) failed. Over time, some units stationed in the newly independent republics swore loyalty to their new national governments, while a series of treaties between the newly independent states divided up the military's assets.

Apart from assuming control of the bulk of the former Soviet Internal Troops and the KGB Border Troops, seemingly the only independent defence move the new Russian government made before March 1992 involved announcing the establishment of a National Guard. Until 1995, it was planned to form at least 11 brigades numbering 3,000 to 5,000 each, with a total of no more than 100,000. National Guard military units were to be deployed in 10 regions, including in Moscow (three brigades), (two brigades), and a number of other important cities and regions. In Moscow alone 15,000 personnel expressed their desire to service in the new Russian Army, mostly former Soviet Armed Forces servicemen. In the end, President Yeltsin tabled a decree "On the temporary position of the Russian Guard", but it was not put into practice.

After signing the Belavezha Accords on 21 December 1991, the countries of the newly formed CIS signed a protocol on the temporary appointment of Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov as Minister of Defence and commander of the armed forces in their territory, including strategic nuclear forces. On 14 February 1992 Shaposhnikov formally became Supreme Commander of the CIS Armed Forces. On 16 March 1992 a decree by Boris Yeltsin created the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the operational control of Allied High Command and the Ministry of Defence, which was headed by President. Finally, on 7 May 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the armed forces and Yeltsin assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander.

In May 1992, General Colonel Pavel Grachev became the Minister of Defence, and was made Russia's first Army General on assuming the post. By August or December 1993 CIS military structures had become CIS military cooperation structures with all real influence lost.

In the next few years, Russian forces withdrew from central and eastern Europe, as well as from some newly independent post-Soviet republics. While in most places the withdrawal took place without any problems, the Russian Armed Forces remained in some disputed areas such as the Sevastopol naval base in the Crimea as well as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and in Transnistria. The Armed Forces have several bases in foreign countries, especially on territory of the former Soviet Republics.

In late 2000 Gazeta.ru reported that of 600,000 personnel planned to be dismissed from the various "power ministries," the Armed Forces would be reduced by 365,000.

Both in Soviet and Russian times, corruption has been a significant impediment to the Armed Forces. "The change from Yeltsin to Putin ..had minimal effect on Russian military corruption. Putin, despite his desire to rebuild Russian strength, has not shown himself willing or able to seriously deal with" corruption. From 1991 to 2001, Russian authorities uncovered at least 350 billion rubles' (US$11.5 billion) worth of corruption in the armed forces (with, for comparison, the total defence budget for 2001 being 214 billion rubles). Areas of particular concern identified by a researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in 2007 included the State Defence Order (perhaps 10-15% realised in 2004); "ghost soldiers," as "it is generally acknowledged that the number of actually serving personnel differs substantially from the authorized number of personnel," and officers at various levels can pocket excess money for themselves; and "the domestic purchases of goods and services, where corrupt officers overpay civilian providers in return for bribes."

2022-present

On 24 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave the execute order to for the Armed Forces to begin the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On 10 April 2022 General Aleksandr Dvornikov assumed command of the operation. In July 2022, at the same time as the Armed Forces began suffering severe casualties, the Ground Forces began to site ammunition in or near structures which are frequented by civilians due to the human shield benefit, ostensibly because Ukrainian HIMARS had tilted the odds of his strategy of attrition by artillery. Within hours after Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu's signature on the UN-brokered deal to resume Ukraine's Black Sea grain exports, Russia bombed the Port of Odesa.

According to Forbes Moscow had committed, as of the end of July 2022, 10 of its Combined Arms Armies to the invasion. The Wagner Group has made a name for itself as Putin's "private army." In June 2023, Putin backed the Ministry of Defense's plan to make mercenary groups sign contracts, which Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin pushed against: these contracts would have placed the Wagner Group under the Ministry's command structure as subordinates and limited Prigozhin's own influence. Later in June, the Wagner Group turned against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense until a peace deal was reached. According to Prigozhin, part of the reason for his march against Russia was to stop the government from " PMC Wagner."

By July 2024, according to the Supreme Commander of NATO Allied Forces Europe Christopher Cavoli: "The Russians are very cleverly adapting technologically and procedurally to many of the challenges that they run into in Ukraine". Cavoli also said in April 2024 that the Russian military has replaced its troop and equipment losses and is larger than it was before the start of the conflict. On June 26, 2024, the UK-based Royal United Services Institute think tank reported that Russia continues to increase the production and sophistication of its main weapons and its defense industry remained highly dependent on foreign imports of critical components. The Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi said on 24 July 2024 that Russians were much better resourced now but also suffer three times higher losses than Ukraine.

Beginning in March 2024, following severe equipment shortages and struggling to build or reactivate from long-term storage enough infantry fighting vehicles to equip front-line regiments and brigades, Russian forces started using Chinese desertcross ″golf-carts″ as well as Chinese and Belarusian dirt bikes as replacements. The assaults with these vehicles have resulted in multiple Russian units being destroyed.

Structure

The Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation serves as the administrative body of the Armed Forces. Since Soviet times, the General Staff has acted as the main commanding and supervising body of the Russian armed forces. "he Soviet General Staff without the MoD is conceivable, but the MoD without the General Staff is not."

Other departments include the Main Intelligence Directorate, the personnel directorate as well as the Logistical Support of the Russian Armed Forces, Railway Troops, Signal Troops and Construction Troops. The Ministry of Defence incorporated the Main Directorate of the Military Police Since 1 December 2012. The Main Directorate of the Military Police oversees subordinated military districts regional directorates of military police. The Chief of the General Staff is currently General of the Army Valery Gerasimov.

In July 2018, the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces was created, restoring a responsibility for ideological training that had been done away with in the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Russian military is divided into three services: the Russian Ground Forces, the Russian Navy, and the Russian Aerospace Forces. In addition there are two independent arms of service: the Strategic Missile Troops and the Russian Airborne Troops. The Armed Forces as a whole are traditionally referred to as the Army (armiya), except in some cases, the Navy is specifically singled out.

Military districts

Since late 2010, the Ground Forces as well as the Aerospace Forces and Navy are distributed among four military districts: Western Military District, Southern Military District, Central Military District, and the Eastern Military District which also constitute four Joint Strategic Commands—West, South, Central, and East. Previously from 1992 to 2010, the Ground Forces were divided into six military districts: Moscow, Leningrad, North Caucausian, Privolzhsk-Ural, Siberian and Far Eastern, with the seventh military district: Kaliningrad formed in 1997; in service until 2010.

Russia's four naval fleets and one flotilla were organizations on par with the Ground Forces' Military Districts. These seven MDs were merged into the four new MDs, which now also incorporate the aerospace forces and naval forces. There is one remaining Russian military base, the 102nd Military Base, in Armenia left of the former Transcaucasus Group of Forces and is incorporated into the Southern Military District.

In mid-2010 a reorganisation was announced which consolidated military districts and the navy's fleets into four Joint Strategic Commands (OSC). In 2014 the Northern Fleet was reorganized in separate Joint Strategic Command. Since 1 January 2021, this Command has the status of military district.

Geographically divided, the five commands/districts are:

• Joint Strategic Command West – Western Military District (HQ in St. Petersburg), includes the Baltic Fleet;
• Joint Strategic Command North – Northern Military District (HQ in Severomorsk), includes the Northern Fleet;
• Joint Strategic Command South – Southern Military District (HQ in Rostov-on-Don) includes the Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla;
• Joint Strategic Command Center – Central Military District (HQ in Yekaterinburg);
• Joint Strategic Command East – Eastern Military District (HQ in Khabarovsk), includes the Pacific Fleet.

The plan was put in place on 1 December 2010 and mirrors a proposed reorganisation by former Chief of the General Staff Army General Yuri Baluyevsky for a Regional Command East which was not implemented. The four commands were set up by a decree of President Medvedev on 14 July 2010. In July 2011, an Operational-Strategic Command of Missile-Space Defence has also been established on the basis of the former Special Purpose Command of the Russian Air Force. A Presidential decree of January 2011 named commanders for several of the new organisational structures.

Russian security bodies not under the control of the Ministry of Defence include the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (now the National Guard of Russia's National Guard Forces Command), the Border Guard Service of Russia (part of the Federal Security Service), the Kremlin Regiment and the rest of the Federal Protective Service, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the country's civil defence service since 1995 and successor to earlier civil defence units.

Naval fleets

The Navy consists of four fleets and one flotilla:

• Northern Fleet (HQ at Severomorsk) forms own Joint Strategic Command.
• Baltic Fleet (HQ at Kaliningrad in the exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command West.
• Black Sea Fleet (HQ at Sevastopol, disputed region of Crimea) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command South.
• Pacific Fleet (HQ at Vladivostok) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command East.
• Caspian Flotilla (HQ at Astrakhan) subordinated to Joint Strategic Command South.

Personnel

Conscription is used in Russia; the term of service is 12 months; and the eligible age is between 18 and 27 years old. Deferments are provided to undergraduate and graduate students, men supporting disabled relatives, parents of at least two children and—upon Presidential proclamation—to some employees of military-oriented enterprises. Men holding a Ph.D., as well as sons and brothers of servicemen killed or disabled during their military service, are released from conscription.

There were widespread problems with hazing in the Army, known as dedovshchina, where first-year draftees are abused by second-year draftees, a practice that appeared in its current form after the change to a two-year service term in 1967. According to Anna Politkovskaya, in 2002, "a complete battalion, more than five hundred men, had been killed not by enemy fire but by beatings". Over a period of 9 months in 2003, 2,500 personnel were accused of dedovshchina, of which half were sentenced. To combat this problem, a new decree was signed in March 2007, which cut the conscription service term from 24 to 18 months. The term was cut further to one year on 1 January 2008.

Thirty percent of Russian Armed Forces' personnel were contract servicemen at the end of 2005. For the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces will be a mixed contract/conscript force. The Russian Armed Forces need to maintain a mobilization reserve to have manning resources capable of reinforcing the permanent readiness forces if the permanent readiness forces cannot deter or suppress an armed conflict on their own.

Recruitment into the Russian military are also open to non-Russian citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which Russia is the largest member. By December 2003, the Russian parliament had approved a law in principle to permit the Armed Forces to employ foreign nationals on contract by offering them Russian citizenship after several years service yet, up to 2010, foreigners could only serve in Russia's armed forces after getting a Russian passport. Under a 2010 Defence Ministry plan, foreigners without dual citizenship would be able to sign up for five-year contracts and will be eligible for Russian citizenship after serving three years. The change could open the way for CIS citizens to get fast-track Russian citizenship, and counter the effects of Russia's demographic crisis on its army recruitment. Each soldier in duty receives an Identity Card of the Russian Armed Forces. On 20 September 2022 the State Duma passed a bill which would make Russian citizenship available to foreign soldiers upon 12 months service in the AFRF; previously the service requirement had been set at three years.

Awards and decorations of the Armed Forces are covered at the Awards and Emblems of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.

On 17 November 2011, General Nikolai Makarov said that Russia had reached a crisis in the conscript service where there simply were not sufficient able-bodied men to draft and was forced to halve its conscription.

In March 2013, Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu promised that all army quarters would have showers by the end of the year.

In 2013, it was reported that: "Compared to 2007, the number of female officers and warrant-officers has dropped by nearly two thirds. There were over 30,000 women serving under a contract in 2007, and now there are only slightly more than 11,000 of them, including 4,300 officers of various rank." Lt. Col. Yelena Stepanova, the chief of the social processes monitoring department at the Russian armed forces' sociological research center, said. This trend "not ..special" but correspond with the general .. reduction of the Russian armed forces."

On 28 May 2022, on the background of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin signed the law which removed the upper age limit for signing first contract for the performance of voluntary military service (earlier this limit was 40 years old).

In November 2024, following heavy personnel losses, Russia reduced payments to troops injured in the invasion of Ukraine amidst the Russian government facing increasing war costs due to the large amount of injuries.

Military education

The Russian military education system, inherited from the Soviet Union, trains officer-specialists in narrowly-defined military occupational specialties. In this it differs greatly from the American military education system in which newly qualified second lieutenants receive particular specialties in the framework of their "career branch" only after graduation from a military academy or the ROTC. Students of Russian civilian institutions of higher education wishing to join the reserve officer training program cannot choose a military occupational specialty, because each civilian specialty taught by civilian university is attached to a particular military occupational specialty taught by the military training center of the same university by the rector's order. It also differs from the American military education system in which students can choose between available types of ROTC.

The Russian military education system includes:

• Warrant officer schools, which prepare career warrant officers for active duty service.
• Higher military schools, which prepare career commissioned officers for active duty service as platoon/company commanders and at equivalent positions (tactical level).
• Military training centers within civilian institutions of higher education, which prepare reserve commissioned officers who can serve as platoon/company commanders and at equivalent positions (tactical level).
• Military academies, which improve the military occupational specialty knowledge of commissioned officers to allow them to be appointed to battalion/regiment/brigade commander or equivalent positions (operational-tactical level).
• Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, which improves skills of officers graduated from military academies to allow them to become highest-ranking military officers (strategic level).
• Adjunctura is a military analogue of civilian graduate school, which allow commissioned officers to get academic degree of candidate of sciences in military oriented specialties and be appointed to a teaching positions in military academies, military schools, military training centers.

Reserve components

Russian Armed Forces have reserves (Russian: запас; transliteration: zapas) which includes 2 components:

• Active reserve – Mobilization human reserve (Russian: мобилизационный людской резерв; transliteration: mobilizatsionnyy lyudskoy reserv)
• Inactive reserve – Mobilization human resource (Russian: мобилизационный людской ресурс; transliteration: mobilizatsionnyy lyudskoy resurs)

By default, at the end of active duty each military personnel is enrolled as a mobilization human resource. This applies equally to conscripts and volunteers regardless of ranks. Furthermore, graduates of civilian institutions of higher education, who have graduated the military training centers of their almae matres, trained under reserve officer program, are enrolled as mobilization Human Resources after their promotion to officer's rank (unlike graduates of such centers, trained under active duty officer program, who are due to be enrolled for active duty after their promotion to officer's rank). Mobilization human resource are replenished with males who reach the age of 27 years old and were not in military service for any reason.

Enrolling in the mobilization human reserve is voluntary and implies the special contract. This possibility is available for each persons, who is in the mobilization human resource already. The initial contract is concluded for 3 years period. Military personnel of mobilization human reserve (reservists) perform part-time duties in military units. Reservists are appointed to a military position in particular military units and are involved in all operational, mobilization, and combat activities of these military units. As a rule, in peacetime time reservists perform their duties 2–3 days per month and during an annual military camp training of 20 to 30 days.

The exact number of reservists is unknown because a relevant paragraph of the Presidential Decree which determines the number of reserve troops is classified. The military units manned by reservists are determined by General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and this information is classified too.

The persons who are in mobilization human resource (non-reservists) may be enlisted to military camp trainings in peacetime. The duration of each training can not exceed 2 months, herewith the total duration of such trainings for the entire period of being in mobilization human resource can not exceed 12 months, and a person may be enlisted in such training no more than once every three years.

As of 2009, the number of citizens who can be used for mobilization deployment on an involuntary basis in the case of wartime mobilization was estimated at 31 million.

Reservists are subject to mobilization in wartime first of all. Non-reservists are subject to mobilization secondarily. The mobilization of non-reservists is carried out by taking into account the age category under the article 53 of Federal Law of 28 March 1998, No.53-FZ "About military duty and military service": in order from first category to third category.

The first category includes: 1) the persons at the any military rank below that of a commissioned officer (enlisted personnel) and not reached the age of 35 years old; 2) the persons at the any rank from junior lieutenant to captain (captain-lieutenant in naval service) inclusively (junior commissioned officers) and not reached the age of 50 years old; 3) the persons at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively and not reached the age of 55 years old; 4) the persons at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) and not reached the age of 60 years old; 5) the persons at the rank of major general (counter admiral in naval service) or higher (supreme officers) and not reached the age of 65 years old.

The second category includes: 1) enlisted personnel in age from 35 but less than 45; 2) junior commissioned officers in the age from 50 but less than 55; 3) commissioned officers at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively in the age from 55 but less than 60; 4) commissioned officers at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) in the age from 60 but less than 65; 5) supreme officers in age from 65 but less than 70.

The third category includes: 1) enlisted personnel in the age from 45 but less than 50; 2) junior commissioned officers in the age from 55 but less than 60; 3) commissioned officers at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively in the age from 60 but less than 65; 4) all females in the age less than 45 for enlisted personnel and less than 50 for commissioned officers. The person who has reached the age limit, established for the third category (the second category for persons at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) or higher), is retired and is not subject to mobilization.

2005–2008 reform of the reserve officer training system

The reserve officer training system, inherited from the Soviet Union, involved selective conscription of graduates of civilian institutions of higher education, who have graduated the military departments of their almae matres and received a commission as an officer. Such person could be conscripted from the reserve of armed forces to active duty, up until the age of 27. The period of active duty of such an officer was several years, and at the end of that period he was due to be enlisted in the reserve of armed forces again. Such officers were called "blazers" in the army's slang (for example, Anatoly Kvashnin was a "blazer").

In 2005, Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov announced a significant reduction in the number of military departments carrying out the training commissioned officers from students of civilian institutions of higher education. By March 2008, 168 of 235 civilian universities, academies and institutions which previously had military departments had lost these units. 37 of 67 civilian universities, academies and institutions which retained military departments became the basis for the establishment of new military training centers. The military training centers focused on training officers for active duty, whilst the military departments focused on training officers for the reserve.

In 2006 the conscription of reserve officers was abolished. Graduates of military departments were not subject to conscription to active duty anymore (with the exception of a wartime mobilization). All graduates of military training centers were due to be enrolled for 3 years active duty upon their university graduation.

2018 beginning of formation of voluntary military reserve force

In 2018, Russia started a full-scale formation of a military reserve force based upon volunteers selected from among those who retired from active duty. The Russian military reserve force (Russian: мобилизационный людской резерв) is a set of citizens who have signed a contract to perform military service as a reservist. They are appointed to a military position in a particular military unit. They are involved in all operational, mobilization, and combat activities of these military units, unlike other citizens who haven't signed such contracts and who can be used for a mobilization deployment of armed forces on an involuntary basis only in cases stipulated by law (Russian: мобилизационный людской ресурс).

The deployment of military units composed of reservists, takes minimum time and does not requires any retraining of military personnel. The military units composed of reservists use the same weapons as used by military units, composed of active duty military personnel. Military units staffed by reservists are 100% manned up to wartime standards just like military units staffed by active duty military personnel only. There is no possibility to define by military units designation what we're dealing with - reserve or not reserve military unit. The number of reservists is not presented in open sources and is not among the number of active duty military volunteers which is published by Ministry of Defence. This makes it difficult for establish real troop strength of new Russian military units and formations.

2019 reform of the reserve officer training system

In 2018 the military departments and the military training centers were abolished. From that moment on, students of civilian institutions of higher education were trained under both officers training programmes (for reserve and for active duty) in the Military Training Centers. In 2019, there were training military centers in 93 civilian institutions of higher education.

Mobilization

The first mobilization of citizens being in mobilization human resource, conducted on a compulsory basis, in the Russian Federation's history was announced by Presidential Decree of 21 September 2022 No.647 during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Budget

Between 1991 and 1997 newly independent Russia's defence spending fell by a factor of eight in real prices. In 1998, when Russia experienced a severe financial crisis, its military expenditure in real terms reached its lowest point—barely one-quarter of the USSR's in 1991, and two-fifths of the level of 1992, the first year of Russia's independent existence.

In the early 2000s, defence spending increased by at least a minimum of one-third year-on-year, leading to overall defence expenditure almost quadrupling over the past six years, and according to Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, this rate is to be sustained through 2010. Official government military spending for 2005 was US$32.4 billion, though various sources, have estimated Russia's military expenditures to be considerably higher than the reported amount.

Estimating Russian military expenditure is beset with difficulty; the annual IISS Military Balance has underscored the problem numerous times within its section on Russia. The IISS Military Balance comments, "By simple observation ... would appear to be lower than is suggested by the size of the armed forces or the structure of the military–industrial complex, and thus neither of the figures is particularly useful for comparative analysis." By some estimates, overall Russian defence expenditure is now at the second highest in the world after the USA. According to Alexander Kanshin, Chairman of the Public Chamber of Russia on affairs of veterans, military personnel, and their families, the Russian military is losing up to US$13 billion to corruption every year.

On 16 September 2008 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that in 2009, Russia's defence budget would be increased to a record amount of $50 billion.

On 16 February 2009 Russia's deputy defence minister said state defence contracts would not be subject to cuts this year despite the ongoing financial crisis, and that there would be no decrease in 2009. The budget would still be 1.376 trillion rubles and in the current exchange rates this would amount to $41.5 billion.

Later in February 2009, due to the world financial crisis, the Russian Parliament's Defence Committee stated that the Russian defence budget would instead be slashed by 15 percent, from $40 billion to $34 billion, with further cuts to come. On 5 May 2009, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the defence budget for 2009 will be 1.3 trillion rubles (US$39.4 billion). 322 billion rubles are allocated to purchase weapons, and the rest of the fund will be spent on construction, fuel storage and food supply.

According to the head of the Defence Committee of the State Duma Vladimir Komoyedov, Russia plans to spend 101.15 billion rubles on nuclear weapons in 2013–2015. "The budget provisions under 'The Nuclear Weapons Complex' section in 2013-2015 will amount to 29.28 billion rubles, 33.3 billion rubles and 38.57 billion rubles respectively," Komoyedov said, Vechernaya Moskva reports.

Komoyedov added that in 2012 the spending on nuclear weapons made up 27.4 billion rubles. The draft law "On the Federal Budget for 2013 and for the planning period of 2014 and 2015" will be discussed in the first reading on 19 October 2012, The Voice of Russia reports.

The Russian government's published 2014 military budget is about 2.49 trillion rubles (approximately US$69.3 billion), the fourth largest in the world behind the US, China and Saudi Arabia. The official budget is set to rise to 3.03 trillion rubles (approximately US$83.7 billion) in 2015, and 3.36 trillion rubles (approximately US$93.9 billion) in 2016. As of 2014, Russia's military budget is higher than any other European nation, and approximately 1/7th (14 percent) of the US military budget.

In 2015, SIPRI found that Russia was the world's second biggest exporter of major weapons for the period 2010–14, increasing exports by 37 per cent. India, China and Algeria accounted for almost 60 percent of total Russian exports. Asia and Oceania received 66 percent of Russian arms exports in 2010–14, Africa 12 percent and the Middle East 10 percent.

In 2017, Russia was reported to have slashed its defense spending by 20%, due to calls by Vladimir Putin to spend money on other initiatives such as healthcare and education. The cut decreased Russia's military spending to $66.3 billion, in which Russia slumped to being the fourth-highest military spender. Russia's 2019 defense budget was US$48 billion and the 2020 figure was $61.7 billion.

However, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Russian government has dramatically increased military spending to over 85+ billion dollars, returning to third position as the highest military spender in the world. The increase in military spending was needed to recoup losses in the war and reorientate Russia into a war economy. On 5 October 2023, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia's spending on defense and security now equals to 6% of its GDP.

Procurement

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (April 2022)

About 70 percent of the former Soviet Union's defence industries are located in the Russian Federation. Many defence firms have been privatised; some have developed significant partnerships with firms in other countries.

The recent steps towards modernization of the Armed Forces have been made possible by Russia's economic resurgence based on oil and gas revenues as well a strengthening of its own domestic market. Currently the military is in the middle of a major equipment upgrade, with the government in the process of spending about $200 billion (what equals to about $400 billion in PPP dollars) on development and production of military equipment between 2006 and 2015 under the State Armament Programme for 2007–2015 (GPV – госпрограмма вооружения).

Mainly as a result of lessons learned during the Russo-Georgian War, the State Armament Programme for 2011–2020 was launched in December 2010. Prime Minister Putin announced that 20–21.5 trillion rubles (over $650 billion) will be allocated to purchase new hardware in the next 10 years. The aim is to have a growth of 30% of modern equipment in the army, navy and air force by 2015, and of 70% by 2020. In some categories, the proportion of new weapon systems will reach 80% or even 100%.

As of 2011, Russia's chief military prosecutor said that 20 percent of the defence budget was being stolen or defrauded yearly. It is suspected that equipment is not properly maintained due to the resulting lack of funds, which may have contributed to equipment failures observed during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In 2018, RF Armed Forces adopted 35 types of weapons and military equipment and completed state tests of 21 more. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) was procured the YeSU TZ (Yedinaya Sistema Upravleniya Takticheskogo Zvena) battlefield management system that same year. The YeSU TZ battlefield management system incorporates 11 subsystems that control artillery, electronic warfare systems, ground vehicles, air defence assets, engineering equipment, and logistics support, among other things.

Twelve missile regiments have been rearmed with Yars ICBMs, 10 missile brigades with Iskander tactical ballistic missile systems, 13 aviation regiments with MiG-31BM, Su-35S, Su-30SM, and Su-34 combat aircraft, three army aviation brigades and six helicopter regiments with Mi-28N and Ka-52 combat helicopters, 20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments with S-400 Triumf SAM systems, 23 batteries with Pantsir-S self-propelled anti-aircraft gun-missile systems, and 17 batteries with Bal and Bastion mobile coastal defence missile systems since 2012 and as of March 2019.

In early 2023, there were reports that the Russian Defense Ministry purchased more than a thousand tablets with a domestic software for higher-ranking officials and also begun receiving a new line of gliding bombs with a range of tens of kilometers.

The New York Times reported on 13 September 2023, citing US and European officials, that Russia overcomes the international sanctions and its missile production now exceeded pre-war levels. It was also reported that Russia now produces more ammunitions than the United States and Europe and it can manufacture 200 tanks and two million units of ammunition in a year. CNN also reported in September 2023 that Russia produces ammunition seven times cheaper and eight times faster than Europe.

In September 2023, various Russian regions launched the production of suicide drones at their own initiatives. Vladimir Putin also claimed that the production of main armored vehicles has increased by four times in comparison with the past year and the production of the especially important destruction means by three times.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Armed Forces received in 2023 several hundreds of thousands of small arms, new and repaired weapon systems, military vehicles and equipment, artillery systems, air defense systems, missiles and bombs, aircraft and helicopters, drones, and also over a million individual armor protection and equipment means. CNN reported on 11 March 2024 that Russia currently produces about 250,000 artillery shells a month or about 3 million a year which is nearly three times the quantity the US and Europe produce for Ukraine. CNN cited Western intelligence officials and also said that Russia imports ammunition from Iran and North Korea.

Nuclear weapons

As of January 2017, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that Russia has approximately 1,765 deployed strategic warheads, and another 2,700 non-deployed strategic and deployed and non-deployed tactical warheads, plus an additional 2,510 warheads awaiting dismantlement. Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces controls its land-based nuclear warheads, while the Navy controls the submarine based missiles and the Aerospace Forces the air-launched warheads. Russia's nuclear warheads are deployed in four areas:

1. Land-based immobile (silos), like R-36 and its replacement RS-28 Sarmat.
2. Land-based mobile, like RT-2PM2 Topol-M and new RS-24 Yars.
3. Submarine based, like R-29RMU2 Layner and RSM-56 Bulava.
4. Air-launched warheads of the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long Range Aviation Command

The military doctrine of Russia sees NATO expansion as one of the threats for the Russian Federation and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional aggression that can endanger the existence of the state. In keeping with this, the country's nuclear forces received adequate funding throughout the late 1990s. The number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and warheads on active duty has declined over the years, in part in keeping with arms limitation agreements with the U.S. and in part due to insufficient spending on maintenance, but this is balanced by the deployment of new missiles as proof against missile defences.

Russia has developed the new RT-2PM2 Topol-M (SS-27) missiles that a Russian general claimed to be able to penetrate any missile defence, including the planned U.S. National Missile Defence. The missile can change course in both air and space to avoid countermeasures. It is designed to be launched from land-based, mobile TEL units.

Because of international awareness of the danger that Russian nuclear technology might fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue officers who it was feared might want to use nuclear weapons to threaten or attack other countries, the federal government of the United States and many other countries provided considerable financial assistance to the Russian nuclear forces in the early 1990s. This money went in part to finance decommissioning of warheads under international agreements, such the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, but also to improve security and personnel training in Russian nuclear facilities.

In the late evening of 11 September 2007 the fuel-air explosive AVBPM or "Father of All Bombs" was successfully field-tested.

See also

• Adjunctura in Russia
• Awards and emblems of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
• History of Russian military ranks
  • Army ranks and insignia of the Russian Federation
  • Naval ranks and insignia of the Russian Federation
• Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces
• Military academies in Russia
• Military Band Service of the Armed Forces of Russia
• Military commissioning schools in Russia
• Reserve Officer Training in Russia
• Uniforms of the Russian Armed Forces
• Warrant officer schools of the Russian Armed Forces

Notes

1. Russian: Вооружённые Си́лы Росси́йской Федера́ции, Vooruzhyonnyye Sily Rossiyskoy Federatsii

1. The potential reserve personnel of Russia may be as high as 20 million, depending on how the figures are counted. However, an est. 2 million have seen military service within the last 5 years.

Citations

1. ^ О воинской обязанности и военной службе [About military duty and military service] (Federal Law 53-FZ) (in Russian). State Duma. 28 March 1998. "Законодательство России. Расширенный поиск". Archived from the original on 28 July 2020. Retrieved 8 October 2022."Законодательство России. Расширенный поиск". Archived from the original on 28 July 2020. Retrieved 8 October 2022.
2. Masters, Jonathan (28 September 2015). "The Russian Military". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 17 September 2017. Retrieved 17 August 2017.
3. Barros, George; Mappes, Grace; Harward, Christina; Hird, Karolina; Zehrung, Haley; Gasparyan, Davit; Ganzeveld, Annika (16 September 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2024". Institute for the Study of War. Archived from the original on 17 September 2024. Retrieved 21 September 2024.
4. IISS 2021, p. 191.
5. ^ "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2022" (PDF). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. April 2023. Archived (PDF) from the original on 23 April 2023. Retrieved 29 April 2023.
6. "The War Trade: How Italy Sold Armoured Vehicles To Russia + Their Deployment With Syrian Army Militias". bellingcat. 20 December 2019. Archived from the original on 27 September 2022. Retrieved 27 September 2022.
7. Korolkov, Alexander (25 January 2016). "Russia continues to buy Iveco LMV armored cars from Italy". Russia Beyond. Archived from the original on 25 July 2017. Retrieved 27 September 2022.
8. "Russia's use of Iranian drones shows up domestic weakness". France 24. 17 October 2022. Archived from the original on 27 October 2022. Retrieved 17 October 2022.
9. "North Korean weapons extending Russian stockpiles, German general says". Reuters. 9 September 2024. Retrieved 24 November 2024.
10. ^ "TIV of arms imports/exports from Russia, 2010-2021". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 7 February 2022. Archived from the original on 21 June 2023. Retrieved 26 January 2023.
11. "Russia". Central Intelligence Agency. 28 February 2023. Archived from the original on 9 January 2021. Retrieved 20 September 2022 – via CIA.gov.
12. IISS, The Military Balance 2022, 201.
13. Nichol, Jim (21 December 2022). "Russian military announces plan to expand, create new units". The Associated Press. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 21 December 2022. Russia expands active personnel to 1.5 million from 1.15 forces
14. "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance". Arms Control Association. August 2020. Archived from the original on 24 January 2018. Retrieved 7 June 2021.
15. "Ballistic missile submarines data". Asia Power Index. Lowy Institute. 2021. Archived from the original on 8 April 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2022.
16. Paul, T. V.; Wirtz, James J.; Fortmann, Michael (2004). Balance of power: theory and practice in the 21st century. Stanford University Press. p. 332. ISBN 978-0-8047-5017-2. Archived from the original on 28 October 2023. Retrieved 5 December 2021.
17. Tian, Nan; Fleurant, Aude; Kuimova, Alexandra; Wezeman, Pieter D.; Wezeman, Siemon T. (26 April 2021). "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020" (PDF). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Archived (PDF) from the original on 17 August 2021. Retrieved 24 November 2021.
18. "Russia plans to boost defence spending by a quarter for 2025". France 24. 30 September 2024. Retrieved 9 November 2024.
19. "Institute for the Study of War". Institute for the Study of War. Archived from the original on 9 November 2024. Retrieved 9 November 2024.
20. ^ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book: Russia Archived 9 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine
21. Russian Military Personnel Policy and Proficiency: Reforms and Trends, 1991–2021 Archived 9 November 2024 at the Wayback Machine; Anika Binnendijk, Dara Massicot, Anthony Atler, John J. Drennan, Khrystyna Holynska, Katya Migacheva, Marek N. Posard, Yuliya Shokh; published Aug 15, 2023.
22. Atlamazoglou, Stavros (19 September 2024). "Russia's Military Will Soon Have 1.5 Million Troops". The National Interest. Retrieved 9 November 2024.
23. "Russia". Central Intelligence Agency. 28 February 2023. Archived from the original on 9 January 2021. Retrieved 20 September 2022 – via CIA.gov.
24. "Putin orders Russian army to expand to become the world's second largest". NBC News. 17 September 2024. Archived from the original on 9 November 2024. Retrieved 9 November 2024.
25. "Understanding the Russian Military Today | Russia and Eurasia | CSIS". www.csis.org. Archived from the original on 9 November 2024. Retrieved 9 November 2024.
26. Russian Military Performance and Outlook Archived 9 November 2024 at the Wayback Machine Congressional Research Services. Updated October 10, 2024.
27. ""Вывозили на КАМАЗе". Как российские солдаты и офицеры воровали у армии трусы, берцы и бронежилеты". BBC News Русская служба (in Russian). Archived from the original on 20 October 2022. Retrieved 17 December 2022.
28. Kovalev, Alexey (19 October 2022). "As War Hits the Homefront, Russia's Defeat Inches Closer". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 17 December 2022. Retrieved 17 December 2022.
29. "'The army has nothing': new Russian conscripts bemoan lack of supplies". the Guardian. 20 October 2022. Archived from the original on 25 February 2023. Retrieved 17 December 2022.
30. Russian Military Performance and Outlook Archived 9 November 2024 at the Wayback Machine Congressional Research Service. Updated October 10, 2024.
31. Sonne, Paul; Lamothe, Dan; Ilyushina, Mary (13 September 2022). "Rapid loss of territory in Ukraine reveals spent Russian military". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 14 September 2022. Retrieved 10 November 2022.
32. ^ "The woes of the Russian war machine are big and real. Are they also temporary?". The Economist. 28 February 2022. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 13 March 2022. Retrieved 13 March 2022.
33. "The Russian Military's Debacle in Ukraine". The New Yorker. 11 March 2022. Archived from the original on 23 March 2022. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
34. Posard, Marek N.; Holynska, Khrystyna (21 March 2022). "Russia has a military professionalism problem, and it is costing them in Ukraine". Breaking Defense. Archived from the original on 5 August 2022. Retrieved 25 August 2022.
35. Grisé, Michelle (5 July 2024). Russia's Speedy Military Rebuild Doesn't Tell the Whole Story (Report).
36. Указ Президента РФ от 1 января 2008 г. № 1 "О штатной численности Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации" [RF Presidential Decree on 1 January 2008 № 1 "On the authorised strength of the Armed Forces"]. Garant.ru (in Russian). 6 February 2008. Archived from the original on 5 March 2016. Retrieved 1 March 2016.
37. IISS Military Balance 2010, p. 222
38. "766,055". RIA Novosti. 31 October 2013. Archived from the original on 14 April 2017. Retrieved 13 April 2017 – via russiandefpolicy.blog.Почти четверть должностей в ВC РФ были вакантными на начало года [Almost a quarter of positions in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were vacant at the beginning of the year]. Риа Новости (in Russian). RIA Novosti. 24 October 2013. Archived from the original on 14 April 2017. Retrieved 13 April 2017.
39. ^ "Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2014". www.sipri.org. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Archived from the original on 19 March 2015. Retrieved 18 March 2015.
40. Perlo-Freeman, Sam; Aude Fleurant; Pieter Wezeman; Siemon Wezeman (April 2016). "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015" (PDF). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Archived from the original (PDF) on 20 April 2016. Retrieved 23 August 2016.
41. Россия вышла на третье место в мире по объему военных расходов, оттеснив Саудовскую Аравию Archived 24 April 2017 at the Wayback Machine NEWSru, 24 April 2017.
42. Odom 1998, pp. 369–387.
43. For some early discussion on this period, see Richard Woff, "A Russian Army", Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1992, 198-200. See also Voenniy vestnik No 12, 1991.
44. "Short life of the new Russian Guard". Tsiganok.ru. 21 December 2006. Retrieved 24 March 2014.
45. Министерство обороны Российской Федерации [Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation] (in Russian). Politika.su. Archived from the original on 21 December 2012. Retrieved 24 March 2014.
46. The Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation was established as the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command in March 1992 and then reorganised as the Coordinating Staff in August 1993. It quickly became a very weak body as the new states' authorities asserted their control over their own armed forces. (Russia and NIS Mineral Industry Handbook, International Business Publications, 2007.) Army General Vladimir Yakovlev (general) appears to have become Chief of the Staff in June 2001 (DS2002-0819).
47. Gazeta.ru, "Military Machine Sentenced to Cut-back," 10 November 2000, http://www.gazeta.ru/print/mmstcb.shtml.
48. Bukkvoll, Tor (January 2008). "Their Hands in the Till: Scale and Causes of Russian Military Corruption". Armed Forces & Society. 34 (2): 259–275. doi:10.1177/0095327X06294622. ISSN 0095-327X. S2CID 145238073. Archived from the original on 4 November 2023. Retrieved 4 November 2023.
49. "Soaring Death Toll Gives Grim Insight Into Russian Tactics". The New York Times. 2 February 2023. Archived from the original on 7 February 2023. Retrieved 19 March 2023.
50. "'Terrible toll': Russia's invasion of Ukraine in numbers". Euractiv. 14 February 2023. Archived from the original on 12 July 2023. Retrieved 19 March 2023.
51. Hussain, Murtaza (9 March 2023). "The War in Ukraine Is Just Getting Started". The Intercept. Archived from the original on 18 May 2023. Retrieved 19 March 2023.
52. Burns, Robert; Yen, Hope (10 April 2022). "US doubts new Russian war chief can end Moscow's floundering". AP News. Archived from the original on 5 June 2022. Retrieved 3 June 2022.
53. Psaropoulos, John (21 June 2022). "Russia resumes eastern Ukraine offensive and expands war aims". Al Jazeera Media Network. Archived from the original on 25 July 2022. Retrieved 24 July 2022.
54. "Ukraine War: Missiles hit Odesa hours after grain agreement". Sky News. YouTube. 23 July 2022. Archived from the original on 3 August 2022. Retrieved 24 July 2022.
55. "UN officials announce grain exports deal with Russia, Ukraine and Turkey". FRANCE 24. 22 July 2022. Archived from the original on 24 July 2022. Retrieved 24 July 2022.
56. Axe, David (29 July 2022). "In Southern Ukraine, Kyiv's Artillery Drops Bridges And Isolates A Whole Russian Army". Forbes. Archived from the original on 8 September 2022. Retrieved 8 September 2022.
57. "What is the Wagner Group, Russia's mercenary organisation?". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2 February 2023. Retrieved 16 March 2022. "From a legal perspective, Wagner doesn't exist," says Sorcha MacLeod
58. Osborn, Andrew (13 June 2023). "Putin backs push for mercenary groups to sign contracts despite Wagner's refusal". Reuters. Archived from the original on 22 June 2023. Retrieved 24 June 2023.
59. "Putin in crisis: Wagner chief Prigozhin declares war on Russian military leadership, says 'we will destroy everything'". POLITICO. 23 June 2023. Archived from the original on 23 June 2023. Retrieved 24 June 2023.
60. Regan, Helen; Raine, Andrew (24 June 2023). "Russia accuses Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin of urging "armed rebellion": Live updates". CNN. Archived from the original on 24 June 2023. Retrieved 24 June 2023.
61. Bourke, Latika (24 June 2023). "Live updates: Putin vows to defend Russia against Wagner rebellion". The Sydney Morning Herald. Archived from the original on 24 June 2023. Retrieved 24 June 2023.
62. "General Cavoli notes Russia's adaptation to challenges in war against Ukraine". Interfax-Ukraine. 10 July 2024. Archived from the original on 13 July 2024. Retrieved 25 July 2024.
63. "Russian military replaced Ukraine battlefield losses 'far faster' than expected, general warns". POLITICO. 11 April 2024. Archived from the original on 13 July 2024. Retrieved 25 July 2024.
64. "A Methodology for Degrading the Arms of the Russian Federation". Royal United Services Institute. 26 June 2024. Retrieved 25 July 2024.
65. Harding, Luke; Mamo, Alessio (24 July 2024). "'I know we will win – and how': Ukraine's top general on turning the tables against Russia". the Guardian. Retrieved 25 July 2024.
66. Axe, David (22 March 2024). "Russia's Golf Cart Troops Don't Stand A Chance". Forbes. Retrieved 3 November 2024.
67. Atlamazoglou, Stavros (17 July 2024). "Desperate Measures: Russian Forces Use Golf Carts in Ukraine Assault". The National Interest. Retrieved 3 November 2024.
68. Axe, David (2 June 2024). "Russia's Mad Max War Bikes Are A Bad Idea". Forbes. Retrieved 3 November 2024.
69. Odom 1998, p. 27.
70. "Военная полиция появится в России 1 декабря 2012 года". Interfax (in Russian). 3 July 2012. Archived from the original on 23 October 2021. Retrieved 22 April 2022.
71. "Putin gives Russian army a political wing". Times of Malta. 31 July 2018. Archived from the original on 6 May 2022. Retrieved 12 December 2021.
72. Wallace, Andrew (27 May 2010). "New military command structure and outsourcing initiatives". THE ISCIP ANALYST (Russian Federation) an Analytical Review. XVI (13). Boston University. Archived from the original on 21 October 2012.
73. "Северный флот России получил статус военного округа". Interfax (in Russian). 1 January 2021. Archived from the original on 20 January 2022. Retrieved 16 September 2021.
74. Golts, Alexsander (20 July 2010). "3 Heads are worse than one". The Moscow Times. Archived from the original on 22 July 2010.
75. Кадровые изменения в Вооружённых Силах [Staffing changes in the Armed Forces] (in Russian). Presidential Administration of Russia. 9 January 2011. Archived from the original on 12 January 2011. Retrieved 23 March 2014.
76. Odom 1998.
77. Politkovskaya, Anna (2007). Putin's Russia: Life in a Failing Democracy. Henry Holt and Company. p. 2. ISBN 978-1-4299-3915-7. Archived from the original on 28 October 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2015.
78. Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 December 2003, p.25.
79. "History of Russian Armed Forces started with biggest military redeployment ever". Pravda. 7 May 2007. Archived from the original on 12 May 2007.
80. Giles, Keir (2006). Where have all the soldiers gone?: Russia's military plans versus demographic reality. Conflict Studies Research Centre. ISBN 978-1-905058-92-1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 June 2019. Retrieved 14 April 2017: Explores some of the challenges of the March 2007 transition to the new approach to deployment.
81. "Recruitment: New Personnel Policy". Russian Ministry of Defence. Archived from the original on 23 August 2006.
82. "Azeris attracted to serve in Russian army." BBC Worldwide Monitoring. (Originally in the Azerbaijani paper Echo.) 14 March 2005. (Via Lexis-Nexis, 27 July 2005).
83. Henry Ivanov, Quality not quantity: Country Briefing: Russia, Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 December 2003, p.25
84. Okorokova, Lidia (25 November 2010). "Russia's new Foreign Legion". The Moscow News. Archived from the original on 17 July 2011. Retrieved 24 March 2014.
85. "Now you can join the 'Russian Foreign Legion'". info-wars.org. 29 November 2010. Archived from the original on 14 November 2011.
86. "Foreign citizens serving in the Russian army under contract to be able to obtain citizenship of Russia under a simplified procedure". The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. 20 September 2022. Archived from the original on 12 April 2023. Retrieved 13 April 2023.
87. "Russian Defense Chief Promises Soldiers Showers by Year End". RIA.ru. 4 February 2013. Archived from the original on 11 October 2016. Retrieved 18 May 2014.
88. Interfax. “Number of Women Serving for Russian Armed Forces down by Nearly Two Thirds in 5 Years.” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 6 March 2013, via EbascoHost and WP:TWL.
89. О внесении изменения в статью 34 Федерального закона "О воинской обязанности и военной службе" [On amendments to the article 34 of the Federal Law "About military duty and military service"] (Federal Law 147-FZ) (in Russian). State Duma. 28 May 2022.
90. "Путин подписал закон об отмене возрастного предела для контрактников" (in Russian). Interfax. 28 May 2022. Archived from the original on 9 June 2022. Retrieved 9 June 2022.
91. Cole, Brendan (14 November 2024). "Putin slashes soldiers' payouts as Russia's losses in Ukraine skyrocket". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 16 November 2024. Retrieved 17 November 2024.
92. "Russia to Reduce Payments for Soldiers Wounded in War". Bloomberg.com. 14 November 2024. Retrieved 17 November 2024.
93. Golts, Alexander (2017). Военная реформа и российский милитаризм [Military reform and Russian militarism] (PDF) (in Russian). Uppsala: Kph Trycksaksbolaget AB. p. 143. ISBN 978-91-554-9936-5. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 March 2022. Retrieved 9 March 2022.
94. ^ Об утверждении Порядка и условий приёма в образовательные организации высшего образования, находящиеся в ведении Министерства обороны Российской Федерации (Order 185) (in Russian). Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. 7 April 2015. "Об утверждении Порядка и условий приема в образовательные организации высшего образования, находящиеся в ведении Министерства обороны Российской Федерации от 07 апреля 2015 - docs.CNTD.ru". Archived from the original on 13 March 2022. Retrieved 26 April 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
95. Об организации деятельности адъюнктуры военных образовательных организаций высшего образования, организаций дополнительного профессионального образования и научных организаций Министерства обороны Российской Федерации (Order 6) (in Russian). Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. 18 January 2016. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Приказ Министр обороны Дата принятия 18.01.2016 Номер начина". Archived from the original on 13 March 2022. Retrieved 26 April 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
96. Об утверждении Положения о порядке пребывания граждан Российской Федерации в мобилизационном людском резерве (Decree 933) (in Russian). Government of Russia. 3 September 2015. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Дата принятия 03.09.2015 Номер начинается на '933'". Archived from the original on 28 July 2020. Retrieved 26 April 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
97. Vorobyeva, Olga (8 October 2017). "Под ружьё по первому зову". Krasnaya Zvezda (in Russian). Archived from the original on 22 January 2021. Retrieved 14 March 2020.
98. ^ Stepovoy, Bogdan; Ramm, Alexey; Andreev, Yevgeniy (13 February 2018). "В резерв по контракту". Izvestia (in Russian). Archived from the original on 13 February 2018. Retrieved 14 March 2020.
99. О создании мобилизационного людского резерва Вооружённых Сил Российской Федерации (Decree 370) (in Russian). President of Russia. 17 July 2015. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Указ Президент Дата принятия 17.07.2015 Номер начинается на". Archived from the original on 17 September 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
100. "Как оплачивается период нахождения на военных сборах?". Argumenty i Fakty (in Russian). 20 November 2019. Archived from the original on 25 November 2019. Retrieved 14 March 2020.
101. Chuprin, Konstantin (2009). Taras, Anatoliy (ed.). Вооружённые силы стран СНГ и Балтии. Справочник [Armed forces of CIS countries and Baltic states. Handbook] (in Russian). Moscow: Современная школа. ISBN 978-985-513-617-1.
102. ^ Gavrilov, Yuriy (4 April 2014). "Военным добавили пять лет". Rossiyskaya Gazeta (in Russian). Archived from the original on 31 March 2019. Retrieved 14 March 2020.
103. ^ "Федеральный закон от 2 апреля 2014 года №64-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в статьи 49 и 53 Федерального закона "О воинской обязанности и военной службе""". Rossiyskaya Gazeta (in Russian). 4 April 2014. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 14 March 2020.
104. Troshev, Gennady (2001). Моя война. Чеченский дневник окопного генерала [My war. Chechen diary of trench general] (in Russian). Moscow: Вагриус. ISBN 5-264-00657-1.
105. Karamayev, Sergey (1 July 2005). "Чем меньше кафедр — тем крепче оборона. Министерство обороны хочет закрыть военные кафедры в российских вузах". Lenta.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 20 February 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
106. ^ "Названы вузы, в которых создадут военные центры". RBK (in Russian). 11 March 2008. Archived from the original on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
107. Об обучении граждан Российской Федерации по программе военной подготовки в федеральных государственных образовательных организациях высшего образования (Decree 152) (in Russian). Government of Russia. 6 March 2008. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Постановление Правительство Дата принятия 06.03.2008 Номер начинается на '152'". Archived from the original on 6 May 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2021."Законодательство России. Поиск: Постановление Правительство Дата принятия 06.03.2008 Номер начинается на '152'". Archived from the original on 6 May 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
108. О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в связи с сокращением срока военной службы по призыву (Federal Law 104-FZ) (in Russian). State Duma. 6 July 2006. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Федеральный закон Дата принятия 06.07.2006 Номер начинается". Archived from the original on 6 May 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)"Законодательство России. Поиск: Федеральный закон Дата принятия 06.07.2006 Номер начинается". Archived from the original on 6 May 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
109. Polunin, Sergey (25 December 2020). "Положение о мобилизационном резерве Вооружённых Сил Российской Федерации и что это". Militaryarms.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
110. О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части совершенствования военной подготовки студентов федеральных государственных образовательных организаций высшего образования (Federal Law 309-FZ) (in Russian). State Duma. 3 August 2018. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Федеральный закон Дата принятия 03.08.2018 Номер начинается". Archived from the original on 11 September 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
111. Об утверждении Положения о военных учебных центрах при федеральных государственных образовательных организациях высшего образования и о признании утратившими силу некоторых актов Правительства Российской Федерации (Decree 848) (in Russian). Government of Russia. 3 July 2019. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Постановление Правительство Дата принятия 03.07.2019 Номер н". Archived from the original on 11 September 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
112. Order 427-R (in Russian). Government of Russia. 13 March 2019. "Законодательство России. Поиск: Распоряжение Правительство Дата принятия 13.03.2019 Номер на". Archived from the original on 11 September 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
113. Gavrilov, Yuriy (15 March 2019). "Лейтенант из института. Определены вузы для военной подготовки студентов". Rossiyskaya Gazeta (in Russian). Archived from the original on 11 September 2021. Retrieved 11 September 2021.
114. McCarthy, Simone; Picheta, Rob (21 September 2022). "Russia announces immediate 'partial mobilization' of citizens, escalating its invasion of Ukraine". CNN. Archived from the original on 21 September 2022. Retrieved 21 September 2022.
115. Austin, Greg; Alexey Muraviev (2000). The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia. London, New York: I.B. Tauris. p. 155. ISBN 1-86064-485-6.
116. FBIS: Informatsionno-Analiticheskoye Agentstvo Marketing i Konsalting, 14 March 2006, "Russia: Assessment, Adm Baltin Interview, Opinion Poll on State of Armed Forces".
117. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, previous editions
118. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006, Routledge, p.153
119. Keir Giles, Military Service in Russia: No New Model Army, Conflict Studies Research Centre, May 2007
120. Коррупция 'забирает треть военного бюджета России' [Corruption 'takes away a third of Russia's military budget'] (in Russian). BBC. 3 July 2008. Archived from the original on 3 February 2017. Retrieved 14 April 2017.
121. "Russian defense budget may rise 25% in 2009". USA Today. Associated Press. 19 September 2008. Archived from the original on 20 September 2008.
122. "Russia boosts defense budget to record $50 Billion". Turkish Daily News. 12 September 2008. Archived from the original on 19 September 2008.
123. "Defense procurement budget". cnguy.com. 17 February 2009.
124. Leander Schaerlaeckens, "Russian budget cuts could impact EU defense market" Archived 4 May 2009 at the Wayback Machine, UPI (23 February 2009).
125. "Russia to spend over 100 billion on nuclear weapons". English.pravda.ru. 18 October 2012. Archived from the original on 18 October 2012. Retrieved 23 March 2014.
126. "Russia to Up Nuclear Weapons Spending 50% by 2016". RIA Novosti. 8 October 2013. Archived from the original on 8 October 2013. Retrieved 1 March 2014.
127. "Russian military spending falls, could affect operations: Think-tank". Reuters. 2 May 2018. Archived from the original on 22 July 2018. Retrieved 22 July 2018.
128. "Defense World". Archived from the original on 12 July 2022. Retrieved 17 May 2022.
129. "ЦАМТО / / Владимир Путин: расходы на оборону и безопасность возросли вдвое и составляют сейчас около 6% ВВП". Archived from the original on 7 October 2023. Retrieved 7 October 2023.
130. CHAPTER 2 - INVESTING IN RUSSIAN DEFENSE CONVERSION: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES Archived 22 December 2015 at the Wayback Machine Federation of American Scientists, fas.org
131. Harding, Luke; Traynor, Ian (8 February 2007). "Big rise in Russian military spending raises fears of new challenge to west". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 16 October 2013.
132. Rusakova, Tatyana (13 January 2016). "What's new with the Russian army?". RBTH. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
133. "Ballerinas, puppets inspire names of Russian arms". RBTH. 4 September 2013. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 30 August 2017.
134. Litovkin, Nikolai (14 September 2016). "Army 2016 forum: Top 8 newest Russian weapons". Russia Beyond. RBTH. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 3 September 2017.
135. Egorov, Boris (12 July 2017). "A farewell to traditional arms: Russia develops weapons for the future". RBTH. Archived from the original on 9 September 2017. Retrieved 3 September 2017.
136. Moscow Defence Brief #1, 2011
137. Faulconbridge, Guy (24 May 2011). "Russia says a fifth of defense budget stolen". Reuters. Archived from the original on 14 April 2017. Retrieved 13 April 2017.
138. "The Russian Military's Debacle in Ukraine". The New Yorker. 11 March 2022. Archived from the original on 23 March 2022. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
139. "Вооруженные Силы в 2018 году приняли на вооружение 56 видов новой техники". RIA Novosti. 15 December 2018. Archived from the original on 17 December 2019. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
140. ^ "Janes | Latest defence and security news". Janes.com. Archived from the original on 6 September 2020. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
141. "СМИ: военные закупили планшеты с операционкой 'Аврора'". Военное.РФ. 2 February 2023. Archived from the original on 29 May 2023. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
142. "СМИ узнали о разработке линейки новых высокоточных авиабомб для ВКС России". Военное.РФ. 14 March 2023. Archived from the original on 28 October 2023. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
143. Barnes, Julian E.; Schmitt, Eric; Gibbons-Neff, Thomas (13 September 2023). "Russia Overcomes Sanctions to Expand Missile Production, Officials Say". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 16 September 2023. Retrieved 15 September 2023.
144. "Ukraine is firing shells faster than can be supplied. Can Europe catch up?". 17 September 2023. Archived from the original on 10 October 2023. Retrieved 23 October 2023.
145. "ЦАМТО / / На Камчатке запустили производство дронов-камикадзе". Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 25 September 2023.
146. "ЦАМТО / / Хабаровский радиотехнический завод представил свои первые БЛА для СВО". Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 25 September 2023.
147. "ЦАМТО / / Владимир Путин провел в Ижевске заседание Военно-промышленной комиссии". Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 25 September 2023.
148. Новости, РИА (26 January 2024). "Поставки новой техники в армию в 2023 году составили 98,8 процента от плана". РИА Новости (in Russian). Archived from the original on 12 March 2024. Retrieved 12 March 2024.
149. Новости, РИА (26 January 2024). "ВМФ в 2023 году получил более 7,7 тысячи единиц средств поражения". РИА Новости (in Russian). Archived from the original on 12 March 2024. Retrieved 12 March 2024.
150. Новости, РИА (26 January 2024). "Армия в 2023 году получила 3,5 тысячи отечественных беспилотников". РИА Новости (in Russian). Archived from the original on 20 June 2024. Retrieved 12 March 2024.
151. Новости, РИА (26 January 2024). "Российские Сухопутные войска за год получили шесть комплектов систем ПВО". РИА Новости (in Russian). Archived from the original on 12 March 2024. Retrieved 12 March 2024.
152. Lillis, Katie Bo; Bertrand, Natasha; Liebermann, Oren; Britzky, Haley (11 March 2024). "CNN Politics". CNN. Archived from the original on 16 March 2024. Retrieved 12 March 2024.
153. "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance". Armscontrol.org. January 2017. Archived from the original on 24 January 2018. Retrieved 13 April 2017.
154. ^ "Президент России". kremlin.ru. Archived from the original on 20 February 2011. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
155. Solovyov, Dmitry (11 September 2007). "Russia tests superstrength bomb, military says". Reuters. Archived from the original on 18 June 2020. Retrieved 17 June 2020.

References

• Austin, Greg; Muraviev, Alexey (2000). The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia. London; New York: I. B. Tauris. ISBN 1-86064-485-6.
• Andrew Bowen, "Russian Armed Forces: Capabilities" ( Archived 23 September 2021 at the Wayback Machine), Congressional Research Service, 30 June 2020.
• Keir Giles (May 2007), Military Service in Russia: No New Model Army Archived 25 March 2024 at the Wayback Machine, Conflict Studies Research Centre, ISBN 1905962169
• "How Are the Mighty Fallen" Archived 24 March 2024 at the Wayback Machine. The Economist. 2–8 July 2005. pp. 45–46.
• IISS (25 February 2021). The Military Balance 2021. London: Routledge. ISBN 9781032012278. Archived from the original on 21 January 2022. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
• International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various editions
• Massicot, Dara. "What Russia Got Wrong"( Archived 9 February 2023 at the Wayback Machine), Foreign Affairs, 2023
• Odom, William E. (1998). The Collapse of the Soviet Military. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-07469-7.
• Russia Creates Unique Rifle That Can Shoot at Four Kilometres RNS, November 2016
• "The United States leads upward trend in arms exports, Asian and Gulf states arms imports up, says SIPRI". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 16 March 2015. Archived from the original on 9 April 2016. Retrieved 13 April 2017.

Further reading

• Bowen, Andrew (2017). "Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine". Journal of Strategic Studies. 42 (3–4): 312–343. doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1413550. ISSN 0140-2390. S2CID 158522112.
• Galeotti, Mark, "Organised crime and Russian security forces: mafiya, militia and militar", Journal of Conflict, Security and Development, issue 1:2, 2001.
• Ivanov, Henry, "Country Briefing: Russia—Austere Deterrence", Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 April 2006
• Lehrke, Jesse Paul (2013). The Transition to National Armies in the Former Soviet Republics, 1988-2005. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-10886-1.
• Pynnöniemi, K., "Russia's Defence Reform: Assessing the real 'Serdyukov heritage'" (Archived 22 September 2013 at the Wayback Machine), FIIA Briefing Paper 126, 26 March 2013, Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
• Tian, Nan; Fleurant, Aude; Kuimova, Alexandra; Wezeman, Pieter D.; Wezeman, Siemon T. (27 April 2020). "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2019" (PDF). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 8 January 2020.
• Turbiville, G., "Organized crime and the Russian Armed Forces", Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 1, issue 4, 1995, pp. 55–73. OCLC 4769433034.
• Waters, T., "Crime in the Russian Military", CSRC Paper C90, Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 1996.

External links

• Russian Ministry of Defense Archived 4 June 2020 at the Wayback Machine (in English)

• Russian Armed Forces