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Space Launch System

SLS Block 1 with the Orion spacecraft launching from Pad 39B
Function	Super heavy-lift launch vehicle
Manufacturer	Aerojet Rocketdyne Boeing Northrop Grumman United Launch Alliance
Country of origin	United States
Project cost	US$26.4 billion
Cost per launch	US$2.5 billion
Cost per year	US$2.6 billion (FY23)
Size
Height	Block 1: 98 m (322 ft) Block 1B/2: 111 m (365 ft)
Diameter	8.4 m (27.6 ft)
Mass	2,610,000 kg (5,750,000 lb)
Stages	2½
Maximum thrust	Block 1: 39 MN (8,800,000 lbf) Block 1B: 40 MN (8,900,000 lbf) Block 2: 42 MN (9,500,000 lbf)
Capacity
Payload to LEO
Altitude	200 km (120 mi)
Orbital inclination	28.5°
Mass	Block 1: 70,000 kg (150,000 lb) Block 1B: 105,000 kg (231,000 lb) Block 2: 130,000 kg (290,000 lb)
Payload to TLI
Mass	Block 1: >27,000 kg (59,500 lb) Block 1B: 42,000 kg (92,500 lb) Block 2: >46,000 kg (101,400 lb)
Associated rockets
Based on	Ares V Delta IV Space Shuttle
Comparable	Energia Falcon Heavy Long March 9 N1 Saturn V Starship
Launch history
Status	Active
Launch sites	Kennedy, LC-39B
Total launches	1
Success(es)	1
First flight	16 November 2022, 06:47:44 UTC (1:47:44 am EST)
Type of passengers/cargo	Orion
Stage info Boosters (Block 1/1B) No. boosters 2 × five-segment Solid Rocket Boosters Height 54 m (177 ft) Diameter 3.7 m (12 ft) Gross mass 730,000 kg (1,600,000 lb) Maximum thrust SL: 14.6 MN (3,280,000 lbf) vac: 16 MN (3,600,000 lbf) Total thrust SL: 29.2 MN (6,560,000 lbf) vac: 32 MN (7,200,000 lbf) Specific impulse 269 s (2.64 km/s) Burn time 126 seconds Propellant PBAN, APCP First stage – Core Height 64.6 m (212 ft) Diameter 8.4 m (28 ft) Empty mass 97,940 kg (215,910 lb) Gross mass 1,085,410 kg (2,392,910 lb) Propellant mass LH2: 144,000 kg (317,000 lb) LOX: 840,000 kg (1,860,000 lb) Powered by 4 × RS-25 Maximum thrust SL: 7.4 MN (1,672,000 lbf) vac: 9.1 MN (2,049,200 lbf) Specific impulse SL: 366 s (3.59 km/s) vac: 452 s (4.43 km/s) Burn time 480 seconds Propellant LH2 / LOX Second stage (Block 1) – ICPS Height 13.7 m (45 ft) Diameter 5 m (16 ft) (LH2 tank) 3.2 m (10 ft) (LOX tank) Empty mass 3,490 kg (7,690 lb) Gross mass 32,066 kg (70,693 lb) Powered by 1 × RL10 Maximum thrust 110.1 kN (24,800 lbf) Specific impulse 465.5 s (4.565 km/s) Burn time 1,125 seconds Propellant LH2 / LOX Second stage (Block 1B/2) – EUS Height 17.3 m (57 ft) Diameter 8.4 m (28 ft) (LH2 tank) 5.5 m (18 ft) (LOX tank) Propellant mass 129,000 kg (284,000 lb) Powered by 4 × RL10C-3 Maximum thrust 433.1 kN (97,360 lbf) Specific impulse 460.1 s (4.512 km/s) Burn time 1,275 seconds Propellant LH2 / LOX
[edit on Wikidata]

The Space Launch System (SLS) is an American super heavy-lift expendable launch vehicle used by NASA. As the primary launch vehicle of the Artemis Moon landing program, SLS is designed to launch the crewed Orion spacecraft on a trans-lunar trajectory. The first (and so far only) SLS launch was the uncrewed Artemis I, which took place on 16 November 2022.

Development of SLS began in 2011 as a replacement for the retiring Space Shuttle as well as the canceled Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles. SLS was built using existing Shuttle technology, including solid rocket boosters and RS-25 engines. The rocket has been criticized for its political motivations, seen as a way to preserve jobs and contracts for aerospace companies involved in the Shuttle program at great expense to NASA. The project has faced significant challenges, including mismanagement, substantial budget overruns, and significant delays. The first Congressionally mandated launch in late 2016 was delayed by nearly six years.

All Space Launch System flights are to be launched from Launch Complex 39B at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The first three SLS flights are expected to use the Block 1 configuration, comprising a core stage, extended Space Shuttle boosters developed for Ares I and the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) upper stage. The improved Block 1B configuration, with the powerful and purpose-built Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), is planned to be introduced on the fourth flight; a further improved Block 2 configuration with new solid rocket boosters is planned for the ninth flight. After the launch of Artemis IV, NASA plans to transfer production and launch operations of SLS to Deep Space Transport LLC, a joint venture between Boeing and Northrop Grumman.

Description

The SLS is a Space Shuttle-derived launch vehicle. The rocket's first stage is powered by one central core stage and two outboard solid rocket boosters. All SLS Blocks share a common core stage design but differ in their upper stages and boosters.

Core stage

Together with the solid rocket boosters, the core stage is responsible for propelling the upper stage and payload out of the atmosphere to near orbital velocity. It contains the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tanks for the ascent phase, the forward and aft solid rocket booster attach points, avionics, and the Main Propulsion System (MPS), an assembly of the four RS-25 engines, associated plumbing and hydraulic gimbal actuators, and equipment for autogenous pressurization of the vehicle's tanks. The core stage provides approximately 25% of the vehicle's thrust at liftoff, the rest coming from the solid rocket boosters.

The stage measures 213 ft (65 m) long by 28 ft (8.4 m) in diameter and is visually similar to the Space Shuttle external tank. It is made mostly of 2219 aluminum alloy, and contains numerous improvements to manufacturing processes, including friction stir welding for the barrel sections, and integrated milling for the stringers. The first four flights will each use and expend four of the remaining sixteen RS-25D engines previously flown on Space Shuttle missions. Aerojet Rocketdyne refits these engines with modernized engine controllers, higher throttle limits, as well as insulation for the high temperatures the engine section will experience due to their position adjacent to the solid rocket boosters. Later flights will switch to an RS-25 variant optimized for expended use, the RS-25E, which will lower per-engine costs by over 30%. The thrust of each RS-25D engine has been increased from 492,000 lbf (2,188 kN), as on the Space Shuttle, to 513,000 lbf (2,281 kN) on the sixteen modernized engines. The RS-25E will further increase per-engine thrust to 522,000 lbf (2,321 kN).

Solid Rocket Boosters

Shuttle derived

Blocks 1 and 1B of the SLS will use two five-segment solid rocket boosters. They use casing segments that were flown on Shuttle missions as parts of the four-segment Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters. They possess an additional center segment, new avionics, and lighter insulation, but lack a parachute recovery system, as they will not be recovered after launch. The propellants for the solid rocket boosters are aluminum powder, which is very reactive, and ammonium perchlorate, a powerful oxidizer. They are held together by a binder, polybutadiene acrylonitrile (PBAN). The mixture has the consistency of a rubber eraser and is packed into each segment. The five-segment solid rocket boosters provide approximately 25% more total impulse than the Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters.

BOLE

The stock of SLS Block 1 to 1B boosters is limited by the number of casings left over from the Shuttle program, which allows for eight flights of the SLS. On 2 March 2019, the Booster Obsolescence and Life Extension program was announced, with the goal of developing new solid rocket boosters for SLS Block 2. These boosters will be built by Northrop Grumman Space Systems, and will be derived from the composite-casing solid rocket boosters then in development for the canceled OmegA launch vehicle, and are projected to increase Block 2's payload to 290,000 lb (130 t) to low Earth orbit (LEO) and at least 101,000 lb (46 t) to trans-lunar injection. As of July 2021, the BOLE program is under development, with first firing expected in 2024.

Upper stages

Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage

The Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) is a temporary upper stage for Block 1 versions of SLS, built by United Launch Alliance, a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The ICPS is essentially an "off-the-shelf" Delta Cryogenic Second Stage, with minimal modifications for SLS integration. The ICPS is intended as a temporary solution and slated to be replaced on the Block 1B version of the SLS by the next-generation Exploration Upper Stage, under design by Boeing.

The ICPS used on the Artemis I mission was powered by a single RL10B-2 engine, while the ICPS for Artemis II and Artemis III will use the RL10C-2 variant. Block 1 is intended to be capable of lifting 209,000 lb (95 t) to low Earth orbit (LEO) in this configuration, including the weight of the ICPS as part of the payload. At the time of SLS core stage separation, Artemis I was travelling on an initial 1,806 by 30 km (1,122 by 19 mi) transatmospheric orbital trajectory. This trajectory ensured safe disposal of the core stage. ICPS then performed orbital insertion and a subsequent translunar injection burn to send Orion towards the Moon. The ICPS will be human-rated for the crewed Artemis II and III flights.

The SLS Block 1 has a conical frustum-shaped interstage called the Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter between the core stage and the ICPS. It consists of sixteen aluminum-lithium panels made of 2195 aluminum alloy. Teledyne Brown Engineering is its builder. The first one cost $60 million, and the next two cost $85 million together.

Exploration Upper Stage

The Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) is planned to first fly on Artemis IV. The EUS will complete the SLS ascent phase and then re-ignite to send its payload to destinations beyond LEO. It is expected to be used by Block 1B and Block 2. The EUS shares the core stage diameter of 8.4 meters, and will be powered by four RL10C-3 engines. It will eventually be upgraded to use four improved RL10C-X engines. As of March 2022, Boeing is developing a new composite-based fuel tank for the EUS that would increase Block 1B's overall payload mass capacity to TLI by 40 percent. The improved upper stage was originally named the Dual Use Upper Stage (DUUS, pronounced "duce"), but was later renamed the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS).

Block variants

Development

Funding

During the joint Senate-NASA presentation in September 2011, it was stated that the SLS program had a projected development cost of US$18 billion through 2017, with $10 billion for the SLS rocket, $6 billion for the Orion spacecraft, and $2 billion for upgrades to the launch pad and other facilities at Kennedy Space Center. These costs and schedules were considered optimistic in an independent 2011 cost assessment report by Booz Allen Hamilton for NASA. An internal 2011 NASA document estimated the cost of the program through 2025 to total at least $41 billion for four 209,000 lb (95 t) launches (1 uncrewed, 3 crewed), with the 290,000 lb (130 t) version ready no earlier than 2030. The Human Exploration Framework Team estimated unit costs for 'Block 0' at $1.6 billion and Block 1 at $1.86 billion in 2010. However, since these estimates were made, the Block 0 SLS vehicle was dropped in late 2011, and the design was not completed.

In September 2012, an SLS deputy project manager stated that $500 million is a reasonable target average cost per flight for the SLS program. In 2013, the Space Review estimated the cost per launch at $5 billion, depending on the rate of launches. NASA announced in 2013 that the European Space Agency will build the Orion service module. In August 2014, as the SLS program passed its Key Decision Point C review and was deemed ready to enter full development, costs from February 2014 until its planned launch in September 2018 were estimated at $7.021 billion. Ground systems modifications and construction would require an additional $1.8 billion over the same time.

In October 2018, NASA's Inspector General reported that the Boeing core stage contract had made up 40% of the $11.9 billion spent on the SLS as of August 2018. By 2021, development of the core stage was expected to have cost $8.9 billion, twice the initially planned amount. In December 2018, NASA estimated that yearly budgets for the SLS will range from $2.1 to $2.3 billion between 2019 and 2023.

In March 2019, the Trump administration released its fiscal year 2020 budget request for NASA, which notably proposed dropped funding for the Block 1B and Block 2 variants of SLS. Congressional action ultimately included the funding in the passed budget. One Gateway component that had been previously planned for the SLS Block 1B is expected to fly on the SpaceX Falcon Heavy rocket.

On 1 May 2020, NASA awarded a contract extension to Aerojet Rocketdyne to manufacture 18 additional RS-25 engines with associated services for $1.79 billion, bringing the total RS-25 contract value to almost $3.5 billion.

Budget

NASA has spent $26.4 billion on SLS development since 2011, through 2023, in nominal dollars. This is equivalent to $32 billion in 2024 dollars using the NASA New Start Inflation Indices.

In 2024, the US Congress approved "up to" $2,600 million for the NASA Space Launch System.

In January 2024 NASA announced plans for a first crewed flight of the Orion spacecraft on the SLS, the Artemis II mission, no earlier than September 2025.

Included in the above SLS costs above are (1) the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), a $412 million contract and (2) the costs of developing the Exploration Upper Stage (below).

Excluded from the SLS cost above are the costs to assemble, integrate, prepare and launch the SLS and its payloads, funded separately in the NASA Exploration Ground Systems, currently at about $600 million per year, and anticipated to stay there through at least the first four launches of SLS. Also excluded are payloads that launch on the SLS, such as the Orion crew capsule, the predecessor programs that contributed to the development of the SLS, such as the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle project, funded from 2008 to 2010 for a total of $70 million, and the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, funded from 2006 to 2010 for a total of $4.8 billion in development, including the 5-segment Solid Rocket Boosters used on the SLS.

Early plans

The SLS was created by an act of the U.S. Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, Public Law 111–267, in which NASA was directed to create a system for launching payloads and crew into space that would replace the capabilities lost with the retirement of the Space Shuttle. The act set out certain goals, such as being able to lift 70–100 tons into low earth orbit with evolvability to 130 tons, a target date of 31 December 2016 for the system to be fully operational, and a directive to use "to the extent practicable" existing components, hardware, and workforce from the Space Shuttle and from Ares I.

On 14 September 2011, NASA announced their plan to meet these requirements: the design for the SLS, with the Orion spacecraft as payload.

The SLS has considered several future development routes of potential launch configurations, with the planned evolution of the blocks of the rocket having been modified many times. Many options, all of which just needed to meet the congressionally mandated payload minimums, were considered, including a Block 0 variant with three main engines, a variant with five main engines, a Block 1A variant with upgraded boosters instead of the improved second stage, and a Block 2 with five main engines plus the Earth Departure Stage, with up to three J-2X engines.

In the initial announcement of the design of the SLS, NASA also announced an "Advanced Booster Competition", to select which boosters would be used on Block 2 of the SLS. Several companies proposed boosters for this competition, all of which were indicated as viable: Aerojet and Teledyne Brown proposed three booster engines each with dual combustion chambers, Alliant Techsystems proposed a modified solid rocket booster with lighter casing, more energetic propellant, and four segments instead of five, and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne and Dynetics proposed a liquid-fueled booster named Pyrios. However, this competition was planned for a development plan in which Block 1A would be followed by Block 2A, with upgraded boosters. NASA canceled Block 1A and the planned competition in April 2014, in favor of simply remaining with the Ares I's five-segment solid rocket boosters, themselves modified from the Space Shuttle's solid rocket boosters, until at least the late 2020s. The overly powerful advanced booster would have resulted in unsuitably high acceleration, and would need modifications to Launch Complex 39B, its flame trench, and Mobile Launcher.

On 31 July 2013, the SLS passed Preliminary Design Review. The review included not only the rocket and boosters but also ground support and logistical arrangements.

On 7 August 2014, the SLS Block 1 passed a milestone known as Key Decision Point C and entered full-scale development, with an estimated launch date of November 2018.

EUS options

In 2013, NASA and Boeing analyzed the performance of several Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) engine options. The analysis was based on a second-stage usable propellant load of 105 metric tons, and compared stages with four RL10 engines, two MARC-60 engines, or one J-2X engine. In 2014, NASA also considered using the European Vinci instead of the RL10, which offered the same specific impulse but with 64% greater thrust, which would allow for the same performance at a lower cost.

In 2018, Blue Origin submitted a proposal to replace the EUS with a cheaper alternative to be designed and fabricated by the company, but it was rejected by NASA in November 2019 on multiple grounds; these included lower performance compared to the existing EUS design, incompatibility of the proposal with the height of the door of the Vehicle Assembly Building being only 390 feet (120 m), and unacceptable acceleration of Orion components such as its solar panels due to the higher thrust of the engines being used for the fuel tank.

SRB tests

From 2009 to 2011, three full-duration static fire tests of five-segment solid rocket boosters were conducted under the Constellation Program, including tests at low and high core temperatures, to validate performance at extreme temperatures. The 5-segment solid rocket booster would be carried over to SLS. Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems has completed full-duration static fire tests of the five-segment solid rocket boosters. Qualification Motor 1 was tested on 10 March 2015. Qualification Motor 2 was successfully tested on 28 June 2016.

Launch costs

NASA has been reluctant to provide an official per-flight cost estimate for the SLS. However, independent agencies, such as the White House Office of Management and Budget and the NASA Office of Inspector General, have offered their own estimates.

A White House Office of Management and Budget letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee in October 2019 estimated that SLS's total cost to the taxpayer was estimated at "over $2 billion" per launch. When questioned by a journalist, a NASA spokesperson did not deny this per-flight cost estimate.

The NASA Office of Inspector General has conducted several audits of the SLS program. A November 2021 report estimated that, at least for the first four launches of Artemis program, the per-launch production and operating costs would be $2.2 billion for SLS, plus $568 million for Exploration Ground Systems. Additionally, the payload would cost $1 billion for Orion and $300 million for the European Service Module. An October 2023 report found that recurring production costs for SLS, excluding development and integration costs, are estimated to be at least $2.5 billion per launch.

NASA has said that it is working with Boeing to bring down the cost of SLS launches and that a higher launch frequency could potentially lead to economies of scale, and would allow fixed costs to be spread out over more launches. However, the NASA Office of Inspector General has called NASA's cost savings goals highly unrealistic and other potential government customers have made it clear they have no interest in using SLS.

Operation

Construction

As of 2020, three SLS versions are planned: Block 1, Block 1B, and Block 2. Each will use the same Core stage with its four main engines, but Block 1B will feature the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), and Block 2 will combine the EUS with upgraded boosters.

The ICPS for Artemis 1 was delivered by ULA to NASA about July 2017 and was housed at Kennedy Space Center as of November 2018.

Construction of core stage

In mid-November 2014, construction of the first core stage hardware began using a new friction stir welding system in the South Vertical Assembly Building at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility. Between 2015 and 2017, NASA test fired RS-25 engines in preparation for use on SLS.

The core stage for the first SLS, built at Michoud Assembly Facility by Boeing, had all four engines attached in November 2019, and it was declared finished by NASA in December 2019.

The first core stage left Michoud Assembly Facility for comprehensive testing at Stennis Space Center in January 2020. The static firing test program at Stennis Space Center, known as the Green Run, operated all the core stage systems simultaneously for the first time. Test 7 (of 8), the wet dress rehearsal, was carried out in December 2020 and the fire (test 8) took place on 16 January 2021, but shut down earlier than expected, about 67 seconds in total rather than the desired eight minutes. The reason for the early shutdown was later reported to be because of conservative test commit criteria on the thrust vector control system, specific only for ground testing and not for flight. If this scenario occurred during a flight, the rocket would have continued to fly normally. There was no sign of damage to the core stage or the engines, contrary to initial concerns.

The second fire test was completed on 18 March 2021, with all four engines igniting, throttling down as expected to simulate in-flight conditions, and gimballing profiles. The core stage was shipped to Kennedy Space Center to be mated with the rest of the rocket for Artemis I. It left Stennis on 24 April and arrived at Kennedy on 27 April. It was refurbished there in preparation for stacking. On 12 June 2021, NASA announced the assembly of the first SLS rocket was completed at the Kennedy Space Center. The assembled SLS was used for the uncrewed Artemis I mission in 2022.

The first SLS, for Artemis I, launched an Orion spacecraft into a lunar orbit on a test flight in fall 2022, and NASA and Boeing are constructing the next three rockets for Artemis II, Artemis III, and Artemis IV. Boeing stated in July 2021 that while the COVID-19 pandemic had affected their suppliers and schedules, such as delaying parts needed for hydraulics, they would still be able to provide the Artemis II SLS core stage per NASA's schedule, with months to spare. The spray-on foam insulation process for Artemis II was automated for most sections of the core stage, saving 12 days in the schedule. The Artemis II forward skirt, the foremost component of the core stage, was affixed on the liquid oxygen tank in late May 2021. By 25 September 2023 the core stage was functionally complete, as all sections were assembled and the four RS-25 engines had been installed. As of May 2023, the complete core stage was set to ship to NASA in late fall 2023, eight months later than was predicted originally. The complete core stage was delivered in July 2024. For Artemis III, assembly of elements of the thrust structure began at Michoud Assembly Facility in early 2021. The liquid hydrogen tank for Artemis III was originally planned to be the Artemis I tank, but it was set aside as the welds were found to be faulty. Repair techniques were developed, and the tank re-entered production and will be proof tested for strength, for use on Artemis III.

Construction of EUS for Block 1B

As of July 2021, Boeing is also preparing to begin construction of the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), which is planned to be used on Artemis IV.

Launches

Originally planned for late 2016, the uncrewed first flight of SLS slipped more than twenty-six times and almost six years. As of earlier that month, the first launch was originally scheduled for 8:30 am EDT, 29 August 2022. It was postponed to 2:17 pm EDT (18:17 UTC), 3 September 2022, after the launch director called a scrub due to a temperature sensor falsely indicating that an RS-25 engine's hydrogen bleed intake was too warm. The 3 September attempt was then scrubbed due to a hydrogen leak in the tail service mast quick disconnect arm, which was fixed; the next launch option was at first a period in late October and then a launch in mid-November, due to unfavorable weather during Hurricane Ian. It launched on 16 November.

NASA originally limited the amount of time the solid rocket boosters can remain stacked to "about a year" from the time two segments are joined. The first and second segments of the Artemis I boosters were joined on 7 January 2021. NASA could choose to extend the time limit based on an engineering review. On 29 September 2021, Northrop Grumman indicated that the limit could be extended to eighteen months for Artemis I, based on an analysis of the data collected when the boosters were being stacked; an analysis weeks before the actual launch date later extended that to December 2022 for the boosters of Artemis I, almost two years after stacking.

In late 2015, the SLS program was stated to have a 70% confidence level for the first Orion flight that carries crew, the second SLS flight overall, to happen by 2023; as of November 2021, NASA delayed Artemis II from 2023 to May 2024. In March 2023, NASA announced they had delayed Artemis II to November 2024, in January 2024 the mission was further delayed to September 2025, and in December 2024 it was announced that the launch was pushed back to April 2026.

Usage beyond Artemis

Efforts have been made to expand the Artemis missions to launching NASA's robotic space probes and observatories. However, SLS program officials have noted that between the launch cadence of Artemis missions and supply chain constraints, it is unlikely that rockets could be built support science missions before the late 2020s or early 2030s.

Another challenge is that the large solid-rocket boosters produce significant vibrations, which can damage sensitive scientific instruments. During wind-tunnel testing, torsional load values (a measurement of twisting and vibration) were nearly double initial estimates. Although program officials later acknowledged the issue, they expressed confidence in their ability to mitigate it.

As of October 2024, NASA has studied using SLS for Neptune Odyssey, Europa Lander, Enceladus Orbilander, Persephone, HabEx, Origins Space Telescope, LUVOIR, Lynx, and Interstellar probe.

Initially, Congress mandated that NASA use the SLS to launch the Europa Clipper probe. However, concerns about the SLS's availability led NASA to seek congressional approval for competitive launch bids. SpaceX ultimately won the contract, saving the agency an estimated US$2 billion in direct launch costs over SLS, albeit at the cost of a longer flight.

After the launch of Artemis IV, NASA plans to transfer production and launch operations of SLS to Deep Space Transport LLC, a joint venture between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The agency hopes the companies can find more buyers for flights on the rocket to bring costs per flight down to $1 billion. However, finding a market for the large and costly rocket will be difficult. Reuters reported that the US Department of Defense, long considered a potential customer, stated in 2023 that it has no interest in the rocket as other launch vehicles already offer them the capability that they need at an affordable price.

Criticism

The SLS has been criticized based on program cost, lack of commercial involvement, and non-competitiveness of legislation requiring the use of Space Shuttle components.

Funding

As the Space Shuttle program drew to a close in 2009, the Obama administration convened the Augustine Commission to assess NASA's future human spaceflight endeavors. The commission's findings were stark: NASA's proposed Ares V rocket, intended for lunar and Martian missions, was unsustainable and should be canceled. The administration further advocated for a public-private partnership, where private companies would develop and operate spacecraft, and NASA would purchase launch services on a fixed-cost basis.

The recommendations faced fierce opposition from senators representing states with significant aerospace industries. In response, in 2011, Congress mandated the development of the SLS. The program was characterized by a complex web of political compromises, ensuring that various regions and interests benefited, maintaining jobs and contracts for existing space shuttle contractors. Utah Senator Orrin Hatch ensured the new rocket used the Shuttle's solid boosters, which were manufactured in his state. Alabama Senator Richard Shelby insisted that the Marshall Space Flight Center design and test the rocket. Florida Senator Bill Nelson brought home billions of dollars to Kennedy Space Center to modernize its launch facilities.

Almost immediately, Representative Tom McClintock called on the Government Accountability Office to investigate possible violations of the Competition in Contracting Act, arguing that the requirement that Shuttle components be used on SLS were non-competitive and assured contracts to existing suppliers.

The Obama administration's 2014 budget called for canceling SLS and turning over space transportation to commercial companies. The White House sent Lori Garver, the NASA deputy administrator, along with astronaut Sally Ride and other experts to defend the proposal, saying the SLS program was too slow and wasteful. However, Senators Shelby and Nelson quickly moved to fight efforts to cut the program and were ultimately victorious. After retirement from NASA, Garver would go on to recommend cancellation of the SLS.

During the Trump administration, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine suggested to a Senate committee that the agency was considering using the Falcon Heavy or Delta IV Heavy rocket to launch Orion instead of SLS. Afterward, the administrator was reportedly called into a meeting with Senator Shelby, who told Bridenstine he should resign for making the suggestion in a public meeting.

In 2023, Cristina Chaplain, former assistant director of the GAO, expressed doubts about reducing the rocket's cost to a competitive threshold, "just given the history and how challenging it is to build."

Management

In 2019, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that NASA had assessed the performance of contractor Boeing positively, though the project had experienced cost growth and delay. A March 2020 report by Office of Inspector General found NASA moved out $889 million of costs relating to SLS boosters, but did not update the SLS budget to match. This kept the budget overrun to 15% in FY 2019; an overrun of 30% would have required NASA to request additional funding from the U.S. Congress The Inspector General report found that were it not for this "masking" of cost, the overrun would have been 33% by FY 2019. The GAO stated "NASA's current approach for reporting cost growth misrepresents the cost performance of the program".

Proposed alternatives

In 2009, the Augustine commission proposed a commercial 165,000 lb (75 t) launcher for lunar exploration. In 2011–2012, the Space Access Society, Space Frontier Foundation, and The Planetary Society called for the cancellation of the project, arguing that the SLS would consume the funds for other projects from the NASA budget. U.S. Representative Dana Rohrabacher and others proposed the development of an orbital propellant depot and the acceleration of the Commercial Crew Development program as an alternative to the SLS program.

An unpublished NASA study and another from the Georgia Institute of Technology found these approaches could have lower costs. In 2012, United Launch Alliance also suggested using existing rockets with on-orbit assembly and propellant depots as needed. In 2019, a former ULA employee alleged that Boeing viewed orbital refueling technology as a threat to the SLS and blocked investment in the technology. In 2010, SpaceX's CEO Elon Musk claimed that his company could build a launch vehicle in the 310,000–330,000 lb (140–150 t) payload range for $2.5 billion, or $300 million (in 2010 dollars) per launch, not including a potential upper-stage upgrade.

Former NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden, expressed that the SLS could be replaced in the future in an interview with Politico in September 2020. Bolden said that the "SLS will go away ... because at some point commercial entities are going to catch up." Bolden further stated, "They are really going to build a heavy-lift launch vehicle sort of like SLS that they will be able to fly for a much cheaper price than NASA can do SLS. That's just the way it works."

See also

• Austere Human Missions to Mars
• Comparison of orbital launch systems
• Criticism of the Space Shuttle program
• DIRECT, proposals prior to SLS
• Shuttle-Derived Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, a 2009 concept launch vehicle
• Ares V, a 2000s cargo vehicle design for the Constellation Program
• National Launch System, 1990s
• Saturn rocket family, 1960s
• Starship HLS, lunar variant of super heavy-lift vehicle Starship
• Studied Space Shuttle Variations and Derivatives

Notes

1. The FY2021 spending plan indicates that this is for "Block 1B (non-add) (including EUS)"
2. See the budget table for yearly inflation-adjusted figures.

3. Then-planned launch date history

   Date	Planned launch date
   October 2010	31 December 2016
   September 2011	2017
   February 2012–August 2014	17 December 2017
   December 2014	June–July 2018
   13 April 2017	November 2018
   28 April 2017	2019
   November 2017	June 2020
   December 2019	November 2020
   21 February 2020	18 April 2021
   28 February 2020	Mid- to late 2021
   May 2020	22 November 2021
   August 2021	December 2021
   22 October 2021	12 February 2022
   17 December 2021	March–April 2022
   February 2022	May 2022
   March 2022	June 2022
   26 April 2022	23 August 2022
   20 July 2022	8:33 am ET (12:33 UTC), 29 August 2022
   29 August 2022	12:48 pm ET (16:48 UTC), 2 September 2022
   30 August 2022	2:17 pm ET (18:17 UTC), 3 September 2022
   3 September 2022	19 September–4 October 2022
   8 September 2022	23 September–4 October 2022
   12 September 2022	27 September–4 October 2022
   24 September 2022	Late October 2022
   30 September 2022	12–27 November 2022
   13 October 2022	12:07 am ET (5:07 UTC), 14 November 2022
   8 November 2022	1:04 am ET (6:04 UTC), 16 November 2022

1. ^ Height measured to the top of the launch abort tower on the crewed variant of the rocket; the cargo variant is shorter. Height varies based on payload fairing.
2. ^ Payload mass is for the cargo variant of the rocket, capacity of the crewed variant is reduced.

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External links

• Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle page on NASA.gov Archived 27 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine
• "Preliminary Report on Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and Space Launch System" (PDF), NASA
• SLS Future Frontiers video
• Video animations of mission to asteroid, the Moon, and Mars, beyondearth.com
• "NASA Continues Journey to Mars Planning", spacepolicyonline.com

v t e Artemis program
List of missions astronauts Commercial Lunar Payload Services Exploration Ground Systems Gateway Logistics Services
Missions	Uncrewed Artemis I (2022) Peregrine Mission One (2024) IM-1 (2024) Blue Ghost M1 (2024) IM-2 (2025) Crewed Artemis II (2025) Artemis III (2026) Artemis IV (2028) Artemis V (2030)
Agencies	NASA Australian Space Agency Canadian Space Agency European Space Agency Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency State Space Agency of Ukraine Korea Aerospace Research Institute New Zealand Space Agency Brazilian Space Agency Saudi Space Commission
Facilities	Cape Canaveral Space Force Station SLC-37B SLC-40 SLC-41 SLC-46 Kennedy Space Center LC-39A LC-39B Mission Control Center SpaceX Starbase Vandenberg Space Force Base SLC-3E SLC-4E White Sands Missile Range
Rockets	Electron Falcon 9 Falcon Heavy Space Launch System Starship Vulcan Centaur Ariane 6 New Glenn
Crewed spacecraft	Human Landing System Starship Blue Moon Lunar Gateway Lunar Terrain Vehicle Orion European Service Module
Robotic spacecraft	CAPSTONE HERACLES Argonaut Nova-C Peregrine VIPER rover
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