| Salvation Force | |
|---|---|
| سپای ڕزگاری | |
 Sheikh Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi on horseback | |
| Also known as | Army of Umar ibn al-Khattab |
| Founding leader | Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi |
| Leaders |
|
| Foundation | 1980 |
| Dissolved | 1988 |
| Country |  Iran |
| Active regions | Avroman |
| Ideology | Kurdish-Islamic nationalism Naqshbandi Islamism Anti-Iranian sentiment |
| Size | 1,000–2,000 |
| Allies |  Ba'athist Iraq Komala (formerly) KDPI (formerly) |
| Opponents | Iran Muslim Peshmerga Komala KDPI PUK |
| Battles and wars | 1979–1983 Kurdistan conflict Iran-Iraq war |
The Salvation Force (Kurdish: سپای ڕزگاری; Sipay Rizgarî) was a Naqshbandi Sufi Islamist militant group composed of Kurds, active in the Avroman region of Iranian Kurdistan during the 1979–1983 Kurdistan conflict and Iran-Iraq war. Like other Kurdish separatist groups in Iran, they aligned with and were armed by the Iraqi side. For the period of its existence, it was led by its founder Sheikh Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi, of the prominent Sheikhs of Tawilah family.
History
Background
Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi, the group's founder, was born in Iraqi Kurdistan and was an Iraqi citizen. He fled to Iran in 1959 after getting into conflict with the political authorities of Iraq under Abd al-Karim Qasim, and established positive relations with the Iranian political authorities of the Pahlavi period. He became friends with Minister of the Court Amir-Asadollah Alam, and his sons took up roles in the Iranian government. He then made use of his relations with the Iranian government to consolidate his influence in the Avroman region. Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim was overthrown by the Ba'ath party in 1963, paving the way for contacts to be established between Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi and the Iraqi authorities.
Formation and early activities
Following the victory of Ruhollah Khomeini in the Iranian Revolution, Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi fled to Iraq and mobilised a force of 1,000–2,000 Kurds, creating the Salvation force. Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi thereafter declared that the newly-established Islamic Republic was a non-Muslim entity, stating that the Kurds of the Salvation Force would repeat the Muslim conquest of Persia, while referring to the group with the nickname "Army of Umar ibn al-Khattab". He then issued a fatwa that whoever beheads 10 Iranian soldiers is guaranteed heaven.
While Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi himself remained in Iraq, the militia was militarily commanded by his son Madih Naqshbandi. With the help of the Ba'athist regime ruling over Iraq, who provided the group with arms, the Salvation Force entered the Avroman region of Iranian Kurdistan in early 1980, forming an alliance with both the KDPI and Komala, also armed and funded by Ba'athist Iraq. For the first months of their existence, they were engaged only in active combat against the IRGC.
Conflict with rival Kurdish rebel groups
As a result of ideological disagreement between Islamist and Leftist Kurdish groups, they soon entered into conflict with their former allies KDPI and Komala. As part of their communist doctrine, Komala had been acting against landlords in Kurdistan, and saw Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi, a wealthy land-owner, as a class enemy. The Salvation Force, meanwhile, viewed Komala as communist atheists. This conflict remained ideological until a few months into 1980, Komala forces from Marivan and Sanandaj and KDPI forces from Paveh and Avroman both attempted to disarm the Salvation Force, which started armed clashes.
Most militants of the Salvation Force did not want to fight other Kurds and therefore abandoned their service, which severely weakened the group. The Salvation Force's leadership, which was weary of the large number of members leaving it, resorted to assassinating former members in order to discourage anyone from leaving again. One of the group's commanders, Muhammad Ziya Naqshbandi, fearing the group's full destruction, even offered to cooperate with the IRGC against Komala, though nothing came of this.
Expulsion to Iraq and dissolution
In September–October 1981, the IRGC and the Islamic Peshmerga, under the command of Osman Fereshteh, collected 200 fighters and began an operation to clear Avroman Takht and its vicinity of all rebels. The Islamic Peshmerga were a pro-IRGC militia composed of local Kurds that were agitated by the instability that Kurdish separatist factions brought to their lands. The Salvation Force had deployed 300 fighters to, and established several military points in, the settlement and surrounding villages. As a result of the operation, approximately 50 Salvation Force fighters were killed and 200 captured. Additionally, the settlements of Avroman Takht, Bendul, Kamaleh, Zhivar, Belbar, Selin, and Rovar were returned to Iranian control. Iranian forces chased the fleeing Salvation Force forces as they were retreating from these settlements, and inflicted another blow on them in the village of Keymeneh, forcing them to retreat into Iraqi Kurdistan.
In the period following, the Salvation Force also entered into hostilities with the PUK, who opposed the group due to its close ties to the Iraqi authorities. As part of this opposition, the PUK harassed their troops and largely cut off their supply lines. By Autumn 1982, Sheikh Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi had left Iraq for Western Europe, later settling in Turkey. His son Madih Naqshbandi, the commander of the Salvation Force, remained in Kurdistan for the time being.
Salvation Force continued to function as a group, fighting both Komala and Iranian government forces, until finally being disbanded in 1988, as a result of Iranian victory in Operation Walfajr 10. The group's surviving members all either surrendered to Iranian forces and accepted whatever punishment they received, or settled in Iraqi Kurdistan in self-exile.
Ideology
The Salvation Force followed the teachings of Sheikh Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi, a Sunni Sufi of the Naqshbandi order. Ideologically, they were Jihadists, and enforced Sharia in the areas they controlled.
The region they controlled would experience an even stricter rule a few decades later under the Islamic Emirate of Byara. During this rule, Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan harassed Sufi sheikhs and bombed their khanqahs and dargahs. Unlike the Salvation Force, Ansar al-Islam took a harder nationalist outlook and opposed the Ba'athist Iraqi government.
See also
Notes
- Various transliterations of the group's name, from both Persian and Kurdish, are used in English-language sources, including:
- Sipay Rizgari
- Sipahî Rizgarî
- Sepah-e Razgari
- Spai Rizgari
- Supay Rizgari
References
- ^ Mofidi, Sabah (2022-01-21). Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan. Transnational Press London. pp. 76–77. ISBN 978-1-80135-109-6 – via Google Books.
Although the KDPI historically had a connection with the Sunni clergies, with the 1979 revolution some religious and religio-national groups emerged in Kurdistan like (...) the Rizgari party related to the Naqshbandi order. (...) The party, known as Sipay Rizgari (the Salvation Force), was a religious/Sufi party under (...) Sheikh Osman Sirajadin Naghshbandi. Due to some conflicts, especially the ideological dispute, Komele in Meriwan and Sine, and KDPI (around the time of its fourth congress) in Pawe and Hewramanat, disarmed Sipay Rizgari in 1980. (...) There were conflicts between secular and religious Kurds especially between the radical leftists/Komele and Islamists such as (...) Rizgari.
- ^ van Bruinessen, Martin (15 August 1986). The Naqshbandi Order as a Vehicle of Political Protest among the Kurds (With Some Comparative Notes on Indonesia). New Approaches in Islamic Studies. Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Sciences. pp. 1–3 – via Academia.edu.
Shaykh Osman (...) had been born, and had long lived, in the Iraqi part of Kurdistan, and he had had to flee from that country because of another revolution. (...) a real dervish army, recruited from among the most devoted followers of Shaykh Osman and commanded by the shaykh's son, Dr. Madih. The old shaykh himself had withdrawn across the border into Iraq, where all enemies of the Iranian revolution were then welcome. (...) The shah welcomed the shaykh and showed him favours, and the shaykh was interested in establishing close relations with the court, to their mutual benefit. The political protection he enjoyed enabled the shaykh to consolidate his influence. (...) the Naqshbandi order, and especially the Kurdish branch of it to which Shaykh Osman belonged, has always been strongly anti-Shi`i. Many pious Kurds regarded the new regime not as an Islamic but as a Shi'i government. (...) Most of the arms of the Sipahî Rizgarî were allegedly provided by Iraq. In the first months of its existence, the Sipahî Rizgarî did in fact engage in a few clashes with revolutionary guards (Pasdaran) in and around Hawraman. Soon, however, the shaykh's men found themselves fighting another Kurdish organization, the left-wing Komala, which had one of its strongest bases in a region overlapping the shaykh's zone of influence. The shaykh was, among many other things, a rich landowner, whereas the Komala had been organizing land invasions and rebellions by landless peasants against landlords and tribal chieftains. The Komala saw the shaykh as a class enemy, (...) Sipahî Rizgarî on the other hand, regarded the Komala as godless communists, and saw the pasdaran, who were after all fellow Muslims, as the lesser evil. One of its commanders, Shaykh Osman's khalifa Muhammad Ziya Naqshbandi, fearing to be crushed between the Komala and the Pasdaran, in fact turned to the latter and offered them his cooperation. (...) In the first year of its existence, the Sipahî Rizgarî counted, according to Shaykh Osman's own claims, a thousand armed men (...) In the following years its numbers rapidly dwindled. (...) In the Iraqi part of Hawraman, which the shaykh's men used as a basis from which to launch patrols into Iran, they ran into trouble with an organization of Iraqi Kurds, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK was in armed rebellion against the Baghdad government, and it resented the shaykh's collaboration with that same regime. (...) The PUK harassed the shaykh's men and largely cut off their supply lines. (...) In the autumn of 1982, the shaykh left Iraq, whose government had become less friendly to him as his usefulness seemed spent. He set out on a tour of western Europe and Turkey, where he still had numerous disciples (...) His son Madih remained in Kurdistan.
- ^ Boroujerdi, Mehrzad; Rahimkhani, Kourosh (2018-06-05). Postrevolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook. Syracuse University Press. p. 345. ISBN 978-0-8156-5432-2 – via Google Books.
Sepah-e Razgari Sheykh Osman Naqshbandi. (...) This group was established in Kurdistan Province and followed the teachings of its leader.
- ^ Cabi, Marouf (February 2020). "The roots and the consequences of the 1979 Iranian revolution: A Kurdish perspective". Middle Eastern Studies. 56 (3): 339–358. doi:10.1080/00263206.2020.1722651 – via ResearchGate.
a fledgling Islamic extremist force, called Spai Rizgari or the Salvation Force, (...) had spread in the southern rural region enforcing Sharia law.
- ^ Bruinessen, Martin van (1992). Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan. London: Zed Books Ltd. p. 336. ISBN 1-85649-018-1 – via Academia.edu.
It was in this village of Duru where I twice visited Shaikh Osman (...). In 1980 his son Madih led a minor army, consisting of the shaikh's followers and armed by Iraq, the Supay Rizgari, against Islamic Iran's government forces and rival Kurdish groups.
- ^ "گروهک "رزگاری"؛ ترور به نام رهایی" [The "Rizgari" group; terror in the name of salvation]. Young Journalists Club (in Persian). 2022-07-01.
- ^ "لە شێخ عیزەدین حوسەینی و موفتیزادەوە تا داعش، ئیسلامی سیاسی لە ڕۆژهەڵاتی کوردستان" [From Sheikh Ezaddin Husseini and Moftizadeh to ISIS, Political Islam in East Kurdistan]. Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center (in Central Kurdish). 2019-04-09.
دوای ڕووخانی حکومەتی شا لە ئێران، بزاڤی تری مەزهەبی لە ڕۆژهەڵاتی کوردستان دەرکەوتن، لەوانە (سوپای ڕزگاری) بە ڕابەرایەتی (شێخ عوسمان نەقشبەندی) ڕابەری تەریقەتی نەقشبەندی لە ناوچەی هەورامانی مەریوان و پاوە درووست بوو. وەک باس دەکرێت 2000 چەکداری هەبووە.
- Amanat, Abbas; Vejdani, Farzin (13 February 2012). Amanat, Abbas; Vejdani, Farzin (eds.). Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan US. p. 195. doi:10.1057/9781137013408. ISBN 978-1-137-01340-8 – via Springer Science+Business Media.
Another Kurd who was prominent in both countries was Shaykh Osman Naqshbandi, an Iraqi citizen who lived in Iran. He had many followers in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and Gorgan, and was friends with the last Shah's influential minister of the court, Amir Asadollah Alam.
- ^ "گروهک تروریستی رزگاری (رستگاری)" [The Rizgari (Salvation) Terrorist Group]. Habilian Association.
- ^ Behzad, Hossein (July 2008). "فرجام شغالان در بیشه شیران؛ نگاهی گذرا به رویدادهای کردستان در روزها و سال های نخستین انقلاب" [The fate of jackals in the forest of lions; A brief look at the events of Kurdistan in the first days and years of the revolution]. Emtedad (in Persian) (30). Foundation for the Preservation and Publication of Sacred Defense Works and Values – via Hawzah News Agency.
جلسات ادواری سران این ائتلاف ضدانقلاب، به طور منظم در دزلی و با حضور افسران عالی رتبه سرویس اطلاعات رژیم بعث عراق برگزار می شد. احمد در بخشی از خاطرات خود از نبردهای غرب، اشاره ای هم به توطئه استکباری تشکیل سپاه رزگاری دارد: «...شیخ عثمان را وا می دارند که گروهک رزگاری (رستگاری) را تشکیل بدهد. او هم نام نیروهای مسلح خود را سپاه عمربن خطاب گذاشته بود. علت انتخاب نام خلیفه دوم برای شاخه نظامی این گروهک این بود که می خواستند از اعتقادات مذهبی مردم اهل سنت منطقه غرب کشور سوءاستفاده کنند. چنان که خود شیخ عثمان هم به چنین سفسطه ای متوسل شد وگفته بود همان طور که سپاه اسلام در زمان خلیفه دوم به ایران حمله کرد و ایرانیان مجوس را مسلمان کرد، حالا هم این سپاه، کارش مشابه همان سپاه دوران عمر است که می خواهد ایران (به زعم او کافر) را مسلمان بکند!» (...) سپاه رزگاری می خواست با دامن زدن به تعصبات مذهبی اهالی مناطق کردنشین غرب کشور و طرح ضدیت میان شیعه و سنی، بن بست جنگ افروزی گروهک ها در کردستان را بشکند. فتوای معروف شیخ عثمان که گفته بود «هر کس ده پاسدار امام خمینی را سر ببرد، بهشت بر او واجب می شود!» تبلور عینی عزم استکبار برای تبدیل بحران کردستان به یک جنگ خونین مذهبی بود.
- ^ "پایانی تلخ بر فصل سرد گروهک تروریستی رزگاری" [A bitter end to the cold period of the Rizgari terrorist group]. Šabake-ye Ettelāresāni-ye Rāh-e Dānā (in Persian). 14 October 2017.
- "عملیات اورامان تخت و پایان عمر سیاسی گروهک رزگاری" [The Avroman Takht operation and the end of the political life of Rizgari group]. Šabake-ye Ettelāresāni-ye Rāh-e Dānā (in Persian). 13 February 2017.
- "Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan (Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, )". www.hrw.org.
- "Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan". Human Rights Watch. Archived from the original on 2010-06-15. Retrieved 2014-01-22.
- Brynjar, Lia. Understanding Jihadi Proto-States - JSTOR. JSTOR 26297412.
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