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Water scarcity in Iran is caused by high climatic variability, uneven distribution of water, over exploitation of available water resources,and prioritization of economic development. Water scarcity in Iran is further exacerbated by climate change.

Water scarcity can be a result of two mechanisms: physical (absolute) water scarcity and economic water scarcity, where physical water scarcity is a result of inadequate natural water resources to supply a region's demand, and economic water scarcity is a result of poor management of the sufficient available water resources.

Rainfall is highly seasonal, which led to the government building dams to ensure a more consistent water supply. Despite this, water availability has declined since the 20th century whilst demand has increased. By the 2010s, authorities and the United Nations were describing it as a crisis and it contributed to protests in the country.

Background

According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), Iran ranks among the most water-stressed countries in the world. The country falls under the "extremely high" category on the Water Stress Index, where 80% to 100% of renewable water resources are withdrawn annually. This means Iran is utilizing nearly all of its available water supply for agriculture, industry, and domestic use, leaving little to no buffer for periods of drought or variability in rainfall.

Climate

Rainfall in Iran is highly seasonal with a rainy season between October and March that leaves the land extremely dry for the remainder of the year. Immense seasonal variations in flow characterize Iran's rivers. For example, the Karun River in Khuzestan carries water during periods of maximum flow that is ten times the amount borne in dry periods. In numerous localities, there may be no precipitation until sudden storms, accompanied by heavy rains, dump almost the entire year's rainfall in a few days. Water shortages are compounded by the unequal distribution of water. Near the Caspian Sea, rainfall averages about 1,280 mm (50 in) per year, but in the Central Plateau and in the lowlands to the south it seldom exceeds 100 mm (3.9 in). Iran's susceptibility to high variation in temperature and precipitation has led to the creation of dams and reservoirs to regulate and create a more stable water flow throughout the country.

Climate change

Iran's overall climate has become drier over the past several decades. Precipitation levels have dropped by about 20-25% in key regions, exacerbating the water crisis. The decline in rainfall and increasing temperatures have pushed the country toward rapid desertification. The Zayandeh Rud River in Isfahan is a striking example. It has dried up multiple times over the last decade, resulting in extensive damage to agriculture.

Iran is expected to have a mean temperature increase of 2.6 °C and a 35% decrease in precipitation within the next few decades. This could potentially exacerbate current drought and crop production issues.

Drought

Iran is an arid and drought prone country with increasing vulnerability to this natural hazard. Water scarcity and drought issues are among the biggest challenges facing the country.The severity of drought episodes during 1999 to 2001 was immense as it affected to varying degrees 26 provinces and over half the population of the country.

Lake Urmia crisis

Once the largest saltwater lake in the Middle East, Lake Urmia has shrunk by 90% since the 1970s due to dam construction, agricultural water diversion, and climate change. Although efforts to restore the lake have been made since 2013, Lake Urmia's decline remains one of the most visible signs of Iran's water crisis. In 1997, the lake's area covered approximately 5,000 km² but shrank to 500 km² by 2013. Restoration projects have helped recover some of the lake, but challenges persist.

Environmental Challenges

Environmental issues such as decreasing rainfall, low precipitation levels due to climate change have aggravated Iran's water scarcity in recent years. In 2017 precipitation levels decreased by 25 percent, felt even in historically water-rich areas in the country's north and northwestern areas. This has contributed to the reported reduction of water entering Iran's dams by 33 percent, from 32 billion cubic meters (BCM) of surface water in 2017 to 25 BCM in 2018.

Water resources

Water availability

Internal renewable water resources are estimated at 89 billion cubic meters (BCM)/year As a result of previous droughts and overexploitation of available water resources, the per capita water availability has been reduced to 1100 m3/year today with 85 million inhabitants .Surface runoff represents a total of 97.3 BCM/year, of which 5.4 BCM/year comes from drainage of the aquifers and thus needs to be subtracted from the total. Groundwater recharge is estimated at 49.3 BCM/year, of which 12.7 BCM/year is obtained from infiltration in the river bed and also needs to be subtracted. Iran receives 6.7 BCM/year of surface water from Pakistan and some water from Afghanistan through the Helmand River. The flow of the Arax river, at the border with Azerbaijan, is estimated at 4.6 BCM/year. The surface runoff to the sea and to other countries is estimated at 55.9 BCM/year. Per capita, water availability in the pre-Islamic Revolution era was about 4,500 cubic meters. In 2009, this figure was less than 2,000 cubic meters.

Water usage

Iran's reliance on groundwater has led to unsustainable extraction rates. The Iranian Ministry of Energy estimates that the country loses 5 billion cubic meters of groundwater annually due to over-extraction. Over the last five decades, Iran has depleted around 70% of its groundwater reserves, and this overuse has led to severe land subsidence in various regions. For example, Tehran subsides at a rate of up to 25 cm per year, indicating the collapsing aquifers beneath the capital city. Neverthelss, the water scarcity issue in Tehran is not uniformly experienced across the city. There are significant disparities between neighborhoods. Wealthier northern districts of Tehran have significantly benefited from greater investments in water infrastructure, resulting in more advanced distribution systems and enhanced storage facilities. In contrast, the less affluent neighborhoods often depend on outdated or inadequate infrastructure.

The total water withdrawal was estimated at 70 BCM in 1993, rising to 96 BCM in 2018, of which 92% was used for agricultural purposes, 6% for domestic use and 2% for industrial use. Although this is equal to 51% of the actual available renewable water resources, annual abstraction from aquifers (57 BCM in 1993, 53 BCM in 2004) is already more than the estimated safe yield (46 BCM). Of the 4.3 BCM/year in 1993 (6.2 in 2004) used for domestic purposes, 61% is supplied from surface water and 39% from groundwater. For example, Greater Tehran with its population of more than 13 million is supplied by surface water from the Lar dam on the Lar River in the Northeast of the city, the Latyan dam on the Jajrood River in the North, the Karaj River in the Northwest, as well as by groundwater in the vicinity of the city. Provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Isfahan have the highest efficiency of irrigation with 54, 52 and 42 percents respectively, and Khuzestan province has the lowest irrigation efficiency with 38 percent. Tap water consumption in the country is 70% over and above the global average. 16 BCM of water was used for power generation in 1999.

As of 2014, Iran is using 70% of its total renewable freshwater, far above the upper limit of 40% recommended according to international norms.

The Qanats

About 2,500 years ago, Iranians invented a number of ways to use groundwater, including a water management system called qanat. The qanats, which are still used today, are a series of underground tunnels and wells that transport underground water to the surface. They supply about 7.6 billion cubic meters or 15% of the country's total water needs and play an important role in advanced water harvesting. However, many of these systems have been abandoned and replaced by other methods over the past few decades, mainly due to socio-economic conditions and changing water extraction technology. In addition, the drilling of deeper and shallower wells has damaged the quality of groundwater, especially in the coastal area of the Central Plain of Iran, which has consequences for the environment, people, and economy of Iran. Therefore, it is necessary to recommend and implement methods to increase the efficiency of qanats to achieve sustainable development in water resources management.

Water pollution

Water pollution is caused by industrial and municipal wastewater, as well as by agriculture. Concerning municipal wastewater, the bulk of collected sewage is discharged untreated and constitutes a major source of groundwater pollution and a risk to public health. In a number of cities without sanitary sewerage, households discharge their sewage through open rainwater drains .

Urban water rationing

Urban areas are increasingly feeling the impact of the water crisis. For instance, in Isfahan, the Zayandeh Rud River, once the lifeblood of the city and its surrounding agricultural lands, has frequently run dry. Water scarcity has led to water rationing in cities like Isfahan and Shiraz, and it is estimated that 28 million Iranians, or 35% of the population, live in regions facing high or very high water stress. Drying rivers and lakes has also caused extensive protests, especially among farmers, who have been forced to abandon their fields due to a lack of water.

Infrastructure

Most drinking water in Iran is supplied through modern infrastructure, such as dams, reservoirs, long-distance transmission pipelines—some of which are more than 300 km (190 mi) long—and deep wells. An estimated 60,000 traditional Karez (کاریز) systems in the plateau regions of Iran in Yazd, Khorasan and Kerman—are still in use today for irrigation and drinking water supply in rural areas and small towns. The oldest and largest known Karez is in the Iranian city of Gonabad which after 2700 years still provides drinking and agricultural water to nearly 40,000 people. Its main well depth is more than 360 meters (1,180 ft) and its length is 45 km (28 mi). It is estimated that there are as many as 500,000 deep and shallow wells in the country. There are 42 large dams under operation in Iran with a combined storage capacity of 33 BCM/year. These dams lose about 200 million cubic meters of storage capacity every year due to sedimentation (0.5–0.75% of their storage capacity). Most dams are multi-purpose dams for hydropower, irrigation, flood control and—in some cases—drinking water supply.

In recent years Iran's reservoirs have been hit hard by water shortages. As of 2021, water stored in dams across the country was 40% lower than the previous year, as the Iran Water Resources Management Company reported. The Karkheh Dam, one of the most important reservoirs in Khuzestan Province, was operating at just 12% of its total capacity during the height of the drought. These shortages have dire implications for irrigation, drinking water, and electricity generation.

Migration

Iran's worsening water crisis affects agriculture, industry, and urban water supplies and triggers significant internal migration. Water shortages, particularly in rural and agricultural regions, are forcing thousands of people to abandon their homes and livelihoods, leading to a phenomenon known as "environmental migration." This migration creates new social, economic, and political challenges as more Iranians move to crowded urban areas, intensifying existing pressures on infrastructure and public services .

Rural-to-Urban Migration

One of the most visible impacts of Iran's water crisis is the large-scale migration from rural to urban areas. Water shortages have severely affected many rural communities that rely on farming, especially in provinces like Khuzestan, Sistan, Baluchestan, and Isfahan. Agricultural productivity in these regions has plummeted due to a lack of irrigation water, and many farmers have been forced to leave their lands. This has caused a steady migration flow to cities like Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Mashhad, where migrants seek better economic opportunities. It is estimated that more than 70% of Iran's villages are at risk of being abandoned due to drought and water scarcity. According to the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture, between 2002 and 2017, over 12,000 villages were entirely deserted, with most of their residents moving to urban centers. This trend has accelerated as droughts become more frequent and severe.

Migration in Khuzestan Province

Historically, Khuzestan, one of Iran's most water-rich provinces, has been hit hard by the mismanagement of water resources. The drying of rivers, including the Karkheh and Karun, has made agriculture unsustainable in many parts of the province. In recent years, Khuzestan has witnessed a significant exodus of its rural population as people move to cities for work and better living conditions. The situation has been exacerbated by periodic dust storms, which further degrade the environment and make life untenable in affected regions. This environmental migration from Khuzestan has led to social tensions in the region, as local communities face declining living standards and heightened unemployment.

Impact on Urban Areas

The influx of migrants from rural areas into cities puts immense strain on Iran's urban infrastructure. Tehran, for instance, has seen its population swell, reaching over 9 million people in recent years, with many newcomers being rural migrants displaced by the water crisis. This migration surge has increased demand for housing, water, sanitation, and other services, worsening problems such as air pollution and traffic congestion. Moreover, the migration of people fleeing water-scarce areas has led to informal settlements and slums around major cities. These settlements are often unregulated, with poor access to essential services like clean water and electricity, creating public health risks. The government has struggled to manage this influx, and tensions between long-term residents and new migrants are rising, adding another layer of complexity to Iran's social challenges.

Projections for Future Migration

With climate change expected to exacerbate Iran's water shortages further, the number of people forced to migrate will likely increase in the coming decades. According to some estimates, up to 50 million Iranians could face severe water shortages by 2050, potentially leading to one of the largest migration waves in the region. This environmental migration is not only a domestic issue but could also have international implications, as Iran's neighbors may see an influx of Iranian migrants in the future.

The water crisis-driven migration in Iran underscores the urgent need for comprehensive water management reforms. Failure to address the root causes of water scarcity, such as poor governance and unsustainable agricultural practices, will likely lead to further displacement, with significant social and economic consequences for rural and urban communities.

Water shortage and the IRGC

IRGC and corruption in water management

Rapid urbanization and agricultural demands have exacerbated the country's already scarce water supply. With approximately 90% of Iran's water resources allocated to agriculture, the inefficiency of irrigation practices and the overreliance on groundwater are leading to severe depletion of these vital reserves. Iran's water management strategies, including the construction of dams and water transfer projects, have been politically driven and often disregard environmental and social impacts. These policies contribute to ecological damage, such as the drying up of rivers and wetlands. These policies fail to address the root causes of scarcity and disproportionately affect rural and peripheral communities, leading to civil disorder.

Corruption in Iran's water supply sector has deep roots and manifests through misallocation of resources, illegal water extraction, lack of transparency, and neglect of marginalized communities. Iran's water management system has been plagued by political favoritism. The IRGC and other politically connected entities control water resources, prioritizing projects for political and economic gain rather than public need. They divert supplies to favored regions, causing shortages in vulnerable provinces like Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchestan. For example, water diversion projects in Isfahan and Yazd provinces received priority despite critical shortages in Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchestan. Reports also indicate that certain agricultural and industrial enterprises with ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have received significant amounts of water, while small farmers and rural communities struggle with severe shortages.

The IRGC, through its construction arm Khatam al-Anbiya, monopolizes Iran's water management. This "water mafia" controls major infrastructure projects like dam construction, prioritizing financial and political gains over environmental and social considerations. The IRGC's influence leads to inefficient water distribution, ecological damage, and widespread public unrest, particularly in marginalized areas. Their dominance undermines sustainable water policies, contributing to Iran's ongoing water crisis and highlighting the complex interplay between power, corruption, and resource management.

Iran's central government prioritizes water allocation for industrial and urban centers, often at the expense of rural and minority populations. These groups face severe water shortages, ecological degradation, and a loss of livelihoods. This pattern of unequal development not only exacerbates regional disparities but also fuels social unrest and environmental crises. Iran's water policy is also characterized by an overreliance on dam construction and large-scale diversion projects, primarily benefiting politically connected enterprises and urban elites. This has led to the drying of rivers, wetlands, and other vital ecosystems, intensifying dust storms and land subsidence in regions like Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchestan. Such environmental degradation, combined with insufficient governmental oversight and transparency, worsens living conditions for marginalized communities, reinforcing cycles of poverty and socio-political marginalization.

The consequences of corruption in Iran's water sector extend beyond misallocation and mismanagement. The environmental damage includes the drying of critical water bodies, such as Lake Urmia, which has shrunk by over 80% due to diversion projects and the construction of dams without proper environmental assessments. Such ecological damage affects biodiversity and threatens agricultural productivity, as salinization renders once-fertile land unusable.

Political climate

In December 2013, Hamid Chitchian, head of the Ministry of Energy, which is in charge of regulating the water sector—stated that the sector's situation had reached "critical levels". He correctly established that past approaches, which mainly focused on constructing dams and trying to increase the storage capacity, would no longer be appropriate remedies. In fact, total storage capacity behind the country's many dams amounts to 68 billion cubic meters, whereas the water potential of the country's rivers totals 46 billion cubic meters per annum.

In July 2013, Issa Kalantari, the Minister of Agricultural under president Hashemi Rafsanjani, told Ghanoon newspaper that the water crisis is the "main problem that threatens" Iran, adding that it is more dangerous "than Israel, USA or political fighting among the Iranian elite". If the water issue is not addressed, Iran could become "uninhabitable". If this situation is not reformed, in 30 years Iran will be a ghost town. Even if there is precipitation in the desert, there will be no yield, because the area for groundwater will be dried and water will remain at ground level and evaporate." By 2050, some estimates suggest Iran could face a 50% reduction in renewable water resources due to climate change, over-extraction, and inefficient water use. This reduction would severely affect not only agriculture but also drinking water supplies and energy production, amplifying social unrest and environmental degradation.

A 2017 United Nations report stated that "Water shortages are acute; agricultural livelihoods no longer sufficient. With few other options, many people have left, choosing uncertain futures as migrants in search of work".

Protests

Some analysts believe the water crisis may have been a significant contributor to the protests around January 2018. At least five protesters were allegedly shot in January 2018 in Qahderijan, where water rights were reportedly the main grievances. As of March 2018, small and intermittent water protests have continued to occur in some rural areas. In July 2021, people in Khuzestan Province took to the streets to protest water shortages.

There have been massive protests in Susengerd, a city of 120,000 people and the industrial city of Shush (ancient Shush). There were also demonstrations in the city of Ahvaz, the capital of Khuzestan, and dozens of other places.

Since holding demonstrations against the water shortage crisis in Iran in the summer of 2021, the government has become extremely defenseless against the water shortage and has faced internal tensions and pressures.

Self-harming policies

The deliberate chosen path of conflict with Israel and the diversion of resources following unchecked efforts to acquire nuclear weapons have debilitated the Islamic Republic and deprived it of utilizing Israel's extensive knowledge in desalination and its daily applications.

See also

• Tehran water shortage inequality
• Environmental issues in Iran

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• Water scarcity
• Environmental disasters in Asia
• Water supply and sanitation in Iran
• Disasters in Iran
• Environmental issues in Iran
• Climate change in Iran