Revision as of 16:35, 1 June 2001 editKoyaanisQatsi (talk | contribs)0 editsmNo edit summary | Latest revision as of 11:47, 20 November 2024 edit undoTheNuggeteer (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users6,515 edits Reverting edit(s) by 193.237.12.202 (talk) to rev. 1252880556 by Serendipity42: Reverting good faith edits: It's only in the british dialect (UV 0.1.6)Tags: Ultraviolet Undo | ||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Short description|Doubtful attitude toward knowledge claims}} | |||
<The following is a portion of ], wikification is encouraged> | |||
{{Redirect|Skeptic}} | |||
{{For-multi|the philosophical view|Philosophical skepticism|denial of uncomfortable truths|Denialism|the band|Skepticism (band)}} | |||
{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2020}} | |||
{{Use American English|date=August 2020}} | |||
'''Skepticism''', also spelled '''scepticism''' in ], is a questioning attitude or ] toward ] claims that are seen as mere ] or ].<ref>{{cite web|quote=Philosophical views are typically classed as skeptical when they involve advancing some degree of doubt regarding claims that are elsewhere taken for granted.|url=http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/skepcont.htm|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090113210019/http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/skepcont.htm |archive-date=13 January 2009|title=Contemporary Skepticism|website=The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|first=Duncan|last=Pritchard|year=2006 }}</ref> For example, if a person is skeptical about claims made by their government about an ongoing war then the person doubts that these claims are accurate. In such cases, skeptics normally recommend not disbelief but suspension of belief, i.e. maintaining a neutral attitude that neither affirms nor denies the claim. This attitude is often motivated by the impression that the available ] is insufficient to support the claim. Formally, skepticism is a topic of interest in ], particularly ]. | |||
More informally, skepticism as an expression of questioning or doubt can be applied to any topic, such as politics, religion, or pseudoscience. It is often applied within restricted domains, such as morality (]), ] (skepticism about the ]), or the ].<ref name="Greco2009">{{cite book |last1=Greco |first1=John |title=The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism |date=2 September 2009 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-518321-4 |pages=3–7 |edition=1 |chapter-url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28229/chapter-abstract/213259164|chapter-url-access=subscription |language=en |chapter=Introduction|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0001}}</ref> Some theorists distinguish "good" or moderate skepticism, which seeks strong evidence before accepting a position, from "bad" or radical skepticism, which wants to suspend judgment indefinitely.<ref name="Raynaud1981">{{cite journal |last1=Raynaud |first1=Maurice |title=Skepticism in Medicine: Past and Present |journal=The Linacre Quarterly |date=1 May 1981 |volume=48 |issue=2 |url=https://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol48/iss2/8/ |issn=0024-3639}}</ref><ref name="MeinerSkeptizismus">{{cite book |editor1-last=Sandkühler |editor1-first=Hans Jörg |title=Enzyklopädie Philosophie |date=2010 |publisher=Meiner |url=https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html|url-access=subscription |chapter=Skepsis/Skeptizismus}}</ref> | |||
] is one important form of skepticism. It rejects knowledge claims that seem certain from the perspective of ]. Radical forms of philosophical skepticism deny that "knowledge or rational belief is possible" and urge us to ] on many or all controversial matters. More moderate forms claim only that nothing can be known with certainty, or that we can know little or nothing about nonempirical matters, such as whether God exists, whether human beings have free will, or whether there is an afterlife. In ancient philosophy, skepticism was understood as a way of life associated with ].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bett |first1=Richard Arnot Home |title=The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism |date=28 January 2010 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-87476-2 |page=289 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5V8pQDsM5poC&pg=PA289 |language=en}}</ref> | |||
In its broadest sense, <i>skepticism</i> is the view that either we <i>do</i> not have any knowledge, or that we <i>cannot</i> have any propositional knowledge -- knowledge either about <i>everything</i>, or about <i>some</i> <i>particular</i> <i>area</i>. We're going to have to narrow our investigation; but first let me explain the different kinds of skepticism. | |||
Skepticism has been responsible for many important developments in science and philosophy. It has also inspired several contemporary social movements. ] advocates for doubt concerning basic religious principles, such as immortality, ], and ].<ref>{{Cite web|title = skepticism (noun)|url = https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skepticism|website = Merriam-Webster|access-date = 2016-02-05}}</ref> ] advocates for testing beliefs for reliability, by subjecting them to ] investigation using the ], to discover ] for them. | |||
== Definition and semantic field == | |||
''Skepticism'', also spelled ''scepticism'' (from the Greek {{lang|grc|σκέπτομαι}} {{transliteration|grc|skeptomai}}, to search, to think about or look for), refers to a doubting attitude toward ] claims.{{r|Greco2009}}<ref name="Popkin">{{cite web |last1=Popkin |first1=Richard H. |title=skepticism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/skepticism |website=Britannica |access-date=23 August 2022 |language=en}}</ref> So if a person is skeptical of their government's claims about an ongoing war then the person has doubts that these claims are true. Or being skeptical that one's favorite hockey team will win the championship means that one is uncertain about the strength of their performance.<ref name="Greco2009"/> Skepticism about a claim implies that one does not ] the claim to be true. But it does not automatically follow that one should believe that the claim is false either. Instead, skeptics usually recommend a neutral attitude: beliefs about this matter should be suspended. In this regard, skepticism about a claim can be defined as the thesis that "the only justified attitude with respect to is suspension of judgment".<ref name="Comesaña2001">{{cite web |last1=Comesaña |first1=Juan |last2=Klein |first2=Peter |title=Skepticism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=24 August 2022 |date=2019}}</ref> It is often motivated by the impression that one cannot be certain about it. This is especially relevant when there is significant expert disagreement.<ref name="Blackburn2008">{{cite book |last1=Blackburn |first1=Simon |title=The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |date=1 January 2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-954143-0 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541430.001.0001/acref-9780199541430-e-2771|url-access=subscription |language=en |chapter=scepticism}}</ref> Skepticism is usually restricted to a claim or a field of inquiry. So religious and ] have a doubtful attitude about religious and moral doctrines. But some forms of philosophical skepticism, are wider in that they reject any form of knowledge.<ref name="Blackburn2008"/> | |||
Some definitions, often inspired by ], see skepticism not just as an attitude but as a way of life. This is based on the idea that maintaining the skeptical attitude of doubt toward most concerns in life is superior to living in dogmatic certainty, for example because such a skeptic has more ] and ] or because it is morally better.<ref name="Greco2009"/><ref>{{multiref2 | |||
First, skepticism can be either the claim that we <i>don't</i> have knowledge, or that we <i>can't</i> have knowledge. There?s a difference -- the second is a stronger claim, and harder to prove. I mean, it really is one thing to say that we <i>could</i>, but unfortunately don't, have knowledge. I think Socrates might have held that view. He basically seemed to think that if we continue to ask questions we might eventually come to have knowledge; but we don't have it yet. (Or they didn't back in ancient Greece anyway!) | |||
|1={{cite web |last1=Vogt |first1=Katja |title=Ancient Skepticism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=30 August 2022 |date=2021}} | |||
|2={{cite book |last1=Reed |first1=Baron |title=The Mystery of Skepticism|editor-first1=Kevin|editor-last1=McCain|editor-first2=Ted|editor-last2=Poston|chapter=Skepticism as a Way of Life |year= 2018 |publisher=Brill|series=Brill Studies in Skepticism|volume=2 |pages=63–80 |isbn=978-90-04-39353-0 |chapter-url=https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004393530/BP000005.xml|chapter-url-access=subscription |language=en|doi=10.1163/9789004393530_006|s2cid=150356547 }} }}</ref> In ], on the other hand, skepticism is often understood neither as an attitude nor as a way of life but as a thesis: the thesis that knowledge does not exist.<ref name="Greco2009"/> | |||
Skepticism is related to various terms. It is sometimes equated with ] and ].<ref name="MeinerSkeptizismus" /><ref name="NewtonFlew2021">{{cite web |first1=Antony Garrard |last1=Newton Flew |title=agnosticism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/agnosticism |website=Britannica |access-date=26 August 2022 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Sankey2012">{{cite journal |last1=Sankey |first1=Howard |title=Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion |journal=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A |date=1 March 2012 |volume=43 |issue=1 |pages=182–190 |doi=10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.12.026 |bibcode=2012SHPSA..43..182S |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0039368111001373|url-access=subscription |language=en |issn=0039-3681}}</ref> However, there are slight differences in meaning. Agnosticism is often understood more narrowly as skepticism about religious questions, in particular, about the ].<ref name="NewtonFlew2021"/> Relativism does not deny the existence of knowledge or truth but holds that they are relative to a person and differ from person to person, for example, because they follow different cognitive norms.<ref name="Baghramian2020">{{cite web |last1=Baghramian |first1=Maria |last2=Carter |first2=J. Adam |title=Relativism: 4.4 Epistemic relativism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/#EpiRel |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=26 August 2022 |date=2022}}</ref> The opposite of skepticism is ], which implies an attitude of certainty in the form of an unquestioning belief.<ref name="Laursen2018">{{cite book |first1=John Christian |last1=Laursen |title=New Dictionary of the History of Ideas |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/skepticism |chapter=Skepticism|year=2018}}</ref> A similar contrast is often drawn in relation to blind faith and credulity.<ref name="Raynaud1981" /> | |||
== Types == | |||
Various types of skepticism have been discussed in the academic literature. Skepticism is usually restricted to knowledge claims on one particular subject, which is why its different forms can be distinguished based on the subject.{{r|Greco2009|Popkin|Blackburn2008}} For example, ] distrust ] and ] raise doubts about accepting various moral requirements and customs. Skepticism can also be applied to knowledge in general. However, this attitude is usually only found in some forms of philosophical skepticism.{{r|Greco2009|Popkin}} A closely related classification distinguishes based on the ], such as skepticism about ], ], or ].<ref name="Cohen1996">{{cite book |last1=Cohen |first1=Stewart |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=}}</ref> A further distinction is based on the degree of the skeptical attitude. The strongest forms assert that there is no knowledge at all or that knowledge is impossible. Weaker forms merely state that one can never be absolutely certain.<ref name="Greco2009"/> | |||
Some theorists distinguish between a good or healthy form of moderate skepticism in contrast to a bad or unhealthy form of radical skepticism. On this view, the "good" skeptic is a critically-minded person who seeks strong evidence before accepting a position. The "bad" skeptic, on the other hand, wants to "suspend judgment indefinitely... even in the face of demonstrable truth".{{r|Raynaud1981|MeinerSkeptizismus}} Another categorization focuses on the motivation for the skeptical attitude. Some skeptics have ] motives: they want to replace inferior beliefs with better ones. Others have a more practical outlook in that they see problematic beliefs as the cause of harmful customs they wish to stop. Some skeptics have very particular goals in mind, such as bringing down a certain institution associated with the spread of claims they reject.{{r|Greco2009|Popkin}} | |||
It's quite a different thing to say that we <i>couldn't</i> <i>ever</i> <i>possibly</i> have knowledge -- to say that knowledge is impossible. I think this has been, believe it or not, a more common opinion among skeptics. They really did, and a very few still do, think that we just cannot know anything. This is the variety we'll be investigating in a little bit. | |||
] is a prominent form of skepticism and can be contrasted with non-philosophical or ordinary skepticism. Ordinary skepticism involves a doubting attitude toward knowledge claims that are rejected by many.<ref name="Comesaña2001"/> Almost everyone shows some form of ordinary skepticism, for example, by doubting the knowledge claims made by ] or ]s.{{r|Greco2009|Popkin}} Philosophical skepticism, on the other hand, is a much more radical and rare position. It includes the rejection of knowledge claims that seem certain from the perspective of ]. Some forms of it even deny that one knows that "I have two hands" or that "the sun will come out tomorrow".<ref name="Comesaña2001"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Olsson |first1=Erik J. |title=Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: 'Pragmatism and Radical Doubt' |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2005 |volume=70 |issue=1 |pages=98–126 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00507.x |jstor=40040781 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040781|url-access=subscription |issn=0031-8205}}</ref> It is taken seriously in philosophy nonetheless because it has proven very hard to conclusively refute philosophical skepticism.{{r|Greco2009|Comesaña2001}} | |||
==In various fields== | |||
Skepticism has been responsible for important developments in various fields, such as ], ], and ]. In science, the skeptical attitude toward traditional opinions was a key factor in the development of the ]. It emphasizes the need to scrutinize knowledge claims by testing them through ] and precise ].<ref name="Laursen2018"/><ref name="Lagerlund2020">{{cite book |last1=Lagerlund |first1=Henrik |chapter=Non-Philosophical Skepticism|title=Skepticism in Philosophy: A Comprehensive, Historical Introduction |date=29 April 2020 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-36995-4 |page=197 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UX3gDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT197|chapter-url-access=subscription |language=en}}</ref> In the field of medicine, skepticism has helped establish more advanced forms of treatment by putting into doubt traditional forms that were based on intuitive appeal rather than ].<ref name="Raynaud1981"/><ref name="Laursen2018"/> In the history of philosophy, skepticism has often played a productive role not just for skeptics but also for non-skeptical philosophers.{{r|Greco2009|Popkin}}<ref>{{cite book |last1=Daly |first1=Chris |title=The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods |date=2015 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|location= U.K. |isbn=978-1-137-34455-7 |pages=1–30 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 |language=en |chapter=Introduction and Historical Overview|chapter-url-access=subscription|doi=10.1057/9781137344557_1 }}</ref> This is due to its critical attitude that challenges the ] foundations of philosophical theories. This can help to keep speculation in check and may provoke creative responses, transforming the theory in question in order to overcome the problems posed by skepticism.{{r|Greco2009|Popkin}} According to Richard H. Popkin, "the history of philosophy can be seen, in part, as a struggle with skepticism". This struggle has led many contemporary philosophers to abandon the quest for absolutely certain or indubitable first principles of philosophy, which was still prevalent in many earlier periods.<ref name="Popkin"/> Skepticism has been an important topic throughout the history of philosophy and is still widely discussed today.<ref name="Greco2009"/> | |||
===Philosophy=== | |||
Now remember that I said that skepticism can be either about <i>everything</i>, or about some <i>particular</i> <i>area</i>. If knowledge of anything at all is impossible, then my view is <i>global</i> <i>skepticism</i>. Whatever in the world you pick, I will say that you can't possibly, or at least don't, know it. There have been very few global skeptics in the history of philosophy. Hardly anybody has been <i>that</i> bold. Global skepticism really <i>is</i> bold -- because look at what it denies. It denies I know my own name. It denies that I know that I have a mind, or a body. It denies that I know I have been alive for longer than ten minutes. And so forth! How anyone might rationally support global skepticism, I won't venture to say. I seriously doubt there are <i>any</i> even <i>minimally</i> <i>plausible</i> arguments for global skepticism, at least of the variety that says: "We cannot know anything at all." Maybe the weaker versions, that say, "We <i>do</i> not know anything at all" could have some support. But I'm not going to get into that. | |||
{{Pyrrhonism sidebar}}{{Main|Philosophical skepticism}} | |||
As a philosophical school or movement, skepticism arose both in ancient Greece and India. In India the ] school of philosophy espoused skepticism. It was a major early rival of ] and ], and possibly a major influence on Buddhism. Two of the foremost disciples of the ], ] and ], were initially students of the Ajñana philosopher ]. A strong element of skepticism is found in ], most particularly in the ] sutra. However the total effect these philosophies had on each other is difficult to discern. Since skepticism is a philosophical attitude and a style of philosophizing rather than a position, the Ajñanins may have influenced other skeptical thinkers of India such as ], ], and ].{{sfn|Matilal|2004|pp=52–75}}{{full citation needed|date=August 2023}} | |||
In Greece, philosophers as early as ] ({{BCE|{{circa|570}}–{{circa|475}}}}) expressed skeptical views, as did ]<ref>{{multiref2 | |||
|1={{cite book|author=]|title=Lives of the Eminent Philosophers|at=}} | |||
|2= ] (2005, p. 86){{full citation needed|date=August 2023}} }}</ref> | |||
and a number of ]. ], for example, reputedly argued that nothing exists, that even if there were something we could not know it, and that even if we could know it we could not communicate it.<ref>{{cite book|first=W. T.|last=Jones|title=A History of Western Philosophy|location=New York|publisher=Harcourt, Brace|year=1952|at=p. 60 n. 45}}</ref> The ] philosopher ] refused to discuss anything and would merely wriggle his finger, claiming that communication is impossible since meanings are constantly changing.<ref name=PopkinSkepticism>{{cite book|first=Richard H.|last=Popkin|chapter=Skepticism|editor-first=Paul|editor-last=Edwards|title=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy|volume=7|location=New York|publisher=Macmillan|year=1967}}</ref>{{rp|449}} ] also had skeptical tendencies, claiming to know nothing worthwhile.<ref>{{cite book|last=Hazlett|first=Allan|author-link=Allan Hazlett|title=]|location=London|publisher=Bloomsbury|year=2014|pages=4–5}}</ref> | |||
] was the founder of the school of skepticism known as ].]] | |||
There were two major schools of skepticism in the ancient Greek and Roman world. The first was ], founded by ] ({{circa|{{BCE|360–270}}}}). The second was ], so-called because its two leading defenders, ] ({{circa|{{BCE|315–240}}}}) who initiated the philosophy, and ] ({{circa|{{BCE|217–128}}}}), the philosophy's most famous proponent, were heads of Plato's ]. Pyrrhonism's aims are psychological. It urges suspension of judgment ({{transliteration|grc|]}}) to achieve mental tranquility ({{transliteration|grc|]}}). The Academic Skeptics denied that knowledge is possible ({{transliteration|grc|]}}). The Academic Skeptics claimed that some beliefs are more reasonable or probable than others, whereas Pyrrhonian skeptics argue that equally compelling arguments can be given for or against any disputed view.{{r|PopkinSkepticism|page=450}} Nearly all the writings of the ancient skeptics are now lost. Most of what we know about ancient skepticism is from ], a Pyrrhonian skeptic who lived in {{CE|the second or third century}}. His works contain a lucid summary of stock skeptical arguments. | |||
Ancient skepticism faded out during the late Roman Empire, particularly after ] ({{CE|354–430}}) attacked the skeptics in his work ''Against the Academics'' ({{CE|386}}). There was little knowledge of, or interest in, ancient skepticism in Christian Europe during the Middle Ages. Interest revived during the Renaissance and Reformation, particularly after the complete writings of Sextus Empiricus were translated into Latin in 1569 and after ]'s skepticism of holy orders.<ref name="Daughtrity 2017 p. 358">{{cite book | last=Daughtrity | first=Dyron B. | title=Martin Luther: A Biography for the People | publisher=Abilene Christian University Press | year=2017 | isbn=978-0-89112-468-9 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TEGHDwAAQBAJ | url-access=subscription | access-date=2023-02-11 | page=}}</ref> A number of Catholic writers, including ] ({{circa|1550–1623}}), ] (1533–1592), ] (1592–1655), and ] (1588–1648) deployed ancient skeptical arguments to defend moderate forms of skepticism and to argue that faith, rather than reason, must be the primary guide to truth. Similar arguments were offered later (perhaps ironically) by the Protestant thinker ] in his influential Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697–1702).<ref name=PopkinHistory>{{cite book|first=Richard H.|last=Popkin|title=The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza|edition=revised|location=Berkeley|publisher=University of California Press|year=1979}}</ref>{{rp|chaps. 1 & 2}} | |||
Now if I say deny that we do or can have knowledge of a particular area, then my view is <i>local</i> skepticism. And I say that I am a skeptic <i>about</i> the area that I have doubts about. Of course there are different kinds of local skepticism, depending on the area. Areas like: the external world; other minds; the past and the future; and so forth. Take for example the external world. If I say that no one can know anything about the external world, the world that exists apart from my own mind, then I am a local skeptic, and I espouse <i>skepticism</i> <i>about</i> the external world. Or even more briefly, external world skepticism. | |||
The growing popularity of skeptical views created an intellectual crisis in seventeenth-century Europe. An influential response was offered by the French philosopher and mathematician ] (1596–1650). In his classic work, ''Meditations of First Philosophy'' (1641), Descartes sought to refute skepticism, but only after he had formulated the case for skepticism as powerfully as possible. Descartes argued that no matter what radical skeptical possibilities we imagine there are certain truths (e.g., that thinking is occurring, or that I exist) that are absolutely certain. Thus, the ancient skeptics were wrong to claim that knowledge is impossible. Descartes also attempted to refute skeptical doubts about the reliability of our senses, our memory, and other cognitive faculties. To do this, Descartes tried to prove that God exists and that God would not allow us to be systematically deceived about the nature of reality. Many contemporary philosophers question whether this second stage of Descartes's critique of skepticism is successful.{{r|PopkinHistory|page=210}} | |||
In the eighteenth century a new case for skepticism was offered by the Scottish philosopher ] (1711–1776). Hume was an empiricist, claiming that all genuine ideas can be traced back to original impressions of sensation or introspective consciousness. Hume argued that on empiricist grounds there are no sound reasons for belief in God, an enduring self or soul, an external world, causal necessity, objective morality, or inductive reasoning. In fact, he argued that "Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not Nature too strong for it."{{r|PopkinSkepticism|page=456}} As Hume saw it, the real basis of human belief is not reason, but custom or habit. We are hard-wired by nature to trust, say, our memories or inductive reasoning, and no skeptical arguments, however powerful, can dislodge those beliefs. In this way, Hume embraced what he called a "mitigated" skepticism, while rejecting an "excessive" Pyrrhonian skepticism that he saw as both impractical and psychologically impossible. | |||
Hume's skepticism provoked a number of important responses. Hume's Scottish contemporary, ] (1710–1796), challenged Hume's strict empiricism and argued that it is rational to accept "common-sense" beliefs such as the basic reliability of our senses, our reason, our memories, and inductive reasoning, even though none of these things can be proved. In Reid's view, such common-sense beliefs are foundational and require no proof in order to be rationally justified.{{r|PopkinSkepticism|page=456}} Not long after Hume's death, the German philosopher ] (1724–1804) argued that human empirical experience has possibility conditions which could not have been realized unless Hume's skeptical conclusions about causal synthetic ''a priori'' judgements were false. | |||
So let me summarize this dry introductory material about skepticism, and then we'll get into the meatier stuff. Skepticism is the view that either we <i>do</i> not have any knowledge, or that we <i>cannot</i> have any propositional knowledge -- knowledge either about <i>everything</i>, or about <i>some</i> <i>particular</i> <i>area</i>. We are going to talk about the sort of skepticism that claims we <i>cannot</i> have propositional knowledge. Skepticism about <i>everything</i> is global skepticism, but that's a very implausible view. We are instead going to talk about some different kinds of <i>local</i> skepticism. So we are going to look at some skepticisms that say: We <i>cannot</i> have knowledge about some particular area, X, or Y, or Z. (I?ll say what X, Y, and Z might be in a bit.) | |||
Today, skepticism continues to be a topic of lively debate among philosophers.{{r|Greco2009}} British philosopher ] posits that reason is perceived as "an enemy of mystery and ambiguity," but, if used properly, can be an effective tool for solving many larger societal issues.<ref name="Radford and Frazier (2017)">{{cite journal |author-link1=Benjamin Radford|last1=Radford|first1=Benjamin|author-link2=Kendrick Frazier|last2=Frazier|first2=Kendrick |title=The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World |journal=Skeptical Inquirer |date=January 2017 |volume=41 |issue=1 |page=60}}</ref> | |||
===Religion=== | |||
{{Main|Religious skepticism}} | |||
Religious skepticism generally refers to doubting particular religious beliefs or claims. For example, a religious skeptic might believe that ] existed (see ]) while questioning claims that he was the messiah or performed miracles. Historically, religious skepticism can be traced back to ], who doubted many religious claims of his time, although he recognized that "] is one, supreme among gods and men, and not like mortals in body or in mind." He maintained that there was one greatest God. God is one eternal being, spherical in form, comprehending all things within himself, is the absolute mind and thought, therefore is intelligent, and moves all things, but bears no resemblance to human nature either in body or mind."<ref>{{cite book |last1=McKirahan |first1=Richard D. |title="Xenophanes of Colophon" |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5UvjwAEACAAJ |website=23 March 2024 |publisher=Hackett Publishing Company |pages=60–62 |date=1994|isbn=978-0-87220-175-0 }}</ref> | |||
Religious skepticism is not the same as ] or ], though these often do involve skeptical attitudes toward religion and philosophical theology (for example, towards divine ]). Religious people are generally skeptical about claims of other religions, at least when the two denominations conflict concerning some belief. Additionally, they may also be skeptical of the claims made by atheists. | |||
Now remember, just before we started talking about skepticism, I said we would ask: "Is knowledge possible?" I said we could rephrase that by asking: "Am I ever sufficiently justified in believing something in order to have knowledge?" I said the skeptic says "No." So the skeptic says I am never sufficiently justified in believing something in order to have knowledge of it. But we just learned that this is a little vague, and we are narrowing down what the skeptic claims. So more precisely we'll say the skeptic claims: | |||
The historian ] writes that ] was "as skeptical of atheism as of any other dogma". The ] encourages skepticism that is mainly centered around self-investigation of | |||
truth.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Smith |first1=Peter |title=A Concise Encyclopedia of the Baháʼí Faith |year=2000 |location=Oxford, U.K.|publisher= Oneworld Publications |isbn=1-85168-184-1 |pages=266–267}}</ref> | |||
===Science=== | |||
{{Main|Scientific skepticism}} | |||
A scientific or ] skeptic is one who questions beliefs on the basis of scientific understanding and empirical evidence. | |||
] skepticism may discard beliefs pertaining to ''purported phenomena'' not subject to reliable observation and thus not systematic or empirically ]. Most scientists, being scientific skeptics, test the reliability of certain kinds of claims by subjecting them to systematic investigation via the ].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bloomberg|first1=David|last2=Novella|first2=Steven|url=https://skepticalinquirer.org/1999/07/scientific-skepticism-csicop-and-the-local-groups/|title=Scientific Skepticism, CSICOP, and the Local Groups|journal=Skeptical Inquirer|volume=23|number=4|date=July 1999|access-date=2018-07-05}}</ref> As a result, ] are considered to be "]" if they are found to improperly apply or to ignore the fundamental aspects of the scientific method. | |||
We <i>can</i> <i>never</i> <i>be</i> justified in believing something <i>about</i> <i>area</i> <i>X</i>, or at least not enough to give us knowledge about that area. | |||
=== Auditing === | |||
Professional skepticism is an important concept in ]. It requires an auditor to have a "questioning mind", to make a critical assessment of evidence, and to consider the sufficiency of the evidence.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU230.aspx#ps-pcaob_1c410f9b-5033-4f18-b865-af1307863bee|title=AU Section 230: Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work|website=Public Company Accounting Oversight Board|year=1972|language=en-US|access-date=2018-04-28|at=Professional Skepticism}}</ref> | |||
==See also== | |||
{{cols|colwidth=21em}} | |||
{{bots|deny=FrescoBot}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
* {{Annotated link|]}} | |||
{{colend}} | |||
==Notes== | |||
You're probably wondering what "areas" I'm talking about, exactly. Once again the areas are, for example, the external world; other minds; the past and the future; and so forth. | |||
{{Reflist}} | |||
==Sources== | |||
* {{cite book|author-link=Panayot Butchvarov|last=Butchvarov|first=Panayot|title=Skepticism About the External World|publisher=]|year=1998}} | |||
* {{cite book|author-link=Richard Hönigswald|first=Richard|last=Hönigswald|title=Die Skepsis in Philosophie und Wissenschaft|orig-year=1914|location=Göttingen|publisher=Edition Ruprecht|year=2008|isbn=978-3-7675-3056-0}} | |||
* {{cite book|last=Keeton|first=Morris T.|chapter=skepticism|pages=277–278|editor-first=Dagobert D.|editor-last=Runes|title=Dictionary of Philosophy|publisher=Littlefield, Adams, and Company|location=Totowa, N.J.|year=1962}} | |||
* {{cite journal |journal=Logos & Episteme |last=Le Morvan |first=P. |title=Healthy Skepticism and Practical Wisdom |volume=2 |number=1 |date=March 2011 |pages=87–102 |url=http://logos-and-episteme.acadiasi.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/HEALTHY-SKEPTICISM-AND-PRACTICAL-WISDOM.pdf |publisher=Institute for Economic and Social Research |issn=2069-0533 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190904064026/https://owd.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/documents/LE_Skepticism.pdf |archive-date=2019-09-04|doi=10.5840/logos-episteme20112151 |doi-access=free }} | |||
* {{cite book|title=]|author-link1=Henry George Liddell|first1=Henry George|last1=Liddell|author-link2=Robert Scott (philologist)|first2=Robert|last2=Scott|edition=revised and augmented|author-link3=Henry Stuart Jones|last3=Jones|first3=Henry Stuart|first4=Roderick|last4=McKenzie|publisher=]|location=Oxford, U.K.|year=1940}} | |||
* {{cite book|title=Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language|edition=Second, Unabridged|editor-first1=W.A.|editor-last1=Neilson|editor-first2=T.A.|editor-last2=Knott|editor-first3=P.W.|editor-last3=Carhart|publisher=G. & C. Merriam Company|location=Springfield, Mass.|year=1950}} | |||
==Further reading== | |||
* {{Cite book|title = The Skeptical Tradition|publisher = University of California Press|year = 1983|isbn = 978-0520037472|language = en|first = Myles|last = Burnyeat |author-link=Myles Frederic Burnyeat }} | |||
* {{Cite book|title = Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism|publisher = Harvard University Press|year = 1933|isbn = 978-0674993013|language = en|first = Robert Gregg|last = Bury |author-link=Robert Gregg Bury }} | |||
* {{Cite book|title = Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=mzO77w6KvDgC|url-access=subscription|publisher = Cambridge University Press|date = 2000-07-20|isbn = 978-0521778091|language = en|first1 = Sextus|last1 = Empiricus|first2 = Julia|last2 = Annas|first3 = Jonathan|last3 = Barnes |author-link2=Julia Annas |author-link3=Jonathan Barnes }} | |||
* {{Cite book|title = The Skeptics' Guide to the Universe: How to Know What's Really Real in a World Increasingly Full of Fake|publisher = Hodder & Stoughton|year = 2018|isbn = 978-1473696419|language = en|first = Steven|last = Novella |author-link=Steven Novella }} | |||
* {{Cite book|title = Total Truth:Liberating Christianity from Its Cultural Captivity|publisher = Crossway Books|year = 2005|isbn = 978-1581347463|language = en|first = Nancy|last = Pearcey |author-link=Nancy Pearcey}} | |||
* {{Cite book|title = The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=7j8PdlgFRDAC|url-access=subscription|publisher = Oxford University Press, US|year = 2003|isbn = 978-0198026716|language = en|first = Richard H. |last = Popkin |author-link=Richard Henry Popkin }} | |||
* {{Cite journal|title = A close look at therapeutic touch|journal = JAMA|date = 1998-04-01|issn = 0098-7484|pages = 1005–1010|volume = 279|issue = 13|doi = 10.1001/jama.279.13.1005|last1 = Rosa L|last2 = Rosa E|last3 = Sarner L|last4 = Barrett S|pmid=9533499|doi-access = free|citeseerx = 10.1.1.592.8130}} | |||
* {{Cite book|title = The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural Philosophy|publisher = Crossway Books|year = 1994|isbn = 978-0891077664|language = en | first = Charles| last = Thaxton|author-link=Charles B. Thaxton}} | |||
* {{Cite book|title = Don't Get Fooled Again: A Sceptic's Handbook|publisher = Icon|year = 2009|isbn = 978-1848310520|language = en|first = Richard|last = Wilson}} | |||
==External links== | |||
Now remember some things we talked about last time, about justification. At one point we were talking about foundationalism, and I gave an argument for foundationalism. If foundationalism is true, then there have to be some basic beliefs; and basic beliefs, remember, are beliefs that are justified, but not justified by other <i>beliefs</i>. So what could justify basic beliefs? I said: mental events, like an instance of perception, or an instance of memory. | |||
{{Wiktionary}} | |||
{{Wikiquote}} | |||
{{commons category|Skepticism}} | |||
* {{PhilPapers|category|skepticism}} | |||
* {{InPho|taxonomy|2391}} | |||
* {{cite SEP |url-id=skepticism |title=Skepticism |last=Klein |first=Peter}} | |||
* {{cite SEP |url-id=skepticism-ancient |title=Ancient Greek Skepticism |last=Vogt |first=Katja}} | |||
* {{cite IEP |url-id=skepanci/ |title=Ancient Greek Skepticism |last=Thorsrud |first=Harald}} | |||
* {{cite SEP |url-id=skepticism-medieval/ |title=Medieval Skepticism |last=Bolyard |first=Charles}} | |||
* {{cite IEP |url-id=skepcont/ |title=Contemporary Skepticism |last=Pritchard |first=Duncan}} | |||
* {{cite journal|first=Kurt|last=Kleiner|url=https://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7915|url-status=dead|title=Most Scientific Papers are Probably Wrong|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080919062923/http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7915 |archive-date=19 September 2008 |journal=]|date=30 August 2005}} | |||
* {{cite web|url=http://www.csicop.org/articles/19991214-century/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070715132139/http://www.csicop.org/articles/19991214-century/|archive-date=2007-07-15|url-status=dead|title=''Skeptical Inquirer'' Magazine Names the Ten Outstanding Skeptics of the Century|website=]|location=Amherst, N.Y.}} | |||
{{Navboxes | |||
|list= | |||
{{analytic philosophy}} | |||
{{epistemology}} | |||
{{skepticism}} | |||
{{philosophy of science}} | |||
{{Virtues}} | |||
}} | |||
{{Portal bar|Philosophy|Psychology}} | |||
{{Authority control}} | |||
] | |||
] | |||
Let me put that point in a more concrete way. Say I'm looking across a field of daisies and I see a cow. So I believe there is a cow across the field of daisies. And surely this belief is justified. How is it justified? What justifies the belief? Why, the mere fact that I see the cow. Or more technically: it is the event of my seeing the cow that justifies my belief that the cow is there peacefully grazing on daisies. | |||
] | |||
] | |||
] | |||
] | |||
This is an important point to understand so I'll give you another example. Suppose I am reminiscing about my high school days and I vividly recall a very nasty gym teacher -- very loud and rude. So I believe I had a nasty gym teacher; and again this belief is justified. How? By the fact that I remember it. That's all. Again, more technically: it is the event of my remembering my nasty gym teacher that justifies my belief that I had that teacher. | |||
] | |||
This is all actually very straightforward, once you understand what's being said. If we assume that foundationalism is true, then we?ve got basic beliefs; and our basic beliefs, to be basic, have to be justified by something that isn?t a belief; so what justifies them? The operation of ordinary cognitive processes, like seeing, remembering, feeling, introspecting, and so forth. When I remember something, that gives me excellent reason to believe what I remember. Not always of course, but usually, especially if the memory is vivid and I can't think of any reason to think that this particular memory is wrong. | |||
But in any case, if I do get justified beliefs from the use of memory, then my memory has to be reliable. Similarly with perception: if my seeming to see something makes me justified in believing it's there, then I have to assume that perception is reliable. If it were unreliable -- if it were often giving me false information -- then I couldn't say I was justified just based on the use of perception. | |||
You'll remember that I said that local skepticism is skepticism <i>about</i> <i>particular</i> <i>areas</i>. Now I can tell you what the areas are: they are matched up, not exactly but fairly closely, with different cognitive processes. What the skeptic doubts is that our cognitive processes are reliable. The skeptic says, for example: perception is not reliable; therefore, you are not justified in your beliefs about what you perceive. | |||
Since what you perceive is the external world, this sort of skeptic says: you are not justified in your beliefs about <i>the</i> <i>external</i> <i>world</i>. So one kind of skepticism is called <i>external</i> <i>world</i> <i>skepticism</i>: that is the view that we cannot know anything about an external world, even that such an external world exists! The reason we can't is that our faculty of perception is not reliable. We have already seen this view in action, when we talked about the theory of perception. Now we're approaching it from a different angle. | |||
You might be wondering, of course, why anyone would want to say that perception is not reliable. I've already given you one argument, which was due to David Hume. To review that very quickly, Hume's argument basically says that we can't know anything about the external world, because to know that we would have to know that there is a connection between our sense-data and the external world that they are supposed to represent. But the only thing we have contact with are our sense-data; we can never know anything in the external world except by first knowing our sense-data. But then we have no way to prove the connection between our sense-data and the external world. So we have no way to prove that our sense-data do represent any external world -- and <i>that</i> is to say that we have no way to prove that perception is reliable. | |||
Now I'm going to give you <i>another</i> argument for external world skepticism, which is more famous than Hume's. Namely, Descartes' famous dreaming doubt, and it goes like this. Descartes was writing one evening in his room, and he thought to himself (I paraphrase very loosely): What if I am asleep in bed right now, and only <i>dreaming</i> that I am awake, and writing? Isn't that at least possible? Then he said, well surely, I can tell when I am awake and when I am asleep. I can tell the difference between wakefulness and a dream. All sorts of strange things happen in dreams; I pass unaccountably from scene to scene when I'm dreaming; I don't have any long memory of what happened in a day, when I'm dreaming; and so forth. Then Descartes said: Haven't I had those very thoughts in some of my dreams? Sometimes, when I was dreaming, I was convinced that I was awake! I even tried to test that I was awake, when I was dreaming, and the tests convinced me that I was awake! But I was wrong; I <i>was</i> dreaming. Isn?t it quite possible that the same thing is happening to me <i>right</i> <i>now</i>? Isn?t it possible that I am dreaming that I can test whether I'm awake or asleep -- and of course, in my dream, I pass the test? So it seems really vivid to me right now that I'm awake -- but in fact, I'm <i>asleep</i>? | |||
Well, Descartes said to him, I guess there <i>aren't</i> any definite signs, or tests, that I could use to tell whether I'm asleep or dreaming. I could, after all, be dreaming those very tests. I have experience of doing that, thinking that I passed the test for being awake, when really I was only dreaming. So there <i>isn't</i> <i>any</i> <i>way</i> to tell that I am awake now. I cannot possibly prove that I am awake. So, Descartes said to himself, I don't really know that I am awake now and writing in the evening. For all I really <i>know</i>, I could be asleep. That's Descartes' dreaming doubt. | |||
Now we can go on and give this argument some more detail. For one thing, why does Descartes think that he doesn't know he's awake and writing? Well, he might be asleep. But what difference does that make? The difference that it makes is that <i>his</i> <i>faculty</i> <i>of</i> <i>sense</i>-<i>perception</i> <i>would</i> <i>not</i> <i>be</i> <i>reliable</i> if he were asleep. In other words, if he were asleep, it would seem to him that he is seeing, feeling, and hearing various things; but he wouldn't really be. In that case, of course, his faculty of perception <i>wouldn't</i> be reliable. But Descartes appears to go farther than that: he appears to be saying that since he <i>might</i> be dreaming, since he can't rule out the hypothesis that he is dreaming right now, that also means that his faculty of perception is not reliable. | |||
If you follow what Descartes is saying, you very well might find it exasperating, or silly. "I mean, of <i>course</i> I can tell that I'm not dreaming": that's what you want to say. Here is Descartes? reply: maybe you can, but <i>maybe</i> you're just <i>dreaming</i> that you can tell. If you say you <i>can</i> tell the difference between being awake and being asleep, then you are assuming that you're awake! And so you're begging the question against the skeptic! | |||
Or maybe you?ll say this. I can tell that my sense-perception is reliable. Here's how I can show that it's reliable. When I see something, like that cow chewing on daisies, I can go over to the cow, touch it, hear it, lean on it, and so forth. That confirms that really am seeing the cow. In the same way, when I hear something, like a marching band outside, I can step outside, and look at the marching band, talk to the members of the band, and so forth. That confirms that I heard the band outside. Throughout my life I've had so many experiences like this that I am practically certain that, in the more obvious cases anyway, my faculty of perception works -- it's generally reliable. | |||
Well, I'm sure you can guess how Descartes' skeptic will reply to this. You might just be <i>dreaming</i> that you are touching, hearing, and leaning on the cow. That marching band might just be part of a dream. For that matter you might only be <i>dreaming</i> that your faculty of perception has been generally reliable. If you argue: I'm not dreaming, because my faculty of perception is reliable, then you are begging the question! First, you have to establish that you're not dreaming! And that's impossible! So you can't know that your faculty of perception is reliable. | |||
And a sharper skeptic might make another remark about seeing the cow and hearing the marching band. Because, after all, weren't you <i>using</i> sense-perception in order to try to argue that your faculty of perception is generally reliable? Think about that: in order to show that your sense of sight works, you use your sense of sight and other senses; in order to show that your sense of hearing works, you use your sense of hearing and other senses. And it's not like you can avoid that. It would be really bizarre (though some philosophers have actually tried it) to try to argue that your senses are reliable, without making use of your senses. But if you make use of your senses, aren't you begging the question again? Don't you have to assume, or presuppose, that your senses are generally shipshape before you start using them to prove <i>anything</i>, including whether your senses are generally shipshape? | |||
Do you see the general problem? How can you prove that perception is reliable <i>without</i> <i>using</i> <i>your</i> <i>senses</i>? That seems impossible. But how can you use senses without assuming that perception is reliable? If you do that then you're arguing in a circle, you're begging the question. So what?s the upshot? That you <i>can't</i> prove that perception is reliable. If you try, you beg the question, and question-begging just isn't allowed. | |||
Notice that this is actually a <i>third</i> skeptical argument, different from Hume's and Descartes', although it is related to both. Hume said you can't prove that your sense-data represent the external world; Descartes said that you can't even prove that you're not dreaming; and this third argument says that you can't prove that perception is reliable, without assuming that your senses are reliable and thereby begging the question at issue. | |||
This third argument is also very serious because it can be used to generate skepticism about other of our cognitive processes. Such as memory. Do you think it would be possible to prove that your faculty of memory is reliable? Well, how would you do it? Could you even possibly do it <i>without</i> relying on <i>any</i> <i>memories</i> <i>at</i> <i>all</i>? Because if you do rely on any memories, then you're assuming that those memories are reliable: and that's what you're trying to prove, so you can't assume that. But how could you possibly show that your memories really do represent the past, <i>just</i> by the use of your other cognitive processes, such as perception, introspection, and so forth? Seems to me that you <i>couldn't</i> prove that. Not without begging the question. | |||
Now let's see how we can answer skepticism. I am very confident that we can, and that skepticism does not really pose a threat to our knowledge-claims. Let me point out a few very important objections to skepticism, that show that it may not be nearly as serious as you might think. | |||
First of all, in all three arguments -- Hume's, Descartes', and the circularity argument -- the claim is made that <i>we</i> <i>can't</i> <i>prove</i> something or other. We can't prove that sense-data represent an external reality. We can't prove that we're not dreaming. We can't prove that perception, or memory, is reliable. But now ask yourself: just because you can prove something, does that mean that you don't <i>know</i> it? Or that you aren't justified in believing it? Take Descartes? dreaming doubt as an example. Suppose you're convinced that you can't prove that you're not dreaming, not without begging the question. And you're even willing to admit that <i>mere</i> <i>very</i> <i>slight</i> possibility that you are dreaming right now. However, you might reply, who cares? So what if I can't prove, to Descartes? skeptic, that I'm not dreaming? Who cares if there is a very, very slight possibility that I'm dreaming right now? Does that really matter to my knowledge-claims? | |||
Now, <i>Descartes</i> <i>himself</i> thought it definitely did matter. Descartes wanted absolutely certain knowledge -- knowledge beyond any doubt. And so he thought that if you can raise the smallest doubt about something, then you don't really know it. For example, the dreaming doubt raises the very small possibility that I am not standing up right now, talking to you; I <i>might</i> be dreaming; and so Descartes would say (at that point -- later he thought he refuted this skepticism) that I don't <i>know</i> I'm standing up right now. | |||
So this forces us to ask ourselves: Do we have to have <i>absolute</i> <i>certainty</i>, lacking any doubt whatsoever, in order to have knowledge? That would be the absolutely strongest grade of justification possible. And then we would be saying that knowledge is not just <i>sufficiently</i> <i>justified</i> true belief, but <i>certainly</i> true belief. | |||
Now I personally don't think that such a strong degree of justification is necessary for knowledge. After all, I think we can know what the weather is going to be like, just by reading the morning forecast! Sometimes we're wrong; but if we're right then we have knowledge. So I'm not particularly worried if I can't prove that I'm not dreaming. I think it's extremely unlikely that I'm dreaming, and I think I'm perfectly well justified in thinking I'm awake. And I don't have to <i>know</i> <i>with</i> <i>absolute</i> <i>certainty</i> that I'm awake, of course, to be <i>well</i> <i>justified</i> in believing I'm awake. | |||
You should know this, that Descartes himself rejected his skeptical doubts in the end. But he thought he <i>could</i> prove that his life is not just a long dream. His procedure was first to prove that God exists, and then to say: well, God is not a deceiver, he is a good God. So he wouldn't allow the possibility that I'm asleep when by every indication I'm awake. And besides, he gave me a faculty of sense-perception, and certainly God wouldn't make this faculty <i>so</i> faulty that it is unreliable. So my faculty of sense-perception is reliable. So Descartes made God the guarantee of his being awake, and of the reliability of his cognitive processes. | |||
Of course, a lot of people have disagreed with Descartes on these points. I won't get into their reasons why. | |||
Here's a second thing you might observe about skepticism: the skeptic makes absolute certainty a requirement for knowledge, then you could reply. So apply that observation to skepticism itself. Is skepticism itself entirely beyond doubt? Isn't it possible to raise various kinds of objection to skepticism? So it would appear; but then no one can know that <i>skepticism</i> is true. So then the skeptic can't know that skepticism is true. But this is actually a bit of a weak reply, because it doesn?t really <i>refute</i> skepticism. The skeptic, after all, may be perfectly happy to admit that no one knows that skepticism is true. The skeptic might rest content saying that skepticism is <i>very</i> <i>probably</i> true. That's not the kind of claim that we non-skeptics will be happy to allow. | |||
A third objection, which especially applies to the circularity argument, comes from that common-sense Scotsman, Thomas Reid. Reid argued as follows. Suppose the skeptic is right, and perception is not reliable. But perception is just another one of my cognitive processes; and if <i>it</i> is not reliable, then my <i>others</i> are also bound not to be reliable. All of my faculties came out of the same shop, he said; so if one is faulty the others are bound to be as well. But that means that the faculty of <i>reasoning</i>, which the skeptic uses, is also bound to be unreliable too. In other words, when we reason, we are bound to make errors, and so we can never trust the arguments we give for any claim. But then that applies to the skeptic's argument for skepticism! So if the skeptic is right, we should not pay attention to skepticism, since the skeptic arrives at the skeptical conclusion by reasoning. And if the skeptic is wrong, then of course we need not pay attention to skepticism. In either case, we need not take skepticism about the reliability of our faculties seriously. | |||
Do you recognize the form of Reid's argument? It's a dilemma, like this: if P, then Q; if not-P, then Q; either P or not-P; therefore, in either case, Q. Either the skeptic is right, in which case we can't trust our ability our reason and so can't trust the skeptic's conclusion; or the skeptic is wrong, in which case again we can't trust the skeptic's conclusion. In either case we don't have to worry about skepticism! | |||
Well, as you know we could go on nearly endlessly about this topic. It's very interesting and has received a lot of discussion in philosophy, so there are a lot of arguments on both sides. I've only given you a basic sampling. | |||
Latest revision as of 11:47, 20 November 2024
Doubtful attitude toward knowledge claims "Skeptic" redirects here. For other uses, see Skeptic (disambiguation). For the philosophical view, see Philosophical skepticism. For denial of uncomfortable truths, see Denialism. For the band, see Skepticism (band).
Skepticism, also spelled scepticism in British English, is a questioning attitude or doubt toward knowledge claims that are seen as mere belief or dogma. For example, if a person is skeptical about claims made by their government about an ongoing war then the person doubts that these claims are accurate. In such cases, skeptics normally recommend not disbelief but suspension of belief, i.e. maintaining a neutral attitude that neither affirms nor denies the claim. This attitude is often motivated by the impression that the available evidence is insufficient to support the claim. Formally, skepticism is a topic of interest in philosophy, particularly epistemology.
More informally, skepticism as an expression of questioning or doubt can be applied to any topic, such as politics, religion, or pseudoscience. It is often applied within restricted domains, such as morality (moral skepticism), atheism (skepticism about the existence of God), or the supernatural. Some theorists distinguish "good" or moderate skepticism, which seeks strong evidence before accepting a position, from "bad" or radical skepticism, which wants to suspend judgment indefinitely.
Philosophical skepticism is one important form of skepticism. It rejects knowledge claims that seem certain from the perspective of common sense. Radical forms of philosophical skepticism deny that "knowledge or rational belief is possible" and urge us to suspend judgment on many or all controversial matters. More moderate forms claim only that nothing can be known with certainty, or that we can know little or nothing about nonempirical matters, such as whether God exists, whether human beings have free will, or whether there is an afterlife. In ancient philosophy, skepticism was understood as a way of life associated with inner peace.
Skepticism has been responsible for many important developments in science and philosophy. It has also inspired several contemporary social movements. Religious skepticism advocates for doubt concerning basic religious principles, such as immortality, providence, and revelation. Scientific skepticism advocates for testing beliefs for reliability, by subjecting them to systematic investigation using the scientific method, to discover empirical evidence for them.
Definition and semantic field
Skepticism, also spelled scepticism (from the Greek σκέπτομαι skeptomai, to search, to think about or look for), refers to a doubting attitude toward knowledge claims. So if a person is skeptical of their government's claims about an ongoing war then the person has doubts that these claims are true. Or being skeptical that one's favorite hockey team will win the championship means that one is uncertain about the strength of their performance. Skepticism about a claim implies that one does not believe the claim to be true. But it does not automatically follow that one should believe that the claim is false either. Instead, skeptics usually recommend a neutral attitude: beliefs about this matter should be suspended. In this regard, skepticism about a claim can be defined as the thesis that "the only justified attitude with respect to is suspension of judgment". It is often motivated by the impression that one cannot be certain about it. This is especially relevant when there is significant expert disagreement. Skepticism is usually restricted to a claim or a field of inquiry. So religious and moral skeptics have a doubtful attitude about religious and moral doctrines. But some forms of philosophical skepticism, are wider in that they reject any form of knowledge.
Some definitions, often inspired by ancient philosophy, see skepticism not just as an attitude but as a way of life. This is based on the idea that maintaining the skeptical attitude of doubt toward most concerns in life is superior to living in dogmatic certainty, for example because such a skeptic has more happiness and peace of mind or because it is morally better. In contemporary philosophy, on the other hand, skepticism is often understood neither as an attitude nor as a way of life but as a thesis: the thesis that knowledge does not exist.
Skepticism is related to various terms. It is sometimes equated with agnosticism and relativism. However, there are slight differences in meaning. Agnosticism is often understood more narrowly as skepticism about religious questions, in particular, about the Christian doctrine. Relativism does not deny the existence of knowledge or truth but holds that they are relative to a person and differ from person to person, for example, because they follow different cognitive norms. The opposite of skepticism is dogmatism, which implies an attitude of certainty in the form of an unquestioning belief. A similar contrast is often drawn in relation to blind faith and credulity.
Types
Various types of skepticism have been discussed in the academic literature. Skepticism is usually restricted to knowledge claims on one particular subject, which is why its different forms can be distinguished based on the subject. For example, religious skeptics distrust religious doctrines and moral skeptics raise doubts about accepting various moral requirements and customs. Skepticism can also be applied to knowledge in general. However, this attitude is usually only found in some forms of philosophical skepticism. A closely related classification distinguishes based on the source of knowledge, such as skepticism about perception, memory, or intuition. A further distinction is based on the degree of the skeptical attitude. The strongest forms assert that there is no knowledge at all or that knowledge is impossible. Weaker forms merely state that one can never be absolutely certain.
Some theorists distinguish between a good or healthy form of moderate skepticism in contrast to a bad or unhealthy form of radical skepticism. On this view, the "good" skeptic is a critically-minded person who seeks strong evidence before accepting a position. The "bad" skeptic, on the other hand, wants to "suspend judgment indefinitely... even in the face of demonstrable truth". Another categorization focuses on the motivation for the skeptical attitude. Some skeptics have ideological motives: they want to replace inferior beliefs with better ones. Others have a more practical outlook in that they see problematic beliefs as the cause of harmful customs they wish to stop. Some skeptics have very particular goals in mind, such as bringing down a certain institution associated with the spread of claims they reject.
Philosophical skepticism is a prominent form of skepticism and can be contrasted with non-philosophical or ordinary skepticism. Ordinary skepticism involves a doubting attitude toward knowledge claims that are rejected by many. Almost everyone shows some form of ordinary skepticism, for example, by doubting the knowledge claims made by flat earthers or astrologers. Philosophical skepticism, on the other hand, is a much more radical and rare position. It includes the rejection of knowledge claims that seem certain from the perspective of common sense. Some forms of it even deny that one knows that "I have two hands" or that "the sun will come out tomorrow". It is taken seriously in philosophy nonetheless because it has proven very hard to conclusively refute philosophical skepticism.
In various fields
Skepticism has been responsible for important developments in various fields, such as science, medicine, and philosophy. In science, the skeptical attitude toward traditional opinions was a key factor in the development of the scientific method. It emphasizes the need to scrutinize knowledge claims by testing them through experimentation and precise measurement. In the field of medicine, skepticism has helped establish more advanced forms of treatment by putting into doubt traditional forms that were based on intuitive appeal rather than empirical evidence. In the history of philosophy, skepticism has often played a productive role not just for skeptics but also for non-skeptical philosophers. This is due to its critical attitude that challenges the epistemological foundations of philosophical theories. This can help to keep speculation in check and may provoke creative responses, transforming the theory in question in order to overcome the problems posed by skepticism. According to Richard H. Popkin, "the history of philosophy can be seen, in part, as a struggle with skepticism". This struggle has led many contemporary philosophers to abandon the quest for absolutely certain or indubitable first principles of philosophy, which was still prevalent in many earlier periods. Skepticism has been an important topic throughout the history of philosophy and is still widely discussed today.
Philosophy
Part of a series on |
Pyrrhonism |
---|
Pyrrhonists |
Concepts |
Similar philosophies |
Modern influence |
Philosophy portal |
As a philosophical school or movement, skepticism arose both in ancient Greece and India. In India the Ajñana school of philosophy espoused skepticism. It was a major early rival of Buddhism and Jainism, and possibly a major influence on Buddhism. Two of the foremost disciples of the Buddha, Sariputta and Moggallāna, were initially students of the Ajñana philosopher Sanjaya Belatthiputta. A strong element of skepticism is found in Early Buddhism, most particularly in the Aṭṭhakavagga sutra. However the total effect these philosophies had on each other is difficult to discern. Since skepticism is a philosophical attitude and a style of philosophizing rather than a position, the Ajñanins may have influenced other skeptical thinkers of India such as Nagarjuna, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, and Shriharsha.
In Greece, philosophers as early as Xenophanes (c. 570–c. 475 BCE) expressed skeptical views, as did Democritus and a number of Sophists. Gorgias, for example, reputedly argued that nothing exists, that even if there were something we could not know it, and that even if we could know it we could not communicate it. The Heraclitean philosopher Cratylus refused to discuss anything and would merely wriggle his finger, claiming that communication is impossible since meanings are constantly changing. Socrates also had skeptical tendencies, claiming to know nothing worthwhile.
There were two major schools of skepticism in the ancient Greek and Roman world. The first was Pyrrhonism, founded by Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE). The second was Academic Skepticism, so-called because its two leading defenders, Arcesilaus (c. 315–240 BCE) who initiated the philosophy, and Carneades (c. 217–128 BCE), the philosophy's most famous proponent, were heads of Plato's Academy. Pyrrhonism's aims are psychological. It urges suspension of judgment (epoche) to achieve mental tranquility (ataraxia). The Academic Skeptics denied that knowledge is possible (acatalepsy). The Academic Skeptics claimed that some beliefs are more reasonable or probable than others, whereas Pyrrhonian skeptics argue that equally compelling arguments can be given for or against any disputed view. Nearly all the writings of the ancient skeptics are now lost. Most of what we know about ancient skepticism is from Sextus Empiricus, a Pyrrhonian skeptic who lived in the second or third century CE. His works contain a lucid summary of stock skeptical arguments.
Ancient skepticism faded out during the late Roman Empire, particularly after Augustine (354–430 CE) attacked the skeptics in his work Against the Academics (386 CE). There was little knowledge of, or interest in, ancient skepticism in Christian Europe during the Middle Ages. Interest revived during the Renaissance and Reformation, particularly after the complete writings of Sextus Empiricus were translated into Latin in 1569 and after Martin Luther's skepticism of holy orders. A number of Catholic writers, including Francisco Sanches (c. 1550–1623), Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), and Marin Mersenne (1588–1648) deployed ancient skeptical arguments to defend moderate forms of skepticism and to argue that faith, rather than reason, must be the primary guide to truth. Similar arguments were offered later (perhaps ironically) by the Protestant thinker Pierre Bayle in his influential Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697–1702).
The growing popularity of skeptical views created an intellectual crisis in seventeenth-century Europe. An influential response was offered by the French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes (1596–1650). In his classic work, Meditations of First Philosophy (1641), Descartes sought to refute skepticism, but only after he had formulated the case for skepticism as powerfully as possible. Descartes argued that no matter what radical skeptical possibilities we imagine there are certain truths (e.g., that thinking is occurring, or that I exist) that are absolutely certain. Thus, the ancient skeptics were wrong to claim that knowledge is impossible. Descartes also attempted to refute skeptical doubts about the reliability of our senses, our memory, and other cognitive faculties. To do this, Descartes tried to prove that God exists and that God would not allow us to be systematically deceived about the nature of reality. Many contemporary philosophers question whether this second stage of Descartes's critique of skepticism is successful.
In the eighteenth century a new case for skepticism was offered by the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776). Hume was an empiricist, claiming that all genuine ideas can be traced back to original impressions of sensation or introspective consciousness. Hume argued that on empiricist grounds there are no sound reasons for belief in God, an enduring self or soul, an external world, causal necessity, objective morality, or inductive reasoning. In fact, he argued that "Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not Nature too strong for it." As Hume saw it, the real basis of human belief is not reason, but custom or habit. We are hard-wired by nature to trust, say, our memories or inductive reasoning, and no skeptical arguments, however powerful, can dislodge those beliefs. In this way, Hume embraced what he called a "mitigated" skepticism, while rejecting an "excessive" Pyrrhonian skepticism that he saw as both impractical and psychologically impossible.
Hume's skepticism provoked a number of important responses. Hume's Scottish contemporary, Thomas Reid (1710–1796), challenged Hume's strict empiricism and argued that it is rational to accept "common-sense" beliefs such as the basic reliability of our senses, our reason, our memories, and inductive reasoning, even though none of these things can be proved. In Reid's view, such common-sense beliefs are foundational and require no proof in order to be rationally justified. Not long after Hume's death, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that human empirical experience has possibility conditions which could not have been realized unless Hume's skeptical conclusions about causal synthetic a priori judgements were false.
Today, skepticism continues to be a topic of lively debate among philosophers. British philosopher Julian Baggini posits that reason is perceived as "an enemy of mystery and ambiguity," but, if used properly, can be an effective tool for solving many larger societal issues.
Religion
Main article: Religious skepticismReligious skepticism generally refers to doubting particular religious beliefs or claims. For example, a religious skeptic might believe that Jesus existed (see historicity of Jesus) while questioning claims that he was the messiah or performed miracles. Historically, religious skepticism can be traced back to Xenophanes, who doubted many religious claims of his time, although he recognized that "God is one, supreme among gods and men, and not like mortals in body or in mind." He maintained that there was one greatest God. God is one eternal being, spherical in form, comprehending all things within himself, is the absolute mind and thought, therefore is intelligent, and moves all things, but bears no resemblance to human nature either in body or mind."
Religious skepticism is not the same as atheism or agnosticism, though these often do involve skeptical attitudes toward religion and philosophical theology (for example, towards divine omnipotence). Religious people are generally skeptical about claims of other religions, at least when the two denominations conflict concerning some belief. Additionally, they may also be skeptical of the claims made by atheists.
The historian Will Durant writes that Plato was "as skeptical of atheism as of any other dogma". The Baháʼí Faith encourages skepticism that is mainly centered around self-investigation of truth.
Science
Main article: Scientific skepticismA scientific or empirical skeptic is one who questions beliefs on the basis of scientific understanding and empirical evidence.
Scientific skepticism may discard beliefs pertaining to purported phenomena not subject to reliable observation and thus not systematic or empirically testable. Most scientists, being scientific skeptics, test the reliability of certain kinds of claims by subjecting them to systematic investigation via the scientific method. As a result, a number of ostensibly scientific claims are considered to be "pseudoscience" if they are found to improperly apply or to ignore the fundamental aspects of the scientific method.
Auditing
Professional skepticism is an important concept in auditing. It requires an auditor to have a "questioning mind", to make a critical assessment of evidence, and to consider the sufficiency of the evidence.
See also
- The Amaz!ng Meeting – Annual conference for skeptics, 2003–2015Pages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
- Critical thinking – Analysis of facts to form a judgment
- Committee for Skeptical Inquiry – Organization focusing on scientific skepticism
- Cynicism
- Debunker – Person or group discrediting false claims
- Euroscepticism – Body of criticism of the European Union
- List of topics characterized as pseudoscience
- Pseudoskepticism – Position that appears to be skeptic but is actually dogmatic
- Scientific skepticism – Questioning of claims lacking empirical evidence
- Skeptic – American science education magazinePages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
- The Skeptic – British magazinePages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
- Skeptical Inquirer – Bimonthly magazine published by CSI
- Skepticality – Skeptical podcast
- Skeptical movement – Questioning of claims lacking empirical evidencePages displaying short descriptions of redirect targets
- The Skeptic's Dictionary – 2003 essay collection by Robert Todd Carroll
- Skeptics in the Pub – Informal social event for skeptics since 1999
- The Skeptics Society – American nonprofit organization
- Trivialism – Logical theory
Notes
- Pritchard, Duncan (2006). "Contemporary Skepticism". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Archived from the original on 13 January 2009.
Philosophical views are typically classed as skeptical when they involve advancing some degree of doubt regarding claims that are elsewhere taken for granted.
- ^ Greco, John (2 September 2009). "Introduction". The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism (1 ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 3–7. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-518321-4.
- ^ Raynaud, Maurice (1 May 1981). "Skepticism in Medicine: Past and Present". The Linacre Quarterly. 48 (2). ISSN 0024-3639.
- ^ Sandkühler, Hans Jörg, ed. (2010). "Skepsis/Skeptizismus". Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Meiner.
- Bett, Richard Arnot Home (28 January 2010). The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge University Press. p. 289. ISBN 978-0-521-87476-2.
- "skepticism (noun)". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 5 February 2016.
- ^ Popkin, Richard H. "skepticism". Britannica. Retrieved 23 August 2022.
- ^ Comesaña, Juan; Klein, Peter (2019). "Skepticism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 24 August 2022.
- ^ Blackburn, Simon (1 January 2008). "scepticism". The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-954143-0.
-
- Vogt, Katja (2021). "Ancient Skepticism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 30 August 2022.
- Reed, Baron (2018). "Skepticism as a Way of Life". In McCain, Kevin; Poston, Ted (eds.). The Mystery of Skepticism. Brill Studies in Skepticism. Vol. 2. Brill. pp. 63–80. doi:10.1163/9789004393530_006. ISBN 978-90-04-39353-0. S2CID 150356547.
- ^ Newton Flew, Antony Garrard. "agnosticism". Britannica. Retrieved 26 August 2022.
- Sankey, Howard (1 March 2012). "Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion". Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 43 (1): 182–190. Bibcode:2012SHPSA..43..182S. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.12.026. ISSN 0039-3681.
- Baghramian, Maria; Carter, J. Adam (2022). "Relativism: 4.4 Epistemic relativism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 26 August 2022.
- ^ Laursen, John Christian (2018). "Skepticism". New Dictionary of the History of Ideas.
- Cohen, Stewart (1996). Craig, Edward (ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
- Olsson, Erik J. (2005). "Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: 'Pragmatism and Radical Doubt'". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 70 (1): 98–126. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00507.x. ISSN 0031-8205. JSTOR 40040781.
- Lagerlund, Henrik (29 April 2020). "Non-Philosophical Skepticism". Skepticism in Philosophy: A Comprehensive, Historical Introduction. Routledge. p. 197. ISBN 978-1-351-36995-4.
- Daly, Chris (2015). "Introduction and Historical Overview". The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods. U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1–30. doi:10.1057/9781137344557_1. ISBN 978-1-137-34455-7.
- Matilal 2004, pp. 52–75. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMatilal2004 (help)
-
- Diogenes Laërtius. Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. Book IX.
- Bakalis (2005, p. 86)
- Jones, W. T. (1952). A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Harcourt, Brace. p. 60 n. 45.
- ^ Popkin, Richard H. (1967). "Skepticism". In Edwards, Paul (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 7. New York: Macmillan.
- Hazlett, Allan (2014). A Critical Introduction to Skepticism. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 4–5.
- Daughtrity, Dyron B. (2017). Martin Luther: A Biography for the People. Abilene Christian University Press. p. 358. ISBN 978-0-89112-468-9. Retrieved 11 February 2023.
- ^ Popkin, Richard H. (1979). The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (revised ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Radford, Benjamin; Frazier, Kendrick (January 2017). "The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World". Skeptical Inquirer. 41 (1): 60.
- McKirahan, Richard D. (1994). "Xenophanes of Colophon". Hackett Publishing Company. pp. 60–62. ISBN 978-0-87220-175-0.
{{cite book}}
:|website=
ignored (help) - Smith, Peter (2000). A Concise Encyclopedia of the Baháʼí Faith. Oxford, U.K.: Oneworld Publications. pp. 266–267. ISBN 1-85168-184-1.
- Bloomberg, David; Novella, Steven (July 1999). "Scientific Skepticism, CSICOP, and the Local Groups". Skeptical Inquirer. 23 (4). Retrieved 5 July 2018.
- "AU Section 230: Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work". Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 1972. Professional Skepticism. Retrieved 28 April 2018.
Sources
- Butchvarov, Panayot (1998). Skepticism About the External World. Oxford University Press.
- Hönigswald, Richard (2008) . Die Skepsis in Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Göttingen: Edition Ruprecht. ISBN 978-3-7675-3056-0.
- Keeton, Morris T. (1962). "skepticism". In Runes, Dagobert D. (ed.). Dictionary of Philosophy. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, and Company. pp. 277–278.
- Le Morvan, P. (March 2011). "Healthy Skepticism and Practical Wisdom" (PDF). Logos & Episteme. 2 (1). Institute for Economic and Social Research: 87–102. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme20112151. ISSN 2069-0533. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 September 2019.
- Liddell, Henry George; Scott, Robert; Jones, Henry Stuart; McKenzie, Roderick (1940). A Greek-English Lexicon (revised and augmented ed.). Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press.
- Neilson, W.A.; Knott, T.A.; Carhart, P.W., eds. (1950). Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (Second, Unabridged ed.). Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company.
Further reading
- Burnyeat, Myles (1983). The Skeptical Tradition. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0520037472.
- Bury, Robert Gregg (1933). Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674993013.
- Empiricus, Sextus; Annas, Julia; Barnes, Jonathan (20 July 2000). Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521778091.
- Novella, Steven (2018). The Skeptics' Guide to the Universe: How to Know What's Really Real in a World Increasingly Full of Fake. Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 978-1473696419.
- Pearcey, Nancy (2005). Total Truth:Liberating Christianity from Its Cultural Captivity. Crossway Books. ISBN 978-1581347463.
- Popkin, Richard H. (2003). The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford University Press, US. ISBN 978-0198026716.
- Rosa L; Rosa E; Sarner L; Barrett S (1 April 1998). "A close look at therapeutic touch". JAMA. 279 (13): 1005–1010. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.592.8130. doi:10.1001/jama.279.13.1005. ISSN 0098-7484. PMID 9533499.
- Thaxton, Charles (1994). The Soul of Science: Christian Faith and Natural Philosophy. Crossway Books. ISBN 978-0891077664.
- Wilson, Richard (2009). Don't Get Fooled Again: A Sceptic's Handbook. Icon. ISBN 978-1848310520.
External links
- Skepticism at PhilPapers
- Skepticism at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
- Klein, Peter. "Skepticism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Vogt, Katja. "Ancient Greek Skepticism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Thorsrud, Harald. "Ancient Greek Skepticism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Bolyard, Charles. "Medieval Skepticism". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Pritchard, Duncan. "Contemporary Skepticism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Kleiner, Kurt (30 August 2005). "Most Scientific Papers are Probably Wrong". New Scientist. Archived from the original on 19 September 2008.
- "Skeptical Inquirer Magazine Names the Ten Outstanding Skeptics of the Century". Committee for Skeptical Inquiry. Amherst, N.Y. Archived from the original on 15 July 2007.