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			{{Short description\|Talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority}}
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			{{pp-30-500\|small=yes}}
			{{Use dmy dates\|date=January 2014}}
			{{Israel-Palestinian peace process}}
			The '''Taba Summit''' (also known as '''Taba Talks''', '''Taba Conference''' or shortened to '''Taba''') were talks between ] and the ], held from 21 to 27 January 2001 in ]. The talks took place during a political transition period – Israeli Prime Minister ] had resigned six weeks previously on 9 December 2000, and ] on 6 February 2001, and the ] had taken place just one day prior, on 20 January 2001.

			The Taba negotiations followed previous peace negotiation efforts, including the ] (1993–1995) and the ] (2000), which had failed to reach a final agreement and were considered more detailed in an attempt to make significant progress on several key issues, including borders, ], ], and ].
	The '''Taba summit''' (also known as ''Taba Summit'', ''Taba Talks'', ''Taba Conference'', ''Taba'', or ''permanent status talks at Taba'') were talks between ] and the ], held from ] to ], ] at ] in the ], were peace talks aimed at reaching the "final status" negotiations to end the ]. The summit came closer to reaching a final settlement than any previous or subsequent peace talks yet ultimately failed to achieve its goals.

			They were peace talks aimed at enhancing the "final status" negotiations, to end the ]. According to the statement issued by the negotiators at the end of the talks, they came closer to reaching a final settlement than in any previous peace talks. Barak's government terminated the talks on 27 January 2001 due to the upcoming Israeli election, and the new ]'s government did not restart them.
	==Diplomatic setting==
	The summit took place against the backdrop of the failed ] between ] ] and the Palestinian President ], and a Palestinian ] that commenced against Israel. The disparate Palestinian militant groups launched a variety of violent attacks against Israeli targets. The Palestinians asserted that the visit to the ] (known to Muslims as Al-Haram al-Qudsi al-Sharif where the ] is) by the ] leader ] sparked the ] in September of 2000. For US President ], the peace diplomacy culminating at the Taba Summit was a final attempt to win an important political victory before he was to leave office (in the shadow of his own ] in 1999) and with expected changes of policy expected with the inauguration of President ] on ], ]. On ], 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected as the new prime minister of Israel, and he refused to meet in person with the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat.

	{{Israel-Palestinian Peace Process}}

	==Background==		==Background==
			{{Main\|2000 Camp David Summit}}
	The Israelis and Palestinians had first negotiated in ] under President ] from ] to ], ]. The Israelis under Foreign Minister ] and the prime minister's bureau chief ]. President Clinton presented bridging proposals. Following a meeting in ], ] between Ben-Ami and ] Chairman ], the talks were then moved to Taba from ] to ], ].
			{{further\|The Clinton Parameters}}
			The Taba Summit took place from 21 to 27 January 2001 at ], after the failed ] between Prime Minister of Israel ] and the Palestinian President ], and against the backdrop of the ] that commenced. The parties had first negotiated at ] in ], hosted by President ] from 19 to 23 December 2000. The Israelis under Foreign Minister ], the Palestinian under senior negotiator ], Minister ] and Gaza security chief ] attended the meeting.<ref name=DVR>UN Division for Palestinian Rights, {{webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131104205003/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/3790975C4E7E4084852569D6006553B3 \|date=4 November 2013}}. Par. 25–29.</ref> President Clinton presented bridging proposals (the so-called ]). A summit in ], mediated by Egyptian President ], was planned on 28 December. As the Palestinians delayed their acceptance of the Clinton Parameters, Barak decided not to go.<ref name=CNN_271200>CNN, 27 December 2000, {{Webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050312002438/http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/12/27/mideast.06/ \|date=12 March 2005 }}</ref>

			==Positions==
	==EU description of the outcome of permanent status talks at Taba==

			===Israeli start positions===
	There is a ] (EU) unofficial report about the Taba talks (see complete full text here: <ref> . EU description of the outcome of permanent status talks at Taba.</ref>, or in 5 parts in ]: <ref> </ref> <ref> </ref> <ref> </ref> <ref> </ref> <ref> </ref>). Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It draws attention to the extensive work which had been undertaken on all permanent status issues like territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security in order to find ways to come to joint positions. At the same time it shows that there remained serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations:
			At the start of the Taba Summit, Israel held on three main points:<ref>Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 January 2001, </ref>
			* no right of Palestinian refugees to return to inside the State of Israel
			* no Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif
			* big settlement blocs (containing 80% of Jewish residents of the West Bank and Gaza) will be under Israeli sovereignty

	===~~Territory~~===		===The Moratinos non-paper===
			January 2001, the ] Special Representative to the Middle East Process ] presented a document, known as "The Moratinos non-paper," describing the outcome of the Taba negotiations.<ref>27 January 2001, , on unispal; * , on MidEastWeb</ref><ref>The Moratinos non-paper in 5 parts, published by ''Haaretz'': ; ; ; ; </ref> Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It describes observed positions on the permanent status issues territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security, in order to find ways to come to joint positions. "At the same time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations." Summary of the paper:
	The two sides agreed that in accordance with the ], the ], ] lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the state of Palestine.

			==== Territory and permanent borders ====
	====West Bank====
			The two sides agreed that in accordance with the ], the 4 June 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the Palestinian state. Israel reduced its demands to 6% with territorial compensation that would offset about 3%, while the Palestinians proposed an Israeli annexation of about 3% along with a territorial compensation of the same amount. The Israeli proposal would have given the Palestinians some 97% of the land area of the West Bank.<ref> {{webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150117011736/http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm \|date=17 January 2015 }}, The Jewish Peace Lobby website, full text (English).</ref>
	For the first time both sides presented their own ]s over the ]. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli interests in the West Bank. The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for annexation of ] blocs. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel seeks to annex.

	====~~Gaza~~ ~~Strip~~====		=====West Bank=====
			]
	Neither side presented any maps over the ]. It was implied that the Gaza Strip would be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details still had to be worked out. All settlements would be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed to by the Israeli side. Both sides agreed that there was going to be a safe passage from the north of Gaza (]) to the ] district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be territorially linked.
			Both sides presented their own ]s of the ]. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli interests in the West Bank. The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for annexation of ], areas which only had a small number of Palestinians. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel sought to annex.

	===~~Jerusalem~~===		=====Gaza Strip=====
			Neither side presented any maps of the ]. It was implied that the Gaza Strip would be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details still had to be worked out. All settlements would be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed to by the Israeli side. Both sides agreed that there was going to be a safe passage from the north of Gaza (]) to the ] district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be territorially linked.
	Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty over ] neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over ]ish neighborhoods in ]. Both sides favored the idea of an ]. The Israeli side accepted that Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states: ''Yerushalaim'', capital of Israel and ''Al-Quds'', capital of the state of Palestine. Both parties accepted the principle of respective control over each side's respective holy sites. Israel's sovereignty over the ] would be recognized although there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area covered by the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's ideas as the space sacred to ] of which it is part. Both sides agreed that the question of ''Haram al-Sharif''/] has not been resolved.

	===~~Refugees~~===		====Jerusalem====
			Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty over ] neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over ]ish neighborhoods in ]. Both sides favored the idea of an ]. The Israeli side accepted that Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states: ''Yerushalaim'', capital of Israel and ''Al-Quds'', capital of the state of Palestine. Both parties accepted the principle of respective control over each side's respective holy sites. Israel's sovereignty over the ] would be recognized although there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area covered by the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's ideas as the space sacred to ] of which it is part. Both sides agreed that the question of ''Haram al-Sharif''/] has not been resolved.
	Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as a good basis for the talks. Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and references which could facilitate the adoption of an agreement. Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement of the ] in accordance with the ] must lead to the implementation of ]. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish to return shall be implemented within the framework of one of the following programs:

			====Refugees====
			Non-papers were exchanged which were regarded as a good basis for the talks. Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and references which could facilitate the adoption of an agreement. Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement of the ]<!--intentional link to DAB page--> in accordance with the ] must lead to the implementation of ]. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish to return shall be implemented within the framework of one of the following programs:

	A. Return and repatriation		A. Return and repatriation
	1. to Israel		# to Israel
	2. to Israeli swapped territory		# to Israeli swapped territory
	3. to the Palestinian state.		# to the Palestinian state

	B. Rehabilitation and relocation		B. Rehabilitation and relocation
	1. Rehabilitation in host country.		# Rehabilitation in host country
	2. Relocation to third country.		# Relocation to third country

	Both sides agreed that ] should be phased out in accordance with an agreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period.		Both sides agreed that ] should be phased out in accordance with an agreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period.

	The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation to ~~former~~ ] be recognized, while accepting that it was not a Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. The Israeli side rejected this.		The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation to ] be recognized, while accepting that it was not a Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. The Israeli side rejected this.

	===Security===		====Security====
	#The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on Palestinian territory.		# The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on Palestinian territory.
	#The Israeli side maintained that the state ~~of Palestine~~ would be non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept limitation on its acquisition of ], and be defined as a state with limited arms.		# The Israeli side maintained that the Palestinian state would be non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept limitation on its acquisition of ], and be defined as a state with limited arms.
	#The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine would have ] over its ].		# The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine would have ] over its ]. The Israeli side agreed to accept and honor all Palestinian civil aviation rights according to international regulations, but sought a unified air control system under overriding Israel control. In addition, Israel requested access to Palestinian airspace for military operations and training.
	#The Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from the West Bank over a 36 month period with an additional 36 months for the Jordan Valley in conjunction with an international force. The Palestinian side rejected a 36 month withdrawal process from the West Bank expressing concern that a lengthy process would exacerbate Palestinian-Israeli tensions.		# The Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from the West Bank over a 36-month period with an additional 36 months for the Jordan Valley in conjunction with an international force. The Palestinian side rejected a 36-month withdrawal process from the West Bank expressing concern that a lengthy process would exacerbate Palestinian-Israeli tensions.
	#The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations on Palestinian territory (in the ]) with the Palestinian response allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limit for the dismantling. The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of ] on Palestinian territory during emergency situations, but was prepared to consider ways in which international forces might be used in that capacity, particularly within the context of regional security cooperation efforts.		# The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations on potentially Palestinian territory (in the ]) with the Palestinian response allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limit for the dismantling. The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of ] on Palestinian territory during emergency situations, but was prepared to consider ways in which international forces might be used in that capacity, particularly within the context of regional security cooperation efforts.
	#Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to promoting security cooperation and fighting ].		# Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to promoting security cooperation and fighting ].
	#The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian sovereignty over borders and international crossing points would be recognized in the agreement.		# The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian sovereignty over borders and international crossing points would be recognized in the agreement.

			===Positions mentioned in other sources===
	==End of the negotiations==
			Israel wanted to keep military control over Palestinian land and airspace in states of emergency, not because of a possible future threat from Palestine, but because of possible other threats from the East. The Palestinians wanted to accept international forces only.<ref>. Palestine Papers, 23 January 2001. On </ref>
	The Taba Summit officially ended with a joint statement <ref name=jointstatement> </ref>, that included some of the following points:

			The Palestinians could not accept Israeli annexation of ] and ] in the Jerusalem area. Israel wanted future expansion of the settlements into the West Bank. Unlike the Palestinians, Israel did not consider East Jerusalem part of the West Bank and its Israeli inhabitants settlers.<ref>. Palestine Papers, 23 January 2001. On </ref>
	:''The Israeli and Palestinian delegations conducted...deep and practical talks with the aim of reaching a permanent and stable agreement between the two parties...it proved impossible to reach understandings on all issues, despite the substantial progress that was achieved in each of the issues discussed...The two sides take upon themselves to return to normalcy and to establish security situation on the ground through the observation of their mutual commitments in the spirit of the ]. The negotiation teams discussed four main themes: refugees, security, borders and Jerusalem, with a goal to reach a permanent agreement that will bring an end to the conflict between them and provide peace to both people...The Taba talks conclude an extensive phase in the Israeli-Palestinian permanent status negotiations with a sense of having succeeded in rebuilding trust between the sides...The two sides express their gratitude to President ]...They also express their thanks to the ]...''

	==~~Barak's negation~~ of the ~~talks~~==		==End of the negotiations==
	In fact Barak went even further, in a ] ] statement <ref>
	"Barak to Bush: Sharon is not bound by negotiating ideas"]. Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser. Feb. 8, 2001.</ref> released by Barak's media advisor he communicated to newly inaugurated President ] as follows:

			===Official statement===
	:''Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak clarified this evening that the ideas which were brought up in the course of the recent negotiations conducted with the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, including those raised at the ] and by President Clinton towards the end of his term in office, are not binding on the new government to be formed in Israel. In a letter to President George Bush, Prime Minister Barak stated that his government had done the utmost to bring about an end to the ], but that these efforts did not bear fruit, primarily because of a lack of sufficient readiness for compromise on the part of the Palestinian leadership...Before sending the letter, Barak spoke with former President ], and they were in agreement that the ideas raised in the past months are not binding on the new government in Israel. Prime Minister Barak intends to convey this position also to the heads of the ] and to Chairman Arafat.''
			The Taba Summit officially ended with a joint statement,<ref name=jointstatement>{{cite web \|title=Israeli-Palestinian joint statement at Taba \|url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/1/Israeli-Palestinian%20Joint%20Statement%20-%2027-Jan-2001 \|website=Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040701082504/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/1/Israeli-Palestinian%20Joint%20Statement%20-%2027-Jan-2001 \|archive-date=1 July 2004 \|date=27 January 2001}}</ref> which included some of the following points:

			{{quote\|The Israeli and Palestinian delegations conducted ... deep and practical talks with the aim of reaching a permanent and stable agreement between the two parties. ... Given the circumstances and time constraints, it proved impossible to reach understandings on all issues, despite the substantial progress that was achieved in each of the issues discussed. ... The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections. The two sides take upon themselves to return to normalcy and to establish security situation on the ground through the observation of their mutual commitments in the spirit of the ]. The negotiation teams discussed four main themes: refugees, security, borders and Jerusalem, with a goal to reach a permanent agreement that will bring an end to the conflict between them and provide peace to both people. ... The Taba talks conclude an extensive phase in the Israeli–Palestinian permanent status negotiations with a sense of having succeeded in rebuilding trust between the sides. ... The two sides express their gratitude to President ]. ... They also express their thanks to the ]. ... The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections. ..."}}
	==Who ended the peace negotiations?==

			===Reasons for impasse===
	The issue of who ended the negotiations is disputed. There is no consensus. Here are some perspectives:
			The breakdown is often attributed to the political circumstances posed by Israeli elections and changeover in leadership in the United States:<ref name=pbs>.</ref> They had run out of political time. They could not conclude an agreement with Clinton now out of office and Barak standing for reelection in two weeks. Israel's negotiator ] said that "We made progress, substantial progress. We are closer than ever to the possibility of striking a final deal".<ref name=Brecher>{{cite book \|last=Brecher \|first=Michael \|date=2016 \|title=The World of Protracted Conflicts \|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xQ4XDAAAQBAJ&dq=%22My+heart+aches+because+I+know+we+were+so+close.+We+need+six+more+weeks+to+conclude+the+drafting+of+the+agreement.%22&pg=PA339 \|publisher=Lexington Books \|page=339\|isbn=9781498531887 }}</ref><ref name=Jeong>{{cite book \|last=Jeong \|first=Ho-Won \|date=2016 \|title=International Negotiation: Process and Strategies \|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-8-xCwAAQBAJ&dq=%22My+heart+aches+because+I+know+we+were+so+close.+We+need+six+more+weeks+to+conclude+the+drafting+of+the+agreement.%22&pg=PA137 \|publisher=Cambridge University Press \|page=137 \|isbn=9781107026407 }}</ref> Palestinian chief negotiator ] also lamented the lack of a final agreement. "My heart aches because I know we were so close. We need six more weeks to conclude the drafting of the agreement."<ref name=Brecher/><ref name=Jeong/>

			===Sharon Government's negation of the talks===
	] of the Israeli peace group ] wrote <ref name=uriavnery> . By ]. ]. Feb. 23, 2002.</ref>: "It was not Arafat who broke off the talks at this critical moment, when the light at the end of the tunnel was clearly visible to the negotiators, but Barak. He ordered his men to break off and return home."
			The following month the ] party candidate ] defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 6 February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks.<ref name="JPressman">Jeremy Pressman, ''International Security'', vol 28, no. 2, Fall 2003, p. 9, . On {{Webarchive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722061359/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/322/visions_in_collision.html\|date=22 July 2011}}</ref> Immediately after the elections and before the change of government, an 8 February 2001 statement published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:

			{{quote\|Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak clarified this evening that the ideas which were brought up in the course of the recent negotiations conducted with the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, including those raised at the ] and by President Clinton towards the end of his term in office, are not binding on the new government to be formed in Israel. In a letter to President George Bush, Prime Minister Barak stated that his government had done the utmost to bring about an end to the ], but that these efforts did not bear fruit, primarily because of a lack of sufficient readiness for compromise on the part of the Palestinian leadership. ... Before sending the letter, Barak spoke with former President ], and they were in agreement that the ideas raised in the past months are not binding on the new government in Israel. Prime Minister Barak intends to convey this position also to the heads of the ] and to chairman Arafat.<ref> {{webarchive \|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050406204002/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/2/Barak%20to%20Bush-%20Sharon%20is%20not%20bound%20by%20negotiating \|date=6 April 2005}}</ref>}}
	A ] page <ref name=pbs> .</ref> has this:
	:But they had run out of political time. They couldn't conclude an agreement with Clinton now out of office and Barak standing for reelection in two weeks. "We made progress, substantial progress. We are closer than ever to the possibility of striking a final deal," said Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel's negotiator. Saeb Erekat, Palestinian chief negotiator, said, "My heart aches because I know we were so close. We need six more weeks to conclude the drafting of the agreement."

			=== Arafat accepts Taba peace plan ===
	From the '']'' David Matz writes <ref name=davidmatz> . By David Matz. ''].'' Vol.10 No.3 2003.</ref> concerning a joint statement <ref name=jointstatement />:
			In June 2002, approximately 18 months after the conclusion of the Taba Summit, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat gave an interview to the Israeli newspaper ], in which he stated that he had accepted the ] proposed by U.S. President Bill Clinton. However, by that time, the new Israeli government emphasized that this offer was no longer under consideration.<ref>, Guardian, Ewen MacAskill, 22 June 2002</ref>
	:The Taba negotiation began on Sunday evening, January 21, and ended on Saturday afternoon, January 27 . At the closing press conference, the parties issued this joint statement: “The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli election.”

	==Summary==
	In December 2000 President Clinton presented a "bridging proposal" aimed at ending the most recent ] culminating with the Taba Summit (January 22 and January 28, 2001). After the November 2000 US presidential elections, President Clinton was on his way out while George W. Bush was waiting in the wings. This was as far as ] would take the ]. It put the Oslo peace process, from the time of ] on indefinite hold. In spite of Barak's concessions to the Palestinians, the majority of Israelis did not support him as seen in Ariel Sharon's rejection of Arafat's position vindicated with his election as prime minister on February 6, 2001.

	Arafat may have wanted to place the Bush administration into the same set of proposals that had been put forth under Clinton and Barak may have wanted a diplomatic success in the forthcoming elections he would face.

	The talks had been structured around four committees to discuss different aspects of the peace negotiations:

	#Jerusalem: Israeli negotiators presented to the Palestinians the idea of creating a special international regime for the "Holy Basin" -- an area including the Old City and some areas outside the walls including the Mount of Olives cemetery. The Palestinians rejected the proposal, insisting on Palestinian sovereignty instead.
	#Territory and settlements: Israel reduced its demands to 6% with territorial compensation that would offset about 3%, while the Palestinians proposed an Israeli annexation of about 3% along with a territorial compensation of the same amount. The Israeli proposal would have given the Palestinians some 97% of the land area of the West Bank, but there was no final agreement.
	#Refugees committee: Arab refugees from Israel and the equal number of Jewish refugees forced out of Arab countries, a problem dating back to the ]. Israeli Justice Minister ] reported that Palestinian negotiator ], reached an agreement on the Palestinian right of return but ] insisted on the Palestinian's Right of Return.
	#Security issues: See above.

	==See also==		==See also==
			* ]

	{{Middle East conflict}}

	== References ==		== References ==
			{{reflist}}
	<references />

	==Related article==
	*]

	==Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties==
	*]
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	==External links==		==External links==
			* ''''
	* (Includes links to texts of Israeli, United States and other press reports)
			* (Includes links to texts of Israeli, United States and other press reports)
			* . David Matz, '']''. Vol.10 No.3 2003.
	*		*
	*		*
	* {{fr}}		* {{in lang\|fr}}

	==Further reading==

	{{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}}

	]		{{Israeli-Palestinian conflict \|Diplomacy}}
			{{Arab-Israeli diplomacy}}
	]
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Latest revision as of 10:29, 8 December 2024

Talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority

Part of a series on
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Israeli–Palestinian
peace process

History

Camp David Accords	1978
Madrid Conference	1991
Oslo Accords	1993 / 95
Hebron Protocol	1997
Wye River Memorandum	1998
Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum	1999
Camp David Summit	2000
The Clinton Parameters	2000
Taba Summit	2001
Road Map	2003
Agreement on Movement and Access	2005
Annapolis Conference	2007
Mitchell-led talks	2010–11
Kerry-led talks	2013–14

Primary concerns

Secondary concerns

International brokers

Proposals

One-state solution:
- Isratin
  Elon Peace Plan
Two-state solution:
- Fahd Plan
  Allon Plan
  Arab Peace Initiative
  Geneva Initiative
  Lieberman Plan
  Israeli Peace Initiative
  Palestinian Prisoners' Document
  Trump Peace Plan
Three-state solution
Israeli unilateral plans:
- Hafrada
  Disengagement
  Realignment

Projects / groups / NGOs

Peace-orientated projects

The Taba Summit (also known as Taba Talks, Taba Conference or shortened to Taba) were talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, held from 21 to 27 January 2001 in Taba, Egypt. The talks took place during a political transition period – Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had resigned six weeks previously on 9 December 2000, and elections were due on 6 February 2001, and the inauguration of President George W. Bush had taken place just one day prior, on 20 January 2001.

The Taba negotiations followed previous peace negotiation efforts, including the Oslo Accords (1993–1995) and the Camp David Summit (2000), which had failed to reach a final agreement and were considered more detailed in an attempt to make significant progress on several key issues, including borders, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements in occupied territories, and Jerusalem.

They were peace talks aimed at enhancing the "final status" negotiations, to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. According to the statement issued by the negotiators at the end of the talks, they came closer to reaching a final settlement than in any previous peace talks. Barak's government terminated the talks on 27 January 2001 due to the upcoming Israeli election, and the new Ariel Sharon's government did not restart them.

Background

Main article: 2000 Camp David Summit Further information: The Clinton Parameters

The Taba Summit took place from 21 to 27 January 2001 at Taba, after the failed Camp David 2000 Summit between Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak and the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, and against the backdrop of the Second Intifada that commenced. The parties had first negotiated at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, hosted by President Bill Clinton from 19 to 23 December 2000. The Israelis under Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Palestinian under senior negotiator Saeb Erekat, Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo and Gaza security chief Mohammed Dahlan attended the meeting. President Clinton presented bridging proposals (the so-called "Clinton Parameters"). A summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, mediated by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, was planned on 28 December. As the Palestinians delayed their acceptance of the Clinton Parameters, Barak decided not to go.

Positions

Israeli start positions

At the start of the Taba Summit, Israel held on three main points:

no right of Palestinian refugees to return to inside the State of Israel
no Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif
big settlement blocs (containing 80% of Jewish residents of the West Bank and Gaza) will be under Israeli sovereignty

The Moratinos non-paper

January 2001, the European Special Representative to the Middle East Process Miguel Moratinos presented a document, known as "The Moratinos non-paper," describing the outcome of the Taba negotiations. Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It describes observed positions on the permanent status issues territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security, in order to find ways to come to joint positions. "At the same time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations." Summary of the paper:

Territory and permanent borders

The two sides agreed that in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the 4 June 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the Palestinian state. Israel reduced its demands to 6% with territorial compensation that would offset about 3%, while the Palestinians proposed an Israeli annexation of about 3% along with a territorial compensation of the same amount. The Israeli proposal would have given the Palestinians some 97% of the land area of the West Bank.

West Bank

Both sides presented their own maps of the West Bank. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli interests in the West Bank. The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for annexation of Settlement blocs, areas which only had a small number of Palestinians. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel sought to annex.

Gaza Strip

Neither side presented any maps of the Gaza Strip. It was implied that the Gaza Strip would be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details still had to be worked out. All settlements would be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed to by the Israeli side. Both sides agreed that there was going to be a safe passage from the north of Gaza (Beit Hanun) to the Hebron district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be territorially linked.

Jerusalem

Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem. Both sides favored the idea of an open city. The Israeli side accepted that Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states: Yerushalaim, capital of Israel and Al-Quds, capital of the state of Palestine. Both parties accepted the principle of respective control over each side's respective holy sites. Israel's sovereignty over the Western Wall would be recognized although there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area covered by the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's ideas as the space sacred to Judaism of which it is part. Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has not been resolved.

Refugees

Non-papers were exchanged which were regarded as a good basis for the talks. Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and references which could facilitate the adoption of an agreement. Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 194. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish to return shall be implemented within the framework of one of the following programs:

A. Return and repatriation

to Israel
to Israeli swapped territory
to the Palestinian state

B. Rehabilitation and relocation

Rehabilitation in host country
Relocation to third country

Both sides agreed that UNRWA should be phased out in accordance with an agreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period.

The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation to Jewish immigrants from Arab countries be recognized, while accepting that it was not a Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. The Israeli side rejected this.

Security

The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on Palestinian territory.
The Israeli side maintained that the Palestinian state would be non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept limitation on its acquisition of arms, and be defined as a state with limited arms.
The two sides recognized that the state of Palestine would have sovereignty over its airspace. The Israeli side agreed to accept and honor all Palestinian civil aviation rights according to international regulations, but sought a unified air control system under overriding Israel control. In addition, Israel requested access to Palestinian airspace for military operations and training.
The Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal from the West Bank over a 36-month period with an additional 36 months for the Jordan Valley in conjunction with an international force. The Palestinian side rejected a 36-month withdrawal process from the West Bank expressing concern that a lengthy process would exacerbate Palestinian-Israeli tensions.
The Israeli side requested to maintain and operate five emergency locations on potentially Palestinian territory (in the Jordan Valley) with the Palestinian response allowing for maximum of two emergency locations conditional on a time limit for the dismantling. The Palestinian side declined to agree to the deployment of Israeli armed forces on Palestinian territory during emergency situations, but was prepared to consider ways in which international forces might be used in that capacity, particularly within the context of regional security cooperation efforts.
Both sides were prepared to commit themselves to promoting security cooperation and fighting terror.
The Palestinian side was confident that Palestinian sovereignty over borders and international crossing points would be recognized in the agreement.

Positions mentioned in other sources

Israel wanted to keep military control over Palestinian land and airspace in states of emergency, not because of a possible future threat from Palestine, but because of possible other threats from the East. The Palestinians wanted to accept international forces only.

The Palestinians could not accept Israeli annexation of Giv'at Ze'ev and Ma'ale Adumim in the Jerusalem area. Israel wanted future expansion of the settlements into the West Bank. Unlike the Palestinians, Israel did not consider East Jerusalem part of the West Bank and its Israeli inhabitants settlers.

End of the negotiations

Official statement

The Taba Summit officially ended with a joint statement, which included some of the following points:

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations conducted ... deep and practical talks with the aim of reaching a permanent and stable agreement between the two parties. ... Given the circumstances and time constraints, it proved impossible to reach understandings on all issues, despite the substantial progress that was achieved in each of the issues discussed. ... The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections. The two sides take upon themselves to return to normalcy and to establish security situation on the ground through the observation of their mutual commitments in the spirit of the Sharm e-Sheikh memorandum. The negotiation teams discussed four main themes: refugees, security, borders and Jerusalem, with a goal to reach a permanent agreement that will bring an end to the conflict between them and provide peace to both people. ... The Taba talks conclude an extensive phase in the Israeli–Palestinian permanent status negotiations with a sense of having succeeded in rebuilding trust between the sides. ... The two sides express their gratitude to President Hosni Mubarak. ... They also express their thanks to the European Union. ... The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections. ..."

Reasons for impasse

The breakdown is often attributed to the political circumstances posed by Israeli elections and changeover in leadership in the United States: They had run out of political time. They could not conclude an agreement with Clinton now out of office and Barak standing for reelection in two weeks. Israel's negotiator Shlomo Ben-Ami said that "We made progress, substantial progress. We are closer than ever to the possibility of striking a final deal". Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat also lamented the lack of a final agreement. "My heart aches because I know we were so close. We need six more weeks to conclude the drafting of the agreement."

Sharon Government's negation of the talks

The following month the Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 6 February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks. Immediately after the elections and before the change of government, an 8 February 2001 statement published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:

Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak clarified this evening that the ideas which were brought up in the course of the recent negotiations conducted with the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, including those raised at the Camp David Summit and by President Clinton towards the end of his term in office, are not binding on the new government to be formed in Israel. In a letter to President George Bush, Prime Minister Barak stated that his government had done the utmost to bring about an end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but that these efforts did not bear fruit, primarily because of a lack of sufficient readiness for compromise on the part of the Palestinian leadership. ... Before sending the letter, Barak spoke with former President Clinton, and they were in agreement that the ideas raised in the past months are not binding on the new government in Israel. Prime Minister Barak intends to convey this position also to the heads of the European Union and to chairman Arafat.

Arafat accepts Taba peace plan

In June 2002, approximately 18 months after the conclusion of the Taba Summit, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat gave an interview to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, in which he stated that he had accepted the Middle East peace plan proposed by U.S. President Bill Clinton. However, by that time, the new Israeli government emphasized that this offer was no longer under consideration.

References

UN Division for Palestinian Rights, "Monthly media monitoring review, December 2000" Archived 4 November 2013 at the Wayback Machine. Par. 25–29.
CNN, 27 December 2000, "Mideast summit in Egypt called off" Archived 12 March 2005 at the Wayback Machine
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 January 2001, "Israeli Position on Three Main Points at Taba Talks"
27 January 2001, "The Moratinos non-paper", on unispal; * "Taba Negotiations: The Moratinos Non-Paper", on MidEastWeb
The Moratinos non-paper in 5 parts, published by Haaretz: "EU description of the outcome of permanent status talks at Taba"; "Dispute over Ma'aleh Adumim"; "How long is the Western Wall?"; "Symbols of sovereignty"; "A negative balance of return"
Clinton Parameters Archived 17 January 2015 at the Wayback Machine, The Jewish Peace Lobby website, full text (English).
Meeting Minutes: Taba Summit – Security. Palestine Papers, 23 January 2001. On
Meeting Minutes: Taba Summit – Plenary Session. Palestine Papers, 23 January 2001. On
"Israeli-Palestinian joint statement at Taba". Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 27 January 2001. Archived from the original on 1 July 2004.
Frontline: shattered dreams of peace: the negotiations | PBS".
^ Brecher, Michael (2016). The World of Protracted Conflicts. Lexington Books. p. 339. ISBN 9781498531887.
^ Jeong, Ho-Won (2016). International Negotiation: Process and Strategies. Cambridge University Press. p. 137. ISBN 9781107026407.
Jeremy Pressman, International Security, vol 28, no. 2, Fall 2003, p. 9, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?". On Archived 22 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine
Archived 6 April 2005 at the Wayback Machine
Arafat approves Taba plan too late, Guardian, Ewen MacAskill, 22 June 2002

External links

The Moratinos non-paper
Israeli–Palestinian negotiations Dec. 2000 – Jan. 2001 (Includes links to texts of Israeli, United States and other press reports)
"Trying to Understand the Taba Talks". David Matz, Palestine–Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture. Vol.10 No.3 2003.
Ariga.com
2001 Taba Talks Examination
(in French) Maps: Israeli proposals, from Camp David (2000) to Taba (2001)

Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Participants

Israelis

Palestinians

Principals	All-Palestine Protectorate Palestine Liberation Organization Fatah Hamas Palestinian Authority
Other groups	al-Aqsa Brigades Children DFLP Jenin Brigades Lions' Den PIJ PLF PPSF PFLP PFLP-GC PRC Sabireen Movement Sons of Zouari

Third-party groups

Individuals

Israelis

Palestinians

Timeline
- military operations

Background

1920–1948	1920 Nebi Musa riots Battle of Tel Hai 1921 Jaffa riots 1929 Palestine riots Hebron massacre 1936–1939 Arab revolt 1944–1947 Jewish insurgency 1947–1948 Civil War / Nakba

1948–1970	1948 Arab–Israeli War massacres 1948–present Fedayeen insurgency 1951–1967 Attacks against Israeli civilians 1950s–1960s Reprisal operations 1953 Qibya massacre 1956 Suez Crisis / Kafr Qasim / Khan Yunis / Rafah massacres 1967 Six-Day War 1967–1970 War of Attrition 1968 Battle of Karameh

Palestinian
insurgency

1968–1982	1970 Avivim school bus bombing 1972 Sabena Flight 571 / Munich massacre / "Bayonet" (1973 Lillehammer affair) 1974 Kiryat Shmona massacre / Ma'alot massacre 1975 Savoy Hotel attack 1976 Entebbe raid 1978 Coastal road massacre / South Lebanon conflict 1980 Misgav Am hostage crisis

1973–1987	1973 Yom Kippur War 1975 Zion Square bombing 1982 Lebanon War Siege of Beirut 1983 1983 West Bank fainting epidemic 1984 Bus 300 affair 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking / "Wooden Leg" 1987 Night of the Gliders

First Intifada

1987–1991	1988 Tunis raid 1989 Bus 405 attack 1990 Temple Mount killings 1990s Palestinian suicide attacks list 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre

Second Intifada

2000–2005	Palestinian rocket attacks Palestinian suicide attacks list Israeli assassinations 2000 October events 2001 Santorini 2002 Karine A / "Defensive Shield" / Battle of Jenin / Battle of Nablus / "Determined Path" 2003 Ain es Saheb airstrike 2004 "Rainbow" / Beit Hanoun raid / "Days of Penitence"

Palestinian dissident
campaigns

2006–present	2006 "Bringing Home the Goods" 2008 Jerusalem yeshiva attack / Jerusalem bulldozer attack 2009 Al-Aqsa clashes 2010 Palestinian militancy campaign 2015–2016 violence 2017 Temple Mount crisis 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis 2022 Al-Aqsa clashes

Gaza–Israel
conflict

2006–present

2006 Gaza beach explosion / Gaza cross-border raid / "Summer Rains" / "Autumn Clouds" / Beit Hanoun shelling
2008 Egypt–Gaza border breach / "Hot Winter"
2008–2009 Gaza War
2010 Gaza flotilla raid
2012 "Returning Echo" / "Pillar of Defense"
2014 "Protective Edge"
2015 Freedom Flotilla III
2018 Gaza border protests / November clashes
2019 May clashes / "Black Belt"
2021 "Guardian of the Walls"
2022 "Breaking Dawn"
2023 "Shield and Arrow" / Israel–Hamas war

Diplomacy/law

Timeline

1948–1991	1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight depopulated towns and villages 1949 Lausanne Conference 1967–present Israeli settlement settler violence international law
1990s	1981–1982 Fahd Plan 1991 Madrid Conference 1993–1995 Oslo Accords 1994 Paris Protocol 1994 Gaza–Jericho Agreement 1994–present US security assistance to the PA 1997 Hebron Agreement 1998 Wye River Memorandum 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum
2000s	2000 Camp David Summit / Clinton Parameters 2001 Taba Summit 2002 Quartet established 2003 Road Map 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access 2006 Valley of Peace initiative 2007 Annapolis Conference 2009 Aftonbladet Israel controversy
2010s	2010–11 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks 2011 Palestine Papers 2013–2014 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks 2023–present Gaza genocide

United Nations

Israel and the UN
Palestine and the UN
1947 UN Resolution 181
1948 UN Resolution 194
1967 UN Resolution 242
ICJ cases
- 2004 Wall construction
- 2023–present South African allegation of genocide
- 2024 Nicaragua v. Germany
- 2023–2024 Israeli occupation

Analysis
Anti-Palestinianism Comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany Criticism Criticism of Hamas Criticism of Israel Israeli criticism of the occupation Media coverage Racism in Israel Racism in Palestine Timeline of anti-Zionism There was no such thing as Palestinians

v t e Diplomacy and peace proposals in the Arab–Israeli conflict
Background	1914 Damascus Protocol 1915 McMahon–Hussein Correspondence 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement 1917 Balfour Declaration 1918 Declaration to the Seven / Anglo-French Declaration 1919 Faisal–Weizmann agreement 1920 San Remo conference 1922 Churchill White Paper 1937 Peel Commission 1939 White Paper 1939 London Conference 1946 Morrison–Grady Plan 1947 Bevin Plan 1946–47 London Conference 1947 UN Partition Plan 1948 American trusteeship proposal
1948–1983	1948 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 194 1949 Armistice agreements / Lausanne Conference 1950 Tripartite Declaration 1967 Khartoum Resolution / UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242 1973 UNSC Resolution 338 / UNSC Resolution 339 1974 Israel–Syria disengagement agreement / UNSC Resolution 350 1978 UNSC Resolution 425 / Camp David Accords 1979 UNSC Resolution 446 / Egypt–Israel peace treaty Palestinian autonomy talks / UNSC Resolution 452 1980 UNSC Resolution 478 1981 UNSC Resolution 497 1981–1982 Fahd Plan 1982 Reagan peace plan 1983 Israel–Lebanon agreement
1991–2016	1991 Madrid Conference 1993 Oslo Accords 1994 Gaza–Jericho Agreement / Israel–Jordan peace treaty 1995 Beilin–Abu Mazen agreement 1998 Wye River Memorandum 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum 2000 Camp David Summit / Clinton Parameters 2000 Isratin 2001 Taba Summit 2002 Beirut Summit and peace initiative / Road map 2003 Geneva Initiative 2004 UNSC Resolution 1559 / UNSC Resolution 1566 2005 UNSC Resolution 1583 / Sharm El Sheikh Summit / Israeli disengagement from Gaza / Agreement on Movement and Access 2006 UNSC Resolution 1850 / Quartet Principles 2006 UNSC Resolution 1701 2007 Annapolis Conference 2010 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks 2013 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks 2016 John Kerry Parameters
2019–present	2019 Trump peace plan 2020 Abraham Accords Israel–UAE normalization agreement Bahrain–Israel normalization agreement Israel–Sudan normalization agreement Israel–Morocco normalization agreement 2022 Israeli–Lebanese maritime border agreement

Categories:

Latest revision as of 10:29, 8 December 2024

Background

Positions

Israeli start positions

The Moratinos non-paper

Territory and permanent borders

West Bank

Gaza Strip

Jerusalem

Refugees

Security

Positions mentioned in other sources

End of the negotiations

Official statement

Reasons for impasse

Sharon Government's negation of the talks

Arafat accepts Taba peace plan

See also

References

External links