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{{Short description|1927–1949 civil war in China}}
{{Infobox War
{{other uses|Chinese Civil War (disambiguation)}}
|image=]
{{pp|sock|small=yes}}
|partof=the ]
{{pp-pc|small=yes}}
|caption=Soldiers of the victorious ] enter ] in June 1949.
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2021}}
|conflict=Nationalist-Communist Civil War
{{Infobox military conflict
|date= Full-scale fighting lasted from April 1927 to December 1936, and clashes from January 1941 resuming full conflict from August 1945 to May 1950; war declared over by the ROC in 1991; <ref></ref> no legal document has been signed to end the war, technically continuing from 1927 until today
| conflict = Chinese Civil War
|place=]
| partof = the ], the ] and the ]
|result=Communist victory.
| image = {{multiple image|border=infobox|perrow=2/2/2|total_width=300
|territory=] (PRC) established with control over ] and ];<br>] (ROC) national sovereignty and territorial control reduced to ], ], ] and ].
| image1 = Battle of Siping03.jpg
|combatant1=] ]<br>'''After 1949:'''<br> ] ]
| image2 = Shangtang.jpg
|combatant2=] ]<br>'''After 1949:'''<br> ] ]
| image3 = Su Yu at MengLiangGu Battle 1947.jpg
|commander1=] ]
| image4 = 1945 Chiang Kai-shek inspected Chinese soldiers with shoes made of straw.jpg
|commander2=] ]
| image5 = 1930s Mao Zedong (cropped).jpg
|strength1= 4,300,000 (July 1945)<ref name="Hsiung">Hsiung, James C. Levine, Steven I. (1992). M.E. Sharpe publishing. Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945. ISBN:156324246X.</ref> <br /> 3,650,000 (June 1948) <br /> 1,490,000 (June 1949)
| image6 = Members_of_the_Republic_of_China_Army_board_a_ship_bound_for_Taiwan_in_1949.jpg
|strength2= 1,200,000 (July 1945)<ref name="Hsiung" /> <br /> 2,800,000 (June 1948) <br /> 4,000,000 (June 1949)
}}
|casualties3= 1928-1936: ~2,000,000 Military Casualties
Clockwise from top left:{{hlist
1946-1949: ~1,200,000 Military Casualties <ref>http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html</ref>
| Communist troops at the ]
| ] troops during the ]
| ] inspecting soldiers
| ] members boarding a ship during ] in 1949
| ] in the 1930s
| CCP general ] inspecting troops shortly before the ]
}}
| date = {{ubli
| 1 August 1927{{snd}}26 December 1936 {{nwr|(first phase)}}<ref name="Li2012">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jhPyvsdymU8C&pg=PA295 |title=China at War: An Encyclopedia |publisher=Bloomsbury |year=2012 |isbn=978-1-598-84415-3 |page=295 |via=Google Books}}</ref>
| 10 August 1945{{snd}}7 December 1949 {{nwr|(second phase)}}
}}
| place = ]
| territory = * Communist control of mainland China
* ]
* ]
| result = Communist victory
| combatant1 = ; 1927–1936
: {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)}} ]{{blist
| {{Flagicon image|Naval Jack of the Republic of China.svg}} ]
| {{Armed forces|Republic of China (1912–1949)}}
}}
| combatant2 = ; 1927–1936
: {{Flagicon image|National Flag of Chinese Soviet Republic.svg}} ] {{nwr|(from 1931)}}
: {{Flagicon image|Chinese soviet flag.svg}} ] {{nwr|(1931–1934)}}{{blist
| {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ]
| {{Flagicon image|Second War Flag of Chinese Soviet Republic.svg}} ]
}}
| combatant1a = ; 1945–1949:
: {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)}} ]{{blist
| {{Flagicon image|Naval Jack of the Republic of China.svg}} ]
| {{Flagicon image|ROC Ministry of National Defense Flag.svg}} ]
}}
| combatant2a = ; 1945–1949:
: {{Flagicon image|National Flag of Chinese Soviet Republic.svg}} ]
: {{flag|China|name=People's Republic of China}} (1949){{blist
| {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ]
| {{Flagicon image|People's Liberation Army Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg}} ]
}}
| commander1 = {{ubli|
| {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|naval}} ]
| {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|naval}} ]
| {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|naval}} ]
| {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|naval}} ]
| {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|naval}} ]
| {{Flagicon|Republic of China (1912–1949)|naval}} ] {{nwr|(until 1930)}}
}}
| commander2 = {{ubli
| {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ]
| {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ]
| {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ]
| {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ]
| {{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party (Pre-1996).svg}} ] {{nwr|(until 1936)}}
}}
| strength1 = {{ubli
| 2 million regular troops
| 2.3 million militia {{nwr|(August 1948)}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=svBt-hzD53AC |title=A History of the Modern Chinese Army |publisher=University Press of Kentucky |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-813-17224-8}}</ref><ref name="Hsiung1992">{{Cite book |last=Hsiung |first=James C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3Yt6TTRdUzwC |title=China's Bitter Victory: The War With Japan, 1937–1945 |publisher=M. E. Sharpe |year=1992 |isbn=1-563-24246-X}}</ref><ref name="Sarker1994">{{Cite book |last=Sarker |first=Sunil Kumar |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rGf2b1nsn9cC |title=The Rise and Fall of Communism |publisher=Atlantic |year=1994 |isbn=978-8-171-56515-3}}</ref>
}}
| strength2 = {{ubli
| 1.2 million regular troops
| 2.6 million militia {{nwr|(July 1945)}}<ref name="Hsiung1992" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Cao |first=Qianfa |author-mask=Cao Qianfa (曹前发) |script-title=zh:毛泽东的独创:"兵民是胜利之本" |url=http://dangshi.people.com.cn/big5/n1/2017/0622/c85037-29355018.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029065431/http://dangshi.people.com.cn/big5/n1/2017/0622/c85037-29355018.html |archive-date=29 October 2020 |access-date=26 October 2020 |website=People's Daily |language=zh}}</ref>
}}
| casualties1 = {{ubli
| 370,000 killed<ref name="Ho">{{Cite book |last=Ho |title=Studies in the Population of China |page=253}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=White |first=Matthew |title=Atrocities |publisher=W. W. Norton |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-393-08192-3 |page=381}}</ref>
| 1.5–1.7 million total {{nwr|(second phase)}}<ref name="Lynch2010">{{Cite book |last=Lynch |first=Michael |title=The Chinese Civil War 1945–49 |publisher=Osprey |year=2010}}</ref><ref name="Sarker1994" /><ref name="Ho"/>
}}
| casualties2 = {{ubli
| 263,800 killed
| 190,000 missing
| over 2.8 million total {{nwr|(second phase)}}
| 850,000 wounded {{nwr|(second phase)}}<ref name="PLA1983">''The History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army''. Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press. 1983.</ref><ref name="Lynch2010" />
}}
| casualties3 = {{ubli|
| {{est.}} 7 million {{nwr|(first phase)}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls |url=http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm#Nationalist |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110305175626/http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm#Nationalist |archive-date=5 March 2011 |access-date=26 July 2017}}</ref>
| {{est.}} 2.5 million {{nwr|(second phase)}} <ref>{{Cite web |title=Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls |url=http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm#Chinese |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110305175626/http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm#Chinese |archive-date=5 March 2011 |access-date=26 July 2017}}</ref>
| up to 6 million total {{nwr|(second phase)}}<ref name="Lynch2010" />
}}
}}
{{Campaignbox Chinese Civil War|state=expanded}}
{{Infobox Chinese|collapse = no
| t = {{linktext|國共|內戰}}
| s = {{linktext|国共|内战}}
| p = Guó-Gòng Nèizhàn
| wuu = Koh-gon-ne-tsoe
| j = Gwok3 gung6 noi6 zin3
| poj = Kok-kiōng lāi-chiàn
| l = Kuomintang–Communist civil war
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|g|uo|2|.|g|ong|4|-|n|ei|4|.|zh|an|4}}
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|gw|ok|3|-|g|ung|6|-|n|oi|6|-|z|in|3}}
| w = {{tonesup|Kuo2-Kung4 Nei4-chan4}}
| tp = Guó-Gòng Nèi-jhàn
| bpmf = {{bpmfsp|ㄍㄨㄛˊ|ㄍㄨㄥˋ|ㄋㄟˋ|ㄓㄢˋ}}
}}
{{Chinese Communist Revolution sidebar}}


The '''Chinese Civil War''' was fought between the ]-led ] of the ] and the forces of the ] (CCP), with armed conflict continuing intermittently from 1 August 1927 until Communist victory resulted in their total control over ] on 7 December 1949.
}}{{Campaignbox Chinese Civil War}}{{ChineseText}}
The '''Chinese Civil War''' ({{zh-tspl|t=國共內戰|s=国共内战|p=Guógòng Nèizhàn|l='''Nationalist-Communist Civil War'''}}) or ({{zh-tspl|t=解放戰爭|s=解放战争|p=Jiefang Zhanzheng|l='''War of Liberation'''}}), which lasted from April 1927 to May 1950, was a ] in ] between the ] (KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party) and the ] (CPC).<ref name="gk">Gay, Kathlyn. (2008). 21st Century Books. Mao Zedong's China. ISBN:0822572850. pg 7</ref> The war began in 1927, after the ].<ref name="Hutchings">Hutchings, Graham. (2001). Modern China: A Guide to a Century of Change. Harvard University Press. ISBN:0674006585.</ref> The war represented an ] split between the Western-supported Nationalist KMT, and the Soviet-supported Communist CPC.


The war is generally divided into two phases with an interlude: from August 1927 to 1937, the ] alliance of the KMT and CCP collapsed during the ], and the Nationalists controlled most of China. From 1937 to 1945, hostilities were mostly put on hold as the ] fought the ] with eventual help from the ], although armed clashes between the groups remained common. Exacerbating the divisions within China further was the formation of the ], a Japan-sponsored puppet government ostensibly led by ], which was established to nominally govern the regions of China that came under Japanese occupation.
The civil war carried on intermittently until the looming ] interrupted it, resulting in an organized and temporary ] invasion. The Japanese assault and occupation of Eastern China was an opportunistic attack made possible by China's internal turmoil. Japan's campaign was defeated in 1945, marking the end of ], and China's full-scale civil war resumed in 1946. Hostilities ended after 23 years in 1950, with an unofficial cessation of major hostilities, with the CPC controlling ] (including ]) and the KMT restricted to their remaining territories of ], ], and the ]. To this day, no official ] has ever been signed, although the two sides have close economic ties.<ref name="so">So, Alvin Y. Lin, Nan. Poston, Dudley L. Contributor Professor, So, Alvin Y. (2001). The Chinese Triangle of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Greenwood Publishing. ISBN 0313308691.</ref>

The civil war resumed as soon as it became apparent that ] was imminent, with the communists gaining the upper hand in the second phase of the war from 1945 to 1949, generally referred to as the ]. The Communists gained control of mainland China and ] in 1949, forcing the leadership of the ] to ].<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8WYSAAAAQBAJ |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War |publisher=Scarecrow |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-810-87873-0 |editor-last=Lew |editor-first=Christopher R. |location=Lanham, MD |page=3 |access-date=26 June 2017 |editor-last2=Leung |editor-first2=Pak-Wah}}</ref> Starting in the 1950s, a lasting political and military stand-off between the two sides of the ] has ensued, with the ROC in Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland ] to be the legitimate government of all China. After the ], both tacitly ceased to engage in open conflict in 1979; however, no ] or ] has ever been signed.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lynch |first=Michael |date=9 October 2022 |title=The Chinese Civil War: 1945–49 |url=https://www.ospreypublishing.com/us/osprey-blog/2022/the-chinese-civil-war-1945-49/ |access-date=4 April 2024 |website=Osprey |quote=There is also a sense in which the Chinese Civil War has not ended; no formal peace treaty or agreement has ever been made.}}</ref>


== Background == == Background ==
{{History of the Republic of China}}
The ] collapsed in 1911.<ref name="so" /> China was left under the control of several major and lesser warlords in the ]. To defeat these warlords, who had seized control of much of ], the anti-monarchist and national unificationist ] party and its leader ] sought the help of foreign powers. His efforts to obtain aid from the Western democracies were ignored, however, and in 1921 he turned to the ]. For political expediency, the Soviet leadership initiated a dual policy of support for both Sun and the newly established ]. The Soviets hoped for Communist consolidation, but were prepared for either side to emerge victorious. Thus the struggle for power in China began between the KMT and the CPC.
Following the collapse of the ] and the ], ] assumed the ] of the newly formed Republic of China, and was shortly thereafter succeeded by ].<ref name="Greenwood2001">{{cite book |date=2001 |editor1-last=So |editor1-first=Alvin Y. |editor2-last=Lin |editor2-first=Nan |editor2-link=Nan Lin |editor3-last=Poston |editor3-first=Dudley |editor3-link=Dudley L. Poston Jr. |title=The Chinese Triangle of Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong: Comparative Institutional Analyses |series=Contributions in Sociology |volume=133 |location=Westport, CT |publisher=Greenwood |isbn=978-0-313-30869-7 |issn=0084-9278 |oclc=45248282}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=January 2020}} Yuan was frustrated in a ] to ], and China fell into ] after his death in 1916.


In 1923, a joint statement by Sun and Soviet representative ] in ] pledged Soviet assistance for China's unification.<ref name="March">March, G. Patrick. Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific. (1996). Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0275955664. pg 205.</ref> The ] was a declaration for cooperation among the ], ] and the ].<ref name="March" /> ] agent ] arrived in China in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of the KMT along the lines of the ]. The CPC joined the KMT to form the ].<ref name="Hsiung" /> The ] (KMT), led by Sun Yat-sen, created a new government in ] to rival the warlords who ruled over large swathes of China and prevented the formation of a solid central government.<ref name="history.state.gov">{{Cite web |title=Milestones: 1945–1952 Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev |access-date=2021-10-28 |website=history.state.gov |archive-date=19 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519004017/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev |url-status=live}}</ref> After Sun's efforts to obtain aid from Western countries were ignored, he turned to the ]. In 1923, Sun and Soviet representative ] in ] pledged Soviet assistance to China's unification in the ], a declaration of cooperation among the ], KMT, and the ] (CCP).<ref name="March1996" /> Comintern agent ] arrived in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of both the CCP and the KMT along the lines of the ]. The CCP, which was initially a study group, and the KMT jointly formed the ].<ref name="history.state.gov" /><ref name="March1996">March, G. Patrick. ''Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific''. (1996). Greenwood. {{ISBN|0-275-95566-4}}. p. 205.</ref>


In 1923, Sun Yat-sen sent ], one of Sun's lieutenants from his ] days, for several months' military and political study in ].<ref name="ChangH">Chang, H. H. Chang. (2007). Chiang Kai Shek - Asia's Man of Destiny. ISBN:1406758183. pg 126</ref> By 1924, Chiang became the head of the ], and rose to prominence as Sun's successor as head of the KMT.<ref name="ChangH" /> In 1923, Sun sent ], one of his lieutenants, for several months of military and political study in Moscow.<ref name="Chang1944">H. H. Chang, ''Chiang Kai Shek: Asia's Man of Destiny'' (Doubleday, 1944; reprint 2007 {{ISBN|1-4067-5818-3}}). p.&nbsp;126.</ref> Chiang then became the head of the ] that trained the next generation of military leaders. The Soviets provided the academy with teaching material, organization, and equipment, including munitions.<ref name="Chang1944" /> They also provided education in many of the techniques for mass mobilization. With this aid, Sun raised a dedicated "army of the party", with which he hoped to defeat the warlords militarily. CCP members were also present in the academy, and many of them became instructors, including ], who was made a political instructor.<ref>Ho, Alfred Kuo-liang. (2004). ''China's Reforms and Reformers''. Greenwood. {{ISBN|0-275-96080-3}}. p. 7.</ref>


Communist members were allowed to join the KMT on an individual basis.<ref name="March1996" /> The CCP itself was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925.<ref name="Fairbank">Fairbank, John King. (1994). ''China: A New History''. Harvard University Press. {{ISBN|0-674-11673-9}}.</ref> As of 1923, the KMT had 50,000 members.<ref name="Fairbank" />
The Soviets provided much of the studying material, organization, and equipment including munitions for the academy.<ref name="ChangH" /> The Soviets also provided education in many of the techniques for mass mobilization. With this aid Sun Yat-sen was able to raise a dedicated "army of the party," with which he hoped to defeat the warlords militarily. CPC members were also present in the academy, and many of them became instructors, including ] who was made a political instructor of the academy.<ref name="HoA">Ho, Alfred K. Ho, Alfred Kuo-liang. (2004). China's Reforms and Reformers. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0275960803. pg 7.</ref>


However, after Sun died in 1925, the KMT split into left- and right-wing movements. KMT members worried that the Soviets were trying to destroy the KMT from inside using the CCP. The CCP then began movements in opposition of the ], passing a resolution against it at a party meeting.
Communist members were allowed to join the KMT on an individual basis.<ref name="March" /> The CPC itself was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925.<ref name="Fairbank">Fairbank, John King. (1994). China: A New History. Harvard University Press. ISBN:0674116739.</ref> The KMT in 1923 had 50,000 members.<ref name="Fairbank" />


Then, in March 1927, the KMT held its second party meeting where the Soviets helped pass resolutions against the Expedition and curbing Chiang's power. Soon, the KMT would be clearly divided.
== Northern Expedition (1926&ndash;1928) and KMT-CPC split ==
Just months after ]'s death in 1925, Chiang-Kai-Shek, as commander-in-chief of the ], set out on the ]<ref name="Fairbank" />. By 1926, however, the KMT had divided into left and right wing factions.<ref name="Fairbank" /> The Communist bloc within it was also growing. In the March 1926 ], after thwarting an alleged kidnapping attempt against him, Chiang imposed restrictions on CPC members' participation in the top KMT leadership and emerged as the pre-eminent KMT leader.


Throughout this time, the Soviet Union sent money and spies to support the CCP. Without their support, the CCP likely would have failed. This is evidenced by documents showing other communist parties in China at the time, one with as many as 10,000 members, which all failed without support from the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite book |title=The man who changed China: the life and legacy of Jiang Zemin |last=Kuhn |first=Robert |publisher=Crown |year=2005}}</ref>{{additional citation needed|date=July 2023}}
]


=== Shanghai massacre and Northern Expedition (1927) ===
In early 1927; the KMT-CPC rivalry led to a split in the revolutionary ranks. The CPC and the left wing of the KMT had decided to move the seat of the KMT government from ] to ], where Communist influence was strong.<ref name="Fairbank" /> But Chiang and ], whose armies defeated warlord ], moved eastward toward ]. The leftists rejected Chiang's demand and Chiang denounced the leftists for betraying Sun Yat-sen's ] by taking orders from the Soviet Union. According to ], Chiang's tolerance of the CPC in the KMT camp decreased as his power increased.<ref>Zedong, Mao. Thompson, Roger R. (1990). Report from Xunwu. Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804721823.</ref>
In early 1927, the KMT–CCP rivalry led to a split in the revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the left wing of the KMT decided to move the seat of the KMT government from Guangzhou to ], where communist influence was strong.<ref name="Fairbank" /> However, Chiang and ], whose armies defeated the warlord ], moved eastward toward ]. The leftists rejected Chiang's demand to eliminate Communist influence within KMT, and Chiang denounced them for betraying Sun Yat-sen's ] by taking orders from the Soviet Union. According to ], Chiang's tolerance of the CCP in the KMT camp decreased as his power increased.<ref>Zedong, Mao. Thompson, Roger R. (1990). Report from Xunwu. Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|0-8047-2182-3}}.</ref>


On April 7, Chiang and several other KMT leaders held a meeting arguing that communist activities were socially and economically disruptive, and must be undone for the national revolution to proceed. As a result of this, on April 12, Chiang turned on the CPC in Shanghai. The incident purged the KMT leftists by arresting and executing hundreds of CPC members.<ref name="Brune">Brune, Lester H. Dean Burns, Richard Dean Burns. (2003). Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations. Routledge. ISBN:0415939143.</ref> The incident was called ] or ] by the CPC.<ref name="Zhaos">Zhao, Suisheng. (2004). A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804750017.</ref> The massacre widened the rift between Chiang and ]'s Wuhan. Attempts were made by CPC to take cities such as ], ], ], and Guangzhou. An armed rural insurrection, known as the ] was staged by peasants, minors and CPC members in ] Province led by ].<ref name="Blasko">Blasko, Dennis J. (2006). The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century. Routledge. ISBN:0415770033.</ref> The uprising was unsuccessful.<ref name="Blasko" /> There were now three capitals in China: the internationally recognized republic capital in ],<ref name="Esherick">Esherick, Joseph. (2000). Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN:0824825187.</ref> the CPC and left-wing KMT at Wuhan,<ref name="Clark">Clark, Anne Biller. Clark, Anne Bolling. Klein, Donald. Klein, Donald Walker. (1971). Harvard Univ. Biographic Dictionary of Chinese communism. Original from the University of Michigan v.1. Digitized Dec 21, 2006. p 134.</ref> and the right-wing KMT regime at Nanjing, which would remain the KMT capital for the next decade.<ref name="Esherick" /> On 7 April, Chiang and several other KMT leaders held a meeting, during which they proposed that Communist activities were socially and economically disruptive and had to be undone for the Nationalist revolution to proceed. On 12 April, many communists within the KMT were purged in Shanghai<ref name="history.state.gov" /> through hundreds of arrests and executions<ref>Brune, Lester H. Dean Burns, Richard Dean Burns. (2003). Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-93914-3}}.</ref> on the orders of General ]. The CCP referred to this as the ''12 April Incident'', the White Terror, or the ].<ref>Zhao, Suisheng. (2004). A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|0-8047-5001-7}}.</ref> This incident widened the rift between Chiang and ], the leader of the left wing faction of the KMT. The left wing of the KMT also expelled CCP members from the ], which in turn was toppled by Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT resumed its campaign against warlords and captured Beijing in June 1928.<ref>Guo, Xuezhi. (2002). The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective. Greenwood. {{ISBN|0-275-97259-3}}.</ref> Soon, most of ] was under the control of the Nanjing central government, which received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. The KMT government announced, in conformity with Sun Yat-sen, the formula for the three stages of revolution: military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy.<ref>Theodore De Bary, William. Bloom, Irene. Chan, Wing-tsit. Adler, Joseph. Lufrano Richard. Lufrano, John. (1999). Sources of Chinese Tradition. Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|0-231-10938-5}}. p.&nbsp;328.</ref>


== Communist insurgency (1927–1937) ==
The CPC had been expelled from Wuhan by their left-wing KMT allies, who in turn were toppled by Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT resumed the campaign against ] and captured Beijing in June 1928.<ref name="Guo">Guo, Xuezhi. (2002). The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0275972593.</ref> Afterwards most of ] was under the Nanjing central government's control, and the Nanjing government received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. The KMT government announced that in conformity with Sun Yat-sen's formula for the three stages of revolution: military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy.<ref>Theodore De Bary, William. Bloom, Irene. Chan, Wing-tsit. Adler, Joseph. Lufrano Richard. Lufrano, John. (1999). Sources of Chinese Tradition. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231109385. pg 328.</ref>
{{see also|Encirclement Campaigns}}
{{Infobox
| title = Communist insurgency (1927–1937)
| data1 = {{Infobox Chinese
|child=yes
|l = Second National Revolutionary War
|s = 第二次国内革命战争
|t = 第二次國內革命戰爭
|p = Dìèrcì guónèi gémìng zhànzhēng
}}
}}


On 1 August 1927, the CCP launched an ] against the Nationalist government in Wuhan. This conflict led to the creation of the ].<ref name="Li2012" /><ref name="Lee1986">Lee, Lai to. Trade Unions in China: 1949 To the Present. (1986). National University of Singapore Press. {{ISBN|9971-69-093-4}}.</ref> On 4 August, the main forces of the Red Army left Nanchang and headed southwards for an assault on Guangdong. Nationalist forces quickly reoccupied Nanchang while the remaining members of the CCP in Nanchang went into hiding.<ref name="Li2012" /> A CCP meeting on 7 August confirmed the objective of the party was to seize the political power by force, but the CCP was quickly suppressed the next day by the Nationalist government in Wuhan, led by Wang Jingwei. On 14 August, Chiang Kai-shek announced his temporary retirement, as the Wuhan faction and Nanjing faction of the Kuomintang were allied once again with common goal of suppressing the CCP after the earlier split. Wang Jingwei took the leadership of KMT after Chiang.{{citation needed|date=October 2017}}
== CPC vs KMT and the Long March (1927&ndash;1937) ==
During the 1920s, Communist Party of China activists retreated underground or to the countryside where they fomented a military revolt, beginning the ] on ], ].<ref name="Lee">Lee, Lai to. Trade Unions in China: 1949 To the Present. (1986). National University of Singapore Press. ISBN:9971690934.</ref> They combined the force with remnants of ] rebels, and established control over several areas in ].<ref name="Lee" /> The Guangzhou commune was able to control Guangzhou for three days and a "soviet" was established.<ref name="Lee" /> KMT armies continued to suppress the rebellions.<ref name="Lee" /> This marked the beginning of the ten year's struggle, known in ] as the "Ten Year's Civil War" ({{zh-sp|s=十年内战|p=Shínían Nèizhàn}}). It lasted until the ] when Chiang Kai-shek was forced to form the ] against the invading ]ese.


Attempts were later made by the CCP to take the cities of ], ] and Guangzhou. The Red Army consisting of mutinous former National Revolutionary Army (NRA) soldiers as well as armed peasants established control over several areas in ].<ref name="Lee1986" /> KMT forces continued to attempt to suppress the rebellions.<ref name="Lee1986" /> Then, in September, Wang Jingwei was forced out of Wuhan. September also saw an unsuccessful armed rural insurrection, known as the ], led by Mao Zedong.<ref>Blasko, Dennis J. (2006). ''The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century''. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-77003-3}}.</ref> Borodin then returned to the Soviet Union in October via Mongolia. In November, Chiang Kai-shek went to Shanghai and invited Wang to join him. On 11 December, the CCP started the ], establishing a soviet there the next day, but lost the city by 13 December to a counter-attack under the orders of General ]. On 16 December, Wang Jingwei fled to France. There were now three capitals in China: the internationally recognized republic capital in ], the CCP and ] KMT at Wuhan and the right-wing KMT regime at ], which would remain the KMT capital for the next decade.<ref>Esherick, Joseph. (2000). ''Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950''. University of Hawaii Press. {{ISBN|0-8248-2518-7}}.</ref><ref>Clark, Anne, Klein, Donald. eds. (1971). ''Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism'' (Harvard University Press), p.&nbsp;134.</ref>
]


In 1930 the ] broke out as an internal conflict of the KMT. It was launched by ], ], and ]. The attention was turned to root out remaining pockets of Communist activity in a series of ]. There were a total of five campaigns.<ref name="Lynch">Lynch, Michael Lynch. Clausen, Søren. (2003). Mao. Routledge. ISBN:0415215773.</ref> The ] and ] campaigns failed and the ] was aborted due to the ]. The ] (1932-1933) achieved some early successes, but Chiang’s armies were badly mauled when they tried to penetrate into the heart of Mao’s ]. During these campaigns, the KMT columns struck swiftly into Communist areas, but were easily engulfed by the vast countryside and were not able to consolidate their foothold. This marked the beginning of a ten-year armed struggle, known in mainland China as the "Ten-Year Civil War" (十年内战) which ended with the ], when Chiang Kai-shek was forced to form the ] against invading forces from the ]. In 1930, the ] broke out as an internal conflict of the KMT; launched by ], ], and Wang Jingwei. The attention was turned to root out remaining pockets of CCP activity in a series of five ].<ref>Lynch, Michael. Clausen, Søren. (2003). ''Mao''. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-21577-3}}.</ref> The ] and ] campaigns failed, and the ] was aborted due to the ]. The ] (1932–1933) achieved some early successes, but Chiang's armies were badly mauled when they tried to penetrate into the heart of Mao's ]. During these campaigns, KMT columns struck swiftly into CCP areas, but were easily engulfed by the vast countryside and were not able to consolidate their foothold.


Finally, in late 1933, Chiang launched a ] that involved the systematic encirclement of the ] region with fortified ]s.<ref name="Manwaring">Manwaring, Max G. Joes, Anthony James. (2000). Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability operations. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0275967689. pg 58</ref> Unlike in previous campaigns in which they penetrated deeply in a single strike, this time the KMT troops patiently built blockhouses, each separated by five or so miles to surround the Communist areas and cut off their supplies and food source.<ref name="Manwaring" /> Finally, in late 1934, Chiang launched a ] that involved the systematic encirclement of the ] region with fortified ]s.<ref name="Manwaring2000">Manwaring, Max G. Joes, Anthony James. (2000). ''Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability operations''. Greenwood. {{ISBN|0-275-96768-9}}. p.&nbsp;58.</ref> The blockhouse strategy was devised and implemented in part by newly hired ] advisors.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world: a concise history |year=2010 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham, NC |page=46}}</ref> Unlike previous campaigns in which they penetrated deeply in a single strike, this time the KMT troops patiently built blockhouses, each separated by about {{convert|5|mi|km|0|order=flip|abbr=off|spell=on}}, to surround the Communist areas and cut off their supplies and food sources.<ref name="Manwaring2000" />


In October 1934, the CPC took advantage of gaps in the ring of blockhouses (manned by the troops of a warlord ally of Chiang Kai-shek's, rather than the KMT themselves) to escape ]. The warlord armies were reluctant to challenge Communist forces for fear of wasting their own men, and did not pursue the CPC with much fervor. In addition, the main KMT forces were preoccupied with annihilating ]'s army, which was much larger than Mao's. The massive military retreat of Communist forces lasted a year and covered 12,500 km (25,000 ]), and was known as the famous ].<ref name="Zhang">Zhang, Chunhou. Vaughan, C. Edwin. (2002). Mao Zedong as Poet and Revolutionary Leader: Social and Historical Perspectives. Lexington books. ISBN:0739104063. p 65, p 58</ref> The march ended when the CPC reached the interior of ]. ]'s army, which took a different route through northwest China, was largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his ] ally, the ]. Along the way, the Communist army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor, solidifying its appeal to the masses. Of the 90,000-100,000 people who began the Long March from the Soviet Chinese Republic, only around 7,000-8,000 made it to Shaanxi.<ref name="Bianco">Bianco, Lucien. Bell, Muriel. (1971). Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949. Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804708274. pg 68</ref> The remnants of Zhang's forces eventually joined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CPC, was never able to challenge Mao's authority. Essentially, the great retreat made Mao the undisputed leader of the Communist Party of China. In October 1934, the CCP took advantage of gaps in the ring of blockhouses (manned by the forces of a warlord ally of Chiang Kai-shek's, rather than regular KMT troops) and broke out of the encirclement. The warlord armies were reluctant to challenge Communist forces for fear of losing their own men and did not pursue the CCP with much fervor. In addition, the main KMT forces were preoccupied with annihilating ]'s army, which was much larger than Mao's. The massive military retreat of Communist forces lasted a year and covered what Mao estimated as 12,500&nbsp;km (25,000 ]); it became known as the ].<ref name="Zhang2002">Zhang, Chunhou. Vaughan, C. Edwin. (2002). ''Mao Zedong as Poet and Revolutionary Leader: Social and Historical Perspectives''. Lexington books. {{ISBN|0-7391-0406-3}}. pp.&nbsp;58,&nbsp;65.</ref>


This military retreat was undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, to evade the pursuit or attack of the Kuomintang army. It consisted of a series of marches, during which numerous Communist armies in the south escaped to the north and west. Over the course of the march from Jiangxi the First Front Army, led by an inexperienced military commission, was on the brink of annihilation by Chiang Kai-Shek's troops as their stronghold was in Jiangxi. The Communists, under the command of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, "escaped in a circling retreat to the west and north, which reportedly traversed over 9,000 kilometers over 370 days." The route passed through some of the most difficult terrain of western China by traveling west, and then northwards towards Shaanxi. "In November 1935, shortly after settling in northern Shaanxi, Mao officially took over Zhou Enlai's leading position in the Red Army. Following a major reshuffling of official roles, Mao became the chairman of the Military Commission, with Zhou and Deng Xiaoping as vice-chairmen." This marked Mao's position as the pre-eminent leader of the CCP, with Zhou in second position to him.{{citation needed|date=November 2016}}
== Second Sino-Japanese War (1937&ndash;1945) ==
{{main|Second Sino-Japanese War}}
] ] (pictured here in March 1945) was severely weakened in power by the ].]]


The march ended when the CCP reached the interior of ]. ]'s army (Red 4th Front Army), which took a different route through northwest China, was largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his ] allies, the ]. Along the way, the Communist army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor, solidifying its appeal to the masses. Of the 90,000–100,000 people who began the Long March from the Soviet Chinese Republic, only around 7,000–8,000 made it to Shaanxi.<ref>]. Bell, Muriel. (1971). ''Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949''. Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|0-8047-0827-4}}. p.&nbsp;68.</ref> The remnants of Zhang's forces eventually joined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CCP, was never able to challenge Mao's authority. Essentially, the great retreat made Mao the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist Party.
During the ]ese invasion and ], Chiang Kai-shek, who saw the CPC as a greater threat, refused to ally with the CPC to fight against the ]. On ], ], KMT Generals ] and ] kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and forced him to a truce with the CPC. The incident became known as the ].<ref name="Ye">Ye, Zhaoyan Ye, Berry, Michael. (2003). Nanjing 1937: A Love Story. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231127545.</ref> Both parties suspended fighting to form a ] to focus their energies and fighting against the Japanese.<ref name="Ye" /> In 1937, Japanese airplanes bombed Chinese cities and well-equipped troops overran north and coastal China.


The Kuomintang used ]pa troops{{snd}}who were former bandits{{snd}}to battle the Communist Red Army as it advanced and to undermine local warlords who often refused to fight Communist forces to conserve their own strength. The KMT enlisted 300 "Khampa bandits" into its Consolatory Commission military in Sichuan, where they were part of the effort of the central government to penetrate and destabilize local Han warlords such as ]. The government was seeking to exert full control over frontier areas against the warlords. Liu had refused to battle the Communists in order to conserve his army. The Consolatory Commission forces were used to battle the Red Army, but they were defeated when their religious leader was captured by the Communists.<ref>{{cite book |access-date=27 December 2011 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rsLQdBUgyMUC&q=force+of+about+300+soldiers+was+organized+and+augmented+by+recruiting+local+Khampa+bandits+into+the+army&pg=PA52 |title=Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers: A Kourney to the West |author1-link=Lin Hsiao-ting |first=Hsiao-ting |last=Lin |year=2010 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |edition=Illustrated |volume=67 |series=Routledge studies in the modern history of Asia |page=52 |quote=A force of about 300 soldiers was organized and augmented by recruiting local Khampa bandits into the army. The relationship between the Consolatory Commission and Liu Wenhui seriously deteriorated in early 1936, when the Norla Hutuktu |isbn=978-0-415-58264-3}}</ref>
The alliance of CPC and KMT Second united front was in name only.<ref name="Buss">Buss, Claude Albert. (1972). Stanford Alumni Association. The People's Republic of China and Richard Nixon. United States.</ref> The CPC hardly ever engaged the Japanese in major battles but proved efficient in ]. The level of actual cooperation and coordination between the CPC and KMT during ] was minimal.<ref name="Buss" /> In the midst of the Second United Front, the CPC and the KMT were still vying for territorial advantage in "]" (i.e. areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by ]).<ref name="Buss" /> The situation came to a head in late 1940 and early 1941 when there were major clashes between the Communist and KMT forces. In December 1940, Chiang Kai-shek demanded that the CPC’s ] evacuate ] and ] Provinces. Under intense pressure, the New Fourth Army commanders complied. In 1941 the ] led to several thousand deaths in the CPC.<ref name="schok">Schoppa, R. Keith. (2000). The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231112769.</ref> It also ended the Second united front formed earlier to fight the Japanese.<ref name="schok" /> In general, developments in the ] were to the advantage of the CPC. The KMT's resistance to the Japanese proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek. In 1944 the last major offensive, ] was launched by the Japanese against the KMT.<ref name="Lary">Lary, Diana. (2007). China's Republic. Cambridge University Press. ISBN:0521842565.</ref>


In 1936, Zhou Enlai and ] grew closer, with Zhou even suggesting that he join the CCP. However, this was turned down by the Comintern in the USSR. Later on, Zhou persuaded Zhang and ], another warlord, to instigate the Xi'an Incident. Chiang was placed under house arrest and forced to stop his attacks on the Red Army, instead focusing on the Japanese threat.
{{Unreferencedsection|date=May 2008}}


<gallery widths="240" heights="180">
In general, developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War were to the advantage of the Communists. Kuomintang's resistance to the Japanese proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek. The war against Japan greatly sapped the KMT's military resources, and Chiang's own central army was never to recover from the devastating losses it had sustained in the early stages of the war. In addition, in the last major Japanese offensive, Operation Ichigo of Fall 1944, the Japanese were able to manoeuver far inland and destroy much of what remained of Chiang's material strength. In contrast, thanks to the brutal mass retaliation policies of the Imperial Japanese Armies, huge numbers of dispossessed villagers were able to be recruited to the Communist ranks. Although the guerrilla operations conducted by the Communists inside occupied China were of limited military value, they greatly heightened popular perception that the Communists were at the vanguard of the fight against the Japanese. By the end of the war, large portions of the peasant masses of occupied China were politically mobilized in support of the Communists; however, the Communists had a severe shortage of war material, including small arms.
File:Nationalist China 1929 - 1937.PNG|The situation in China in 1929: After the ], the KMT had direct control over east and central China, while the rest of China proper as well as Manchuria was under the control of warlords loyal to the Nationalist government.
File:China Soviet Zones.png|Map showing the communist-controlled Soviet Zones of China during and after the encirclement campaigns
File:The Long March 1934 - 1935.PNG|Route(s) taken by Communist forces during the Long March
File:Long-march.jpg|A Communist leader addressing survivors of the Long March
File:Chiang1926.jpg|] ], Commander-in-Chief of the ], emerged from the ] as the leader of the ]
File:National Revolutionary Army troops.png|NRA soldiers marching
File:National Revolutionary Army artillery.png|NRA troops firing artillery at Communist forces
</gallery>


== Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) ==
==Immediate post-war clashes (1945&ndash;1946)==
{{Main|Second Sino-Japanese War}}
], ], ], ], Wang Shi Jie (王世杰), ]]]
During Japan's invasion and occupation of Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek saw the CCP as the greater threat. Chiang refused to ally with the CCP, preferring to unite China by eliminating the warlord and CCP forces first. He believed his forces were too weak to face the ]; only after unification could the KMT mobilize against Japan. He ignored the Chinese people's discontent and anger at the KMT policy of compromise with the Japanese, instead ordering KMT generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to suppress the CCP. However, their provincial forces suffered significant casualties in battles against the Red Army.<ref>{{cite archive |collection=Background of Xi'an Incident |institution=Cultural China |url=http://history.cultural-china.com/en/34H7514H12570.html |access-date=June 4, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121207115613/http://history.cultural-china.com/en/34H7514H12570.html |archive-date=7 December 2012 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
] on ] and ] in 1945.<ref name="Lary" /> Under the terms of the Japanese ] dictated by the ], Japanese troops were ordered to surrender to KMT troops and not to the CPC present in some of the occupied areas.<ref name="Zarrow">Zarrow, Peter Gue. (2005). China in War and Revolution, 1895-1949. Routledge. ISBN:0415364477. pg 338.</ref> In ] the Japanese surrendered to the ]. However the KMT had no forces in Manchuria. Chiang Kai-Shek ordered the Japanese troops to remain at their post to receive the Kuomintang and not surrender their arms to the communists.<ref name="Zarrow" />


On 12 December 1936, the disgruntled Zhang and Yang conspired to kidnap Chiang and force him into a truce with the CCP. The incident became known as the Xi'an Incident.<ref name="Ye2003">Ye, Zhaoyan Ye, Berry, Michael. (2003). ''Nanjing 1937: A Love Story''. Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|0-231-12754-5}}.</ref> Both parties suspended fighting to form a Second United Front to focus their energies and fight the Japanese.<ref name="Ye2003" /> In 1937, Japan launched its full-scale invasion of China and its well-equipped troops overran KMT defenders in northern and coastal China.
{{Unreferencedsection|date=May 2008}}
However, as the Nationalists had no forces in Manchuria and very few or no forces in the most of the rest of the Japanese occupied area, while the communist guerrillas were the only Chinese force present in the area, the communists were able to takeover most of Manchuria before the Nationalists could send troops there. Even after sending sufficient forces, it would still take the Nationalists months of fighting to drive the communists out of major cities in Manchuria. As the communists were the only Chinese forces left in the region that had engaged the Japanese in guerrilla warfare, it was difficult for the Nationalists though to receive local popular support in Manchuria and other parts of China,because local Chinese residents blamed the Nationalists for allowing the Japanese invaders to conquer the local area, such as in the case of Manchuria 14 years previously.


The alliance of CCP and KMT was in name only.<ref name="Buss1972">Buss, Claude Albert. (1972). Stanford Alumni Association. ''The People's Republic of China and Richard Nixon. United States''.</ref> Unlike the KMT forces, CCP troops shunned ] and instead waged ] against the Japanese. The level of actual cooperation and coordination between the CCP and KMT during ] was minimal.<ref name="Buss1972" /> In the midst of the Second United Front, the CCP and the KMT were still vying for territorial advantage in "]" (i.e., areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by Japanese ] such as Manchukuo and the ]).<ref name="Buss1972" />
Immediately after World War II, Chiang Kai-shek made a fatal mistake in trying to simultaneously solve the warlord problem and exterminate communism. Many of the warlords who sided with the Nationalists were only interested in keeping their own power, and defected to the Japanese side when the Japanese offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their cooperation. After World War II, these former Japanese puppet regimes once again joined the Nationalists.


The situation came to a head in late 1940 and early 1941 when clashes between Communist and KMT forces intensified. Chiang demanded in December 1940 that the CCP's ] evacuate ] and ] Provinces, due to its provocation and harassment of KMT forces in this area. Under intense pressure, the New Fourth Army commanders complied. The following year they were ] by KMT forces during their evacuation, which led to several thousand deaths.<ref name="Schoppa2000">Schoppa, R. Keith. (2000). ''The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History''. Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|0-231-11276-9}}.</ref> It also ended the Second United Front, formed earlier to fight the Japanese.<ref name="Schoppa2000" />
Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good, as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined the Nationalists, because such a move would alienate other factions within the Nationalists; furthermore, these former warlords could still provide much-needed military assistance to the Nationalists.


As clashes between the CCP and KMT intensified, countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to prevent a disastrous civil war. After the New Fourth Army incident, US President ] sent ] ] to talk with Chiang Kai-shek and KMT party leaders to express their concern regarding the hostility between the two parties, with Currie stating that the only ones to benefit from a civil war would be the Japanese. The Soviet Union, allied more closely with the CCP, sent an imperative telegram to Mao in 1941, warning that civil war would also make the situation easier for the Japanese military. Due to the international community's efforts, there was a temporary and superficial peace. Chiang criticized the CCP in 1943 with the propaganda piece ''China's Destiny'', which questioned the CCP's power after the war, while the CCP strongly opposed Chiang's leadership and referred to his regime as fascist in an attempt to generate a negative public image. Both leaders knew that a deadly battle had begun between themselves.<ref>Chen, Jian. (2001). ''Mao's China and the Cold War''. The University of North Carolina Press. {{ISBN|0-807-84932-4}}.</ref>
As Chiang had neither sufficient force nor sufficient time to deploy his own troops in the former Japanese controlled regions, these warlords were given titles and ranks in the Nationalist forces and ordered to "keep order" in their areas of control. They were forbidden from surrendering to the communists, and, if necessary, were permitted to fight off a communist push for power. Chiang and his followers had hoped that these warlords would be able to resist the communists and hold on to the former Japanese-occupied regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops there. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still be of benefit to Chiang, because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plaguing China for so long could thus be greatly reduced. At the same time, the communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have an easier time taking control. The ensuing battles between the communists and these warlords resulted mostly in communist victories, exactly as Chiang and his followers had predicted, and their attempt to greatly reduce the problem of the warlords resulted in success.


In general, developments in the ] were to the advantage of the CCP, as its guerrilla war tactics had won them popular support within the Japanese-occupied areas. In occupied areas, the Communists established military and political bases from which it carried out guerilla warfare.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=The Cold War in East Asia |date=2018 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-138-65179-1 |location=Abingdon, Oxon}}</ref>{{Rp|page=35}} The Communists built popular support in these areas, returning land to poor peasants, reducing peasant's rent, and arming the people.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=35}} By Spring 1945, there were 19 Communist-governed areas in China in which 95 million people lived.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=36}} In Fall 1945, the Communist armies had 1.27 million men and were supported by 2.68 million militia members.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=36}} The KMT had to defend the country against the main Japanese campaigns, since it was the legal Chinese government, a factor which proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek and his troops. Japan launched its last major offensive against the KMT, ], in 1944, which resulted in the severe weakening of Chiang's forces.<ref>Lary, Diana. (2007). ''China's Republic''. Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-84256-5}}.</ref> The CCP also suffered fewer losses through its guerrilla tactics.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lovell |first=Julia |title=Maoism: A Global History |year=2019 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday |isbn=978-0-525-65605-0 |page= |quote=Though it is also worth pointing out that, in practice, Mao's recipe for guerrilla manoeuvres played a limited role in Chinese revolutionary wars during the 1930s and '40s. Nationalist armies carried most of the resistance to the Japanese during the Second World War, and Chinese Communist victory in the final years of the civil war up to 1949 was won through field battles that the Soviets taught the CCP how to fight. |author-link=Julia Lovell}}</ref>
However, this success came at a huge cost in the Nationalists' loss of popular support in these Japanese dominated regions, because the local population already blamed them for losing the regions to the Japanese, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as Nationalist forces to fight alongside of Japanese soldiers against the communists only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment towards Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists.
<gallery widths="240" heights="180">
File:Situation at the End of World War Two.PNG|Japanese occupation (red) of eastern China near the end of the war, and Communist bases (striped)
</gallery>


== Immediate post-war clashes (1945–1946) ==
The first post-war peace negotiation was attended by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong in ] from Aug 28, 1945 to Oct 10, 1945.<ref name="Xu">Xu, Guangqiu. (2001). War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929-1949. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:0313320047. pg 201.</ref> Both sides stressed the importance of a peaceful reconstruction, but the conference did not produce any concrete result.<ref name="Xu" /> Battles between the two sides continued even as the peace negotiation was in progress, until the agreement was reached in January 1946. However, large campaigns and full scale confrontations between the CPC and Chiang's own troops were temporarily avoided.
]


Under the terms of the Japanese ] dictated by the Allies, Japanese troops were to surrender to KMT troops but not to the CCP, which was present in some of the occupied areas.<ref name="Zarrow2005">Zarrow, Peter Gue. (2005). ''China in War and Revolution, 1895–1949''. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-36447-7}}. p.&nbsp;338.</ref> In ], however, where the KMT had no forces, the Japanese surrendered to the Soviet Union. Chiang Kai-shek reminded Japanese troops to remain at their posts to receive the KMT, but Communist forces soon began taking surrenders from the Japanese and fighting those who resisted.<ref name="Zarrow2005" /> ] of the United States Army became alarmed at these developments and wanted seven American divisions to be sent to China, but ] replied that it should not be given priority over Japan and Korea.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Spector |first1=Ronald H. |title=In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia |publisher=Random House |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ibEQxK_ypsQC&pg=PA38 |year=2007 |location=New York |isbn=978-0-375-50915-5 |pages=38–39}}</ref>
In the last month of ] in ], Soviet forces launched the mammoth ] to attack the Japanese in Manchuria and along the Chinese-Mongolian border.<ref name="Bright">Bright, Richard Carl. (2007). Pain and Purpose in the Pacific: True Reports of War. Trafford Publishing. ISBN:1425125441.</ref> This operation destroyed the fighting capability of the ] and left the USSR in occupation of all of Manchuria by the end of the war. Consequently, the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region surrendered. Later in the year, Chiang Kai-shek realized that he lacked the resources to prevent a CPC takeover of Manchuria following the scheduled Soviet departure. He therefore made a deal with the Russians to delay their withdrawal until he had moved enough of his best-trained men and modern material into the region. KMT troops were then ]ed by the United States to occupy key cities in ], while the countryside was already dominated by the CPC. The Soviets spent the extra time systematically dismantling the extensive Manchurian industrial base (worth up to 2 billion dollars) and shipping it back to their war-ravaged country.<ref>Lilley, James. '' China hands : nine decades of adventure, espionage, and diplomacy in Asia '', PublicAffairs, New York, 2004</ref>


The first post-war peace negotiation, attended by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, was in ] from 28 August to 10 October 1945. Chiang entered the meeting at an advantage because he had recently signed a ] with the Soviet Union while the Communists were still forcing the Japanese to surrender in some places. Mao was accompanied by American ambassador ], who was devoted to Chiang but also wanted to ensure Mao's safety in light of the past history between the two Chinese leaders.{{sfn|Spector|2007}} It concluded with the signing of the ].<ref name="Xu2001">Xu, Guangqiu. (2001). ''War Wings: The United States and Chinese Military Aviation, 1929–1949''. Greenwood. {{ISBN|0-313-32004-7}}. p.&nbsp;201.</ref> Both sides stressed the importance of a peaceful reconstruction, but the conference did not produce any concrete results.<ref name="Xu2001" /> Battles between the two sides continued even as peace negotiations were in progress, until the agreement was reached in January 1946. However, large campaigns and full-scale confrontations between the CCP and Chiang's troops were temporarily avoided. On 26 November 1945, Hurley resigned, viewing Chiang as having gone against his agreement with the Communists.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=53}} In December 1945, Hurley's former position was filled by Marshall.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=54}}
The truce fell apart in June 1946, when full scale war between CPC and KMT broke out on June 26. China then entered a state of ] that lasted more than three years.<ref name="Hu">Hu, Jubin. (2003). Projecting a Nation: Chinese National Cinema Before 1949. Hong Kong University Press. ISBN:9622096107.</ref>


], September{{snd}}October 1945]]
==Post-war power struggle (1946&ndash;1947)==
{{Unreferencedsection|date=May 2008}}


In the last month of World War II in East Asia, Soviet forces launched the huge ] against the Japanese ] in Manchuria and along the Chinese-Mongolian border.<ref>Bright, Richard Carl. (2007). ''Pain and Purpose in the Pacific: True Reports of War''. Trafford Publishing. {{ISBN|1-4251-2544-1}}.</ref> This operation destroyed the Kwantung Army in just three weeks and left the USSR occupying all of Manchuria by the end of the war in a total power vacuum of local Chinese forces. Consequently, the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region surrendered. Later in the year Chiang Kai-shek realized that he lacked the resources to prevent a CCP takeover of Manchuria following the scheduled Soviet departure.<ref name="Lilley2004">Lilley, James. ''China hands: nine decades of adventure, espionage, and diplomacy in Asia''. PublicAffairs, New York, 2004</ref> He therefore made a deal with the Soviets to delay their withdrawal until he had moved enough of his best-trained men and modern ] into the region. However, the Soviets refused permission for the Nationalist troops to traverse its territory and spent the extra time systematically dismantling the extensive Manchurian industrial base (worth up to $2&nbsp;billion) and shipping it back to their war-ravaged country.<ref name="Lilley2004" /> KMT troops were then airlifted by the US to occupy key cities in North China, while the countryside was already dominated by the CCP. On 15 November 1945, the KMT began a campaign to prevent the CCP from strengthening its already strong base.<ref name="Jessup1989">{{cite book |last=Jessup |first=John E. |title=A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945–1985 |publisher=Greenwood |year=1989 |isbn=0-313-24308-5 |location=New York}}</ref> At the same time, however, the return of the KMT also brought widespread graft and corruption, with an ] officer remarking that the only winners were the Communists.{{sfn|Spector|2007|p=61}}
Contrary to the Nationalist propaganda that the Soviets had given huge quantity of weapons to the Communists in Manchuria, the actual amount was extremely low: the total Soviet weaponry and Japanese weaponry captured by the Soviet Union that was given to the communists was only enough to equip 30 infantry regiments and 2 mountain gun battalions, equipping a mere 20,000 communist troops out of a total of 400,000 (as of the end of 1947), and the Soviet aid to Communists completely stopped by the end of 1947. The Communists originally expected the Soviets to play a much larger role and Lin Biao personally wrote a letter to Joseph Stalin on June 25, 1947, asking for Japanese weaponry to be turned over to the Communists, even as he asked for captured German weaponry. Stalin, however, did not even bother to respond. On December 28, 1947, Lin Biao wrote another letter directly to Stalin, asking for more weaponry. Again, Lin Biao appealed to Stalin in the letter that if such demand could not be met with captured Japanese weaponry, then captured German weaponry could fill the gap. Stalin, just like he had done previously, did not respond.


In the winter of 1945–1946, ] commanded Marshal ] to give Mao Zedong most ] weapons that were captured.<ref>{{cite web |author=Yang Kuisong |url=http://book.sina.com.cn/excerpt/sz/rw/2011-11-24/0951293044_2.shtml |script-title=zh:杨奎松《读史求实》: 苏联给了林彪东北野战军多少现代武器 |website=Sina |date=24 November 2011 |access-date=17 May 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130926184147/http://book.sina.com.cn/excerpt/sz/rw/2011-11-24/0951293044_2.shtml |archive-date=26 September 2013 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
The key source of weapons for the Communists during this period was not in fact, the Soviet Union but rather, weapons captured from the former Japanese-aligned warlords who had been ordered by Chiang Kai Shek to attack the communists. In some cases, the Japanese and their nominally Kuomintang collaborators simply abandoned their weapons, allowing the Communists to claim them as a windfall. By February 1947, hundreds of artillery pieces were recovered by the communists, including: 49 howitzers, 300 heavy mortars, 137 anti-aircraft artilleries, 141 anti-tank guns, 108 mountain guns, 97 cannons, and many other smaller artillery pieces, almost one-third of the Nationalist weaponry. These weapons included a mix of chinese-manufactured and Japanese-maunfactured weapons and these helped to sustain the Communists for 2 years, their stockpiles then being augmented by huge quantities of American weaponry, also captured from Koumintang troops who were poorly motivated and quick to surrender, often having been press-ganged into service.


Chiang Kai-shek's forces pushed as far as ] by 26 November 1945, meeting with little resistance. This was followed by a Communist offensive on the ] that was largely successful, as all of the peninsula, except what was controlled by the US, fell to the Communists.<ref name="Jessup1989"/> The truce fell apart in June 1946 when full-scale war between CCP and KMT forces broke out on 26 June 1946. China then entered a state of civil war that lasted more than three years.<ref>Hu, Jubin. (2003). ''Projecting a Nation: Chinese National Cinema Before 1949''. Hong Kong University Press. {{ISBN|962-209-610-7}}.</ref>
The Americans, concerned about the weakness and innefficiency of the Chiang Kai Shek regime, had hoped to negotiate a power-sharing agreement which would create a peace favoring the Nationalists. The communists were amenable, expecting the popular support they enjoyed to ensure that they would soon be in a dominant postition. Chiang Kai Shek refused however, insisting that his leadership represented the sole representative of the Chinese nation and people. In consequence, all that the American negotiator, George C. Marshall was able to hammer out was an uncertain truce.


<gallery widths="240" heights="180">
The truce fell apart in June 1946 when full scale war broke out on June 26, and although negotiations continued, Marshall was recalled in January 1947, the same time when the last Communist envoys in Nationalist controlled regions were recalled back to Yan'an.
File:Manchuria Operation map-es.svg|The Soviet ] ] in August 1945.
File:Chinese Communist troops marched north(1945) 03.jpg|Chinese Communist soldiers march north to occupy rural ], 1945.
</gallery>


== <span class="anchor" id="Second phase"></span> Resumed fighting (1946–1949) ==
==Fighting on mainland China (1946&ndash;1950)==
{{further|Chinese Communist Revolution}}
] and control the later capital of PRC]]
With the breakdown of talks, an all out war resumed. This stage is referred to in Communist media and historiography as the "War of Liberation" ({{zh-sp|s=解放战争|p=Jiěfàng Zhànzhēng}}). The United States assisted the KMT with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new surplus military supplies and generous loans of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment.<ref>p23, U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, William Blum, Zed Books 2004 London.</ref> They also airlifted many KMT troops from central China to the Northeast (once called Manchuria). Nevertheless, the CPC, who had already situated themselves in the north and northeast, were poised to strike.


=== Background and disposition of forces ===
] himself stated that he knew of no evidence that the CPC were being supplied by the Soviet Union.<ref>New York Times, 12 Jan 1947, p44.</ref> The CPC did benefit indirectly from the elimination of the Japanese ] but the Soviets did not provide direct support to the CPC during this period as they expected either a power-sharing arrangement or a KMT victory. The CPC were able to capture a number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese and KMT including some tanks but it was not until large numbers of well trained KMT troops joined the communist force that the CPC were finally able to master the hardware.<ref>Zeng Kelin, ''Zeng Kelin jianjun zishu'' (General Zeng Kelin Tells his story), Liaoning renmin chubanshe, Shenyang, 1997. p. 112-3</ref> Anti-Japanese Koreans also played an important role, with 30-40,000 Korean troops participating in the war on the Communist side. Koreans are also credited with repairing Manchurian railroads and bridges which were used by Mao.<ref>Tikhomirov, V.V., & Tsukanov, A. M., "Komandirovka v Manchzhuriyu" (Assignment to Manchuria), in Akimov</ref>
{{Infobox
|title = Resumed fighting (1946–1949)
|data1 =
{{Infobox Chinese|child = yes
|name1 = Name in mainland China
|l = Third National Revolutionary War
|s = 第三次国内革命战争
|t = 第三次國內革命戰爭
|p = Dìsāncì guónèi gémìng zhànzhēng
|altname = Second name in mainland China
|l2 = War of Liberation
|t2 = 解放戰爭
|s2 = 解放战争
|p2 = Jiěfàng Zhànzhēng
|wuu2 = Chia-fhon-tsan-zen
|j2 = Gaai2 fong3 zin3 zang1
|poj2 = Kái-hòng chiàn-cheng
|altname3 = Name in Taiwan
|t3 = 反共戡亂戰爭
|s3 = 反共戡乱战争
|p3 = Fǎngòng kānluàn zhànzhēng
|altname4 = Third name in mainland China
|l4 = Chinese People's Liberation War
|s4 = 中国人民解放战争
|t4 = 中國人民解放戰爭
|p4 = Zhōngguó rénmín jiěfàng zhànzhēng
}}
}}


By the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the power of the Chinese Communist Party grew considerably. Their main force grew to 1.2&nbsp;million troops, backed with additional militia of 2&nbsp;million, totalling 3.2&nbsp;million troops.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=36}} Their "Liberated Zone" in 1945 contained 19 base areas,<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=36}} including one-quarter of the country's territory and one-third of its population; this included many important towns and cities. Moreover, the Soviet Union turned over all of its captured Japanese weapons and a substantial amount of their own supplies to the Communists, who received Northeastern China from the Soviets as well.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002">{{cite book |title=Lịch sử thế giới hiện đại |last=Nguyễn Anh Thái |author2=Nguyễn Quốc Hùng |author3=Vũ Ngọc Oanh |author4=Trần Thị Vinh |author5=Đặng Thanh Toán |author6=Đỗ Thanh Bình |year=2002 |publisher=Giáo Dục |location=Ho Chi Minh City |id=8934980082317 |pages=320–322 |language=vi}}</ref>
In March 1947 the KMT seized the CPC capital of ]. By late 1948 the CPC eventually captured the northern cities of ] and ].<ref>Lilley, James R. China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia. ISBN:1586481363.</ref> The economy between the years 1946-1949 witnessed the growth of enterprises offering ] services to sustain workers ] during the ] crisis that afflicted the KMT.<ref>Howard, Joshua H. Workers at War: Labor in China's Arsenals, 1937-1953. (2004). Stanford University Press. ISBN:0804748969. pg 363.</ref> The KMT position was bleak. Chiang Kai Shek attempted to eliminate the CPC in the North by using troops belonging to northern warlords who had sided with Chiang during the Civil War and then switched sides to join the Japanese during the invasion. This strategy backfired as the effort to suppress the CPC who the peasants remembered as the enemies of the Japanese by using troops who had assisted the hated invaders further eroded any base of popular support which Chiang might have hoped for. Although the KMT had an advantage in their numbers and weapons, and benefited from considerable international support, their low morale hindered their ability to fight. Furthermore, though they administered a larger and more populous territory, their corruption effectively stifled any civilian support.


In March 1946, despite repeated requests from Chiang, the ] under the command of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky continued to delay pulling out of Manchuria, while Malinovsky secretly told the CCP forces to move in behind them, which led to full-scale war for the control of the Northeast. These favorable conditions also facilitated many changes inside the Communist leadership: the more radical hard-line faction who wanted a complete military take-over of China finally gained the upper hand and defeated the careful opportunists.<ref>Michael M Sheng, ''Battling Western Imperialism'', Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 132–135</ref> Before giving control to Communist leaders, on 27 March, Soviet diplomats requested a joint venture of industrial development with the Nationalist Party in Manchuria.<ref>{{cite book |last=Liu |first=Shiao Tang |title=Min Kuo Ta Shih Jih Chih |volume=2 |year=1978 |publisher=Zhuan Chi Wen Shuan |location=Taipei |page=735 |language=zh}}</ref>
The CPC were ultimately able to seize the Northeast after struggling through numerous set-backs while trying to take the cities, with the decisive ].<ref name="Westad">Westad, Odd Arne. (2003). Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. Stanford University Press. ISBN:080474484X. p 192-193.</ref> The capture of large KMT formations provided them with the tanks, heavy artillery, and other combined-arms assets needed to prosecute offensive operations south of the Great Wall. By April 1948 the city of ] fell, cutting the KMT army off from ].<ref name="Elleman">Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. Routledge. ISBN:0415214734.</ref> Following a fierce battle, the CPC captured ] and ] on September 28, 1948.<ref name="Elleman" />
The ] of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for the CPC.<ref name="Westad" /> The outcome of these encounters were decisive for the military outcome of the civil war.<ref name="Westad" /> The ] resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China lasting 64 days from ], ] to ], ].<ref name="Finkld">Finkelstein, David Michael. Ryan, Mark A. McDevitt, Michael. (2003). Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949. M.E. Sharpe. China. ISBN:0765610884. p 63</ref> The People's Liberation Army suffered heavy casualties from securing ], ] along with its port and garrison at ], and ].<ref name="Finkld" /> The CPC brought 890,000 troops from the Northeast to oppose some 600,000 KMT troops.<ref name="Elleman" /> There were 40,000 CPC casualties at ] alone. They in turned killed, wounded or captured some 520,000 KMT during the campaign.<ref name="Finkld" />


Although ] stated that he knew of no evidence that the CCP was being supplied by the Soviet Union, the CCP was able to utilize a large number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese, including some tanks. When large numbers of well-trained KMT troops began to defect to the Communist forces, the CCP was finally able to achieve material superiority.<ref>''The New York Times'', 12 January 1947, p. 44.</ref><ref>Zeng Kelin, ''Zeng Kelin jianjun zishu'' (General Zeng Kelin Tells His Story), Liaoning renmin chubanshe, Shenyang, 1997. pp. 112–113</ref> The CCP's most effective political reform was its land reform policy. This drew the massive number of landless and starving peasants in the countryside into the Communist cause.<ref>], ''cong dalishi jiaodu du Jiang Jieshi riji'' (Reading Chiang Kai-shek's diary from a macro-history perspective), China Times Publishing Press, Taipei, 1994, pp. 441–443</ref> This strategy enabled the CCP to access an almost unlimited supply of manpower for both combat and logistical purposes; despite suffering heavy casualties throughout many of the war's campaigns, manpower continued to grow. For example, during the ] alone the CCP was able to mobilize 5,430,000 peasants to fight against the KMT forces.<ref>], ''dajiang dahai 1949'', Commonwealth Publishing Press, Taipei, 2009, p. 184</ref>
On ], Communist forces crossed the ], capturing Nanjing, capital of the KMT's ].<ref name="Zhang" /> In most cases, the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remnants of KMT forces southwards in southern China.


]
==CPC establish People's Republic of China / KMT retreat to Taiwan island==
] proclaiming the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.]]
On ], ], Mao Zedong proclaimed the ] with its capital at Beiping, which was renamed Beijing (Peking). Chiang Kai-shek and approximately 2 million Nationalist Chinese retreated from the ] to the island of ]<ref name="Cookc">Cook, Chris Cook. Stevenson, John. (2005). The Routledge Companion to World History Since 1914. Routledge. ISBN:0415345847. p 376.</ref>, which had been under military occupation by the ROC since Oct. 25, 1945. There remained only isolated pockets of resistance, particularly in the far south. A PRC attempt to take the ROC controlled island of ] was thwarted in the ] halting the PLA advance towards Taiwan.<ref name="QiB">Qi, Bangyuan. Wang, Dewei. Wang, David Der-wei. (2003). The Last of the Whampoa Breed: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora. Columbia University Press. ISBN:0231130023. pg 2</ref> In December 1949, Chiang proclaimed ], Taiwan, the temporary capital of the ] and continued to assert his government as the sole legitimate authority in China. The last of the fighting ended with the ] which resulted in the Communist conquest of ] in April 1950 and ] in May 1950.<ref name="MacF">MacFarquhar, Roderick. Fairbank, John K. Twitchett, Denis C. (1991). The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge University Press. ISBN:0521243378. pg 820.</ref> However, no legal document to officially end the Chinese Civil War has ever been signed. Legally speaking, with both contending governments PRC and ROC still existing, the Chinese Civil War has not been resolved.


After the war with the Japanese ended, Chiang Kai-shek quickly moved KMT troops to newly liberated areas to prevent Communist forces from receiving the Japanese surrender.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002"/> The US airlifted many KMT troops from central China to the ] (Manchuria). President ] was very clear about what he described as "using the Japanese to hold off the Communists". In his memoirs he writes:
==Relationship between the two sides since 1950==<!-- This section is linked from ]. If you change the title of this section, please change the link as well -->
{{main|Cross-Strait relations}}
{{seealso|Political Status of Taiwan}}
Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the United States initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of the ] in June 1950. At this point, allowing a total Communist victory over Chiang became politically impossible in the United States, and President ] ordered the ] into the ]s to prevent ROC and PRC from attacking each other.<ref name="BushR">Bush, Richard C. (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN:081571288X.</ref>


{{blockquote|It was perfectly clear to us that if we told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard, the entire country would be taken over by the Communists. We therefore had to take the unusual step of using the enemy as a garrison until we could airlift Chinese National troops to South China and send ] to guard the seaports. |sign = President Truman<ref>Harry S Truman, ''Memoirs'', Vol. Two: "Years of Trial and Hope, 1946–1953" (Great Britain 1956), p. 66</ref>}}
In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all mainland ports and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure covered from a point north of the mouth of ] in ] to the mouth of the ] in Manchuria.<ref name="Tsang">Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang Tsang. The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership Between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950-1958. (2006). I.B. Tauris. ISBN:1850438420. p 155, p 115-120, p 139-145</ref> Since the mainland's railroad network was underdeveloped, north-south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity also caused severe hardship for mainland fishermen.


Using the pretext of "receiving the Japanese surrender", business interests within the KMT government occupied most of the banks, factories and commercial properties, which had previously been seized by the Imperial Japanese Army.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002" /> They also conscripted troops at an accelerated pace from the civilian population and hoarded supplies, preparing for a resumption of war with the Communists. These hasty and harsh preparations caused great hardship for the residents of cities such as Shanghai, where the unemployment rate rose dramatically to 37.5%.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002" />
After losing the mainland, a group of approximately 12,000 KMT soldiers escaped to ] and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China. Their leader, General ], was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of ]. Initially, the United States supported these remnants and the ] provided them with aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the ] in 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times.


] meant those employed in the Kuomintang forces lost the purchasing power of their pay.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{Rp|204}} This resulted in corruption and the embezzlement of supplies which disappeared into the barter economy.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{Rp|204}} Ordinary Kuomintang soldiers were often malnourished and desertion was common.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{Rp|204}}
After the Republic of China complained to the United Nations against the ] supporting the CPC, the ] was adopted on ], ] to condemn the Soviet Union.


The US strongly supported the Kuomintang forces. About 50,000 US soldiers were sent to guard strategic sites in Hebei and Shandong in ]. The US equipped and trained KMT troops, and transported Japanese and Koreans back to help KMT forces to occupy liberated zones as well as to contain Communist-controlled areas.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002" /> According to ], American aid included substantial amounts of mostly surplus military supplies, and loans were made to the KMT.<ref>p. 23, U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, William Blum, Zed Books 2004 London.</ref> Within less than two years after the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT had received $4.43&nbsp;billion from the US{{snd}}most of which was military aid.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002" /> Highlighting the aid provided by the US to the KMT, the Communists' position was that the US was stirring domestic warfare and characterized the civil war as both a national revolution against the KMT and a revolution against US colonization and aggression.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Hongshan |title=Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.–China Relations in the Cold War |year=2024 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-231-20705-8 |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|14}}
Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in ] as vital for any future campaign to retake the mainland. On ], ], the ] began when the PLA started shelling ] and threatened to take the ].<ref name="Tsang" /> On ], ], the PLA took nearby ], with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded defending the island. On ] of the same year, the ] passed the ] authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.<ref name="Tsang" /> The First Taiwan Straits crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during the ].<ref name="Tsang" />


=== Outbreak of war ===
The ] began on ], ] with air and naval engagements between PRC and ROC forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of ] (by the PRC) and ] (by the ROC), and ended on November of the same year.<ref name="Tsang" /> PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the United States rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb mainland artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided ] ships to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On ], the United States escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships and the PRC refrained from firing. On ], the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire" &mdash; the PLA would only shell Quemoy on odd-numbered days. The ] in 1995&ndash;96 escalated tensions between both sides when the PRC tested a series of missiles not far from Taiwan.<ref>Behnke, Alison. (2007). Taiwan in Pictures. Twenty-First Century Books. ISBN:082257148X.</ref>
<gallery widths="200px" heights="180px">
File:Chaing Kai-shek's Strategy 1947.PNG|Situation in 1947
File:Communist Offensives September through November 1948.PNG|Situation in the fall of 1948
File:Communist Offensives November 1948 - January 1949.PNG|Situation in the winter of 1948 and 1949
File:Communist Offensives April - October 1949.PNG|Situation in April to October 1949
</gallery>


As postwar negotiations between the Nationalist government and the CCP failed, the civil war between these two parties resumed. This stage of war is referred to in ] and Communist historiography as the "War of Liberation" ({{zh |s = 解放战争 |p = Jiěfàng Zhànzhēng |links = no }}). On 20 July 1946, Chiang Kai-shek launched a large-scale assault on Communist territory in ] with 113 brigades (a total of 1.6&nbsp;million troops).<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002" />
Since the late 1980s, there has been growing economic exchanges on both sides while the ]s remain a dangerous flash point.<ref name="so" /> Beginning in the early 21st century, there has been a significant warming of relations between the ] and the ] with high level exchanges such as the ].


Knowing their disadvantages in manpower and equipment, the CCP executed a "passive defense" strategy. It avoided the strong points of the KMT army and was prepared to abandon territory in order to preserve its forces. In most cases the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. The CCP also attempted to wear out the KMT forces as much as possible. This tactic seemed to be successful; after a year, the power balance became more favorable to the CCP. They wiped out 1.12&nbsp;million KMT troops, while their strength grew to about two million men.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002" />
== Commanders during the Civil War ==
=== Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)===
*] (Commander-In-Chief)
*]
*] (During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he betrayed Chiang and joined the Japanese Forces)
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]


]
=== Communist Party of China ===
]]]
*] (Commander-in-chief)
]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]


In March 1947, the KMT achieved a symbolic victory by seizing Yan'an, the capital of the ].<ref>Lilley, James R. ''China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia''. {{ISBN|1-58648-136-3}}.</ref> The Communists counterattacked soon afterwards. With KMT efforts for an all-out offensive failing, the Nationalists changed strategy from broad assaults to concentrating on key targets, including Communist-controlled areas in Shandong and Shaanxi.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=56}} This approach also failed.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=56}}
=== Warlords ===
*] (Killed in a train bombing by the Japanese, his son Zhang Xueliang took over his lands)
*] (Son of Zhang Zuolin, in the ], he and Yang Hu Cheng forced ] to end his war against the Communists and ally with them against the Japanese. He was then jailed by Chiang until 1989.)
*] (Changed his support to KMT in 1925, then fought them in 1930 ] and lost. Organized the ] in cooperation with north China Communists and changed again to CPC in 1945 and visited the USSR).
*] (Ruled ] Province until 1948)
*]
*]


From June to September 1947, the Communists launched offensives and Nationalist-controlled areas became the primary battlefields.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=56}} On 30 June 1947, CCP troops crossed the Yellow River and moved to the ] area, restored and developed the ]. At the same time, Communist forces also began to counterattack in Northeastern China, North China and East China.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002" />
=== List of Chinese Civil War weapons ===


By late 1948, the CCP captured the northern cities of ] and ] and seized control of the Northeast after suffering numerous setbacks while trying to take the cities, with the decisive ].<ref name="Westad2003">Westad, Odd Arne. (2003). ''Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950''. Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|0-8047-4484-X}}. pp. 192–193.</ref> The ], regarded as the best KMT army, was forced to surrender after the CCP conducted a brutal six-month ] that resulted in more than 150,000 civilian deaths from starvation.<ref>Pomfret, John. "Red Army Starved 150,000 Chinese Civilians, Books Says" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111025143728/http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19901122&slug=1105487 |date=25 October 2011 }} Accessed: 2009-10-02. Archived {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111025143728/http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19901122&slug=1105487 |date=25 October 2011 }}</ref>
'''Handguns'''


] FT tanks]]
*], Nationalist, warlords, Communists
The capture of large KMT units provided the CCP with the tanks, heavy artillery and other combined-arms assets needed to execute offensive operations south of the Great Wall. By April 1948, the city of Luoyang fell, cutting the KMT army off from Xi'an.<ref name="Elleman">Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-21473-4}}.</ref> Following a fierce battle, the CCP captured ] and Shandong province on 24 September 1948During this period, ] took place, which was an important battle for the CCP to liberate Shandong. Through the Weixian Campaign, the CCP controlled the Jiaoji Railway and cut off the connection between Jinan and Qingdao. The ] of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for the CCP.<ref name="Westad2003" /> A large number of KMT troops deserted and changed sides in these conflicts.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{Rp|204}} The outcome of these encounters were decisive for the military outcome of the civil war.<ref name="Westad2003" />
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Communists
*], Communists
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist


The ] resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China. It lasted 64 days, from 21 November 1948 to 31 January 1949.<ref name="Finkelstein">Finkelstein, David Michael. Ryan, Mark A. McDevitt, Michael. (2003). ''Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949''. M. E. Sharpe. China. {{ISBN|0-7656-1088-4}}. p. 63.</ref> The PLA suffered heavy casualties while securing ], Tianjin along with its port and garrison at ] and ]<!--NOT A TYPO. Beijing was called Beiping at that time.-->.<ref name="Finkelstein" /> The CCP brought 890,000 troops from the northeast to oppose some 600,000 KMT troops.<ref name="Elleman" /> There were 40,000 CCP casualties at Zhangjiakou alone. They in turn killed, wounded or captured some 520,000 KMT during the campaign.<ref name="Finkelstein" />
'''Rifles'''


] they next moved to ], then to ], ] and finally, ] before arriving ] in 1949.]]
*], Nationalist, warlords, Communists
*], Nationalist, warlords, Communists
*], Nationalist
*],Nationalist, warlords, Communists
*],Nationalist, warlords, Communists
*], Nationalist, warlords, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Communists
*] , Communists
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*], Nationalist
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist


After achieving decisive victory at Liaoshen, Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns, the CCP destroyed 144 regular and 29 irregular KMT divisions, including 1.54&nbsp;million ] KMT troops, which significantly reduced the strength of Nationalist forces.<ref name="Đỗ Thanh Bình2002"/> Stalin initially favored a ] in postwar China, and tried to persuade Mao to stop the CCP from crossing the Yangtze and attacking the KMT positions south of the river.<ref>Donggil Kim, "Stalin and the Chinese Civil War." ''Cold War History'' 10.2 (2010): 185–202.</ref> Mao rejected Stalin's position and on 21 April, began the ]. On 23 April, they captured the KMT's capital, Nanjing.<ref name="Zhang2002" /> The KMT government retreated to Canton (Guangzhou) until 15 October, ] until 25 November, and then Chengdu before ] on 7 December. By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remnants of KMT forces southwards in southern China, and only ] was left. A Chinese Muslim ] cavalry regiment, the 14th ] Cavalry, was sent by the Kuomintang to attack Mongol and Soviet positions along the border during the ].<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IAs9AAAAIAAJ&q=warlords+and+muslims |title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: a political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949 |first=Andrew D. W. |last=Forbes |year=1986 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0-521-25514-7 |pages=215, 225 |access-date=28 June 2010}}</ref>
'''Submachine Guns'''


The Kuomintang made several last-ditch attempts to use ]pa troops against the Communists in southwest China. The Kuomintang formulated a plan in which three Khampa divisions would be assisted by the ] to oppose the Communists.<ref>{{harvnb|Lin|2010|p=117}}: "China's far northwest. A simultaneous proposal suggested that, with the support of the new Panchen Lama and his entourage, at least three army divisions of anti-Communist Khampa Tibetans could be mustered in southwest China."</ref> Kuomintang intelligence reported that some Tibetan tusi chiefs and the Khampa Su Yonghe controlled 80,000 troops in Sichuan, Qinghai and Tibet. They hoped to use them against the Communist army.{{sfn|Lin|2010|p=xxi}}
*] ''(Chinese copy)'', Nationalist,warlords,Communists
*], warlords
*](U.S Lend Lease, later local produced Chinese copies), Nationalist
*], Communists
*], Communists
*], Communists
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*], Nationalist, Communists


=== Pushing south ===
'''Machine Guns'''
{{See also|Proclamation of the People's Republic of China}}


On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong ] with its capital at Beiping, which was returned to the former name Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and approximately two million Nationalist soldiers ] to the ] in December after the PLA advanced into Sichuan province. Isolated Nationalist pockets of resistance remained in the area, but the majority of the resistance collapsed after the ] on 10 December 1949, with some resistance continuing in the far south.<ref>Cook, Chris Cook. Stevenson, John. (2005). ''The Routledge Companion to World History Since 1914.'' Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-34584-7}}. p. 376.</ref>
*] ''(purchashed in large quantity from former ])'', Nationalist, warlords, Communists
*] ''(Chinese copy)'', Nationalist, warlords, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist
*],Nationalist
*], Communists
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist


] in mid 1950]]
'''Heavy Machine Guns'''


A PRC attempt to take the ROC-controlled island of ] was thwarted in the ], halting the PLA advance towards Taiwan.<ref>Qi, Bangyuan. Wang, Dewei. Wang, David Der-wei. (2003). ''The Last of the Whampoa Breed: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora''. Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|0-231-13002-3}}. p. 2.</ref> In December 1949, Chiang proclaimed Taipei the ] of the ] and continued to assert his government as the sole legitimate authority in China.
*Chinese Type 24 Heavy Machine Gun (Chinese copy of ]),Nationalist,warlords, Communists
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Nationalist, Communists
*], Communists
*], Communists
*], Communists


The Communists' other amphibious operations of 1950 were more successful: they led to the ] in April 1950, the ] off the Guangdong coast (May–August 1950), and ] off Zhejiang (May 1950).<ref>MacFarquhar, Roderick. Fairbank, John K. Twitchett, Denis C. (1991). ''The Cambridge History of China''. Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-24337-8}}. p. 820.</ref>
'''Anti-Tank Weapons'''


== Aftermath ==
*],Nationalist
{{Main|Cross-strait relations|Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan}}
*], Communists
{{See also|Political status of Taiwan|Two Chinas}}
*], Communists
]
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist


Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall to the imminent invasion of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army, and the US was initially reluctant in offering full support for Chiang in their final stand. US President ] announced on 5 January 1950 that the United States would not engage in any dispute involving the Taiwan Strait, and that he would not intervene in the event of an attack by the PRC.<ref>{{cite web |title=Harry S Truman, 'Statement on Formosa', January 5, 1950 |url=http://china.usc.edu/harry-s-truman-%E2%80%9Cstatement-formosa%E2%80%9D-january-5-1950 |publisher=] |access-date=7 May 2017}}</ref> Truman, seeking to exploit the possibility of a Titoist-style ], announced in his United States Policy toward Formosa that the US would obey the ] designation of Taiwan as Chinese territory and would not assist the Nationalists. However, the Communist leadership was not aware of this change of policy, instead becoming increasingly hostile to the US.<ref>{{cite book |first=Yafeng |last=Xia |title=Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.–China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972 |year=2006 |publisher=Indiana University Press |isbn=978-0-253-11237-8 |page=38}}</ref> The situation quickly changed after the sudden onset of the ] in June 1950. This led to changing political climate in the US, and President Truman ordered the ] to sail to the ] as part of the ] policy against potential Communist advance.<ref>Bush, Richard C. (2005). ''Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait''. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-1288-X}}</ref>
'''Grenades'''


]" – a rock in Kinmen Island with Chiang Kai-shek's calligraphy signifying the retaking of one's homeland]]
*] (Chinese copies)Communists, warlords, Nationalist
*], Communists
*], Communists
*] ''(U.S ])'', Nationalist


In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all mainland China ports and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure was from a point north of the mouth of ] in ] to the mouth of the ] in ].<ref name="Tsang2006">Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang Tsang. ''The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership Between the Republic of China and the UK'', 1950–1958. (2006). I.B. Tauris. {{ISBN|1-85043-842-0}}. pp. 155, 115–120, 139–145</ref> Since mainland China's railroad network was underdeveloped, north–south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity also caused severe hardship for mainland China fishermen.
'''Misc'''


During ], KMT troops, who could not retreat to Taiwan, were left behind to fight a ] against the Communists. These ] were eliminated in what the PRC called the ] and the ]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yang |first=Kuisong |date=March 2008 |title=Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries |journal=The China Quarterly |issue=193 |pages=102–121 |jstor=20192166}}</ref> According to official statistics from the CCP in 1954, during the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, at least 2.6 million people were arrested, some 1.29 million people were ], and 712,000 people were executed.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Guo |first=Xuezhi |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-7_lfNx76GcC&pg=PA62 |title=China's Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics |year=2012 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-02323-9 |page=62 |quote=Among them, 712.000 counterrevolutionaries were executed, 1.29 million were imprisoned, and 1.2 million were subject to control at various times. |access-date=7 November 2022}}</ref> Most of those killed were former Kuomintang officials, businessmen, former employees of Western companies and intellectuals whose loyalty was suspect.<ref>Steven W. Mosher. ''China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality.'' ], 1992. {{ISBN|0-465-09813-4}} p. 73</ref>
*], Communists


Winning China proper in 1950, also after ], the CCP controlled the entire mainland in late 1951 (excluding ] and ]). But a group of approximately 3,000 KMT Central soldiers retreated to ] and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China during the ] and ]. Their leader, ], was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of ]. Initially, the US-supported these remnants and the ] provided them with military aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the ] in 1953, the US began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954 nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times to maintain a base close to China.
==See also==
{{sisterlinks}}
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]


After the ROC complained to the United Nations against the Soviet Union for violating the ] to support the CCP, the ] was adopted on 1 February 1952, condemning the Soviet Union.
==Notes==
{{reflist|2}}


In the end, the Communist military forces suffered 1.3&nbsp;million combat casualties in the 1945–1949 phase of the war: 260,000 killed, 190,000 missing, and 850,000 wounded, discounting irregulars. Nationalist casualties in the same phase were recorded after the war by the PRC 5,452,700 regulars and 2,258,800 irregulars.<ref name="PLA1983"/>{{Page needed|date=May 2024}}
==External links==
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After the formation of the PRC, the PRC government named the Western nations, led by the U.S., as the biggest threat to its national security.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chen |first=Jian |title=China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=1994 |isbn=978-0231100250 |location=New York |page=26}}</ref> Basing this judgment on multiple factors, including the idea of a Chinese ] at the hands of Western powers beginning in the mid-19th century,{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=22}} U.S. support for the Nationalists during the Chinese Civil War,{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=41}} and the ideological struggles between revolutionaries and reactionaries,{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=21}} the PRC leadership believed that China would become a critical battleground in the U.S.' crusade against Communism.{{Sfn|Chen|1994|p=19}} As a countermeasure and to elevate China's standing among the worldwide Communist movements, the PRC leadership adopted a foreign policy that actively promoted Communist revolutions throughout territories on China's periphery.{{Sfn|Chen|1994|pp=25–26, 93}}

]

===Taiwan Strait tensions===
Though viewed as a military liability by the US, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in ] as vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake mainland China. On 3 September 1954, the ] started with the PRC shelling ].<ref name="Tsang2006" /> The PRC ] on 19 January 1955, leading to the ROC abandoning the ] the following month.<ref>{{cite web |last1=McCauley |first1=Kevin |title=PLA Yijiangshan Joint Amphibious Operation: Past is Prologue |url=https://jamestown.org/program/pla-yijiangshan-joint-amphibious-operation-past-is-prologue/ |date=13 September 2016 |access-date=12 April 2024 |archive-date=17 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240717104204/https://jamestown.org/program/pla-yijiangshan-joint-amphibious-operation-past-is-prologue/ |url-status=live}}</ref> On 24 January 1955, the ] passed the ] authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands. The First Taiwan Straits crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis ended during the ].<ref name="Tsang2006" />

The ] began on 23 August 1958 with air and naval engagements between PRC and ROC forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Kinmen by the PRC and ] by the ROC, and ended on November of the same year.<ref name="Tsang2006" /> PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the US rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb mainland China artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided ] ships to land supplies, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On 7 September, the US escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships and the PRC refrained from firing.

The third crisis occurred in 1995–96. The PRC responded to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States, and the U.S. recognition of Lee as a representative of Taiwan, with military exercises. The exercises were also meant to deter Taiwanese voters from supporting Lee in the 1996 election; Lee won the election. Two U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed during the crisis; they were not attacked and deescalation followed.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Kuhn |first1=Anthony |last2=Feng |first2=Emily |date=August 2, 2022 |title=What 3 past Taiwan Strait crises can teach us about U.S.–China tensions today |url=https://www.npr.org/2022/08/02/1115234980/what-3-past-taiwan-strait-crises-can-teach-us-about-u-s-china-tensions-today |access-date=August 3, 2022 |work=NPR |archive-date=3 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220803204936/https://www.npr.org/2022/08/02/1115234980/what-3-past-taiwan-strait-crises-can-teach-us-about-u-s-china-tensions-today |url-status=live}}</ref>

US Speaker of the House ]'s ] in August 2022 triggered ] across the Taiwan Strait. She originally intended to travel to Taiwan in April 2022,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Pollard |first=Martin Quin |date=2022-04-07 |title=China warns U.S. against House Speaker Pelosi visiting Taiwan |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-warns-strong-measures-if-us-speaker-pelosi-visits-taiwan-2022-04-07/ |access-date=2022-08-03 |archive-date=3 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220803051619/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-warns-strong-measures-if-us-speaker-pelosi-visits-taiwan-2022-04-07/ |url-status=live}}</ref> but was delayed due to ].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chiacu |first=Doina |date=2022-04-08 |title=U.S. House Speaker Pelosi is latest U.S. official to test positive for COVID |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-house-speaker-pelosi-tests-positive-covid-spokesman-2022-04-07/ |access-date=2022-08-03 |archive-date=3 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220803051619/https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-house-speaker-pelosi-tests-positive-covid-spokesman-2022-04-07/ |url-status=live}}</ref> She rescheduled the trip to August as part of a wider Asian trip. The White House was reported to have been initially divided over the appropriateness of the trip but later affirmed Pelosi's right to visit Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Mason |first1=Jeff |last2=Martina |first2=Michael |date=August 1, 2022 |title=White House: U.S. will not be intimidated by China; Pelosi has right to visit Taiwan |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/white-house-says-pelosi-has-right-visit-taiwan-2022-08-01 |work=Reuters |url-access=registration |access-date=6 August 2022 |archive-date=4 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804001906/https://www.reuters./ |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Nancy Pelosi's plan to visit Taiwan prompts outrage from China |url=https://www.ft.com/content/09669099-1565-4723-86c9-84e0ca465825 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/https://www.ft.com/content/09669099-1565-4723-86c9-84e0ca465825 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |agency=Financial Times |url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |script-title=uk:Китай-Тайвань: на тлі можливого візиту Пелосі зростає напруження |trans-title=China-Taiwan: Tensions rise amid possible Pelosi visit |language=uk |newspaper=BBC News Україна |url=https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-62389913 |access-date=2022-08-02 |archive-date=2022-08-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220802164200/https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-62389913 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |script-title=uk:Ненсі Пелосі летить на Тайвань: що потрібно знати про кризу між США і Китаєм |trans-title=Nancy Pelosi flies to Taiwan: what you need to know about the crisis between the USA and China |url=https://www.unian.ua/world/nensi-pelosi-letit-na-tayvan-shcho-potribno-znati-pro-krizu-mizh-ssha-i-kitayem-novini-svitu-11925576.html |access-date=2022-08-02 |website=unian.ua |language=uk |archive-date=2022-08-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220801182653/https://www.unian.ua/world/nensi-pelosi-letit-na-tayvan-shcho-potribno-znati-pro-krizu-mizh-ssha-i-kitayem-novini-svitu-11925576.html |url-status=live}}</ref> As a result, the PLA announced four days of unprecedented military live-fire drills,<ref>{{cite web |last=Zheng |first=Sarah |date=2022-08-02 |title=China Plans Four Days of Military Drills in Areas Encircling Taiwan |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-02/china-announces-military-drills-encircling-taiwan-from-aug-4-7-l6cc5ljn |access-date=2022-08-03 |website=Bloomberg}}</ref> in six zones that encircle the island on the busiest international waterways and aviation routes.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Davidson |first1=Helen |last2=Ni |first2=Vincent |date=2022-08-03 |title=China to begin series of unprecedented live-fire drills off Taiwan coast |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/03/china-to-begin-series-unprecedented-live-fire-drills-off-coast-of-taiwan |access-date=2022-08-04 |website=the Guardian |archive-date=4 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804035722/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/03/china-to-begin-series-unprecedented-live-fire-drills-off-coast-of-taiwan |url-status=live}}</ref> In response to the announcement, ROC officials complained that the PRC's live-fire drills were an invasion of Taiwan's territorial space and a direct challenge to free air and sea navigation.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lee |first=Yimou |date=2022-08-04 |title=China begins 'illegitimate, irresponsible' live-fire military drills – Taiwan |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/suspected-drones-over-taiwan-cyber-attacks-after-pelosi-visit-2022-08-04/ |access-date=2022-08-04 |archive-date=4 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804044456/https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/suspected-drones-over-taiwan-cyber-attacks-after-pelosi-visit-2022-08-04/ |url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Political fallout ===
{{Main|China and the United Nations|United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758}}
] wreckage (pilot ]) on display at the ] in Beijing]]
On 25 October 1971, the ] admitted the PRC and ], which had been a founding member of the ] and was one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Representatives of Chiang Kai-shek refused to recognise their accreditations as representatives of China and left the assembly. Recognition for the People's Republic of China soon followed from most other member nations, including the United States.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un/ |title=People's Republic of China In, Taiwan Out, at U.N. |date=25 October 2011 |website=The Learning Network |access-date=20 May 2018 |archive-date=13 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200813021518/https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un/ |url-status=live}}</ref>

By 1984, PRC and ROC began to de-escalate their hostilities through diplomatic relations with each other, and cross-straits trade and investment has been growing ever since. The state of war was officially declared over by the ROC in 1991.<ref>{{cite web |title=Taiwan flashpoint |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/chinas_stance.stm |website=BBC News |access-date=20 October 2017 |archive-date=18 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171218121434/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/chinas_stance.stm |url-status=live}}</ref> Despite the end of the hostilities, the two sides have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war. According to Mao Zedong, there were three ways of "staving off imperialist intervention in the short term" during the continuation of the Chinese Revolution. The first was through a rapid completion of the military takeover of the country, and through showing determination and strength against "foreign attempts at challenging the new regime along its borders". The second was by "formalising a comprehensive military alliance with the Soviet Union", which would dedicate Soviet power to directly defending China against its enemies; this aspect became extensively significant given the backdrop of the start of the Cold War. And finally, the regime had to "root out its domestic opponents: the heads of secret societies, religious sects, independent unions, or tribal and ethnic organisations". By destroying the basis of domestic reaction, Mao believed a safer world for the Chinese revolution to spread in would come into existence.<ref>{{Dead link|date=May 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} By Westad, Odd Arne. Stanford University Press, 21 Mar pp. 292–297 2003 (Google Books).</ref>

Under the new ROC president ], the ] was renounced in May 1991, thus ending the chances of the Kuomintang's quest to retake the mainland. In July 1999, Lee announced a "special diplomatic relationship". China was furious again, but the military drills were stopped by the ]. It was the last tense moment of this civil war.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=zh:历次台海危机内幕及其背后大国之间的博弈(图) |url=https://news.ifeng.com/history/2/shidian/200803/0313_2666_439865_9.shtml |access-date=23 May 2022 |archive-date=4 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804104748/https://news.ifeng.com/history/2/shidian/200803/0313_2666_439865_9.shtml |url-status=live}}</ref>

With the election in 2000 of ] candidate ], a party other than the KMT gained the presidency for the first time in Taiwan. The new president did not share the Chinese nationalist ideology of the KMT and CCP. This led to tension between the two sides, although trade and other ties such as the ] continued to increase.

With the election of pro-mainland President ] (KMT) in 2008, significant warming of relations resumed between Taipei and Beijing, with high-level exchanges between the semi-official diplomatic organizations of both states such as the ] series. Although the ] remains a potential flash point, regular direct air links were established in 2009.<ref name="Greenwood2001" />{{Page needed|date=January 2020}}

== Analysis ==
The Communist victory over the Nationalists is regarded as one of the most impressive twentieth century insurgent victories.<ref name="Opper2020">{{Cite book |last=Opper |first=Marc |title=People's Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam |year=2020 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-472-90125-8 |location=Ann Arbor |doi=10.3998/mpub.11413902 |s2cid=211359950}}</ref>{{Rp|1}} Historians and political scientists cite a number of factors, including the CCP's success at mobilizing mass support and the shortcomings of the Nationalist government.<ref name="Opper2020" />{{Rp|1}}

=== Poor governance by Nationalists ===
{{See also|Chinese hyperinflation}}
Almost all studies of the failure of the Nationalist government identify ] as a major factor in the government's collapse.<ref name="Coble2023">{{Cite book |last=Coble |first=Parks M. |title=The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War |year=2023 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-009-29761-5 |author-link=Parks M. Coble}}</ref>{{Rp|5}} The Nationalist military and the government's civilian employees were most impacted by hyperinflation which in turn prompted widespread corruption and pilfering.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{Rp|5}} Little funding reached enlisted soldiers, who were typically malnourished and poorly equipped.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{Rp|9}} Desertion was common.<ref name="Coble2023" />{{Rp|9}}

The historian ] writes that a lack of trust in the Nationalist government developed, as it was increasingly seen as "corrupt, vindictive, and with no overall vision of what China under its rule should look like".<ref name="Mitter2020">{{Cite book |last=Mitter |first=Rana |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1141442704 |title=China's good war: how World War II is shaping a new nationalism |year=2020 |publisher=Belknap |isbn=978-0-674-98426-4 |location=Cambridge, MA |page=54}}</ref> Chiang wrote in his diary in June 1948: "After the fall of Kaifeng our conditions worsened and became more serious. I now realized that the main reason our nation has collapsed, time after time throughout our history, was not because of superior power used by our external enemies, but because of disintegration and rot from within."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Trei |first=Lisa |date=9 March 2005 |title=Hoover's new archival acquisitions shed light on Chinese history |url=http://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/march9/chinese-030905.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190711184425/https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/march9/chinese-030905.html |archive-date=11 July 2019 |access-date=11 July 2019 |work=Stanford University}}</ref>

Historian ] says the Communists won the Civil War because they made fewer military mistakes than Chiang Kai-shek and also because in his search for a powerful centralized government, Chiang antagonized too many interest groups in China. Furthermore, his party was weakened in the war against the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Communists targeted different groups, such as peasants, and brought them to their side.<ref>Odd Arne Westad, ''Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750'' (2012) p.&nbsp;291.</ref> After 1945, the economy in the ROC areas collapsed because of hyperinflation and the failure of ] by the ROC government and financial reforms; the Gold Yuan depreciated sharply in late 1948<ref>{{Cite web |script-title=zh:金圓券相關史料 – 財政部財政史料陳列室 |url=http://www.mof.gov.tw/museum/ct.asp?xItem=3682&ctNode=34 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150102062530/http://www.mof.gov.tw/museum/ct.asp?xItem=3682&ctNode=34 |archive-date=2 January 2015 |access-date=8 March 2014 |language=zh}}</ref> and resulted in the ROC government losing the support of the cities' ]es.

United States Secretary of State ] described the Nationalists as "corrupt, reactionary, and inefficient". He believed that the Nationalists had displayed both political inadequacy as well as "the grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military command," and that the Communists "did not create this condition", but skillfully exploited the opportunity it provided.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kissinger |first1=Henry |title=On China |year=2011 |publisher=Penguin |isbn=9781594202711 |pages=117–118}}</ref>

=== Popular support for Communists and cohesion ===
In the meantime, the Communists continued their land reform programs, winning the support of the population in the countryside. This was a decisive factor in the Communists' success.<ref name="Lin2006">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |title=The Transformation of Chinese Socialism |year=2006 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-8223-3785-0 |location=Durham, NC |page=43 |doi=10.1017/S1598240800003520 |s2cid=155992759}}</ref> Millions of peasants who obtained land through the movement joined the People's Liberation Army or assisted in its logistical networks.<ref name="Lin2006" /> According to historian Brian DeMare, land redistribution was a critical factor because it linked the interests of peasants in the north and northeast to the Communists' success.<ref>{{Cite book |last=DeMare |first=Brian James |title=Land Wars: the Story of China's Agrarian Revolution |year=2019 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-5036-0952-5}}</ref> Ultimately, the Communists obtained the greatest popular support of any insurgency in modern history.<ref name="Opper2020" />{{Rp|3}}

An important advantage of the Communists was the "extraordinary cohesion" within its top leadership. This cohesion not only secured it from defections during difficult times but also facilitated "communications and top level debates over tactics". The ] of Mao Zedong created a "unity of purpose" and a "unity of command" which the KMT lacked. Apart from that, the CCP had mastered the manipulation of local politics to their benefit; this was also derived from their ] skills that had also been decentralised successfully by portraying their opponents as "enemies of all groups of Chinese" and itself as "defenders of the nation" and people (given the backdrop of the war with Japan).<ref>For quotes see {{cite book |first=Odd Arne |last=Westad |title=Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JBCOecRg5nEC&pg=PA10 |year=2003 |publisher=Stanford University Press |pages=9–11 |isbn=978-0-8047-4484-3 |access-date=6 October 2019}}</ref>

=== International factors ===
After the Second Sino-Japanese War ended, the United States government provided economic and military support exclusively to the Nationalists.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=|pages=53-54}} As the United States increased aid to the Nationalists in 1947 and 1948, the Communists incorporated United States involvement into its political discourse and framed the conflict not as one between two Chinese sides, but between the Communists and "US imperialists and their puppets".<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=55}} Mao contended that the United States had provided US$5.9 billion to the Nationalists from 1945 to 1949 "to help Chiang Kai-shek slaughter several million Chinese".<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=55}}

Strong American support for the Nationalists was hedged with the failure of the ], and then stopped completely mainly because of KMT corruption<ref>{{cite web |last=Sun |first=Tung-hsun |year=1982 |title=Some Recent American Interpretations of Sino-American Relations of the Late 1940s: An Assessment |url=http://www.ea.sinica.edu.tw/eu_file/12010586724.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191205024030/https://www.ea.sinica.edu.tw/eu_file/12010586724.pdf |archive-date=5 December 2019 |access-date=22 November 2018 |website=Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica}}</ref> (such as the notorious Yangtze Development Corporation controlled by ] and ]'s family)<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150227195642/http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/soong_register.pdf|date=27 February 2015}} media.hoover.org</ref><ref>{{cite web |script-title=zh:轉載: 杜月笙的1931 (6) – 五湖煙景的日誌 – 倍可親 |url=http://big5.backchina.com/blog/323944/article-142137.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150227190213/http://big5.backchina.com/blog/323944/article-142137.html |archive-date=27 February 2015 |access-date=23 November 2018 |website=big5.backchina.com |language=zh}}</ref> and KMT's military setback in Northeast China. Historians such as Jay Taylor, Robert Cowley, and Anne W. Carroll argue that the Nationalists' failure was largely caused by external reasons outside of the KMT's control, most notably the refusal of the Truman administration to support Chiang with the withdrawal of aid, the US armed embargo, the failed pursuit of a détente between the Nationalists and the communists, and the USSR's consistent support of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War.<ref>{{cite book |first=Jay |last=Taylor |title=The Generalissimo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DUg2KGMQWHQC&q=describe%20peace |year=2009 |publisher=Harvard University Press |pages=102–103 |isbn=978-0-674-05471-4 |access-date=18 March 2023}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://worldif.economist.com/article/12130/chiangs-china |title=Chiang's China |date=1 July 2015 |website=Worldif.economist.com |access-date=20 July 2022 |archive-date=19 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220719100737/https://worldif.economist.com/article/12130/chiangs-china |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.uchronia.net/label/waldchinaw.html |title=China Without Tears: If Chiang Kai-Shek Hadn't Gambled in 1946 |website=Uchronia.net |access-date=2022-07-19 |archive-date=3 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221003180407/http://www.uchronia.net/label/waldchinaw.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/who-lost-china-10801 |title=Who Lost China? &#124; EWTN |access-date=23 July 2022 |archive-date=23 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220723190451/https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/library/who-lost-china-10801 |url-status=live}}</ref> The better-trained Communist army's support from the USSR helped counter the American aid that the Nationalists received.<ref name="Mitter2020" /> ] said: "They did their best to help us, we were backed by the Soviet Union and North Korea."<ref>{{cite web |script-title=ru:ГЛАВА 35 ГРАЖДАНСКАЯ ВОЙНА В КИТАЕ |url=http://www.xliby.ru/istorija/rossija_i_kitai_konflikty_i_sotrudnichestvo/p35.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210127062850/http://www.xliby.ru/istorija/rossija_i_kitai_konflikty_i_sotrudnichestvo/p35.php |archive-date=27 January 2021 |access-date=13 August 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=青 |first1=山 |script-title=zh:苏联出兵之后中共对东北的争夺 |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/69118/69659/4731844.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210506195325/https://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/69118/69659/4731844.html |archive-date=6 May 2021 |access-date=17 March 2021 |website=中国共产党新闻网 |publisher=人民网}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=吕 |first1=明辉 |script-title=zh:朝鲜支援中国东北解放战争纪实 |url=https://wyxy.thnu.edu.cn/koreanps/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=176 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210514072156/https://wyxy.thnu.edu.cn/koreanps/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=176 |archive-date=14 May 2021 |access-date=17 March 2021 |website=通化师范学院 |publisher=白山出版社}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=金 |first1=东吉 |script-title=zh:中国人民解放军中的朝鲜师回朝鲜问题新探 |url=http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=6375 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211113103846/http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=6375 |archive-date=13 November 2021 |access-date=17 March 2021 |website=香港中文大學 |publisher=中國研究服務中心}}</ref>

== Atrocities ==
During the war, both the Nationalists and Communists carried out mass atrocities, with millions of non-combatants deliberately killed by both sides.<ref>Rummel, Rudolph (1994), ''Death by Government''.{{ISBN?}}{{page needed|date=April 2024}}</ref>

=== Nationalist atrocities ===
Over several years after the 1927 ], the Kuomintang killed between 300,000 and one million people, primarily peasants, in anti-communist campaigns as part of the White Terror.<ref>Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170325202546/https://books.google.com/books?id=NztlWQeXf2IC |date=25 March 2017 }}. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. {{ISBN|962-996-280-2}}. Retrieved 12 November 2022. p. 38</ref><ref name="Karl2010">{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world: a concise history |date=2010 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham, NC |pages=33}}</ref> During the White Terror, the Nationalists specifically targeted women with short hair who had not been subjected to ], on the presumption that such "non-traditional" women were radicals.<ref name="Karl2010" /> Nationalist forces cut off their breasts, shaved their heads, and displayed their mutilated bodies to intimidate the populace.<ref name="Karl2010" />

Torture, rape, and collective punishment were common Nationalist practices during its counter-insurgency campaigns.<ref name="Opper2020" />{{Rp|91–92}} The Nationalists uprooted and moved entire communities in an effort to more easily monitor Communist activities.<ref name="Opper2020" />{{Rp|92}}

From 1946 to 1949, the Nationalists arrested, tortured, and killed political dissidents via the Sino-American Cooperative Organization.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mitter |first=Rana |title=China's good war: how World War II is shaping a new nationalism |year=2020 |publisher=Belknap |isbn=978-0-674-98426-4 |location=Cambridge, MA |page=179}}</ref>

===Communist atrocities===
{{main|Siege of Changchun|Chinese Land Reform#Mass killings of landlords}}
During the December 1930 ], the communists executed 2,000 to 3,000 members of the Futian battalion after its leaders had mutinied against Mao Zedong.<ref>{{cite book |last=Feigon |first=Lee |author-link=Lee Feigon |title=Mao: A Reinterpretation |year=2002 |pages=51–53 |isbn=978-1566634588 |publisher=Ivan R. Dee |location=Chicago}}</ref>

Between 1931 and 1934 in the ], the communist authorities engaged in a widespread campaign of violence against civilians to ensure compliance with its policies and to stop defection to the advancing KMT, including mass executions, land confiscation and forced labor.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Opper |first=Marc |date=2018 |title=Revolution Defeated: The Collapse of the Chinese Soviet Republic |journal=Twentieth-Century China |volume=43 |issue=1 |page=60 |doi=10.1353/tcc.2018.0003 |s2cid=148775889 |doi-access=free}}</ref> According to ], a high-ranking communist in Jiangxi at the time, in response to mass flight of civilians to KMT held areas, the local authorities would "usually to send armed squads after those attempting to flee and kill them on the spot, producing numerous ]s throughout the CSR that would later be uncovered by the KMT and its allies." ], another high-ranking communist, reported that "the policy of annihilating landlords as an exploiting class had degenerated into a massacre"<ref>{{cite book |chapter=The Chinese Soviet Republic, 1931–1934 |title=People's Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam |first=Marc |last=Opper |year=2020 |page=58 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |doi=10.3998/mpub.11413902 |hdl=20.500.12657/23824 |isbn=978-0-472-13184-6 |s2cid=211359950}}</ref> The population of the communist controlled area fell by 700,000 from 1931 and 1935, of which a large proportion were murdered as "class enemies", worked to death, committed suicide, or died in other circumstances attributable to the communists.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Halliday |first1=Jon |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L_bQX73aOvcC&pg=PA133 |title=Mao: The Unknown Story |last2=Chang |first2=Jung |year=2012 |isbn=9781448156863 |page=133 |publisher=Random House |access-date=8 November 2022}} The Ruijin base, the seat of the first Red state, consisted of large parts of the provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian. These two provinces suffered the greatest population decrease in the whole of China from the year when the Communist state was founded, 1931, to the year after the Reds left, 1935. The population of Red Jiangxi fell by more than half a million – a drop of 20 percent. The fall in Red Fujian was comparable. Given that escapes were few, this means that altogether some 700,000 people died in the Ruijin base. A large part of these were murdered as "class enemies," or were worked to death, or committed suicide, or died other premature deaths attributable to the regime.</ref>

During the ], the ] implemented a military blockade on the KMT-held city of Changchun and prevented civilians from leaving the city during the blockade;<ref name="Koga2016"/> this blockade caused the starvation of tens<ref name="Koga2016">Koga, Yukiko (2016). ''Inheritance of Loss: China, Japan, and the Political Economy of Redemption After Empire''. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|022641213X}}. {{page needed|date=April 2024}}</ref> to 150<ref>{{cite web |title=Pomfret, John (October 2, 2009). "Red Army Starved 150,000 Chinese Civilians, Books Says". Associated Press. ''The Seattle Times''. Archived from the original on October 2, 2009. Retrieved October 2, 2009. |url=https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/19901122/1105487/red-army-starved-150000-chinese-civilians-books-says |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111025143728/http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19901122&slug=1105487 |url-status=live |archive-date=25 October 2011}}</ref> thousand civilians. The PLA continued to use siege tactics throughout Northeast China.<ref>Lary, Diana (2015). ''China's Civil War''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|1107054672}}. {{page needed|date=April 2024}}</ref>

At the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1946, Mao Zedong began to push for a return to radical policies to mobilize China against the landlord class, but protected the rights of middle peasants and specified that rich peasants were not landlords.<ref>DeMare, Brian James (2019). ''Land Wars: The Story of China's Agrarian Revolution''. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|978-1503609525}}. {{page needed|date=April 2024}}</ref> The 7 July Directive of 1946 set off eighteen months of fierce conflict in which all rich peasant and landlord property of all types was to be confiscated and redistributed to poor peasants. CCP work teams went quickly from village to village and divided the population into landlords, rich, middle, poor, and landless peasants. Because the work teams did not involve villagers in the process, however, rich and middle peasants quickly returned to power.{{sfnb|Tanner|2015|pp=134–135}} The Outline Land Law of October 1947 increased the pressure.<ref>Saich ''The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party'' {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406143614/https://books.google.com/books?id=w48YDQAAQBAJ&q=%22Outline+Land+Law%22+-wikipedia |date=6 April 2023 }}</ref> Those condemned as landlords were buried alive, dismembered, strangled and shot.<ref>{{cite book |last=Scheidel |first=Walter |author-link=Walter Scheidel |title=The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century |publisher=] |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-691-16502-8 |url=http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10921.html |page=225 |access-date=25 November 2019}}</ref>
In response to the aforementioned land reform campaign, the Kuomintang helped establish the "Huanxiang Tuan" ({{zhi|t=還鄉團}}), or Homecoming Legion, which was composed of landlords who sought the return of their redistributed land and property from peasants and CCP guerrillas, as well as forcibly conscripted peasants and communist POWs.<ref name="Liu2002">{{cite book |last=Liu |first=Zaiyu |script-title=zh:第二次國共戰爭時期的還鄉團 |publisher=Twenty First Century Bimonthly |location=Hong Kong |year=2002 |url=http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c071-200104044.pdf |access-date=25 November 2019 |archive-date=5 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191205024025/http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c071-200104044.pdf |language=zh |url-status=live}}</ref> The Homecoming legion conducted its guerrilla warfare campaign against CCP forces and purported collaborators up until the end of the civil war in 1949.<ref name="Liu2002"/>

== See also ==
{{Portal|China|Taiwan}}
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== References ==
{{Reflist}}

== Further reading ==
* {{Cite journal |last=Cheng |first=Victor Shiu Chiang |date=January 2005 |title=Imagining China's Madrid in Manchuria: The Communist Military Strategy at the Onset of the Chinese Civil War, 1945–1946 |journal=] |volume=31 |issue=1 |pages=72–114 |doi=10.1177/0097700404270549 |issn=0097-7004}}
* {{Cite book |last=Chi |first=Hsi-sheng |title=Nationalist China at war: military defeats and political collapse, 1937–45 |date=1982 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-472-10018-7 |series=Michigan studies on China |location=Ann Arbor}}
* {{Cite book |last=Dreyer |first=Edward L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YsWOAwAAQBAJ |title=China at War 1901–1949 |publisher=] |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-317-89984-6}}
* {{Cite book |last=Gueniffey |first=Patrice |title=The military history of the Chinese Civil War |year=1969 |publisher=Watts |isbn=978-0-531-01252-9 |location=New York}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Eastman |first=Lloyd E. |date=December 1981 |title=Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-shek Testifies |journal=] |volume=88 |pages=658–668 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000029416 |issn=0305-7410}}
* {{Cite book |last=Eastman |first=Lloyd E. |title=The Nationalist era in China: 1927–1949 |publisher=] |year=1991 |isbn=978-0-521-38591-6}}
* {{Cite book |last=Fenby |first=Jonathan |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/ocm52829166 |title=Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China he lost |year=2003 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-7432-3144-2 |location=London}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Ferlanti |first=Federica |year=2012 |title=The New Life Movement at War: Wartime Mobilisation and State Control in Chongqing and Chengdu, 1938–1942 |url=https://ccposters.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Ferlanti.pdf |journal=European Journal of East Asian Studies |volume=11 |issue=2 |pages=187–212 |doi=10.1163/15700615-20121104 |issn=1568-0584}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Jian |first=Chen |date=January 1997 |title=The Myth of America's 'Lost Chance' in China: A Chinese Persopective in Light of New Evidence |journal=] |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=77–86 |doi=10.1111/1467-7709.00052 |issn=0145-2096}}
* {{Cite book |last=Lary |first=Diana |title=China's Civil War: A Social History, 1945-1949 |year=2015 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-107-05467-7 |series=New approaches to Asian history}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Levine |first=Steven I. |date=October 1979 |title=A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=3 |issue=4 |pages=349–376 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-7709.1979.tb00322.x |issn=0145-2096}}
* {{Cite book |last=Lew |first=Christopher R. |title=The Third Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 1945–49: an analysis of communist strategy and leadership |year=2009 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-415-77730-8 |series=Asian states and empires |location=London}}
* {{Cite book |title=China at war: an encyclopedia |year=2012 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-59884-415-3 |editor-last=Li |editor-first=Xiaobing |location=Santa Barbara, CA}}
* {{Cite book |last=Lynch |first=Michael |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=05qHCwAAQBAJ |title=The Chinese Civil War 1945–49 |publisher=Bloomsbury |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-4728-1025-0}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Mitter |first=Rana |date=January 2010 |title=Research Note Changed by War: The Changing Historiography Of Wartime China and New Interpretations Of Modern Chinese History |journal=] |volume=17 |issue=1 |pages=85–95 |doi=10.1179/tcr.2010.17.1.85 |issn=1547-402X}}
* {{Cite thesis |last=Nasca |first=David S. |title=Western Influence on the Chinese National Revolutionary Army from 1925 to 1937 |date=19 April 2013 |degree=Master's |publisher=Marine Corps Command and Staff College |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA601601.pdf |place=Quantico, VA}}
* {{Cite book |last=Pepper |first=Suzanne |title=Civil war in China: the political struggle, 1945–1949 |date=1999 |publisher=Roman & Littlefield Publishers |isbn=978-0-8476-9133-3 |edition=2nd |location=Lanham, MD}}
* {{Cite thesis |last=Reilly |first=Thomas P. |title=Mao Tse-Tung and Operational Art During the Chinese Civll War |date=21 May 1998 |publisher=] |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA357835.pdf}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Shen |first1=Zhi hua |title=Mao and the Sino-Soviet partnership, 1945–1959: a new history |last2=Xia |first2=Yafeng |date=2015 |publisher=Lexington |isbn=978-1-4985-1169-8 |series=The Harvard Cold War studies book series |location=Lanham, MD}}
* {{Cite book |last=Tanner |first=Harold Miles |title=Where Chiang Kai-Shek lost China: the Liao-Shen campaign, 1948 |publisher=] |year=2015 |isbn=978-0-253-01692-8 |series=Twentieth-century battles |location=Bloomington}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Taylor |first1=Jeremy E. |last2=Huang |first2=Grace C. |date=January 2012 |title="Deep changes in interpretive currents"? Chiang Kai-shek studies in the post-cold war era |journal=] |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=99–121 |doi=10.1017/S1479591411000209 |issn=1479-5914}}
* {{Cite book |last=Taylor |first=Jay |title=The generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the struggle for modern China |date=2009 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-674-03338-2 |location=Cambridge, MA}}
* {{Cite book |last=Van de Ven |first=Hans J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HHCbDwAAQBAJ |title=China at war: triumph and tragedy in the emergence of the new China |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-674-98350-2 |location=Cambridge, MA}}
* {{Cite book |last=Westad |first=Odd Arne |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JBCOecRg5nEC&pg=PA10 |title=Decisive encounters: the Chinese civil war, 1946–1950 |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-8047-4478-2}}
* {{Cite book |last=Yick |first=Joseph K. S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=651zCQAAQBAJ |title=Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle for Beiping-Tianjin, 1945–49: The CCP-GMD Struggle for Beiping-Tianjin, 1945–49 |publisher=] |year=2015 |isbn=978-1-317-46568-3}}

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Latest revision as of 11:56, 24 December 2024

1927–1949 civil war in China For other uses, see Chinese Civil War (disambiguation).

Chinese Civil War
Part of the interwar period, the Chinese Communist Revolution and the Cold War
Clockwise from top left:
Date
  • 1 August 1927 – 26 December 1936 (first phase)
  • 10 August 1945 – 7 December 1949 (second phase)
LocationMainland China
Result Communist victory
Territorial
changes
Belligerents
1927–1936
Republic of China (1912–1949) Republic of China
1927–1936
Chinese Soviet Republic (from 1931)
Jiangxi Soviet (1931–1934)
1945–1949
Republic of China (1912–1949) Republic of China
1945–1949
Yan'an Soviet
 People's Republic of China (1949)
Commanders and leaders
Strength
  • 2 million regular troops
  • 2.3 million militia (August 1948)
  • 1.2 million regular troops
  • 2.6 million militia (July 1945)
Casualties and losses
  • 370,000 killed
  • 1.5–1.7 million total (second phase)
  • 263,800 killed
  • 190,000 missing
  • over 2.8 million total (second phase)
  • 850,000 wounded (second phase)
  • est. 7 million (first phase)
  • est. 2.5 million (second phase)
  • up to 6 million total (second phase)
Campaigns of the Chinese Civil War
First Phase (1927–1937)
Resumption of hostilities (1945–1949)
Aftermath
Chinese Civil War
Traditional Chinese國共內戰
Simplified Chinese国共内战
Literal meaningKuomintang–Communist civil war
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinGuó-Gòng Nèizhàn
Bopomofoㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄍㄨㄥˋ ㄋㄟˋ ㄓㄢˋ
Wade–GilesKuo-Kung Nei-chan
Tongyong PinyinGuó-Gòng Nèi-jhàn
IPA
Wu
RomanizationKoh-gon-ne-tsoe
Yue: Cantonese
JyutpingGwok3 gung6 noi6 zin3
IPA
Southern Min
Hokkien POJKok-kiōng lāi-chiàn
Part of a series on the
Chinese Communist
Revolution
Proclamation of the People's Republic of China
Proclamation of the People's Republic of China
Mao Zedong and leading revolutionaries proclaim the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949.
Outline of the Chinese Civil War
Origins
Context
Ideas
Movements
Early history
First United Front
Labor organizing
Northern Expedition
Civil War
Aftermath of purge
Internal Purges
Chinese Soviet Republic
Second United Front
Second Sino-Japanese War
Communist base areas
Resumed Civil War
Military conflict
Urban support for Communists
Forming the People's Republic
Government
Reforms
Foreign relations
Legacy

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Communism portal

The Chinese Civil War was fought between the Kuomintang-led government of the Republic of China and the forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with armed conflict continuing intermittently from 1 August 1927 until Communist victory resulted in their total control over mainland China on 7 December 1949.

The war is generally divided into two phases with an interlude: from August 1927 to 1937, the First United Front alliance of the KMT and CCP collapsed during the Northern Expedition, and the Nationalists controlled most of China. From 1937 to 1945, hostilities were mostly put on hold as the Second United Front fought the Japanese invasion of China with eventual help from the Allies of World War II, although armed clashes between the groups remained common. Exacerbating the divisions within China further was the formation of the Wang Jingwei regime, a Japan-sponsored puppet government ostensibly led by Wang Jingwei, which was established to nominally govern the regions of China that came under Japanese occupation.

The civil war resumed as soon as it became apparent that Japanese defeat was imminent, with the communists gaining the upper hand in the second phase of the war from 1945 to 1949, generally referred to as the Chinese Communist Revolution. The Communists gained control of mainland China and proclaimed the People's Republic of China in 1949, forcing the leadership of the Republic of China to retreat to the island of Taiwan. Starting in the 1950s, a lasting political and military stand-off between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has ensued, with the ROC in Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland both claiming to be the legitimate government of all China. After the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, both tacitly ceased to engage in open conflict in 1979; however, no armistice or peace treaty has ever been signed.

Background

History of the
Republic of China
National emblem of the Republic of China
1912–1949
Mainland rule
1945–present
Taiwan
History of

flag Taiwan portal

Following the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen assumed the presidency of the newly formed Republic of China, and was shortly thereafter succeeded by Yuan Shikai. Yuan was frustrated in a short-lived attempt to restore monarchy in China, and China fell into power struggle after his death in 1916.

The Kuomintang (KMT), led by Sun Yat-sen, created a new government in Guangzhou to rival the warlords who ruled over large swathes of China and prevented the formation of a solid central government. After Sun's efforts to obtain aid from Western countries were ignored, he turned to the Soviet Union. In 1923, Sun and Soviet representative Adolph Joffe in Shanghai pledged Soviet assistance to China's unification in the Sun–Joffe Manifesto, a declaration of cooperation among the Comintern, KMT, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin arrived in 1923 to aid in the reorganization and consolidation of both the CCP and the KMT along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CCP, which was initially a study group, and the KMT jointly formed the First United Front.

In 1923, Sun sent Chiang Kai-shek, one of his lieutenants, for several months of military and political study in Moscow. Chiang then became the head of the Whampoa Military Academy that trained the next generation of military leaders. The Soviets provided the academy with teaching material, organization, and equipment, including munitions. They also provided education in many of the techniques for mass mobilization. With this aid, Sun raised a dedicated "army of the party", with which he hoped to defeat the warlords militarily. CCP members were also present in the academy, and many of them became instructors, including Zhou Enlai, who was made a political instructor.

Communist members were allowed to join the KMT on an individual basis. The CCP itself was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925. As of 1923, the KMT had 50,000 members.

However, after Sun died in 1925, the KMT split into left- and right-wing movements. KMT members worried that the Soviets were trying to destroy the KMT from inside using the CCP. The CCP then began movements in opposition of the Northern Expedition, passing a resolution against it at a party meeting.

Then, in March 1927, the KMT held its second party meeting where the Soviets helped pass resolutions against the Expedition and curbing Chiang's power. Soon, the KMT would be clearly divided.

Throughout this time, the Soviet Union sent money and spies to support the CCP. Without their support, the CCP likely would have failed. This is evidenced by documents showing other communist parties in China at the time, one with as many as 10,000 members, which all failed without support from the Soviet Union.

Shanghai massacre and Northern Expedition (1927)

In early 1927, the KMT–CCP rivalry led to a split in the revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the left wing of the KMT decided to move the seat of the KMT government from Guangzhou to Wuhan, where communist influence was strong. However, Chiang and Li Zongren, whose armies defeated the warlord Sun Chuanfang, moved eastward toward Jiangxi. The leftists rejected Chiang's demand to eliminate Communist influence within KMT, and Chiang denounced them for betraying Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People by taking orders from the Soviet Union. According to Mao Zedong, Chiang's tolerance of the CCP in the KMT camp decreased as his power increased.

On 7 April, Chiang and several other KMT leaders held a meeting, during which they proposed that Communist activities were socially and economically disruptive and had to be undone for the Nationalist revolution to proceed. On 12 April, many communists within the KMT were purged in Shanghai through hundreds of arrests and executions on the orders of General Bai Chongxi. The CCP referred to this as the 12 April Incident, the White Terror, or the Shanghai massacre. This incident widened the rift between Chiang and Wang Jingwei, the leader of the left wing faction of the KMT. The left wing of the KMT also expelled CCP members from the Wuhan Government, which in turn was toppled by Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT resumed its campaign against warlords and captured Beijing in June 1928. Soon, most of eastern China was under the control of the Nanjing central government, which received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. The KMT government announced, in conformity with Sun Yat-sen, the formula for the three stages of revolution: military unification, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy.

Communist insurgency (1927–1937)

See also: Encirclement Campaigns
Communist insurgency (1927–1937)
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese第二次國內革命戰爭
Simplified Chinese第二次国内革命战争
Literal meaningSecond National Revolutionary War
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinDìèrcì guónèi gémìng zhànzhēng

On 1 August 1927, the CCP launched an uprising in Nanchang against the Nationalist government in Wuhan. This conflict led to the creation of the Red Army. On 4 August, the main forces of the Red Army left Nanchang and headed southwards for an assault on Guangdong. Nationalist forces quickly reoccupied Nanchang while the remaining members of the CCP in Nanchang went into hiding. A CCP meeting on 7 August confirmed the objective of the party was to seize the political power by force, but the CCP was quickly suppressed the next day by the Nationalist government in Wuhan, led by Wang Jingwei. On 14 August, Chiang Kai-shek announced his temporary retirement, as the Wuhan faction and Nanjing faction of the Kuomintang were allied once again with common goal of suppressing the CCP after the earlier split. Wang Jingwei took the leadership of KMT after Chiang.

Attempts were later made by the CCP to take the cities of Changsha, Shantou and Guangzhou. The Red Army consisting of mutinous former National Revolutionary Army (NRA) soldiers as well as armed peasants established control over several areas in southern China. KMT forces continued to attempt to suppress the rebellions. Then, in September, Wang Jingwei was forced out of Wuhan. September also saw an unsuccessful armed rural insurrection, known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising, led by Mao Zedong. Borodin then returned to the Soviet Union in October via Mongolia. In November, Chiang Kai-shek went to Shanghai and invited Wang to join him. On 11 December, the CCP started the Guangzhou Uprising, establishing a soviet there the next day, but lost the city by 13 December to a counter-attack under the orders of General Zhang Fakui. On 16 December, Wang Jingwei fled to France. There were now three capitals in China: the internationally recognized republic capital in Beijing, the CCP and left-wing KMT at Wuhan and the right-wing KMT regime at Nanjing, which would remain the KMT capital for the next decade.

This marked the beginning of a ten-year armed struggle, known in mainland China as the "Ten-Year Civil War" (十年内战) which ended with the Xi'an Incident, when Chiang Kai-shek was forced to form the Second United Front against invading forces from the Empire of Japan. In 1930, the Central Plains War broke out as an internal conflict of the KMT; launched by Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and Wang Jingwei. The attention was turned to root out remaining pockets of CCP activity in a series of five encirclement campaigns. The first and second campaigns failed, and the third was aborted due to the Mukden Incident. The fourth campaign (1932–1933) achieved some early successes, but Chiang's armies were badly mauled when they tried to penetrate into the heart of Mao's Soviet Chinese Republic. During these campaigns, KMT columns struck swiftly into CCP areas, but were easily engulfed by the vast countryside and were not able to consolidate their foothold.

Finally, in late 1934, Chiang launched a fifth campaign that involved the systematic encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet region with fortified blockhouses. The blockhouse strategy was devised and implemented in part by newly hired Nazi advisors. Unlike previous campaigns in which they penetrated deeply in a single strike, this time the KMT troops patiently built blockhouses, each separated by about eight kilometres (five miles), to surround the Communist areas and cut off their supplies and food sources.

In October 1934, the CCP took advantage of gaps in the ring of blockhouses (manned by the forces of a warlord ally of Chiang Kai-shek's, rather than regular KMT troops) and broke out of the encirclement. The warlord armies were reluctant to challenge Communist forces for fear of losing their own men and did not pursue the CCP with much fervor. In addition, the main KMT forces were preoccupied with annihilating Zhang Guotao's army, which was much larger than Mao's. The massive military retreat of Communist forces lasted a year and covered what Mao estimated as 12,500 km (25,000 Li); it became known as the Long March.

This military retreat was undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, to evade the pursuit or attack of the Kuomintang army. It consisted of a series of marches, during which numerous Communist armies in the south escaped to the north and west. Over the course of the march from Jiangxi the First Front Army, led by an inexperienced military commission, was on the brink of annihilation by Chiang Kai-Shek's troops as their stronghold was in Jiangxi. The Communists, under the command of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, "escaped in a circling retreat to the west and north, which reportedly traversed over 9,000 kilometers over 370 days." The route passed through some of the most difficult terrain of western China by traveling west, and then northwards towards Shaanxi. "In November 1935, shortly after settling in northern Shaanxi, Mao officially took over Zhou Enlai's leading position in the Red Army. Following a major reshuffling of official roles, Mao became the chairman of the Military Commission, with Zhou and Deng Xiaoping as vice-chairmen." This marked Mao's position as the pre-eminent leader of the CCP, with Zhou in second position to him.

The march ended when the CCP reached the interior of Shaanxi. Zhang Guotao's army (Red 4th Front Army), which took a different route through northwest China, was largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Muslim allies, the Ma clique. Along the way, the Communist army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting peasants and the poor, solidifying its appeal to the masses. Of the 90,000–100,000 people who began the Long March from the Soviet Chinese Republic, only around 7,000–8,000 made it to Shaanxi. The remnants of Zhang's forces eventually joined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CCP, was never able to challenge Mao's authority. Essentially, the great retreat made Mao the undisputed leader of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Kuomintang used Khampa troops – who were former bandits – to battle the Communist Red Army as it advanced and to undermine local warlords who often refused to fight Communist forces to conserve their own strength. The KMT enlisted 300 "Khampa bandits" into its Consolatory Commission military in Sichuan, where they were part of the effort of the central government to penetrate and destabilize local Han warlords such as Liu Wenhui. The government was seeking to exert full control over frontier areas against the warlords. Liu had refused to battle the Communists in order to conserve his army. The Consolatory Commission forces were used to battle the Red Army, but they were defeated when their religious leader was captured by the Communists.

In 1936, Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang grew closer, with Zhou even suggesting that he join the CCP. However, this was turned down by the Comintern in the USSR. Later on, Zhou persuaded Zhang and Yang Hucheng, another warlord, to instigate the Xi'an Incident. Chiang was placed under house arrest and forced to stop his attacks on the Red Army, instead focusing on the Japanese threat.

  • The situation in China in 1929: After the Northern Expedition, the KMT had direct control over east and central China, while the rest of China proper as well as Manchuria was under the control of warlords loyal to the Nationalist government. The situation in China in 1929: After the Northern Expedition, the KMT had direct control over east and central China, while the rest of China proper as well as Manchuria was under the control of warlords loyal to the Nationalist government.
  • Map showing the communist-controlled Soviet Zones of China during and after the encirclement campaigns Map showing the communist-controlled Soviet Zones of China during and after the encirclement campaigns
  • Route(s) taken by Communist forces during the Long March Route(s) taken by Communist forces during the Long March
  • A Communist leader addressing survivors of the Long March A Communist leader addressing survivors of the Long March
  • Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, emerged from the Northern Expedition as the leader of the Republic of China Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army, emerged from the Northern Expedition as the leader of the Republic of China
  • NRA soldiers marching NRA soldiers marching
  • NRA troops firing artillery at Communist forces NRA troops firing artillery at Communist forces

Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)

Main article: Second Sino-Japanese War

During Japan's invasion and occupation of Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek saw the CCP as the greater threat. Chiang refused to ally with the CCP, preferring to unite China by eliminating the warlord and CCP forces first. He believed his forces were too weak to face the Japanese Imperial Army; only after unification could the KMT mobilize against Japan. He ignored the Chinese people's discontent and anger at the KMT policy of compromise with the Japanese, instead ordering KMT generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to suppress the CCP. However, their provincial forces suffered significant casualties in battles against the Red Army.

On 12 December 1936, the disgruntled Zhang and Yang conspired to kidnap Chiang and force him into a truce with the CCP. The incident became known as the Xi'an Incident. Both parties suspended fighting to form a Second United Front to focus their energies and fight the Japanese. In 1937, Japan launched its full-scale invasion of China and its well-equipped troops overran KMT defenders in northern and coastal China.

The alliance of CCP and KMT was in name only. Unlike the KMT forces, CCP troops shunned conventional warfare and instead waged guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. The level of actual cooperation and coordination between the CCP and KMT during World War II was minimal. In the midst of the Second United Front, the CCP and the KMT were still vying for territorial advantage in "Free China" (i.e., areas not occupied by the Japanese or ruled by Japanese puppet governments such as Manchukuo and the Reorganized National Government of China).

The situation came to a head in late 1940 and early 1941 when clashes between Communist and KMT forces intensified. Chiang demanded in December 1940 that the CCP's New Fourth Army evacuate Anhui and Jiangsu Provinces, due to its provocation and harassment of KMT forces in this area. Under intense pressure, the New Fourth Army commanders complied. The following year they were ambushed by KMT forces during their evacuation, which led to several thousand deaths. It also ended the Second United Front, formed earlier to fight the Japanese.

As clashes between the CCP and KMT intensified, countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to prevent a disastrous civil war. After the New Fourth Army incident, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent special envoy Lauchlin Currie to talk with Chiang Kai-shek and KMT party leaders to express their concern regarding the hostility between the two parties, with Currie stating that the only ones to benefit from a civil war would be the Japanese. The Soviet Union, allied more closely with the CCP, sent an imperative telegram to Mao in 1941, warning that civil war would also make the situation easier for the Japanese military. Due to the international community's efforts, there was a temporary and superficial peace. Chiang criticized the CCP in 1943 with the propaganda piece China's Destiny, which questioned the CCP's power after the war, while the CCP strongly opposed Chiang's leadership and referred to his regime as fascist in an attempt to generate a negative public image. Both leaders knew that a deadly battle had begun between themselves.

In general, developments in the Second Sino-Japanese War were to the advantage of the CCP, as its guerrilla war tactics had won them popular support within the Japanese-occupied areas. In occupied areas, the Communists established military and political bases from which it carried out guerilla warfare. The Communists built popular support in these areas, returning land to poor peasants, reducing peasant's rent, and arming the people. By Spring 1945, there were 19 Communist-governed areas in China in which 95 million people lived. In Fall 1945, the Communist armies had 1.27 million men and were supported by 2.68 million militia members. The KMT had to defend the country against the main Japanese campaigns, since it was the legal Chinese government, a factor which proved costly to Chiang Kai-shek and his troops. Japan launched its last major offensive against the KMT, Operation Ichi-Go, in 1944, which resulted in the severe weakening of Chiang's forces. The CCP also suffered fewer losses through its guerrilla tactics.

  • Japanese occupation (red) of eastern China near the end of the war, and Communist bases (striped) Japanese occupation (red) of eastern China near the end of the war, and Communist bases (striped)

Immediate post-war clashes (1945–1946)

Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong met in Chongqing in 1945.

Under the terms of the Japanese unconditional surrender dictated by the Allies, Japanese troops were to surrender to KMT troops but not to the CCP, which was present in some of the occupied areas. In Manchuria, however, where the KMT had no forces, the Japanese surrendered to the Soviet Union. Chiang Kai-shek reminded Japanese troops to remain at their posts to receive the KMT, but Communist forces soon began taking surrenders from the Japanese and fighting those who resisted. General Wedemeyer of the United States Army became alarmed at these developments and wanted seven American divisions to be sent to China, but General Marshall replied that it should not be given priority over Japan and Korea.

The first post-war peace negotiation, attended by both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, was in Chongqing from 28 August to 10 October 1945. Chiang entered the meeting at an advantage because he had recently signed a friendly treaty with the Soviet Union while the Communists were still forcing the Japanese to surrender in some places. Mao was accompanied by American ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, who was devoted to Chiang but also wanted to ensure Mao's safety in light of the past history between the two Chinese leaders. It concluded with the signing of the Double Tenth Agreement. Both sides stressed the importance of a peaceful reconstruction, but the conference did not produce any concrete results. Battles between the two sides continued even as peace negotiations were in progress, until the agreement was reached in January 1946. However, large campaigns and full-scale confrontations between the CCP and Chiang's troops were temporarily avoided. On 26 November 1945, Hurley resigned, viewing Chiang as having gone against his agreement with the Communists. In December 1945, Hurley's former position was filled by Marshall.

Shangdang Campaign, September – October 1945

In the last month of World War II in East Asia, Soviet forces launched the huge Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and along the Chinese-Mongolian border. This operation destroyed the Kwantung Army in just three weeks and left the USSR occupying all of Manchuria by the end of the war in a total power vacuum of local Chinese forces. Consequently, the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region surrendered. Later in the year Chiang Kai-shek realized that he lacked the resources to prevent a CCP takeover of Manchuria following the scheduled Soviet departure. He therefore made a deal with the Soviets to delay their withdrawal until he had moved enough of his best-trained men and modern materiel into the region. However, the Soviets refused permission for the Nationalist troops to traverse its territory and spent the extra time systematically dismantling the extensive Manchurian industrial base (worth up to $2 billion) and shipping it back to their war-ravaged country. KMT troops were then airlifted by the US to occupy key cities in North China, while the countryside was already dominated by the CCP. On 15 November 1945, the KMT began a campaign to prevent the CCP from strengthening its already strong base. At the same time, however, the return of the KMT also brought widespread graft and corruption, with an OSS officer remarking that the only winners were the Communists.

In the winter of 1945–1946, Joseph Stalin commanded Marshal Rodion Malinovsky to give Mao Zedong most Imperial Japanese Army weapons that were captured.

Chiang Kai-shek's forces pushed as far as Jinzhou by 26 November 1945, meeting with little resistance. This was followed by a Communist offensive on the Shandong Peninsula that was largely successful, as all of the peninsula, except what was controlled by the US, fell to the Communists. The truce fell apart in June 1946 when full-scale war between CCP and KMT forces broke out on 26 June 1946. China then entered a state of civil war that lasted more than three years.

Resumed fighting (1946–1949)

Further information: Chinese Communist Revolution

Background and disposition of forces

Resumed fighting (1946–1949)
Name in mainland China
Traditional Chinese第三次國內革命戰爭
Simplified Chinese第三次国内革命战争
Literal meaningThird National Revolutionary War
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinDìsāncì guónèi gémìng zhànzhēng
Second name in mainland China
Traditional Chinese解放戰爭
Simplified Chinese解放战争
Literal meaningWar of Liberation
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinJiěfàng Zhànzhēng
Wu
RomanizationChia-fhon-tsan-zen
Yue: Cantonese
JyutpingGaai2 fong3 zin3 zang1
Southern Min
Hokkien POJKái-hòng chiàn-cheng
Name in Taiwan
Traditional Chinese反共戡亂戰爭
Simplified Chinese反共戡乱战争
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinFǎngòng kānluàn zhànzhēng
Third name in mainland China
Traditional Chinese中國人民解放戰爭
Simplified Chinese中国人民解放战争
Literal meaningChinese People's Liberation War
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinZhōngguó rénmín jiěfàng zhànzhēng

By the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the power of the Chinese Communist Party grew considerably. Their main force grew to 1.2 million troops, backed with additional militia of 2 million, totalling 3.2 million troops. Their "Liberated Zone" in 1945 contained 19 base areas, including one-quarter of the country's territory and one-third of its population; this included many important towns and cities. Moreover, the Soviet Union turned over all of its captured Japanese weapons and a substantial amount of their own supplies to the Communists, who received Northeastern China from the Soviets as well.

In March 1946, despite repeated requests from Chiang, the Soviet Red Army under the command of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky continued to delay pulling out of Manchuria, while Malinovsky secretly told the CCP forces to move in behind them, which led to full-scale war for the control of the Northeast. These favorable conditions also facilitated many changes inside the Communist leadership: the more radical hard-line faction who wanted a complete military take-over of China finally gained the upper hand and defeated the careful opportunists. Before giving control to Communist leaders, on 27 March, Soviet diplomats requested a joint venture of industrial development with the Nationalist Party in Manchuria.

Although General Marshall stated that he knew of no evidence that the CCP was being supplied by the Soviet Union, the CCP was able to utilize a large number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese, including some tanks. When large numbers of well-trained KMT troops began to defect to the Communist forces, the CCP was finally able to achieve material superiority. The CCP's most effective political reform was its land reform policy. This drew the massive number of landless and starving peasants in the countryside into the Communist cause. This strategy enabled the CCP to access an almost unlimited supply of manpower for both combat and logistical purposes; despite suffering heavy casualties throughout many of the war's campaigns, manpower continued to grow. For example, during the Huaihai Campaign alone the CCP was able to mobilize 5,430,000 peasants to fight against the KMT forces.

Nationalist warplanes being prepared for an air raid on Communist bases

After the war with the Japanese ended, Chiang Kai-shek quickly moved KMT troops to newly liberated areas to prevent Communist forces from receiving the Japanese surrender. The US airlifted many KMT troops from central China to the Northeast (Manchuria). President Harry S. Truman was very clear about what he described as "using the Japanese to hold off the Communists". In his memoirs he writes:

It was perfectly clear to us that if we told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard, the entire country would be taken over by the Communists. We therefore had to take the unusual step of using the enemy as a garrison until we could airlift Chinese National troops to South China and send Marines to guard the seaports.

— President Truman

Using the pretext of "receiving the Japanese surrender", business interests within the KMT government occupied most of the banks, factories and commercial properties, which had previously been seized by the Imperial Japanese Army. They also conscripted troops at an accelerated pace from the civilian population and hoarded supplies, preparing for a resumption of war with the Communists. These hasty and harsh preparations caused great hardship for the residents of cities such as Shanghai, where the unemployment rate rose dramatically to 37.5%.

Hyperinflation meant those employed in the Kuomintang forces lost the purchasing power of their pay. This resulted in corruption and the embezzlement of supplies which disappeared into the barter economy. Ordinary Kuomintang soldiers were often malnourished and desertion was common.

The US strongly supported the Kuomintang forces. About 50,000 US soldiers were sent to guard strategic sites in Hebei and Shandong in Operation Beleaguer. The US equipped and trained KMT troops, and transported Japanese and Koreans back to help KMT forces to occupy liberated zones as well as to contain Communist-controlled areas. According to William Blum, American aid included substantial amounts of mostly surplus military supplies, and loans were made to the KMT. Within less than two years after the Sino-Japanese War, the KMT had received $4.43 billion from the US – most of which was military aid. Highlighting the aid provided by the US to the KMT, the Communists' position was that the US was stirring domestic warfare and characterized the civil war as both a national revolution against the KMT and a revolution against US colonization and aggression.

Outbreak of war

  • Situation in 1947 Situation in 1947
  • Situation in the fall of 1948 Situation in the fall of 1948
  • Situation in the winter of 1948 and 1949 Situation in the winter of 1948 and 1949
  • Situation in April to October 1949 Situation in April to October 1949

As postwar negotiations between the Nationalist government and the CCP failed, the civil war between these two parties resumed. This stage of war is referred to in mainland China and Communist historiography as the "War of Liberation" (Chinese: 解放战争; pinyin: Jiěfàng Zhànzhēng). On 20 July 1946, Chiang Kai-shek launched a large-scale assault on Communist territory in North China with 113 brigades (a total of 1.6 million troops).

Knowing their disadvantages in manpower and equipment, the CCP executed a "passive defense" strategy. It avoided the strong points of the KMT army and was prepared to abandon territory in order to preserve its forces. In most cases the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. The CCP also attempted to wear out the KMT forces as much as possible. This tactic seemed to be successful; after a year, the power balance became more favorable to the CCP. They wiped out 1.12 million KMT troops, while their strength grew to about two million men.

North China areas of politico-military control in August 1947
The PLA enters Beiping in the Pingjin Campaign
Map of the Far East from the Time magazine showing the situation of the Chinese Civil War in late 1948

In March 1947, the KMT achieved a symbolic victory by seizing Yan'an, the capital of the Yan'an Soviet. The Communists counterattacked soon afterwards. With KMT efforts for an all-out offensive failing, the Nationalists changed strategy from broad assaults to concentrating on key targets, including Communist-controlled areas in Shandong and Shaanxi. This approach also failed.

From June to September 1947, the Communists launched offensives and Nationalist-controlled areas became the primary battlefields. On 30 June 1947, CCP troops crossed the Yellow River and moved to the Dabie Mountains area, restored and developed the Central Plain. At the same time, Communist forces also began to counterattack in Northeastern China, North China and East China.

By late 1948, the CCP captured the northern cities of Shenyang and Changchun and seized control of the Northeast after suffering numerous setbacks while trying to take the cities, with the decisive Liaoshen Campaign. The New 1st Army, regarded as the best KMT army, was forced to surrender after the CCP conducted a brutal six-month siege of Changchun that resulted in more than 150,000 civilian deaths from starvation.

Republic of China FT tanks

The capture of large KMT units provided the CCP with the tanks, heavy artillery and other combined-arms assets needed to execute offensive operations south of the Great Wall. By April 1948, the city of Luoyang fell, cutting the KMT army off from Xi'an. Following a fierce battle, the CCP captured Jinan and Shandong province on 24 September 1948During this period, Battle of Weixian took place, which was an important battle for the CCP to liberate Shandong. Through the Weixian Campaign, the CCP controlled the Jiaoji Railway and cut off the connection between Jinan and Qingdao. The Huaihai Campaign of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for the CCP. A large number of KMT troops deserted and changed sides in these conflicts. The outcome of these encounters were decisive for the military outcome of the civil war.

The Pingjin Campaign resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China. It lasted 64 days, from 21 November 1948 to 31 January 1949. The PLA suffered heavy casualties while securing Zhangjiakou, Tianjin along with its port and garrison at Dagu and Beiping. The CCP brought 890,000 troops from the northeast to oppose some 600,000 KMT troops. There were 40,000 CCP casualties at Zhangjiakou alone. They in turn killed, wounded or captured some 520,000 KMT during the campaign.

The Nationalists' retreat to Taipei: after the Nationalists lost Nanjing they next moved to Guangzhou, then to Chongqing, Chengdu and finally, Xichang before arriving Taipei in 1949.

After achieving decisive victory at Liaoshen, Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns, the CCP destroyed 144 regular and 29 irregular KMT divisions, including 1.54 million veteran KMT troops, which significantly reduced the strength of Nationalist forces. Stalin initially favored a coalition government in postwar China, and tried to persuade Mao to stop the CCP from crossing the Yangtze and attacking the KMT positions south of the river. Mao rejected Stalin's position and on 21 April, began the Yangtze River Crossing Campaign. On 23 April, they captured the KMT's capital, Nanjing. The KMT government retreated to Canton (Guangzhou) until 15 October, Chongqing until 25 November, and then Chengdu before retreating to Taiwan on 7 December. By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remnants of KMT forces southwards in southern China, and only Tibet was left. A Chinese Muslim Hui cavalry regiment, the 14th Tungan Cavalry, was sent by the Kuomintang to attack Mongol and Soviet positions along the border during the Pei-ta-shan Incident.

The Kuomintang made several last-ditch attempts to use Khampa troops against the Communists in southwest China. The Kuomintang formulated a plan in which three Khampa divisions would be assisted by the Panchen Lama to oppose the Communists. Kuomintang intelligence reported that some Tibetan tusi chiefs and the Khampa Su Yonghe controlled 80,000 troops in Sichuan, Qinghai and Tibet. They hoped to use them against the Communist army.

Pushing south

See also: Proclamation of the People's Republic of China

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong officially proclaimed the People's Republic of China with its capital at Beiping, which was returned to the former name Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and approximately two million Nationalist soldiers retreated from mainland China to the island of Taiwan in December after the PLA advanced into Sichuan province. Isolated Nationalist pockets of resistance remained in the area, but the majority of the resistance collapsed after the fall of Chengdu on 10 December 1949, with some resistance continuing in the far south.

Communist conquest of Hainan Island in mid 1950

A PRC attempt to take the ROC-controlled island of Quemoy was thwarted in the Battle of Kuningtou, halting the PLA advance towards Taiwan. In December 1949, Chiang proclaimed Taipei the temporary capital of the Republic of China and continued to assert his government as the sole legitimate authority in China.

The Communists' other amphibious operations of 1950 were more successful: they led to the Communist conquest of Hainan Island in April 1950, the Wanshan Islands off the Guangdong coast (May–August 1950), and Zhoushan Island off Zhejiang (May 1950).

Aftermath

Main articles: Cross-strait relations and Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan See also: Political status of Taiwan and Two Chinas
Map of the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949, and 1950)

Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall to the imminent invasion of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army, and the US was initially reluctant in offering full support for Chiang in their final stand. US President Harry S. Truman announced on 5 January 1950 that the United States would not engage in any dispute involving the Taiwan Strait, and that he would not intervene in the event of an attack by the PRC. Truman, seeking to exploit the possibility of a Titoist-style Sino-Soviet split, announced in his United States Policy toward Formosa that the US would obey the Cairo Declaration's designation of Taiwan as Chinese territory and would not assist the Nationalists. However, the Communist leadership was not aware of this change of policy, instead becoming increasingly hostile to the US. The situation quickly changed after the sudden onset of the Korean War in June 1950. This led to changing political climate in the US, and President Truman ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to sail to the Taiwan Strait as part of the containment policy against potential Communist advance.

"Forget not that you are in " – a rock in Kinmen Island with Chiang Kai-shek's calligraphy signifying the retaking of one's homeland

In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all mainland China ports and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure was from a point north of the mouth of Min River in Fujian to the mouth of the Liao River in Liaoning. Since mainland China's railroad network was underdeveloped, north–south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity also caused severe hardship for mainland China fishermen.

During the retreat of the Republic of China to Taiwan, KMT troops, who could not retreat to Taiwan, were left behind to fight a guerrilla war against the Communists. These KMT remnants were eliminated in what the PRC called the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and the Campaigns to Suppress Bandits. According to official statistics from the CCP in 1954, during the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, at least 2.6 million people were arrested, some 1.29 million people were imprisoned, and 712,000 people were executed. Most of those killed were former Kuomintang officials, businessmen, former employees of Western companies and intellectuals whose loyalty was suspect.

Winning China proper in 1950, also after annexation of Tibet, the CCP controlled the entire mainland in late 1951 (excluding Kinmen and Matsu Islands). But a group of approximately 3,000 KMT Central soldiers retreated to Burma and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China during the Kuomintang Islamic Insurgency in China (1950–1958) and Campaign at the China–Burma Border. Their leader, Li Mi, was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of Yunnan. Initially, the US-supported these remnants and the Central Intelligence Agency provided them with military aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the United Nations in 1953, the US began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954 nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times to maintain a base close to China.

After the ROC complained to the United Nations against the Soviet Union for violating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance to support the CCP, the UN General Assembly Resolution 505 was adopted on 1 February 1952, condemning the Soviet Union.

In the end, the Communist military forces suffered 1.3 million combat casualties in the 1945–1949 phase of the war: 260,000 killed, 190,000 missing, and 850,000 wounded, discounting irregulars. Nationalist casualties in the same phase were recorded after the war by the PRC 5,452,700 regulars and 2,258,800 irregulars.

After the formation of the PRC, the PRC government named the Western nations, led by the U.S., as the biggest threat to its national security. Basing this judgment on multiple factors, including the idea of a Chinese century of humiliation at the hands of Western powers beginning in the mid-19th century, U.S. support for the Nationalists during the Chinese Civil War, and the ideological struggles between revolutionaries and reactionaries, the PRC leadership believed that China would become a critical battleground in the U.S.' crusade against Communism. As a countermeasure and to elevate China's standing among the worldwide Communist movements, the PRC leadership adopted a foreign policy that actively promoted Communist revolutions throughout territories on China's periphery.

Monument in memory of the crossing of the Yangtze in Nanjing

Taiwan Strait tensions

Though viewed as a military liability by the US, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in Fujian as vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake mainland China. On 3 September 1954, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis started with the PRC shelling Kinmen. The PRC captured the Yijiangshan Islands on 19 January 1955, leading to the ROC abandoning the Dachen Islands the following month. On 24 January 1955, the United States Congress passed the Formosa Resolution authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands. The First Taiwan Straits crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis ended during the Bandung conference.

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis began on 23 August 1958 with air and naval engagements between PRC and ROC forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Kinmen by the PRC and Xiamen by the ROC, and ended on November of the same year. PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the US rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb mainland China artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided amphibious assault ships to land supplies, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On 7 September, the US escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships and the PRC refrained from firing.

The third crisis occurred in 1995–96. The PRC responded to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States, and the U.S. recognition of Lee as a representative of Taiwan, with military exercises. The exercises were also meant to deter Taiwanese voters from supporting Lee in the 1996 election; Lee won the election. Two U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed during the crisis; they were not attacked and deescalation followed.

US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022 triggered PRC military exercises across the Taiwan Strait. She originally intended to travel to Taiwan in April 2022, but was delayed due to COVID-19. She rescheduled the trip to August as part of a wider Asian trip. The White House was reported to have been initially divided over the appropriateness of the trip but later affirmed Pelosi's right to visit Taiwan. As a result, the PLA announced four days of unprecedented military live-fire drills, in six zones that encircle the island on the busiest international waterways and aviation routes. In response to the announcement, ROC officials complained that the PRC's live-fire drills were an invasion of Taiwan's territorial space and a direct challenge to free air and sea navigation.

Political fallout

Main articles: China and the United Nations and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758
Lockheed U-2 wreckage (pilot Chang Liyi) on display at the Museum in Beijing

On 25 October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly admitted the PRC and expelled the ROC, which had been a founding member of the United Nations and was one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Representatives of Chiang Kai-shek refused to recognise their accreditations as representatives of China and left the assembly. Recognition for the People's Republic of China soon followed from most other member nations, including the United States.

By 1984, PRC and ROC began to de-escalate their hostilities through diplomatic relations with each other, and cross-straits trade and investment has been growing ever since. The state of war was officially declared over by the ROC in 1991. Despite the end of the hostilities, the two sides have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war. According to Mao Zedong, there were three ways of "staving off imperialist intervention in the short term" during the continuation of the Chinese Revolution. The first was through a rapid completion of the military takeover of the country, and through showing determination and strength against "foreign attempts at challenging the new regime along its borders". The second was by "formalising a comprehensive military alliance with the Soviet Union", which would dedicate Soviet power to directly defending China against its enemies; this aspect became extensively significant given the backdrop of the start of the Cold War. And finally, the regime had to "root out its domestic opponents: the heads of secret societies, religious sects, independent unions, or tribal and ethnic organisations". By destroying the basis of domestic reaction, Mao believed a safer world for the Chinese revolution to spread in would come into existence.

Under the new ROC president Lee Teng-hui, the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion was renounced in May 1991, thus ending the chances of the Kuomintang's quest to retake the mainland. In July 1999, Lee announced a "special diplomatic relationship". China was furious again, but the military drills were stopped by the 921 earthquakes. It was the last tense moment of this civil war.

With the election in 2000 of Democratic Progressive Party candidate Chen Shui-bian, a party other than the KMT gained the presidency for the first time in Taiwan. The new president did not share the Chinese nationalist ideology of the KMT and CCP. This led to tension between the two sides, although trade and other ties such as the 2005 Pan-Blue visit continued to increase.

With the election of pro-mainland President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) in 2008, significant warming of relations resumed between Taipei and Beijing, with high-level exchanges between the semi-official diplomatic organizations of both states such as the Chen-Chiang summit series. Although the Taiwan Strait remains a potential flash point, regular direct air links were established in 2009.

Analysis

The Communist victory over the Nationalists is regarded as one of the most impressive twentieth century insurgent victories. Historians and political scientists cite a number of factors, including the CCP's success at mobilizing mass support and the shortcomings of the Nationalist government.

Poor governance by Nationalists

See also: Chinese hyperinflation

Almost all studies of the failure of the Nationalist government identify hyperinflation as a major factor in the government's collapse. The Nationalist military and the government's civilian employees were most impacted by hyperinflation which in turn prompted widespread corruption and pilfering. Little funding reached enlisted soldiers, who were typically malnourished and poorly equipped. Desertion was common.

The historian Rana Mitter writes that a lack of trust in the Nationalist government developed, as it was increasingly seen as "corrupt, vindictive, and with no overall vision of what China under its rule should look like". Chiang wrote in his diary in June 1948: "After the fall of Kaifeng our conditions worsened and became more serious. I now realized that the main reason our nation has collapsed, time after time throughout our history, was not because of superior power used by our external enemies, but because of disintegration and rot from within."

Historian Odd Arne Westad says the Communists won the Civil War because they made fewer military mistakes than Chiang Kai-shek and also because in his search for a powerful centralized government, Chiang antagonized too many interest groups in China. Furthermore, his party was weakened in the war against the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Communists targeted different groups, such as peasants, and brought them to their side. After 1945, the economy in the ROC areas collapsed because of hyperinflation and the failure of price controls by the ROC government and financial reforms; the Gold Yuan depreciated sharply in late 1948 and resulted in the ROC government losing the support of the cities' middle classes.

United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson described the Nationalists as "corrupt, reactionary, and inefficient". He believed that the Nationalists had displayed both political inadequacy as well as "the grossest incompetence ever experienced by any military command," and that the Communists "did not create this condition", but skillfully exploited the opportunity it provided.

Popular support for Communists and cohesion

In the meantime, the Communists continued their land reform programs, winning the support of the population in the countryside. This was a decisive factor in the Communists' success. Millions of peasants who obtained land through the movement joined the People's Liberation Army or assisted in its logistical networks. According to historian Brian DeMare, land redistribution was a critical factor because it linked the interests of peasants in the north and northeast to the Communists' success. Ultimately, the Communists obtained the greatest popular support of any insurgency in modern history.

An important advantage of the Communists was the "extraordinary cohesion" within its top leadership. This cohesion not only secured it from defections during difficult times but also facilitated "communications and top level debates over tactics". The charismatic style of leadership of Mao Zedong created a "unity of purpose" and a "unity of command" which the KMT lacked. Apart from that, the CCP had mastered the manipulation of local politics to their benefit; this was also derived from their propaganda skills that had also been decentralised successfully by portraying their opponents as "enemies of all groups of Chinese" and itself as "defenders of the nation" and people (given the backdrop of the war with Japan).

International factors

After the Second Sino-Japanese War ended, the United States government provided economic and military support exclusively to the Nationalists. As the United States increased aid to the Nationalists in 1947 and 1948, the Communists incorporated United States involvement into its political discourse and framed the conflict not as one between two Chinese sides, but between the Communists and "US imperialists and their puppets". Mao contended that the United States had provided US$5.9 billion to the Nationalists from 1945 to 1949 "to help Chiang Kai-shek slaughter several million Chinese".

Strong American support for the Nationalists was hedged with the failure of the Marshall Mission, and then stopped completely mainly because of KMT corruption (such as the notorious Yangtze Development Corporation controlled by H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong's family) and KMT's military setback in Northeast China. Historians such as Jay Taylor, Robert Cowley, and Anne W. Carroll argue that the Nationalists' failure was largely caused by external reasons outside of the KMT's control, most notably the refusal of the Truman administration to support Chiang with the withdrawal of aid, the US armed embargo, the failed pursuit of a détente between the Nationalists and the communists, and the USSR's consistent support of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War. The better-trained Communist army's support from the USSR helped counter the American aid that the Nationalists received. Chen Yun said: "They did their best to help us, we were backed by the Soviet Union and North Korea."

Atrocities

During the war, both the Nationalists and Communists carried out mass atrocities, with millions of non-combatants deliberately killed by both sides.

Nationalist atrocities

Over several years after the 1927 Shanghai massacre, the Kuomintang killed between 300,000 and one million people, primarily peasants, in anti-communist campaigns as part of the White Terror. During the White Terror, the Nationalists specifically targeted women with short hair who had not been subjected to foot binding, on the presumption that such "non-traditional" women were radicals. Nationalist forces cut off their breasts, shaved their heads, and displayed their mutilated bodies to intimidate the populace.

Torture, rape, and collective punishment were common Nationalist practices during its counter-insurgency campaigns. The Nationalists uprooted and moved entire communities in an effort to more easily monitor Communist activities.

From 1946 to 1949, the Nationalists arrested, tortured, and killed political dissidents via the Sino-American Cooperative Organization.

Communist atrocities

Main articles: Siege of Changchun and Chinese Land Reform § Mass killings of landlords

During the December 1930 Futian incident, the communists executed 2,000 to 3,000 members of the Futian battalion after its leaders had mutinied against Mao Zedong.

Between 1931 and 1934 in the Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet, the communist authorities engaged in a widespread campaign of violence against civilians to ensure compliance with its policies and to stop defection to the advancing KMT, including mass executions, land confiscation and forced labor. According to Li Weihan, a high-ranking communist in Jiangxi at the time, in response to mass flight of civilians to KMT held areas, the local authorities would "usually to send armed squads after those attempting to flee and kill them on the spot, producing numerous mass graves throughout the CSR that would later be uncovered by the KMT and its allies." Zhang Wentian, another high-ranking communist, reported that "the policy of annihilating landlords as an exploiting class had degenerated into a massacre" The population of the communist controlled area fell by 700,000 from 1931 and 1935, of which a large proportion were murdered as "class enemies", worked to death, committed suicide, or died in other circumstances attributable to the communists.

During the Siege of Changchun, the People's Liberation Army implemented a military blockade on the KMT-held city of Changchun and prevented civilians from leaving the city during the blockade; this blockade caused the starvation of tens to 150 thousand civilians. The PLA continued to use siege tactics throughout Northeast China.

At the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1946, Mao Zedong began to push for a return to radical policies to mobilize China against the landlord class, but protected the rights of middle peasants and specified that rich peasants were not landlords. The 7 July Directive of 1946 set off eighteen months of fierce conflict in which all rich peasant and landlord property of all types was to be confiscated and redistributed to poor peasants. CCP work teams went quickly from village to village and divided the population into landlords, rich, middle, poor, and landless peasants. Because the work teams did not involve villagers in the process, however, rich and middle peasants quickly returned to power. The Outline Land Law of October 1947 increased the pressure. Those condemned as landlords were buried alive, dismembered, strangled and shot. In response to the aforementioned land reform campaign, the Kuomintang helped establish the "Huanxiang Tuan" (還鄉團), or Homecoming Legion, which was composed of landlords who sought the return of their redistributed land and property from peasants and CCP guerrillas, as well as forcibly conscripted peasants and communist POWs. The Homecoming legion conducted its guerrilla warfare campaign against CCP forces and purported collaborators up until the end of the civil war in 1949.

See also

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