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Revision as of 14:54, 30 January 2008 view sourceNishidani (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Extended confirmed users99,509 editsm Zeq. You are interfering with a nice point of English. 'Took' does not mean, in Benvenisti, grasp by hand (and then change). It means 'interpret'. Ask any native speaker.← Previous edit Revision as of 14:57, 30 January 2008 view source Nishidani (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Extended confirmed users99,509 editsm Undid revision 187924015 by Nishidani (talk) Zeq's right. Apologies.Next edit →
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=== 1929 Palestine riots === === 1929 Palestine riots ===
After his appointment, al-Husayni sought to transform the Haram into a symbol of pan-Arabic and Palestinian nationalism, to rally support against the programme of Zionist immigration that followed on the ] and the ]. Al-Husayni often accused the Jews of planning to take possession of the ] of Jerusalem and tear down the ]. He interpreted certain statements, for example, by the ] ] of Palestine, ] regarding the eventual return in time of the ] back to Jewish hands, as signifying the existence of a concrete political plot to seize control of the area.<ref>Rabbi Kook had preached as early as 1920:'The Temple Mount is Israel’s holy place, and even should it be under the hand of others for long days and periods of time, it will finally come into our hands . .' This could merely mean that, in rabbinical thought, with the coming of the Messiah, the Temple would automatically revert to the Jews. See ], ''City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem,'' University of California Press, 1996 pp.77ff. </ref>. Al-Husayni's intensive work to refurbish the shrine as a cynosure for the Muslim world, and Jewish endeavours to improve their access to, and establish a ritually appropriate ambiance on the plaza by the ], led to increased conflict between the two communities. Each attempt to make minor alterations, such as seating and screens (to divide the sexes) was bitterly protested before the British authorities by Al-Hussayni, who at the same time organized in turn a series of noisy disturbances, including offensively parading donkeys through the area, in order to disturb prayer and harass Jewish worshippers. One extreme wing of Zionism, under ], actively rallied its ]im brigades to make demonstrations, claiming that 'The Wall is Ours'<ref>], ''A History of Zionism'', p.255ff</ref>. Claim and counter-claim escalated in a spiral of heated rhetoric and violence, and, a series of massacres then ensued after fiery speeches by al-Hussayni, insinuating that the Jews were intent on taking over Muslim holy places, inflamed local passions. After his appointment, al-Husayni sought to transform the Haram into a symbol of pan-Arabic and Palestinian nationalism, to rally support against the programme of Zionist immigration that followed on the ] and the ]. Al-Husayni often accused the Jews of planning to take possession of the ] of Jerusalem and tear down the ]. He took certain statements, for example, by the ] ] of Palestine, ] regarding the eventual return in time of the ] back to Jewish hands, and turned them to a concrete political plot to seize control of the area.<ref>Rabbi Kook had preached as early as 1920:'The Temple Mount is Israel’s holy place, and even should it be under the hand of others for long days and periods of time, it will finally come into our hands . .' This could merely mean that, in rabbinical thought, with the coming of the Messiah, the Temple would automatically revert to the Jews. See ], ''City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem,'' University of California Press, 1996 pp.77ff. </ref>. Al-Husayni's intensive work to refurbish the shrine as a cynosure for the Muslim world, and Jewish endeavours to improve their access to, and establish a ritually appropriate ambiance on the plaza by the ], led to increased conflict between the two communities. Each attempt to make minor alterations, such as seating and screens (to divide the sexes) was bitterly protested before the British authorities by Al-Hussayni, who at the same time organized in turn a series of noisy disturbances, including offensively parading donkeys through the area, in order to disturb prayer and harass Jewish worshippers. One extreme wing of Zionism, under ], actively rallied its ]im brigades to make demonstrations, claiming that 'The Wall is Ours'<ref>], ''A History of Zionism'', p.255ff</ref>. Claim and counter-claim escalated in a spiral of heated rhetoric and violence, and, a series of massacres then ensued after fiery speeches by al-Hussayni, insinuating that the Jews were intent on taking over Muslim holy places, inflamed local passions.


Subsequently, the Jewish National Council in Palestine, in an open letter dated November 1928, denied that they had any intention whatsoever of wresting control of these sites from Muslim hands.<ref>reproduced in the Shaw Report, ibid p.30 </ref>. Indeed, those acts which Al-Husayni read as betraying signs of such an intent were committed by a small, radical and secular minority, whose ideas and behaviour were often opposed to the views and politics of mainstream Zionists. However, al-Husayni, a firm believer in conspiracies, (indeed, before the Shaw Commission, he held a copy of the ] in his hand)<ref>Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August 1929, Minutes of Evidence (London 1930), Vol 2 page 539 paragraph 13,430, page 527 paragraph 13,107 (interview on 4/12/1929)</ref> refused to accept these assurances, and continued his allegations, which exacerbated local Arab hostility against the Jews. Subsequently, the Jewish National Council in Palestine, in an open letter dated November 1928, denied that they had any intention whatsoever of wresting control of these sites from Muslim hands.<ref>reproduced in the Shaw Report, ibid p.30 </ref>. Indeed, those acts which Al-Husayni read as betraying signs of such an intent were committed by a small, radical and secular minority, whose ideas and behaviour were often opposed to the views and politics of mainstream Zionists. However, al-Husayni, a firm believer in conspiracies, (indeed, before the Shaw Commission, he held a copy of the ] in his hand)<ref>Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August 1929, Minutes of Evidence (London 1930), Vol 2 page 539 paragraph 13,430, page 527 paragraph 13,107 (interview on 4/12/1929)</ref> refused to accept these assurances, and continued his allegations, which exacerbated local Arab hostility against the Jews.

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Mohammad Amin al-Husayni
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem
In office
1921–1948
Preceded byKamal al-Husayni
Succeeded byHusam al-Din Jarallah
President of Supreme Muslim Council
In office
1922–1937
Personal details
Born1895
Jerusalem, Ottoman Palestine
Died(1974-07-04)4 July 1974
Beirut, Lebanon
Political partyArab Higher Committee

Mohammad Amin al-Husayni (1895 - July 4, 1974, أمين الحسيني, alternatively spelt al-Husseini),a member of theal-Husayni clan of Jerusalem, was a Palestinian and Arab nationalist and a Muslim leader in Palestine. Al-Husayni was also the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem over the period from 1921 to 1948.

Like many other Arab leaders of his time al-Husayni was known for his anti-Zionism and fought against the establishment of a National home for the Jewish people in the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine, particularly during the Great Arab Revolt. He fled Palestine in 1937 and took refuge in Nazi Germany during World War II and helped recruit Muslims for the Waffen-SS. In 1941 al-Husayni met Adolf Hitler in Berlin and asked him to oppose, as part of the Arab struggle for independence, the establishment of a Jewish state . During the 1948 Palestine War his faction was represented by the Army of the Holy War, which had been founded as a secret society by Jamal al-Husayni in 1936. He opposed King Abdullah's ambitions for the Palestinian territory captured by the Arabs during the war.

After being sidelined successively by the Arab Nationalist Movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization, he lost most of his remaining political influence. Al-Husayni died in Beirut, Lebanon in 1974.

Early life

Amin al-Husayni was born in 1895 in Jerusalem, the son of the then mufti of that city and prominent early opponent of Zionism, Tahir al-Husayni . The al-Husayni clan consisted of wealthy landowners in southern Palestine, centred around the district of Judea, and thirteen members of the clan had been Mayors of Jerusalem between 1864 and 1920. Another member of the clan and Amin's brother, Kamal al-Husayni, also served as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Amin al-Husayni attended a government school in Jerusalem and Al-Azhar University in Cairo, studying Islamic law for about one year, without completing his course. In 1913 at the age of 18, al-Husayni went to Mecca and received the honorary title of Hajj. Prior to World War I, he studied at the School of Administration in Istanbul.

With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, al-Husayni joined the Ottoman Turkish army, received a commission as an artillery officer and was assigned to the Forty-Seventh Brigade stationed in and around the predominantly Greek Christian city of Smyrna. In November 1916 he left the Ottoman army on a three month disability leave and returned to Jerusalem where he remained for the duration of the war. The British and Sherfian armies conquered Ottoman-controlled Palestine and Syria in 1918, with Palestinians taking part in the offensive against the Turks. The Palin Report noted that Captain C. D. Brunton, who recruited them, acted in cooperation with a 'Sherifian officer named Hagg Ameen el Husseini, who was described at the time as being very pro-English'. Husayni was employed in various positions by the British military administration in Jerusalem and Damascus, including one where he recruited soldiers for Faisal's army for the Arab Revolt.

Early political activism

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In 1919, al-Husayni attended the Pan-Syrian Congress held in Damascus where he supported Emir Faisal for King of Syria. That year al-Husayni joined (perhaps founded) the Arab secret society El-Nadi al-Arabi (The Arab Club) in Jerusalem and wrote articles for the Suriyya al-Janubiyya (Southern Syria). The paper was published in Jerusalem beginning in September 1919 by the lawyer Muhammad Hassan al-Budayri, and edited by Aref al-Aref, both prominent members of al-Nadi al-Arabi.

During the annual Nabi Musa procession in Jerusalem in April 1920, al-Husayni, then a teacher at the Rashidiya school in Jerusalem, incited the Arab crowds against the Jews. For his role in the riots, al-Husayni was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in absentia, since he had already fled to Transjordan.

Until late 1921, al-Husayni focused his efforts on Pan-Arabism and the ideology of the Greater Syria in particular, with Palestine understood as a southern province of an Arab state whose capital was to be established in Damascus. Greater Syria was to include territory now occupied by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. The struggle for Greater Syria collapsed after Britain ceded control over present day Syria and Lebanon to France in July 1920 in accordance with the prior Sykes-Picot Agreement. The French army entered Damascus at that time, overthrew King Faisal and dissolved the objective of Greater Syria.

Al-Husayni then turned from Damascus-oriented Pan-Arabism to a specifically Palestinian ideology centered on Jerusalem, which sought to expel the Jews and foreigners from Palestine, thus in his mind restoring it to Dar al-Islam.

Mufti of Jerusalem

Following the death of Amin's brother Kamil al-Husayni, the former Mufti, the British High Commissioner Herbert Samuel pardoned Amin al-Husayni. Al-Husayni and another Arab had been excluded from an earlier general amnesty because they had fled before their convictions had been passed down. Elections were held, and of the four candidates running for the office of Mufti, al-Husayni received the least number of votes. Nevertheless, Samuel, anxious to keep a balance between al-Husaynis and their rival clan the Nashashibis, decided to appoint Amin al-Husayni Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a position that had been held by the al-Husayni clan for more than a century.

In 1922 al-Husayni was elected President of the newly formed Supreme Muslim Council, which controlled the Waqf funds - worth annually tens of thousands of pounds - and the orphan funds - worth annually about 50,000 pounds. In addition, he controlled the Islamic courts in Palestine. Among other functions, these courts were entrusted with the power to appoint teachers and preachers.

Al-Husayni launched an international Muslim campaign to improve and restore the mosque known as the Dome of the Rock. Indeed, the current landscape of the Temple Mount was directly affected by constructions built, as a result, of al-Husayni's fund raising activities. Al-Husayni also served as president of the World Islamic Congress, which he founded in 1931.

The British initially balanced appointments to the Supreme Muslim Council between the Husaynis and their supporters (known as the majlisiya, or council supporters) and the Nashashibis and their allied clans (known as the mu'aridun, the opposition). For example the British replaced Musa al-Husayni as Mayor of Jerusalem with Ragheb al-Nashashibi. The mu'aridun, were more disposed to a compromise with the Jews, and indeed had for some years received annual subventions from the Jewish Agency. During most of the period of the British mandate, bickering between these two families seriously undermined any Palestinian unity. In 1936, however, they achieved a measure of unity when all the Palestinian groups joined to create a permanent executive organ known as the Arab Higher Committee under al-Husayni's chairmanship.

1929 Palestine riots

After his appointment, al-Husayni sought to transform the Haram into a symbol of pan-Arabic and Palestinian nationalism, to rally support against the programme of Zionist immigration that followed on the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate for Palestine. Al-Husayni often accused the Jews of planning to take possession of the Western Wall of Jerusalem and tear down the Al-Aqsa Mosque. He took certain statements, for example, by the Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Palestine, Abraham Isaac Kook regarding the eventual return in time of the Temple Mount back to Jewish hands, and turned them to a concrete political plot to seize control of the area.. Al-Husayni's intensive work to refurbish the shrine as a cynosure for the Muslim world, and Jewish endeavours to improve their access to, and establish a ritually appropriate ambiance on the plaza by the Western Wall, led to increased conflict between the two communities. Each attempt to make minor alterations, such as seating and screens (to divide the sexes) was bitterly protested before the British authorities by Al-Hussayni, who at the same time organized in turn a series of noisy disturbances, including offensively parading donkeys through the area, in order to disturb prayer and harass Jewish worshippers. One extreme wing of Zionism, under Ze'ev Jabotinsky, actively rallied its Betarim brigades to make demonstrations, claiming that 'The Wall is Ours'. Claim and counter-claim escalated in a spiral of heated rhetoric and violence, and, a series of massacres then ensued after fiery speeches by al-Hussayni, insinuating that the Jews were intent on taking over Muslim holy places, inflamed local passions.

Subsequently, the Jewish National Council in Palestine, in an open letter dated November 1928, denied that they had any intention whatsoever of wresting control of these sites from Muslim hands.. Indeed, those acts which Al-Husayni read as betraying signs of such an intent were committed by a small, radical and secular minority, whose ideas and behaviour were often opposed to the views and politics of mainstream Zionists. However, al-Husayni, a firm believer in conspiracies, (indeed, before the Shaw Commission, he held a copy of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in his hand) refused to accept these assurances, and continued his allegations, which exacerbated local Arab hostility against the Jews.

The Jewish Agency also charged him with responsibility for inciting the violence. While rejecting by a majority of two to one the view that the riots were carefully premeditated, the Shaw Report apportioned "a share in the responsibility for the disturbances" to al-Husayni. In a minority opinion, Mr. Harry Snell insisted on al-Husayni's responsibility, in that he was fully aware of the dangers of incitement in religious propaganda and failed to exercise his authority as a religious leader in restraining outbreaks of violence. The League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission also found that al-Husayni's accusations against the Jews were both untruthful and incendiary, basing its judgment on evidence in the Shaw Report. The Commission concluded that al-Husayni’s incitement had exacerbated the situation.

Arab revolt of 1936-1939

On April 19 1936, a wave of Arab violence against the Jews broke out in Palestine. Initially, the riots were led by Farhan al-Sa'ada, but al-Husayni soon decided to seize the initiative. He controlled waqf and orphan funds, which generated annual income of about 115,000 Palestinian pounds; after the start of the revolt, most of that money was used to finance the activities of his representatives throughout the country. The guerillas recruited by al-Husayni's men were responsible for most attacks on Jews during the first months of the revolt; later, they were joined by volunteers from the neighboring Arab lands led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji. Upon al-Husayni's initiative, the leaders of Palestinian Arab clans formed the Arab Higher Committee under the mufti's chairmanship. The Committee called for nonpayment of taxes after May 15 and for a general strike of Arab workers and businesses, demanding an end to the Jewish immigration. The British High Commissioner for Palestine Sir Arthur Wauchope responded by engaging in negotiations with al-Husayni and the Committee. The talks, however, soon proved fruitless. The mufti issued a series of warnings, threatening the 'revenge of God Almighty' unless the Jewish immigration were to stop, and the general strike began, paralyzing the government, public transportation, Arab businesses and agriculture.

As the time passed, it turned out that those were the Arabs deprived of their usual sources of income who bore the brunt of the cost of the strike. Under these circumstances, the Mandatory government was looking for an intermediary who might help persuade the Arab Higher Committee to end the rebellion. Al-Husayni and the Committee rejected King Abdullah of Transjordan as mediator because of his dependence on the British and friendship with the Zionists, but accepted the Iraqi foreign minister Nuri as-Said. As Wauchope warned of an impending military campaign and simultaneously offered to dispatch a Royal Commission of Inquiry to hear the Arab complaints, the Arab Higher Committee called off the strike on October 11. When the promised Royal Commission of Inquiry arrived in Palestine in November, al-Husayni testified before it as chief witness for the Arabs.

In July 1937 British police were sent to arrest al-Husayni for his part in the Arab rebellion, but, tipped off, he managed to escape to the Haram where the British deemed it inadvisable to touch him. He stayed there for three months, directing the revolt from within. In September, he was removed from the presidency of the Muslim Supreme Council and the Arab Higher Committee was declared illegal. In mid-October, after sliding under cover of darkess down a rope from the haram's wall, he fled to Lebanon, disguised as a woman, There he reconstituted the committee under his leadership. Al-Husayni retained the support of most Palestinian Arabs and used his power to punish the Nashashibis. He remained in Lebanon for two years, but his deteriorating relationship with the French and Syrian authorities led him to withdraw to Iraq in October 1939.

The rebellion itself lasted until 1939, when it was finally quelled by British troops. It forced Britain to make substantial concessions to Arab demands. Jewish immigration was to continue but under restrictions, with a quota of 75,000 places spread out over the following five years. On the expiry of this period further Jewish immigration would depend on Arab consent. Besides local unrest, another key factor in bringing about a decisive change in British policy was Nazi Germany's preparations for a European war, since would forseeably, develop into a worldwide conflict. In British strategic thinking, securing the loyalty and support of the Arab world assumed an importance of some urgency. While Jewish support was unquestioned, Arab backing in a new global conflict was by no means assured. By promising to phase out Jewish immigration into Palestine, Britain hoped to win back support from wavering Arabs.. Al-Husayni nonetheless felt that the concessions did not go far enough, and he rejected the new policy. See also Peel Commission, White Paper of 1939.

Nazi ties and activities during World War II

Pre-war

File:Himmler to Mufti telegram 1943.png
November 2, 1943 Himmler's telegram to Mufti: 'To the Grand Mufti: The National Socialist movement of Greater Germany has, since its inception, inscribed upon its flag the fight against the world Jewry. It has therefore followed with particular sympathy the struggle of freedom-loving Arabs, especially in Palestine, against Jewish interlopers. In the recognition of this enemy and of the common struggle against it lies the firm foundation of the natural alliance that exists between the National Socialist Greater Germany and the freedom-loving Muslims of the whole world. In this spirit I am sending you on the anniversary of the infamous Balfour declaration my hearty greetings and wishes for the successful pursuit of your struggle until the final victory.' Reichsfuehrer S.S. Heinrich Himmler

In 1933, within weeks of Hitler's rise to power in Germany, al-Husayni sent a telegram to Berlin addressed to the German Consul-General in Palestine saying he looked forward to spreading their ideology in the Middle East , especially in Palestine and offered his services. Al-Husayni's offer was rejected at first out of concern for disrupting Anglo-German relations by allying with an anti-British leader. But one month later, Al-Husayni secretly met the German Consul-General Karl Wolff near the Dead Sea and expressed his approval of the anti-Jewish boycott in Germany and asked him not to send any Jews to Palestine. Later that year, the Mufti's assistants approached Wolff, seeking his help in establishing an Arab National Socialist (Nazi) party in Palestine. Wolff and his superiors disapproved because they didn't want to become involved in a British sphere of influence, because the Nazis desired further Jewish immigration to Palestine, and because at the time the Nazi party was restricted to German speaking 'Aryans' only.

On 21 July 1937, Al-Husayni paid a visit to the new German Consul-General, Hans Döhle, in Palestine. He repeated his former support for Germany and 'wanted to know to what extent the Third Reich was prepared to support the Arab movement against the Jews.' He later sent an agent and personal representative to Berlin for discussions with Nazi leaders.

In 1938, though Anglo-German relations were a concern, Al-Husayni's offer was accepted. From August 1938, al-Husayni received financial and military assistance and supplies from Nazi Germany and also from fascist Italy, with which his enemy, Jabotinsky's Irgun had just broken off ties. Though in the ensuing war, the Mufti was strongly pro-Axis, this did not reflect the position of the entire Palestinian leadership. Al-Husayni's cousin Jemal, for example, was in favour of cutting a deal with Britain for Palestine.

In May 1940, the British Foreign Office declined a proposal from the chairman of the Vaad Leumi (Jewish National Council in Palestine) that they assassinate al-Husayni, but in November of that year Winston Churchill approved such a plan. In May 1941, several members of the Irgun, (several members of which were themselves feeling out the Nazis in Beirut about a possible collaboration between the Jewish underground and Germany to throw the British out of Palestine), including its former leader David Raziel were released from prison and flown to Iraq on a secret mission which, according to British sources, included a plan to 'capture or kill' the Mufti. The Irgun version is that they were approached by the British for a sabotage mission and added a plan to capture the Mufti as a condition of their cooperation. The mission was abandoned when Raziel was killed by a German plane.

In the Middle East

In April 1941 the Golden Square pro-Nazi Iraqi army officers, led by General Rashid Ali, forced the Iraqi Prime Minister, the pro-British Nuri Said Pasha, to resign. From his base in Iraq, al-Husayni issued a fatwa for a holy war against Britain a month later, in May. Forty days later, British troops occupied the country, and al-Husayni fled to Iran where he was granted legation asylum first by Japan and then by Italy. On October 8, after the occupation of Iran by Britain and the Soviet Union and the severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, al-Husayni fled to Italy with the Italian diplomats who provided him with an Italian service passport. To avoid recognition, al-Husayni changed his appearance by shaving his beard and dying his hair.

Throughout the war, al-Husayni repeatedly made requests in Berlin to 'the German government to bomb Tel Aviv.'

In Nazi-occupied Europe

Al-Husayni arrived in Rome on October 11 and immediately contacted Italian military intelligence. The mufti claimed to be head of a secret Arab nationalist organization with offices in all Arab countries. On condition that the Axis powers "recognize in principle the unity, independence, and sovereignty, of an Arab state of a Fascist nature, including Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan", he offered support in the war against Britain and stated his willingness to discuss the issues of "the Holy Places, Lebanon, the Suez canal, and Aqaba". The Italian foreign ministry approved the mufti's proposal, recommending to give him a grant of one million lire, and referred him to Benito Mussolini, who met al-Husayni on October 27. According to the mufti's account, the meeting went amicably with the Italian leader expressing his hostility to the Jews and Zionism.

Back in the summer of 1940 and again in February 1941, al-Hussayni submitted to the German government a draft declaration of German-Arab cooperation, containing a clause:

Germany and Italy recognize the right of the Arab countries to solve the question of the Jewish elements, which exist in Palestine and in the other Arab countries, as required by the national and ethnic (völkisch) interests of the Arabs, and as the Jewish question was solved in Germany and Italy.

Now, encouraged by his meeting with the Italian leader, al-Husayni prepared a draft declaration, affirming the Axis support for the Arabs on November 3. In three days, the declaration, slightly amended by Italian foreign ministry, received the formal approval of Mussolini and was forwarded to the German embassy in Rome. On November 6, al-Husayni arrived in Berlin, where he discussed the text of his declaration with Ernst von Weizsäcker and other German officials. In the final draft, which differed only marginally from al-Husayni's original proposal, the Axis powers declared their readiness to approve the elimination (Beseitigung) of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

On November 20, al-Husayni met the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and was officially received by Adolf Hitler on November 28. He asked Hitler for a public declaration that 'recognized and sympathized with the Arab struggles for independence and liberation, and that would support the elimination of a national Jewish homeland'. Hitler refused to make such a public announcement, saying that it would strengthen the Gaullists against the Vichy France, but made the following declaration, requesting al-Husayni "to lock it deep in his heart:

  1. He (the Führer) would carry on the fight until the last traces of the Jewish-Communist European hegemony had been obliterated.
  2. In the course of this fight, the German army would - at a time that could not yet be specified, but in any case in the clearly foreseeable future - gain the southern exit of Caucasus.
  3. As soon as this breakthrough was made, the Führer would offer the Arab world his personal assurance that the hour of liberation had struck. Thereafter, Germany's only remaining interest there was "the destruction of the power protecting the Jews" (die Vernichtung der das Judentum protegierenden Macht).

The Holocaust

The Mufti was in Berlin during the war, but later denied knowing of the Holocaust. One of Adolf Eichmann's deputies, Dieter Wisliceny, stated after the war that he had actively encouraged the extermination of European Jews, and that he had had an elaborate meeting with Eichmann at his office, during which Eichmann gave him an intensive look at the current state of the “Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe” by the Third Reich. This testimony was denied by Eichmann at his 1961 trial in Jerusalem. Eichmann stated that he had only been introduced to the Mufti during an official reception, along with all other department heads. In the final judgement, the Jeruzalem court stated: "In the light of this partial admission by the Accused, we accept as correct Wisliceny's statement about this conversation between the Mufti and the Accused. In our view it is not important whether this conversation took place in the Accused's office or elsewhere. On the other hand, we cannot determine decisive findings with regard to the Accused on the basis of the notes appearing in the Mufti's diary which were submitted to us." .

Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt, who attended the complete Eichmann trial, concluded in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil: "The trial revealed only that all rumours about Eichmann's connection with Haj Amin el Husseini, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, were unfounded." Rafael Medoff concludes that "actually there is no evidence that the Mufti's presence was a factor at all; the Wisliceny hearsay is not merely uncorroborated, but conflicts with everything else that is known about the origins of the Final Solution." Bernard Lewis also called Wisliceny's testimony into doubt: "There is no independent documentary confirmation of Wisliceny's statements, and it seems unlikely that the Nazis needed any such additional encouragement from the outside."

Some recent research, however, apparently argues that al-Husayni did work with Eichmann for the dispatch of a special corps of Einsatz commandos to exterminate the Jews in Palestina, if Rommel managed to break through the British lines in Egypt. Husseini did intervene on May 13, 1943, with the German Foreign Office to block possible transfers of Jews from Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumenia, after reports reached him that 4000 Jewish children accompanied by 500 adults had managed to reach Palestine. He asked that the Foreign Minister 'to do his utmost' to block all such proposals and this request was complied with.. A year later, on the 25th July, 1944, he wrote to the Hungarian foreign minister to register his objection to the release of certificates for 900 Jewish children and 100 adults for transfer from Hungary, fearing they might end up in Palestine. He suggested that if such transfers of population were deemed necessary, then:-

'it would be indispensable and infinitely preferable to send them to other countries where they would find themselves under active control, as for example Poland, thus avoiding danger and preventing damage.'

Among the acts of sabotage al-Husayni attempted to implement, Michael Bar Zohar reports a chemical warfare assault on the second largest and predominantly Jewish city in Palestine, Tel Aviv. According to him, five parachutists were sent with a toxin to dump into the water system. The police caught the infiltrators in a cave near Jericho, and according to Jericho district police commander Fayiz Bey Idrissi, 'The laboratory report stated that each container held enough poison to kill 25,000 people, and there were at least ten containers.' .

In his memoirs after the war, Husayni noted that "Our fundamental condition for cooperating with Germany was a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world. I asked Hitler for an explicit undertaking to allow us to solve the Jewish problem in a manner befitting our national and racial aspirations and according to the scientific methods innovated by Germany in the handling of its Jews. The answer I got was: 'The Jews are yours'.'

In September 1943, intense negotiations to rescue 500 Jewish children from the town of Arbe in Croatia collapsed due to the objection of the Mufti who blocked the children's departure to Turkey because they would end up in Palestine. The children were sent to Auschwitz.

Recent Nazi documents uncovered in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military Archive Service in Freiburg by two researchers, Klaus Michael Mallmann from Stuttgart University and Martin Cüppers from the University of Ludwigsburg, indicated that in the event of the British being defeated in Egypt by Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps the Nazis had planned to deploy a special unit called Einsatzkommando Ägypten to exterminate Palestinian Jews and that they wanted Arab support to prevent the emergence of a Jewish state. In their book the researchers concluded that, "the most important collaborator with the Nazis and an absolute Arab anti-Semite was Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem.'

Propaganda and recruitment

File:Grossmufti-inspecting-ss-recruits.jpg
Al-Husayni inspects Islamic Waffen SS recruits

Toward the end of the World War II, al-Husayni worked for Nazi Germany as a propagandist targeting Arab public opinion and a recruiter of Muslim volunteers for the German armed forces. Beginning in 1941, Al-Husayni visited Bosnia, and convinced Muslim leaders that a Muslim S.S. division would be in the interest of Islam. In spite of these and other propaganda efforts, only half of the expected 20,000 to 25,000 Muslims volunteered." Al-Husayni was involved in the organization and recruitment of Bosnian Muslims into several divisions of the Waffen SS and other units. The largest was the 13th "Handschar" division of 21,065 men, which conducted operations against Communist partisans in the Balkans from February 1944 and participated in the genocide of Yugoslav Jews.

On March 1, 1944, while speaking on Radio Berlin, al-Husayni said:

'Arabs, rise as one man and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history, and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you.'

Activities after World War II

Arrest and trial

After the Second World War, al-Husayni fled to Switzerland, was detained and expelled back to Germany, was captured by the French and put under house arrest in France after he was sentenced by the Yugoslav Supreme Military Court to three years imprisonment and two years of deprivation of civil rights as convicted war criminal. During the Nuremberg Trials, Eichmann's deputy Dieter Wisliceny testified that The Mufti was one of the initiators of the extermination of European Jewry and a collaborator and adviser of Eichmann and Himmler in the initiation of the Final Solution. In 1948, Husayni escaped and was given asylum in Egypt. Jewish groups petitioned the British to have him indicted as a war criminal. The British declined because such a move would have added to their growing problems in Egypt and among Palestinians - where al-Husayni was still popular. Yugoslavia unsuccessfully sought his extradition.

1948 Palestine War

See also: 1947-1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine

From his Egyptian exile, al-Husayni used what influence he had to encourage the participation of the Egyptian military in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. He was involved in some high level negotiations between Arab leaders - before and during the War - at a meeting held in Damascus in February 1948, to organize Palestinian Field Commands and the commanders of the Holy War Army. Hasan Salama and Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni (his nephew), were allocated to the Lydda district and Jerusalem respectively. This decision paved the way for undermining the Mufti's position among the Arab States. On February 9, four days after the Damascus meeting, he suffered a severe setback at the Arab League's Cairo session, when his demands for more Palestinian self-determination for Palestine's fate were rejected. His demands included, the appointment of a Palestinian to the League's General Staff, the formation of a Palestinian Provisional Government, the transfer of authority to local National Committees in areas evacuated by the British, and both, a loan for Palestinian administration and an appropriation of large sums to the Arab Higher Executive for Palestinians entitled to war damages.

The Arab League blocked recruitment to the al-Husayni's forces - which collapsed following the death of one of his most charismatic commanders, Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, on April 8.

Following rumors that King Abdullah I of Transjordan was reopening the bilateral negotiations with Israel that he had previously conducted clandestinely with the Jewish Agency, the Arab League - led by Egypt - decided to set up the All-Palestine Government in Gaza on September 8 , 1950 under the nominal leadership of al-Husayni. Avi Shlaim writes:

The decision to form the Government of All-Palestine in Gaza, and the feeble attempt to create armed forces under its control, furnished the members of the Arab League with the means of divesting themselves of direct responsibility for the prosecution of the war and of withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against popular outcry. Whatever the long-term future of the Arab government of Palestine, its immediate purpose, as conceived by its Egyptian sponsors, was to provide a focal point of opposition to Abdullah and serve as an instrument for frustrating his ambition to federate the Arab regions with Transjordan.

Abdullah regarded the attempt to revive al-Husayni's Holy War Army as a challenge to his authority and on October 3, his minister of defense ordered all armed bodies operating in the areas controlled by the Arab Legion to be disbanded. Glubb Pasha carried out the order ruthlessly and efficiently.

Exile from Jerusalem

King Abdullah had assigned the position of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem to Husam al-Din Jarallah, and al-Husayni appears to have had contacts with the Arab conspirators behind King Abdullah's assassination in 1951. The assassin was a member of an underground Palestinian organization that was led by a relative and aide of al-Husayni, Daoud al-Husayni. Abdullah was succeeded by King Talal - who refused to allow al-Husayni entry into Jerusalem. Within a year, King Talal was declared incompetent, but his successor King Hussein renewed the ban on al-Husayni entering the city.

Al-Husayni died in Beirut, Lebanon on 4 July 1974. He wished to be buried in Jerusalem, but the Israeli government refused this request;Israel captured East Jerusalem from Jordan, in 1967, during the Six-Day War.

Legacy

  • The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's report of April 20, 1946 stated: "The flight of the Mufti, Haj Amin el-Husseini, to Italy and Germany, and his active support of the Axis, did not lose for him his following, and he is probably the most popular Arab leader in Palestine today."
  • Israeli historian Tom Segev paraphrased a letter that the commander of the British forces in the British Mandate for Palestine, General Evelyn Barker, publicly anti-Zionist, wrote to his wife in around May 1947 about the mufti's legacy: "Haj Amin al-Husseini, the former mufti, thought only of his own interests and not of his people, and had done the Palestinian Arabs a great disservice. The mufti sought only to augment his political power. The Arabs had only dissension and petty jealousies. Their tragedy was that they had no real leadership."
  • Yasser Arafat's interview with the London-based Arabic language newspaper Al Sharq al Awsat was reprinted by a leading Palestinian daily Al Quds (August 2, 2002):
Interviewer: I have heard voices from within the Palestinian Authority in the past few weeks, saying that the reforms are coordinated according to American whims...
Arafat: We are not Afghanistan. We are the mighty people. Were they able to replace our hero Hajj Amin al-Husseini?... There were a number of attempts to get rid of Hajj Amin, whom they considered an ally of the Nazis. But even so, he lived in Cairo, and participated in the 1948 war, and I was one of his troops."
  • John Marlowe said: "The dominant figure in Palestine during the Mandate years was neither an Englishman nor a Jew, but an Arab — Haj Amin Muhammed Effendi al Husaini... Able, ambitious, ruthless, humourless, and incorruptible, he was of the authentic stuff of which dictators are made."

See also

Notes

  1. "The leadership of al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Arab Higher Committee, which had dominated Palestinian political scene since the 1920s, was devastated by the disaster of 1948 and discredited by its failure to prevent it. The socio-economic base underlying the political power of traditional Palestinian notables was severely disrupted." Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon, Westview Press, Boulder, 1990 ch.2.
  2. Philip Matter explains there is a controversy about his birth date that is due to the transcription from the Islamic calendar and concludes he was born in 1895 and not in 1893.
  3. ^ Sachar (2006), p. 170
  4. Mattar (1988), p.6
  5. Pappé (1994)p.2
  6. Huneidi, Sahar "A Broken Trust, Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians". 2001 ISBN 1-86064-172-5, p.35.
  7. See, the rivalry Benny Morris, Righteous Victims,pp.111ff.
  8. Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution. Indiana University Press,1997 p. 6
  9. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims ibid. p.111
  10. Rabbi Kook had preached as early as 1920:'The Temple Mount is Israel’s holy place, and even should it be under the hand of others for long days and periods of time, it will finally come into our hands . .' This could merely mean that, in rabbinical thought, with the coming of the Messiah, the Temple would automatically revert to the Jews. See Meron Benvenisti, City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem, University of California Press, 1996 pp.77ff.
  11. Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism, p.255ff
  12. reproduced in the Shaw Report, ibid p.30
  13. Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August 1929, Minutes of Evidence (London 1930), Vol 2 page 539 paragraph 13,430, page 527 paragraph 13,107 (interview on 4/12/1929)
  14. Sachar (2006), p. 175
  15. The Shaw Report, Minority Opinion by Mr.Snell p.174
  16. Permanent Mandates Commission (page sourcing required), citing Shaw Report p.31
  17. Sachar (2006), pp. 199-200
  18. Sachar (2006), pp. 200-201
  19. Sachar (2006), pp. 202-203
  20. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, (1961) New Viewpoints, New York 1973 p.716.
  21. Nicosia (2000) p.85-86
  22. Ami Isseroff and Peter FitzGerald-Morris, 'The Iraq Coup of 1941, The Mufti and the Farhud';http://www.mideastweb.org/iraqaxiscoup.htm
  23. Mattar, 1984.
  24. The Iraq Coup Attempt of 1941, the Mufti, and the Farhud Isserof, Ami; Peter FitzGerald-Morris. MidEastWeb
  25. Lewis (1999), p. 150
  26. Lewis (1995), 351.
  27. Lewis (1999), pp. 150-151
  28. ^ Lewis (1984), p.190.
  29. Lewis (1999), pp. 151-152
  30. Segev (2001), p. 463
  31. ^ Lewis (1999), p. 152
  32. Yisraeli, David The Palestine Problem in German Politics, 1889-1945 p. 310 quoted in Browning, Christopher R. (2004). The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0803213271 p. 539.
  33. Eichmann had, indeed, been sent to Palestine in 1937, but that was on office business at a time when he was not even a commissioned officer. Apparently it concerned the Ha'avara Agreement for Jewish immigration into Palestine from Germany. As for contacting the Arab rebels in Palestine, or their leader the Mufti, Eichmann was turned back by the British authorities at the Egyptian border. It is doubtful whether Eichmann made contact with the Mufti even in 1942, when the latter resided in Berlin. If this fallen idol makes an occasional appearance in Eichmann's office correspondence it is because Eichmann's superiors at the Foreign Office found the Mufti a very useful sacred cow, always to be invoked when the reception of Jewish refugees in Palestine was under discussion. Dieter Wisliceny even believed that Eichmann regarded the Mufti as a colleague in a much expanded post-war Final Solution.' G.Reitlinger, The Final Solution, ibid. pp. 27-28
  34. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.(1963) Viking Press, New York 1965 p.13
  35. Medoff, Rafael (1996). The Mufti's Nazi Years Re-examined. The Journal of Israeli History, vol. 17. No. 3.
  36. Lewis (1999), p. 156
  37. 'Hätte Erwin Rommel 1942 die Truppen seines Gegners, des britischen Feldmarschalls Montgomery, in Ägypten geschlagen und wäre anschließend bis nach Palästina vorgedrungen, hätte das Einsatzkommando den Auftrag erhalten, die Juden in Palästina zu töten. Das Einsatzkommando sollte nach dem Muster der NS-Einsätze in Osteuropa arbeiten; dabei waren hunderttausende von Juden in der Sowjetunion und anderen Ländern Osteuropas ermordet worden. Die Nationalsozialistischen Machthaber wollten sich die Deutschfreundlichkeit der palästinensischen Araber für ihre Pläne zunutze machen. 'Bedeutendster Kollaborateur der Nationalsozialisten und zugleich ein bedingungsloser Antimsemit auf arabischer Seit war Haj Amin el-Husseini, der Mufti von Jerusalem,' schreiben Mallmann und Cüppers. In seiner Person habe sich exemplarisch gezeigt, 'welch entscheidende Rolle der Judenhass im Projekt der deutsch-arabischen Verständigung einnahm.' El-Husseini habe unter anderem bei mehreren Treffen mit Adolf Eichmann Details der geplanten Morde festgelegt.'http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/aktuelles/presse/2006/36.html
  38. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, (1961) New Viewpoints, New York 1973 p.504
  39. Joseph Schechtman, The Mufti and the Führer, ibid. pp.154-155
  40. Ami Isseroff and Peter FitzGerald-Morris, 'The Iraq Coup Attempt of 1941, the Mufti, and the Farhud,' http://www.mideastweb.org/Iraqaxiscoup.htm.
  41. Daniel Carpi, The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia, Shoah Resource Center, page 39
  42. The Black Book of Bosnia by Nader Mousavizadeh, (Editor), Basic Books, New York, 1996, p. 23
  43. "Hall Amin Al-Husayni: The Mufti of Jerusalem". Holocaust Encyclopedia. June 25, 2007. Retrieved 2007-10-19. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  44. Lewis (1999), p. 154
  45. Pearlman (1947), p. 51
  46. Sachar (1961), p.231
  47. Stillman (2000), p.143
  48. Levenberg, 1993, p. 198.
  49. Sayigh, 2000, p. 14.
  50. Shlaim, 2001, p. 97.
  51. Shlaim, 2001, p. 99.
  52. Anglo-American Committee of inquiry, Report to the US and UK Governments, April 20, 1946 Appendix IV. Palestine: Historical Background. The Arabs and the War. Verified 23 Oct 2007.
  53. Segev (2001), p. 498

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