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The 2003 invasion of Iraq was launched by the United States and the United Kingdom on March 20, 2003, with support from some other governments, making up what was described as the "coalition of the willing". The invasion's legitimacy has been disputed: the main officially stated reason was that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the appreciation of the urgency to counter a possible use of these varied greatly among members of the United Nations. After approximately three weeks of fighting, Iraq was occupied by coalition forces and the rule of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party came to an end. No Weapons of Mass Destruction were found. Subsequently, the period known as post-invasion Iraq began.

Template:Infobox 2003 Invasion of Iraq

Political / Diplomatic aspects

In his 17 March 2003 address to the nation, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline . All three refused this demand.

Since the invasion began without the explicit approval of the United Nations Security Council, some legal authorities regard it as a violation of the U.N. Charter. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in September 2004, "From our point of view and the U.N. charter point of view, it was illegal." There have been no formal charges under international law.

Military aspects

United States military operations were conducted, first, under the name Operation Iraqi Liberation , which was changed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, United Kingdom military operations as Operation Telic, and Australian operations as Operation Falconer. Approximately 100,000 United States troops and 45,000 British, and smaller forces from other nations, collectively called the "Coalition of the Willing," entered Iraq primarily through a staging area in Kuwait. Plans for opening a second front in the north were abandoned when Turkey officially refused the use of its territory for such purposes. Forces also supported Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 50,000.

Facing them was a large but poorly-equipped military force. The regular Iraqi army was estimated at 290,000–350,000, mostly conscript, troops, with four Republican Guard divisions with 50,000–80,000 troops, and the Fedayeen Saddam, a 20,000–40,000 strong militia, who used guerrilla tactics during the war. There were an estimated thirteen infantry divisions, ten mechanized and armored divisions, as well as some special forces units. The Iraqi Air Force and Navy played a negligible role in the conflict.

Prelude

Since the end of the Gulf War of 1991, Iraq's relations with the UN, the US, and the UK remained poor. In the absence of a Security Council consensus that Iraq had fully complied with the terms of the Persian Gulf War ceasefire, both the UN and the US enforced numerous economic sanctions against Iraq throughout the Clinton administration, and patrolled Iraqi airspace to enforce Iraqi no-fly zones. The United States Congress also passed the "Iraq Liberation Act" in October 1998, which provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic opposition organizations" in order to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq." This contrasted with the terms set out in U.N. Resolution 687 , all of which related to weapons and weapons programs, not to what regime was in place. Weapons inspectors had also been used to gather intelligence on Iraq's WMD program, information that was then used in targeting decisions during Operation Desert Fox , . At the same time Tony Blair's Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, could not guarantee that an invasion in the circumstances would not be challenged on legal grounds.

The United States Republican Party's campaign platform in the U.S. presidential election, 2000 called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act and removal of Saddam Hussein with a focus on rebuilding a coalition, tougher sanctions, reinstating inspections, and support for the pro-democracy, opposition exile group, Iraqi National Congress then headed by Ahmed Chalabi.

In September 2000, in the Rebuilding America's Defenses (pg. 17) report, Project for the New American Century, a right-wing think tank, suggested that the United States shift to more ground-based air forces to help contain the forces of Saddam Hussein so that "the demand for carrier presence in the region can be relaxed." Upon the election of George W. Bush as president, many advocates of such a policy (including some of those who wrote the 2000 report) were included in the new administration's foreign policy circle. According to former treasury secretary Paul O'Neill, as widely reported by the mainstream press, an attack was planned since the inauguration, and the first security council meeting discussed plans on invasion of the country. O'Neill later clarified that these discussions were part of a continuation of foreign policy first put into place by the Clinton Administration.

Notes from aides who were with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center one year later, on the day of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack, reflect that he wanted, "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit at same time. Not only ." The notes also quote him as saying, "Go massive," and "Sweep it all up. Things related and not." Shortly thereafter, the George W. Bush administration announced a War on Terrorism, accompanied by the doctrine of 'preemptive' military action dubbed the Bush doctrine. A preemptive war requires that the declared purpose be to respond to an imminent threat of war by the other power, whereas wars instituted against a hypothetical future threat are more properly called preventive war and generally considered a war of aggression. Every political appointee from the Clinton and Bush Administrations believed at the time that Saddam Hussein was a threat to U.S. interests, Middle East stability, inflamed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and gave financial support to terrorists. All subsequent reports have confirmed those views. The September 11 commission in June, 2004 released a staff report that said it found 'no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.'"

In 2002 the Iraq disarmament crisis arose primarily as a diplomatic situation. In October 2002, with the "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq" (Adopted 296-133 by the House of Representatives and 77-23 by the Senate), the United States Congress granted President Bush the authority to wage war against Iraq. The Joint Resolution was worded so as to encourage, but not require, UN Security Council approval for military action, although as a matter of international law the US required explicit Security Council approval for an invasion unless an attack by Iraq had been imminent — the US administration argued that there was a "growing" or "gathering," rather than imminent, threat. The joint resolution allowed the President of the United States to, "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."

In November 2002, United Nations actions regarding Iraq culminated in the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the resumption of weapons inspections. However, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan later stated that the subsequent invasion was a violation of the UN Charter. Force was not authorized by resolution 1441 itself, as the language of the resolution mentioned "serious consequences," which is generally not understood by Security Council members to include the use of force to depose the government; however the threat of force, as cultivated by the Bush administration, was prominent at the time of the vote. Both the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, and the UK ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, in promoting Resolution 1441 on 8 November, 2002, had given assurances that it provided no "automaticity," no "hidden triggers," no step to invasion without consultation of the Security Council; in the event such consultation was forestalled by the US and UK's abandonment of the Security Council procedure and their invasion of Iraq. Richard Perle, a senior member of the administration's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, has expressed an opinion in November, 2003, that the invasion was against international law, but argued that it was justified. There is still much disagreement among international lawyers on whether prior resolutions, relating to the 1991 war and later inspections, permitted the invasion.

The United States also began preparations for an invasion of Iraq, with a host of diplomatic, public relations, and military preparations.

Rationale

See The UN Security Council and the Iraq war and Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq for more details

In the wake of the September 11 attacks and the relative success of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Bush administration felt that it had sufficient military justification and public support in the United States for further operations against perceived threats in the Middle East. The relations between some coalition members and Iraq had never improved since 1991, and the nations remained in a state of low-level conflict marked by American and British air-strikes, sanctions, and threats against Iraq. Iraqi radar had also locked onto and anti-aircraft guns and missiles were fired upon coalition airplanes enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones, which had been implemented after the Gulf War in 1991.

Throughout 2002, the U.S. administration made it clear that removing Saddam Hussein from power was a major goal, although it offered to accept major changes in Iraqi military and foreign policy in lieu of this. Specifically, the stated justification for the invasion included Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction, links with terrorist organizations and human rights violations in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government, issues that are detailed below.

To that end, the stated goals of the invasion, according to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were:

• Self-defense
  • find and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, weapons programs, and terrorists
  • collect intelligence on networks of weapons of mass destruction and terrorists
• Humanitarian
  • end sanctions and to deliver humanitarian support (According to Madeline Albright, half a million Iraqi children had died because of sanctions.)
• UNSC Resolution
  • Resolution 1205, made in 1999.
• Regime Change
  • end the Saddam Hussein government
  • help Iraq's transition to democratic self-rule
• Other
  • secure Iraq's oil fields and other resources

Many staff and supporters within the Bush administration had other, more ambitious goals for the war as well. Many propagated the claim that the war could act as a catalyst for democracy and peace in the Middle East, and that once Iraq became democratic and prosperous other nations would quickly follow suit due to this demonstration effect, and thus the social environment that allowed terrorism to flourish would be eliminated. However, for diplomatic, bureaucratic reasons these goals were played down in favor of justifications that Iraq represented a specific threat to the United States and to international law. Little evidence was presented actually linking the government of Iraq to al-Qaeda (see below).

Opponents of the Iraq war disagreed with many of the arguments presented by the administration, attacking them variously as being untrue, inadequate to justify a preemptive war, or likely to have results different from the administration's intentions. Further, they asserted various alternate reasons for the invasion. Different groups asserted that the war was fought primarily for:

• Energy economics
  • to gain control over Iraq's hydrocarbon reserves and in doing so maintain the U.S. dollar as the monopoly currency for the critical international oil market (since 2000, Iraq had used the Euro as its oil export currency)
  • to ensure the US had military control over the region's hydrocarbon reserves as a lever to control other countries that depend on it
  • to assure that the revenue from Iraqi oil would go primarily to American interests
  • to lower the price of oil for American consumers
• Defense and construction special interests
  • to channel money to defense and construction interests
• Public perception
  • to maintain the wartime popularity that the President enjoyed due to his response to the 11 September attacks, and thus distract attention from other domestic political issues on which he was politically vulnerable (in contrast to his father whose wartime popularity quickly faded when the electorate began to focus on the economy)
• Ideological, emotional reasons
  • in pursuance of the PNAC's stated strategic goal of "unquestionable geopolitical preeminence"
  • a chance for George W. Bush to get revenge against Saddam Hussein for allegedly attempting to have his father, President George H. W. Bush, assassinated during a visit to Kuwait in 1993.
  • to satisfy and create closure for President George H.W. Bush, Cheney, and other members of the first Bush administration who had been humilated by the end of the first Gulf War and wanted an opportunity to finally "get" Saddam, after previously failing to do so.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

See Iraq disarmament crisis for more details.

Ultimately, the Iraq war was presented as largely being a case of removing banned weapons from Iraq. Administration officials, especially with the United States Department of State led by Colin Powell were eager to make the cause for war as universally acceptable to as many nations as possible. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense stated in an interview on 28 May 2003 in Vanity Fair that 'For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction'.

Before the attack, the head UN weapons inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix, clearly stated that his teams had been unable to find any evidence of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons in Iraq. However, the discovery of illegal missiles discovered by United Nations weapons inspectors which were ultimately deemed in violation of United Nations Resolution 687 (1991), called the Al-Samoud IIs, raised serious questions: these rockets could possibly narrowly pass the allowed range of 150 km (93 miles), though without carrying any load. Ultimately though, they were determined to be in violation of the terms of which Saddam Hussein agreed to in order to cease the hostilities of the Persian Gulf War and thus, deemed prohibited and ordered destroyed by the United Nations Security Council. Retrospectively, some time after the attack, Hans Blix expressed doubts that the nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons had existed , , but never speculated whether the discovery of the illegal Al-Samoud IIs could be a trigger for justifying war or not. Former top American weapons inspector to Iraq, Scott Ritter, a longtime advocate of more thorough weapons inspections previously and considered an anti-Iraq hardliner, said that he was now absolutely convinced Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction which contradicts earlier 1998 statements by Scott Ritter regarding this issue.

On August 26, 1998, approximately two months prior to United Nations inspectors' ejection from Iraq, Scott Ritter resigned from his position rather than participate in what he called the "illusion of arms control." In his resignation letter to Amb. Butler, Ritter wrote: "The Special Commission was created for the purpose of disarming Iraq. As part of the Special Commission team, I have worked to achieve a simple end: the removal, destruction or rendering harmless of Iraq's proscribed weapons. The sad truth is that Iraq today is not disarmed ... UNSCOM has good reason to believe that there are significant numbers of proscribed weapons and related components and the means to manufacture such weapons unaccounted for in Iraq today ... Iraq has lied to the Special Commission and the world since day one concerning the true scope and nature of its proscribed programs and weapons systems. This lie has been perpetuated over the years through systematic acts of concealment. It was for the purpose of uncovering Iraq's mechanism of concealment, and in doing so gaining access to hidden weapons components and weapons programs, that you created a dedicated capability to investigate Iraq's concealment activities, which I have had the privilege to head."

Furthermore, on September 7, 1998, approximately one month prior to United Nations weapons inspectors' ejection from Iraq, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, Scott Ritter was asked by John McCain (R, AZ) whether UNSCOM had intelligence suggesting that Iraq had assembled the components for three nuclear weapons and all that it lacked was the fissile material. Ritter replied: "The Special Commission has intelligence information, which suggests that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exists, lacking the fissile material. Yes, sir." As Paul Leventhal, head of the Nuclear Control Institute remarked in response to Ritter's statement, "Iraq could be only days or weeks away from having nuclear weapons if it acquires the needed plutonium or bomb-grade uranium on the black market or by other means." Ritter also said that, absent UNSCOM, Iraq could reconstruct its chemical and biological weapons programs in six months, as well as its missile program. He said that Iraq had a plan for achieving a missile breakout within six months of receiving the signal from Saddam Hussein.

It is unclear what Scott Ritter believes happened to that capability he insinuated Saddam Hussein had in 1998 as compared to that capability he believes Saddam Hussein had after the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, considering United Nations weapons inspectors were absent from Iraq from 1998 to 2002.

President Bush and members of his cabinet and staff relied heavily on intelligence reports, of which the C.I.A.'s 2002 report on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was one of the more prominent.

No weapons of mass destruction were found by the Iraq Survey Group, headed by inspector David Kay. Kay, who resigned as the Bush administration's top weapons inspector in Iraq, said U.S. intelligence services owed President Bush an explanation for having concluded that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. However, the team claims to have found evidence of low-level WMD programs — a claim hotly disputed by many, with the Biosecurity Journal referring to the Biological Warfare (BW) claims as a "worst case analysis" .

On 29 May 2003, Pres. Bush said during an interview with Polish network TVP that "We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories."

The Iraq Survey Group under Bush-appointed inspector David Kay reported in the 'Interim Progress Report' on 2003 October 3 the following key points: "We have not yet found stocks of weapons," difficulty in explaining why, clandestine laboratories suitable for "preserving BW expertise" which contained equipment subject to UN monitoring, a prison laboratory complex which Kay describes as "possibly used in human testing of BW agents," strains of bacteria kept in one scientists home (including a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B), twelve-year-old documents and small parts concerning uranium enrichment kept found in a scientist's home , partially declared UAVs, capability to produce a type of fuel useful for Scud missiles, a scientist who had drawn plans for how to make longer-range missiles , and attempts to acquire missile technology from North Korea, and destroyed documents of unknown significance. . The report categorized most biological agents as "BW-applicable" or "BW-capable"; the report mentions nothing that was being used in such a context. Chemical weapons are referred to in a similar fashion. The nuclear program, according to the report, had not done any work since 1991, but had attempted to retain scientists and documentation from it in case sanctions were ever dropped.

However, Kay himself has since stated (concerning Iraqi WMDs): "We were almost all wrong - and I certainly include myself here." He has stated that many intelligence analysts have come to him "in apology that the world we were finding was not the world that they had thought existed" . He has also directly contradicted since then much of the October report. Before Kay made these revelations, many of the scientists on his staff had already come out with similar statements. .

Kay told the Senate Armed Services Committee during his oral report the following, though: "Based on the intelligence that existed, I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you know reality on the ground as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a different conclusion — although I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war."

Dr. Kay's team concluded that Iraq had the production capacity and know-how to produce a great deal more chemical and biological weaponry when international economic sanctions were lifted, a policy change which was actively being sought by France, Germany and Russia. Kay also believes that a large but undetermined amount of the former Iraqi government's WMD program had been moved to Syria shortly before the 2003 invasion. However, in April 2005, the Iraq Survey Group's final report "found no senior policy, program, or intelligence officials who admitted any direct knowledge of such movement of WMD," and ruled out any government-sanctioned movement of banned weapons to Syria.

The current consensus view of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction seems similar to that portrayed by Hussein Kamel in 1995 and that of Imad Khadduri : that Iraq had almost completely destroyed its programs, but sought to retain as much knowledge and information as it could so that, should sanctions ever end, the programs could start over quickly.

As of May 2005, small quantities of chemically degraded mustard gas had been found in old munitions. However, these are generally regarded as left-overs from the pre-sanction era before the 1991 Gulf War, and in November 2005 David Kay, the head of the Iraq Survey Group charged with finding Saddam Hussein's WMDs stated that there probably were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to the invasion and that the likelihood of any WMDs having been sent to neighboring nations like Syria was so small that it was not a viable explanation for what happened to the weapons, which contradicts the earlier statement which says: "Kay also believes that a large but undetermined amount of the former Iraqi government's WMD program had been moved to Syria shortly before the 2003 invasion." The general consensus is that the intelligence community, including the CIA and other foreign services, failed to provide an accurate picture of the WMD program in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The U.S. government and the Bush administration have not yet taken official stances on the intelligence failures, but Congressional investigations, primarily under Democratic leadership, were either underway or forming in the spring of 2005.

The United Nations announced a report on March 2, 2004 from the weapons inspection teams stating that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction of any significance after 1994.

In a June 2004 interview with Time Magazine, former president Bill Clinton said, "I have repeatedly defended President Bush against the left on Iraq, even though I think he should have waited until the U.N. inspections were over." He added that he supported the invasion because "there was a lot of stuff unaccounted for."

On August 2, 2004 Pres. Bush stated "Knowing what I know today we still would have gone on into Iraq. He had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction. He had terrorists ties … the decision I made is the right decision. The world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power."

On October 6, 2004 Charles Duelfer, head of the Iraq Survey Group, appearing before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee announced that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced any weapons of mass destruction since 1991, when UN sanctions were imposed and, furthermore, were incapable of doing so. The report noted that Saddam had made it his primary goal to have sanctions lifted by whatever means necessary and that whether or not Saddam Hussein was, indeed, "contained" was questionable considering dozens of instances in which prohibited material had entered Iraq through several nefarious means such as front companies and other questionable means. From the report: " wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted." Also, from the report: "Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to forumulate and implement strategies, policies, and methods to terminate the UN's sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nation's member states and other international players' resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis." The report concluded in its Key Findings that: "The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them."

Furthermore, in the Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD Charles Duelfer made the statement that "Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined. There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to warrant further investigation. ... ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war. It should be noted that no information from debriefing of Iraqis in custody supports this possibility. ... Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials."

On January 12, 2005, US military forces, having located no weapons of mass destruction, formally abandoned the search.

On June 8, 2005, retired 4-star general and former Secretary of State in the Bush administration Colin Powell, appeared on The Daily Show and stated regarding Weapons of Mass Destructions in Iraq that; "Now where we got the intelligence wrong, dead wrong, is that we thought he also had existing stockpiles, and now we know that those are not there."

Sanctions

However effective, UN sanctions fostered a growing humanitarian crisis in Iraq. International popular opinion seemed to shift in favour of lifting the sanctions and finding diplomatic alternatives such as targeted sanctions that might be as effective, but which would not inadvertently affect the Iraqi populace. Temporary solutions, such as the Oil for Food program, an easing of the sanctions on a controlled basis, had limited success in the face of corruption in the Iraqi government and UN officials involved in the program . Essentially, harsh sanctions originally intended to be temporary could not be kept in place indefinitely. In addition, Saddam's persistent efforts to sway certain UN Security Council members with money diverted from the Oil for Food program meant that sanctions may have reached the limit of their usefulness.

Human Rights

Another key rationale for the war was ending Saddam Hussein's nearly 40-year track record of murder, torture, and other major human rights abuses (see Human rights in Saddam's Iraq). Some critics called this justification self-serving, since the US government did not do much to prevent or to punish those crimes while they were happening. Although the use of chemical weapons against Kurds in 1983 was known by US intelligence, Donald Rumsfeld, at the time presidential envoy of Ronald Reagan, nevertheless spoke of his "close relationship" with Saddam Hussein and even visited him. After the Persian Gulf War the US government encouraged rebellions by the Shiites but did not intervene when Saddam crushed the rebels.

Ken Roth of Human Rights Watch has argued that the justification of "human rights" for the war in Iraq does not meet appropriate standards for the level of suffering that it causes.

Libyan disarmament

Also included in the list of postwar justifications is Libya's agreement to abandon its WMD programs in December of 2003. Those who argue that this action was directly inspired by the invasion of Iraq point to a phone call Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi says he had with Libya's leader, Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi in April of 2003, in which he quotes Qadaffi as saying "I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid." Negotiations between Libya and the United States and Britain on disarmament began almost immediately thereafter. On the other hand, Flynt Leverett (former senior director for Middle Eastern Affairs at the NSC) and Martin S. Indyk (former Clinton administration official) argue that the agreement was instead a result of good-faith negotiations. Libya had in principle agreed to surrender its programs in 1999.

Purported links between the government of Iraq and terrorist organizations

Al-Qaeda

See Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda for more details.

An alleged link between al Qaeda and Iraq was often mentioned in the run-up to war. Before the invasion, journalists were generally skeptical; for example, one January 2003 article in the San Jose Mercury News said the claim "stretches the analysis of U.S. intelligence agencies to, and perhaps beyond, the limit." After the invasion, in January of 2004, Secretary Powell stated "I have not seen smoking-gun, concrete evidence about the connection, but I think the possibility of such connections did exist, and it was prudent to consider them at the time that we did."

Some of the evidence for a connection between the two turns out to have been misinformation coming from several sources, most notably an associate of Ahmed Chalabi who was given the code name "Curveball" and captured al Qaeda leader Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. The Chalabi source has been thoroughly discredited, and the al Qaeda source has since recanted his story. Other al Qaeda leaders have claimed that there was no operational relationship between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and indeed that Osama bin Laden had forbidden such a relationship with the Iraqi leader, whom he considered an infidel.

There are, however, some who have bolstered the current US administration's claims of collaboration between al Qaeda and the now deposed Iraqi government, as well as charges of cooperation made by the Clinton administration. Weapons smuggler Mohamed Mansour Shahab said in an interview in the New Yorker magazine that he had been directed by the Iraqi intelligence community to organize, plan, and carry out up to nine terrorist attacks against American targets in the Middle East, including an attack similar to the one carried out on the USS Cole. . His story is not considered credible, however. Reporter Guy Dinmore wrote in the London Financial Times of Sahab: "it is apparent that the man is deranged. He claims to have killed 422 people, including two of his wives, and says he would drink the blood of his victims. He also has no explanation for why, although he was arrested two years ago, he only revealed his alleged links to al-Qaeda and Baghdad after the September 11 attacks." (22 May 2002 p. 13) And Al Qaeda expert Jason Burke wrote after interviewing Shahab, "Shahab is a liar. He may well be a smuggler, and probably a murderer too, but substantial chunks of his story simply are not true.".

The only member of the original plot to destroy the World Trade Center to escape US law enforcement officials, Abdul Rahman Yasin, fled to Baghdad shortly after the attacks in 1993. Abdul Rahman Yasin was the only alleged member of the al Qaeda cell that detonated the 1993 World Trade Center bomb to remain at large after the investigation into the bombing where he fled to Iraq. After major fighting ceased U.S. forces discovered a cache of documents in Tikrit, that purport to show that the Iraqi government gave Yasin a house and monthly salary.

FBI and CIA investigations in 1995 and 1996, however, determined "that the Iraqi government was in no way involved in the attack"; then-U.S. counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke has since testified, "the fact that one of the 12 people involved in the attack was Iraqi hardly seems to me as evidence that the Iraqi government was involved in the attack. The attack was Al Qaida; not Iraq.... he allegation that has been made that the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center was done by the Iraqi government I think is absolutely without foundation." (911 Commission Hearing, 24 March 2004)

Abbas al-Janabi, who served for fifteen years as personal assistant to Uday Hussein before defecting to United Kingdom, has often claimed that he knew of collaboration between the former Iraqi government and al Qaeda. Al-Janabi said that he had learnt that Iraqi officials had visited Afghanistan and Sudan to strengthen ties with Al-Qaeda and he also claimed he knew of a facility near Baghdad where foreign fighters were trained and instructed by members of the Republican Guard and Mukhabarat. . Salman Pak, a facility matching al-Janabi’s description, was captured by US Marines in Mid April of 2003 , but no evidence of al Qaeda presence at the camp has been found. Some claim that the camp was actually a counterterrorism facility built by the British in the mid 1980's but UN weapons inspectors, including Charled Duelfer beleived it had been converted from its original purpose and was being used to train militiants.

In April of 2001, the Czech Security Information Service reported a meeting between Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani, an Iraqi Intelligence Service officer operating out of the Iraqi embassy in Prague, and a man they believed to be Mohamed Atta. The Czech report was based on a single eyewitness from Prague who is now generally considered unreliable. Nevertheless, this Prague connection was seen as a crucial link between Iraq and al Qaeda by proponents of collaboration between Iraq and al Qaeda. The 9/11 Commission examined this evidence, saying that circumstantial evidence appeared to place Atta in Florida at the time, and that "The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting." The report concluded, "Based on the evidence available including investigation by Czech and U.S. authorities plus detainee reporting we do not believe that such a meeting occurred." It also says that Czech intelligence indicates that al-Ani "was about 70 miles away from Prague" at the time that the meeting supposedly took place. ,

It was eventually shown that, while representatives of Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda had indeed met, an operational relationship was never realized and there was a deep sense of mistrust and dislike of one another. Osama Bin Laden was shown to view Iraq's ruling Ba'ath party as running contrary to his religion, calling it an "apostate regime." A British intelligence report went so far as to say of Bin Laden "His aims are in ideological conflict with present day Iraq."

In 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, concluded that there was no credible evidence that Saddam Hussein had assisted al-Qaeda in preparing for or carrying out the 9/11 attacks.

Other Terrorist Organizations

Aside from the contentious allegations of Iraq's relationship with al Qaeda, the former government did have relationships with other militant organizations in the Middle East including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It is known that some $10–15M total was paid to the families of suicide bombers, presented as compensation for the demolition of their homes in Israeli collective punishment operations. Abu Abbas (associate with the PLO and the Achille Lauro hijacking) was found in Iraq, and had been wanted for quite some time. In August 2002, Abu Nidal (attacks in Italy and elsewhere) died in Baghdad from gunshot wounds while facing treason charges under Saddam's government.

In 1998, Iraq plotted to blow up Radio Free Europe in Prague, for broadcasting opposition communications into Iraq. According to Jabir Salim, the consul and second secretary at the Iraq embassy in Prague, Saddam Hussein had allocated $150,000 to recruit and train individuals who would not be traceable back to Iraq. This plot was aborted in December 1998 when Salim defected in Prague, revealing details of the plot to the CIA, British MI-6 and Czech intelligence.

The now deposed Iraqi regime has also been accused of an assassination plot on former President George Bush. On April 14, 1993, it is charged that Iraq plotted to assassinate former President George Bush while he was visiting Kuwait. The assassins were Ra'ad al-Asadi and Wali al-Ghazali, two Iraqi nationals, who had been supplied with a car bomb. The plot was foiled when the two were captured in Kuwait City. The FBI learned that the two had been recruited by the Iraqi intelligence Service in Basra, Iraq, who also gave them the explosive devices shortly before Bush arrived in Kuwait.

Some documents indicate that the leadership was attempting to distance itself from Islamist militants instead of working with them , and that any connection between al Qaeda and Iraq is new. This was in relation to the rising insurgency in Iraq: Saddam was fearful that the foreign fighters might use this as an opportunity for themselves, rather than fight for Saddam to take control again. Many international jihadists have in fact begun operating in Iraq since the U.S. occupation began. (See Iraqi insurgency for further details).

The Bush Administration also has claimed that there are links between Saddam Hussein's government and Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose organization Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War) has taken credit for kidnappings and beheadings directed against the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Zarqawi is rumored to have been treated in an Iraqi hospital after being wounded in Afghanistan during the U.S. invasion. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi had settled in Kurdish northern Iraq (an area not controlled by Saddam Hussein's government) where he joined the terrorist organization Ansar al-Islam, which was an enemy of the Ba'athist government. Nevertheless, U.S. officials continued to assert that Zarqawi constitutes an important link between Saddam's government and al Qaeda. A CIA report in early October 2004 "found no clear evidence of Iraq harbouring Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." Also, Zarqawi does not seem to have ever been, as some have asserted, an al Qaeda leader, and only pledged his allegiance to the al Qaeda organization in October 2004. This pledge came two days after his insurgent organization in Iraq was officially declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.

On October 19, 2004, the International Institute for Strategic Studies published its annual report stating that the war in Iraq had actually increased the risk of terrorism against westerners in Arab countries.

Opinion and legality

See Views on the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Popular opposition to the 2003 Iraq war

Countries supporting and opposing the war

Support for the invasion and occupation of Iraq included 49 nations, a group that was frequently referred to as the "coalition of the willing." These nations provided combat troops, support troops, and logistical support for the invasion. The nations contributing combat forces were, roughly: United States (250,000), United Kingdom (45,000), South Korea (3,500), Australia (2,000), Denmark (200), and Poland (184). Ten other countries offered small numbers of non-combat forces, mostly either medical teams and specialists in decontamination. In several of these countries a majority of the public was opposed to the war. For example, in Spain polls reported at one time a 90% opposition to the war. In most other countries less than 10% of the populace supported an invasion of Iraq without UN sanction . Even in the US only approximately 33% of the population said they were in favor of a unilateral invasion .

Popular opposition to war on Iraq led to global protests. In many Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, many protesters supported Saddam Hussein, but protesters in the United States and Europe generally did not. On the government level, the war was criticized by Canada, Belgium, Russia, France, The People's Republic of China, Germany, Switzerland, The Vatican, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, the Arab League, the African Union and others. Though many nations opposed the war, no foreign government openly supported Saddam Hussein, and none volunteered any assistance to the Iraqi side.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud said the U.S. military could not use Saudi Arabia's soil in any way to attack Iraq. After ten years of U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, cited among reasons by Saudi-born Osama bin Laden for his al-Qaeda attacks on America on September 11, 2001, most of U.S. forces were withdrawn in 2003. According to the New York Times, the invasion secretly received support from Saudi Arabia.

Legality of the invasion

U.S. Law

Under the United States Constitution, presidents do not have authority to declare war. This power is granted exclusively to Congress, and there is no provision in the Constitution for its delegation. As the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, it cannot be superseded except by amendment to itself. On October 3, 2002, Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) submitted to the House International Relations committee a proposed declaration which read, "A state of war is declared to exist between the United States and the government of Iraq." It was rejected. Citing several factors, including unresolved issues from the 1991 Gulf War, the Bush administration claimed intrinsic authority to engage Iraq militarily, and Congress delegated its war powers to the President; from this point of view, the invasion of Iraq, while a war, may therefore be considered a police action commenced by the executive, like the Korean war.

International Law

Resolution 1441, drafted and accepted unanimously the year before the invasion, threatened "serious consequences" to Iraq in case Iraq did not comply with all conditions. Russia, the People's Republic of China, and France made clear in a joint statement that this did not authorize the use of force but a further resolution was needed. This was also the position of the UK and the US at the time the resolution was decided. On the day of the vote the US ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, said a 2nd UN resolution was required to authorise war. Until a few days before the war, it was the position of the UK, the main US ally in the war, that a further resolution would be desirable before the UK would go to war.

Some have said that the US and other coalition governments' invasion of Iraq was an unprovoked assault on an independent country which breached international law. Under Article 2, Number 4 of the UN Charter, "All Members shall refrain... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state..." This is known as the "Prohibition of Aggression." For the use of force other than in self defence, it is absolute without the positive sanction of the security council under Article 42. Resolution 1441 was not intended by China, Russia and France to authorise war. The coalition formed around the USA argued that another understanding of the resolution is possible, although Kofi Annan, speaking on behalf of the UN charter, declared: "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal."

The Bush administration argued that the UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing the 1991 invasion, in addition to Resolution 1441, gave legal authority to use "all necessary means," which is diplomatic code for going to war. This war ended with a cease fire instead of a permanent peace treaty. Their view was that Iraq had violated the terms of the cease-fire by breaching two key conditions and thus made the invasion of Iraq a legal continuation of the earlier war. If a war can be reactivated ten years after the fact, it would imply that any nation that has ever been at war that ended in a cease-fire (such as Korea) could face war for failing to meet the conditions of the cease-fire. Such is the purpose of using a cease-fire agreement in place of a peace treaty; the resumption of war is the penalty for, and thus deterrent of, engaging in the prohibited action(s). For instance, in WWII, the state of war with Germany did not end until 19 October 1951 and with Japan, not until 28 April 1952.

Since the majority of the United Nations security council members (both permanent and rotating) did not support the attack, it appears that they viewed the attack as invalid under any resolution still in effect in March, 2003. Both Kofi Annan, current Secretary-General of the United Nations, and former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as well as several nations, say that the attack violated international law as a war of aggression since it lacked the validity of a U.N. Security Council resolution to authorize military force, and was not an act of defence, and so violated the UN charter. However, none have called for the security council to consider sanctions against the United States or the other nations involved, both because of an effort to restore warmer relationships with the US, and because the attempt would be futile since the US has a veto in the Security Council.

The United States and United Kingdom claimed, and continue to claim, that it was a legal action which they were within international law to undertake. Some in the media have called the good faith of the Security Council into question on this matter. One argument is that the United Nations itself, along with the three opponents of the Iraq War on the Security Council, France, Russia, and China, all benefited financially (in some cases, perhaps illegally) from transactions with the Saddam Hussein regime under the Oil for Food program; and that the leaders of these three countries, along with Kofi Annan, fought against a second UN resolution not out of higher principle but in order to keep these contracts. Additionally, the resistance of the Security Council and the UN as a whole to the invasion of Iraq has been attributed to Anti-Americanism and a resentment of the cultural and economic dominance of the USA. In the case of France, it has also been attributed an attempt to court the Arab world and its local Muslim population.

On 28 April 2005, the UK government published the full advice given by the Attorney General Lord Goldsmith on 7 March 2003 on the legality of the war. The publication of this document followed the leaking of the summary to the press the day before. In a Labour press conference, Tony Blair responded to a question from journalist Jon Snow asking whether the full report could be published by saying 'we may as well, you've seen most of it already'. In the document, Lord Goldsmith weighs the different arguments on whether military action against Iraq would be legal without a second UN Resolution. Saying that "regime change cannot be the objective of military action," it clearly stated that invasion for the purpose of regime change was illegal.

Downing Street Memo

On 1 May 2005, a related UK document known as the Downing Street memo, detailing the minutes of a meeting on 26 July 2002, was apparently leaked to The Times. British officials did not dispute the document's authenticity, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's spokesman has called the document "nothing new." The document corroborates the information in the full advice of Lord Goldsmith: "The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult.," and states furthermore that "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action." and that "It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.." On 5 May, John Conyers and 89 members of congress asked George W. Bush, in a formal letter, to answer some questions about the document, including whether he or anyone in his administration disputes its accuracy. The Bush Administration has stated that they will not answer the questions.

Call for British investigation into legality

On 22 May 2005, the British government declined a request from the families of soldiers killed in Iraq for an investigation into the legality of the war. The families are now seeking a judicial review of the request.

Opposition view of the invasion

See Popular opposition to the 2003 Iraq war

Those who opposed the war in Iraq did not regard Iraq's violation of UN resolutions to be a valid case for the war, since no single nation has the authority, under the UN Charter, to judge Iraq's compliance to UN resolutions and to enforce them. Furthermore, critics argued that the US was applying double standards of justice, noting that other nations such as Israel are also in breach of UN resolutions and have nuclear weapons; this argument is not a black and white matter, , as some claim that Iraq's history of actually using chemical weapons (against Iran and the Kurdish population in Iraq) suggested at the time that Iraq was a far greater threat. Others claim, also, that this contradicts previous U.S. policy, since the US was one of many nations that supplied chemical weapon precursors, even when well aware of what it was being used for.

Although Iraq was known to have pursued an active nuclear weapons development program previously, as well as to have tried to procure materials and equipment for their manufacture, these weapons and material have yet to be discovered. President Bush's reference to Iraqi attempts to purchase uranium in Africa in his 2003 State of the Union address are by now commonly considered as having been based on forged documents (see Yellowcake forgery).

Invasion

See 2003–2004 occupation of Iraq timeline for the White House statements and 2003 Iraq war timeline for a more detailed account of the invasion.

Prior to invasion, the United States and other coalition forces involved in the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq, enforcing Iraqi no-fly zones. Iraqi air-defense installations were engaged on a fairly regular basis after repeatedly targeting American and British air patrols. In mid-2002, the U.S. began to change its response strategy, more carefully selecting targets in the southern part of the country in order to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq. A change in enforcement tactics was acknowledged at the time, but it was not made public that this was part of a plan known as Operation Southern Focus.

The tonnage of bombs dropped increased from 0 in March 2002 and 0.3 in April 2002 to between 7 and 14 tons per month in May-August, reaching a pre-war peak of 54.6 tons in September - prior to Congress' 11 October authorisation of the invasion. The September attacks included a 5 September 100-aircraft attack on the main air defence site in western Iraq. According to The New Statesman this was "Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias, it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected."

Opening attack

At approximately 02:30 UTC or about 90 minutes after the lapse of the 48-hour deadline, at 05:30 local time, explosions were heard in Baghdad; coinciding with Australian Special Air Service Regiment personnel crossing the border into southern Iraq. At 03:15 UTC, or 10:15 pm EST, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that he had ordered the coalition to launch an "attack of opportunity" against targets in Iraq.

Before the invasion, many observers had expected a lengthy campaign of aerial bombing in advance of any ground action, taking as examples the Persian Gulf War or the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In practice, U.S. plans envisioned simultaneous air and ground assaults to decapitate the Iraqi forces as fast as possible (see Shock and Awe), attempting to bypass Iraqi military units and cities in most cases. The assumption was that superior U.S. mobility and coordination would allow the U.S. to attack the heart of the Iraqi command structure and destroy it in a short time, and that this would minimize civilian deaths and damage to infrastructure. It was expected that the elimination of the leadership would lead to the collapse of the army and the government, and that much of the population would support the invaders once the government had been weakened. Occupation of cities and attacks on peripheral military units were viewed as undesirable distractions.

Following Turkey's decision to deny any official use of its territory, the U.S. was forced to abandon a planned simultaneous attack from north and south, so the primary bases for the invasion were in Kuwait and other Persian Gulf nations. One result of this was that one of the divisions intended for the invasion was forced to relocate and was unable to take part in the invasion until well into the war. Many observers felt that the U.S. devoted insufficient troops to the invasion, and that this (combined with the failure to occupy cities) put them at a major disadvantage in achieving security and order throughout the country when local support failed to meet expectations.

The invasion was swift, with the collapse of the Iraq government and the military of Iraq in about three weeks. The oil infrastructure of Iraq was rapidly secured with limited damage in that time. Securing the oil infrastructure was considered important. In the first Persian Gulf War, while retreating from Kuwait, the Iraqi army had set many oil wells on fire, in an attempt to disguise troop movements and to distract Coalition forces--a side effect of these actions were many environmental problems. Presumably, oil infrastructure was secured for financial reasons as well as strategic. The British Royal Marines 3 Commando Brigade launched an air and amphibious assault on the Al-Faw peninsula during the closing hours of 20 March to secure the oil fields there; the amphibious assault was supported by frigates of the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy. The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, attached to 3 Commando Brigade, attacked the port of Umm Qasr. The British 16 Air Assault Brigade also secured the oilfields in southern Iraq in places like Rumaila.

In keeping with the rapid advance plan, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division moved westward and then northward through the desert toward Baghdad, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and 1 (UK) Armoured Division moved northward through marshland. All forces avoided major cities except when necessary to capture river crossings over the Tigris and Euphrates. The British 7 Armoured Brigade ('The Desert Rats') fought their way into Iraq's second-largest city, Basra, on 6 April, coming under constant attack by regulars and Fedayeen, while the 3rd Parachute Regiment cleared the 'old quarter' of the city that was inaccessible to vehicles. The entering of Basra had only been achieved after two weeks of conflict, which included the biggest tank battle by British forces since World War II when the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards destroyed 14 Iraqi tanks on 27 March. The UK's control of the city was, however, limited. Element's of 1 (UK) Armoured Division began to advance north towards U.S. positions around Al Amarah on 9 April. Pre-existing electrical and water shortages continued through the conflict and looting began as Iraqi forces collapsed. While British forces began working with local Iraqi Police to enforce order, humanitarian aid began to arrive from ships landing in the port city of Umm Qasr and trucks entering the country through Kuwait.

After a rapid initial advance, the first major pause occurred in the vicinity of Hillah and Karbala, where U.S. leading elements, hampered by dust storms, met resistance from Iraqi troops and paused for some days for re-supply before continuing toward Baghdad.

The 2nd Battalion of the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group (part of the Green Berets) conducted reconnaissance in the cities of Basra, Karbala and various other locations. In the North 10th SFG had the mission of aiding the Kurdish factions such as the Union of Kurdistan and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. Turkey had officially forbidden any US troops from using their bases, so lead elements of the 10th had to make certain detours; their journey was supposed to take four hours but instead it took ten. However, Turkey did allow the use of its air space and so the rest of the 10th flew in. The mission was to destroy Ansar al-Islam and a Kurdish faction. The target was Sargat and after heavy fighting with both groups the special forces finally took Sargat and pushed the remaining units out of Northern Iraq. After Sargat was taken, Bravo Company along with their Kurdish Allies pushed south towards Tikrit and the surrounding towns of Northern Iraq. During the Battle of the Green Line, Bravo Company with their Kurdish allies pushed back, destroyed, or routed 13th Iraqi Armoured and Infantry Division. Bravo took Tikrit. The 173rd Airborne Brigade parachuted into H3, an Iraqi Airfield, and secured it for future use. Iraq was the largest deployment of Special Forces since Vietnam.

Fall of Baghdad (April 2003)

Three weeks into the invasion, U.S. forces moved into Baghdad. Initial plans were for armor units to surround the city and a street-to-street battle to commence using Airborne units. However, within days a "Thunder Run" of US tanks was launched to test Iraqi defenses, with about 30 tanks rushing from a staging base to the Baghdad airport. They met heavy resistance, including many suicide attacks, but launched another run two days later into the Palaces of Saddam Hussein, where they established a base. Within hours of the palace seizure, and television coverage of this spreading through Iraq, Iraqi resistance crumbled around the city. Iraqi government officials had either disappeared or had conceded defeat. On April 9 2003, Baghdad was formally secured by US forces and the power of Saddam Hussein was declared ended. Saddam had vanished, and his whereabouts were unknown. Many Iraqis celebrated the downfall of Saddam by vandalizing the many portraits and statues of him together with other pieces of his personality cult. One widely publicized event was the dramatic toppling of a large statue of Saddam in central Baghdad by a US tank, while a crowd of Iraqis apparently cheered the Marines on. The spontaneity of this event has been disputed, with evidence that it was staged by US forces. More detail is available under media coverage.

General Tommy Franks assumed control of Iraq as the supreme commander of occupation forces. Shortly after the sudden collapse of the defense of Baghdad, rumors were circulating in Iraq and elsewhere that there had been a deal struck (a "safqua") wherein the US had bribed key members of the Iraqi military elite and/or the Ba'ath party itself to stand down. In May 2003, General Franks retired, and confirmed in an interview with Defense Week that the U.S. had paid Iraqi military leaders to defect. The extent of the defections and their effect on the war are unclear.

Coalition troops promptly began searching for the key members of Saddam Hussein's government. These individuals were identified by a variety of means, most famously through sets of most-wanted Iraqi playing cards.

On 22 July 2003 during a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and men from Task Force 20, Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay, and one of his grandsons were killed.

Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13 2003 by the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121 during Operation Red Dawn.

Other areas

In the north, Kurdish forces opposed to Saddam Hussein had already occupied for years an autonomous area in northern Iraq. With the assistance of U.S. Special Forces and airstrikes, they were able to rout the Iraqi units near them and to occupy oil-rich Kirkuk on 10 April.

U.S. special forces had also been involved in the extreme west of Iraq, attempting to occupy key roads to Syria and airbases. In one case two armored platoons were used to convince Iraqi leadership that an entire armored battalion was entrenched in the west of Iraq.

On 15 April, U.S. forces mostly took control of Tikrit, the last major outpost in central Iraq, with an attack led by the Marines' Task Force Tarawa (comprised of units from 1st Marine Expeditionary Force) and followed by elements of the Army's 4th Infantry Division.

Summary of the invasion

Coalition forces managed to topple the government and capture the key cities of a large nation in only 28 days, taking minimal losses while also trying to avoid large civilian deaths and even high numbers of dead Iraqi military forces. The invasion was, in a military context, a complete success, and did not require the huge army built up for the 1991 Gulf War, which numbered half a million Allied troops. This did prove short-sighted, however, due to requirement for a much larger force to combat the irregular Iraqi forces in the aftermath of the war.

The Saddam-built army had no weapons that could stand up to Coalition forces, and managed only to stage a few ambushes that gained a great deal of media attention but in reality did nothing to slow the Coalition advance. The Iraqi T-72 tanks, the heaviest armored vehicles in the Iraqi Army, were both outdated and ill-maintained, and when they did stand up to Coalition forces were destroyed quickly, thanks in part due to the Coalition's control of the air. The U.S. Air Force and British Royal Air Force operated with impunity throughout the country, pinpointing heavily defended enemy targets and destroying them before ground troops arrived.

The main battle tanks (MBT) of the Coalition forces, the U.S. M1 Abrams and British Challenger 2, proved their worth in the rapid advance across the country. Even with the large number of RPG attacks by irregular Iraqi forces, few Coalition tanks were lost and no tank crewmen was killed by hostile fire. All three British tank crew fatalities were a result of friendly fire. The only tank loss sustained by the British Army was a Challenger 2 of the Queen's Royal Lancers that was hit by another Challenger 2, killing two crewmen.

The Iraqi Army suffered from poor morale, even amongst the supposedly elite Republican Guard, and entire units simply melted away into the crowds upon the approach of Coalition troops. Other Iraqi Army officers were bribed by the CIA or coerced into surrendering to coalition forces. Worse, the Iraqi Army had incompetent leadership - reports state that Qusay Hussein, charged with the defense of Baghdad, dramatically shifted the positions of the two main divisions protecting Baghdad several times in the days before the arrival of U.S. forces, and as a result the units within were both confused and further demoralized when the U.S. Army attacked. By no means did the Coalition invasion force see the entire Iraqi military thrown against it, and it is assumed that most units disintegrated to either join the growing Iraqi insurgency or return to their homes.

Security, Looting and War Damage

Looting took place in the days following. It was reported that the National Museum of Iraq was among the looted sites. The assertion that US forces did not guard the museum because they were guarding the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Interior is apparently true. According to U.S. officials the "reality of the situation on the ground" was that hospitals, water plants, and ministries with vital intelligence needed security more than other sites. There were only enough US troops on the ground to guard a certain number of the many sites that ideally needed protection, and so, apparently, some "hard choices" were made. Also, it was reported that many trucks of purported Iraqi Gold and $1.6 billion of bricks of US cash were seized by US forces.

The FBI was soon called into Iraq to track down the stolen items. It was found that the initial claims of looting of substantial portions of the collection were somewhat exaggerated and for months people have been returning objects to the museum. Yet, as some of the dust has settled, thousands of antiquities are still missing, including dozens from the main collection.

There has been speculation that some objects still missing were not taken by looters after the war, but were taken by Saddam Hussein or his entourage before or during the fighting. There have also been reports that early looters had keys to vaults that held rarer pieces, and some have speculated as to the pre-meditated systematic removal of key artifacts.

The National Museum of Iraq was only one of many museums and sites of cultural significance that were affected by the war. Many in the arts and antiquities communities briefed policy makers in advance of the need to secure Iraqi museums. Despite the looting being lighter than initially feared, the cultural loss of items from ancient Sumeria is significant.

More serious for the post-war state of Iraq was the looting of hundreds of thousands of tons of heavy ordinance: artillery shells, aircraft bombs, mortars; all of which were then used to attack US forces, Iraqi officials, and civilians by the insurgents and terrorists. After invading to prevent WMD’s, the Iraqi nuclear facilities weren’t even a priority- the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, with about 100 tons of uranium, was allowed to be looted. Video showed locals crossing through the fence as US troops looked on passively.

Zainab Bahrani, professor of Ancient Near Eastern Art History and Archaeology at Columbia University, reports that a helicopter landing pad was constructed in the heart of the ancient city of Babylon, and "removed layers of archeological earth from the site. The daily flights of the helicopters rattle the ancient walls and the winds created by their rotors blast sand against the fragile bricks. When my colleague at the site, Maryam Moussa, and I asked military personnel in charge that the helipad be shut down, the response was that it had to remain open for security reasons, for the safety of the troops."

Bahrani also reports that this summer "the wall of the Temple of Nabu and the roof of the Temple of Ninmah, both sixth century BC, collapsed as a result of the movement of helicopters."

Electrical power is scarce in post-war Iraq, Bahrani reports, and some fragile artifacts, including the Ottoman Archive, will not survive the loss of refrigeration.

"End of major combat operations" (May 2003)

On 1 May 2003 George W. Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, in a Lockheed S-3 Viking, where he gave a speech announcing the end of major combat operations in the Iraq war. Bush's landing was criticized by opponents as an overly theatrical and expensive stunt. Clearly visible in the background was a banner stating "Mission Accomplished." The banner, made by White House staff) and hung by the U.S. Navy, was criticized as premature - especially later as the guerrilla war dragged on. The White House subsequently released a statement alleging that the sign and Bush's visit referred to the initial invasion of Iraq and disputing the claim of theatrics. The speech itself noted: "We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We are bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous." ()

"Major combat" concluding did not mean that peace had returned to Iraq. Iraq was subsequently marked by violent conflict between U.S.-led occupation of Iraq soldiers and forces described by the occupiers as insurgents. Some critics of the invasion (such as former CIA analyst Bill Christison (writing in Counterpunch)) argue that there are parallels between the current situation in Iraq and the Vietnam War (, or film-maker George Lucas ). Many supporters of the invasion disagree, for example U.S. Senator John McCain, a Vietnam veteran, who said in a speech given to the U.S. Senate on April 7, 2004: "I know we do not face another Vietnam."

The ongoing resistance in Iraq was concentrated in, but not limited to, an area referred to by Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle and Baghdad . Critics point out that the regions where violence is most common are also the most populated regions. This resistance may be described as guerrilla warfare. The tactics in use were to include mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as sabotage against the oil infrastructure. There are also accusations, questioned by some, about attacks toward the power and water infrastructure.

There is evidence that some of the resistance was organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Ba'ath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis angered by the occupation, and foreign fighters. The insurgents are generally known to the Coalition forces as Ali Baba, after a character in the Arabian Nights .

After the war, information began to emerge about several failed Iraqi peace initiatives, including offers as extensive as allowing 5,000 FBI agents in to search the country for weapons of mass destruction, support for the US-backed Roadmap For Peace, and the abdication of Saddam Hussein to be replaced under UN elections.

On May 24, 2005 the International Institute for Strategic Studies stated that Washington's policies of promoting democracy in Iraq and elsewhere looked "increasingly effective".

In June of 2005 a new service medal, known as the Iraq Campaign Medal, was authorized by the United States Department of Defense for service performed during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The decoration repalced the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, which had previously been issued by Iraq service. This gave indication that the 2003 invasion of Iraq is seen as a separate conflict from the war on terrorism as a whole.

Deaths

See Casualties in the conflict in Iraq for details.

Estimates of the casualties from the Iraq War (beginning with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the ensuing occupation and insurgency and civil war) have come in several forms, and those estimates of different types of Iraq War casualties vary greatly.

Estimating war-related deaths poses many challenges. Experts distinguish between population-based studies, which extrapolate from random samples of the population, and body counts, which tally reported deaths and likely significantly underestimate casualties. Population-based studies produce estimates of the number of Iraq War casualties ranging from 151,000 violent deaths as of June 2006 (per the Iraq Family Health Survey) to 1,033,000 excess deaths (per the 2007 Opinion Research Business (ORB) survey). Other survey-based studies covering different time-spans find 461,000 total deaths (over 60% of them violent) as of June 2011 (per PLOS Medicine 2013), and 655,000 total deaths (over 90% of them violent) as of June 2006 (per the 2006 Lancet study). Body counts counted at least 110,600 violent deaths as of April 2009 (Associated Press). The Iraq Body Count project documents 186,901 – 210,296 violent civilian deaths in their table. All estimates of Iraq War casualties are disputed.

Tables

The tables below summarize reports on Iraqi casualty figures.

Scientific surveys:

Body counts:

Overview: Iraqi death estimates by source Summary of casualties of the Iraq War. Possible estimates on the number of people killed in the invasion and occupation of Iraq vary widely, and are highly disputed. Estimates of casualties below include both the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the following Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–present.

Overview: Death estimates by group

Iraqi Security Forces (aligned with Coalition)	From June 2003, through December 31, 2010, there have been 16,623 Iraqi military and police killed based on several estimates. The Iraq Index of the Brookings Institution keeps a running total of ISF casualties. There is also a breakdown of ISF casualties at the iCasualties.org website.
Iraqi insurgents	From June 2003, through September 30, 2011, there have been 26,320-27,000+ Iraqi insurgents killed based on several estimates.
Media and aid workers	136 journalists and 51 media support workers were killed on duty according to the numbers listed on source pages on February 24, 2009. (See Category:Journalists killed while covering the Iraq War.) 94 aid workers have been killed according to a November 21, 2007, Reuters article.
U.S. armed forces	As of July 19, 2021, according to the U.S. Department of Defense casualty website, there were 4,431 total deaths (including both killed in action and non-hostile) and 31,994 wounded in action (WIA) as a result of the Iraq War. As a part of Operation New Dawn, which was initiated on September 1, 2010, there were 74 total deaths (including KIA and non-hostile) and 298 WIA. See the references for a breakdown of the wounded, injured, ill, those returned to duty (RTD), those requiring medical air transport, non-hostile-related medical air transports, non-hostile injuries, diseases, or other medical reasons.
Coalition deaths by hostile fire	As of 23 October 2011, hostile-fire deaths accounted for 3,777 of the 4,799 total coalition military deaths.
Armed forces of other coalition countries	See Multinational force in Iraq. As of 24 February 2009, there were 318 deaths from the armed forces of other Coalition nations. 179 UK deaths and 139 deaths from other nations. Breakdown: Australia – 2 Azerbaijan – 1 Bulgaria – 13 Czech Republic – 1 Denmark – 7 El Salvador – 5 Estonia – 2 Fiji – 1 Georgia – 5 Hungary – 1 Italy – 33 Kazakhstan – 1 Latvia – 3 Netherlands – 2 Poland – 30 Portugal – 1 Romania – 4 Slovakia – 4 South Korea – 1 Spain – 11 Thailand – 2 Ukraine – 18 United Kingdom – 179
Contractors	Contractors. At least 1,487 deaths between March 2003 and June 2011 according to the list of private contractor deaths in Iraq. 245 of those are from the U.S. Contractors are "Americans, Iraqis and workers from more than three dozen other countries." 10,569 wounded or injured. Contractors "cook meals, do laundry, repair infrastructure, translate documents, analyze intelligence, guard prisoners, protect military convoys, deliver water in the heavily fortified Green Zone and stand sentry at buildings – often highly dangerous duties almost identical to those performed by many U.S. troops." A July 4, 2007, Los Angeles Times article reported 182,000 employees of U.S.-government-funded contractors and subcontractors (118,000 Iraqi, 43,000 other, 21,000 U.S.).

Overview: Iraqi injury estimates by source

Additional statistics for the Iraq War

• Iraqis:
• Deadliest single insurgent bombings:
  • August 14, 2007. Truck bombs – 2007 Yazidi communities bombings (in northwestern Iraq):
    • 796 killed.
• Other deadly days:
  • November 23, 2006, (281 killed) and April 18, 2007, (233 killed):
    • "4 bombings in Baghdad kill at least 183. ... Nationwide, the number of people killed or found dead on Wednesday was 233, which was the second deadliest day in Iraq since Associated Press began keeping records in May 2005. Five car bombings, mortar rounds and other attacks killed 281 people across Iraq on November 23, 2006, according to the AP count."

• As of January 12, 2007, 500 U.S. troops have undergone amputations due to the Iraq War. Toes and fingers are not counted.
• As of September 30, 2006, 725 American troops have had limbs amputated from wounds received in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• A 2006 study by the Walter Reed Medical Center, which serves more critically injured soldiers than most VA hospitals, concluded that 62 percent of patients there had suffered a brain injury.
• In March 2003, U.S. military personnel were wounded in action at a rate averaging about 350 per month. As of September 2007, this rate has increased to about 675 per month.

• U.S. military: number unknown.
  • An October 18, 2005, USA Today article reports:
    • "More than one in four U.S. troops have come home from the Iraq war with health problems that require medical or mental health treatment, according to The Pentagon's first detailed screening of service members leaving a war zone."
• Iraqi combatants: number unknown

• As of November 4, 2006, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 1.8 million Iraqis had been displaced to neighboring countries, and 1.6 million were displaced internally, with nearly 100,000 Iraqis fleeing to Syria and Jordan each month.

Iraqi invasion casualties

Franks reportedly estimated soon after the invasion that there had been 30,000 Iraqi casualties as of April 9, 2003. That number comes from the transcript of an October 2003 interview of U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld with journalist Bob Woodward. But neither could remember the number clearly, nor whether it was just for deaths, or both deaths and wounded.

A May 28, 2003, Guardian article reported that "Extrapolating from the death-rates of between 3% and 10% found in the units around Baghdad, one reaches a toll of between 13,500 and 45,000 dead among troops and paramilitaries."

An October 20, 2003, study by the Project on Defense Alternatives at Commonwealth Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimated that for March 19, 2003, to April 30, 2003, the "probable death of approximately 11,000 to 15,000 Iraqis, including approximately 3,200 to 4,300 civilian noncombatants."

The Iraq Body Count project (IBC) documented a higher number of civilian deaths up to the end of the major combat phase (May 1, 2003). In a 2005 report, using updated information, the IBC reported that 7,299 civilians are documented to have been killed, primarily by U.S. air and ground forces. There were 17,338 civilian injuries inflicted up to May 1, 2003. The IBC says its figures are probably underestimates because: "many deaths will probably go unreported or unrecorded by officials and media."

Iraqi civilian casualties

Iraq Body Count project (IBC)

An independent British-American group, the Iraq Body Count project (IBC project) compiles reported Iraqi civilian deaths resulting from war since the 2003 invasion and ensuing insurgency and civil war, including those caused directly by coalition military action, Iraqi military actions, the Iraqi insurgency, and those resulting from excess crime. The IBC maintains that the occupying authority has a responsibility to prevent these deaths under international law.

The IBC project has recorded a range of at least 185,194 – 208,167 total violent civilian deaths through June 2020 in their database. The Iraq Body Count (IBC) project records its numbers based on a "comprehensive survey of commercial media and NGO-based reports, along with official records that have been released into the public sphere. Reports range from specific, incident based accounts to figures from hospitals, morgues, and other documentary data-gathering agencies." The IBC was also given access to the WikiLeaks disclosures of the Iraq War Logs.

Iraq Body Count project data shows that the type of attack that resulted in the most civilian deaths was execution after abduction or capture. These accounted for 33% of civilian deaths and 29% of these deaths involved torture. The following most common causes of death were small arms gunfire at 20%, suicide bombs at 14%, vehicle bombs at 9%, roadside bombs at 5%, and air attacks at 5%.

The IBC project, reported that by the end of the major combat phase of the invasion period up to April 30, 2003, 7,419 civilians had been killed, primarily by U.S. air-and-ground forces.

The IBC project released a report detailing the deaths it recorded between March 2003 and March 2005 in which it recorded 24,865 civilian deaths. The report says the U.S. and its allies were responsible for the largest share (37%) with 9,270 deaths. The remaining deaths were attributed to anti-occupation forces (9%), crime (36%) and unknown agents (11%). It also lists the primary sources used by the media – mortuaries, medics, Iraqi officials, eyewitnesses, police, relatives, U.S.-coalition, journalists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), friends/associates and other.

According to a 2010 assessment by John Sloboda, director of Iraq Body Count, 150,000 people including 122,000 civilians were killed in the Iraq War with U.S. and Coalition forces responsible for at least 22,668 insurgents as well as 13,807 civilians, with the rest of the civilians killed by insurgents, militias, or terrorists.

The IBC project has been criticized by some, including scholars, who believe it counts only a small percentage of the number of actual deaths because of its reliance on media sources. The IBC project's director, John Sloboda, has stated, "We've always said our work is an undercount, you can't possibly expect that a media-based analysis will get all the deaths." However, the IBC project rejects many of these criticisms as exaggerated or misinformed.

According to a 2013 Lancet article, the Iraq Body Count is "a non-peer-reviewed but innovative online and media-centred approach that passively counted non-combatant civilian deaths as they were recorded in the media and available morgue reports. In passive surveillance no special effort is made to find those deaths that go unreported. The volunteer staff collecting data for the IBC have risked criticism that their data are inherently biased because of scarcity or absence of independent verification, variation in original sources of information, and underestimation of mortality from violence... In research circles, random cross-sectional cluster sampling survey methods are deemed to be a more rigorous epidemiological method in conflict settings."

Civilian deaths by perpetrator

In 2011, the IBC published data in PLOS Medicine on 2003-2008 civilian deaths in Iraq by perpetrator and cause of death. The study broke down civilian deaths by perpetrator into the following categories:

• 74% unidentified perpetrator: defined as "those who target civilians (i.e., no identifiable military target is present), while appearing indistinguishable from civilians: for example, a suicide bomber disguised as a civilian in a market. Unknown (i.e., unidentified) perpetrators in Iraq include sectarian combatants and Anti-Coalition combatants who maintain a civilian appearance while targeting civilians."

• 11% anti-coalition forces: defined as "un-uniformed combatants identified by attacks on coalition targets" during the event. Anti-Coalition combatants in the event of targeting purely civilians would instead be classed under the "unidentified perpetrator" category.

• 12% coalition forces: identified by uniforms or use of air attacks.

IBC table of violent civilian deaths

Following are the yearly IBC Project violent civilian death totals, broken down by month from the beginning of 2003. Table below is copied irregularly from the source page, and is soon out-of-date as data is continually updated at the source. As of June 12, 2023 the top of the IBC database page with the table says 186,901 – 210,296 "Documented civilian deaths from violence". That page also says: "Gaps in recording and reporting suggest that even our highest totals to date may be missing many civilian deaths from violence."

People's Kifah

The Iraqi political party People's Kifah, or Struggle Against Hegemony (PK) said that its survey conducted between March and June 2003 throughout the non-Kurdish areas of Iraq tallied 36,533 civilians killed in those areas by June 2003. While detailed town-by-town totals were given by the PK spokesperson, details of methodology are very thin and raw data is not in the public domain. A still-less-detailed report on this study appeared some months later on Al Jazeera's website, and covered casualties up to October 2003.

Iraqi refugees crisis

Roughly 40 percent of Iraq's middle class is believed to have fled, the U.N. reported in 2007. Most are fleeing systematic persecution and have no desire to return. All kinds of people, from university professors to bakers, have been targeted by militias, Iraqi insurgents and criminals. An estimated 331 school teachers were slain in the first four months of 2006, according to Human Rights Watch, and at least 2,000 Iraqi doctors have been killed and 250 kidnapped since the 2003 U.S. invasion.

Coalition military casualties

For the latest casualty numbers see the overview chart at the top of the page.

Since the official handover of power to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004, coalition soldiers have continued to come under attack in towns across Iraq.

National Public Radio, iCasualties.org, and GlobalSecurity.org have month-by-month charts of American troop deaths in the Iraq War.

The combined total of coalition and contractor casualties in the conflict is now over ten times that of the 1990–1991 Gulf War. In the Gulf War, coalition forces suffered around 378 deaths, and among the Iraqi military, tens of thousands were killed, along with thousands of civilians.

Troops fallen ill, injured, or wounded

See the overview chart at the top of the page for recent numbers.

On August 29, 2006, The Christian Science Monitor reported: "Because of new body armor and advances in military medicine, for example, the ratio of combat-zone deaths to those wounded has dropped from 24 percent in Vietnam to 13 percent in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, the numbers of those killed as a percentage of overall casualties is lower."

Many U.S. veterans of the Iraq War have reported a range of serious health issues, including tumors, daily blood in urine and stool, sexual dysfunction, migraines, frequent muscle spasms, and other symptoms similar to the debilitating symptoms of "Gulf War syndrome" reported by many veterans of the 1991 Gulf War, which some believe is related to the U.S.'s use of radioactive depleted uranium.

A study of U.S. veterans published in July 2004 in The New England Journal of Medicine on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental disorders in Iraq and Afghanistan veterans found that 5 percent to 9.4 percent (depending on the strictness of the PTSD definition used) suffered from PTSD before deployment. After deployment, 6.2 percent to 19.9 percent suffered from PTSD. For the broad definition of PTSD that represents an increase of 10.5 percent (19.9 percent – 9.4 percent = 10.5 percent). That is 10,500 additional cases of PTSD for every 100,000 U.S. troops after they have served in Iraq. ePluribus Media, an independent citizen journalism collective, is tracking and cataloging press-reported possible, probable, or confirmed incidents of post-deployment or combat-zone cases in its PTSD Timeline.

Information on injuries suffered by troops of other coalition countries is less readily available, but a statement in Hansard indicated that 2,703 U.K. soldiers had been medically evacuated from Iraq for wounds or injuries as of October 4, 2004, and that 155 U.K. troops were wounded in combat in the initial invasion.

Leishmaniasis has been reported by U.S. troops stationed in Iraq, including visceral leishmaniasis. Leishmaniasis, spread by biting sand fleas, was diagnosed in hundreds of U.S. troops compared to just 32 during the first Gulf War.

Accidents and negligence

As of August 2008, sixteen American troops have died from accidental electrocutions in Iraq according to the Defense Department. One soldier had been electrocuted in a shower, while another had been electrocuted in a swimming pool. KBR, the contractor responsible, had been warned by employees of unsafe practices, and was criticised following the revelations.

Nightline controversy

Ted Koppel, host of ABC's Nightline, devoted his entire show on April 30, 2004, to reading the names of 721 of the 737 U.S. troops who had died thus far in Iraq. (The show had not been able to confirm the remaining sixteen names.) Claiming that the broadcast was "motivated by a political agenda designed to undermine the efforts of the United States in Iraq", the Sinclair Broadcast Group took the action of barring the seven ABC network-affiliated stations it controls from airing the show. The decision to censor the broadcast drew criticism from both sides, including members of the armed forces, opponents of the war, MoveOn.org, and most notably Republican U.S. Senator John McCain, who denounced the move as "unpatriotic" and "a gross disservice to the public".

Amputees

As of January 18, 2007, there were at least 500 American amputees due to the Iraq War. In 2016, the number was estimated to be 1,650 U.S. troops. The 2007 estimate suggests amputees represent 2.2% of the 22,700 U.S. troops wounded in action (5% for soldiers whose wounds prevented them returning to duty).

Traumatic brain injuries

By March 2009, the Pentagon estimated as many as 360,000 U.S. veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts may have suffered traumatic brain injuries (TBI), including 45,000 to 90,000 veterans with persistent symptoms requiring specialized care.

In February 2007, one expert from the VA estimated that the number of undiagnosed TBIs were higher than 7,500.

According to USA Today, by November 2007 there were more than an estimated 20,000 US troops who had signs of brain injuries without being classified as wounded during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mental illness and suicide

A top U.S. Army psychiatrist, Colonel Charles Hoge, said in March 2008 that nearly 30% of troops on their third deployment suffered from serious mental-health problems, and that one year was not enough time between combat tours.

A March 12, 2007, Time article reported on a study published in the Archives of Internal Medicine. About one third of the 103,788 veterans returning from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars seen at U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs facilities between September 30, 2001, and September 30, 2005, were diagnosed with mental illness or a psycho-social disorder, such as homelessness and marital problems, including domestic violence. More than half of those diagnosed, 56 percent, were suffering from more than one disorder. The most common combination was post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.

In January 2008, the U.S. Army reported that the rate of suicide among soldiers in 2007 was the highest since the Army started counting in 1980. There were 121 suicides in 2007, a 20-percent jump over the prior year. Also, there were around 2100 attempted suicides and self-injuries in 2007. Other sources reveal higher estimates.

Time magazine reported on June 5, 2008:

Data contained in the Army's fifth Mental Health Advisory Team report indicate that, according to an anonymous survey of U.S. troops taken last fall, about 12% of combat troops in Iraq and 17% of those in Afghanistan are taking prescription antidepressants or sleeping pills to help them cope. ... About a third of soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq say they can't see a mental-health professional when they need to. When the number of troops in Iraq surged by 30,000 last year, the number of Army mental-health workers remained the same – about 200 – making counseling and care even tougher to get.

In the same article Time also reported on some of the reasons for the prescription drug use:

That imbalance between seeing the price of war up close and yet not feeling able to do much about it, the survey suggests, contributes to feelings of "intense fear, helplessness or horror" that plant the seeds of mental distress. "A friend was liquefied in the driver's position on a tank, and I saw everything", was a typical comment. Another: "A huge f______ bomb blew my friend's head off like 50 meters from me." Such indelible scenes – and wondering when and where the next one will happen – are driving thousands of soldiers to take antidepressants, military psychiatrists say. It's not hard to imagine why.

Concern has been expressed by mental health professionals about the effects on the emotional health and development of returning veterans' infants and children, due to the increased rates of interpersonal violence, posttraumatic stress, depression, and substance abuse that have been reported among these veterans. Moreover, the stressful effects of physical casualties and loss pose enormous stress for the primary caregiver that can adversely affect her or his parenting, as well as the couple's children directly. The mental health needs of military families in the aftermath of combat exposure and other war-related trauma have been thought likely to be inadequately addressed by the military health system that separates mental health care of the returning soldier from his or her family's care, the latter of whom is generally covered under a contracted, civilian managed-care system.

Iraqi insurgent casualties

Total insurgent deaths are hard to estimate. In 2003, 597 insurgents were killed, according to the U.S. military. From January 2004 through December 2009 (not including May 2004 and March 2009), 23,984 insurgents were estimated to have been killed based on reports from Coalition soldiers on the frontlines. In the two missing months from the estimate, 652 were killed in May 2004, and 45 were killed in March 2009. In 2010, another 676 insurgents were killed. In January and March through October 2011, 451 insurgents were killed. Based on all of these estimates some 26,405 insurgents/militia were killed from 2003, up until late 2011.

However, this number could be low compared to reality as it only counts combat deaths against US-led forces; insurgents also frequently clashed between each other and those killed by noncombat causes are not counted. There have been contradictions between the figures released by the U.S. military and those released by the Iraqi government. For example, the U.S. military's number of insurgents killed in 2005, is 3,247, which is in contrast to the Iraqi government's figure of 1,734, however, fear of civilians fatalities, numbers were lowered. In 2007, 4,544 militants were killed according to the Iraqi ministries, while the U.S. military claimed 6,747 died. Also, in 2008, 2,028 insurgents were reported killed and in 2009, with the exception of the month of June, 488 were killed according to the Iraqi Defence Ministry. These numbers are also not in line with the U.S. military estimate of some 3,984 killed in 2008 and 2009.

U.S. military- and Iraqi Defence Ministry-provided numbers, including suicide bombers

• 2011 – 451 (not including February & August)
• 2010 – 676
• 2009 – 488 (not including June)
• 2008 – 2,028
• 2007 – 6,747 (U.S. military), 4,544 (Iraqi Defence Ministry)
• 2006 – 3,902
• 2005 – 3,247 (U.S. military), 1,734 (Iraqi Defence Ministry)
• 2004 – 6,801
• 2003 – 603

In addition as of August 22, 2009, approximately 1,719 suicide-bombers had also been reported killed.

• 2009 – 73
• 2008 – 257
• 2007 – 442
• 2006 – 297
• 2005 – 478
• 2004 – 140
• 2003 (from August to December) – 32

Grand total – 21,221–26,405 insurgents dead

On September 28, 2006, an Al Qaeda leader claimed that 4,000 foreign insurgents had been killed in the war.

On June 6, 2008, an Iraqi Army official revealed that about 6,000 Al Qaeda fighters were among the insurgents killed since the start of the war up until April 2008.

The US military also reported on the number of suspected insurgents who were detained, arrested, or captured. From June 2003 through August 2007 the US military reported that 119,752 were detained, compared to 18,832 that had been killed.

Contractor casualties

By July 2007, the Department of Labor recorded 933 deaths of contractors in Iraq. By April 2007, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that the number of civilian contractor deaths on US-funded projects in Iraq was 916. In January 2007, the Houston Chronicle reported that the Pentagon did not track contractor deaths in Iraq. In January 2017, an estimated 7,761 contractors had been injured in Iraq, but their nationality was not known. By the end 2006, civilian contractors suffered "3,367 injuries serious enough to require four or more days off the job." The Labor Department had these numbers because it tracked workers' compensation claims by injured workers or families of slain contractors under the federal Defense Base Act.

Health outcomes

By November 2006, there were reports of a significant deterioration of the Iraq health care system as a result of the war.

In 2007, an Iraqi Society of Psychiatrists and WHO study found that 70% of 10,000 primary school students in the Sha'ab section of north Baghdad are suffering from trauma-related symptoms.

Subsequent articles in The Lancet and Al Jazeera have suggested that the number of cases of birth defects, cancer, miscarriages, illnesses and premature births may have increased dramatically after the first and second Iraq wars, due to the presences of depleted uranium and chemicals introduced during American attacks, especially around Fallujah, Basra and Southern Iraq.

Total Iraqi casualties

Estimates of the total number of Iraqi war-related deaths for certain periods of time are highly disputed.

Iraq Living Conditions Survey (2004)

A study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), called the Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS), sampled almost 22,000 households across all Iraqi provinces. It estimated 24,000 war-related violent deaths by May 2004 (with a 95 percent confidence interval from 18,000 to 29,000). This study did not attempt to measure what portion of its estimate was made up of civilians or combatants. It would include Iraqi military killed during the invasion, as well as "insurgents" or other fighters thereafter. This study has been criticized for various reasons. For more info see the section in Lancet surveys of Iraq War casualties that compares the Lancet and UNDP ILCS studies.

Lancet (2004)

The October 2004 Lancet study done by public health experts from Johns Hopkins University and published on October 29, 2004, in The Lancet medical journal, estimated that 100,000 "excess" Iraqi deaths from all causes had occurred since the U.S. invasion began. The study did not attempt to measure how many of these were civilian, but the study's authors have said they believe that the "vast majority" were non-combatants, based on 7% of the casualties being women and 46% being children under the age of 15 (including Falluja data). To arrive at these excess death figures, a survey was taken from 988 Iraqi households in 33 clusters throughout Iraq, in which the residents were asked how many people lived there and how many births and deaths there had been since the war began. They then compared the death rate with the average from the 15 months before the war. Iraqis were found to be 1.5 times more likely to die from all causes after the invasion (rising from 0.5% to 0.79% per year) than in the 15 months preceding the war, producing an estimate of 98,000 excess deaths. This figure excluded data from one cluster in Falluja, which was deemed too much of an outlier for inclusion in the national estimate. If it included data from Falluja, which showed a higher rate of violent deaths than the other 32 clusters combined, the increased death rate would be raised from 1.5 to 2.5-fold, violent deaths would be 58 times more likely with most of them due to air-strikes by coalition forces, and an additional 200,000 fatalities would be estimated.

Iraqiyun estimate (2005)

The Iraqi non-governmental organisation, Iraqiyun, estimated 128,000 deaths from the invasion until July 2005. A July 2005 United Press International (UPI) article said the number came from the chairman of the Iraqiyun humanitarian organization in Baghdad, Dr. Hatim al-'Alwani. He said 55 percent of those killed were women, and children aged 12 and under. The UPI article reported: "Iraqiyun obtained data from relatives and families of the deceased, as well as from Iraqi hospitals in all the country's provinces. The 128,000 figure only includes those whose relatives have been informed of their deaths and does not include those were abducted, assassinated or simply disappeared." A 2010 book by Nicolas Davies reported the Iraqiyun estimate, and that Iraqiyun was affiliated with the political party of Interim President Ghazi Al-Yawer. Davies wrote: "The report specified that it included only confirmed deaths reported to relatives, omitting significant numbers of people who had simply disappeared without trace amid the violence and chaos."

Lancet (2006)

The October 2006 Lancet study by Gilbert Burnham (of Johns Hopkins University) and co-authors estimated total excess deaths (civilian and non-civilian) related to the war of 654,965 excess deaths up to July 2006. The 2006 study was based on surveys conducted between May 20 and July 10, 2006. More households were surveyed than during the 2004 study, allowing for a 95% confidence interval of 392,979 to 942,636 excess Iraqi deaths. Those estimates were far higher than other available tallies at the time.

The Burnham et al. study has been described as the most controversial study in survey research on armed conflict, and its findings have been widely disputed in the academic literature. Shortly after publication, the study's estimate and methodology came under criticism from a number of sources, including the United States government, academics, and the Iraq Body Count. At the time, other experts praised the methodology of the study. John Tirman, who commissioned and directed the funding for the study defended the study. A 2008 systematic review of casualty estimates in the Iraq War in the journal Conflict and Health concluded that the highest quality studies have used "population-based methods" that have "yielded the highest estimates. A 2016 study described the Lancet study as seen "widely viewed among peers as the most rigorous investigations of Iraq War–related mortality among Iraqi civilians," and argued that part of the criticism "may have been politically motivated."

A number of peer-reviewed studies criticized the Lancet study on the basis of its methodology and exaggerated casualty numbers. The authors of the Lancet study were also accused of ethical breaches in terms of how the survey was conducted and in how the authors responded to requests for data and information. In 2009, the lead author of the Lancet study was censured by American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) for refusing to provide "several basic facts about" the study. AAPOR had over a 12-year period only formally censured two other individuals. In 2012, Michael Spagat noted that six peer-reviewed studies had identified shortcomings in the Lancet study, and that the Lancet authors had yet to make a substantive response to the critiques. According to Spagat, there is "ample reason" to discard Lancet study estimate. Columbia University statistician Andrew Gelman said in 2014 that "serious flaws have been demonstrated" in the Lancet study, and in 2015 that his impression was that the Lancet study "had pretty much been discredited". Joshua Goldstein, professor emeritus of International Relations at American University, wrote that critics of the study "have argued convincingly that the sample method was biased." According to University of Delaware sociologist Joel Best in his book Stat-Spotting: A Field Guide to Identifying Dubious Data, "it seems likely that was too large". Conflict scholars Nils Petter Gleditsch, Erik Melander and Henrik Urdal said there were "major biases" in the study, leading to oversampling of households affected by violence.

A 2008 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that the 2006 Lancet study may have considerably overestimated Iraq War casualties, that the study made "unusual" methodological choices, and called on the 2006 Lancet study authors to make all of their data available. The 2008 study was awarded "Article of the Year – 2008" by the Journal of Peace Research, with the jury of Lars-Erik Cederman (ETH Zürich), Jon Hovi (University of Oslo) and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (University of Iowa) writing that the "authors show convincingly that previous studies which are based on a cross-street cluster-sampling algorithm (CSSA) have significantly overestimated the number of casualties in Iraq." American University political scientist Thomas Zeitzoff said the Journal of Peace Research study showed the Lancet study to be "wildly inaccurate" due to its reliance on information from biased samples.

Michael Spagat criticized the 2006 Lancet study in a 2010 article for the journal Defence and Peace Economics. Spagat wrote that he found "some evidence relating to data fabrication and falsification" and "this evidence suggests that this survey cannot be considered a reliable or valid contribution towards knowledge about the extent of mortality in Iraq since 2003". Spagat also chided the Lancet study for "ethical violations to the survey's respondents including endangerment, privacy breaches and violations in obtaining informed consent". In a letter to the journal Science, Spagat said that the Lancet study had failed replication in a study by the WHO (the Iraq Family Health Survey). Spagat noted that the lead author of the 2006 study had been censured by the American Association for Public Opinion Research for "repeatedly refusing to disclose the corresponding information for his survey".

The Iraq Family Health Survey published by WHO researchers in The New England Journal of Medicine found that the 2006 Lancet study results "considerably overestimated the number of violent deaths" and that the results are highly improbable. In comparing the two studies, peace researcher Kristine Eck of Uppsala University notes that the IFHS study which covered the same period as the Lancet survey "was based on a much larger sample (9,345 households compared to Burnham et al's 1,849) in far more clusters (1,086 clusters compared to Burnham et al's 47)." In comparing the two studies, Joachim Kreutz of Stockholm University and Nicholas Marsh of PRIO said the IFHS study produced "a more reliable estimate." Oxford University political scientist Adam Roberts wrote that the IFHS study was "more rigorous."

Burnham, Edward J. Mills, and Frederick M. Burkle noted that the IFHS's data indicated that Iraqi mortality increased by a factor of 1.9 following the invasion, compared to the factor of 2.4 found by Burnham et al., which translates to some 433,000 excess Iraqi deaths (violent and non-violent). Timothy R. Gulden considered it implausible that fewer than one-third of these excess deaths would have been violent in nature. Francisco J. Luquero and Rebecca F. Grais argued that the IFHS's lengthy survey and use of IBC data as a proxy for particularly dangerous areas likely resulted in an underestimate of violent mortality, while Gulden hypothesized that respondents may have been reluctant to report violent deaths to researchers working with the Iraqi government. In a similar vein, Tirman observed that the Iraqi Health Ministry was affiliated with Shi'ite sectarians at the time, remarking that there was evidence that many violent deaths may have been recategorized as "non-violent" to avoid government retribution: "For example, the number of deaths by auto accidents rose by four times the pre-invasion rate; had this single figure been included in the violent deaths category, the overall estimate would have risen to 196,000." Gulden even commented that "the IFHS results are easily in line with the finding of more than 600,000 violent deaths in the study by Burnham et al." However, the authors of the IFHS rejected such claims: "Because the level of underreporting is almost certainly higher for deaths in earlier time periods, we did not attempt to estimate excess deaths. The excess deaths reported by Burnham et al. included only 8.2% of deaths from nonviolent causes, so inclusion of these deaths will not increase the agreement between the estimates from the IFHS and Burnham et al."

A graph in the Lancet article purportedly demonstrating that its conclusions are in line with violence trends measured by the IBC and Defense Department used cherry-picked data and had two Y-axes; the authors conceded that the graph was flawed, but the Lancet never retracted it.

Iraq Health Minister estimate (2006)

In early November 2006 Iraq's Health Minister Ali al-Shemari said that he estimated between 100,000 and 150,000 people had been killed since the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion. The Taipei Times reported on his methodology: "Al-Shemari said on Thursday that he based his figure on an estimate of 100 bodies per day brought to morgues and hospitals – though such a calculation would come out closer to 130,000 in total." The Washington Post reported: "As al-Shemari issued the startling new estimate, the head of the Baghdad central morgue said Thursday he was receiving as many as 60 violent death victims each day at his facility alone. Dr. Abdul-Razzaq al-Obaidi said those deaths did not include victims of violence whose bodies were taken to the city's many hospital morgues or those who were removed from attack scenes by relatives and quickly buried according to Muslim custom."

From a November 9, 2006, International Herald Tribune article:

Each day we lost 100 persons, that means per month 3,000, per year it's 36,000, plus or minus 10 percent", al-Shemari said. "So by three years, 120,000, half-year 20,000, that means 140,000, plus or minus 10 percent", he said, explaining how he came to the figures. "This includes all Iraqis killed – police, ordinary people, children", he said, adding that people who were kidnapped and later found dead were also included in his estimate. He said the figures were compiled by counting bodies brought to "forensic institutes" or hospitals.

From a November 11, 2006, Taipei Times article:

An official with the ministry also confirmed the figure yesterday , but later said that the estimated deaths ranged between 100,000 and 150,000. "The minister was misquoted. He said between 100,000–150,000 people were killed in three-and-a-half years", the official said.

United Nations (2006)

The United Nations reported that 34,452 violent deaths occurred in 2006, based on data from morgues, hospitals, and municipal authorities across Iraq.

D3 Systems poll (2007)

From February 25 to March 5, 2007, D3 Systems conducted a poll for the BBC, ABC News, ARD and USA Today.

ABC News reported: "One in six says someone in their own household has been harmed. ... 53 percent of Iraqis say a close friend or immediate family member has been hurt in the current violence. That ranges from three in 10 in the Kurdish provinces to, in Baghdad, nearly eight in 10."

The methodology was described thus: "This poll... was conducted February 25 – March 5, 2007, through in-person interviews with a random national sample of 2,212 Iraqi adults, including oversamples in Anbar province, Basra city, Kirkuk and the Sadr City section of Baghdad. The results have a 2.5-point error margin."

There was a field staff of 150 Iraqis in all. That included 103 interviewers, interviewing selected respondents at 458 locales across the country. "This poll asked about nine kinds of violence (car bombs, snipers or crossfire, kidnappings, fighting among opposing groups or abuse of civilians by various armed forces)."

Question 35 asked: "Have you or an immediate family member – by which I mean someone living in this household – been physically harmed by the violence that is occurring in the country at this time?" Here are the results in percentages:

17% of respondents reported that at least one member of the household had been "physically harmed by the violence that is occurring in the country at this time." The survey did not ask whether multiple household members had been harmed.

Opinion Research Business (ORB) survey (2007, 2008)

A September 14, 2007, estimate by Opinion Research Business (ORB), an independent British polling agency, suggested that the total Iraqi violent death toll due to the Iraq War since the U.S.-led invasion was in excess of 1.2 million (1,220,580). These results were based on a survey of 1,499 adults in Iraq from August 12–19, 2007. ORB published an update in January 2008 based on additional work carried out in rural areas of Iraq. Some 600 additional interviews were undertaken and as a result of this the death estimate was revised to 1,033,000 with a given range of 946,000 to 1,120,000.

Participants of the ORB survey were asked the following question: "How many members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 (ie as a result of violence rather than a natural death such as old age)? Please note that I mean those who were actually living under your roof."

This ORB estimate has been strongly criticised as exaggerated and ill-founded in peer reviewed literature. According to Carnegie Mellon University historian Jay D. Aronson, "Because this was a number that few people could take seriously (given the incredible magnitude of violence that would have had to take place daily for such a number to be even remotely possible), the ORB study has largely been ignored."

Iraq Family Health Survey (IFHS, 2008)

The Iraq Family Health Survey published in 2008 in The New England Journal of Medicine surveyed 9,345 households across Iraq and was carried out in 2006 and 2007. It estimated 151,000 deaths due to violence (95% uncertainty range, 104,000 to 223,000) from March 2003 through June 2006.

The study was done by the "Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group", a collaborative effort of six organizations: the Federal Ministry of Health, Baghdad; Kurdistan Ministry of Planning, Erbil; Kurdistan Ministry of Health, Erbil; Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, Baghdad; World Health Organization Iraq office, Amman, Jordan; World Health Organization, Geneva.

The Associated Press and Health Ministry (2009)

In April 2009, the Associated Press reported that Iraq Health Ministry had recorded (via death certificates issued by hospitals and morgues) a total of 87,215 violent deaths of Iraqi citizens between January 1, 2005, and February 28, 2009. The number excludes thousands of missing persons and civilians whose deaths were unrecorded; the government official who provided the data told the AP that if included, the number of dead for that period would be 10 to 20 percent higher.

The Associated Press used the Health Ministry tally and other data (including counts of casualties for 2003–2004, and after March 1, 2009, from hospital sources and media reports, in major part the Iraq Body Count) to estimate that more than 110,600 Iraqis were killed from the start of the war to April 2009. Experts interviewed by the AP found this estimate to be credible and an "important baseline" although necessarily an estimate because of unrecorded deaths, especially in inaccessible areas. While mass graves discovered over time shed more light on deaths in the Iraq War, the AP noted that "how many remain will never be known."

PLOS Medicine (2013)

A 2013 study by Hagopian et al. in PLOS Medicine estimated that 461,000 Iraqis died as a result of the Iraq War. The study used a similar methodology as the 2006 Lancet study and had the lead author of the 2006 study as one of the 12 authors. According to one of the authors, Amy Hagopian, half of the casualties not resulting from violence were due to inadequate treatment of cardiovascular disease. Upon the study's publication, Michael Spagat, a critic of the 2006 Lancet study, said that the 2013 study seemed "to fix most of the methodological flaws of the 2006 paper". Spagat however noted that he found the large confidence interval of the 2013 study disconcerting. Other critics of the 2006 Lancet study mirrored Spagat's views, noting that the 2013 study was an improvement but that the large confidence interval was concerning.

A 2017 study by Spagat and Van Weezel replicated the 2013 study by Hagopian et al. and found that the 500,000 casualty estimate by Hagopian et al. was not supported by data. Spagat and Van Weezel said that Hagopian et al. made many methodological errors. Hagopian et al. defended their original study, arguing that Van Weezel and Spagat misunderstood their method. Van Weezel and Spagat answered, saying that the response by Hagopian et al. "avoids the central points, addresses only secondary issues and makes ad hominem attacks."

Some media estimates

In December 2005 President Bush said there were 30,000 Iraqi dead. White House spokesman Scott McClellan later said it was "not an official government estimate", and was based on media reports.

For 2006, a January 2, 2007, Associated Press article reports: "The tabulation by the Iraqi ministries of Health, Defence and Interior, showed that 14,298 civilians, 1,348 police and 627 soldiers had been killed in the violence that raged across the country last year. The Associated Press figure, gleaned from daily news reports from Baghdad, arrived at a total of 13,738 deaths." The Australian reports in a January 2, 2007, article: "A figure of 3700 civilian deaths in October '', the latest tally given by the UN based on data from the Health Ministry and the Baghdad morgue, was branded exaggerated by the Iraqi Government." Iraqi government estimates include "people killed in bombings and shootings but not deaths classed as 'criminal'." Also, they "include no deaths among the many civilians wounded in attacks who may die later from wounds. Nor do they include many people kidnapped whose fate remains unknown."

A June 25, 2006, Los Angeles Times article, "War's Iraqi Death Toll Tops 50,000", reported that their estimate of violent deaths consisted "mostly of civilians" but probably also included security forces and insurgents. It added that, "Many more Iraqis are believed to have been killed but not counted because of serious lapses in recording deaths in the chaotic first year after the invasion, when there was no functioning Iraqi government, and continued spotty reporting nationwide since." Here is how the Times got its number: "The Baghdad morgue received 30,204 bodies from 2003 through mid-2006, while the Health Ministry said it had documented 18,933 deaths from 'military clashes' and 'terrorist attacks' from April 5, 2004, to June 1, 2006. Together, the toll reaches 49,137. However, samples obtained from local health departments in other provinces show an undercount that brings the total well beyond 50,000. The figure also does not include deaths outside Baghdad in the first year of the invasion."

Reviews

A 2008 review of Iraqi death estimates concluded that 600,000 deaths between 2003 and 2006 likely undercounted total mortality:

Studies assessed as the highest quality, those using population-based methods, yielded the highest estimates... Our review indicates that, despite varying estimates, the mortality burden of the war and its sequelae on Iraq is large... Of the population-based studies, the Roberts and Burnham studies provided the most rigorous methodology as their primary outcome was mortality... not surprisingly their studies have been roundly criticized given the political consequences of their findings and the inherent security and political problems of conducting this type of research.

A 2016 review came to similar conclusions, stating that estimates of very high Iraqi casualties published in the journal Lancet are

"...widely viewed among peers as the most rigorous investigations of Iraq War–related mortality among Iraqi civilians; we agree with this assessment and believe that the study is also scientifically rigorous... in fact, may have been underestimated by these scientifically conservative studies."

According to a 2017 review by Keith Krause of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, "the consensus seems to be that around 150,000 people died violently as a result of the fighting between 2003 and 2006."

Undercounting

Some studies estimating the casualties due to the war in Iraq say there are various reasons why the estimates and counts may be low.

Morgue workers have alleged that official numbers underestimate the death toll. The bodies of some casualties do not end up in morgue and thus may go unrecorded. In 2006, The Washington Post reported: "Police and hospitals often give widely conflicting figures of those killed in major bombings. In addition, death figures are reported through multiple channels by government agencies that function with varying efficiency."

A January 31, 2008 Perspective in the New England Journal of Medicine contains the following discussion of undercounting Iraqi civilian casualties in household surveys:

... sometimes it was problematic or too dangerous to enter a cluster of households, which might well result in an undercount; data from the Iraq Body Count on the distribution of deaths among provinces were used to calculate estimates in these instances. If the clustering of violent deaths wasn't accurately captured, that could also increase uncertainty. The sampling frame was based on a 2004 count, but the population has been changing rapidly and dramatically because of sectarian violence, the flight of refugees, and overall population migration. Another source of bias in household surveys is underreporting due to the dissolution of some households after a death, so that no one remains to tell the former inhabitants' story.

The Washington Post noted in 2008 that

research has shown that household surveys typically miss 30 to 50 percent of deaths. One reason is that some families that have suffered violent deaths leave the survey area. ... Some people are kidnapped and disappear, and others turn up months or years later in mass graves. Some are buried or otherwise disposed of without being recorded. In particularly violent areas, local governments have effectively ceased to function, and there are ineffective channels for collecting and passing information between hospitals, morgues and the central government.

The October 2006 Lancet study states:

Aside from Bosnia, we can find no conflict situation where passive surveillance recorded more than 20% of the deaths measured by population-based methods . In several outbreaks, disease and death recorded by facility-based methods underestimated events by a factor of ten or more when compared with population-based estimates. Between 1960 and 1990, newspaper accounts of political deaths in Guatemala correctly reported over 50% of deaths in years of low violence but less than 5% in years of highest violence.

The report describes no other specific examples except for this study of Guatemala.

Juan Cole wrote in October 2006 that even though heavy fighting could be observed, none of the Iraqi casualties in the skirmishes were reported on, which suggests undercounting.

A July 28, 2004, opinion piece by Robert Fisk published by The Independent reports that "some families bury their dead without notifying the authorities."

Stephen Soldz, who runs the website "Iraq Occupation and Resistance Report", wrote in a February 5, 2006, article:

Of course, in conditions of active rebellion, the safer areas accessible to Western reporters are likely to be those under US/Coalition control, where deaths are, in turn, likely to be due to insurgent attacks. Areas of insurgent control, which are likely to be subject to US and Iraqi government attack, for example most of Anbar province, are simply off-limits to these reporters. Thus, the realities of reporting imply that reporters will be witness to a larger fraction of deaths due to insurgents and a lesser proportion of deaths due to US and Iraqi government forces.

An October 19, 2006, The Washington Post article reports:

The deaths reported by officials and published in the news media represent only a fraction of the thousands of mutilated bodies winding up in Baghdad's overcrowded morgue each month. ... Bodies are increasingly being dumped in and around Baghdad in fields staked out by individual Shiite militias and Sunni insurgent groups. Iraqi security forces often refuse to go to the dumping grounds, leaving the precise number of bodies in those sites unknown. Civilian deaths, unlike those of American troops, often go unrecorded.

The Australian reported in January 2007 that Iraqi government casualty estimates do not count deaths classed as 'criminal', deaths of civilians who get wounded and die later from the wounds, or kidnap victims who have not been found.

The Iraq Body Count project (IBC) stated in November 2004 that "we have always been quite explicit that our own total is certain to be an underestimate of the true position, because of gaps in reporting or recording".

Underreporting by U.S. authorities

An April 2005 article by The Independent reports:

A week before she was killed by a suicide bomber, humanitarian worker Marla Ruzicka forced military commanders to admit they did keep records of Iraqi civilians killed by US forces. ... in an essay Ms Ruzicka wrote a week before her death on Saturday and published yesterday, the 28-year-old revealed that a Brigadier General told her it was "standard operating procedure" for US troops to file a report when they shoot a non-combatant. She obtained figures for the number of civilians killed in Baghdad between February 28 and April 5 , and discovered that 29 had been killed in firefights involving US forces and insurgents. This was four times the number of Iraqi police killed.

The December 2006 report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) found that the United States has filtered out reports of violence in order to disguise its perceived policy failings in Iraq. A December 7, 2006, McClatchy Newspapers article reports that the ISG found that U.S. officials reported 93 attacks or significant acts of violence on one day in July 2006, yet "a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light more than 1,100 acts of violence." The article further reports:

The finding confirmed a September 8 McClatchy Newspapers report that U.S. officials excluded scores of people killed in car bombings and mortar attacks from tabulations measuring the results of a drive to reduce violence in Baghdad. By excluding that data, U.S. officials were able to boast that deaths from sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital had declined by more than 52 percent between July and August, McClatchy newspapers reported.

From the ISG report itself:

A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. personnel doesn't count.

Casualties caused by criminal and political violence

In May 2004, Associated Press completed a survey of the morgues in Baghdad and surrounding provinces. The survey tallied violent deaths from May 1, 2003, when President Bush declared an end to major combat operations, through April 30, 2004.

From the AP article:

In Baghdad, a city of about 5.6 million, 4,279 people were recorded killed in the 12 months through April 30, , according to figures provided by Kais Hassan, director of statistics at Baghdad's Medicolegal Institute, which administers the city's morgues. "Before the war, there was a strong government, strong security. There were a lot of police on the streets and there were no illegal weapons", he said during an AP reporter's visit to the morgue. "Now there are few controls. There is crime, revenge killings, so much violence." The figure does not include most people killed in big terrorist bombings, Hassan said. The cause of death in such cases is obvious so bodies are usually not taken to the morgue, but given directly to victims' families. Also, the bodies of killed fighters from groups like the al-Mahdi Army are rarely taken to morgues.

Accidental trauma deaths from car accidents, falls, etc. are not included in the numbers. The article reports that the numbers translate to 76 killings per 100,000 people in Baghdad, compared to 39 in Bogotá, Colombia, 7.5 in New York City, and 2.4 in neighboring Jordan. The article states that there were 3.0 killings per 100,000 people in Baghdad in 2002 (the year before the war). Morgues surveyed in other parts of Iraq also reported large increases in the number of homicides. Karbala, south of Baghdad, increased from an average of one homicide per month in 2002 to an average of 55 per month in the year following the invasion; in Tikrit, north of Baghdad, where there were no homicides in 2002, the rate had grown to an average of 17 per month; in the northern province of Kirkuk, the rate had increased from 3 per month in 2002 to 34 per month in the survey period.

See also

• Casualty recording
• Center for Civilians in Conflict
• Civilian casualty ratio
• Health in Iraq
• International Criminal Court and the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Iraq Body Count project
• Iraq Family Health Survey
• Lancet surveys of Iraq War casualties
• List of aviation shootdowns and accidents during the Iraq War
• ORB survey of Iraq War casualties
• Post-traumatic stress disorder
• United States military casualties of war
• Violence against academics in post-invasion Iraq

References

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229. Roug, Louise; Smith, Doug (June 25, 2006). "War's Iraqi Death Toll Tops 50,000 – Higher Than the U.S. Estimate But Thought To Be Undercounted, the Tally Is Equivalent to 570,000 Americans Killed in Three Years" Archived March 17, 2010, at the Wayback Machine. Los Angeles Times (via Common Dreams NewsCenter). Retrieved September 3, 2010.
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232. ^ Cooney, Daniel (May 23, 2004). "5,500 Iraqis Killed, Morgue Records Show" Archived July 16, 2011, at the Wayback Machine. Associated Press (via The United Jerusalem Foundation). Retrieved September 3, 2010. (Article is here Archived May 27, 2009, at the Wayback Machine also (via the China Daily). Retrieved September 3, 2010.)
233. Brownstein, Catherine A.; Brownstein, John S. (31 January 2008). "Estimating Excess Mortality in Post-Invasion Iraq". New England Journal of Medicine. 358 (5): 445–447. doi:10.1056/NEJMp0709003. PMID 18184951.
234. Cole, Juan (October 11, 2006). "655,000 Dead in Iraq since Bush Invasion" Archived February 6, 2016, at the Wayback Machine. Informed Comment (blog at juancole.com). Retrieved September 3, 2010.
235. Fisk, Robert (July 28, 2004). "Baghdad Is a City That Reeks with the Stench of the Dead" (opinion piece). The Independent. Retrieved September 3, 2010.
236. Soldz, Stephen (February 5, 2006). "When Promoting Truth Obscures the Truth: More on Iraqi Body Count and Iraqi Deaths" Archived May 4, 2006, at the Library of Congress Web Archives. ZNet. Retrieved September 3, 2010.
237. Press release (November 7, 2004). "IBC Response to the Lancet Study Estimating '100,000' Iraqi Deaths" Archived October 5, 2007, at the Wayback Machine. Iraq Body Count project. Retrieved September 3, 2010.
238. Buncombe, Andrew (April 20, 2005). "Aid Worker Uncovered America's Secret Tally of Iraqi Civilian Deaths" Archived January 1, 2007, at the Wayback Machine. The Independent (via Common Dreams NewsCenter). Retrieved September 3, 2010.
239. ^ Landay, Jonathan S. (December 7, 2006). "Study Says Violence in Iraq Has Been Underreported" Archived December 10, 2006, at the Wayback Machine. McClatchy Newspapers (via Common Dreams NewsCenter). Retrieved September 3, 2010.

External links

• "Likely Humanitarian Scenarios", UN internal memo predicting 100,000 direct and 400,000 indirect casualties as a result of the invasion.
• "iraqimemorial.org", online database and traveling exhibition of proposals and projects to memorialize the civilian casualties in Iraq.
• "Eyes Wide Open" Archived February 3, 2005, at the Wayback Machine, a traveling exhibition on the human cost of war

v t e Iraq War (2003–2011)
Beginning of the Iraqi conflict
Prelude Background Pre-1990 17 July Revolution Iranian Revolution 1979 Ba'ath Party Purge Iran–Iraq War British / U.S. support for Iraq Chemical attacks against Iran Anfal campaign Iran–Contra affair 1990–2003 Gulf War Invasion of Kuwait Nayirah testimony Sanctions against Iraq No-fly zones 1991 uprisings UNSCOM Arms-to-Iraq affair Oil-for-Food Programme Investigations September 11 attacks Aftermath War on terror 2001 anthrax attacks U.S. War in Afghanistan Invasion Rationale WMD claims Yellowcake uranium Aluminum tubes Biological weapons Chemical weapons "Curveball" Mobile weapon labs Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory Anthrax claims Prague Ricin claims Oil as a possible rationale Issues American imperialism Bush Doctrine Wolfowitz Doctrine Colin Powell's UN presentation Disarmament crisis UNMOVIC Failed peace initiatives Iraq resolution / UK parliament's support for invasion Iraqi–Kurdish conflict Legality Legitimacy of the invasion Media coverage Military analyst program Rapid response operation Saddam's alleged shredder Preemptive war Saddam Hussein and human rights Dossiers and memos Habbush letter Downing Street memo September Dossier Vilnius letter Letter of the eight Bush–Blair 2003 memo February Dossier Bush–Aznar memo
Overview Key events Invasion (2003) Occupation (2003–2011) Insurgency 2003–06 period Anbar campaign Fallujah Capture of Saddam Hussein Interrogation Trial Execution / Reactions 2006 al-Askari mosque bombing Civil war (2006–08) 2007 U.S. troop surge timeline U.S. withdrawal Status of forces agreement Invasion (2003) Timeline Preparations for invasion Multi-National Force Battle of Nasiriyah Fall of Baghdad Battle of Debecka Pass Firdos Square statue Mission Accomplished speech US public opinion Occupation (2003–2011) Occupation of Ramadi De-Ba'athification 100 Orders CPA Order 2 CPA Order 17 U.S. military bases Blackwater Reconstruction Development Fund Economic reform UNAMI Al Qa'qaa high explosives U.S. kill or capture strategy Replacement governments Coalition Provisional Authority Iraqi Governing Council Interim Government 2005 parliamentary elections Transitional Government Constitution Ratification
Participants Countries Australia Ba'athist Iraq Denmark Georgia Iran Italy Japan Poland South Korea Thailand Ukraine United Kingdom United States Insurgent groups Sunni groups Islamic Army in Iraq 1920 Revolution Brigades Jaish al-Rashideen Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance Hamas of Iraq Jeish Muhammad Mujahideen Shura Council Islamic State of Iraq Al-Qaeda in Iraq Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan Black Banner Organization Wakefulness and Holy War Abu Theeb's group Abu Bakr Al-Salafi Army Mujahideen Army Shia groups Mahdi Army Abu Deraa's militia Badr Organization Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Sheibani Network Soldiers of Heaven Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Promised Day Brigade Kata'ib Hezbollah Ba'ath loyalists Fedayeen Saddam Al-Awda Popular Army Al-Abud Network Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
Battles and operations Operations 2003 Ancient Babylon Catalyst Desert Scorpion Desert Thrust Falconer Iron Hammer Iron Justice Ivy Blizzard Northern Delay Airborne Dragon Panther Squeeze Peninsula Strike Planet X Capture of Saddam Hussein (Red Dawn) Telic 2004 Baton Rouge Bulldog Mammoth Iron Saber New Dawn (Al Fajr) Phantom Fury Phantom Linebacker Plymouth Rock Vigilant Resolve Warrior's Rage 2005 Able Rising Force Able Warrior Cyclone Iron Hammer Matador New Market Spear (Romhe) Squeeze Play Steel Curtain 2006 Al Majid Gaugamela Guardian Tiger Iron Triangle River Falcon Sinbad Swarmer Together Forward 2007 Alljah Arbead II Ardennes Black Eagle Commando Eagle Forsythe Park Imposing Law Leyte Gulf Marne Avalanche Marne Torch Mawtini Phantom Strike Phantom Thunder Polar Tempest Purple Haze Saber Guardian Sledgehammer Stampede 3 Tiger Hammer Valiant Guardian (Harris Ba'sil) 2008 Defeat Al Qaeda in the North Augurs of Prosperity Phantom Phoenix 2009–2011 New Dawn Battles 2003 Invasion Umm Qasr Al Faw Basra I Nasiriyah Karbala I Haditha Dam Najaf I Samawah I Karbala II Al Kut Hillah Karbala Gap Debecka Pass Baghdad I Majar al-Kabir Ramadan Offensive 2004 Spring fighting Karbala City Hall Fallujah I Siege of Sadr City Ramadi I Good Friday ambush Baghdad International Airport Husaybah Danny Boy Najaf II CIMIC House Samarra Fallujah II Mosul 2005 Lake Tharthar Abu Ghraib Al-Qa'im Hit convoy Haditha Tal Afar 2006 Baghdad II Ramadi II Diwaniya Al Rumaythah Amarah Turki 2007 Haifa Street Karbala provincial HQ Najaf III Shurta Nasir Basra II Baqubah Route Bismarck Donkey Island Karbala III 2008 Spring fighting Iraqi Day of Ashura Nineveh Basra III Al-Qaeda offensive 2009–2011 Palm Grove (2010) Related events Turkish incursions into northern Iraq 2007 2008 Abu Kamal raid
War crimes Occupation forces Killings and massacres During the 2003 invasion U.S. killings of journalists Fallujah killings Killing of Nadhem Abdullah (2003) Murder of Muhamad Husain Kadir Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre (2004) Haifa Street helicopter incident (2005) Tal Afar shootings (2005) Basra prison incident (2005) Haditha massacre (2005) Mahmudiyah rape and killings (2006) Ishaqi massacre (2006) Baghdad detainee killings (2006) Hamdania incident (2006) Iraqi bodyguard killing (2006) Iron Triangle Murders (2006) Baghdad airstrike (2007) Nisour Square massacre (2007) Iraq War Logs (2010) Chemical weapons Use of white phosphorus by the United States (2004–05) Torture and abuse Abu Ghraib prison (2003–06) Camp Bucca (2003–09) Camp Nama (2003–04) Balad Air Base (2003–2011) Death of Nagem Hatab (2003) Killing of Baha Mousa (2003) Death of Abed Hamed Mowhoush (2003) Killing of Manadel al-Jamadi (2003) Death of Fashad Mohamed (2004) § Other killings and bombings 2003 Jordanian embassy Canal Hotel Imam Ali mosque bombing Baghdad October 2003 2004 Erbil 2004 Ashura massacre Basra 2004 Mosul 2004 2004 church bombings Baghdad bombings 14 September 30 September Karbala and Najaf bombings Baqubah 2004 Kufa mosque bombing 2005 Al Hillah 2005 Erbil 2005 Musayyib bombing Baghdad bombings August September Balad 2005 Khanaqin bombings 2006 Karbala and Ramadi Al-Askari mosque 2006 Buratha mosque bombing Sadr City bombings July November Hayy Al-Jihad massacre 2007 Mustansiriya University Baghdad bombings 22 January 3 February 12 February 18 February 29 March 18 April 26 July 1 August Al Hillah 2007 Tal Afar 2007 Iraqi Parliament 2007 Karbala mosque bombings Massacres of Yazidis April massacre Qahtaniyah bombings Makhmour Abu Sayda Al-Askari mosque 2007 Al-Khilani mosque bombing Amirli bombing Kirkuk 2007 Al Amarah bombings 2008 Bagdad bombings February March June Balad 2008 Karbala 2008 Al-Karmah Dujail bombing Balad Ruz bombing Attacks on Christians in Mosul 2009 Bagdad bombings March 6 April June August October December Baghdad–Miqdadiyah Taza bombing Kirkuk 2009 Tal Afar 2009 2010 Nationwide attacks 10 May 25 August Bagdad bombings January February April August September November Baqubah 2010 Baghdad church massacre 2011 Nationwide attacks January August Bagdad bombings January August October Arba'een bombings Tikrit assault Al Hillah 2011 Samarra bombing Al Diwaniyah bombing Taji bombings Karbala 2011 Basra 2011 Other war crimes Raid on Camp Ashraf (2011) Archaeological looting Chlorine bombings Torture by the Wolf Brigade (2004–2011) Prosecution United States and the International Criminal Court Hague Invasion Act Prosecution for the 2003 invasion Abtan v. Blackwater Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Saleh v. Bush Taguba Report § All attacks listed in this group were either committed by insurgents, or have unknown perpetrators
Impact General Casualties Iraq Body Count Iraq Family Health Survey Lancet surveys ORB survey Damage to Baghdad Al-Aimmah Bridge disaster Human rights Humanitarian crisis 2007 cholera outbreak Financial cost Refugees Iraqi Christians Mandaeans Violence against Iraqi academics Political controversies Post-invasion WMD conjecture Iraq scandal in Finland Dixie Chicks comments Plame affair Hood event Death of David Kelly Hutton Inquiry Kidnapping of Angelo dela Cruz 2004 document leak Al Jazeera bombing memo Scott Thomas Beauchamp controversy MoveOn.org ad controversy Six Days in Fallujah Role of Canada War resisters Investigations Senate Report on WMD Intelligence Duelfer Report Chilcot Inquiry Reactions Pre-war Pre-war international reactions Khuy Voyne! Saddam Hussein interview Views on the invasion U.S. public opinion Opposition Criticism United Nations Oprah's Anti-war series Iraqi map pendant Winter Soldier: Iraq & Afghanistan Photo Op A Responsible Plan to End the War in Iraq Bush shoe-throwing incident Protests Halloween 2002 February 15, 2003 March 20, 2003 Bring Them Home Now Tour January 20, 2005 September 24, 2005 January 27, 2007 March 17, 2007 2007 Port of Tacoma September 15, 2007 March 19, 2008 Aftermath in Iraq The rise of ISIL Insurgency (2011–13) War in Iraq (2013–17) War against ISIL (2014–present) U.S.-led intervention in Iraq (2014–2021) Insurgency (2017–present)
Miscellaneous Terminology Axis of evil Outposts of tyranny "Baghdad Bob" "Chemical Ali" Coalition of the willing Dead checking Embedded journalism Freedom fries Friedman Unit "Mother of All Bombs" "Mrs. Anthrax" Old Europe and New Europe Regime change Shock and awe "Sixteen Words" "Smoking gun / mushroom cloud" Star Spangled Ice Cream Strategic reset "There are unknown unknowns" Triangle of Death "Yo, Blair" Critical Global arrogance Inverted totalitarianism "The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time" Memorials Afghan–Iraqi Freedom Memorial (Salem, Oregon) Al-Shaheed Monument Iraq and Afghanistan Memorial (London) Northwood Gratitude and Honor Memorial Old North Memorial Garden Saving Iraqi Culture Lists Assassinations Aviation shootdowns and accidents Bombings Coalition military operations Documentaries Iraqi security forces fatality reports Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards Private contractor deaths Timeline 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Related Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Chelsea Manning CIA black sites Efforts to impeach George W. Bush "Enhanced interrogation techniques" Torture in the United States Extraordinary rendition Green Zone Guantanamo Bay detention camp Gulf of Tonkin incident Resolution Military–industrial complex Neoconservatism Patriot Act Petrodollar warfare theory Post-9/11 Special Relationship The Iraq War: A Historiography of Misplaced Pages Changelogs Unilateralism Unitary executive theory U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East WikiLeaks Ba'ath Party archives
Outline / Category / Wikinews / Multimedia

Related phrases

This campaign featured a variety of new terminology, much of it initially coined by the U.S. government or military; many of the phrases carried an implicit bias. The name "Operation Iraqi Freedom," for example, expresses one viewpoint of the purpose of the invasion, and is almost never used outside the United States. Also notable was the usage "death squads" to refer to fedayeen paramilitary forces. Members of the Saddam Hussein government were called by disparaging nicknames - e.g., "Chemical Ali" (Ali Hassan al-Majid), "Baghdad Bob" or "Comical Ali" (Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf), and "Mrs. Anthrax" or "Chemical Sally" (Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash). Saddam Hussein was systematically referred to as "Saddam," which some Westerners mistakenly believed to be disparaging. (Although there is no consensus about how to refer to him in English, "Saddam" is acceptable usage, and is how people in Iraq and the Middle East generally refer to him. )

Terminology introduced or popularized during the war include:

• "Axis of Evil," originally used by President Bush during a State of the Union address on January 29, 2002 to describe the countries of Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
• "Coalition of the willing," a term that originated in the Clinton era (eg: interview, President Clinton, ABC, June 8, 1994), and used by the Bush Administration to describe the countries contributing troops in the invasion, of which the U.S. and U.K. were the primary members.
• "Decapitating the regime," a euphemism for either overthrowing the government or killing Saddam Hussein.
• "Embedding," United States practice of assigning civilian journalists to U.S. military units.
• "Minder," an Iraqi government official assigned to watch over a foreign correspondent
• "Old Europe," Rumsfeld's term used to describe the divisions between European governments: "You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe."
• "Regime change," a euphemism for overthrowing a government.
• "Shock and Awe," the strategy of reducing an enemy's will to fight through displays of overwhelming force.

Many slogans and terms coined came to be used by President Bush's political opponents, or those opposed to the war. For example, in April of 2003 John Kerry, the Democratic candidate in the presidential election, said at a campaign rally: "What we need now is not just a regime change in Saddam Hussein and Iraq, but we need a regime change in the United States."

Media coverage

Main article: 2003 invasion of Iraq media coverage

Media coverage of this war was different in certain ways from that of the Persian Gulf War. Victoria Clarke, the Assistant Defense Secretary (formerly with Hill and Knowlton, the PR firm infamous for promoting the false baby-incubator story during the first Persian Gulf War) devised the Pentagon's policy of "embedding" reporters with military units. Viewers in the United States were able to watch U.S. tanks rolling into Baghdad live on television, with a split screen image of the Iraqi Minister of Information claiming that U.S. forces were not in the city. Many foreign observers of the media and especially the television coverage in the USA felt that it was excessively partisan and in some cases "gung-ho."

Critics of the war, especially those on the political left argued that media organizations should be neutral, and not be "expected" to support the military of their country. In Europe in particular such critics have long argued that the American press and news media are unquestioningly pro-Bush. The fact that American news programs accepted the administration's war terminology like "Operation Iraqi Freedom" uncritically, and that many American reporters wore US flags in their lapels, were seen as inappropriate behavior.

European coverage was more critical of the invasion, and tended to put a greater emphasis on coalition setbacks and losses and civilian deaths than the US media . Supporters of the war, especially American conservatives often characterized European media coverage as anti-American and "left-wing."

Arab media coverage of the conflict was criticized as biased towards the old Iraqi regime. For example, the Chicago Tribune on April 10, 2003 reported that the defeat sent a shockwave of incredulity across the Middle East, and quoted a Damascus housewife who believed that jubilant Iraqis were being paid to act that way in front of the cameras .

Another difference was the wide and independent coverage on the World Wide Web, demonstrating that for web-surfers in rich countries and the elites in poorer countries, the Internet had become mature as a medium, giving about half a billion people access to different versions of events.

First-hand reports by Iraqis, however, were spotty during the war itself, since internet penetration in Iraq was already very weak (with an estimate of 12,000 users in Iraq in 2002). The deliberate destruction of Iraqi telecommunication facilities by US forces made Internet communication even more difficult. The web did offer some first-hand reports from bloggers such as Salam Pax, and additional information was available on soldier blogs.

Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based news network, which was formed in 1996, gained worldwide attention for its coverage of the war. Their broadcasts were popular in much of the Arab world, but also to some degree in Western nations, with major American networks such as CNN and MSNBC re-broadcasting some of their coverage. Al-Jazeera was well-known for their graphic footage of civilian deaths, which American news media branded as overly sensationalistic. The English website of Al-Jazeera was brought down during the middle of the Iraq war by Internet vandals.

In August of 2004, Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi had al-Jazeera's Baghdad offices closed, and temporarily banned the station from broadcasting in Iraq. A couple of weeks later, the ban was made indefinite, and Iraqi security officers raided the station, sealing it off. Al-Jazeera called the raid "reminiscent of the way certain other regimes have behaved."

Military leaders shut off the BBC connection to HMS Ark Royal after grumbling among sailors that it was biased in favor of Iraqi reports. By contrast, a study by Justin Lewis at Cardiff University found that the BBC reports had been somewhat sanitized, and did not question pro-war assumptions.

Belgian journalist Alain Hertoghe published a book accusing the French press in particular and the European press in general of not being objective in its coverage of the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Hertoghe's book, La Guerre à Outrances (The War of Outrages), criticizes French press coverage of the war as being pessimistic of the US led Coalition's chance of success and continually focusing on challenges faced during the invasion. Hertoghe also claims in his book that the European media became so wrapped up in its own particular biases against the United States that they fed disinformation to their readers and viewers and misled them as to the unfolding events. His selection of press articles to illustrate his point has been criticised as somewhat selective. The European coverage's concerns about the military becoming bogged down in Iraq and the war ending badly seem to have come true, as late as eighteen months after the declaration of the end of "major hostilities." Since being published, Hertoghe has been fired from his position at French newspaper La Croix. It was claimed that only one major French newspaper had published a review of his book.

International initiatives protested against the U.S. media for downplaying and misinterpreting protests as anti-Americanism and accused them of foul language such as calling Chirac "A balding Joan of Arc in drag", the French "weasels" (New York Post) or stating that "Chirac and his poodle Putin have severely damaged the United Nations". Questions have also been raised about U.S. media coverage, given that in the U.S. a pre-war Washington Post poll showed that 69% of the population thought it "likely" or "very likely" that Iraq was involved in the planning of the 9/11 attacks, although no evidence of an Iraqi connection to the attack is known.

Journalist Peter Arnett was fired by MSNBC and National Geographic after he declared in an interview with the Iraqi information ministry that he believed the U.S. strategy of "shock and awe" had failed. He also went on to tell Iraqi State TV that he had told "Americans about the determination of the Iraqi forces, the determination of the government, and the willingness to fight for their country," and that reports from Baghdad about civilian deaths had helped antiwar protesters undermine the Bush administration's strategy. The interview was given 10 days before the fall of Baghdad.

On 2 April 2003, in a speech given by British Home Secretary David Blunkett while in New York City, Blunkett also commented on what he believed to be sympathetic and corrupt reporting of Iraq by Arab news sources. He told the audience that "It's hard to get the true facts if the reporters of Al Jazeera are actually linked into, and are only there because they are provided with facilities and support from, the régime." Ironically, his speech came only hours before Al Jazeera was ejected from Baghdad by the Iraqi government.

U.S. media coverage of other wars has included photographs of the flag-draped coffins of American military personnel killed in action. During the invasion and occupation of Iraq, however, the Bush administration prohibited release of such photographs, and, according to Senator Patrick Leahy, scheduled the return of wounded soldiers for after midnight so that the press would not see them. A number of Dover photographs were eventually released in response to a Freedom of Information request filed by blogger Russ Kick. The practice of transporting wounded soldiers to the US at night was documented by both Matt Drudge as well as Salon Magazine. This ban was instituted in 2000 by the Clinton administration, and mirrors a similar ban put in place during the Gulf War , though it appears not to have been enforced as tightly during previous military operations.

See also

• 2003 - 2004 occupation of Iraq timeline
• American government position on invasion of Iraq
• American popular opinion of invasion of Iraq
• Australian contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• British Mandate of Iraq
• Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003
• Global protests against invasion of Iraq
• Governments' pre-war positions on invasion of Iraq
• Human rights in post-Saddam Iraq
• Iraq disarmament crisis
• Iraqi insurgency
• List of Coalition aircraft crashes in Iraq
• List of people associated with the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Polish contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
• Popular opposition to the 2003 Iraq War
• Post-invasion Iraq, 2003-2005
• Predicted effects of invading Iraq
• Reconstruction of Iraq
• The UN Security Council and the Iraq war
• Views on the 2003 invasion of Iraq

References

• Donnelly, Thomas. Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century. Report of the Project for the New American Century, September 2000. Available online.

• CNN.com/Inside Politics (2002). Senate approves Iraq war resolution. Accessed on June 06 2005.

• Paul, U.S. Representative Ron, Office of (2002). Paul Calls for Congressional Declaration of War with Iraq. Accessed on June 06 2005.

• Washington Post (2002). Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote. Accessed on June 06 2005.

Further reading

• Master of Chaos: The History of the Special Forces by Linda Robinson
• Heavy Metal a Tank Company's Battle to Baghdad by Captain Jason Conroy and Ron Martz

External links

• Civilian Death Toll
• Amnesty International Report on Iraq
• Borgen Project: Cost of the Iraq War
• Iraq: Amnesty International seeks clarification on house demolitions by US troops in Iraq
• Iraq: full texts of speeches and key documents archived by The Guardian. Retrieved 31 May 2005.
• Iraq: Forcible return of refugees and asylum-seekers is contrary to international law
• Iraq: Tribunal established without consultation
• Memorandum on concerns related to legislation introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority
• National Priorities Project Cost of the Iraqi War Estimate
• Reconstruction must ensure the human rights of Iraqis
• USAF B-52 mission flights from Fairford to Iraq, radio communication recorded by Frequency Monitor Centre in the Netherlands
• Video Seminar on Iraq Coalition Politics: 20 April 2005, sponsored by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois.
• War in Iraq: Day by Day Guide
• Iraq and Iran
• Iraq War NEWS DIGEST-Iraq and the U.S.A.
• Iraq Special Weapons News

• Iraq War
• Iraq War casualties
• George W. Bush administration controversies
• U.S.-Iraqi relations
• Operations involving special forces
• 2003 Iraq conflict
• CIA leak scandal