Misplaced Pages

Revision as of 00:00, 7 September 2009

Gaza War
Part of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Map of Gaza; Map of Region
Date December 27, 2008 (2008-12-27) – January 18, 2009 (2009-01-19) Location Gaza Strip and Southern Israel Status Israel declared unilateral ceasefire, 12 hours later Hamas announced a one-week ceasefire
Belligerents
Israel (IDF)	Gaza Strip (Palestinian paramilitary forces including the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades, Quds Brigades and the Popular Resistance Councils)
Commanders and leaders
Gabi Ashkenazi (Chief of Staff) Ido Nehoshtan (IAF) Eli Marom (Navy) Eyal Eisenberg (Gaza Div) Yigal Slovik (401st Bde) Ilan Malka (Givati Bde) Avi Peled (Golani Bde) Herzi Levy (Para Bde)	Khaled Mashal Ismail Haniyeh Mahmoud al-Zahar Said Seyam (KIA) Ahmed Jabari Tawfik Jaber  (KIA) Osama Mazini
Strength
176,500 (total) Backed by tanks, artillery, gunboats, and aircraft.	Hamas: 20,000 (total)
Casualties and losses
Total killed: 13 Soldiers: 10 (friendly fire: 4) Civilians: 3 Total wounded: 518 Soldiers: 336 Civilians: 182	Total killed: 1,417 (PCHR), 1,166 (IDF) Militants and policemen: 491* (PCHR), 709 (IDF) Civilians: 926 (PCHR), 295 (IDF) Total wounded: 5,303(PCHR)
One Egyptian border guard officer killed and three guards and two children wounded. Over 50,800 Gaza residents displaced. Over 4,000 homes destroyed; around $2bn worth of damage to Gaza
*255 policemen were killed (PCHR).

Template:Campaignbox Arab-Israeli conflict

The Gaza War, codenamed Operation Cast Lead (Template:Lang-he) by Israel, and known as the Gaza massacre (Template:Lang-ar) in parts of the Arab and Muslim world and beyond, began on December 27, 2008, when Israel launched a military attack on the Gaza Strip.

Between 1,166 and 1,417 Palestinians and 13 Israelis were killed. More than 400,000 Gazans were left without running water, 4,000 homes were destroyed or badly damaged, leaving tens of thousands of people homeless; 80 government buildings were hit.

The Israeli operation began with a bombardment of the Gaza Strip, with the stated aim of stopping Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel and arms smuggling into Gaza. Israeli forces targeted Hamas bases, police training camps, police headquarters, and offices. Civilian infrastructure, including mosques, houses, medical facilities, and schools, were attacked and destroyed, according to Israel because many of them were being used by combatants, and as storage spaces for weapons and rockets. Hamas intensified its rocket and mortar attacks against targets in Israel throughout the conflict, hitting previously untargeted cities such as Beersheba and Ashdod.

The Israeli ground invasion began on January 3, 2009. The war ended on January 18, when Israel first declared unilateral ceasefire, then after 12 hours Hamas announced a one-week ceasefire. Israel completed its withdrawal on January 21.

Background

See also: Timeline of the Gaza War, List of rocket and mortar attacks in Israel in 2008 and in 2009 following the Gaza War

The Gaza Strip is a coastal strip of land on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea bordering Egypt and Israel. It is one of the most densely populated places on earth. According to the CIA Factbook as of July 2008, it holds a population of 1,500,202 on an area of 360 square kilometers (139 sq mi). The UN, HRW and many other international bodies and NGOs consider Israel to be the occupying power of the Gaza Strip as Israel controls Gaza's airspace, territorial waters and does not allow the movement of people or goods in or out of Gaza by air or sea. Israel maintains that its occupation of Gaza, as defined by Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, ended following the completion of its unilateral disengagement plan in 2005, asserting that Israel has no functions of government in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas assumed administrative control of Gaza following the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and its 2007 military victory over the attempted ouster of Hamas by Fatah, the secular Palestinian nationalist party. Subsequently, Egypt closed the Rafah Border Crossing when EU monitors left in July 2007. Israel closed off all remaining access to Gaza around the same time. The blockade allowed Israel to control the flow of goods going into Gaza, including power and water. Israel halted all exports and only allowed shipments into Gaza to avert a humanitarian crisis. Palestinian groups were partially able to bypass the blockade through tunnels, some of which were used for weapons smuggling. Between 2005 and 2008, Palestinian groups launched over 7,200 rockets and mortars into Israel, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, between 2005 and 2008 116 Israelis, including both civilians and IDF personnel, were killed and 1,509 were injured by Palestinians in "direct conflict" related incidents in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. During the same period 1,735 Palestinians, including civilians and militants from various groups, were killed and 8,308 were wounded by Israelis in "direct conflict" incidents.

2008 lull

On June 19, 2008, an Egyptian-brokered “lull” or pause in hostilities between Israel and Hamas went into effect. The term “lull” is a translation of the Arabic term Tahdia. According to The New York Times, neither side fully respected the terms of the cease-fire.

The agreement required Hamas to end rocket and mortar attacks on Israel and to enforce the lull throughout Gaza. In addition, Israel insisted that the agreement includes an end to Hamas's military buildup in Gaza and movement toward the release of Corporal Shalit. In exchange, Hamas expected the blockade to end, commerce in Gaza to resume, and truck shipments to be restored to 2005 levels, which was between 500 and 600 trucks per day. Israel tied easing of the blockade to a reduction in rocket fire and gradually re-opened supply lines and permitted around 90 daily truck shipments to enter Gaza, up from around 70 per day. The above increase in supply trucks never began to approach what Hamas thought it was going to get. Hamas criticized Israel for its continued blockade while Israel accused Hamas of continued weapons smuggling via tunnels to Egypt and pointed to continued rocket attacks.

The UN recorded seven IDF violations of the ceasefire between June 20 and June 26, and three violations by Palestinian groups not affiliated with Hamas between June 23 and 26. On December 18, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, reported 185 Israeli violations during the lull period. The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center reported a total of 223 rockets and 139 mortar shells fired from Gaza during the lull, including 20 rockets and 18 mortar shells before November 4. It noted that "Hamas was careful to maintain the ceasefire" until November 4, when the ceasefire was "seriously eroded." Rocket fire decreased by 98 percent in the four and a half months between June 18 and November 4 when compared to the four and a half months preceding the ceasefire.

Hamas denied responsibility for the rocket fire during the 'lull'. However, Human Rights Watch reported that while Hamas security forces demonstrated an ability to curb rocket fire, some people detained for firing rockets were summarily released without explanation.

Conflict escalates

On November 4, 2008, Israeli forces raided a Hamas-dug tunnel near the Israel-Gaza border. The IDF claimed the tunnel was intended for the capture of Israeli soldiers while Hamas asserted that the tunnel served defensive purposes. The raid and the associated air strike killed six Hamas fighters. Hamas launched 35 rockets into southern Israel in what was described by a Hamas spokesman as a "response to Israel's massive breach of the truce". According to a November 17 article in The Daily Telegraph, "since violence flared on November 5, Israeli forces and militants, some of them from Hamas, have engaged in almost daily tit-for-tat exchanges." Rocket attacks targeted at Israeli cities near Gaza sharply increased during November 2008, approaching pre-truce levels.

On December 13, Israel announced that it was in favor of extending the cease-fire, provided Hamas adhered to the conditions. On December 14, a Hamas delegation in Cairo proposed that the parties return to the original ceasefire arrangement: Hamas would undertake to stop all rocket attacks against Israel if Israel would agree to open up the border crossings, not to reduce commercial traffic, and not to launch attacks into Gaza. At an Israeli cabinet meeting on December 21, Yuval Diskin, head of Israel's internal security agency, said he thought Hamas was "interested in continuing the truce, but wants to improve its terms...it wants us to lift the siege of Gaza, stop attacks, and extend the truce to include the West Bank."

On December 20, Hamas officially announced that it would not extend the cease-fire which had expired on December 19. It cited the Israeli border blockade as the primary reason and resumed shelling of the western Negev. Israel said that it had begun to ease the blockade, but reimposed it when Hamas failed to end all rocket fire and weapons smuggling.

On December 23, senior Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar reiterated that Hamas was willing to renew the cease-fire under the original terms. That same day the IDF killed three Palestinian militants, claiming that they had been planting explosives on the Israel-Gaza border. On December 24, more than 60 Palestinian mortar shells and Katyusha and Qassam rockets hit the Negev. Hamas code-named the attacks "Operation Oil Stain" and claims it fired 87 rockets and mortar rounds at Israel that day.

On December 25, after Israel had "wrapped up preparations for a broad offensive," Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert delivered a final warning in an interview with the Arabic language satellite channel al-Arabiya. He said "I am telling them now, it may be the last minute, I'm telling them stop it. We are stronger."

On Friday, December 26, Israel reopened five border crossings between Israel and Gaza to supply fuel for Gaza's main power plant and to provide about 100 truck loads of humanitarian aid, including grain and other goods. That same day, militants fired approximately a dozen rockets and mortar shells from Gaza at Israel; one accidentally struck a northern Gaza house, killing two Palestinian sisters and wounding a third. According to Israeli officials, its subsequent December 27 offensive took Hamas by surprise, thereby increasing militant casualties.

Campaign

Israeli offensive

Israel began planning for a military operation as early as six months before the conflict by collecting intelligence on potential targets. The IDF also engaged in a disinformation campaign to give Hamas a false sense of security and to take them by surprise. Defense minister Ehud Barak stated that the offensive was the result of Israel’s “patience running out” over the rocket attacks.

Air strikes

At 11:30am on December 27, 2008, the Israeli Air Force launched an attack in which 88 aircraft simultaneously struck 100 preplanned targets within a span of 220 seconds. The Israel Air Force claimed a 95% success rate with zero misses in the opening attack. Thirty minutes later, a second wave of 60 jets and helicopters struck at an additional 60 targets. The air strikes hit Hamas headquarters, government offices and police stations. The chief of police, Tawfiq Jabber, was killed along with approximately 140 other Hamas security forces. Israeli Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni told reporters that Israel would strike all targets associated with what she called the "illegitimate, terrorist government of Hamas".

At least 230 Palestinians were killed and more than 700 injured on the first day of air strikes. Civilians, including children, were among the casualties. Human rights groups critically note that the attacks began around the time that children were leaving school. The Israeli attack was the deadliest one-day death toll in 60 years of conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, which has led some Palestinians to call it the Massacre of Black Saturday.

In the weeks following the initial air raids, F-15is, F-16is, and AH-64 Apaches continued to target Hamas facilities while also inflicting massive damage to Palestinian infrastructure. Israel used the 2000-pound Mark 84 Joint Direct Attack Munition to attack buildings and tunnels along the Gaza-Sinai border. The 500-pound variant was used against underground bunkers. Israel also used the new PB500A1 laser-guided hard-target penetration bomb which is based on the less sophisticated Mark 83. Unconfirmed reports claim the IAF also used the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb for the first time. Israeli aircraft also utilized synthetic aperture radar targeting pods and high-resolution imaging pods.

According to the IAF, 80 percent of the bombs used by the IAF were precision weapons, and 99 percent of the air strikes hit their targets. A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies points out that whenever possible, IAF executed strikes using the smallest precision-guided weapons, and coordinated both air strikes and the use of artillery weapons using GPS, in a systematic effort to limit collateral damage. In a 2009 interview, Major General Ido Nehushtan said that the only use of non-precision-guided munitions from the Israeli Air Force was in open areas. He went on to say: "We had to find ways to do things as precisely and proportionately as possible, while focusing on how to differentiate between terrorists and uninvolved civilians.

The IDF also targeted homes of Hamas commanders, noting: "Destruction of hundreds of Hamas leaders' homes one of the keys to the offensive's success. The homes serve as weapons warehouses and headquarters, and shelling them has seriously hindered Hamas capabilities." Several high-ranking Hamas commanders were killed, including Nizar Rayan, Abu Zakaria al-Jamal, and Jamal Mamduch. The Hamas leaders often died along with their families in their homes. According to a Hamas spokesperson and Rayyan's son, the IDF warned Rayan, by contacting his cell phone, that an attack on his house was imminent.

Among IDF's measures to reduce civilian casualties were the extensive use of leaflets and phone messages to warn Palestinians, including families in high-risk areas and families of Hamas personnel, to leave the area or to avoid potential targets. Israel used F-4 Skyhawks to deliver more than 2 million leaflets urging the population to evacuate. In a practice codenamed roof knocking, the IDF issued warning calls prior to air strikes on civilian buildings. Typically, Israeli intelligence officers and Shin Bet security servicemen contacted residents of a building in which they suspected storage of military assets and told them that they had 10–15 minutes to flee the attack. At several instances, the IDF has also used a sound bomb to warn civilians before striking homes. In some cases, IDF commanders called off airstrikes, when residents of suspected houses have been able to gather on its roof. IAF developed small bomb that is designed not to explode as it was aimed at empty areas of the roofs to frighten residents into leaving the building. Israel's military used low-explosive missiles to warn civilians of imminent attack and to verify that buildings were evacuated prior to attack. Some of the attacks took place sooner than the warning suggested and many calls were not followed up with attacks. The Israeli Government report claims that while the warning systems implemented by the IDF did not eliminate all harm to civilians, they were apparently effective, due to the fact that in many incidents aerial video surveillance by IDF forces confirmed the departure of numerous residents from targeted areas as a direct result of the warnings prior to the attacks.

Through January 3, 2009, Israel Air Force had flown 555 fighter sorties and 125 helicopter missions. Hundreds of UAV flight hours were logged. They claimed to have destroyed more than 500 targets including one-third of the underground passages built by Hamas and other militant groups to smuggle and store rockets, weaponry, and other supplies. Throughout the initial stages of the air operation, the IDF transmitted messages to civilians in Gaza to stay away from Kassam launch sites and Hamas buildings and infrastructure.

By January 3, 2009, the Palestinian death toll stood at 400, with 25 percent estimated to be civilian casualties. The air offensive continued throughout the ground invasion that followed, and as of January 15, Israeli forces had carried out 2,360 air strikes. No safe haven or bomb shelters existed, making this one of the rare conflicts where civilians had no place to flee.

Naval Operations

The Israeli navy attacked Hamas coastal targets and boats. The Navy coordinated with other Israeli forces and used powerful shipboard sensors to acquire targets. Records of the attacks published by the navy indicate that for the first time vessels were equipped with Spike ER electro-optically guided antiarmor missiles. Videos of an attack showed precision hits from a Typhoon stabilizing gun despite a rolling sea. Versions of the Spike were also used by ground units and possibly by helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles.

Ground invasion

IDF infantry and armor units amassed near the Gaza border on December 28, engaging in an active blockade of the strip. On December 27, Hamas fired rockets into Southern Israel, killing one civilian. On December 29, Hamas rocket fire killed two civilians. A Hamas mortar attack on Nahal Oz army base on December 29 killed one Israeli soldier.

On January 3, the IDF shelled the Ibrahim al-Maqadna mosque in Beit Lahiya. Thirteen people were killed and 30 wounded. Israel has accused Hamas of using this and other mosques, to hide weapons and ammunition, and as cover for firing on the IDF.

On the eve of the ground incursion by Israeli forces, Khaled Mashal assured that should IDF launch ground offensive, black destiny and abduction awaits Israeli soldiers. Hamas spokesman added that with the God's help Gaza will become a graveyard to Israeli troops.

On the evening of January 3, Israel launched a ground operation by sending troops into Gaza for the first time since the start of the conflict. According to the IDF, the intention of the ground invasion, termed the 'second stage' of Operation Cast Lead, was to secure areas within the Gaza strip from which militants continued to launch rockets even after the Israeli air strikes.

Israel utilized the Paratroopers, Golani, and Givati brigades simultaneously entering the Gaza Strip from several unexpected directions to avoid reported booby traps while also outflanking opposing forces. The 401st armored brigade used the Merkava Mk4 tank to quickly control and block access from Rafah and Khan Yunis to Gaza City which cut supply lines to Hamas from the south.

Each brigade combat team was assigned a UAV squadron for close support. This was the first Israeli operation in which UAVs, helicopters, and fighter jets were allocated to ground forces directly without IAF central command authorizing sorties. Air-support controller teams operated alongside brigade commanders at the front emphasizing the brigade commander's utilization of direct air assets. A high degree of situational awareness was achieved by maintaining at least a dozen UAVs in flight over Gaza at all times. Aerial surveillance was provided by Heron and Hermes 450 UAVs and Apache attack helicopters. Along with coordination between the Air Force and ground troops, Israel ground forces were able to utilize cooperation with the Israel Security Agency by having operatives attached to the forward units. This interservice coordination allowed for a higher level of tactical awareness and the ability to strike time-critical targets.

Israeli ground troops entered Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza in the early hours of January 4. Israeli forces reportedly bisected Gaza and surrounded Gaza City, but restricted their movements to areas that were not heavily urbanised. One Israeli soldier was killed and 19 other soldiers were wounded in Jabalia when a mortar shell fired by Hamas fighters landed on their patrol. The Israeli military said that it targeted forty sites, including weapons depots and rocket launch sites.

Three Hamas commanders were killed on January 4 in Israeli strikes.

As Israeli tanks and troops seized control of large parts of the Gaza Strip, tens of thousands of Gazans fled their homes amidst artillery and gunfire, and flooded into the inner parts of Gaza city. Gun battles broke out between Israel and Hamas on the streets of Gaza as Israel surrounded the city. On January 5, 3 Israeli soldiers were killed and another 20 soldiers wounded after an Israeli tank fired at their position, which had been identified as an enemy position. On January 6, at least 125 Palestinians were killed. One Israeli Officer was killed by a misdirected Israeli artillery shell. Hamas fighters also ambushed an Israeli patrol in Gaza city, resulting in a firefight. One Israeli soldier was killed and four other soldiers were wounded. All of the Hamas fighters were killed.

Israeli artillery units also worked closely with battalion commanders. For the first time, the Sheder Ham digitized data, mapping, and command-and-control system linked the Artillery Corps into the Army's overall C4I network. Israel artillery fired approximately 7,000 rounds during the conflict. An Israel Defense Forces colonel stated that tactics and procedures had to suit the difficult urban environment. The number of rounds in the 22-day conflict was 5 percent of the total fired during the 34-day Lebanon war. Under the condition of anonymity, another officer said that close air support missions accounted for more than 90 percent of rounds fired. He also said that about half of those were MA25A1 incendiary based smoke rounds used to used to mask troop movements. Retired U.S. Army colonel Douglas Macgregor gave his opinion as: "They went in heavy, with lots of firepower. But at the same time, because of good intel and other improvements, they were able to be selective and cut down on collateral damage."

On January 6, Israel fired mortar shells at militants near the Al-Fakhura school. Initially, reports mistakenly stated that the attack had directly hit the school and that the victims had taken refuge there to escape the fighting. This created a public outcry and prompted condemnation from Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki Moon, members of the news media, and international aid agencies. The response before it was learned that the school itself was not attacked lead to a renewed push for a cease-fire in the conflict.

Allegations of misconduct by IDF soldiers

Testimonies from Israeli soldiers allegedly admitting indiscriminate killings of civilians, as well as vandalizing homes, were reported in March 2009. Soon after the publication of the testimonies, reports implying that the testimonies were based on hearsay and not on the first-hand experience started to circulate. At the same time, another kind of evidence was collected from several soldiers who took part in the fighting, that rebutted claims of immoral conduct on the military's part during Gaza War. Following investigation, the IDF issued an official report, concluding that alleged cases of deliberate shooting at civilians didn't take place. Nine Israeli rights groups reacting to the closure of the investigation issued a joint statement calling for an "independent nonpartisan investigative body to be established in order to look into all Israeli army activity" in Gaza.

In July 2009, an Israeli NGO Breaking the silence published testimony from 26 soldiers (two junior officers and the rest is enlisted personnel) who took part in the Gaza assault and which claimed that the IDF used Gazans as human shields, improperly fired incendiary white phosphorous shells over civilian areas and used overwhelming firepower that caused needless deaths and destruction. The report did not represent a cross-section of the army, but rather they were troops who had approached the group or were reached through acquaintances of NGO members. An Israeli military spokesperson dismissed the testimonies as anonymous hearsay. Breaking the Silence representative stated that "the personal details of the soldiers quoted in the collection, and the exact location of the incidents described in the testimonies, would readily be made available to any official and independent investigation of the events, as long as the identity of the testifiers did not become public". The representative of the Israeli organisation NGO Monitor charged that the allegations presented in the report frequently rely upon secondhand evidence and hearsay. In response to the report, a dozen English-speaking reservists who served in Gaza delivered signed, on-camera counter-testimonies via the SoldiersSpeakOut group, about Hamas "use of Gazans as human shields and the measures the IDF took to protect Arab civilians".

Attack on Gaza City

On January 8, an exchange of fire took place in Gaza city. Many Hamas fighters were killed in the clash as well as an Israeli officer of the Golani Brigade. In Northern Gaza, Hamas snipers opened fire on Israeli forces conducting an operation, an Israeli soldier. Another Israeli soldier was lightly wounded. In Central Gaza, a force of IDF soldiers entered a building near the Kissfum crossing. As the force entered, Hamas fighters fired an anti-tank missile at them, killing one Israeli officer and wounding one soldier. On the morning of January 11, the IDF started the third stage of the operation with an attack on the suburbs of Gaza City. Israeli forces pushed into the south of the city and reached a key junction to its north. During their advance Hamas and Islamic Jihad ambushed Israeli troops at several locations and heavy fighting ensued. Additionally, the IAF reported that Hamas operatives had tried to shoot down an IAF fixed wing aircraft with anti-aircraft missiles for the first time since operations in Gaza began. Heavy machine gun fire against helicopters had also been unsuccessful.

On January 12, the IDF reported that it had started deploying reserve forces in Gaza.

On January 13, Israeli tanks continued their advance toward the headquarters of Hamas' preventative security building from the al-Karramah neighborhood in the northwest and the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood in the northeast. Before dawn, during the night, troops advanced 300 metres into Tel al-Hawa, a neighborhood which has several high-rise buildings. As troops entered the narrow streets, heavy street fighting with militants ensued leaving three Israeli soldiers wounded and 30 Hamas militants dead or wounded, according to the IDF. By morning IDF soldiers were still advancing slowly towards the city center and several buildings were in flames in Tel al-Hawa, where most of the fighting took place.

On January 15, Israeli artillery started a bombardment of the city while fighting was still going on in the streets. Three high-rise buildings were shelled. The Israeli military reported to have killed dozens of militants, since breaching the city limits four days earlier, while they suffered 20-25 soldiers wounded. Among buildings shelled were the al-Quds hospital, Gaza's second-largest, in the Tel al-Hawa neighborhood.

It was reported that Hamas’s approximately 100-man strong "Iranian Unit" was mostly destroyed during fighting in the Zeytoun neighborhood on January 15. Members of the military wing had previously traveled to Iran for training by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. According Palestinian sources, Iran was preparing for an end to the fighting end the fighting and promised money and resources to rebuild military capabilities and infrastructure destroyed during the fighting.

The headquarters of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was also shelled on January 15. There were 3 people injured and tonnes of food and fuel intended for 750,000 Palestinian refugees was destroyed. The Associated Press initially reported that an anonymous Israeli military official stated that Gaza militants had fired anti-tank weapons and machine guns from inside the compound. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said “it is absolutely true that we were attacked from that place, but the consequences are very sad and we apologize for it, I don't think it should have happened and I'm very sorry.” After the UNRWA dismissed the Israeli claim as "nonsense" Israel ordered an army investigation into the incident. Israeli officials afterwards “came forward to say that preliminary results showed that the militants ran for safety inside the U.N. compound after firing on Israeli forces from outside."

The Givati Brigade penetrated the deepest into Gaza City. The brigade's reconnaissance battalion swept into the Tel el-Hawa neighborhood and took over two 15-story buildings in search of Hamas operatives two days before the cease fire went into effect. The commander of the brigade, Ilan Malka, was critical of Hamas's use of civilian houses and said that he "took many steps to prevent our soldiers from getting hurt." Colonel Ilan Malka told reporters that the IDF had initially predicted each battalion would lose six or seven soldiers.

Humanitarian ceasefires

Due to the number of civilian casualties, Israel faced significant international pressure for a ceasefire. On January 7, Israel opened a "humanitarian corridor" to allow the shipment of aid into Gaza. The Israeli army promised to interrupt fighting for three hours and Hamas agreed not to launch missiles during the pause. Israel repeated the ceasefire either daily or every other day. Aid officials and the UN praised the truce, but said it was not enough as fighting usually resumed immediately following the humanitarian ceasefires.

On January 7, despite the parties’ agreement to halt fighting during aid deliveries, a UN convoy was fired upon, killing two aid workers. The UN initially blamed Israeli tank fire, though an Israeli investigation later cleared the IDF of responsibility. UN sources subsequently admitted "that they were not sure in which direction the truck was headed when it was hit, and could also not say with certainty that tank shells were responsible." As a result of the incident, the UN briefly suspended aid shipments but resumed them on January 9 after receiving assurances from Israel that they were not being targeted. On January 9, an Israeli media report alleged that Hamas fired mortar shells at Israel while aid shipments were taking place.

Palestinian paramilitary activity

According to Abu Ahmed, the official media spokesman of the Al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, Palestinian paramilitary factions in Gaza worked together, operationally and otherwise, to repel the Israeli attack on Gaza. Abu Ahmed told Asharq al-Awsat during the war that, "everybody helps everybody else with regards to food, weapons, and first aid; there is no difference between a member 'Al Quds Brigade' or 'Al Qassam Brigade ' or 'Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade' or 'Abu Ali Mustafa Brigade '. For everybody's goal is the same and their compass is pointing in the same direction, and that is to drive out the occupation and defeat them, and disrupt their plan to dissolve the Palestinian Cause."

Political representatives for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, Saiqa, the Popular Struggle Front, the Revolutionary Communist Party, Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Fatah al-Intifada, and a number of other Palestinian factions in Syria formed a temporary alliance during the offensive as well. They issued a joint statement refusing, "any security arrangements that affect the resistance and its legitimate right to struggle against the occupation," and refusing proposals suggesting international forces be sent to Gaza. The coalition also affirmed that any peace initiatives must include an end to the blockade, and an opening of all of Gaza's crossings, including the Rafah crossing with Egypt.

Preparation

Militants booby-trapped houses and buildings and built an extensive system of tunnels in preparation for combat. A Hamas fighter reported that the group had prepared a tunnel network in Gaza city that would allow Hamas to engage the IDF in urban warfare. IDF commanders said that many Hamas members have dug tunnels for themselves under their homes and hid weapon caches in them. Some houses were booby-trapped with manneqins, explosives and adjacent tunnels: Israeli officers said that houses were set up this way so that "Israeli soldiers would shoot the mannequin, mistaking it for a man; an explosion would occur; and the soldiers would be driven or pulled into the hole, where they could be taken prisoner". A colonel estimated that one-third of all houses encountered were booby-trapped. IDF Brigadier-General Eyal Eisenberg said that roadside bombs were planted in TV satellite dishes, adding that Hamas booby-trapping of homes and schools was "monstrous" and "inhumane". Ron Ben-Yishai, an Israeli military correspondent embedded with invading ground forces, stated that entire blocks of houses were booby-trapped and wired in preparation for urban confrontation with the IDF. Israel claims to have found a map showing "the deployment of explosives and Hamas forces in the al-Atatra neighborhood in northern Gaza." This map allegedly shows that Hamas placed many explosives and firing positions in residential areas, several mosques, and next to a gas station. Israel deployed the elite Sayeret Yahalom combat engineering unit throughout the brigades with new equipment including miniature robots and improved wall-breaching munitions to counter the booby-traps.

Several witnesses told an Italian reporter that on many roofs of the tall buildings that were hit by Israeli bombs, including UN building, there were rocket-launchers or Hamas look-outs. On January 27, the Shin Bet released details given by Hamas captives, including the militants' use of mosques for weapon caches and military training. Militants admitted to the location of Hamas weapon storage sites, in tunnels, in the homes of activists, and in citrus groves and mosques, and told of theory instruction given in mosques as well.

Engagement with Israeli forces

Hamas representatives said they were fighting with the aid of armored vehicles and weapons confiscated from the Palestinian National Authority, given by Israel, the United States and other countries. Hamas and Islamic Jihad manufactured a variety of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), some of which were anti-personnel bombs and others were planted on the sides of roads or underground to be activated against tanks and armored personnel carriers. Some of the IEDs were manufactured from medicine bottles transferred to the Gaza Strip as humanitarian aid by Israel.

Several reports stated that Hamas fighters shed their uniforms shortly after the start of the ground incursion. Hamas hoped to bog Israeli forces down in heavy fighting and inflict heavy casualties on the Israelis. The NY Times quotes a study published by the Israel-based Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, charging Hamas with methodically building its military infrastructure in the heart of population centers. According to the study, Hamas not only hides among the population, but has made a main component of its combat strategy “channeling” the army into the densely populated areas to fight.

Several testimonies from local Gazan population and from IDF soldiers stated that Hamas operatives donned medic uniforms and commandeered ambulances for fighters transportation. An IDF probe, released on April 22 2009, stated that an incident occurred where UN vehicle attacked by IDF occurred when a Palestinian anti-tank squad was being unloaded from the vehicle. Amnesty International rejected the charges by Israel that Hamas had systematically used medical facilities, vehicles and uniforms as a cover, stating that no evidence had been provided proving such actions.

Rocket attacks into Israel

The strike range of Hamas rockets had increased from 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) to 40 kilometres (25 mi) since early 2008 with the use of improved Qassam and factory-made rockets. These attacks resulted in civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. Rockets reached major Israeli cities Ashkelon, Beersheba and Gedera for the first time, putting one-eighth of Israel's population in rocket range. As of January 13, 2009, Palestinian militants had launched approximately 565 rockets and 200 mortars at Israel since the beginning of the conflict, according to Israeli security sources. A source close to Hamas described the movement's use of stealth when firing: "They fired rockets in between the houses and covered the alleys with sheets so they could set the rockets up in five minutes without the planes seeing them. The moment they fired, they escaped, and they are very quick." It is reported that 102 rockets and 35 mortars were fired by Fatah, Hamas's chief rival.

Besides the rockets fired by the Qassam Brigades of Hamas, other factions claimed responsibility for rockets fired into Israel and attacks on Israeli soldiers, including Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (affiliated with Fatah), the Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades, the Quds Brigades and the Popular Resistance Councils. A Fatah official stated that the rocket attacks by his faction contradicted the official position of Mahmoud Abbas, Fatah leader and President of the Palestinian National Authority. Abbas had called on all sides to cease hostilities unconditionally.

Militants fired over 750 rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel during the conflict. Bersheeba and Gedera were the furthest areas hit by rocket or mortars. The rockets killed three civilians and one IDF soldier and wounded 182 people, with another 584 people suffering from shock and anxiety syndrome. The rockets also caused property damage, including damage to three schools. Senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar stated during the operation "they shelled everyone in Gaza.... They shelled children and hospitals and mosques, ... and in doing so, they gave us legitimacy to strike them in the same way."

In addition to the rockets fired from Gaza, Israel experienced other attacks along the borders with Lebanon and Syria.

Unilateral ceasefires

On January 17, Israeli officials announced a unilateral ceasefire, without an agreement with Hamas. In a press conference, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared the ceasefire effective that night, at 00:00 GMT on January 18. The Israeli ceasefire was first suggested by Livni and consists of two phases worked out by Ehud Barak: "First a ceasefire is declared. If Hamas stops firing rockets then Israel pulls its forces out of the Gaza Strip. If rocket fire resumes then the IDF goes back in, this time with the international backing gained by having tried a truce." Olmert declared that the military objectives had been met.

Hamas initially "vowed to fight on", and responded that any continued Israeli presence in Gaza would be regarded as an act of war. Farzi Barhoum, a Hamas spokesman, said before the ceasefire began, "The occupier must halt his fire immediately and withdraw from our land and lift his blockade and open all crossings and we will not accept any one Zionist soldier on our land, regardless of the price that it costs." Palestinian militants resumed rocket fire at Israeli communities the following Sunday morning, four of the supposed six fired landed in or near the town of Sderot. The Israeli military returned fire and carried out an air strike against the rocket launching squad in the northern Gaza Strip.

On January 18, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other paramilitias stated they would stop launching rockets into Israel for one week, on condition that Israel would withdraw its military within this period.

On January 21, Israeli troops completed their pullout from the Gaza Strip.

Shortly after Israel completed its troop pullout, Hamas declared "remarkable victory". Khaled Mashaal said that "the resistance won the battle in Gaza and the enemy failed in the field as it failed in politics. The enemy had to withdraw from the Strip without being able to impose any condition".

Since the unilateral ceasefires were declared on January 17, militants have fired rockets and mortar shells from Gaza, and the IDF has launched airstrikes against Gaza.

Continued negotiations

Egyptian mediators held discussions with Israel and Hamas about extending the cease-fire by a year or more. Hamas and Fatah met in an effort to create a mechanism that would allow both to play a role in rebuilding. Israel began pressuring Egypt to do more to stop weapons smuggling into Gaza, the halting of which is one of Israel's central demands in extending a cease-fire. However, on 27 January 2009, Foreign Minister of Egypt Ahmed Aboul Gheit discouraged Britain, France and Germany from sending warships to patrol the waters off Gaza, which the three European nations felt could help halt seaborne smuggling. Gheit said such efforts would harm Europe's relations with the Arab world. Egypt also reacted coolly to suggestions that European troops should be stationed on the border between Gaza and Egypt to monitor smugglers' tunnels.

Israel, along with many Western and some Arab countries, wanted international aid groups to control aid from donations around the world, so that Hamas would not receive credit for the rebuilding. Hamas, in order to speed up reconstruction, agreed on 27 January 2009 that it would not insist on collecting reconstruction money itself and would allow donated money to flow through different avenues based on the various alliances, although Hamas ultimately expected to administer the aid. But advisors to senior Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh said Israel's willingness to open the border only for humanitarian aid was unacceptable, as Hamas would need much more to rebuild its economy and produce relief to citizens. Haniyeh officials said the cease-fire is contingent on a full border opening.

On 20 January 2009, Barack Obama assumed the Presidency of the United States of America. Soon thereafter, Obama directed George J. Mitchell, his newly appointed special envoy to the Middle East, to visit Israel, the West Bank, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia for peace talks. Mitchell began his meetings in Cairo on 27 January 2009 and Obama said his visit was part of the President's campaign promise to listen to both sides of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and work toward a Middle East peace deal. However, in a continuation of a George W. Bush administration policy, Mitchell did not plan to talk to Hamas, but instead focus on talks with the more moderate Palestinian Authority. A spokesman for Haniyeh said he respected Mitchell, but was disappointed with the envoy's decision not to hold discussions with Hamas.

Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that Israel would not agree to a long term truce or lift the blockade that it has imposed on Gaza without the freeing of Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier held captive in Gaza since June 2006. Hamas has insisted that Shalit's release be dependent on the release of 1,400 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and be kept separate from ceasefire negotiations.

Aftermath

Several months after the war end, Hamas has suspended its use of rockets and shifted focus to winning support at home and abroad through cultural initiatives and public relations, with the aim to build a "cultural resistance". Hamas official stated that "The current situation required a stoppage of rockets. After the war, the fighters needed a break and the people needed a break". Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center notes that Hamas's policy of restraint has come under severe criticism from local radical Islamic organizations, which accused Hamas of abandoning the principle of jihad in order to strengthen its control over the Gaza Strip. Israeli officials say that Hamas military commanders have recognized that their decision to take off their fatigues and don civilian clothing a few days into the fighting was a mistake that might had damaged morale and was perceived by Gazans as indicative that they had lost control of the territory; Hamas militants are now under orders to stay in uniform even if this makes them more easily targeted in Israeli air strikes.

Propaganda and psychological warfare

Hamas

Before and during the conflict, Hamas' senior representatives released number of statements designed to avert Israeli decision-makers from launching any military operation in Gaza and to cause demoralization among Israelis. Before the end of the pre-conflict ceasefire, Hamas boasted that it had countless surprises awaiting Israeli troops, should they advance. Hamas representatives threatened on several occasions to abduct Israeli soldiers, and during the ground invasion tried to spread rumors that it actually had captured or killed more Israeli soldiers.

During the war, Hamas' launches of homemade and Grad rockets into Israeli towns paralyzed life across Israel's south. On a video broadcasted on Al-Aqsa TV on January 10, showing the names of Israeli towns hit by rockets, it was implied Tel-Aviv is the next target and that 'all options are open'. Also, Hamas sent messages in Hebrew to Israeli citizens' mobile phones warning: "Rockets on all cities, shelters will not protect you."

Hamas instrumentalized the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit as a form of psychological weapon, declaring that he had been wounded by Israeli fire, later announcing that his condition was no longer of interest to them.

According to IDF spokesman, Hamas' ruses in the battlefield comprised of Gaza's neighborhoods riddled with booby traps, including mannequins placed at apartment entrances and rigged to explode when the soldiers approach.

Arab television stations reported Hamas-provided statistics for Israeli casualties on the assumption that Israel is distorting its own figures of soldiers killed and wounded.

A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that Hamas propaganda both rejected Hamas responsibility for the fighting and used it to attack the Palestinian Authority.

Dr. Tal Pavel from Israeli think-tank International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) said that Hamas uses its Web sites to make comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany, portraying Israel as a destructive, oppressive regime afraid of Hamas rockets raining on Tel Aviv.

Israel

The day before the beginning of the offensive on December 27 the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) pulled troops back from the border and used its radio channels to broadcast talk of a "lull" in order to achieve disinformation coup ("con") to lure Hamas fighters out of hiding.

A broadcaster in Islamic Jihad's Voice of Jerusalem radio station in Gaza City reported that IDF have been breaking into his station signal "least once an hour" during conflict intensification to broadcast messages to Gaza population that their problems were due to Hamas. The army also dropped leaflets with similar messages and contact info to report about the whereabouts of militant leaders and weapons caches. The leaflets also noted that "the Israeli army will respond if the rocket fire continues." In war zones, leaflets warned local residents that they had to flee. It also warned residents that their homes would be targeted if they were located in an area of possible target. Dr. Yaniv Levitan of the University of Haifa said that the aim of the flyers was not to demoralize the civil population, but to implant recognition in hearts and minds that Hamas has failed, that there is an option of choosing another path.

IDF spokespersons often reported that scores of demoralized Hamas fighters had been observed deserting. The claim strengthened the Israeli will to continue and undermined the confidence in Hamas in Gaza.

There was a mistrust of phone calls warning messages to people that they have "just minutes to evacuate before they bomb the house." According to a human rights lawyer at the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), despite the hundreds of phone calls to families warning their house is about to be blown up, only 37 were destroyed, presumably as of the January 3 date.

Casualties

In January 2009, the Palestinian Ministry of Health, a Gaza governmental office (PMoH), put death toll at total of 1,324 Gazans killed, of which most were civilians. The PMoH stated that 437 children under the age of 16, 110 women, 123 elderly men, 14 medics, and four journalists were among those killed. The wounded include 1,890 children and 200 people in serious condition. Hamas claimed to have suffered only 48 casualties and to have killed at least 80 Israeli soldiers. As of 5 February, the MoH total was revised to 1,440 Palestinians dead, 431 children and 114 women, a rise attributed by the MoH to delays by people in officially registering the deaths of family members due to the conflict. Those who died due to a lack of access to regular health care were not included in these figures.

In March, the PCHR put the death toll at 1,417, of which 926 were civilian, 236 were combatants and 255 were members of the Palestinian security forces. According to PCHR, out of 926 civilians and non-combatants, there are 116 women and 313 minors under 18. The organization has also posted a list of the victims detailing their names, ages, jobs, place of residence, and time and place of the attacks that killed them.

An IDF report on March 26, 2009 listed 1,166 Palestinian fatalities, of which 295 were identified as civilians. According to IDF, out of 295 Palestinian non-combatants, there are 89 under the age of 16 and 49 women The IDF report stated that at least 709 of the deaths were members of a militant organization, including police. Additional 162 Palestinian men were listed by IDF as "unaffiliated," meaning that those names have not been attributed to any militant group.

13 Israelis were killed during the conflict, including four soldiers in two separate friendly fire incidents and three civilians. 182 Israeli civilians were wounded during the conflict. Israel took measures to reduce their casualties. Colonel Ilan Malka told reporters that the IDF had initially predicted each battalion would lose six or seven soldiers. By the end of the conflict, Israel stated that 10 IDF soldiers had been killed and 336 wounded. Out of those figures, five were killed engaging Hamas combatants, four were killed by friendly fire, and one was killed when Hamas rockets hit a military base inside Israel.

Hamas claimed that it lost 48 of its fighters and that at least 80 IDF soldiers were killed.

Other casualties

The World Health Organization reported that sixteen health personnel were killed and that 22 health personnel were injured over the course of the offensive. In response, the Israeli Defense Ministry stated that nine of the sixteen medical personnel killed were Hamas operatives, referring to publications on Hamas affiliated Web sites. The UNRWA reported that five of its staff members were killed and that eleven staff members were injured. The World Food Programme reported that one of its contractors were killed and that two were injured.

Hamas gunmen killed one Egyptian border guard and wounded another on December 28. Shrapnel from an Israeli air strike near the Rafah border crossing wounded two border guards and two Egyptian children. A Ukrainian woman married to a Palestinian and their daughter were killed by Israeli tank shelling on January 8; the couple's other daughter was wounded.

Disputed figures

On February 17, the UN announced that it will compile a casualty report to determine the exact figure of Palestinian casualties. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs will lead the investigation, which will research "data on the number of casualties provided by the Palestinian Health Ministry, the IDF and Gaza-based human rights organizations." Due to its complexity, the work is expected to last "several weeks, if not months" one UN official stated.

The PCHR has issued a statement contesting the IDF figures, saying that it regarded them as a "deliberate manipulative attempt" to distort the reality of the attacks, and to "disguise Israeli illegal actions". The PCHR civilian count included Hamas members killed in what the PCHR assessed were non-combat situations. Similarly, Israeli officials have stated that the PMoH significantly inflated the civilian death toll and played down the number of Hamas casualties. The PCHR's representative reaffirmed further its own figures, saying that extensive investigation and cross-checking was done in researching the numbers and identities of Palestinians killed; he assured that the fatalities list does not include deaths caused by "internal events" or natural causes, refuting allegations from some Israeli security sources. UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes has stated that the PMoH figures have not been seriously challenged.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that police are presumptively civilians but are considered valid targets if formally incorporated into the armed forces of a party to a conflict or directly participating in the hostilities. The IDF has made clear that it regards police under the control of Hamas in Gaza to be inherently equivalent to armed fighters, including them in the militant's count. The PCHR representative argued however that Israel wrongly classified 255 police officers killed at the outset of the war as militants, explaining that International Law regards policemen who are not engaged in fighting as non-combatants or civilians. Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center compiled a report claiming that during Gaza War many supposedly civil policemen were at the same time operatives in Hamas’s military wing. One of ITIC bulletins also presented supposed evidence of Hamas policy to hide details of Hamas men who got killed or injured in the fighting.

The Israeli International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) compiled a report on their research of the casualties figures published by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, supplemented by Hamas and Fatah websites and official Palestinian government online sources. The ICT claimed that many of those listed by PCHR as civilians, including civil policemen, were in fact hailed as militant martyrs by Hamas. The ICT also claimed that some of the civilians were Fatah members killed by Hamas and that among the youngsters counted as children by the PCHR, 18 combatants were identified. Based on their examination of age distribution of the casualties listed by PCHR, the ICT estimated that 63% to 75% of the Palestinians killed in Gaza War appear to have been specifically-targeted, combat-aged males, and stated that PCHR’s own data refutes claim that Israel’s attacks were indiscriminate.

Based on data collected by Amnesty International delegates in Gaza and on cases documented by local NGOs, Amnesty concluded that an overall figure of some 1,400 fatalities is accurate and that, in addition to some 300 children, 115 women and 85 men aged over 50, some 200 men aged less than 50 were unarmed civilians who took no part in the hostilities.

Effects

There were multiple economic, industrial and medical effects of the Gaza War. The United Nations Development Programme warned that there will be long-term consequences of the attacks on Gaza because the livelihoods and assets of tens of thousands of Gaza civilians have been affected.

Early estimates by independent contractors in Gaza say that Gaza lost nearly $2 billion in assets, including 4,000 homes destroyed. The IDF destroyed 600–700 factories, small industries, workshops and business enterprises throughout the Gaza Strip, 24 mosques, 31 security compounds, and 10 water or sewage lines. The World Health Organization said that 34 health facilities (8 hospitals and 26 primary health care clinics) were damaged over the course of the offensive and the UNOCHA said that over 50 United Nations facilities sustained damage, of which 28 reported damage in the first three days of the operation.

A satellite-based damage assessment of the Gaza Strip by the United Nations revealed 2,692 destroyed and severely damaged buildings, 220 impact craters on roads and bridges with an estimated length of 167 kilometres (104 miles) of paved and unpaved roads damaged, 714 impact craters on open ground or cultivated land with an estimated land area of 2,100 hectares (21 square kilometres), 187 greenhouses completely destroyed or severely damaged with an estimated area of 28 hectares (0.28 square kilometres), and 2,232 hectares (22.32 square kilometres) of demolished zones targeted by IDF bulldozers, tanks and phosphorus shelling.

Gaza humanitarian crisis

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that the Gaza strip humanitarian crisis is significant and should not be understated. It also states that the situation is a "human dignity crisis" in the Gaza strip, entailing "a massive destruction of livelihoods and a significant deterioration of infrastructure and basic services". Fear and panic are widespread; 80 percent of the population cannot support themselves and are dependent on humanitarian assistance. The International Red Cross said the situation was "intolerable" and a "full blown humanitarian crisis." The importation of necessary food and supplies continues to be blocked even after the respective ceasefires. According to the World Food Programme, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization and Palestinian officials, between 35% and 60% of the agriculture industry was wrecked. With extensive damage occurring to water sources, greenhouses, and farmland. It is estimated that 60% of the agricultural land in the north of the Strip may no longer be arable. More than 50,800 Gazans were left homeless. Extensive destruction was caused to commercial enterprises and to public infrastructure. According to Palestinian industrialists, 219 factories were destroyed or severely damaged during the Israeli military operation. They accounted as part of the 3% of industrial capacity that was operating after the Israeli blockade was imposed, which was mostly destroyed during the operation.

On January 3, prior to the IDF ground operation, Israel's foreign minister Tzipi Livni said that Israel had taken care to protect the civilian population of Gaza, and that it had kept the humanitarian situation "completely as it should be", maintaining Israel's earlier stance. The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, criticized Livni's statement and further criticized the Security Council for not responding faster to the crisis. On subsequent reports, the UN stated that "only an immediate cease-fire will be able to address the large-scale humanitarian and protection crisis that faces the people of Gaza".

The Emergency Relief Coordinator of the United Nations has stated that after the end of the Israeli operation, at best, only 120 truckloads get into Gaza, instead of the normal daily requirement, including commercial traffic, of 500 trucks at minimum. It is also reported in his statement and other UN humanitarian office reports that essential items such as construction materials, water pipes, electrical wires, and transformers continue to be effectively banned, or only allowed infrequently. He also stated that commercial goods must be allowed in and out, since Gaza Palestinians "do not want or deserve to be dependent on humanitarian aid" and that the "limited trickle" of items into Gaza continue the effective collective punishment of the civilian population and force the counter-productive reliance on tunnels for daily essentials.

As a result of the conflict, the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and over 50 nations donated humanitarian aid to Gaza, including the United States which donated over $20 million. On January 7, a UN Relief Works Agency spokesman acknowledged that he was "aware of instances where deliveries of humanitarian aid into Gaza" were diverted by the Hamas government, though never from his agency. Additionally, on February 3, blankets and food parcels were confiscated by Hamas police personnel from an UNRWA distribution center, and on February 4, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator demanded that the aid be returned immediately. The Hamas government issued a statement stating that the incident was a misunderstanding between the drivers of the trucks and has been resolved through direct contact with the UNRWA. On February 9, UNRWA lifted the suspension on the movement of its humanitarian supplies into Gaza, after the Hamas authorities returned all of the aid supplies confiscated. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has described the Israeli procedures for humanitarian organizations entrance to Gaza as inconsistent and unpredictable ones that impedes the ability of organizations to effectively plan their humanitarian response and obstructs efforts to address the humanitarian crisis brought by the 18 months blockade and Israel's military operation. The UN also reported that international organizations have faced "unprecedented denial" of access to Gaza by Israel since 5 November and that humanitarian access remains unreliable and needs to be granted in a daily basis unrestricted.

In a damage assessment by the World Health Organization, 48% of the 122 health facilities assessed were found to be damaged or destroyed. 15 of Gaza's 27 hospitals and 41 primary health care centers suffered damages. 29 ambulances were partially damaged or destroyed. Injured patients needing referral outside Gaza for specialized care were evacuated exclusively through the Egyptian Rafah border crossing. In the early stages of the conflict, Hamas sealed the border, and prevented wounded Palestinians from seeking medical attention in Egypt. On 30 December, the organization allowed a trickle of medical evacuations from Gaza, but restricted their number. Gaza Ministry of Health reported that between December 29 and January 22, 608 injured were evacuated through Rafah. The Israeli Erez crossing was closed much of the period and only 30 patients were able to exit during the crisis. An initial survey conducted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that 14,000 homes, 68 government buildings, and 31 non-governmental organization offices (NGOs) were either totally or partially damaged. As a result, an estimated 600,000 tonnes of concrete rubble will need to be removed. Since 2007, construction material have not permitted entry into Gaza, adversely affecting UN] projects, in particular UNRWA and UNDP which were forced to suspend more than $100 million in construction projects due to lack of materials.

Israel

During the conflict, life in much of southern Israel was paralyzed. The Israeli Home Front Command issued detailed emergency instructions to Israeli citizens for preparing for and dealing with rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. The instructions included orders to stay within a certain distance of bomb shelters based on proximity to the source of the rockets. Hamas' Grad rockets' increased range of 40 km put more than 700,000 Israelis within strike range, prompting 40% of the residents of the southern city of Ashkelon to flee the city, despite official calls to stay. Schools and universities in southern Israel began to close due to rocket threats on December 27. Palestinian rockets landed on Israeli educational facilities several times during the conflict with no casualties. Studies officially resumed on January 11. Only schools with fortified classrooms and bomb shelters were allowed to bring students in, and IDF Home Front Command representatives were stationed in the schools; attendance was low. The largest hospital on Israel's southern coast, Ashkelon's Barzilai Hospital, moved its critical treatment facilities into an underground shelter after a Gaza-fired rocket struck beside its helicopter pad on December 28.

International law

It has been suggested that this section be split out into another article. (Discuss) (August 2009)

Accusations of violations regarding international humanitarian law, which governs the actions by belligerents during an armed conflict, have been directed at both Israel and Hamas, such as accusations of violating laws governing distinction and proportionality by Israel and the indiscriminate firing of rockets by Hamas at civilian locations. As of September 2009, some 360 complaints had been filed by individuals and NGOs at the prosecutor's office in The Hague calling for investigations into alleged crimes committed by Israel during Operation Cast Lead.

The UN inquiry team

On January 12, 2009, United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) adopted Resolution S-9/1, calling to "dispatch an urgent, independent international fact-finding mission, to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression, and calls upon Israel not to obstruct the process of investigation and to fully cooperate with the mission." The Council also ordered series of periodic reports aimed to assess human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) following the Israel's military operation. The first of the reports is to be presented to the Council in September 2009. The report, compiled by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, alleges that Israeli forces breached laws of armed conflict by attacking indiscriminately civilians in at least several incidents, by targeting civilian and protected facilities, by damaging large number of buildings, by failing to provide unquestionably effective warning to civilians at risk and by failing to implement rules of international humanitarian law regarding military occupation. The report also states that indiscriminate rocket attacks, as well as ill-treatment and extrajudicial execution of detainees by Palestinian armed groups, constitute violations of laws of war.

The UN announced in Spring 2009 that it has commissioned a team of experts, led by South African prosecutor Richard Goldstone, to investigate whether Israel and Hamas committed war crimes during the Gaza war. Hamas had been very cooperative with the team. Israel has stated that UNHRC, which commissioned the investigation, has a history of bias against Israel and ascribed its refusal to cooperate with the mission to its one-sided founding resolution. Israel believes the mission's findings were decided ahead of time, noting that its member professor Christine Chinkin signed an editorial published in the Sunday Times in January calling its operation in Gaza "an act of aggression and contrary to international law". Geneva-based NGO UN Watch submitted in August 2009 a petition to the UN, calling to disqualify professor Chinkin over prior statements she made that bring her impartiality in question. UN Watch further notes that in May 2009 meeting with Geneva NGOs, professor Chinkin denied that her impartiality was compromised, saying that her statement only addressed jus ad bellum, and not jus in bello; however, says UN Watch, the statement not only determined that "Israel’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defence," but additionally charged that they were "contrary to international humanitarian and human rights law," and constituted "prima facie war crimes." The inquiry members rejected the petition and said that on the possible violations of humanitarian law during the fighting, which are the only focus of the mission, the letter co-signed by Professor Chinkin "had expressed no view".

UN Watch stated that despite the promise of the UNHRC president to Judge Goldstone to alter the mandate of the committee to examine conduct of both sides of the conflict, the Council did not ratify changes to mission's mandate at its June session and the council's president does not possess the powers to legislate them on his own.

UN Watch director noted that others, such as former UN high commissioner for human rights Mary Robinson, turned down the mission chairmanship because the resolution was one-sided. Pro-Israeli NGO Monitor noted that before accepting the lead of the committee, judge Goldstone was a member of Human Rights Watch, but resigned after Monitor highlighted the conflict of interest.

The team was deprived of access to military sources and victims of Hamas rockets in Israel, and denied Gaza Strip entrance via Israel. Hamas security had often accompanied the team during their visit to Gaza, suggesting that the ability of witnesses to freely describe the events is questionable. At the end of a four-day fact-finding trip to Gaza, the head of the team expressed his shock by the scale of the destruction in Gaza areas. Goldstone refused to comment on the ongoing investigation's content, but announced that the team will hold public hearings with the war's victims later in June, in Gaza and Geneva. Alex Whiting, a professor at Harvard law school, said cases like the one being probed by the UN inquiry team are hard to investigate, especially without military records.

On July 6, private Israeli witnesses and representatives testified in front of the committee, describing several years' lives under rocket attacks' threat. The last to take the floor was Noam Shalit, father of the Israeli captive soldier Gilad Shalit. Later that day, pro-Palestinian witnesses and experts from Israel and the West Bank testified. The next day, military expert testified on weapons use by Hamas and Israel and international law expert testified at Goldstone’s Gaza hearings. Following the two-days session, Richard Goldstone said that the investigation entered its final phase, but noted, however, that it was too soon to conclude that war crimes were committed during the conflict.

Israelis

The UN Human Rights Council as well as many non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have accused Israel of violating international law as regards collective punishment, targeting civilians,, proportionality, of prohibiting access to medical assistance, and of using civilians as human shields. Richard Falk, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, and AI said that such actions are in violation of international humanitarian law governing the obligations of an occupying force and the laws of war.

Israel has responded to these accusations by stating that use of force in Gaza are acts of self-defense rather than being reprisals or punishment. A study by military analyst Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that Israel did not violate the laws of war during its operation in Gaza. Norman Finkelstein, a political scientist, wrote that Cordesman's study lacked credibility as it is based almost entirely on official Israeli sources and ignored information that was readily available from the UN, NGOs and news reports.

Sixteen human rights campaigners, including Desmond Tutu and Mary Robinson, sent an open letter to the United Nations calling for a "prompt, independent and impartial investigation would provide a public record of gross violations of international humanitarian law committed." The letter stated that the signatories had been "shocked to the core" by the damage inflicted during the Israeli offensive. In response to criticism of using disproportionate force, OC Southern Command Maj.-Gen. Yoav Galant said, "800 terrorists and 300 civilians, who we did not want to harm, were killed ... This ratio of almost a quarter uninvolved is an achievement unmatched in the history of this kind of combat."

In order to protect soldiers from charges for possible war crime charges, the IDF censor banned the publication of the identity of military leaders who fought Hamas in Gaza. In addition, a defense team was set up to co-ordinate a legal defense for civilians and the military, should war crimes charges be raised. Israeli human rights groups criticized the Israeli military for failing to properly investigate violations of the laws of war in Gaza, despite plenty of evidence of possible war crimes.

Attacks on civilians and civilian objects (the principle of distinction)

Israel has been criticized for violating laws covering distinction. Israel has stated that "anything affiliated with Hamas is a legitimate target." This has been criticized as being too broad. Amnesty International (AI) has said that this definition includes, "presumptively civilian" targets such as government ministries that serve no military purpose. Israel has said that these government ministries and the parliament building are part of the Hamas infrastructure and as such legitimate targets. B'Tselem describes Israel's reasoning as being "legally flawed," stating that simple Hamas' affiliation does not make such locations legitimate targets. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) asserted that under various provisions on International Law (e.g., UN Security Council Resolution 1566), Palestinian governing authorities in Gaza, whether directly involved in terror attacks or not, are criminal terrorists, by virtue of their willing provision of finance, plan, support and safe haven for terrorists. AI and B'Tselem point out that in many instances, IDF targeted civilian buildings without providing explanation for the attack, and some of such attacks raise the strong possibility that Israel may have violated the prohibition against targeting objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. AI asserts that those instances would violate Articles 51, 52 and 54 of Protocol I. A Center for Strategic International Studies report notes that the IDF admits it did hit some purely civilian targets, including UN facilities, but says that it is not clear that combatants were not in or near such targets; CSIS also claims that the laws of war require an effort to discriminate, and not perfect success. AI further notes that Israel’s firing of artillery, shelling from tanks and from naval ships into densely populated civilian areas in Gaza may also amount to indiscriminate attacks. Retired U.S. Army colonel said however that the number of artillery rounds was low, indicating considerable restraint from the IDF, and that from military perspective he believes that things could not have been done any differently.

In June 2009, HRW issued a report entitled "Precisely wrong", presenting an investigation of six UAV attacks that resulted in large civilian death. HRW concluded that in the cases probed, Israeli forces either failed to take all feasible precautions to verify that the targets were combatants, or failed to distinguish between combatants and civilians and to target only the former; as a result, HRW deduce that these attacks were a violation of International Humanitarian Law. The report methodology included interviews with victims and witnesses, investigations of the attack sites and IDF and media reports; the probes were based on the presumption that the impact mark and the fragmentation patterns were consistent with the Israeli-produced Spike missile that are used by the drones. The Israeli military did not cooperate with HRW on the report and said that the report appeared to be based on "unnamed and unreliable Palestinian sources" whose military expertise was "unproven". Spike's manufacturer, Israeli concern Rafael, says the missile can be fired not only by drones, but by helicopters, infantry units and naval craft. Several military experts said that drones may reach operational heights of 4,000 metres; the launch of a missile at that altitude would likely elude the naked eye. HRW military expert also conceded that two of the incidents cited took place in the evening or night, something that could potentially rule out anyone seeing the small aircraft.

In July 2009, Amnesty released 117-page report that was based on physical evidence and testimony gathered by a team of four researchers, including a military expert, from dozens of attack sites in Gaza and southern Israel during and after the war. The pattern of Israeli attacks and the high number of civilian casualties "showed elements of reckless conduct, disregard for civilian lives and property and a consistent failure to distinguish between military targets and civilians and civilian objects," Amnesty charged. The group said that hundreds of Palestinian civilians were killed using high-precision weapons, while others were shot at close range. The IDF responded that the report ignores the efforts the military made to minimize harm to innocent civilians that included millions of flyers, personal phone calls to homes of Palestinians and radio broadcasts to warn civilians of the impending operation.

In August 2009, HRW published a report that deals with seven incidents in which 11 Palestinian civilians, including 5 women and 4 children, were killed by Israeli soldiers despite the fact that they were waiving white flags supposedly visible to the IDF. According to the testimonies on which the report is based, the IDF was in control of the areas in which the incidents occurred, no fighting was taking place at the when they occurred and no armed people traveled among the civilians. HRW researches concluded that the Israeli soldiers at best failed to protect civilians, and at worst deliberately shot at them. In one of the cases mentioned in the report, on January 7, Israeli soldiers shot and killed two of the girls of the Abd Rabbo family (aged 2 and 7), wounding the third girl (aged 4) and their grandmother. Pro-Israeli NGOs CAMERA and Monitor found out significant contradictions between the testimonies of the family members and the neighbors that were told HRW and the reports of the incident published in numerous newspapers in winter 2009. In a response to the report, the Israeli military said its soldiers were obligated to avoid harming anyone waving a white flag, but that in some cases Hamas militants had used civilians with white flags for cover. In correlation with the statement, the IDF uploaded a video to the internet depicting what it said was a Hamas gunman planting an explosive device and then attempting to take shelter in a home of uninvolved civilians waving white flags during fighting in Gaza.

Attacks on civil police

HRW points out that under international humanitarian law, police are presumed to be civilian - and thus immune from attack - unless formally incorporated into the armed forces of a party to a conflict or directly participating in the hostilities. HRW representative stated that a decision that police and police stations are legitimate military targets depends on whether those police play a role in fighting against Israel, or whether a particular police station is used to store weapons or for some other military purpose. IDF stated that it perceives police in Gaza as equivalent to the enemy's armed force and as such legitimate targets. Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) alleged that the distinction between the internal security forces and Hamas military wing is not sharply defined and cites Gaza police officials who said that police were instructed to fight the enemy in case of an invasion into the Gaza Strip. Many security force members were reported to "moonlight" with the Izzidin al-Qassam Brigades. Amnesty International criticized Israel for targeting and killing large number of civilian police. One of the traffic course trainees who had participated in the ceremony attacked by IAF on 27 December, 2008, told B'Tselem that they were trained in first-aid and in maintaining order. The Israeli 'Orient Research Group' claimed that 78 of the 89 killed during the first IAF strike were terror operatives, many of them belonging to the al-Qassam Brigades.

The principle of proportionality

Amnesty stated that some attacks on homes of Hamas leaders have killed dozens of civilians, even though it should have been apparent to Israeli forces that the target of attack was not likely to be present or that civilians were likely to be killed in the attack. AI asserted that such conduct may amount to disproportionate attacks, a type of indiscriminate attack, that “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Article 51(5b) of Additional Protocol I). The official report of the Israeli Government, published in July 2009, notes that while Israel is not a party to the Protocol I, Israel however accepts its provisions as reflective of customary international law. A senior legal adviser in Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that a standard practice in assessing the anticipated military advantage, as was established by committee to review NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, is that of 'reasonable military commander' rather than a human rights lawyer. The Israeli Government report further explains that a standpoint of a 'reasonable military commander' implies possessing of such information as was available at the time of the targeting decision.

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) asserts that the rule of distinction permits attacking legitimate targets, even if the attack is expected to cause collateral damage to civilians and even if, in retrospect, the attack was a mistake based on faulty intelligence; moreover, Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention makes clear that the presence of civilians “may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations". CSIS report notes that Israel planned its air and air-land campaigns in ways that clearly discriminated between military and civilian targets and that were intended to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage, by systematic and comprehensive use of its IS&R assets, careful mapping, GPS abilities and guidance from targeting experts briefed in the laws and conventions of war; the report concludes that this aspect of the IDF‘s actions met the key legal test that the anticipated military advantage did not outweigh the risk to civilians. Israeli Government report further adds that on numerous occasions a last-minute decision not to attack legitimate military targets or to divert missiles moments before the impact was upheld to avoid the possibility of civilian harm, even though such an attack might not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. The report claims that the IDF also refrained from attacking Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, despite alleged Hamas’ use of an entire ground floor wing as its headquarters, out of concern for the inevitable harm to civilians present in the hospital.

Food, medical supplies and relief

AI accused Israel of failure to provide adequate supply of food, essential supplies, medicine and medical care to the population of Gaza, as well as deliberate impediment of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance. JCPA asserted that according to Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is under no obligation to provide anything itself; Israel is only required not to interfere with passage of food and so forth sent by others for the benefit of children under age fifteen, mothers of newborns and pregnant women; under Article 23, a party can block passage even of food, clothing and medicine even for these population groups if it has serious grounds for suspecting that the items will be intercepted before reaching their destination. Several instances of Hamas seizing convoys of humanitarian aid were reported before and in the course of the fighting. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that more than 37,000 tons of humanitarian aid were allowed to Gaza from Israel and that numerous efforts for providing medical help took place during the war. The emergency clinic, opened at the Erez crossing at the end of the fighting, was shut down shortly due to the low number of Palestinian patients, supposedly as a the result of a direct order by Hamas not to transfer the wounded to Israel.

Destruction of homes and property

AI points out that according to Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, destruction of homes and property of Palestinians is forbidden, unless it is militarily necessary to do so; unjustified violation of the prohibition is, in accodance with Article 147, a grave breach of the IHL. The comprehensive Amnesty International report, published in July 2009, notes that the destruction of homes, businesses and public buildings during Israeli offensive was in many cases "wanton and deliberate" and "could not be justified on the grounds of military necessity". The report stated that more than 3,000 homes were destroyed and approximately 20,000 were damaged. Deliberations by the IDF during the conflict resulted in a decision that striking homes supposedly used to store weapons, when "sufficient warning" is given to the residents, falls within the boundaries of international law and is therefore legitimate, citing Article 52(2) of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, which defines a site being used for military activities as a legitimate target.

Weapons

Israel has been criticized for using weapons such as white phosphorous and flechette shells which human rights groups have said violate laws on distinction.

The Israeli military used white phosphorus munitions in the Gaza strip. The IDF repeatedly denied using white phosphorus munitions but acknowledged use after the conflict. Israel claims the use was in compliance with international law. The use of white phosphorus against civilians or in civilian areas is banned under international law, but it is legal to use the substance in other conditions such as to illuminate areas during night or as a smoke screen. The weapon has a potential to cause particularly severe and painful burns or death. Military expert, testifying in front of the fact-finding mission in July 2009, told that white phosphorous is used for smoke generation to hide from the enemy. He stated that "the quality of smoke produced by white phosphorous is superb; if you want real smoke for real coverage, white phosphorus will give it to you".

On March 25, Human Rights Watch, published a report titled Rain of Fire, Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza providing, "witness accounts of the devastating effects that white phosphorus munitions had on civilians and civilian property in Gaza."

The Israeli government released a report in July 2009 that stated that the IDF used white phosphorous in exploding munitions and smoke projectiles. The report stated that the use of exploding munitions were used by Israeli ground and naval forces. The report defended the use of these munition stating that they were only fired on unpopulated areas for marking and signaling and not as an anti-personnel weapon. The report further says that the main type of munitions containing white phosphorous employed by the IDF during the Gaza Operation was smoke screening projectiles, which are smoke shells containing felt wedges dipped in white phosphorous. The report suggests that the use of smoke obscurants proved to be highly effective at cloaking IDF forces while obstructing enemy lines of sight and that at no time did IDF forces have the objective of inflicting any harm on the civilian population.

Amnesty International stated that the Israeli army used flechette shells in densely populated civilian areas resulting in the injuries and deaths of civilians. The anti-personnel weapon spreads up to 8000 4 cm long metal darts over a 30,000 square meter area. The army has argued that it has used the weapons very selectively. Use of the munition is not forbidden under international law.

Military expert told Goldstone team that there is no proof that Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) rounds were used, but he is of view that some weapons systems used in the conflict had some sort of DIME component, citing evidence of tungsten, iron, and sulfur in samples analyzed in a forensic lab. He made it clear the intent of Israel if it did indeed use these weapons was to reduce civilian casualties; however, those within the area of dispersal will experience catastrophic injuries, possibly leading to multiple amputations.

Human shields allegations

On March 24, a report from the UN team responsible for the protection of children in war zones was released, it found "hundreds" of violations of the rights of children and accused Israeli soldiers of shooting children, using children as human shields, bulldozing a home with a woman and child still inside, and shelling a building they had ordered civilians into a day earlier. One case involved using an 11-year-old boy as a human shield, by forcing him to enter suspected buildings first and also inspect bags. The report also mentioned the boy was used as a shield when Israeli soldiers came under fire. The Guardian has also received testimony from three Palestinian brothers aged 14, 15, and 16, who all claimed to have been used as human shields.

In the report published by human rights NGO Breaking the Silence in July 2009, two testimonies were dedicated to alleged cases of using Palestinian civilians as human shields who were forced to enter suspect buildings ahead of troops. One of the testimonies were of the Golani Brigade soldier, who said that he had not seen Palestinians being used as human shields but had been told by his commanders that this occurred. Golani Brigade commander Col. Avi Peled said in response that the soldier had not been in combat at the time and that his testimony is based on what he heard happened. Peled added that at no point was there any civilian who was sent in ahead of Israeli troops to any place.

Richard Falk, the UN's Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Palestinian territories, alleged that Israel had confined Palestinian civilians to the combat zone in Gaza and prevented them from leaving during bombardment. Such a practice was a "new crime against humanity", Falk said and called for Israel to be held accountable. Aharon Leshno Yar, Israel's ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council, condemned the report, saying Israel found the report "to have no value except to narrowly further the politicized agenda of the Human Rights Council ... The report grossly and undeniably includes significant factual and legal errors and misrepresentations." NGO UN Watch noted that the USA and the Czech Republic on behalf of the European Union had argued that Falk’s report should be discredited for its unbalanced and unconstructive approach, suggesting that the Human Rights council look into the objectivity of his mandate, which is to only investigate Israel’s violations while ignoring those of the Palestinians.

Attacking and obstructing medical workers

Amnesty International said in their report, published in July 2009, that lives were lost because Israeli forces "frequently obstructed access to medical care". Moreover, Amnesty accused Israel of using civilians, including children, as human shields in Gaza, forcing them to remain in houses which its troops were using as military positions, and to inspect sites suspected of being booby trapped. Israeli military correspondent recorded evidence of a Palestinian family that had insisted on staying in the house occupied by IDF, but at the same time tried to accuse forces of abusing civilians.

Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR) stated the Israeli military violated medical ethics codes during its offensive, not only refusing to evacuate besieged and wounded families, but also preventing Palestinian medical teams from reaching the wounded. PHR quoted figures issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) which showed 16 Palestinian medical personnel were killed by Israeli fire during the offensive and that 25 were wounded while performing their duties. The IDF representative said in response that Hamas fighters had "methodically made use of medical vehicles, facilities and uniforms in order to conceal and camouflage terrorist activity, and in general used ambulances to carry terror activists and weapons." An IDF investigation, published on April 22, 2009, stated that seven Palestinian medical personnel have been killed by the IDF, of which five were Hamas operatives (including a nephew of the Health Minister in Gaza) and two were civilians. The Israeli Government report published in July 2009 further states that some of the reported cases of attacks on medical personel were based on false information; in one such case the supposedly killed driver of the ambulance was allegedly interviewed on a Hamas website a few days after the incident.

The PHR report further claimed that the Palestinian health system "collapsed" during the operation and failed to provide adequate medical care for the wounded. The WHO report, however, noted that there was no shortage in medicine or medical supplies and that hospitals were never more than 75% full.

The PHR report accused the IDF of failing to assist in the evacuation of wounded Palestinians from the battlefield, claiming that the army had "created countless obstacles for the rescue teams in the field who attempted to evacuate trapped and injured persons." The Defense Ministry, however, said in its report that the Palestinian health authorities had refused to cooperate with the Gaza Coordination and Liaison Administration (CLA) to coordinate the transfer of wounded to Israel, despite "numerous requests by the CLA".

Attacks on UN facilities

Ban Ki-Moon ordered a UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry led by Ian Martin to independently investigate the nine most serious attacks on UN personnel and property. Israeli Government report says that while Israel viewed this inquiry as premature, pending the conclusion of its internal investigations, it cooperated fully with the Board, providing it with pertinent information.

Israel was faulted in seven of the nine cases, and Hamas was found guilty in one of the nine. The Israeli Government report notes however that the test applied by the Board was merely whether the physical premises of U.N. facilities had been affected and not whetgher the Laws of Armed Conflict were violated.

One of those included an UNRWA school incident in Jabalia that the UN says killed between 30 and 40 people. IDF officials claim the UN has confirmed that shells fired by Israeli forces landed outside the school compound. The report accused Israel of "gross negligence" and also stated that allegations that militants had fired from within U.N. premises "were untrue, continued to be made after it ought to have been known that they were untrue, and were not adequately withdrawn and publicly regretted." Ban plans to seek up to $11 million in damages from Israel

Israeli officials rejected the report as one-sided, saying it ignored the fact that Israel was fighting a war against a terrorist organization. The IDF conducted its own probe into claims regarding incidents where UN and international facilities were fired upon and damaged. The findings published argue that in all the cases investigated, the damage resulted either from retaliatory fire or from misuse of the UN vehicles by Hamas militants and that there were no deliberate intentions to hit UN facilities.

Palestinians

Attacks directed against civilians and civilian objects

As stated by several sources, including the UN official and Human Rights Watch report published in August 2009, deliberate and systematic targeting of civilians and civilian objects in southern Israel since 2001 by Palestinian armed groups' rocket attacks violates International Humanitarian Law and amount to war crimes. Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) note that such attacks contravene the Principle of Distinction, as encapsulated by Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949: "it is strictly prohibited to direct attacks at civilian objects or civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities". Furthermore, former Canadian justice minister and McGill University law professor, Irwin Cotler, and the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center point out that violation of this prohibition also amounts to a war crime as defined in the Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) and B'Tselem reports notice that even if the above attacks were directed at a specific military objective, they would still be unlawful, due to the fact that the types of rockets used by Palestinian armed groups are imprecise and cannot be directed in a way that discriminates between military targets and civilians.

In 2007, exiled Hamas political chief Khaled Mashaal called recent rockets attacks on Israel "self-defense". Hamas leaders argue that "rocket attacks on Israel are the only way to counter Israel's policies and operations, including artillery strikes". Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch has said that such justifications do not overcome the illegality of the attacks under laws governing reprisals, which prohibit direct or indiscriminate attacks on civilians. In its August 2009 report, HRW notes that the absence of Israeli military forces in the areas struck by the rockets, as well as statements from the leaders of Hamas and other armed groups, indicate that many of these attacks are deliberately intended to strike Israeli civilians and civilian structures; individuals who willfully authorize or carry out deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against civilians are committing war crimes.

The Amnesty report, published in July 2009, said Palestinian militants rocket fire from the Gaza Strip was "indiscriminate and hence unlawful under international law", regardless of small number of civilian casualties. Hamas official rejected the report as "unbalanced, unfair and unprofessional," calling the firing of rockets "self defense" and a legitimate response to Israel's actions.

HRW report, published in August 2009, says that the rocket attacks have also placed civilians in Gaza at risk, killing several local residents; furthermore, Palestinian armed groups have frequently violated the laws of war by firing rockets from within populated areas, failing to take all feasible precautions to avoid placing military targets within densely populated areas. In a response to HRW report, Hamas spokesman denied the charges, saying that "Hamas did not fire rockets from residential areas, Hamas does not target civilians".

Attacks aimed to spread terror

HRW points out that primary purpose of the rocket attacks seems to be at least to spread terror among the Israeli civilian population. HRW adds that the rockets have created a pervasive climate of fear among people in the areas where they can reach. During the fighting, the psychological effect of the rocket strikes paralyzed life across Israel's south. HRW official stated that "firing rockets into civilian areas with the intent to harm and terrorize Israelis has no justification whatsoever, regardless of Israel's actions in Gaza". Military expert, who testified in front of the fact-finding UNHCR mission in July 2009, said that rockets launched from Gaza Strip belong to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) type of weapon that incorporate “destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic materials” that are used in 70% of global terror attacks. He further noticed that the level of lethal damage of IEDs is low compared to other means and that their primary impact on the target is psychological. ITIC asserted that the attacks aimed at sowing terror among Israel's civilian population are prohibited under International Humanitarian Law and violate Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions: "Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited."

Attacks from populated areas

The BBC reported on January 5 that "Witnesses and analysts confirm that Hamas fires rockets from within populated civilian areas. Amnesty International assessed that Hamas fighters put civilians in danger by firing from homes. United Nations Humanitarian Affairs Chief John Holmes accused Hamas of "reckless and cynical" use of civilian facilities during the hostilities in the Gaza Strip, and told that the above, as well as indiscriminate firing of rockets against civilian populations, are clear violations of International Humanitarian Law. In the course of the fighting, purported evidencies of Hamas' exploitation of civilian infrastructure were recorded in ITIC reports. A study by CSIS suggests that Hamas must share responsibility for the outcome on the civil population, as it seems to have relied on the population density of Gaza to both deter Israeli attacks, and as a defense against Israeli offensive. Irwin Cotler said that attacks from within civilian areas and civilian structures in order to be immune from a response, e.g. apartment building, a mosque or a hospital, are unlawful; he argues that in these cases Hamas bears legal responsibility for the harm to civilians, as enshrined in general principles of International Humanitarian Law. ITIC] accused Hamas of making systematic use of protected civilian areas (including homes and mosques) for the hiding and storage of rockets, explosives and ammunition; using of civilian facilities (such as universities) for weapons development; calling on Palestinians to flock to targets which are expected to be attacked in order to form "human shields". ITIC states that such conduct contravenes the Laws of Armed Conflict and some of the practices above, e.g. Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the International Criminal Court, amount to a war crime.

The Amnesty report, issued in July 2009, found no evidence that Palestinian militants had forced civilians to stay in buildings being used for military purposes, contradicting Israeli claims that Hamas repeatedly used "human shields"; however, Amnesty assumed that Palestinian militant groups had endangered civilians by firing rockets from residential neighbourhoods and storing weapons in them. HRW researchers said that they did not find instances in which Palestinian fighters had fired from within the midst of the civilian population; however, they pointed out that the International Crisis Group interviewed three Hamas fighters in January who said, "They had often fired rockets in close proximity to homes and from alleys, hoping that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding."

Use of the emblems of the Geneva Conventions

The Israeli security services chief Yuval Diskin suggested at the start of the offensive that Hamas militants were hiding at Gaza hospitals, some disguised as doctors and nurses. IDF probe, issued in April 2009, asserted that Hamas seniors, including Ismail Haniyeh, were taking over a ward of the Shifa Hospital, the Gaza Strip's largest, and set up a command center for the duration of the campaign. The Palestinian Authority's Health Ministry in Ramallah accused Gaza-based security services of turning several hospitals and Red-Crescent clinics in Gaza into interrogation and detention centers during and after the war and expelling medical staffers. ITIC stated that alleged evidences of improper use of protective emblems of the Geneva Conventions, as well as hiding in hospitals, constitute acts prohibited under the Laws of Armed Conflict, e.g., Article 44 of the First Geneva Convention. Irwin Cotler told The Jerusalem Post that misuse of humanitarian symbols, like using an ambulance to transport fighters or weapons or disguising oneself as a doctor in a hospital, amounts to war crimes.

Amnesty International released a report on July 1, 2009 that rejected the charges by Israel that Hamas had systematically used medical facilities, vehicles and uniforms as a cover, stating that no evidence had been provided proving such actions.

Perfidy principle

Hamas fighters presumptively wore civilian clothes and concealed their weapons as fighting tactics. The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) alleges that militants not dressed in uniform while carrying out attacks feign civilian status and endanger innocent Palestinian civilians; JCPA notes that this practice is called perfidy that is prohibited under International Humanitarian Law (Art. 37 of the Protocol I).

Extrajudicial violence

HRW points out that recorded cases of extrajudicial executions, torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary detentions against alleged collaborators and spies are prohibited under Article 3 of Fourth Geneva Convention.

Hamas has been accused of executing several Fatah members and Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. In April 20, 2009, HRW published its report titled Under Cover of War Hamas, Political Violence in Gaza, claiming at least 32 people were killed. Fatah officials in Ramallah reported Hamas executed at least 19 party members and more than 35 Palestinians. The Palestinian Center for Human Rights stated on January 31 that "it had credible reports that Hamas operatives killed six members of Fatah" and that another "35 were shot in the knees or beaten." The Hamas government in Gaza endorsed the killing of Israeli collaborators but denied allegations it had attacked members of Fatah during the conflict. A Hamas spokesperson said that the internal security service "was instructed to track collaborators and hit them hard." Hamas also said that "the government will show no mercy to collaborators who stab our people in the back, and they will be held accountable according to the law... if any collaborator is sentenced to death, we will not hesitate to carry it out." Hamas later accused Fatah of spying for Israel during the conflict, claiming that the espionage was what had enabled Israel to create massive damage and hit targets with precision.

Media

The Foreign Press Association of Israel released a statement saying, “The unprecedented denial of access to Gaza for the world’s media amounts to a severe violation of press freedom and puts the state of Israel in the company of a handful of regimes around the world which regularly keep journalists from doing their jobs.”

Media facilities in Gaza, both foreign and domestic, came under Israeli fire in the military campaign. On one occasion a Grad rocket may have been launched from a location near the television studios in the Al-Shuruk tower in Gaza City. Although the Israeli recording of a reporter describing a missile launch was during the initial aerial bombardment phase the tower was only bombed in the final few days. On December 29, the IDF destroyed the facilities and headquarters of Al-Aqsa TV (though broadcasts continue from elsewhere), and on January 5, the IDF bombed the offices of the Hamas-affiliated Al-Risala newsweekly. On January 9, the IDF hit the Johara tower of Gaza City, which houses more than 20 international news organizations, including Turkish, French, and Iranian outlets.

Media relations also played an important role, with the use of new media (up to and including cyber warfare) on the part of both Israel and Hamas. Haaretz reported that Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni "instructed senior ministry officials to open an aggressive and diplomatic international public relations campaign in order to gain support for Israel Defense Forces operations in the Gaza Strip." Israeli officials at embassies and consulates worldwide have mounted campaigns in local media, and to that end have recruited people who speak the native language. Israel has also opened an international media centre in Sderot. In an effort to improve Israeli public relations, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption has recruited 1,000 volunteers with the objective of flooding news websites and blogs that the ministry term as anti-Israeli with pro-Israeli opinions. Volunteers proficient in languages other than Hebrew were particularly sought after.

Foreign Press Branch head Avital Leibovich believes the "new media" is another war zone, stating, "We have to be relevant there." As part of its public-relations campaign, the Israeli army opened a Youtube channel “through which it will disseminate footage of precision bombing operations in the Gaza Strip, as well as aid distribution and other footage of interest to the international community.”

Reactions

The United Nations Security Council issued a statement on December 28, 2008 calling "for an immediate halt to all violence". The Arab League, the European Union and many nations made similar calls. On January 9, 2009, following an earlier, failed attempt at a ceasefire resolution, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1860 calling for "an immediate, durable and fully respected cease-fire" leading to a full Israeli withdrawal and an end to Gaza arms smuggling, by 14 votes to one abstention (the United States). The resolution was ignored by both Israel and Hamas.

Most governments condemned both belligerents, or neither of them. Thirty-four states condemned Israel's attacks exclusively, expressed support for Hamas' operations, or defined them as falling within its right of self-defense and resistance. Bolivia, Jordan, Mauritania and Venezuela significantly downscaled or severed their relations with Israel in protest of the offensive. Nineteen states condemned Hamas' attacks exclusively and or expressed support for Israel's operations or defined them as falling within Israel's right to self defense. The conflict was marked by worldwide civilian demonstrations for and against both sides, with many protesters disagreeing with their governments' official position on the conflict. Protests in Egypt led to controversial police detentions of Islamist protesters.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei issued a religious decree to Muslims around the world on December 28, ordering them to "defend the defenseless women, children and people in Gaza in any way possible", and calling those who die as "martyr". More than 70,000 Iranian student volunteers have registered to carry out attacks against Israel. Several riots broke out in Tehran where students demanded to be sent to Gaza where they could fight the Israelis.

The Israeli offensive also "prompted a wave of reprisal attacks against Jewish targets in Europe". The worldwide number of recorded antisemitic incidents during the conflict more than tripled the number of such incidents in the same period of the previous year, marking a two-decade high. The conflict also triggered violence against Muslims in France according to President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The British government reviewed all export licenses to Israel for violations of EU and national arms export control laws and decided to revoke the export licenses for a number of armaments because they were used by Israel in the Gaza offensive. The revocation of the export licenses applied to replacement parts and other equipment for Sa'ar 4.5 gunships used by Israel. British policy is not to export armaments "where there is a clear risk that arms will be used for external aggression or internal repression." Ever since the Israeli offensive, human rights organizations in Britain have exerted pressure on the British Parliament to evaluate whether export control laws were broken by Israel's use of British armaments.

See also

• 2008 Israel–Hamas ceasefire
• 2008–2009 Israel–Gaza foreign involvement
• Military equipment of Israel
• Palestinian domestic weapons production
• Civil defense in Israel
• Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas' military wing)
• Gaza Strip smuggling tunnels

References

1. ^ Shane Bauer. "Palestinian factions united by war". Al Jazeera English. Retrieved 2009-01-23.
2. ^ "Hamas leader in Syria announce one-week ceasefire in Gaza". Xinhua. 2009-01-18. Retrieved 2009-08-03.
3. ^ "Hamas agrees to 1-week ceasefire". CBC News. 2009-01-18. Retrieved 2009-08-03.
4. "Israel rejects EU calls for immediate cease-fire".
5. "Israeli jets kill 'at least 225' in strikes on Gaza". The Sunday Times. Times Online. 2008-12-28. Retrieved 2009-02-27.
6. ^ "ABC News: Israeli Troops Mobilise as Gaza Assault Widens". Abcnews.go.com. Retrieved December 28, 2008.
7. ^ Al-Mughrabi, Nidal. Israel tightens grip on urban parts of Gaza, Reuters, January 12, 2009.
8. ^ "Hamas rocket team leader killed, Israel says". CNN. January 10, 2009.
9. Israel steps up attacks in Gaza; Hamas indicates it's open to a truce. By Sebastian Rotella and Rushdi abu Alouf. January 13, 2009. LA Times.
10. ^ Current events Embassy of Israel in Washington DC.
11. ^ Field update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator. 24-26 January 2009. OCHA oPt (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory). .
12. ^ "Confirmed figures reveal the true extent of the destruction inflicted upon the Gaza Strip; Israel's offensive resulted in 1,417 dead, including 926 civilians, 255 police officers, and 236 fighters" (Press release). Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. 19 March 2009. Retrieved 19 March 2009.
13. ^ Lappin, Yaakov. IDF releases Cast Lead casualty, The Jerusalem Post, March 26, 2009.
14. סוכנויות הידיעות. "קצין מצרי נהרג מירי אנשי חמאס סמוך למעבר רפיח" (in Hebrew). nana10.co.il. Retrieved 2009-01-01.
15. ^ "Two Egyptian Children, Police Injured in Israeli Air Strike Near Gaza Border". 2009-01-11.
16. "Gaza homeless toll 'hits 50,000'" news.bcc.co.uk 19 January 2009 Link retrieved 19-01-09
17. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7845428.stm
18. ضحايا مجزرة غزة يقارب الـ3 آلاف في اليوم التاسع للعدوان Archived from the original on 2009-01-06
19. Euro-Muslims Editorial Desk. "Euro Muslims' Stance on Gaza Massacre". Retrieved 2009-08-23.
20. John Docker and Ned Curthoys (January 9, 2009). "Unleashed: The Gaza Massacre". ABC (Australia).
21. "Unmentioned Casualties of the Gaza Massacre". Palestine Monitor. 30 December 2008. Retrieved 2009-08-23.
22. Al-Mughrabi, Nidal. Israel tightens grip on urban parts of Gaza, Reuters, January 12, 2009; Lappin, Yaakov. IDF releases Cast Lead casualty, The Jerusalem Post, March 26, 2009.
23. Gaza 'looks like earthquake zone', BBC News, January 19, 2009; 'Scale of Gaza destruction emerges', BBC News, January 19, 2009; Beaumont, Peter. A life in ruins, The Observer, July 5, 2009.
24. Bright, Arthur (December 26, 2008). "Report: Israel set to launch 'limited operation' in Gaza". Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 21 August 2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help)
25. Harel, Amos. Most Hamas bases destroyed in 4 minutes, Haaretz, December 28, 2008; McCarthy, Rory and Batty David. Israeli warplanes destroy Gaza houses and mosque as air strikes continue, The Guardian, January 2, 2009.
26. Rockets land east of Ashdodm Ynetnews, December 28, 2008; Rockets reach Beersheba, cause damage, Ynetnews, December 30, 2008.
27. Hamas, Israel set independent cease-fires, CNN International; Last Israeli troops 'leave Gaza', BBC News, January 21, 2009.
28. ^ . HRW. 2009-01-10 http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/10/israel-stop-unlawful-use-white-phosphorus-gaza. Retrieved 2009-01-23. {{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help); Text "title Israel: Stop Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza" ignored (help)
29. "Disease risk assessment and interventions; Gaza January 2009" (PDF). World Health Organization. 2009-01-20. Retrieved 2009-02-05.
30. ^ "Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: The conflict in Gaza: A briefing on applicable law, investigations and accountability". Amnesty International. 2009-01-19. Retrieved 2009-06-05.
31. "Human Rights Council Special Session on the Occupied Palestinian Territories" July 6, 2006; Human Rights Watch considers Gaza still occupied.
32. Levs, Josh (2009-01-06). "Is Gaza 'occupied' territory?". CNN. Retrieved 2009-05-30.
33. "Legal Acrobatics: The Palestinian Claim that Gaza is Still "Occupied" Even After Israel Withdraws". JCPA. August 26, 2005.
34. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1202657415718&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull
35. http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804?printable=true&currentPage=all
36. http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/242029.htm
37. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘THE “GAZA WAR”: A Strategic Analysis,’ Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2009 p.7
38. Isabel Kershner (2007-12-14). "Abbas's Premier Tells Israel to Reopen Gaza". New York Times.
39. Kevin Dowling, 'Strikes on Gaza continue ahead of imminent ceasefire,' The Times 17/01/2009 p.2
40. "Rocket Statistics, 3 Jan 2009". IDF Spokesperson Report. Retrieved 2009-02-26.
41. ^ "POC_Monthly_Tables_October_2008" (PDF). OCHA-oPt. October 2008. Retrieved 2009-02-25.
42. Isabel Kershner (2008-06-25). "Rockets hit Israel, breaking Hamas truce". International Herald Tribune.
43. Hamas offering Israel truce, not peace. USA Today. Published 3/12/2008.
44. ^ BRONNER, ETHAN (2008-12-19). "Gaza Truce May Be Revived by Necessity". New York Times. Retrieved 2009-02-12.
45. "Israel Agrees to Truce with Hamas on Gaza". NY Times. 18-06-2008. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
46. UN Press Conference on Gaza humanitarian situation
47. BBC
48. Guardian Gaza truce broken as Israeli raid kills six Hamas gunmen Rory McCarthy 5 November 2008
49. FACTBOX-Israel, Palestinians trade blame for truce violations Reuters. 26 Jun 2008
50. "Official Statistics About the lull Zionist Violations From the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades Information Office" - "إحصائية رسمية صادرة عن المكتب الإعلامي لكتائب القسام حول الانتهاكات الصهيونية للتهدئة". Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades Information Office. 2008-12-18. Archived from the original on 2009-01-17. Retrieved 2009-01-17.
51. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e007.pdf
52. Six Months of the Lull Arrangement Intelligence Report Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC) December 31, 2008
53. Summary of Rocket Fire and Mortar Shelling in 2008. (pdf) Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. Retrieved January 14, 2009. pp. 5-7. Drop in rocket fire calculated from data provided in report.
54. Porter, Gareth (2009-01-09). "Israel Rejected Hamas Ceasefire Offer In December". Huffington Post. Inter Press Service. Retrieved 2009-01-23.
55. Rory McCarthy (11/5/2008). "Gaza truce broken as Israeli raid kills six Hamas gunmen". Guardian. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
56. Hider, James (November 6, 2008). "Six die in Israeli attack over Hamas 'tunnel under border to kidnap soldier'". Retrieved 2009-01-08. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |source= ignored (help)
57. "Israel decides to maintain Gaza blockade". The Telegraph. 2008-11-17. Retrieved 2009-01-23.
58. ""Hamas militants step up rocket attacks"". November 15, 2008. Retrieved 2009-01-08. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |source= ignored (help)
59. Sofer, Roni (December 13, 2008). "Israel in favor of extending Gaza lull". Ynetnews. Retrieved December 27, 2008.
60. "Israeli leaders 'to topple Hamas'". BBC News. 2008-12-22. Retrieved 2009-01-23.
61. Harel, Amos (December 21, 2008). "Hamas declares end to cease-fire, Israeli gov't sources fear violence is unavoidable". Haaretz. Retrieved December 27, 2008. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
62. "Israeli jets target Gaza tunnels". BBC. December 28, 2008. Retrieved February 18, 2009.
63. Nahmias, Roee (December 23, 2008). "Hamas: Willing to renew truce". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved 2009-03-20.
64. al-Mughrabi, Nidal (December 24, 2008). "Flare-up dims truce hopes along Israel-Gaza border". Gaza City, PS: Reuters. Retrieved 2009-01-03.
65. Katz, Yaakov (December 24, 2008). "IDF gets green light to strike Hamas after rocket barrage". Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on December 30, 2008. Retrieved December 27, 2008. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
66. "Hamas: 87 shells fired at Israeli targets in 24 hours". Bethlehem, PS: Ma’an News. 2008-12-25. Retrieved 2009-01-03.
67. "Olmert Delivers 'Last Minute' Warning to Gaza". December 25, 2008.
68. "Ha'aretz".
69. "Israeli attacks on Gaza kill 227". Yahoo. December 27, 2008. Retrieved 2008-12-27.
70. "Israel Reopens Gaza Crossings". The New York Times. December 26, 2008. Retrieved December 27, 2008.
71. Ravid, Barak (December 27, 2008). "Disinformation, secrecy, deception: How the Gaza offensive came about". Haaretz. Retrieved December 27, 2008.
72. "Six months of secret planning - then Israel moves against Hamas". The Guardian.
73. Barak Ravid. "Disinformation, secrecy and lies: How the Gaza offensive came about". Ha'aretz.
74. ^ ">"In Gaza, Both Sides Reveal New Gear". Defense News. January 05, 2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
75. ^ Katz, Yaakov (December 28, 2008). "A year's intel yields 'alpha hits'". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved December 28, 2008.
76. ^ "Casualties". Reuters. December 27, 2008.
77. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israelopt-immediate-access-humanitarian-workers-and-observers-essential-20081231
78. name="Alarabiya1">At least 205 killed as Israeli pounds Gaza, Alarabiya, December 27, 2008
79. http://www.newsoftheworld.co.uk/news/112090/Merciless.html
80. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5404501.ece
81. Barzak, Ibrahim (2009-01-04). "Israeli troops, tanks slice deep into Gaza". azcentral.com. Retrieved 2009-02-18. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
82. ^ Eshel, David (2009-05-11). "New Tactics Yield Solid Victory in Gaza". Aviation Week. Retrieved 2009-07-03.
83. "Examining the Conduct of IDF Operations in Gaza". The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. March 27, 2009.
84. ^ Opall-Rome, Barbara (2009-03-08). "Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan". DefenceNews. Retrieved 2009-08-04.
85. Hanan Greenberg (January 18, 2009). "IDF ponders response to rocket fire". Ynet.
86. "Profile of a professor who was prepared for martyrdom". The Independent. 2009-01-02. Retrieved 2009-01-04.
87. "Hardline Hamas leader killed in air strike on Gaza home". The Telegraph. January 1, 2009. Retrieved 2009-01-02.
88. ^ "Hamas leader, 20 Palestinians killed in IAF strikes". Ynet. 2009-01-09. Retrieved 2009-01-09.
89. Kershner, Isabel (2009-01-02). "As bombing continues, Israel allows some foreigners to leave Gaza". International Herald Tribune. Retrieved 2009-01-04. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
90. ^ "IDF phones Gaza residents to warn them of imminent strikes". Haaretz. January 02, 2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
91. ^ "Gaza War Full of Traps and Trickery". The NY Times. January 10, 2009.
92. "We are not all Hamas now". Times. January 11, 2009.
93. Kurz, Anat N. (2009-01-04). "A response to a Euro-Mediterranean appeal". opinion.jpost.com. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 2009-01-10. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help) Archived version 2009-01-29
94. Harel, Amos (2009-01-04). "IDF targets senior Hamas figures". Haaretz.com. Haaretz. Retrieved 2009-01-09. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
95. ^ "Gaza Humanitarian Situation Report - January 2, 2009 as of 14:30". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-01-02. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-01-02. Retrieved 2009-01-02.
96. ^ FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS, IMFA, 30 July 2009
97. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7809699.stm
98. Donald Macintyre and Kim Sengupta (January 15, 2009). "Civilian casualties: Human rights groups accuse Israelis of war crimes".
99. "Situation Report From The Humanitarian Coordinator - January 7, 2009, 1700 hours". UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-01-07. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-01-07. Retrieved 2009-01-07.
100. ^ Opall-Rome, Barbara (2009-05-11). "Gaza War Is Battle Lab for Joint Combat Ops". DefenceNews. Retrieved 2009-08-06.
101. ^ Human Rights Watch accuses Israel over Gaza drones, Reuters, 30 June, 2009
102. "Israel reinforces troops, ground offensive possible". China Daily. December 28, 2008. Retrieved December 28, 2008.
103. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3646961,00.html
104. ^ Israeli troops enter Gaza Strip BBC News. 2009-01-03
105. Six children among 12 killed in mosque blast The Guardian. 2009-01-04.
106. IDF bombs mosque during Gaza operations, killing thirteen worshipers January 4, 2009
107. "Gaza: Hamas gunmen hide in hospitals". YNET. 2008-12-31.
108. FACTBOX-Developments in Gaza fighting, Jan 17, Reuters 17-01-2009
109. "Hamas threatens 'black destiny' if Israeli soldiers enter Gaza". Daily Telegraph. 03-01-2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
110. "Israel continues Gaza assault". Al Jazeera. 03-01-2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
111. "Israel rolls its tanks into Gaza to storm Hamas rocket bases". Dailymail. 04-01-2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
112. Harel, Amos (January 3, 2009). "Israel launches a ground operation in the Gaza Strip". Jerusalem, IL: Haaretz. Retrieved 2009-01-03. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
113. Greenberg, Hanan (2009-01-03). "IDF enters Gaza; dozens of terrorists hurt". Retrieved 2009-01-03.
114. Israeli ground troops enter Gaza, Al Jazeera English. 2009-01-04
115. IDF soldier killed, another seriously wounded in Gaza ground operation, Haaretz, 2009-01-04
116. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3650496,00.html
117. McCarthy, Rory (2009-01-05). "Thousands flee guns and shells as Israel tightens grip on Gaza".
118. "Israel presses on with Gaza attack". Reuters. 2009-01-05.
119. Israeli troops and Hamas fighters clash in Gaza City Guardian.co.uk. 2009-01-05.
120. Opall-Rome, Barbara (2009-03-23). "Adapting Artillery to Urban War". DefenceNews. Retrieved 2009-08-06.
121. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304655600&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
122. Account of Israeli attack on Gaza school doesn't hold up to scrutiny. By Patrick Martin. Globe and Mail (Toronto, Canada). Published January 29, 2009.
123. ^ BBC: Israel troops admit Gaza abuses
124. Times on Line Israeli soldiers admit to deliberate killing of Gaza civilians by James Hider
125. ^ "Israel Disputes Soldiers' Accounts of Gaza Abuses". The NY Times. March 27, 2009.
126. "Israel IDF soldiers rebut claims of immoral conduct in Gaza". Ynet. March 19, 2009.
127. ^ "Gaza offensive: Israeli military says no war crimes committed". Guardian. March 31, 2009.
128. ^ Europeans funding 'Breaking the Silence', Jerusalem Post, July 17, 2009
129. "Breaking silence on Gaza abuses". BBC. 2009-07-15. Retrieved 2009-07-18.
130. Na'aman, Oded (2009-07-17). "Israel needs the truth about Cast Lead". Retrieved 2009-07-18.
131. Empty noises from Breaking the Silence, The Guardian, July 15, 2009]
132. IDF soldiers give testimonies to counter Gaza war crimes claims, Haaretz, July 16, 2009
133. 'Breaking the Silence' vs. 'Soldiers Speak Out' on Cast Lead, Arutz 7, July 23, 2009
134. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7822786.stm
135. http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1054497.html
136. "War On Gaza Day 18" (in Arabic). Al-Jazeera. 2009-01-13. Retrieved 2009-01-28.
137. Greenberg, Hanan (2009-01-12). "IDF incorporates reservists in Gaza op".
138. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/13/israel.gaza/index.html
139. Haaretz IDF officer critically hurt in Gaza; 6 other soldiers also wounded By Anshel Pfeffer
140. Issacharoff, Avi (2001-01-16). "Palestinian sources: 'Iran unit' of Hamas has been destroyed". Haaretz. Retrieved 2009-08-07. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
141. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29558&Cr=gaza&Cr1=unrwa
142. http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/090115/world/israel_palestinians_42
143. http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20090115/wl_mcclatchy/3145540
144. 'A necessary operation', JPost, August 4, 2009]
145. ^ Sonja Pace. "Israel Opens Up Humanitarian Corridors in Gaza as Fighting Continues".
146. "Israel resumes Gaza raid after lull".
147. "Israel Declares Short 'Recess' In Gaza Fighting". 2009-01-07.
148. CNN Exchange of fire mars 3-hour truce in Gaza, January 7, 2009
149. Reuters (January 7, 2009). "Clashes resume in Gaza City after 3-hour humanitarian truce". Haaretz. Retrieved 2009-01-07. {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help)
150. Barzak, Ibrahim (January 7, 2009). "Israel halts campaign for 3 hours to let in aid". Associated Press. Archived from the original on January 7, 2009. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
151. "IDF: Army didn't fire on UN truck driver". January 10, 2009. Archived from the original on January 10, 2009.
152. "UN pulls out of Gaza over fears for its staff". The Independent. Associated Press. January 8, 2009.
153. Reuters (January 9, 2009). "UN aid workers plan to resume Gaza movement soon". ynetnews. {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help)
154. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1231424898375&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
155. Abdul-Hadee Aoukal (January 15, 2009). "Al Quds Brigade: Urban Battle yet to Begin". Asharq al-Awsat. Retrieved 2009-08-23.
156. Tim Butcher, Israeli soldiers shocked by tunnel network, Telegraph.co.uk 14-01-2009
157. The Times online, Jan 12, 2009
158. IDF: Hamas built underground city, YNET, January 7 2009
159. Ethan Bronner, Israel Lets Reporters See Devastated Gaza Site and Image of a Confident Military, New York Times 16-01-2009
160. Yaakov Katz, Hamas use of children was 'monstrous', Jerusalem Post 22-01-2009
161. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/09/hamas.sketch/index.html
162. ^ "Maximum 600 Palestinians died in Gaza". Jerusalem Post. 2009-01-22. Cite error: The named reference "Maximum 600 Palestinians died in Gaza" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
163. "Gaza doctor refutes casualties reported in Cast Lead op". Haaretz. 2009-01-25.
164. Amos Harel (2009-01-28). "Hamas captives tell Shin Bet: We used Gaza mosques to hide arms, for training". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
165. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas: We're using PA arms to battle IDF", Jerusalem Post 04-01-2009
166. Yaakov Katz, Hamas threw 'medicine grenades' at IDF. Jerusalem Post 13-02-2009
167. ^ "Gaza's tunnels, traps and martyrs". Times. 2009-01-12.
168. "Cracks in Hamas". Jerusalem Post. 2009-01-18.
169. "Hamas Aims To Look Sharp". Strategy Page. 2009-04-27.
170. "Warnings Not Enough for Gaza Families". New York Times. January 5, 2009.
171. ^ Katz, Yaakov (2009-04-22). "'Haniyeh hid in hospital during Gaza op'". JPost. Retrieved 2009-04-22.
172. ^ "Hamas tried to hijack ambulances during Gaza war". SMH. 2009-01-29.
173. "Weighing Crimes and Ethics in the Fog of Urban Warfare". The NY Times. 2009-01-16.
174. ^ "Amnesty accuses Israel of reckless use of weapons". JPost. 2009-02-02.
175. "FACTBOX-Hamas's arsenal of rockets", Reuters 06-01-2009
176. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-qassam.htm
177. Amy Teibel (January 13, 2009). "Despite Gaza toll, Israeli media focus on Israel". www.cleveland.com. Cleveland, Ohio: The Plain Dealer (newspaper). Associated Press. Retrieved March 18, 2009. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
178. Yair Yanga, "Shin Bet: Some 565 rockets, 200 mortar shells fired at Israel since start of Gaza op", Ha'aretz 13-01-2009
179. Ethan Bronner, Parsing Gains of Gaza War, New York Times 18-01-2009
180. Khaled Abu Toameh (2009-01-19). "Al-Aksa Brigades: We also fought IDF in Gaza". JPost.com (Jerusalem Post). Retrieved 2009-01-20.
181. ^ "Terrorists fire 18 rockets at Israel". 2009-01-14. Retrieved 2009-03-06.
182. "Israel strikes back against Hamas terror infrastructure in Gaza". Israeli MFA. 21 Jan 2009. Retrieved 2009-03-06.
183. Rockets reach Beersheba, cause damage, YNET, December 30, 2008.
184. Rocket lands near Ashdod kindergarten; no injuries, YNET, January 11, 2009.
185. ynetnews Rocket hits Beersheba school; no injuries, December 31, 2008
186. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/05/israel.gaza/index.html
187. Rockets from Lebanon:
     • Jpost IDF on alert after Nahariya attack By Yaakov Katz, retrieved on January 8, 2009
     • BBC, Rockets hit Israel from Lebanon
     • CNN Lebanese PM condemns rocket attack on Israel
     • "Israeli soldiers come under fire at Syria border fence". Xinhua. 11-01-2009. Archived from the original on 2001-01-01-2009. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= and |archivedate= (help)
188. "Israel declares ceasefire in Gaza". BBC. January 17, 2009. Retrieved January 17, 2009.
189. ^ Haaretz, Analysis/ Israel declares victory in Gaza, but at what cost? By Aluf Benn, January 18, 2009,
190. Jpost
191. Nidal al-Mughrabi (January 17, 2009). ""Israel plans ceasefire, Hamas vows to fight on"". Reuters. Retrieved 2009-01-17. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |source= ignored (help)
192. "Rocket fire tests Gaza ceasefire". BBC. January 18, 2009. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
193. "6 rockets, 3 mortars fired from Gaza". ynetnews. January 18, 2009. Retrieved January 18, 2009.
194. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7835981.stm
196. Haaretz, January 18, 2009
197. CNN January 18, 2009
198. BBC January 18, 2009
199. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/middleeast/22mideast.html?_r=1&scp=8&sq=israel%20gaza&st=cse
200. ""Hamas Leader Claims Remarkable Victory"". CBS News. 2009-01-22.
201. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1067516.html
202. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1235410720483
203. "'Five rockets' fired into Israel". BBC. February 28, 2009. Retrieved February 28, 2009.
204. ^ Kershner, Isabel and Ethan Bronner. "U.S. Envoy Urges Cease-Fire After Gaza Violence." The New York Times, January 28, 2009. Retrieved on 2009-01-28.
205. ^ Witte, Griff. "Blast at Gaza Border Kills Israeli Soldier; Palestinian Farmer Killed by Gunfire." The Washington Post, January 28, 2009. Retrieved on 2008-01-28.
206. "Israel puts terms on Gaza truce". BBC. February 14, 2009. Retrieved 2009-02-27.
207. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1072288.html
208. "Captive deal 'key to Gaza truce'". BBC. February 18, 2009. Retrieved 2009-02-27.
209. Hamas Shifts From Rockets to Culture War, NY Times, July 23, 2009
210. News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict July 21-28, 2009, ITIC, July 2009
211. Hamas smuggling new arsenal into Gaza, Haaretz, April 22, 2009
212. ^ "Psychological Tricks to Demoralize the Enemy". Spiegel. January 16-2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
213. ^ Israel's Gaza war adds psychological operations, MSNBC, January 11, 2009
214. ^ "Israel's Gaza war adds psychological operations". Associated Press via MSNBC. 2009-01-11. Retrieved 2009-02-19.
215. "Operation Cast Lead Update No 12". IITC.
216. "Hamas leader killed in airstrike as Israelis reject ceasefire call". Times Online. 02-01-2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
217. ^ "Text messages and phone calls add psychological aspect to warfare in Gaza". The Guardian. 2009-01-03. Retrieved 2009-02-12. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
218. ^ The unreported battle with Hamas: psychological warfare, Haaretz, Jan. 14, 2009
219. "Israel continues Gaza assault". Doha, QA: Al Jazeera. 2009-01-03. Retrieved 2009-01-03.
220. "War On Gaza Day 14" (in Arabic). Al-Jazeera. 2009-01-09. Retrieved 2009-01-26.
221. ^ Younis, Khan. Rights Group Puts Gaza Death Toll At 1,284, CBS, February 17, 2009.
222. "Gaza fighting casualties added up". The Sunday Times (Western Australia). 2009-01-22. Retrieved 2009-02-12.
223. http://www.metimes.com/International/2009/01/19/guns_fall_silent_on_gazas_ruins/7035/
224. "FIELD UPDATE ON GAZA FROM THE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR: 3 - 5 February 2009, 1700 hours". United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). February 5, 2009. Retrieved 2009-05-02.
225. Associated Press (March 19, 2009). "Rights group names 1,417 Gaza war dead". Washington Times. Retrieved 19 March 2009. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
226. "The Dead in the course of the Israeli recent military offensive on the Gaza strip between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009" (PDF). Palestinian Center for Human Rights. 2009-03-19. Retrieved 2009-04-29.
227. • Arutz Sheva Friendly Fire Kills 4 IDF Soldiers Gaza by Maayana Miskin and Hana Levi Julian
     • Haaretz Four of six IDF soldiers killed in Gaza were victims of friendly fire By Amos Harel
     • Telegraph Israeli soldiers killed by 'friendly fire' in Gaza By Damien McElroy 06 Jan 2009
     • Gaza: Ynet 3 soldiers killed, 24 injured in friendly fire incident Hanan Greenberg 06 Jan 2009
228. Field update on Gaza from the Humanitarian Coordinator. January 20–21, 2009. OCHA oPt (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - occupied Palestinian territory). .
229. Katz, Yaakov (2009-08-03). "'A necessary operation'". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 2009-08-07.
230. ^ "Hamas says only 48 fighters slain in Israel war". Al-Arabiya. January 19, 2009. Retrieved 2009-02-17.
231. ""Al-Qassam Brigades announce 48 fighters dead"". Ma'an News Agency.
232. ^ "Protection of Civilians Weekly Report" (PDF). January 16–20, 2009.
233. ^ Israel refutes claims of Gaza misconduct, JPost, Aug. 10, 2009
234. "Gaza death toll of 765 includes Ukrainian mother, baby; nearly 100 Ukrainians evacuated". Kyiv Post. 2009-01-09.
235. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1233304800373
236. "PCHR Contests Distortion of Gaza Strip Death Toll". Palestinian Center for Human Rights. 26 March, 2009. Archived from the original on 29 March, 2009. Retrieved 29 March, 2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate=, |date=, and |archivedate= (help)
237. Lazaroff, Tovah (January 23, 2009). "Israel disputes Gaza death toll". JPost. Retrieved 2009-02-17. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
238. ^ "Israel's Gaza toll far lower than Palestinian tally". Reuters. 2009-03-26.
239. ^ "Breifing to the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-01-27. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-02-11. Retrieved 2009-02-11.
240. "War On Gaza Day 3" (in Arabic). Al-Jazeera. 2008-12-29. Retrieved 2009-06-21.
241. ^ "Israel/Gaza: Civilians must not be tagets". Human Rights Watch. 2008-12-30. Retrieved 2009-03-26.
242. . Fox News. 2009-03-26 http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2009Mar26/0,4670,MLIsraelPalestinians,00.html. {{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
243. ^ "Mounting evidence indicates that during Operation Cast Lead members of Hamas's internal security forces served as commanders and operatives in Hamas's military wing". Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 2009-03-24. Cite error: The named reference "Mounting evidence indicates" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
244. "Hamas hides the casualties suffered by its operatives". IITC.
245. "Casualties in Operation Cast Lead". International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2009-04. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
246. ^ "Casualties in Operation Cast Lead: A closer look" (PDF). International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2009-04. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
247. OPERATION ‘CAST LEAD’: 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION, Amnesty International, July 2, 2009
248. http://www.ochaopt.org/gazacrisis/admin/output/files/ocha_opt_pres_release_ny_2009_english.pdf
249. ^ Gaza 'looks like earthquake zone', BBC News, January 19, 2009.
250. Amira Hass, 'Industrial wastelands,’ Haaretz 26/02/2009
251. UN Chief: Hamas rocket attacks are 'appalling and unacceptable' , Haaretz, 20/01/2009
252. "Satellite-based Gaza Damage Assessment Overview". United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 2009-03-10. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-04-07. Retrieved 2009-04-07.
253. "Gaza clashes spark 'major crisis'". BCC News.
254. Michael Slackman, 'At a Border Crossing, Drivers and Truckloads of Aid for Gaza Go Nowhereì, New York Times, January 27, 2009
255. Peter Beaumont, 'Gaza desperately short of food after Israel destroys farmland,'The Observer, February 1,2009
256. Donald Macintyre,'Gaza counts the cost – and assigns blame,' The Independent Sunday, February 1, 2009
257. ^ "Field Update on Gaza From The Humanitarian Coordinator - 27-29 January 2009, 1700 hours". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-01-29. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-02-11. Retrieved 2009-02-11.
258. "Livni: No crisis in Gaza Strip". Aljazeera English. 2009-01-01. Retrieved 2009-01-03.
259. http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1052302.html
260. "Field Update On Gaza From The Humanitarian Coordinator". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-01-11. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-01-14. Retrieved 2009-01-14.
261. ^ "Field Update On Gaza From The Humantirian Coordinator - 19 January 2009, 1700 hours". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-01-19. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-01-22. Retrieved 2009-01-22.
262. ^ "Field Update on Gaza From the Humanitarian Coordinator". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-02-05. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-02-13. Retrieved 2009-02-13.
263. "'Every Gazan has a tale of profound grief to tell'..., Security Council told". United Nations Regional Information Centre Magazine. Archived from the original on 2009-02-19.
264. Elise Labott, U.S. to give $20 million more in humanitarian aid to Gaza CNN 26-01-2009
265. "Middle East: Israel Halts Operations To Allow Aid Shipments". Washington Post. January 7, 2009. Archived from the original on January 14, 2009.
266. "UNRWA suspends activities in Gazans after Hamas seized aid". Xinhua News. 2009-02-06. Retrieved 2009-02-13.
267. "Field Update on Gaza From the Humanitarian Coordinator, 6-9 February 2009, 1700 hours". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-02-09. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-02-13. Retrieved 2009-02-13.
268. ^ "Field Update On Gaza From The Humanitarian Coordinator, 30 January - 2 February 2009, 1700 hours". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-02-02. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-02-11. Retrieved 2009-02-11.
269. "Field Update On Gaza From The Humanitarian Coordinator - 24-26 January 2009, 1700 hours". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009-01-26. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-01-28. Retrieved 2009-01-28.
270. ^ "Health Situation in the Gaza Strip". UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. World Health Organization. 2009-02-04. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-02-13. Retrieved 2009-02-13.
271. "Hamas denying Gaza wounded treatment in Egypt". Reuters Africa. December 28, 2008. Archived from the original on December 30, 2008. Retrieved December 28, 2008.
272. "Palestinian wounded finally pass through Egypt crossing". Associated French Press. December 30, 2008. Archived from the original on January 5, 2009.
273. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israeli-forces-bisect-gaza-and-surround-biggest-city-1224897.html
274. Home Front Command issues emergency instructions, Ynet 31-12-2008
275. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/4045162/More-than-700000-Israelis-now-in-range-of-Hamas-missiles.html
276. Aron Heller, "Israelis get creative in coping with rocket threat", Associated Press 31-12-2008
277. Ashkelon Empties, Trauma teams Struggle, IRIN News (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs),13-01-2009
278. Aron Heller, "School resumes in Israel despite rocket threat", Associated Press, 11-01-2009
279. IDF: Rocket that hit Beersheba school made in China. By Yael Barnovsky. Ynet News. Published December 31, 2008.
280. Abe Selig, "School closure saves lives of pupils", Jerusalem Post 31-12-2009
281. 4 troops hurt in mortar attack; Grad hits Ashkelon school. By Shmulik Hadad. Ynet News. Published January 8, 2009.
282. Some 2,700 Beersheba students to attend classes in bomb shelters, Jerusalem Post 10-01-2009
283. "Ashkelon Empties, Trauma teams Struggle", IRIN News (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs),13-01-2009
284. "Ashkelon Empties, Trauma teams Struggle", IRIN News (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs13-01-2009
285. Some Israelis go back to school as rocket fire declines. By Dina Kraft. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. Published January 13, 2009.
286. Abe Selig, "Back to school for students in South", Jerusalem Post 12-01-2009
287. Fear sends Israeli hospital underground. MSNBC.com. Published December 28, 2008.
288. "Palestinian teen accuses Israel in The Hague". September 1, 2009. Retrieved 2009-09-01.
289. REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ON ITS NINTH SPECIAL SESSION, UNHCR, 27 February 2009
290. UN official: Evidence that Israel abused human rights in Gaza Haaretz, August 15 2009
291. HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PALESTINE, UNHRC, August 13, 2009
292. ^ "Goldstone's UN inquiry team arrives in Gaza". BBC. 2009-06-01. Retrieved 2009-06-04.
293. ^ UN's Gaza war crimes investigation faces obstacles, Associated Press, 06.09.09
294. ^ Analysis: The problem with Goldstone JPost, July 6, 2009
295. Israel’s bombardment of Gaza is not self-defence – it’s a war crime, The Sunday Times, January 11, 2009
296. NGO: Academic should quit Cast Lead inquiry, JPost, August 23 2009
297. LSE Law Professor Urged to Step Down from U.N Gaza Inquiry over Bias, UN Watch, August 20 2009
298. Dispute over 'biased' Gaza inquiry professor, TheJC.com, August 27 2009
299. U.N. Human Rights Council fails to ratify changes to Goldstone Mission, UN Watch, July 5, 2009
300. Human Rights Watch’s Ken Roth: Ends Justify the Means?, UN Watch, August 27 2009
301. ^ Noam Schalit slams Hamas at UN c'tee, Jerusalem Post, Jul 6, 2009
302. From Gulag Liberators to Saudi Retainers, NRO, July 21 2009
303. Gaza Israel and Hamas 'both guilty of war crimes', Times Online, July 2, 2009
304. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1090452.html
305. Noam Shalit to UN: My son's abduction was a war crime, Haaretz, 07/07/2009
306. ^ Goldstone’s Gaza fact-finding mission hears from Israeli victims, UN Watch, July 6, 2009
307. West Bank and Israeli Palestinians testify before Goldstone mission, UN Watch, July 6, 2009
308. ^ Military expert testifies on weapons use by Hamas, Israel at Goldstone’s Gaza hearings, UN Watch, July 7, 2009 Cite error: The named reference "Military expert testifies on weapons use by Hamas, Israel at Goldstone’s Gaza hearings" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
309. International law expert testifies before Goldstone’s Gaza inquiry team,UN Watch, July 7, 2009
310. UN Gaza investigation 'in final stage' Jerusalem Post, July 7, 2009
311. ^ Falk, Richard (2008-12-27). "Statement by Prof. Richard Falk, United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories" (h.her). United Nations Human Rights Council. Retrieved 2009-01-04. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
312. Israel to be held accountable for Gaza warcrimes: Palestinian lawyer, IRNA, January 22, 2009.
313. "Israeli Strikes Disproportionate - EU Aid Chief". Javno. January 13, 2009. Retrieved 2009-01-13.
314. Alan, Cowell (2009-01-08). "Gaza Children Found With Mothers' Corpses". New York Times. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help) (subscription)
315. "Gaza 'human shields' criticised". BBC News. 2009-01-08. Retrieved 2009-03-22 =. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
316. ^ "Israel army 'used human shields'". BBC. 2009-03-24.
317. "Legal Aspects of 'Operation Cast Lead' in Gaza". Jurist. 2009-01-11.
318. "US study: IDF didn't violate rules of war". Ynet. April 2, 2009. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
319. Finkelstein, Norman (2009-02-19). "A Camp Follower Who Aims to Please: How Anthony Cordesman Proved that Israel Fought a Clean War". Retrieved 2009-06-05.
320. ^ Hider, James (2009-03-16). "Human rights campaigners call on UN to investigate Gaza 'war crimes'". timesonline. Retrieved 2009-03-19.
321. "Galant: Cast Lead death ratio an achievement." Jerusalem Post. 24 March 2009. 25 March 2009.
322. Harel, Amos. "IDF censor bans naming officers involved in Gaza op". Haaretz. Retrieved 2009-03-27.
323. "Israel forms war crime defense team". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2009-03-27.
324. ^ Heather Sharp (January 5 2009). "Gaza conflict: Who is a civilian?". Jerusalem: BBC News. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
325. http://www.globallawforum.org/ViewPublication.aspx?ArticleId=87
326. ^ http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/007/2009/en/4c407b40-e64c-11dd-9917-ed717fa5078d/mde150072009en.html
327. Adapting Artillery to Urban War, Defense News, March 23 2009
328. ^ Report: IDF used RPV fire to target civilians, YNET, 30 June, 2009
329. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0
330. Precisely Wrong - Overview, HRW, June 30, 2009
331. Human Rights Watch accuses Israel over Gaza drones2, Reuters, June 30, 2009
332. 22 Days of Death and Destruction, Amnesty, July 2009
333. Israel and Hamas 'both guilty of war crimes' - Amnesty, July 2 2009, Times
334. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6621805.ece
335. ^ Amnesty details Gaza 'war crimes', BBC, July 2, 2009 Cite error: The named reference "Amnesty details Gaza 'war crimes'" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
336. ^ Hamas, Israel reject Amnesty claims, July 1, 2009 Cite error: The named reference "Hamas, Israel reject Amnesty claims" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
337. Report: IDF killed women and children with white flags in Gaza, YNET, August 13, 2009
338. Gaza white flag deaths probe call, BBC, August 13, 2009
339. IDF dismisses Cast Lead claims JPost, August 13, 2009
340. CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, Maariv, 21 August 2009
341. Rights group: IDF killed Gazans waving 'white flags' during war, Haaretz, August 13, 2009
342. "Q & A on Hostilities between Israel and Hamas". HRW. 31 December, 2008. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
343. "Consent and advise". Haaretz. 2009-02-05. Retrieved 2009-06-05.
344. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/world/middleeast/10mideast.html?_r=1
345. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/01/world/fg-gaza-scene1
346. http://www.btselem.org/Download/200902_Operation_Cast_Lead_Position_paper_Eng.pdf
347. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3720759,00.html
348. The inadequacy of international law The inadequacy of international law, The Boston Globe, May 07 2009
349. ^ "International Law and the Fighting in Gaza" (PDF). JCPA. 2009-01-05.
350. "Hamas seizes aid meant for Red Crescent". YNET. 2008-02-07.
351. "Hamas Hamas raids aid trucks, sells supplies". JPOST. 2009-01-12.
352. "Humanitarian aid to Gaza during IDF operation". Israel MFA. 2009-01-18.
353. "Israel to close clinic at Erez crossing". YNET. 2009-01-27.
354. "Israel admits using white phosphorous in attacks on Gaza". The Times. 2009-01-24. Retrieved 2009-03-10. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
355. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6150448.ece
356. 'IDF white phosphorus use not illegal'. The Jerusalem Post. Published January 13, 2009.
357. "Phosphorous weapons - the ICRC's view". International Red Cross. 2009-01-17. Archived from the original on 2009-02-05. Retrieved 2009-02-05.
358. Rain of Fire, Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza
359. ""THE OPERATION IN GAZA, 27 DECEMBER 2008 – 18 JANUARY 2009 FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS"" (PDF). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2009-07-29.
360. Israeli army used flechettes against Gaza civilians Amnesty International, January 27, 2009.
361. http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,6119,2-10-1462_1347525,00.htm
362. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/23/israel-palestinian-territories
363. Macintyre, Donald (2009-03-24). "UN accuses Israeli troops of using boy, 11, as human shield". Belfast Telegraph. Retrieved 2009-03-26. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
364. Clancy Chassay. Palestinian brothers: Israel used us as human shields in Gaza war. {{cite AV media}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |year2= and |month2= (help); Unknown parameter |date2= ignored (help)
365. Cast Lead Testimonies, Breaking the silence, July 15, 2009
366. Barak: Criticism of IDF should be directed at me, Haaretz, July 15, 2009
367. Golani commander: Soldier 'wasn't in field at the time', Jerusalem Post, July 15, 2009
368. "Israel accused of 'new Gaza crime'". Al Jazeera. 2009-03-24.
369. http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-03-23-voa62.cfm
370. States debate one-sided, anti-Israel report, UN Watch, March 24, 2009
371. A day with our troops in Gaza YNET, 09 January, 2009
372. ^ Lewis, Ori (2009-03-23). "Israeli troops broke medical ethics: rights group". Reuters.
373. ^ http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/today/09/4/2201.htm
374. Worsnip, Patrick (2009-05-05). Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSN05321386. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
375. . United Nations. 2009-05-05 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12224.doc.htm. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
376. http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSN05321386
377. http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2009/01/un_mulls_breach_in_civilian_le.html
378. ^ Rockets from Gaza - summary, HRW, August 5, 2009
379. ^ "Hamas Exploitation of Civilians as Human Shields" (PDF). IITC.
380. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1231866576202&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull Law professor: Hamas is a war crimes 'case study'
381. "Palestinian Rocket Attacks since the IDF Withdrawal".
382. http://www.btselem.org/English/Israeli_Civilians/Qassam_Missiles.asp
383. "Hamas: Rocket Attacks on Israel Are 'Self Defense'". Associated Press. April 29, 2007.
384. Palestinian Rocket Attacks since the IDF Withdrawal http://www.hrw.org/en/node/10911/section/3 Palestinian Rocket Attacks since the IDF Withdrawal. {{cite web}}: Check |url= value (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
385. Rights Group: Hamas May Have Committed War Crimes, NY Times, August 6, 2009
386. "Palestinian Rocket Attacks since the IDF Withdrawal".
387. "Civilians must not be targets".
388. "Gaza 'human shields' criticized". BBC. April January 8, 2009. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
389. "Top UN official blasts Hamas for 'cynical' use of civilian facilities". Haaretz. 2009-01-28.
390. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e046.htm
391. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e055.htm
392. http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hamas_e044.htm
393. ^ "Law professor: Hamas is a war crimes 'case study'". JPost. 2009-01-13.
394. HRW: Hamas rocket attacks 'war crime', JPost, August 6, 2009
395. "Israeli Leaders Reject Gaza Truce With Hamas". CBS5. 2008-12-31.
396. PA Health Ministry: Hamas using hospitals as detention centers, Ma'an, February 07 2009
397. "Under Cover of War". HRW. April 20, 2009.
398. Under Cover of War Hamas, Political Violence in Gaza
399. Gaza "Hamas Should End Killings, Torture". Human Rights Watch. 2009-04-20. Retrieved 2009-04-28. {{cite web}}: Check |url= value (help)
400. Jpost Hamas moves on Fatah 'collaborators' By Khaled Abu Toameh
401. National Post Fatah accuses Hamas of killings
402. Miami Herald Still in charge, Hamas attacking Fatah rivals By Shashank Bengali and Dion Nissenbaum McClatchy News Service
403. McCarthy, Rory (2009-01-30). "Dozens believed dead in reprisal attacks as Hamas retakes control". The Guardian. Retrieved 2009-02-01.
404. AFP Hamas defends killing of collaborators during Gaza war Feb 2, 2009
405. Hamas: Fatah helped Israel in war, Al Jazeera 24-02-2009
406. Bronner, Ethan (2009-01-06). "Israel Puts Media Clamp on Gaza". New York Times. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
407. ^ "Airstrike hits media building in Gaza". Committee to Protect Journalists. January 9, 2009. Retrieved 2009-01-11.
408. "Gaza reporter on Al-Arabiya: "A rocket from here? It's here. Listen, it's here, below the building..."". 2009-01-20.
409. "Jawwara building, with more than 20 press offices inside, hit by Israeli missiles". Ma'an News Agency. 2009-01-09. Archived from the original on 2009-01-10. Retrieved 2009-01-10.
410. Ravid, Barak (December 27, 2008). "Israel to mount emergency international PR effort in wake of Gaza campaign". Retrieved December 27, 2008. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
411. Silverstein, Richard (January 9, 2009). "Hasbara spam alert". The Guardian.
412. JONATHAN BECK (January 18, 200). "Latest hasbara weapon: 'Army of bloggers'". Jerusalem Post.
413. Cnaan Liphshiz (19/01/2009). "Israel recruits 'army of bloggers' to combat anti-Zionist Web sites". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
414. "Pro-Israel media: Bloggers join media war". Ynet. Yedioth Ahronoth. 2009-01-29. Archived from the original on 2009-02-16. Retrieved 2009-02-16.
415. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1230456531523
416. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28450663/
417. Worsnip, Patrick (December 28, 2008). "U.N. Security Council calls for end to Gaza violence". Reuters. Retrieved December 28, 2008. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
418. "A rush to broker peace in Gaza".
419. Castle, Stephen. "Europe Sends Two Missions to Promote a Cease-Fire". New York Times. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
420. Nidal al-Mughrabi (2009-01-04). "Israeli tanks, soldiers invade Gaza Strip". Reuters. Retrieved 2009-01-04.
421. "White House 'behind' US volte-face on ceasefire call January 9, 2009". The Guardian.
422. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7820027.stm
423. http://www.radiomundial.com.ve/yvke/noticia.php?17621
424. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/05/content_10603389.htm
425. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/01/2009116151135307776.html
426. http://www.radiomundial.com.ve/yvke/noticia.php?17680
427. Major cities stage fresh protests over Gaza, AFP 11-01-2009
428. Will Rasmussen, Egypt police hold 16 Islamists after Gaza protests, Reuters 14-01-2009
429. "Saudi cleric issues fatwa urging Muslims to avenge Gaza raids". Haaretz. 2008-12-28. Retrieved 2008-12-29.
430. Suicide bombers ready to fight Israel
431. Philippe Naughton, "Gaza conflict fuels anti-Semitic attacks across Europe", Times Online 06-01-2009
432. Highest anti-Semitism rates in 2 decades, Jerusalem Post, 25-01-2009
433. "Sarkozy vows "zero tolerance" for Gaza hate crimes".
434. Haaretz English edition on-line, July 13, 2007, "U.K.: We revoked Israel arms licenses, but it's no embargo" http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1099701.html

External links

• Special reports from Aljazeera, BBC News, CNN, Christian Science Monitor, Financial Times, The Guardian, Haaretz, ICRC, Jerusalem Post, Los Angeles Times, Palestine News Network, Radio France International
• Rebuilding Gaza: Poor Prospects for the Economy
• B'Tselem's Guidelines for Israel's Investigation Into Operation Cast Lead by B'Tselem

Involved parties

• IDF Spokesperson's Unit postings on Youtube
• IDF Spokesperson's Website on Operation Cast Lead
• Hamas War Against Israel reports from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Hamas military wing - English site

Resources

• United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory
• Gaza crisis: key maps and timeline, BBC News.
• Hamas's arsenal of rockets, Reuters.
• TIMELINE - Israeli-Hamas violence since truce ended, Reuters.
• Al Jazeera Creative Commons Repository, daily reports from Gaza by Al Jazeera

Template:Link FA

• Articles with dead external links from February 2009
• Articles to be split from August 2009
• 2008 in Israel
• 2008 in the Palestinian territories
• 2008-2009 Israel-Gaza conflict
• Conflicts in 2008
• Conflicts in 2009
• Gaza
• Gaza Strip
• Israeli-Palestinian conflict