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"Chetnik" redirects here. For other uses of this and similar terms, see Cheta.

Template:Infobox movement Chetniks, or the Chetnik movement (Template:Lang-sr, pronounced [tʃɛ̂tniːtsi]), were Serbian nationalist and monarchist paramilitary organizations from the first half of the 20th century. The Chetniks were formed as a Serbian resistance against the Ottoman Empire in 1904, and participated in the two Balkan Wars, World War I, and World War II. Between the wars, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, they functioned in the form of two civilian organizations. The name is today most closely associated with the Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army, the World War II movement of Draža Mihailović, which was later renamed the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (Jugoslovenska vojska u otadžbini, Југословенска војска у отаџбини; JVUO, ЈВУО), though the original name remained more common. The Mihailović Chetniks, though considered a single organization, were not an entirely homogeneous movement.

In the wake of the Axis invasion and partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the first of the two resistance organizations to be founded were the Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army. However, while some Chetnik units did engage in marginal resistance activities for limited periods, the Chetnik movement collaborated with the Axis occupation to one degree or another by establishing modus vivendi or operating as "legalised" auxiliary forces under Axis control. Over a period of time, and in different parts of the country, the Chetnik movement was progressively drawn into collaboration agreements: first with the Nedić forces in Serbia, then with the Italians in occupied Dalmatia and Montenegro, with some of the Ustaše forces in northern Bosnia, and after the Italian capitulation also with the Germans directly. While Chetnik collaboration reached "extensive and systematic" proportions, the Chetniks themselves referred to their policy of collaboration as "using the enemy".

The Chetniks were a partner in the pattern of terror and counter terror that developed in Yugoslavia during World War II. The Chetniks used terror tactics against the Croats in areas where Serbs and Croats were intermixed, against the Muslim population in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Sandžak, and against the Partisans and their supporters in all areas. These terror tactics took various forms, including killing of the civilian population, burning of villages, assassinations and destruction of property. The terror tactics used by the Chetniks against the Croats was largely a reaction against the mass terror perpetrated by the Ustaše, and the terror against the Partisans and their supporters was ideologically-driven. The Muslim population of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Sandžak was a primary target of Chetnik terror due to the traditional animosity between Serbs and Muslims, but this action was also undertaken to 'cleanse' these areas of Muslims in order to create a 'Greater Serbia' free of non-Serbs.

Several modern Serbian paramilitary organizations, formed in the 1990s after the breakup of Yugoslavia, chose the name "Chetniks", and consider themselves as the continuation of the Chetnik legacy.

Etymology

The word, "chetnik" was used to describe a member of a Balkan guerrilla force called cheta. The word is derived from the Serbian word "četa" (чета) which means "band or troop", itself derived from the Turkish word "çete" of the same meaning. The suffix -nik is of Slavic origin. It is a personal suffix meaning "person or thing associated with or involved in".

Early Chetniks

World War I and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia

In World War I bands of Chetniks fought against the Bulgarian Army and organized the Toplica Insurrection, which was quickly crushed by the Bulgarians.

After the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Kingdom of Yugoslavia) and the arrival of peacetime, the Chetnik movement ceased functioning as a guerrilla force, and became a civilian organization. In 1921 the Organization of Chetniks for the Freedom and Honor of the Fatherland (Udruženje Četnika za slobodu i čast Otadžbine) was formed, and in 1924 the Organization of Serbian Chetniks for King and Fatherland (Udruženje srpskih četnika za Kralja i Otadžbinu), while the formation of the Organization of Serbian Chetniks Petar Mrkonjić (Udruženje srpskih četnika Petar Mrkonjić) also followed. These latter two merged together the following year as the Organization of Serbian Chetniks Petar Mrkonjić.

After the unitarianist King Alexander I proclaimed a dictatorship in 1929, the Organization of Serbian Chetniks Petar Mrkonjić was banned while the Organization of Chetniks for Freedom and Honour of the Fatherland was allowed to continue operating. Kosta Pećanac was the organization's leader from 1932 up to the occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941.

World War II

Main article: Yugoslav Front Main article: Invasion of Yugoslavia

Formation and ideology

In April 1941 the Germans, Italians and Hungarians invaded Yugoslavia leading to the swift collapse of the Yugoslav state and the surrender of the Yugoslav army. Many Serbian detachments refused to surrender and took to the hills. The Chetnik tradition of paramilitary activity and outrage at Ustaše atrocities quickly attracted recruits to the Chetniks. The pre-war Chetnik leader Kosta Pećanac soon came to an arrangement with Nedić's collaborationist regime in Serbia. Colonel Draža Mihailović, who wanted to establish resistance to the occupation, set up his headquarters in Ravna Gora and initially named his group "The Ravna Gora Movement" in order to distinguish it from the Chetniks engaged in collaboration with the Germans. But as the other Chetnik groups acted as adjuncts to the occupation, the word "Chetnik" again became associated with Mihailović's force. The group was also called the "Chetnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army", although "The Ravna Gora Movement" was and still is used to refer to the Chetniks. The movement was later to be renamed the "Yugoslav Army in the Homeland", (sometimes translated as "Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland"), although the original name of the movement remained the most common in use throughout the war, even among the Chetniks themselves. It is these forces that are generally referred to as "the Chetniks" throughout World War II although the name was also used generally for other smaller groups. In June 1941, following the start of Operation Barbarossa, the communist-led Partisans under Josip Broz Tito organised an uprising and in the period between June and November 1941, the Chetniks and Partisans largely cooperated in their anti-Axis activities.

In the summer of 1941, the Rava Gora Movement had attracted a small number of Serbia intellectuals who developed a political ideology for the Chetniks. Stevan Moljević believed that Serbs should not repeat the mistakes of World War I by failing to define the borders of Serbia, and proposed that at the end of World War II Serbs should take control of all territories to which they laid claim, and from that position negotiate the form of a federally organized Yugoslavia. This plan required the relocation of non-Serbs from Serbian controlled territories and other shifts of populations. He produced a document, Homogenous Serbia, which articulated these notions. Moljević proposed that Greater Serbia consist of 65-70% of the total Yugoslav territory and population. He based his plan on the expulsion of the non-Serb population in different areas and on population exchanges, but did not provide any figures. Mihailović appointed Moljević to the Central National Committee of the Chetnik movement in August 1941. Moljević's proposals were very similar to those later formulated by the Belgrade Chetnik Committee and presented to the Government in Exile in September 1941, in which the Chetniks set forth specific figures in regard to population shifts.

In March 1942, the Chetnik Dinara Division created a program which proposed a Greater Serbia with a corridor between Herzegovina, northern Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Lika to Slovenia, and cleansing of these areas of non Serbian populations. This was accepted a month later by the military leaders of these areas. This document continued additional formulations of strategy, including collaboration with Italian forces as a modus vivendi, formation of Croatian Chetnik units as part of a continuing struggle against the Partisans, Domobrans and Ustaše. This document also proposed decent treatment of the Muslim population in order to keep them from joining the Partisan forces, and noted that the Muslims could later be eliminated.

In the fall of 1942, a program was fomulated at a Conference of Young Chetnik Intellectuals of Montenegro, which also proposed a unified Yugoslavia consisting only of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, exclusion of other ethnic groups, which was to be controlled by the Chetnik forces with the endorsement of the King, as well as agrarian and political reforms, nationalization of banking and wholesale trade, and increased propaganda to promote Chetnik ideology. Mihailović was not present, but was represented by his subordinate commanders Ostojić, Lašić, and Đurišić. Đurišić played the dominant role at this conference.

A manual prepared by Chetnik military leaders in late 1942 detailed a three phased approach and the military structure to be used during the war. The manual argued that both the Serbs and the Croats had been politically victimized in the period between the two world wars, and the unproven notion that in Serbia and especially in Belgrade, Croats held the upper hand in the government. Except for the Ustaše, Croats were not seen as the enemies of the Serbs, and a goal was set for the incorporation of Croatian forces under Chetnik leadership. Ustaše, on the other hand, were to be summarily executed. The question of shifting populations and religious conversion of the Croats was to be left aside until the Serbs had assumed power in Yugoslavia. Revenge was incorporated into the Chetnik manual as a " sacred duty of the Serbian people against those who had wronged them during the war and occupation".

Early activities

Chetnik leaders initially conducted a number of operations against Axis forces, some jointly with the Partisans. However, by September 1941 Mihailović was advocating postponement of military action against the Germans, in contrast to the significant number of actions organised by the Partisans. According to Mihailovic the reason was humanitarian: the prevention of German reprisals against Serbs at the published rate of 100 civilians for every German soldier killed, 50 civilians for every soldier wounded. Nevertheless, in December 1941 the Yugoslav government in exile in London under King Peter II promoted him to Brigadier-General and named him commander of the Yugoslav Home Army. That same month the Germans launched an attack on Mihailović's forces in Ravna Gora and effectively routed the Chetniks from Serbia. The bulk of the Chetnik forces retreated into eastern Bosnia and Sandžak and the centre of Chetnik activity moved to the Independent State of Croatia, a Nazi puppet state.

However, by this time Mihailović had already asked the Germans for munitions to fight the communists. The Germans declined to negotiate, instead demanding unconditional surrender. The British liaison to Mihailović advised London to stop supplying the Chetniks after their assistance in the German attack on Užice (see First anti-Partisan Offensive), but Britain continued to do so.

For some time after Yugoslavia was invaded, the Chetniks enjoyed high-profile support from the American media and received financial aid; American general Billy Mitchell's sister was one of the many Americans that supported and/or financed the cause of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland.

Axis offensives

Main article: Seven anti-Partisan offensives

Later during the War, the Allies were seriously considering an invasion of the Balkans, so the Yugoslav resistance movements increased in strategic importance, and there was a need to determine which of the two factions was fighting the Germans. A number of Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents were sent to Yugoslavia to determine the facts on the ground. In the meantime, the Germans, also aware of the growing importance of Yugoslavia, decided to wipe out the Partisans with determined offensives. The Chetniks, by this time, had agreed to provide support for the German operations, and were in turn granted supplies and munitions to increase their effectiveness.

The first of these large anti-Partisan offensives was Fall Weiss, also known as the Battle of Neretva. The Chetniks participated with a significant, 20,000-strong, force providing assistance to the German and Italian encirclement from the east (the far bank of the river Neretva). However, Tito's Partisans managed to break through the encirclement, cross the river, and engage the Chetniks. The conflict resulted in a near-total Partisan victory, after which the Chetniks were almost entirely incapacitated in the area west of the Drina river. The Partisans continued on, and later again escaped the Germans in the Battle of Sutjeska.

In the meantime, the Allies stopped planning an invasion of the Balkans and finally rescinded their support for the Chetniks and instead supplied the Partisans. At the Teheran Conference of 1943 and the Yalta Conference of 1945, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided to split their influence in Yugoslavia in half.

Loss of support and final war years

To gather intelligence, agents of the western Allies were infiltrated into both the Partisans and the Chetniks. The intelligence gathered by liaisons to the resistance groups was crucial to the success of supply missions and was the primary influence on Allied strategy in Yugoslavia. The search for intelligence ultimately resulted in the demise of the Chetniks and their eclipse by Tito’s Partisans. In 1942, though supplies were limited, token support was sent equally to each. The new year would bring a change. The Germans were executing Operation Schwarz (the Battle of Sutjeska, i.e., the Fifth anti-Partisan offensive), one of a series of offensives aimed at the resistance fighters, when F.W.D. Deakin was sent by the British to gather information.

His reports contained two important observations. The first was that the Partisans were courageous and aggressive in battling the German 1st Mountain and 104th Light Division, had suffered significant casualties, and required support. The second observation was that the entire German 1st Mountain Division had transited from Russia on rail lines through Chetnik-controlled territory. British intercepts (Ultra) of German message traffic confirmed Chetnik timidity. All in all, intelligence reports resulted in increased Allied interest in Yugoslavia air operations, and a shift in policy. In September 1943, at Churchill’s request, Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean was parachuted to Tito’s headquarters near Drvar to serve as a permanent, formal liaison to the Partisans. While the Chetniks were still occasionally supplied, the Partisans received the bulk of all future support.

Thus, after the Tehran Conference the Partisans received official recognition as the legitimate national liberation force by the Allies, who subsequently set-up the RAF Balkan Air Force (under the influence and suggestion of Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean) with the aim to provide increased supplies and tactical air support for Marshal Tito's Partisan forces. On 14 August 1944, the Tito-Šubašić agreement between Partisans and the Government in exile was signed on the island of Vis. The document called on all Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs to join the Partisans. Mihailović and the Chetniks refused to accept the Royal Government's agreement and continued to engage the Partisans, by now the official Yugoslav Allied force. Consequently on 29 August 1944, King Peter II dismissed Mihailović as Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army and on 12 September appointed Marshal Josip Broz Tito in his place. On 6 October 1944, the Nedić government transferred the Serbian State Guard to Mihailović's command, although cooperation proved impossible and they separated in January 1945 whilst in Bosnia.

In the last years of the war the Chetniks were involved in operations in which Allied (mostly United States) airmen were rescued and sheltered from the occupation forces. The largest of these operations was Operation Halyard, which took place shortly before the Chetnik movement was destroyed. In 1944, the Chetniks of Mihailovic rescued and evacuated between 417 and 512 Allied aircrew who had been shot down behind enemy lines. Most of the airmen were shot down during bombing runs of oil fields in Romania. Due to the efforts of Major Richard L. Felman, President Harry S. Truman posthumously awarded Mihailović the "Legion of Merit", for the rescue of American airmen. This award was classified secret by the United States Department of State so as not to offend Yugoslavs .

Finally, in April and May 1945, as the victorious Partisans took possession of the country's territory, many Chetniks retreated toward Italy and a smaller group toward Austria. Many were captured by the Partisans or returned to Yugoslavia by British forces while a number were killed afterwards at Bleiburg. Some were tried for treason and were sentenced to prison terms or death. Many were summarily executed, especially in the first months after the end of the war. Mihailović and his few remaining followers tried to fight their way back to the Ravna Gora, but he was captured by Partisan forces. In March 1946, Mihailović was brought to Belgrade, where he was tried and executed on charges of treason in July. During the closing years of World War II, many Chetniks defected from their units, as the Partisan commander-in-chief, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, proclaimed a general amnesty to all defecting forces for a time.

Non-Serbian Chetniks

The Yugoslav Army of the Homeland was almost exclusively made up of Serbs except for a large proportion of Montenegrins who considered themselves Serbs. A few Croats in central Dalmatia and Primorje supported Mihailović, but the group was too small to have any political or military significance. A few Sandžak and Bosnian Muslims also supported him. In Slovenia, Major Karlo Novak led a small pro-Mihailović group which never played an important role.

There had been long standing mutual animosity between Muslims and Serbs throughout Bosnia. Due to mass atrocities carried out against non-Serbs late in the spring of 1941 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other ethnically heterogeneous areas, and due to Muslims, especially those in eastern Bosnia, being branded as 'Turks' and 'Ustase cronies', few Muslims joined the Chetniks.

However, there were some notable exceptions, and a few Muslims cooperated with or even joined the Chetniks:

In late 1942, Herzegovinian Muslim leader Ismet Popovac obtained assistance from the Italians and formed an Italian Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (MVAC). Early in 1943, Popovac's militia of around 800 fighters cooperated with the Chetniks against the Partisans during Fall Weiss. Not long after this, Popovac was assassinated.
In 1943, the Chetniks moderated their policies towards the Muslims to some extent, in order to assist them to enlist Muslims into their ranks. Fehim Musakadić became the commander of all Muslim Chetnik units.
At the end of 1943, Muslims comprised up to eight percent of Mihailovic forces, numbering about 4,000.
One prominent Muslim supporter of Mihailovic was Mustafa Mulalić, who had been a representative of the Yugoslav National Party in the pre-war Yugoslav parliament. In January 1944, at the Congress of Ba, Mulalić was appointed vice-chairman of the Chetnik National Committee. In late 1944, the Chetniks organised a Muslim Chetnik corps in north-east Bosnia.

In November 1941, Major Karlo Novak, who had initially been appointed as the chief of staff of the Slovene Chetniks, became their commander when Mihailović's original delegate, Colonel Jakob Avšić defected to the Partisans. In Slovenia, anti-Communist resistance was dominated by the Slovene Alliance led by the Slovene People's Party rather than the Chetniks, and although the Slovene Alliance theoretically owed allegiance to the government-in-exile via Mihailović as Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, in reality it was completely independent of his command. The Slovene Alliance collaborated with the Italians, becoming 'legalised' as units of the MVAC. Partly as a result of the dominance and influence of the Slovene Alliance, Novak was unable to attract a significant following, and at their peak the Slovene Chetniks numbered no more than 300-400 fighters. Novak received some arms and ammunition indirectly from the Italians. However, in September 1943 at the village of Grčarice, 50 kms southeast of Ljubljana, the main Slovene Chetnik force of about 200 fighters was destroyed by the Partisans. Novak escaped to Italy where he remained for the remainder of the war.

In mid-1944, Colonel (later General) Ivan Prezelj, who had been appointed as Mihailović's delegate in Slovenia after Novak's escape to Italy, briefly re-established several Slovene Chetnik detachments. One of these, operating in Lower Styria and led by Joze Melaher, managed to survive until the end of the war.

Axis collaboration

File:Meeting between German, Chetniks and Domobran commander.jpg

German General Major Friedrich Stahl (left) stands alongside an Ustaše officer (center) and Chetnik commander Rade Radić (right) somewhere in central Bosnia, 1942.

Throughout the war, the Chetnik movement remained mostly inactive against the occupation forces, and increasingly collaborated with the Axis, eventually losing its international recognition as the Yugoslav resistance force. After a brief initial period of cooperation, the Partisans and the Chetniks quickly started fighting against each other. Gradually, the Chetniks ended up primarily fighting the Partisans instead of the occupation forces, and started cooperating with the Axis in a struggle to destroy the Partisans, receiving increasing amounts of logistical assistance. Mihailović admitted to a British colonel that the Chetniks' principal enemies were "the partisans, the Ustasha, the Muslims, the Croats and last the Germans and Italians" in that order.

At the start of the conflict, Chetnik forces were merely relatively inactive towards the occupation, and had contacts and negotiations with the Partisans. This changed when the talks broke down, and they proceeded to attack the latter (who were actively fighting the Germans), while continuing to engage the Axis only in minor skirmishes. Attacking the Germans provoked strong retaliation and the Chetniks increasingly started to negotiate with them. Negotiations with the occupiers were aided by the two sides' mutual goal of destroying the Partisans. This collaboration first appeared during the operations on the Partisan "Užice Republic", where Chetniks played a part in the general Axis attack.

Collaboration with the Italians

Chetnik collaboration with the occupation forces of fascist Italy took place in three main areas: in Italian-occupied (and Italian-annexed) Dalmatia; in the Italian puppet state of Montenegro; and in the Italian-annexed and later German-occupied Ljubljana Province in Slovenia. The collaboration in Dalmatia and parts of Bosnia was the most widespread. The split between Partisans and Chetniks took place earlier in those areas.

The Partisans considered all occupation forces to be "the fascist enemy," while the Chetniks hated the Ustaše but balked at fighting the Italians, and had approached the Italian VI Army Corps (General Renzo Dalmazzo, Commander) as early as July and August 1941 for assistance, via a Serbian politician from Lika, Stevo Rađenović. In particular, Chetnik vojvodas ("leaders") Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin and Dobroslav Jevđević were favorably disposed towards the Italians, because they believed Italian occupation over the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be detrimental to the influence of the Ustaše state. For this reason, they sought an alliance with the Italian occupation forces in Yugoslavia. The Italians (esepcially General Dalamazzo) looked favorably on these approaches and hoped to first avoid fighting the Chetniks, and then use them against the Partisans, a strategy which they thought would give them an "enormous advantage". An agreement was concluded on January 11, 1942 between the representative of the Italian 2nd Army, Captain Angelo De Matteis and the Chetnik representative for southeastern Bosnia, Mutimir Petković, and was later signed by Draža Mihailović's chief delegate in Bosnia, Major Boško Todorović. Among other provisions of the agreement, it was agreed that the Italians would support Chetnik formations with arms and provisions, and would facilitate the release of "recommended individuals" from Axis concentration camps (Jasenovac, Rab...). The chief interest of both the Chetniks and Italians would be to assist each other in combating Partisan-led resistance.

In the following months of 1942, General Mario Roatta, commander of the Italian 2nd Army, worked on developing a Linea di condotta ("Policy Directive") on relations with Chetniks, Ustaše and Partisans. In line with these efforts, General Vittorio Ambrosio outlined the Italian policy in Yugoslavia: All negotiations with the (quisling) Ustaše were to be avoided, but contacts with the Chetniks were "advisable." As for the Partisans, it was to be "struggle to the bitter end". This meant that General Roatta was essentially free to take action with regard to the Chetniks as he saw fit. He outlined the four points of his policy in his report to the Italian Army General Staff:

To support the Chetniks sufficiently to make them fight against the communists, but not so much as to allow them too much latitude in their own action; to demand and assure that the Chetniks do not fight against the Croatian forces and authorities; to allow them to fight against the communists on their own initiative (so that they can "slaughter each other"); and finally to allow them to fight in parallel with the Italian and German forces, as do the nationalist bands in Montenegro.
— General Mario Roatta, 1942

During 1942 and 1943, an overwhelming proportion of Chetnik forces in the Italian-controlled areas of occupied Yugoslavia were organized as Italian auxiliary forces in the form of the Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (Milizia volontaria anti comunista, MVAC). According to General Giacomo Zanussi (then a Colonel and Roatta's chief of staff), there were 19,000 to 20,000 Chetniks in the MVAC in Italian-occupied parts of the Independent State of Croatia alone. The Chetniks were extensively supplied with thousands of rifles, grenades, mortars and artillery pieces. In a memorandum dated March 26, 1943 to the Italian Army General Staff, entitled "The Conduct of the Chetniks", Italian officers noted the ultimate control of these collaborating Chetnik units remained in the hands of Draža Mihailović, and contemplated the possibility of a hostile reorientation of these troops in light of the changing strategic situation. The commander of these troops was vojvoda Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, who arrived in Italian-annexed Split in October 1941 and received his orders directly from Mihailović in the spring of 1942.
By the time of the Italian capitulation on 8 September 1943, all Chetnik detachments in the Italian-controlled parts of the Independent State of Croatia had at one time or another collaborated with the Italians against the Partisans. This collaboration lasted right up until the Italian capitulation when Chetnik troops switched to supporting the German occupation in trying to force the Partisans out of the coastal cities which the Partisans liberated after the Italian withdrawal. After the Allies did not land in Dalmatia as they had hoped, these Chetnik detachments were basically forced into collaboration with the Germans in order to avoid being caught between the Germans and the Partisans.

Collaboration with the NDH

Battle of the Neretva

Main article: Battle of the Neretva

One of the highpoints of Chetnik collaboration with the Axis took place during the Battle of the Neretva, which was the final phase of operation Fall Weiss or the Fourth Enemy Offensive. In 1942, Partisans forces were on the rise, having established large liberated territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chetnik forces, partially because of their collaboration with the Italian occupation, were also gaining in strength, however, but were no match to the Partisans and required Axis logistical support to attack the liberated territories. In light of the changing strategic situation, Adolf Hitler and the German high command decided to disarm the Chetniks and destroy the Partisans for good. In spite of Hitler's insistence, Italian forces in the end refused to disarm the Chetniks (thus rendering that course of action impossible), under the justification that the Italian occupation forces could not afford to lose the Chetniks as allies in their maintenance of the occupation.

Collaboration with the Germans

File:Chetniks with German soldiers.jpg

Chetniks posing with soldiers of the German occupation forces during World War II in an unidentified Serbian village in occupied Yugoslavia

When Germans invaded Yugoslavia they met in the Chetniks an organization trained and adapted for guerilla warfare. Although there were some clashes between the Germans and the Chetniks as early as May 1941, Mihailovic thought of resistance in terms of setting up an organisation which, when the time was ripe, would rise against the occupying forces. British policy with regard to European resistance movements was to restrain them from activities which would led to their premature destruction, and this policy coincided initially with the concepts on the basis of which Mihailovic´s movement was being operated. In order to dissociate himself from the Chetniks who collaborated with the Germans, Mihailovic at first called its movement the "Ravna Gora Movement".

As early as spring 1942, the Germans favored the collaboration agreement the Ustaše and the Chetniks had established in a large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the Ustaše military was supplied by, and immediately subordinate to, the German military occupation, collaboration between the two constituted indirect German-Chetnik collaboration. This was all favorable to the Germans primarily because the agreement was directed against the Partisans, contributed to the pacification of areas significant for German war supplies, and reduced the need for additional German occupation troops (as Chetniks were assisting the occupation). After the Italian capitulation on September 8, 1943, the German 114th Jäger Division even incorporated a Chetnik detachment in its advance to retake the Adriatic coast from the Partisans who had temporarily liberated it. The report on German-Chetnik collaboration of the XV Army Corps on November 19, 1943 to the 2nd Panzer Army states that the Chetniks were "leaning on the German forces" for close to a year.

German-Chetnik collaboration entered a new phase after the Italian surrender, because the Germans now had to police a much larger area than before and fight the Partisans in the whole of Yugoslavia. Consequently, they significantly liberalized their policy towards the Chetniks and mobilized all Serbian nationalist forces against the Partisans. The 2nd Panzer Army oversaw these developments: the XV Army Corps was now officially allowed to utilize Chetniks troops and forge a "local alliance". The first formal and direct agreement between the German occupation forces and the Chetniks took place in early October 1943 between the 373rd Infantry Division and a detachment of Chetniks under Mane Rokvić operating in western Bosnia and Lika. The Germans subsequently even used Chetnik troops for guard duty in occupied Split, Dubrovnik, Šibenik, and Metković. Independent State of Croatia (NDH) troops were not used, despite Ustaše demands, because mass desertions of Croat troops to the Partisans rendered them unreliable. From this point on, the German occupation actually started to "openly favor" Chetnik (Serbian) troops to the Croat formations of the NDH, due to the pro-Partisan dispositions of the Croatian rank-and-file. The Germans paid little attention to frequent Ustaše protests about this.

Ustaše Major Mirko Blaž (Deputy Commander, 7th Brigade of the Poglavnik's Personal Guard) observed that:

The Germans are not interested in politics, they take everything from a military point of view. They need troops that can hold certain positions and clear certain areas of the Partisans. If they ask us to do it, we cannot do it. The Chetniks can.
— Major Mirko Blaž, March 5, 1944

When appraising the situation in western Serbia, Bosnia, Lika, and Dalmatia, Captain Merrem, intelligence officer with the German commander-in-chief southeastern Europe, was "full of praise" for Chetnik units collaborating with the Germans, and for the smooth relations between the Germans and Chetnik units on the ground.
In addition, the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Panzer Army observed in a letter to the Ustaše liaison officer that the Chetniks fighting the Partisans in Eastern Bosnia were "making a worthwhile contribution to the Croatian state", and that the 2nd Army "refused in principle" to accept Croatian complaints against the usage of these units. German-Chetnik Collaboration continued to take place until the very end of the war, with the tacit approval of Draža Mihailović and the Chetnik Supreme Command in Serbia. Though Mihailović himself never actually signed any agreements, he endorsed the policy for the purpose of eliminating the Partisan threat.

Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs commented:

Though he himself shrewdly refrained from giving his personal view in public, no doubt to have a free hand for every eventuality (e.g. Allied landing on the Balkans), he allowed his commanders to negotiate with Germans and to co-operate with them. And they did so, more and more...
— Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, 1945

The loss of Allied support in 1943 caused the Chetniks to lean more than ever towards the Germans for assistance against the Partisans. On 14 August 1944, the Tito-Šubašić agreement between the Partisans and the Yugoslav King Peter II and government-in-exile was signed on the island of Vis. The document called on all Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs to join the Partisans. Mihailović and the Chetniks refused to follow the order and abide by the agreement and continued to engage the Partisans (by now the official Yugoslav Allied force). Consequently on 29 August 1944, King Peter II dismissed Mihailović as Chief-of-Staff of the Yugoslav Army and on 12 September appointed Marshal Josip Broz Tito in his place. Josip Broz Tito at this point became the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav state and the joint government.

Collaboration with Nedić's Serbia

In occupied Serbia, the Germans initially installed Milan Aćimović, as leader, but later replaced him with General Milan Nedić, former minister of war, who governed until 1944. Aćimović instead later served as the key liaison between the Germans and the Chetniks. In the second half of August 1941, prior to Nedić assuming power, the Germans arranged with Kosta Pećanac for the transfer of several thousand of his Chetniks to serve as auxiliaries for the Serbian gendarmerie. Collaboration between the Nedić administration and Mihailović's Chetniks began in fall of 1941 and lasted until the end of German occupation. Nedić was initially firmly opposed to Mihailović and the Chetniks. On September 4, 1941, Mihailović sent Major Aleksandar Mišić and Miodrag Pavlović to enter a meeting with Nedić and nothing was accomplished. After Mihailović shifted his policy of mild cooperation with the Partisans to becoming hostile to them and seizure of anti-German activity in late October 1941, Nedić relaxed his opposition. On October 15, Colonel Milorad Popović, acting on behalf of Nedić, gave Mihailović about 500,000 dinars (in addition to an equal amount given on October 4) to persuade the Chetniks to collaborate. On October 26, 1941, Popović gave an additional 2,500,000 dinars. By mid-November 1941, Mihailović put 2,000 of his men under Nedić's direct command and shortly later these men joined the Germans in a anti-Partisan operation. When the Germans launched Operation Mihailović on December 6–7, 1941, with the intent of capturing Mihailović and removing his headquarters in Ravna Gora, he escaped, probably because he was warned of the attack by Aćimović on December 5. In June 1942, Mihailović left Serbia to Montenegro and became out of contact with the Nedić authorities until returning in June. Subsequently, in the fall of 1942 the Chetniks of Mihailović (and Pećanac) that were legalized in Nedić's Serbia were dissolved. By 1943, Nedić feared that the Chetniks would become the primary collaborator with the Germans and after the Chetniks murdered Ceka Đorđević, deputy minister of internal affairs, in March 1944 he co-opted to replace him with a prominent Chetnik in the hopes of quelling the rivalry. A report prepared in April 1944 by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services commented that:

should be viewed in the same light as Nedić, Ljotić, and the Bulgarian occupation forces.
— Office of Strategic Services report, April 1944

In mid-August 1944, Mihailović, Nedić, and Dragomir Jovanović met in the village of Ražani secretly where Nedić agreed to give one hundred million dinars for wages and to request from the Germans arms and ammunition for Mihailović. On September 6, 1944, under the authority of the Germans and formalization by Nedić, Mihailović took command over the entire military force of Nedić's Serbia, including the Serbian State Guard, Serbian Volunteer Corps, and the Serbian Border Guard.

Terror Tactics and Cleansing Actions

see also Ethnic cleansing and Draža Mihailović: Terror Tactics and Cleansing Actions

Chetnik ideology revolved around the notion of a Greater Serbia within the borders of Yugoslavia, to be created out of all territories in which Serbs were found, even if the numbers were small. This goal had long been the foundation of the movement for a Greater Serbia. During Axis occupation the notion of clearing or "cleansing" these territories was introduced largely in response to the massacres of Serbs by the Ustaše in the Independent State of Croatia. However, the largest Chetnik massacres took place in east Bosnia which was relatively untouched by the Ustaša genocide until spring of 1942.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, use of terror tactics had a long tradition in the area as various oppressed groups sought their freedom and atrocities were committed by all parties engaged in conflict in Yugoslavia. During the early stages of the occupation, the Ustaše had also recruited a number of Muslims to aid in the persecutions of the Serbs, and even though only a relatively small number of Croats and Muslims engaged in these activities, and many opposed them, those actions initiated a cycle of violence and retribution between the Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims, as each sought to rid the others from the territories they controlled. In particular, Ustaše ideologues were concerned with the large Serbian minority in the NDH, and initiated acts of terror on a wide scale in May 1941, and by July, even the Germans protested the brutality of these actions. Reprisals followed, as in the case of Nevesinje, where Serb peasants staged an uprising in response to the persecution, drove out the Ustaše militia, but then engaged in reprisals killing hundreds of Croats and Muslims.

A directive dated 20 December 1941, addressed to newly appointed commanders in Montenegro, Major Đorđije Lašić and Captain Pavle Đurišić, outlined, among other things, the cleansing of all non-Serb elements in order to create a Greater Serbia:

#The struggle for the liberty of our whole nation under the scepter of His Majesty King Peter II;
the creation of a Great Yugoslavia and within it of a Great Serbia which is to be ethnically pure and is to include Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srijem, the Banat, and Bačka;

the struggle for the inclusion into Yugoslavia of all still unliberated Slovene territories under the Italians and Germans (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, and Carinthia) as well as Bulgaria, and northern Albania with Scutari;

the cleansing of the state territory of all national minorities and a-national elements;

the creation of contiguous frontiers between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as between Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing the Muslim population from Sandžak and the Muslim and Croat populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina.— Directive of 20 December 1941

The authenticity of the directive is disputed. Some have attributed the directive as having come from Mihailović. Others have claimed that there is no original and that it may have been a forgery made by Đurišić to suit his purposes.

The Chetniks systemically massacred Muslims in villages that they captured. In late autumn of 1941 the Italians handed over the towns of Višegrad, Goražde, Foča and the surrounding areas, in south-east Bosnia to the Chetniks to run as a puppet administration and NDH forces were compelled by the Italians to withdraw from there. After the Chetniks gained control of Goražde on 29 November 1941, they began a massacre of Home Guard prisoners and NDH officials that became a systematic massacre of the local Muslim civilian population. Several hundred Muslims were murdered and their bodies were left hanging in the town or thrown into the Drina river. On 5 December 1941, the Chetniks received the town of Foča from the Italians and proceeded to massacre around five hundred Muslims. Additional massacres against the Muslims in the area of Foča took place in August 1942. In total, over two thousand people were killed in Foča. In early January, the Chetniks entered Srebrenica and killed around a thousand Muslim civilians in the town and in nearby villages. Around the same time the Chetniks made their way to Višegrad where deaths were reportedly in the thousands. Massacres continued in the following months in the region. In the village of Žepa alone about three hundred were killed in late 1941. In early January, Chetniks massacred fifty-four Muslims in Čelebić and burned down the village. On 3 March, the Chetniks burned forty-two Muslim villagers to death in Drakan.

In early January 1943 and again in early February, Montenegrin Chetnik units were ordered to carry out "cleansing actions" against Muslims, first in the Bijelo Polje county in Sandžak and then in February in the Čajniče county and part of the Foča county in southeastern Bosnia, and in part of the Pljevlja county in Sandžak. Pavle Đurišić, the officer in charge of these operations, reported to Mihailović, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, that on 10 January 1943: "thirty-three Muslim villages had been burned down, and 400 Muslim fighters (members of the Muslim self-protection militia supported by the Italians) and about 1,000 women and children had been killed, as against 14 Chetnik dead and 26 wounded". In another report sent by Đurišić dated 13 February 1943, he reported that: "Chetniks killed about 1,200 Muslim fighters and about 8,000 old people, women, and children; Chetnik losses in the action were 22 killed and 32 wounded". He added that "during the operation the total destruction of the Muslim inhabitants was carried out regardless of sex and age". The total number of deaths caused by the anti-Muslim operations between January and February 1943 is estimated at 10,000. The casualty rate would have been higher had a great number of Muslims not already fled the area, most to Sarajevo, when the February action began. According to a statement from the Chetnik Supreme Command from February 24, 1943, these were countermeasures taken against Muslim aggressive activities; however, all circumstances show that these massacres were committed in accordance with implementing the directive of December 20, 1941.

Actions against the Croats were of a smaller scale but similar in action. One of the worst Chetnik outbursts against the Croat population of Dalmatia took place in early October 1942 in the village of Gata near Split, in which an estimated one hundred people were killed and many homes were burnt in a reprisal taken against the people of Gata and nearby villages for the destruction of some roads in the area and carried out on the Italians account. In that same October, formations under the command of Petar Baćović and Dobroslav Jevđević, who were participating in the Italian Operation Alfa in the area of Prozor, massacred over five hundred Croats and Muslims and burnt numerous villages. Baćović noted that "Our Chetniks killed all men 15 years of age or older. Seventeen villages were burned to the ground." Mario Roatta, commander of the Italian Second Army, objected to these "massive slaughters" of noncombatant civilians and threatened to halt Italian aid to the Chetniks if they did not end.

The exact number of Muslim, Croat and other non-Serb civilians killed by Chetniks has never been established. According to World War II historian Vladimir Žerjavić, about 65,000 Croat and Muslim civilians were killed by Chetniks in the Independent State of Croatia. In addition the Chetniks also completely destroyed 300 villages and small towns and a large number of mosques and Catholic churches.

The Partisans were also targets of terror tactics. In Serbia, apart from a few terrorist acts against Nedić's and Ljotić's men, and in Montenegro against separatists, terror was directed solely against the Partisans, their families and sympathizers, on ideological grounds. The goal, as repeatedly proven by Chetnik documents in general and specific orders, was for the complete destruction of the Partisans. The Chetniks created lists of individuals that were to be liquidated and special units known as "black trojkas" were trained to carry out these acts of terror. During the summer of 1942, using names supplied by Mihailović, lists of individual Nedić and Ljotić supporters to be assassinated or threatened were broadcast over BBC radio during news programming in Serbo-Croatian. Once the British discovered this, the broadcasts of these lists were halted, although this did not prevent the Chetniks from continuing the assassinations.

SFR Yugoslavia

After the end of World War II, the Chetniks were banned in the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 29 November 1945, King Peter II was deposed by the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly after an overwhelming referendum result. Chetnik leaders either escaped the country or were arrested by the authorities. On 13 March 1946, Draža Mihailović was captured by OZNA, the Yugoslav security agency. He was put to trial, found guilty of high treason against Yugoslavia, sentenced to death and then hanged on July 17. Later, Momčilo Đujić formed the 'Movement of Serbian Chetniks of Ravna Gora' in the United States and Canada.

Recent history

Yugoslav Wars

Main articles: Yugoslav Wars and Serbian Radical Party See also: White Eagles (paramilitary), Serb Volunteer Guard, and Serbian Guard (paramilitary)

During the Yugoslav wars, Serb paramilitaries often self-identified and were referred to as Chetniks. Vojislav Šešelj's Serbian Radical Party formed the White Eagles group which identified themselves as Chetniks. Vuk Drašković's Serbian Renewal Movement was closely associated with the Serbian Guard, which was also associated with Chetniks and monarchism.

During the war five Serb soldiers received the title of Chetnik voivodes from World War II veteran Momčilo Đujić: Rade Čubrilo, Slavko Aleksić, Branislav Gavrilović, Rade Radović, and Mitar Maksimović Mando. The title to Šešelj was given in 1989 but later taken off in 1998 when it became obvious that Šešelj is in cooperation with Slobodan Milošević. Rade Čubrilo became the flag-bearer of Đujić's former unit, the Dinara Chetnik Division. Serb politician Vojislav Šešelj was also named a voivode prior to the start of the wars by Đujić and the title was taken from Šešelj in later decade, since he was anti-monarchist and in cooperation with Milošević.

Contemporary period

The current situation of the movement is different from place to place.

Modern Chetnik movements include:

Serbian Chetnik Movement of Republika Srpska
Ravna Gora Chetnik Movement of Republika Srpska, based in Brčko.
Serbian Movement of Ravna Gora, with branches in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

Serbia

Since 1992, the Serbian Renewal Movement has annually organized the "Ravna Gora Parliament". People who attend the Parliament wear World War II Chetnik iconography and t-shirts with the image of Draža Mihailović or war crimes suspect Ratko Mladić. In 2005, Croatian president Stjepan Mesić cancelled a planned visit to Serbia as it coincided with the gathering, officially supported by the Serbian government, and attended by Vuk Drašković.

In March 2004, the National Assembly of Serbia passed a new law that equalized the Chetniks and Partisans as equivalent anti-fascists. Rights were granted on the basis that both were anti-fascist movements that fought occupiers, and this formulation has entered the law. The vote was 176 for, 24 against and 4 abstained (the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) of Slobodan Milošević was the one voting against the decision). There have been varying reactions to the law in Serbian public opinion. Many have praised it as just and long overdue, including Prince Alexander Karađorđević (son of Peter II, the last Yugoslav king), as well as most political parties (with the most notable exception of the SPS). Others protested the decision, including the Serbian Association of Former Partisans, the Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, the Croatian Anti-Fascist Movement, and the President and Prime Minister of Croatia. In 2009, Serbian courts rehabilitated Chetnik ideologist Dragiša Vasić.

The Serbian basketball player Milan Gurović has a tattoo of World War II Chetnik Draža Mihailović on his left arm which has resulted in a ban since 2004 in playing in Croatia under its anti-fascist laws. Turkey has also threatened to enact such a ban. Serbian rocker Bora Đorđević is also a self-declared Chetnik, but calling it a "national movement that is much older than the WWII", and adding that he does not hate other nations and never been a member of the Radical Party nor advocated Greater Serbia.

Montenegro

In 2002, preparations for a memorial complex dedicated to Pavle Đurišić near Berane began. In 2003, Vesna Kilibarda, the Montenegrin Minister of Culture, banned the construction of the monument saying that the Ministry of Culture had not applied for the approval to erect monuments. The Association of War Veterans of the National Liberation Army (SUBNOR) objected to the construction of the monument saying that Đurišić was a war criminal who was responsible for the deaths of many colleagues of the veterans association and 7,000 Muslims. The following month the Montenegrin government forbade the unveiling of the monument stating that it "caused public concern, encouraged division among the citizens of Montenegro, and incited national and religious hatred and intolerance." A press release from the committee in charge of the construction of the monument stated that the actions taken by the government was "absolutely illegal and inappropriate." The stand that was prepared for the erection of the monument was later removed by the police.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

On July 12, 2007, a day after the 12th anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide and the burial of a further 465 victims, a group of men dressed in Chetnik uniforms marched the streets of Srebrenica. They all wore badges of military units which committed the massacre in July 1995. On July 11, 2009, after the burial of 543 victims in Srebrenica, members of the Ravna Gora Chetnik movement desecrated the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina, marched in the streets wearing T-shirts with the face of Ratko Mladić and sang Chetnik songs. A group of men and women associated with the Serbian far-right group Obraz "chanted insults directed towards the victims and in support of the Chetnik movement, calling for eradication of Islam." A full report of the incident was submitted to the local District Prosecutor's Office but no one has been prosecuted. The Bosnian political party SDP has been campaigning for a creation of a law that would ban the group within Bosnia.

Croatia

Milorad Pupovac of the Independent Democratic Serb Party in Croatia (the present-day leader of Serbs of Croatia and member of the Croatian Parliament), has described the organization as "fascist collaborators".

United States

Monuments dedicated to Draža Mihailović, Momčilo Đujić, and Pavle Đurišić exist at the Serbian cemetery in Libertyville, Illinois.

Notes

Tomasevich (1975), pp. 116-117
Tomasevich (1975), p.125
Milazzo (1975), p.140
"History - World Wars: Partisans: War in the Balkans 1941 - 1945". BBC. Retrieved 2011-08-12.
Milazzo (1975), p.182
Milazzo (1975), pp. 103-105
Milazzo (1975), pp.185-186
Ramet (2006), p. 147
Tomasevich (1975), pp. 224-225
MacDonald (2002), pp. 140-142
Pavlowitch (2007), pp. 65-67
Milazzo (1975), preface
^ Tomasevich (1975), p.196
Tomasevich (1975), p.246
^ Ramet (2006), p.145
"Both the Chetniks' political program and the extent of their collaboration have been amply, even voluminously, documented; it is more than a bit disappointing, thus, that people can still be found who believe that the Chetniks were doing anything besides attempting to realize a vision of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short run, by a policy of collaboration with the Axis forces. The Chetniks collaborated extensively and systematically with the Italian occupation forces until the Italian capitulation in September 1943, and beginning in 1944, portions of the Chetnik movement of Draža Mihailović collaborated openly with the Germans and Ustaša forces in Serbia and Croatia."
Tomasevich (1975), pp. 256-261
"Online Etymology Dictionary". Etymonline.com. Retrieved 2011-08-12.
"Sensagent Dictionary". Sensagent.com. Retrieved 2011-12-03.
"Online Etymology Dictionary". Etymonline.com. Retrieved 2011-12-22.
^ Roberts(1973), p. 21
^ "Srpsko Nasledje". Srpsko-nasledje.rs. Retrieved 2011-08-12.
www.glas-javnosti.rs
Pavlowitch (2007), p. 54
Tomasevich (1975), p. 123
Roberts(1973), p. 67
Pavlowitch (2007), p. 64
Tomasevich (1975), p.169
^ Judah (2000), pp. 121-122
^ Tomasevich (1975), pp. 167-171
^ Hoare (2006), p. 143
^ Tomasevich (1975), p.170
^ Tomasevich (1975), p.171
Pavlowitch (2007), p.112
Tomasevich (1975), p. 172
^ Tomasevich (1975), p.174
Tomasevich (1975), p.261
^ Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005. Indiana University Press. p. 147. ISBN 0-253-34656-8.
Bailey, Ronald H. 1980 (original edition from 1978). Partisans and guerrillas (World War II; v. 12). Chicago, Illinois, USA: Time-Life Books. P. 80
^ Martin, David (1946). Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich. New York: Prentice Hall.
"A Country Study: Yugoslavia (Former)". Library of Congress Call Number DR1214 .Y83. 1992.
Tinee, Mae (1 April 1943). "Chetniks' Story Is Dramatically Told in Movie". Chicago Daily Tribune.
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=jrshAAAAIBAJ&sjid=opwFAAAAIBAJ&pg=4234,4360804&hl=en
^ Tomasevich (1975), p. 226
David Martin, Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1946), 34.
Tomasevich (2001), p. 228
Two airmen who shared a B-24 stint in World War II are reunited - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
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"Foreign News: New Power". Time. 1944-12-04. Retrieved 2010-04-28.
Tomasevich (1975), pp.173-174
Tomasevich (1975), p.158
Tomasevich (2001), p. 492
^ Velkonija (2003), p. 167
Tomasevich (1975), pp. 216-217
Tomasevich (2001), p. 494
Judah (2000), p. 122
Tomasevich (2001), p. 501
Tomasevich (1975), p.222
Tomasevich (1975), p.224
Tomasevich (1975), p.225
Tomasevich (2001), p. 125
"Photograph #46717". United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Retrieved 5 February 2011.
^ Cohen, Philip J.; Riesman, David (1996). Serbia's secret war: propaganda and the deceit of history. Texas A&M University Press. p. 40. ISBN 978-0-89096-760-7.
Chetnik - Britannica Online Encyclopedia
Velkonija (2003), pp. 166-167
^ Tomasevich (1975), p. 352
Redžić, Enver (2005). Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War. Routledge. p. 141. ISBN 0714656259.
Roberts, p. 20
Roberts, p. 26
Roberts, p. 27
Roberts, p. 21
^ Tomasevich (2001), p. 308
Werner Roehr (zusammengestellt), Europa unterm Hakenkreuz-Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938-1945), 1994, s.358
^ Ramet (2006), pp. 133-135
Tomasevich (2001), p. 183
^ Tomasevich (2001), pp. 214–216
^ Cohen, Philip J.; Riesman, David (1996). Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History. Texas A&M University Press. p. 57. ISBN 0890967601.
Tomasevich (1975), p.173
Tomasevich (1975), pp. 256-257
Pavlowitch (2007), pp. 47-49
^ Malcolm (1994), p.175
Judah (2000), p. 120
Tomasevich (1975), pp. 171, 210, 256
Milazzo (1975), p. 64
Karchmar (1987), p. 397
Pavlowitch (2007), p.80
^ Hoare (2006), p. 145
^ Tomasevich (1975), p. 256-261
^ Hoare (2006), p. 147
^ Hoare (2006), p. 146
^ Tomasevich (1975), pp. 258-259
Hoare (2006), p. 331
Tomasevich (1975), p.259
^ Ramet (2006), p. 146
Tomasevich (1975), p. 259
^ Tomasevich (1975), p. 260
http://www.novinar.de/2007/12/15/tekst-pisma-vojvode-momcila-episkopu-kanadskom-georgiju-dokicu.html NOVINAR.de » Tekst Pisma Vojvode Momčila - episkopu kanadskom Georgiju (Đokiću) | online novine koje zajedno stvaramo - vesti iz zemlje i sveta
Cathcart, Brian (1994-04-17). "Harrier pilot safe". The Independent. London. Retrieved 2010-04-28.
United Nations Commission on Breaches of Geneva Law in Former Yugoslavia
Giška and guards died for nothing, Glas javnosti
^ Title of voivode only for military service, Danas
The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Vojislav Šešelj
Provokacija iz Trebinja: osnovan "Srpski četnički pokret Republike Srpske", Slobodna Dalmacija
The Movement of Serbian Chetniks Ravne Gore Chapters
^ "Ravnogorski sabor, 15. put". B92. 13 May 2006.
"Ravnogorski sabor". B92. 13 May 2007.
Predsjednik Mesiæ O Odgodi Posjeta Scg-U
Ramet, Sabrina P. (2008). Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia at Peace and at War: Selected Writings, 1983-2007. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 143. ISBN 3037359129.
Rehabilitovan Dragiša Vasić, Blic
ISN Security Watch - Serbia rehabilitates Chetniks with pensions
Bora Čorba kod Hrge: Ponosan sam četnik - Dnevnik.hr
"Ovih dana u selu Gornje Zaostro kod Berana počinje gradnja spomen-kompleksa Pavlu Đurišiću". Glas javnosti. 7 May 2002.
"Ministarka kulture zabranila podizanje spomenika Đurišiću". B92. 11 June 2003.
Sekulović, Milutin (10 June 2003). "Partizanski komandant, pa - vojvoda". Večernje novosti.
"Zabranjen skup za otkrivanje spomenika Đurišiću". B92. 4 July 2003.
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"Policija srušila postolje za spomenik Đurišiću". B92. 3 July 2003.
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Voloder, Vanda (12 July 2007). "Četnici bili u Srebrenici, ali policija nije reagirala". 24 sata.
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"Sramotno: četničko orgijanje po Srebrenici i Bratuncu". Slobodna Dalamacija. 13 July 2009.
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References

Cohen, Philip J. (1996). Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 0890967601.
Judah, Tim (2000). The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Yale University Press. ISBN 0300085079.
Karchmar, Lucien (1987). Draza Mihailović and the Rise of the Cetnik Movement, 1941-1945. Garland Publishing. ISBN 0824080270.
Malcolm, Noel (1994). Bosnia: A Short History. New York University Press. ISBN 0814755208.
Milazzo, Matteo J. (1975). The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0801815894.
Mulaj, Klejda (2008). Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: Nation-State Building and Provision of In/Security in Twentieth-Century Balkans. Lexington Books. ISBN 0739117823.
Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (2007). Hitler's New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 1850658951.
Pavlowitch, Stevan K. (05-2005). "Review of Le Monténégro et l'Italie durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale: Histoire, mythes et réalités by Antoine Sidoti". The English Historical Review. 120 (487): 863. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005. New York: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0253346568.
Roberts, Walter R. (1973). Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941-1945. Rutgers University Press.
Tomasevich, Jozo (1975). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks. Vol. 1. San Francisco: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804708576.
Tomasevich, Jozo (2001). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Vol. 2. San Francisco: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804736154.
Velkonija, Mitja (2003). Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 1585442267.

External links

v t e World War II in Yugoslavia
1941	Invasion of Yugoslavia Uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina May 1941 Sanski Most revolt June uprising in eastern Herzegovina Siege of Rogatica Olovo Uprising in Serbia Battle of Loznica Battle of Banja Koviljača Attack on Šabac Mačva operation Battle of Trešnjica Kruševac Kraljevo Operation Uzice Operation Mihailovic Novi Pazar Sjenica Uprising in Montenegro Battle of Pljevlja Uprising in Croatia Croatian Partisans Srb uprising Karadak-Gollak Uprising (1941–1951)
1942	Operations Southeast Croatia and Ozren Operation Trio Chetnik sabotage of Axis communication lines Kozara Offensive Operation Alfa Operation Kopaonik
1943	Case White Case Black Siege of Turjak Operation Kugelblitz Battle of Višegrad
1944	Operations Kugelblitz and Schneesturm Operation Rösselsprung Operation Rübezahl Belgrade offensive Operation Draufgänger Battle of Jelova Gora Kosovo Operation Battle of Knin Battle of Tuzla Battle of Batina
1945	Syrmian Front Mostar operation Sarajevo Operation Battle of Lijevče Field Battle of Zelengora Battle of Poljana Battle of Odžak
Croatia	Zagreb in World War II
Macedonia	World War II in Yugoslav Macedonia
Serbia	Kosovo during World War II
Slovenia	World War II in the Slovene Lands
Strategic bombing	Belgrade 1941 1944 Podgorica Sarajevo Zadar Zagreb
see also Factions in the Yugoslav Front People of the Yugoslav Front

Collaboration in Yugoslavia during World War II

Puppet regimes

Political
organizations

People

Croatian & Bosniak	Mehmed Alajbegović Andrija Artuković Ivan Babić Mijo Babić Rafael Boban Mile Budak Eduard Bunić Fedor Dragojlov Mato Dukovac Jure Francetić Miroslav Filipović Muhamed Hadžiefendić Ivo Herenčić Božidar Kavran Vladimir Košak Džafer Kulenović Osman Kulenović Dido Kvaternik Slavko Kvaternik Vladimir Laxa Mladen Lorković Vjekoslav Luburić Mihajlo Lukić Julije Makanec Nikola Mandić Ivica Matković Vladimir Metikoš Josip Metzger Ademaga Mešić Husein Miljković Ljubo Miloš Ante Nikšić Miroslav Navratil Sulejman Pačariz Ante Pavelić Stijepo Perić Viktor Pavičić Ismet Popovac Ivan Prpić Osman Rastoder Husein Rovčanin Franjo Šimić Slavko Štancer Dinko Šakić Tomislav Sertić Alija Šuljak Ivan Tomašević Ante Vokić Vjekoslav Vrančić Hasan Zvizdić
Serbian	Milan Aćimović Petar Baćović Miloš Glišić Jezdimir Dangić Uroš Drenović Momčilo Đujić Dobroslav Jevđević Velibor Jonić Dragomir Jovanović Milan Kalabić Nikola Kalabić Dragutin Keserović Rade Korda Dimitrije Ljotić Vojislav Lukačević Draža Mihailović Kosta Mušicki Fehim Musakadić Milan Nedić Mihailo Olćan Kosta Pećanac Rade Radić Stevo Rađenović Mane Rokvić Miroslav Trifunović Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin Svetozar Vujković
Slovene	Franc Frakelj Ernest Peterlin Gregorij Rožman Leon Rupnik
Montenegrin	Blažo Đukanović Krsto Popović Bajo Stanišić Pavle Đurišić Zaharije Ostojić Sekula Drljević Mihailo Ivanović Novica Radović
Albanian	Gajur Deralla Xhafer Deva Aćif Hadžiahmetović Xhem Hasa Rexhep Mitrovica Shaban Polluzha Mefail Shehu
Bulgarian	Ivan Mihailov Hristo Tatarchev

Military
organizations

Chetnik movement (broad term)	Dinara Division Lim-Sandžak Chetnik Detachment Pećanac Chetniks
Croatian Armed Forces	Croatian Air Force Croatian Air Force Legion Croatian Home Guard Croatian Legion 369th Division 373rd Division 392nd Division Croatian Navy Croatian Naval Legion Green cadres Hadžiefendić Legion Sandžak Muslim militia 13th SS Division 23rd SS Division Ustaše Militia Black Legion SS Polizei-Selbstschutz-Regiment Sandschak Einsatzstaffel der Deutschen Mannschaft
Government of National Salvation	Russian Corps Serbian State Guard Serbian Volunteer Corps Montenegrin Volunteer Corps 1st Belgrade Special Combat detachment Belgrade Special Police
Slovene military organizations	Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia Black Hand Legion of Death Slovene Home Guard
Italian governorate of Montenegro / German occupied territory of Montenegro	Lovćen Brigade National Army of Montenegro and Herzegovina Montenegrin National Army
Italian protectorate of Albania (1939–1943) and German occupation of Albania	Albanian Militia Balli Kombëtar Skanderbeg SS Skanderbeg Vulnetari Kosovo Regiment
Bulgarian occupation / Independent State of Macedonia	Bulgarian Action Committees IMRO MYSRO Ohrana

See also: Invasion of Yugoslavia; World War II in Yugoslavia

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