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Battle of Warsaw
Part of the Polish-Russian War 1830–1831
Russian assault on Warsaw in 1831
Date September 1831 Location Warsaw, Poland Result Russian victory, Polish rebellion quashed
Belligerents
Imperial Russia	Poland
Commanders and leaders
Ivan Paskevich	Jan Krukowiecki
Strength
approximately 71 000 men, 360 cannons	approximately 40 000 men, 200 cannons
Casualties and losses
Unknown, but significantly smaller than Polish casualties.	Unknown

The Battle of Warsaw was fought in September 1831 between Imperial Russia and Poland. The Russians were led by Ivan Paskevich, while the Polish were led by Jan Krukowiecki. The Russians captured the Polish capital, Warsaw, crushing the November Uprising, which had begun in late 1830.

Background

In 1830 a series of revolutions struck Europe: the July Revolution in France, the Belgian Revolution and a number of smaller revolts in Italy threatened to overthrow the very framework of European politics established at the Congress of Vienna. As the Russian tsars were among the strongest advocates of that status quo, the uprising in Poland and the ousting of the tsar as the king of Poland by the Sejm and Senate of Poland on 25 January 1831 were considered a thorn in Russia's back. Russia could not send its' armies to Belgium or France before the rebellion in Poland was quelled. For that reason the capture of Warsaw, considered to be the main target in the war, was Russia's aim from the very start of hostilities.

In the course of the Uprising, the army of Russia unsuccessfully tried to capture the capital of Poland on two occasions. First in February of 1831, when forces under Field Marshal Hans Karl von Diebitsch stormed the eastern suburb of Praga. After a bloody battle at Grochów, the Polish Army successfully retreated to Warsaw and the capital remained in Polish hands.

Unable to capture Warsaw by a frontal assault, von Diebitsch devised a plan to outflank it and enter the city from the west. In the spring of 1831 he sent his forces upstream to the area of upper Vistula, where the Russian divisions were to cross the river and head back north, towards Warsaw. However, the new plan was thwarted by the staunch Polish defence in three successive battles around Wawer, Dębe Wielkie and Iganie. The Russians were forced to withdraw back towards Siedlce, where von Diebitsch soon fell ill and died of cholera - the same outbreak that killed Prussian generals Carl von Clausewitz and August Neidhardt von Gneisenau stationed in Prussian-controlled Poland at the time.

The successor of von Diebitsch as Commander in Chief of Russian forces in Poland, Count Ivan Paskevich, decided to wait for the Polish forces in other fronts to be defeated before he resumes his march on Warsaw. In June 1831 Gen. Antoni Giełgud's attack on Wilno failed and his corps was forced to cross the border with Prussia to avoid complete destruction. There the Polish force got interned and only a small detachment under Gen. Henryk Dembiński managed to rejoin the main Polish force. This secured Paskevich's northern flank and allowed his forces to devise a new plan of attack. Instead of attacking the city directly and risking yet another defeat, he intended to surround Warsaw, cut it off from other Polish-controlled areas and force it into submission.

Between 17 July and 21 July 1831 he crossed Vistula near Osiek with his main force, and headed towards Warsaw through Gąbin and Łowicz. Meanwhile other Russian forces from other theatres were also directed towards the city. Gen. Gregor von Rosen's Corps (12,000 men and 34 guns) marched almost unopposed from Brześć Litewski and reached Praga on 10 August. Gen. Theodor von Rüdiger's corps (12,000 men and 42 guns) crossed Upper Vistula at Józefów on 7 August and captured the city of Radom.

The new Commander in Chief of the Polish Army, Jan Zygmunt Skrzynecki, was also hesitant to fight a major battle. Instead, he ordered Warsaw to be fortified and allowed the Russians to cross the Vistula River unopposed, planning to force them to besiege the city. In his opinion, the war could only be won diplomatically, by interventions of the governments of the United Kingdom, Austria and France. Should those fail, Skrzynecki believed Warsaw would hold out at least several weeks of siege, after which the main bulk of the Polish Army would still be intact to fight a decisive battle against the Russians, who by then would be cut-out from their rear by the Vistula river. However, on 10 August 1831 Skrzynecki was forced to resign and was replaced by Henryk Dembiński, the military governor of Warsaw.

Prelude

Battlefield

In late 18th century and early 19th century Warsaw experienced a period of fast growth. However, as Poland was going through a period of turmoil and constant devastating wars, it lacked modern permanent fortifications. To make up for it, three lines of earthworks, ramparts and palisades were constructed on both sides of the Vistula river. The inner, third line ran approximately along the Lubomirski Ramparts demolished only a couple of years before the outbreak of the uprising. It was a continuous line of earthworks 3 metres (9.8 ft) high, strengthened by numerous forts and fortified houses.

The second line of defences consisted of forts located 400 to 600 metres (1,300 to 2,000 ft) in front of the inner line of defences. The strongest forts were located along the road towards Kalisz. The first, outer line of defences consisted of smaller forts and ramparts running along a semi-circular line from Szopy, through Rakowiec, Wola and Parysów to the banks of Vistula river. The fortified outposts of the outer line were located between 1.5 and 3 kilometres (0.93 and 1.86 mi) in front of the third line. Their purpose was to withstand the initial attacks and divide the attacking Russian forces into smaller groups. There were five large groups of earthworks of the outer line:

• Królikarnia (Forts No. 44 and 45)
• Rakowiec (Forts No. 48 to 53)
• Wola (Fort No. 56)
• Parysów (Forts No. 61 and 62)
• Marymont Forest (Fort No. 66)

The space between the large fortifications was covered by a series of smaller redans (chevron-shaped forts) and barkans (trapezoidal forts). The strongest fortification in the outer line of defences was the Fort No. 56 in the suburb of Wola, built around the St Lawrence's Church. It was supported by a Lunette No. 57 located right in front of it and two additional forts (Nos. 54 and 55) to the south of it. The post of the headquarters was located in Fort No. 73 between Rakowiec and the Jerozolimskie Gate.

Polish headquarters decided to defend the outer line of defences, the furthest from the densely-populated areas. The reason was that in 1830s roughly 53% of buildings (out of 3148 houses in Warsaw) were made of wood and a possible fire could easily destroy the city. However, in case the enemy broke through all three lines of defences, the city centre was also fortified with 30 barricades, embrasures cut through the walls of several buildings and mines hidden beneath major street crossings.

Opposing forces

By 20 August 1831 Warsaw was almost entirely encircled by the Russians. Count Paskevich had at his disposal a formidable force. His main force on the left bank of the Vistula consisted of between 54,000 and 55,000 soldiers, supported by 324 guns of various calibres. Additional 7000 soldiers and 20 guns guarded the river crossings. In addition to Paskevich's main force, the II Corps under Gen. Cyprian von Kreutz (21,000 soldiers, 90 guns) was heading towards the city from Osiek. Meanwhile von Rüdiger's corps was tied down around Radom, fighting a large Polish corps under Gen. Samuel Różycki.

By 5 September 1831 the main Russian force rose to 78,500 men at arms, including 2000 sappers, 54,000 infantry, 17,200 cavalry. Russian artillery outnumbered the Polish and had 382 cannons and 8 mortars manned by 7,300 men. The forces assaulting Warsaw were divided as follows:

• I Infantry Corps (Gen. Peter von der Pahlen) - 11,300 infantry, 424 cavalry, 66 cannons and 4 mortars
  • Cavalry Division (Prince Stepan Khilkov) - 2700 cavalry, 847 Cossacks, 10 cannons
• II Infantry Corps (Gen. Cyprian Kreutz) - 11,200 infantry, 1110 cavalry, 68 cannons and 4 mortars
  • Cavalry Division (Gen. Georg Nostitz) - 2100 cavalry, 16 cannons
  • Infantry Division (Gen. Nikolai Muraviev) - 3100 infantry, 16 cannons
• Corps of Imperial Guard (in reserve, Grand Duke Michael Pavlovich) - 15,700 infantry, 56 cannons
  • Grenadier Corps (Gen. Ivan Shakhovskoy) - 11,000 infantry, 40 cannons
  • Cavalry Corps (Gen. Jan de Witte) - 8500 cavalry, 40 cannons
  • artillery reserve - 60 cannons
• 2nd Light Division (Gen. Karol Strandman) - 1400 infantry, 484 cavalry, 875 Cossacks and 6 cannons

While superior, the Russian force faced severe logistical problems. Count Paskevich's army was too big to sustain on food confiscated from captured lands. It relied on provisions transported from Russia, either directly through Polish territory or through - theoretically neutral - Prussia. However, the epidemic of cholera brought to Poland and East Prussia by Russian soldiers forced the Prussian authorities to close their borders to Russian transports. To avoid starving his army, Paskevich ordered two permanent bridges built across Vistula, in Góra and Podgórze. However, only the latter one had been completed by the start of the Russian assault of Warsaw.

The Polish Army in early September 1831 numbered around 62,000 men in total. The garrison of the city itself numbered some 31,100 infantry and 3800 cavalry. It was divided onto the following units:

• I Corps (Gen. Jan Nepomucen Umiński) - 18,100 infantry, 1400 cavalry, 34 guns
• Reserve Corps (Gen. Henryk Dembiński) - 11,500 infantry, 1700 cavalry, 12 guns
• Garrison of Warsaw and Praga - 1361 infantry, 524 cavalry

The artillery, including organic artillery of infantry and cavalry divisions, as well as artillery of the forts, included 228 pieces of artillery and 21 Congreve rocket batteries, manned by 4554 soldiers of the regular army and 200 members of the National Guard.

The crew was insufficient to man all the defences and some forts had to be abandoned. While there were roughly 15,000 able-bodied members of Straż Bezpieczeństwa, Gwardia Narodowa and Jewish City Guard militias willing to join the fight, the army refused to provide them with arms for fear of losing control over the unruly plebeians.

The situation of the defenders was critical, as the city was home to over 175,000 civilians, refugees, sick and wounded. The defenders were low on provisions and food supplies were far from adequate. The epidemic of cholera brought to Poland by Russian troops struck Warsaw as well, between 16 May and 20 August 4734 people fell ill and 2524 died.

In addition, on 15 August a riot broke out in the city, with up to 3000 angry civilians and soldiers killing suspected spies and traitors. Between 36 and 60 people were killed. The order was restored, but the situation in the besieged city remained fragile. On the other hand the ammunition supplies were excellent and would "allow the Polish Army to fight not one, but three major battles". The Warsaw Arsenal alone stored roughly 3 million rifle rounds and 60,000 cannon shots, that is roughly 200 shots per cannon.

Both sides were trained in a similar manner and used similar equipment. The standard rifle for both sides were the Model 1808 flintlock musket (a clone of the Charleville musket) and its' modification, the Model 1826 Musket, with effective fire range not exceeding roughly 250 metres (820 ft). Some units of the Polish infantry were still armed with hunting rifles or war scythes, but contrary to common misconception the Kosynierzy were but a small minority of Polish forces. The heavy artillery used was mostly 6-pounders and 12-pounders, while heavier artillery included 20-pounders ("half-pood") and 10-pounders ("quarter-pood") cannons. Also, the forces of both sides were a mixture of old, battle-hardened soldiers trained in regular units before the war, and new, unproven recruits.

The Polish Army was made up primarily of volunteers and organised along the lines of Napoleon Bonaparte's army, which meant that there were no corporal punishments in the military handbooks and the soldiers were highly-motivated. However, the excellent morale of the first months of the uprising were long gone by the early days of September. A long string of defeats, partial victories, retreats and high command's indecisiveness, coupled with frequent changes in command structure (between 12 and 20 August the post of Commander-in-Chief changed hands four times) meant that the soldiers' morale was low. Also, most of the generals in Warsaw lacked faith in the aims of the uprising set by the more liberal-minded members of Sejm and instead were "only doing their job", hoping the status quo would return as soon as the Tsar is forced to stand by his promises. The generals supporting the idea of carrying-on with the fight (Umiński, Dembiński, Józef Bem, Kazimierz Małachowski) were in charge in early September, but they were outnumbered by generals, who were willing to sign an armistice with the Russians, even against the will of the Sejm.

By contrast the Russian forces' morale was record-high. The Russian commanders had ample experience in siege operations, Paskevich himself had captured at least six fortified cities in his career, including the capture of Erevan and Abbas-Abbad in the Russo-Persian War of 1826 and the battle of Akhalzic and siege of Kars during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828.

Battle

Initial clashes

Facing logistical problems, the new Polish Commander in Chief Jan Krukowiecki, who replaced Dembiński in mid-August, ordered a sortie on the right-bank. Like his predecessor, Krukowiecki was a conservatist and believed the main aim of the November Uprising was the return of status quo ante with the tsars of Russia as kings of Poland, but respecting the constitution and Polish laws. Unlike Skrzynecki however, he believed foreign intervention to be unrealistic. Instead he wanted to force the Russians to return to peace talks by either defeating the Russian forces of von Rosen and von Rüdiger, breaking the siege or by defeating the assault attempts.

According to the new strategy, the forces under Girolamo Ramorino and Tomasz Łubieński were to leave the city and stay on the right bank of the Vistula, harass the Russian forces under von Rosen and von Rüdiger, capture the river crossings at Osiek, provide the city with supplies and force Paskevich to divert some of his forces to fight them. Both forces left the city between 16 and 20 August 1831. Tomasz Łubieński's Corps headed towards Płock and indeed managed to break the encirclement and deliver much-needed supplies to Warsaw. His forces also broke the northern line of communications between Pashevich's forces and East Prussia. Meanwhile Girolamo Ramorino's II Corps operating in Podlachia defeated von Rosen's Corps in a number of clashes, notably in the battles of Międzyrzec and Rogoźnica. However, Ramorino's indecisiveness and disregard for orders allowed the defeated and numerically-inferior Russians to retreat towards Brześć Litewski. The Russian corps thus avoided complete destruction.

The departure of regular units under Ramorino and Łubieński depleted the forces of the defenders, further weakening the crew manning the first line of defence. The entire garrison dropped to merely 28,000 regular soldiers and 10,000 fresh troops, often armed only with scythes, badly-equipped and poorly-trained.

Having defeated von Rosen at Międzyrzec on 29 August, Ramorino's forces were ordered to return to Siedlce, but Ramorino disregarded that order and followed von Rosen all the way towards Brześć. The order to return through Łuków to Siedlce was repeated on 4 September. From there the a forcible march could allow the II Corps to cross Vistula to the south of Warsaw and attack Paskevich from the rear, or rejoin the bulk of the Polish Army defending Warsaw. However, the repeated order was also ignored. In effect a large part of Polish forces, composed mostly of seasoned soldiers, high on morale thanks to recent victories, was wandering aimlessly through Podlachia, only a couple of days' march from Warsaw. In the end, instead of coming to the aid of Warsaw or following the fleeing forces of von Rosen, Ramorino waited in Podlachia for a week, and then headed south, away from the enemy.

On 4 September Paskevich sent an envoy to Warsaw requesting surrender and promising the revision of the constitution. However, only three out of ten members of the Diplomatic Commission voted in favour of further negotiations. In the end on 5 September the Russian commander was informed that the only acceptable solution has already been made known to all in the declaration of the Sejm. In short, the Poles requested that all lands grabbed by Russia in the effect of the partitions of Poland be reattached to Poland, and that the act of deposition of Nicholas I as the king of Poland (of 25 January 1831) was still valid.

In the eve of the battle, the Russian Army moved from its' positions in villages surrounding Warsaw (Nadarzyn, Wolica, Falenty, Dawidy and Raszyn) closer to Polish positions. The Guards started moving towards the village of Opacze Wielkie, the grenadiers, Cavalry Corps and the I Infantry Corps moved to the road to Kalisz near the village of Szamoty, while the II Infantry Corps moved to Włochy. An infantry division under Muraviev occupied the fields between Okęcie and Rakowiec, and Cavalry Division of Nostitz moved to Zbarż. To complete the encirclement, the 2nd Light Division under Strandman took positions at the road towards Lublin near Służew, while Stepan Khilkov's Cavalry Division moved to Chrzanów. The supply trains and reserves were left in Nadarzyn.

Battle plans

Although far from decisive, the actions of Ramorino and Łubieński forced the hand of Paskevich. Initially opposing the idea of an all-out assault of the city, Paskevich was low on provisions and supplies: by early September the main Russian force had only 5 days' worth of food and horse fodder. On 28 August Paskevich caved in to some of his generals' advice and ordered preparation of a general attack. After several days of quarrels within the Russian staff, it was decided on 4 September that the main thrust should be aimed at the strongest Polish positions behind the suburb of Wola. The main thrust of the Russian attack was directed at the central rampart in Wola, the Fort No. 56, as well as the fortifications surrounding it. The Russian I Infantry Corps was to storm Fort No. 57 and continue towards Forts 56 and 58. The II Infantry Corps was to focus on nearby Forts No. 54 and 55. Other sectors of the front were to be only lightly pressed by diversionary attacks. Most probably Paskevich did not want to enter the city itself, and counted on the Polish defenders to abandon the city or surrender once the outer ring of defences is pierced and the city centre is threatened with fire.

Meanwhile the Polish plan was based on fixed defence of the front line, with the forces under Umiński and Dembiński sheltered behind the second line of defences and acting as a mobile reserve, together with divisional artillery and cavalry. Umiński's Corps was to cover the southern sector of the front, a line of approximately 7.1 kilometres (4.4 mi) from road to Puławy, through the road towards Kraków, to the line connecting the Fort 18 and Fort 74. Forces under Dembiński were to defend the western and northern sector, along a line of approximately 9.6 kilometres (6.0 mi) running from Redoubt No. 54 to the suburb of Marymont. Most of the Polish forces were amassed in the southern part of the city, as the Polish headquarters falsely assumed, that the Russians would attack the weakest part of the defences, around Królikarnia, the suburbs of Mokotów and Czerniaków.

September 6

Already before the battle Paskevich achieved devastating numerical superiority on the western front. The first Russian line facing Wola numbered 30,200 soldiers, 144 pieces of artillery and 8 mortars, the second line was formed by 39,200 soldiers and 196 pieces of artillery. Facing them was a force of 5300 infantry, 65 cannons and 1100 cavalry under Dembiński, with additional 4800 soldiers in reserve.

Enemy movements alerted Polish observation posts located atop the Holy Trinity Church and Astronomical Observatory at Ujazdów Avenue.. At 2:00 Polish defenders were put on alert. The attack started around 4:00. Polish soldiers manning forts No. 54 and 57 were the first to notice enemy movement, Fort No. 54 opened fire on approaching Russians around 5:00, Russian artillery responded with fire and the battle started.

Fort 54

The Fort No. 56 consisted of three wings, each surrounded by its' own earthwork, stockades and a moat. Partially obscured by the trees of Brühl's Garden, the central wing was further reinforced by the St. Laurence's Church and the surrounding monastery, contained within. The fort was manned by 2 battalions of the 8th Regiment of Line Infantry (1200 men), with 40 sappers, 13 cannons, 2 Congreve rocket launchers and a small detachment from the 14th Regiment of Line Infantry (170 men). The fort was commanded by Gen. Józef Sowiński. In front of Fort No. 56, on a hill overlooking the battlefield, lay a smaller irregularly-shaped Fort No. 57 manned by 300 men under Maj. Józef Krassowski, armed with 4 pieces of artillery and 2 Congreve rocket launchers. To the north lay Fort No. 59 (4 cannons, 400 men under Maj. Józef Borzęcki), while to the south Fort No. 54 (up to 350 men under Maj. Ignacy Dobrzelewski and 6 guns under Lt. Julian Konstanty Ordon. Even though the remaining forts of Wola (Forts No. 55, 58, 60 and 61) were deprived of their garrisons to strengthen the defence, the most important Polish positions were still severely undermanned. Around 5:00 86 guns of the I Infantry Corps started shelling Polish positions around Wola from a distance of 600 metres (2,000 ft).

Further to the south lay a group of forts of the outer line near the village of Rakowiec. All had been abandoned by the Poles already in early September, and were captured by Russian infantry under Gen. Muraviev without a fight. Meanwhile forces under Gen. Strandman captured the village of Szopy and started attacking Forts No. 44, 45 and the fortifications around Królikarnia. Although Strandman's unit did not have a clear numerical superiority (2900 Russians with 6 guns against 1700 Poles with 6 guns), the Polish defenders were quickly pushed back. Soon dense black powder smoke covered the battlefield. Unable to determine the true direction of Russian attacks, the Polish commanders believed that the aim of the main thrust would be delivered against the positions at Królikarnia.

The first to realise the mistake was Gen. Dembiński, the commanding officer of the Reserve Corps tasked with defending the western sector. He immediately asked for reinforcements, but was denied by Gen. Krukowiecki. Forced to fight alone, Dembiński decided not to reinforce the first line with his reserve 3rd Infantry Division and instead sent forward only a token force: half a battalion to man Fort No. 58 and support Fort No. 57. To make things worse for the Poles, Gen. Umiński, the commanding officer of the southern sector, focused entirely on the skirmishes around Królikarnia and did not notice what was happening in Wola. Around 7:00 he even reinforced Królikarnia with almost 6 battalions of infantry (ca. 2800 men) and 3 guns. Forts No. 54 and 55 received no reinforcements.

Meanwhile the outer earthworks protecting the forts around Wola were being destroyed by Russian artillery. Since 6:00 roughly 108 pieces of Russian artillery were focused only on forts 54, 55 and 57. Fort 54 held out and losses among the infantry were low, but the artillery of the isolated outposts was forced to hide behind the ramparts. Forts 59 and 61 could not support their neighbours as their crews fought their own artillery duel with horse artillery of Khilkov's Cavalry Division. Khilkov's men suffered heavy casualties.

Out of 32 pieces of artillery held in reserve by Dembiński, only 4 were moved forward to fort No. 58. Around 6:30 additional 9 guns joined the artillery duel around Wola, but their support was too weak and came too late. At that time two large assault columns were formed by Russian II Infantry Corps. The first, under Gen. Nikolai Sulima, headed for Fort No. 54 with Lutkovski's Brigade (2500 men) in the first line. The second, commanded by Gen. Friedrich Caspar von Geismar, headed for Fort No. 55. Soon von Geismar realised that the redoubt is empty, he ordered 1500 men under Col. Pavel Liprandi to join the attack on Fort 54 instead. Despite serious losses, three battalions of Lutkovski's Brigade reached the stockade surrounding the earthworks and started clearing the obstacles.

Because of the smoke the commanders of the second line of Polish outposts did not open fire with their artillery on the approaching Russians, unable to see their progress. Contrary to the battle plan, the second line did not send reinforcements to the first either. This was particularly important in the case of Forts 54 and 56, as they had to face the enemy alone, without the support of Forts No. 21, 22 and 23 located behind them. The most important positions in the suburb of Wola received only token reinforcements from the main reserve and were forced to fight alone and in isolation.

Polish defenders of Fort 54 fired incessantly, but by then the Russian horse artillery had clear line of sight onto the top of the rampart. Also, for unknown reasons the Poles did not use grenades prepared for defence in close quarters. When the breach was completed, two Russian regiments (13th 'Belozerskiy' and 14th 'Olonetskiy') charged into the gap. After several salvoes (among the fallen Russians was Col. Alexander Tukhachevsky, commander of the 14th Regiment and grandfather to Soviet World War II commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky), Polish infantry retreated to within the fort, to fire at Russian soldiers appearing on top of the rampart. The first to cross the obstacles was Pavel Liprandi with his men. With 10:1 Russian superiority, the bayonet fight was short and between 60 and 80 remaining Poles laid down their weapons in a matter of minutes. However, soon afterwards the gunpowder magazine was set on fire and exploded, killing over 100 Russians, among them the commanding officer of the 13th Regiment, Col. Ivan Khludenev. The explosion was fictionalised and immortalised in Adam Mickiewicz's poem Reduta Ordona (Ordon's Redoubt). Altogether the Russian losses during the storming of Fort No. 54 amounted to between 500 and 600 killed.Expecting a Polish counter-attack, Russian engineers started to repair Forts 54 and 55. However, initially only Polish artillery from forts No. 73, 21, 22 and 23 responded with fire, while Dembiński's reserves remained passive.

Seeing no activity on Polish side, Russian II Infantry Corps' artillery started supporting its' neighbours of the I Infantry Corps. Russian artillery suffered some losses, but its' superiority was evident. Batteries of the I Corps approached Fort 57 to within the distance of 300 metres (980 ft), which forced the Polish artillery to be dismantled and withdrawn from the fort. Around 8:00 two columns of the I Corps (under Alexander von Lüders and Ivan Nabokov) assaulted the fort. Elements of four Russian regiments (3rd and 4th Marine Regiments, 7th 'Revelski' Infantry Regiment and Moskovsky Regiment) stormed the fort from three sides, hoping a three-hour artillery barrage destroyed the obstacles and palisade guarding the entry to Polish positions. However, the stockade was almost intact and Russian forces suffered considerable losses, both from small-arms fire and from artillery of the 2nd line. The officers ordered a retreat, but the soldiers disregarded the order and continued to assault the fort on their own. Despite the losses, Russian infantry entered the fort and captured it in a close quarters fight, without a single shot fired. Only about 80 Poles were taken captive and four managed to retreat to the Polish line with their wounded commanding officer, the remainder fought fanatically to the last man. As the recently-captured fort was well within the range of Polish artillery, the Russians withdrew and started hiding behind it.

Fort 56

Despite the loss of forts no. 54, 55 and 57 Krukowiecki was still convinced that the attack on Wola is but a diversion, and refused to grant Gen. Dembiński additional reinforcements. Only Gen. Ludwik Bogusławski, commanding officer of the 3rd Infantry Division, disregarded his orders and sent a single battalion of the 10th Line Infantry Regiment to Fort 56 as reinforcements. The battalion was led by Col. Piotr Wysocki, the same officer who started the entire November Uprising. Desperate, Dembiński abandoned Fort 58. Its' artillery, along with 12 pieces of artillery and 6 rocket launchers from his reserves, was ordered to take positions between the first and second lines of defence, in front of Forts 21, 22 and 23. Around 9:00, when Russian forces were preparing to push further into the second line of Polish defences, Brigadier Józef Bem arrived to Wola with his 12 cannons and boldly positioned them not far from the recently-lost fort No. 54, right on the flank of Kreutz's infantry and Russian artillery shelling Fort 56. Additional 8 guns and 4 rocket launchers arrived to the northern flank of Wola and joined the defence of Fort 58. Around that time the combined artillery forces of both Russian infantry corps shifted their fire to Forts No. 56, 59 and 23. This time the artillery duel was won by the Poles. Despite Russian numerical superiority in guns and mortars, Russian artillery suffered losses and was forced to withdraw, followed by infantry, likewise forced back into hiding behind the captured earthworks. However, Dembiński did not take advantage of this success and Polish infantry remained hidden behind fixed defences.

Seeing no activity, the commander of the Russian II Corps ordered all his cannons to shift fire on the 14 guns under Józef Bem. Heavily-pressed, Polish artillery withstood the fire for over half an hour, before switching to new positions right of the road to Kalisz. It resumed fire on the II Corps, but was again targeted by enemy guns. Artillery duel continued, but the situation of Fort No. 56 was becoming critical. Shelled from three sides, the largest Polish fort around Warsaw was now isolated. Including reinforcements brought by Col. Wysocki, the crew of the fort included approximately 1660 infantrymen and 10 pieces of artillery. By 10:00 most artillerymen were killed or wounded (including fort's artillery commander, Capt. Krzywicki) and had to be replaced with untrained infantrymen. All ramparts were being successively damaged by Russian artillery and there was a 30-metre breach in one of its' sides.

Paskevich, who observed the artillery duel from Fort 55, became convinced that his Polish counterpart would not come to the rescue of Fort 56. Initially hesitant, he finally ordered Russian infantry to attack Fort 56 around 10:00. The attack was carried out by 13 infantry battalions (ca. 6900 men) from columns commanded by Gen. Lüders and Martinov. The forces of Lüders stormed the obstacles and crossed the stockade, but Polish defenders welcomed them with rifle volleys from within the fort, and the attack was repelled. However, Lüders quickly ordered his second line (2300 men) to advance as well. The new forces were twice pushed back into the moat by the commander of the northern wing, Maj. Franciszek Biernacki, but in the end the Polish defenders were overpowered and had to withdraw further into the fort. The Russians entered the fort, but their battalions lost cohesion and were fighting as isolated groups of soldiers and not as a single force, which allowed the numerically-inferior force under Biernacki to hold-out inside the fort and cover the flank of the central wing.

Meanwhile forces under Gen. Martinov assaulted the central wing of Fort 56. Here the obstacles were intact and 200 Polish soldiers managed to repel three consecutive assaults by famed Moscow Guards Regiment. The Russians lost two regimental commanders before they managed to reach the moat. When a force of roughly 2900 Russians reached the top of the rampart, they were surprised by a staunch defence of a second rampart, located right behind it. Russian infantry retreated and hid under the first rampart. Meanwhile Biernacki fighting in the northern wing managed to expel the Russian infantry, but was killed in action during the counter-attack and the Poles withdrew back into the trees on the far side of the fort. To stabilise the situation, Gen. Sowiński ordered a company of the 8th Line Infantry Regiment to leave the central wing and join the fight in the north. The new commanding officer of the north wing, Maj. Lipski, organised yet another counter-attack. Shouting "Mates, remember Grochów, remember Iganie!" he led his men in a brave charge and pushed the Russians back once again, but the impetus was lost and the Russians retained control of the rampart to the north-west. A short stale-mate ensued, in which the Polish infantrymen and their single 12-pounder carronade could prevent much larger enemy forces from entering the fort.

Seeing that their forces failed, Paskevich and Pahlen decided to throw in even more forces into the fight. Elements of 9th 'Ingermanland' Infantry Regiment and 10th 'New Ingermanland' Infantry Regiment (890 men and 6 guns) were ordered to attack the eastern side of the northern wing. Simultaneously 7 battalions (ca. 4000 men) were to attack the central and eastern wings from the south. Meanwhile roughly 70 pieces of artillery were ordered to fire on the second line of Polish defences to prevent Polish reinforcements from breaking through to the fort. This time several thousand Russians entered the northern wing in strict military formations. By then the garrison under Maj. Lipski had roughly 800 men and was not strong enough to withstand the assault. Poles were again pushed back into the trees of the far side of the northern wing and Maj. Lipski was killed. He was replaced by Maj. Dobrogoyski, who panicked and sounded a retreat, taking with him roughly 500 men. The remaining 300 soldiers under Maj. Świtkowski tried to once again charge the Russians out, but were by then outnumbered 10:1 and around 10:30 had to withdraw towards the central wing. The central wing, by then under command of Lt.Col. Wodzyński, held out against a large column led by Gen. Lüders, composed of elite regiments of Prince Wilhelm and Prince Charles. By that time the central wing was defended by mere 900 men and one cannon. The combined forces of Lüders, Martynov and Friedrich von Berg exceeded 6000 men and were preparing to storm the central wing. Several assaults were repelled, but shortly after 11:00 the Polish position was attacked both from the north and south at the same time. The northern pincer stalled while the southern pincer, led by Gen. Malinovski, was bloodily repelled and Gen. Martynov was heavily wounded. However, Gen. Pahlen ordered additional 2300 men (5th Infantry Regiment and elements of Siberian Grenadiers) to attack from the other side. The Siberian regiment entered the fort and forced the crews of carronades, commanded personally by Gen. Sowiński, to withdraw to within the walls surrounding the church. The largest group of Polish soldiers fighting in front of the church was offered capitulation and Sowiński accepted. He and the remainder of his crew laid down their arms. However, another group of Polish soldiers still defending the church fired at the Russians and the prisoners of war were then massacred by angered Russian soldiers, Gen. Sowiński among them. As Russian authorities later confirmed he died on the field of duty, Sowiński soon became a Polish national hero, immortalised in a poem "Sowiński w okopach Woli" (Sowiński in the trenches of Wola) by Juliusz Słowacki.

The surrounded church was well-prepared for defence, but its' garrison was by then composed almost entirely of the wounded. By noon the defenders were overpowered and the Russians entered the church. The fight for Fort 56 was over. Altogether the Russian side lost no less than 1000 killed in action during the storming of the fort. Polish casualties did not exceed 300 killed and wounded, while 1230 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. Only up to 500 soldiers managed to withdraw and reach Polish lines.

Wola

The Poles tried to recapture the main positions in Wola, but two consecutive counter-attacks around 11:00 failed. After capturing the redoubts in Wola, Paskevich sent another envoy to Warsaw, but the hastily called session of the Parliament renounced his offer of a cease-fire. Around 14:30 the attacks resumed along the entire front-line. Paskevich himself was lightly wounded by a Polish canister shot, but recovered soon afterwards.

By that point the battle plan of the Russians was still not clear to the Polish Commander-in-Chief Gen. Krukowiecki. Unsure whether the main attack is on Wola or the forts around Królikarnia, he did not reassign any sizeable infantry force to the western front, despite the fact that the southern line was safely in Polish hands and repeated Russian attacks there were being repelled. Only a small detachment of horse artillery was dispatched to the second line near Wola.

In the evening Gen. Krukowiecki agreed to Paskevich's terms. The cease-fire agreement (apparently never signed on paper) stipulated that the Polish Army was free to leave the city, a two-day cease fire would come into effect and that the city of Warsaw would be spared the horrors it experienced during the 1794 siege. No political clauses were included.

September 7

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At 3:00 the cease-fire signed the previous day came into effect. The Polish Army withdrew to the other side of Vistula and continued north towards the Modlin Fortress. The Sejm, Senate and many civilians also left the city "in grim silence". Many soldiers and officers however, including high-ranking officers, decided to stay in the city and lay down their arms. Up to 5000 soldiers stayed in Warsaw, along with roughly 600 officers, among them generals Krukowiecki, Małachowski, Chrzanowski and Prądzyński. The food stores were opened and their contents was distributed among the civilians.

In the evening of the following day Grand Duke Michail Pavlovich entered the city leading his Imperial Guard. Warsaw capitulated.

Aftermath

Although no large-scale evacuation of supplies from Warsaw was ordered, the Modlin Fortress was well-prepared for a lengthy siege. Its' magazines contained over 25 thousand cannon rounds, almost 900 thousand musket and rifle rounds and enough provisions for several months of full siege. Despite the fall of Warsaw, also the treasury of the Polish government was still intact and contained more than 6.5 million złotys.

The fall of Warsaw was synonymous with the fall of entire Poland, both to Poles and to foreigners. Soon afterwards the tsar practically dismantled the Kingdom of Poland: its' constitution was abolished, the government given to Russian officials and its' Warsaw University closed.

The news of the fall of Warsaw spread quickly throughout the world and incited a wave of sympathy towards Poles and their plight. Several towns in the United States voted to change their names to Warsaw after the news of the battle reached their residents, among them Warsaw, Virginia and Warsaw, Kentucky.

Shortly after the battle, in December 1831, the tsarist authorities issued a "For the Taking of Warsaw by Assault in 1831" Medal awarded to Russian veterans of the battle. Soon afterwards a monument "To the Captors of Warsaw" was constructed not far from the site once occupied by Redoubt No. 54. Demolished after Poland regained independence in 1918, the spot is now occupied by a post-war monument to Juliusz Konstanty Ordon and his soldiers. There are plans to move the monument closer to where the actual Redoubt was.

Casualties

Early official Russian data assert that the total number of casualties were between 8 and 10 thousand killed and wounded for the Russian side, and between 6 and 7 thousand for the Polish.

Other sources give the total Polish casualties as 9000

References

Notes

1. ^ Strzeżek (1998), p. 7
2. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 9-10
3. ^ Black, pp. 41-42
4. ^ Strzeżek (1996), pp. 19-22
5. Zwierkowski, p. 497
6. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 11-12
7. ^ Durand, pp. 230-243
8. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 21-24
9. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 17-19
10. ^ Ringelblum, p. 30
11. Nieuważny, p. 1
12. Strzeżek (1996), p. 207
13. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 23
14. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 24-26
15. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 28-30
16. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 14-16
17. ^ Strzeżek (1996), pp. 15-16
18. ^ Kasparek, pp. 168-170
19. ^ Laskowski, pp. 140-144
20. ^ Strzeżek (1998), p. 12
21. ^ Łojek, pp. 122-124
22. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 27-28
23. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 53
24. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 35-41
25. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 30-34
26. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 59
27. Tokarz (1917), p. 248
28. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 41-44
29. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 44-48
30. ^ Strzeżek (1998), pp. 50-55
31. ^ Strzeżek (1996), p. 103
32. Tucker, pp. 1156-1157
33. Barber, pp. 30, 130
34. rusempire.ru, p. 1
35. ^ Kraj, p. 1
36. Jacques, p. 1094

Footnotes

Bibliography

• Template:Pl icon Tomasz Strzeżek (1996). Obrona Warszawy 6-7 września 1831 roku. Rozprawy i Materiały Ośrodka Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego w Olsztynie. Vol. 158 (1 ed.). Ośrodek Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego. p. 240. OCLC 39202136. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Template:Pl icon Tomasz Strzeżek (1998). Kornelia Kompanowska (ed.). Warszawa 1831. Historyczne Bitwy. Warsaw: Dom Wydawniczy Bellona. ISBN 83-11-08793-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Template:Pl icon Norbert Kasparek (1997). "Obrona Warszawy 6-7 września 1831 roku" (pdf). Mazowieckie Studia Humanistyczne. 3 (2). Łowicz: Mazowiecka Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczno-Pedagogiczna: 166–170. ISSN 1234-5075. Retrieved 2013-08-19. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
• Template:Pl icon various authors (1931). Józef Lachowski (ed.). Powstanie Listopadowe. Lwów: Obywatelski Komitet Obchodu Stulecia Powstania Listopadowego we Lwowie. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Template:En icon Francene Barber; David Jett; Brenda Harhai (2010). Warsaw. Images of America. Charleston, S.C.: Arcadia Publishing. pp. 30, 130. ISBN 978-0-7385-6776-1. LCCN 2009921315.
• Template:Pl icon Jerzy Łojek (1980). Szanse powstania listopadowego: rozważania historyczne. Warsaw: PAX. ISBN 83-211-0148-8.
• Template:Pl icon Otton Laskowski (1931). Przewodnik po polach bitew wojny polsko-rosyjskiej 1830-1831 r. Warsaw: Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
• Template:Pl icon Władysław Rostocki (1975). "Korpus w gęsie pióra uzbrojony. Urzędnicy warszawscy, ich życie i praca w Księstwie Warszawskim i Królestwie Polskim do roku 1831". Acta Poloniae Historica. 31. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
• Template:Pl icon Raymond Durand (1980). Robert Bielecki (ed.). Depesze z powstańczej Warszawy 1830-1831: raporty konsula francuskiego w Królestwie Polskim. Warsaw: Czytelnik. p. 304. ISBN 8307002540. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |trans_title= (help)
• Template:En icon Tony Jaques (2007). Dictionary of Battles and Sieges. Vol. 3. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 1354. ISBN 0313335397. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
• Template:En icon Spencer C. Tucker (2009). A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East. ABC-CLIO. p. 2777. ISBN 1851096728. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |trans_title= (help)
• Template:En icon Emanuel Ringelblum (1992). Joseph Kermish; Shmuel Krakowski (eds.). Polish-Jewish Relations During the Second World War. Northwestern University Press. p. 330. ISBN 0810109638. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |trans_title= (help)
• Template:Pl icon Andrzej Nieuważny (2008). "Dni krwi i chwały..." Rzeczpospolita (23-06-2008). Retrieved 2013-08-21. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
• Template:En icon Jeremy Black (2009). War in the Nineteenth Century. War and Conflict Through the Ages. Vol. 1. Polity. p. 252. ISBN 0745644481. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |trans_title= (help)
• Template:Pl icon Wacław Tokarz (1917). Armja Królestwa Polskiego: 1815-1830. Cracow: Departament Wojskowy Naczelnego Komitetu Narodowego. p. 386. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Template:Pl icon Wacław Tokarz (1930). Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830 i 1831 (PDF) (1 ed.). Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy. p. 588. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Template:Ru icon rusempire.ru (corporate author) (2012). "Медаль "За взятие приступом Варшавы в 1831 году"". Архив статей. rusempire.ru. Retrieved 2013-08-22. {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Template:Pl icon Izabela Kraj (2008). "Przesunąć redutę Ordona". Rzeczpospolita (2008-01-31). Retrieved 2013-08-22. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Template:Pl icon Walenty Zwierkowski (1973). Władysław Lewandowski (ed.). Rys powstania, walki i działań polaków 1830 i 1831 roku. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza. p. 611. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)

• Conflicts in 1831
• 1831 in Poland
• Battles of the November Uprising
• History of Warsaw