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The Israeli occupation of the West Bank began on 7 June 1967 when Israel occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and continues to the present day. The status of the West Bank as an occupied territory has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice and, with the exception of East Jerusalem, by the Israeli Supreme Court, though the official Israeli government view is that the law of occupation does not apply and it uses the term "Disputed Territories" instead. Military occupations of this kind continue on the premise that a state of cease-fire exists, in theory temporary, which maintains the status of a conflictual arrangement denying the Palestinians – technically, protected persons under the First Geneva Convention – the right to self-determination.

Among the most controversial policies enacted as part of its occupation, Israel has established numerous Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The international community considers these settlements illegal under international law, though Israel disputes this. The United Nations Security Council has consistently reaffirmed that settlements in that territory are void of legality and are a "flagrant violation of international law", most recently with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334. The creation and ongoing expansion of the settlements have led to Israel's policies being criticized as an example of colonialism.

It is reputed to be perhaps "the most closely studied conflict on earth", and controversies abound even as to what terminology is most appropriate for narrating the realities, pro-Israeli sources favouring one set of terms and the Palestinian Authority advocating a different nomenclature. Observers have dedicated much analysis of the implications of keywords that tend to dominate the respective discourses. This dissension extends to the issue of the way the media, both traditional and social, portray the conflict, with arguments protesting either a systematic pro-Israeli bias or prejudice against Israel. The domain of public discussion is also subject to intense contestation: some organizations claim pro-Israeli Jewish students are subject to vilification and harassment on campus. Others note that proposed talks on campus concerning Palestinian issues can be rescinded for fears that audiences might not be sufficiently prepared to evaluate objectively the material to be presented. Attempts have been made to silence several high-profile critics of Israeli policies in the territories, among them Tony Judt, Norman Finkelstein, Joseph Massad, Nadia Abu El-Haj and William I. Robinson. Such difficulties have given rise to anxieties that the topic itself is at risk, and that the political pressures circumscribing research and discussion undermine academic freedom itself.

The length of Israel's prolonged occupation was already regarded as "exceptional" after two decades and is now deemed to be the longest in modern history, suggesting that, rather than a temporary occupation, it is an extension of a colonial project outlined as early as Theodor Herzl which is how Palestinians view it. Generally, international jurists affirm that the longer the occupation, the greater must be the weight of the occupied people's humanitarian needs in any assessment of the occupying power's security measures. It is widely considered to be a classic example of an "intractable" conflict.

On the 50th anniversary of the occupation, Human Rights Watch stated that Israel's methods of control consist of "repression, institutionalized discrimination, and systematic abuses of the Palestinian population's rights", and involve five types of major violations of International human rights law. The system developed has often been likened to that of apartheid. The broad thrust of Israeli ethnic and geopolitical policies since the foundation of the state, following Mandatory tactics, has been perceived as one intent on divide and rule (hafrayd umshol) and, in the case of West Bank Palestinians, given their ethnic unity, to exploit class and village/urban differences, and to splinter them into different factions in order to undermine their collective bargaining power, and then negotiate with the weakest actor.

The occupation has numerous critics in Israel, and some, among them Jeff Halpern, argue that the technologies Israel has developed to contain Palestinian national aspirations have been widely adopted and now play a pivotal role in the broader sphere of global pacification.

The language of conflict

In the immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War Israeli usage initially adopted the standard terminology of referring to the West Bank and Gaza as "occupied territories" (ha-šeṭaḥim ha-kevušim). This was soon replaced by "administered territories" (ha-šeṭaḥim ha-muḥzaqim). Finally, the West Bank area, excluding East Jerusalem, was renamed "Judea and Samaria" (Yehudah we-Šomron). Over subsequent decades, U.S. media coverage, which initially described Israel's presence in either of the Palestinian territories as an "occupation", gradually dropped the word and by 2001 it had become "almost taboo" in, and "ethereal in its absence" from, American reportage. A poll of British newsreaders that same year found that only 9% were aware that Israel was the occupying power of Palestinian territories. Israeli academic surveys at the time of Operation Defensive Shield (2002) also found that the Israeli public thought the West Bank revolt was evidence that Palestinians were trying, murderously, to wrest control of territories within Israel itself.

Several studies have concluded that "terminology bias" has been a recurrent feature of coverage of the conflict, and scholars and commentators like Yasir Suleiman and Peter Beinart argue that language manipulation plays an important role in endeavours to win over the international public, with some concluding that Israel has proven more adept in this battle. So too Greg Myre wrote of the rise of a "verbal arms race" where "(m)uch of the Mideast conflict is about winning international support", one which escalated with the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Brian Whitaker, reviewing 1,659 articles covering events in the Guardian and Evening Standard for this period (2000-2001), observed the same effects, adding that omission of important adjectives was notable: 66% failed to mention that the incidents took place in an occupied territory. Hebron was described as a divided city, though 99% of its inhabitants are Palestinian, whereas Israel describes Jerusalem as "undivided" though a third of its inhabitants are Palestinian. Likewise, Jews live in "communities", Palestinians in "areas". In his view Israel had won the verbal war. East Jerusalem is not "occupied" or a cultural and spiritual centre for Muslims and Arabs for 14 centuries, but "the eternal, indivisible capital of Israel" and "reunited". In reporting the capture of Gilad Shalit on Israeli soil and his removal to the Gaza Strip, and Israel's response of detaining 60 Hamas members, half Palestinian West Bank parliamentarians, the former was said to have been kidnapped while the latter, seized from their beds in night raids and removed to Israeli prisons, were arrested. Beinart's article suggested there was a pattern of Orwellian "linguistic fraud and a culture of euphemism" in the way AIPAC, for one, describes what takes place in the West Bank.

In Israeli newspaper reportage of violence, the IDF confirms, or says, while the Palestinians claim. The word "violence" itself connotes, according to Gershon Shafir, different events in Israeli and non-Israeli discourse: In the former, it is essentially dissociated from the 50 year long practice of occupying Palestinian lands and used to refer only to an intermittent recourse to military methods to contain episodic upsurges of hostile Palestinian resistance, a means employed when the security of an otherwise peaceful state is said to be at stake. Thus, Israeli violence is restricted to responses to specific events like putting down the First and Second Intifadas, Israel's wars in Gaza and the Palestinian knifing attacks in 2015-2016, which were mainly the work of lone wolves. Shafir argues to the contrary that the occupation "is best understood as ongoing, day-in and day-out coercion, and its injuries include material, psychological, social, and bodily harm". And, he further claims, it is the coercive techniques of the institutions of occupation deployed to enforce submission that produce the occasional eruptions of "military operations" and wars. Violence is omnipresent reality for Palestinians, on the other hand, and found in all facets of the occupation. Consequently, he concludes, the most intense suppression of uprisings and wars cannot be considered in isolation from the occupation regime as an everyday experience.

Such omissions and alterations in the terms used are cited as an example of the pervasive use of euphemisms or loaded terminology in reportage on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a problem which the International Press Institute thought sufficiently important by 2013 to issue a handbook to guide journalists through the semantic minefield. What Palestinians call "assassinations" – the shooting of people suspected of terrorism – Israel first called "pre-emptive strikes", then "pinpoint preventive operations", and also "extrajudicial punishments" or "long-range hot pursuit" until "focused prevention" was finally settled on. Offers to return "occupied territory" are "(painful) concessions" rather than a compliance with international law. For decades, Israeli announcements, speaking of arrests of children, never used the word "child". Even a 10-year-old shot by the IDF could be referred to as "a young man of ten." The use of the term "colonialism" by New Historians to describe Zionist settlement, a term likening the process to the French colonization of Algeria and the Dutch settlement of South Africa, has likewise been challenged, with some asserting that this is a demonizing term used in Palestinian textbooks.

Robert Fisk argues that the descriptive language used by major political players and the press to describe the occupation is one of "desemanticization": occupied lands become "disputed territories"; colonies are described as "settlements", "neighbourhoods" "suburbs", "population centres"; dispossession and exile are referred to as "dislocation"/"displacement"; Israelis are shot by "terrorists" but when Palestinians are shot dead they die in "clashes"; the Wall becomes a "fence" or "security barrier". Suicide bombers for Palestinians are "martyrs" (shahid); Israel prefers "homicide bombers". Israel calls one of its uses of Palestinians as human shields a "neighbour procedure". If children are killed by Israeli fire, these events are often contextualized by the "shop-worn euphemism" (Fisk) of their being "caught in the crossfire". Deporting West Bankers to Gaza as collective punishment for families who have siblings that participated in terror incidents is known as an "order limiting the place of residency". Israeli military actions are customarily referred to as "responses" or "retaliations" to a Palestinian attack, even if it is Israel that strikes first.

Media and academic coverage

The quality of both Media coverage of the Arab–Israeli conflict and research and debates on university campuses have been the object of extensive monitoring and research. In the latter regard, organizations like Campus Watch closely report and denounce what they consider "anti-Israeli" attitudes. In addition to Israel's hasbara organization, intent on countering negative press images, there are also many private pro-Israeli organizations, among them CAMERA, FLAME, HonestReporting, Palestinian Media Watch and the Anti-Defamation League which subject reportage to scrutiny in the belief news on Israel has systematically distorted reality to privilege Palestinian versions. In Ehud Barak's view Palestinians are "products of a culture in which to tell a lie..creates no dissonance". Others allow that both sides lie, but "Arabs" are better at it. The term Pallywood was coined to suggest that Palestinian coverage of their plight, in a genre called "traumatic realism", is marked by a diffuse intent to fraudulently manipulate the media, beginning with the killing of Mohammad Durrah, and, it has been argued, still being evoked as late as 2014 to dismiss Israeli responsibility for the Beitunia killings. The idea has been dismissed as bearing the hallmarks of a "conspiracy theory". On the other hand, book-length studies have been devoted to testing the theory that the world's understanding of the conflict, though "mediated by Israeli newspapers to a domestic audience", is "anti-Israel".

Internal Israeli studies have argued that local press coverage has traditionally been conservative, reflecting the often tendentious and biased views of the political and military establishment, and similar tendencies have been noted in Palestinian reportage. In a sample of 48 reports of 22 Palestinian deaths, 40 Israeli accounts only gave the IDF version, a mere 8 included a Palestinian reaction. Tamar Liebes, former director of the Smart Institute of Communication at the Hebrew University, argued that Israeli "Journalists and publishers see themselves as actors within the Zionist movement, not as critical outsiders". The explosive expansion of the Internet has opened up a larger sphere of controversy. Digital forensics flourishing on social networks have occasionally revealed problems with a few widely circulating images of dead Palestinians, but, according to Kuntzman and Stein, technical suspicion quickly yielded ground, among Israeli Jewish social media practitioners who combined a politics of militant nationalism with global networking conventions, to unfounded polemical claims, making out that, 'the fraudulent, deceiving Palestinian was a "natural condition" that required no substantiation', and that, generically, images of dead or injured Palestinians were faked.

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have argued that "the American media's coverage of Israel tends to be strongly biased in Israel's favour" compared to reportage in other democratic countries' media, with a tendency to marginalize anyone who voices a critical attitude. A 2001 study concluded that press coverage had highlighted violent displays and demonstrations of Palestinian grievances as if it were Palestinians who "looked for a confrontation", but consistently failed to add any context of the systematic abuses to which they are subjected. Marda Dunsky argues that empirical work appears to support Mearsheimer and Walt's claim. She concluded that coverage of (a) the refugee problem; (b) settlements; (c) the historical and political background, (which are either frequently skimmed over or entirely omitted), and (d) violence, "reflects the parameters of U.S. Middle East policy", regarding both U.S. aid and support for Israel. This view that American media are biased towards Palestinians has been challenged by authors who cite research that concluded most mainstream media have a "liberal" bias, a criticism extended to European outlets like Le Monde and the BBC.

The West Bank in 1967

On the eve of occupation the West Bank accounted for 40% of Jordanian GNP, between 34% and 40% of its agricultural output and almost half of its manpower, though only a third of Jordanian investment was allocated to it and mainly to the private housing construction sector. Though its per-capita product was 10 times greater than that of the West Bank, the Israeli economy on the eve of occupation had experienced two years (1966-1967) of a sharp recession. Immediately after the occupation, from 1967 to 1974, the economy boomed. In 1967 the Palestinian economy had a gross domestic product of $1,349 per capita for a million people, with the West Bank population at 585,500, of whom 18% were refugees, and was growing annually by 2%. West Bank growth, compared to Gaza (3%), had lagged, due to the effect of mass emigration of West Bankers seeking employment in Jordan. As agriculture gave way to industrial development in Israel, in the West Bank the former still generated 37% of domestic product, and industry a mere 13%.

The growth rate of the West Bank economy in the period of the Jordanian Occupation of the West Bank before Israeli occupation had ticked along at an annual rate of 6-8%. This rate of growth was indispensable if the post-war West Bank were to achieve economic self-reliance. However, the loss of East Jerusalem cut off potential gains from tourism. British and Arab commercial banks operating in the West Bank were closed down soon after Israel assumed power there. Bank Leumi then opened nine branches, without successfully replacing the earlier system. Farmers could get loans, but Palestinian businessmen avoided tasking out loans from them since they charged 9% compared to 5% interest in Jordan. 80% of Jordan's fruit-growing land and 40% of its vegetables lay in the West Bank, and, with the onset of the occupation, the area could no longer produce export earnings.

Education has been a high priority in modern Palestinian culture. Compared to Israel, the West Bank had a favourable educational basis, due to the pre-existing provisions of the Jordanian school system which provided free and compulsory education for 12 years. 84.4% of Israelis in the 6-11 age group, compared to 80.5% of West Bank children, went to school, but the disparity was inverted for the 15–17 year olds, with 44.6% West Bank teenagers frequenting school, as compared to 22.8% of Israelis at that age. Enrolments grew on an average of 7% for the decade before occupation, and by 1966, Palestinian youth had the highest enrolment rate of all Arab countries.

Local Palestinian tradition, underwritten by both Ottoman and British law, held that the land belonged to God or the sultan: families could maintain the land but the notion of private property title was alien, despite efforts since 1858 to introduce it. Until British rule which redistributed land to individual family units, village land was held collectively by the hamula or clan. The Ottoman system and all later governments until 1967 acknowledged that the land surrounding the village was for the use of its inhabitants either as common pastures or for the future development of the village. The villagers did not have any need or opportunity to register their lands. They knew among themselves which of the village lands belonged to which families and which were owned in common (mashaa ). Customary practice however under the British was reviewed to consider all land within village and town boundaries as no longer miri but mülk.

By June 1967, only a third of West Bank land had been registered under the Settlement of Disputes over Land and Water Law and Israel quickly moved, in 1968, to cancel the possibility of registering one's title with the Jordanian Land Register. Claims for land in the other two thirds depended on either a Turkish or British certificate of registration, or through tax registers and proof of purchase under Jordanian law. On assuming control, Israel suspended these procedures, and asserted that of five categories of land in the old Ottoman Law – waqf. mülk, miri, matruke and mawat – the last three were state land, taking advantage of modifications enacted by the British Mandatory Authority, such as the Mawat Land Ordinance of 1921. The Jordanian government never considered the last three as state land, and only a very small proportion of the West Bank was registered as such under Jordanian rule.

Conquest

Palestine remains the only Arab land which has been denied Arab rule and independent statehood. In 1956, the Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion, who also recognized that year that for Arabs what Zionism undertook to do was seen as theft, stated that: "Jordan has no right to exist.. The territory to the West of the Jordan should be made an autonomous region of Israel". That Zionism thought of partition agreements as temporary and aspired from the outset to incorporate all of Palestine into a Jewish state went back at least to declarations of intent made by Ben-Gurion in 1937-1938

Before the Six-Day War, there had been an unwritten agreement between Israel and the Jordanian government to uphold the neutrality of the border between the two countries along the Green Line. According to King Hussein, after Israel retaliated against Syrian-backed guerrilla infiltrations and sabotage by conducting on 13 November 1966 an assault on Samu in the West Bank, an area administered by Jordan, that tacit accord was broken. After Israel attacked Egypt at 8 a.m. on 5 June 1967, Jordan responded by shelling Israeli targets in West Jerusalem, and settlements along the border and then, after ignoring an Israeli warning, by attacking Israeli airfields in Ramat David and Kfar Syrkin, but also Netanya. In response, the Israeli army in a swift campaign took possession of East Jerusalem and, after news that King Hussein had ordered his forces to withdraw across the Jordan, took the entire West Bank by noon on 8 June.

Israel expelled many people from areas it had conquered, beginning with an estimated 12,000 people who on the very first day were rounded up in the villages of Imwas, Yalo and Bayt Nuba in the Latrun Salient and ordered by the Israeli military into exile eastwards. All three villages were then blown up, and within two years the area was planned as a recreational area now called Canada Park. Tens of thousands of Palestinians fled to Jordan from the refugee camps of Aqabat Jaber and Ein as-Sultan after Israel bombed the camps. The overall numbers of Palestinians displaced by that war is generally estimated to have been around 280,000-325,000, of which it has been calculated that some 120-170,000 were two-time refugees, having been displaced earlier during the 1948 war. The number who left the West Bank as a consequence of the war ranges from 100,000 to 400,000, of which from 50,000 to 200,000 lived in the Jordan Valley.

Legal status

Before proceding with settlement, the government sought legal advice from their resident expert on international law, Theodor Meron, His top secret memorandum stated unequivocally that the prohibition on any such population transfer was categorical, and that "civilian settlement in the administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention." Gershom Gorenberg argues the documentary record indicates that the Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was therefore aware the promotion of settlements in the West Bank would be illegal. The International community has also since rejected Israel's unwillingness to accept the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the territories it occupies, with most arguing all states are duty bound to observe them. Israel alone challenges this premise, arguing that the West Bank and Gaza are "disputed territories", and that the Conventions do not apply because these lands did not form part of another state's sovereign territory, and that the transfer of Jews into areas like the West Bank is not a government act but a voluntary movement by Israeli Jewish people, not acting under compulsion, a position contested by Yoram Dinstein.

Military Administration

Even before the end of the 1967 June War, Israel invested all "powers of government, legislature, appointment and administration in relation to the region or its inhabitants" in the hands of the Military Governor. General Chaim Herzog announced on 7 June 1967, that all previously existing laws would remain in force, save in cases where they conflicted with the rights of Israel as Occupying Power to ensure security for both its forces and public order. Israel justified the retention of what it considered the Jordanian maintenance of British occupation regulations, believing them consonant with Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which properly concern the treatment by a hostile power of the occupied population. The Jordanian position is that Israel is not heir to its laws in this regard in that they were abolished decades earlier. Called on to adjudicate between competing claims, the United Nations, in its Special Committee Report of 1970, stated that the Mandatory Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which the British themselves subsequently repealed, did not constitute a warrant for applying them to the Palestinian Territories since they were invalid, in conflicting with the protocols of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The Israeli Military Governorate instituted to rule the territories was dissolved in 1982 and replaced by the Israeli Civil Administration, which is actually an arm of the Israeli army. Set up in November 1981 under military order no. 947, it has a mandate which stipulates that the function of the body is to "administer the civil affairs in the area ... for the welfare and benefit of the population and for provision and operation of public services, considering the need to maintain proper administration and public order in the area." The creation of this new body unleashed a wave of protest in the first few months of 1982, repressing which caused more Palestinian casualties than had occurred in the preceding 15 years of occupation. From 1967 to 2014, the Israeli administration issued over 1,680 military orders regarding the West Bank. Though formally the IDF was obliged to be neutral, it was drawn into the politics of the conflict, caught between the administration of the occupied people and the defense of settlements, which were originally thought of as a military burden whose defense should be left to the settlers, but whose early militias were salaried, trained, and furnished with arms by the IDF, which now operates to defend them.

By the time of the Oslo Accords, 47% of West Bankers were refugees, and 11% of the total population dwelt in refugee camps. As part of Ariel Sharon's strategy, the Civil Administration had extended to all areas of the West Bank the Village Leagues (rawabit al-qura) originally developed only for the Hebron area in 1978. These were used to circumvent direct political representation. Elections themselves, even for union officials, had been banned in the wake of the 1976 municipal elections which turned in an overwhelming majority of nationalist candidates, and most of the mayors where eventually dismissed, with some suffering deportation. The Village Leagues by contrast were supposed to resolve disputes and promote rural development, but stoked peasant resentments against Palestinian urban centres and were manned, according to George Bisharat, with men from the lower middle class many of whom had reputations for laziness and criminal pursuits, who were harshly criticized as quislings collaborating with Israel, which furnished them with militias and Uzi machine guns that they purportedly used to intimidate civilians. The military even closely supervised elections in local clubs, cooperatives or charitable organizations:West Bank lawyers were banned on security grounds from organizing professionally a bar association.

In the Accord, Palestinian authorities were given a limited zone of autonomy in a restricted number of areas. Various analysts have argued that the agreement saw Israel outmanoeuvring the local Palestinian delegation, which had led the Intifada, by getting the PLO representatives abroad to relinquish demands the West Bank and Gaza opposition insisted on – an end to settlements and the formation of a Palestinian state – and thereby securing their own return. They were thus allowed to assume political and economic authority within the territories which they had never managed to achieve alone. Thus the Palestinian Authority itself is often viewed as a Quisling regime, or Israel's proxy, since Israel remains in total control of all three zones. Peter Beinart calls it Israel's "subcontractor". For Edward Said, Meron Benvenisti and Norman Finkelstein, the agreement merely delegated to the PLO a role as "Israel's enforcer", continuing the occupation by "remote control", lending a form of legitimacy to Israel's claims to possess "rights" in what then became in its view "disputed territories", despite the international consensus Israel was under an obligation to withdraw from all of the land it held as occupying power. In Finkelstein's reading, it ratified an extreme version of the Allon Plan. Others speak of Israel outsourcing the occupation.

The Palestinian Authority also underwrote an agreement which absolved Israel of liability for recompense for all omissions to, or violations of, its obligations as an occupying power committed during the previous three decades of Israeli military rule. Indeed, were Israel convicted of any crime for that period, the burden of Israel paying reparations would fall on the Palestinian authorities who would be obligated to reimburse Israel. The Accords further weakened the Palestinian cause, it has been argued, because it undermined the strength of the Palestinian position by transforming negotiations into endless bargaining between unequal parties.

In an analysis by the Israeli think tank Molad in 2017, it is noted that Israel deploys from 50% to 75% of its active IDF forces in the West Bank, more than the combined deployment of soldiers on all other fronts. The deployment consists of seven regional brigades, assisted by auxiliary combat battalions, together with Israel's Border Police, the IAF and various special units. Their function is not to counter what Israel defines as terrorism – only 20% perform that task – but to defend settlements, which require 80% of those reserves to undertake guard duty. In Hebron alone some 2,000 soldiers, an entire infantry division, together with 3 border police companies, serve in rotation to "protect" the settlement of from 500 to 800 Israelis established in that city. Molad's conclusion is that defending settlements has a negative impact on Israel's security.

Territory

Israel extended its jurisdiction over East Jerusalem on 28 June 1967, suggesting internally it was annexed while maintaining abroad that it was simply an administrative move to provide services to residents. The move was deemed " null and void" by the United Nations Security Council. The elected Arab council was disbanded, and a number of services provided by Palestinian companies were transferred to their Israeli competitors. The population ratio for this unitied Jerusalem was set ideally as 76% Jewish and 24% Arab, and Jewish Israeli settlers were given a 5-year tax exemption, not applied to Palestinian Jerusalemites, who were placed in a high income tax bracket, and paid for 26% of municipal services while receiving 5% of the benefits. The Palestinian areas were encircled by Jewish new town developments which effectively closed them off from expansion, and services to the latter were kept low so that after decades, basic infrastructure was left in neglect, with shortages of schools, inadequate sewage and garbage disposal. By 2017, 370,000 lived in the overcrowded Arab areas, living under strict restrictions on their daily movement and commerce. One 2012 report stated that the effect of Israeli policies was that, amidst flourishing modern Jewish settlements, the Arab sector had been allowed to decay into a slum where criminals, many of them collaborators, thrived.

Israel's policies regarding the use of land in the rest of the West Bank display three interlocking aspects, all designed around a project of Judaization of what was Palestinian territory. These policies consist in (a) planning for land use (b) expropriations of land and (c) the construction of settlements.

Area C

The "Letters of Mutual Recognition" accompanying the "Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" (the DOP), signed in Washington on 13 September 1993, provided for a transitional period not exceeding five years of Palestinian interim self-government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Major critics of these arrangements, headed by Raja Shehadeh, argue that the PLO had scarce interest or competence in the legal implications of what it was signing.

These Oslo Accords ceded nominal control of a small amount of the West Bank to a Palestinian authority, with a provisory division of the land, excluding East Jerusalem, into 3 areas: Area A (18% of territory, 55% of population), Area B (20% of territory, 41% of the population), and Area C (62% of territory, 5.8% of population). Israel never finalized the undertaking with regard to Area C to transfer zoning and planning from the Israeli to the Palestinian authorities within five years and all administrative functions continued to remain in its hands. Tactically, the Accord lessened Israel's problem with large-scale demonstrations since the areas of ostensible PA control were fragmented into 165 islands containing 90% of the Palestinian population, all surrounded by the spatially contiguous 60% of the West Bank where the PA was forbidden to venture. Israel then reasserted in 2000 a right to enter, according to "operational needs", Area A where most West Bank Palestinians live and which is formally under PA administration, meaning they still effectively control all the West Bank including areas under nominal PA authority.

According to the United Nations special rapporteur on Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories, Michael Lynk, the policies applied by Israel indicate an intention to annex totally Area C, which has 86% of the nature reserves, 91% of the forests, 48% of the wells and 37% of the springs in the West Bank.

Initial impact of occupation

Soon after the 1967 Yigal Allon produced the Plan, which would have annexed a strip along the Jordan River valley and excluded areas closer to the pre-1967 border, which had a high density of Palestinians. Moshe Dayan proposed a plan which Gershom Gorenberg likens to a "photo negative of Allon's." The Allon plan evolved over a period of time to include more territory. The final draft dating from 1970 would have annexed about half of the West Bank. Israel had no overall approach for integrating the West Bank: its military strategy in the war there had been piecemeal and unplanned,

The early occupation set severe limits on public investment and comprehensive development programmes in the territories. Ian Lustick states that Israel "virtually prevented" Palestinian investment in local industry and agriculture. At the same time, Israel encouraged Arab labour to enter into Israel's economy, and regarded them as a new, expanded and protected market for Israeli exports. Limited export of Palestinian goods to Israel was allowed. Confiscation of prime agricultural land in an economy where two thirds of the workforce had farmed is believed to account for the flight of labourers to work in Israel. 40% of the workforce commuted to Israel on a daily basis finding only poorly paid menial employment. Remittances from labourers earning a wage in Israel were the major factor in Palestinian economic growth during the 1969-73 boom years, but the migration of workers from the territories had a negative impact on local industry by creating an internal labour scarcity in the West Bank and consequent pressure for higher wages there, and the contrast between the quality of their lives and Israelis' growing prosperity stoked resentment.

Israel established a licensing system according to which no industrial plant could be built without obtaining a prior Israeli permit. With Military Order No. 393 (14 June 1970), the local commander was given the power and authority to block any construction if, in his evaluation, the building might pose a danger to Israel's security. The overall effect was to obstruct manufacturing development and subordinate any local industrial activity to the exigencies of Israel's economy, or to block the creation of industries that might compete with Israel's. Entrepreneurs were denied a permit for a cement factory in Hebron, melon production was forbidden, imports of grapes and dates banned, to protect Israeli farmers, and limits were set to how many cucumbers and tomatoes could be produced. Israeli milk producers exerted pressure on the Ministry for Industry and Trade to stop the establishment of a competitive dairy in Ramallah.

The sum effect after two decades was that 15% of all Palestinian firms in the West Bank (and Gaza) employing over eight people, and 32% with less than that number of workers, were prohibited from selling their products in Israel. Israeli protectionist policies thus distorted wider trade relations to the point that, by 1996, 90% of all West Bank imports came from Israel, with consumers paying more than they would for comparable products had they been able to exercise commercial autonomy.

Land seizure mechanisms

The mechanisms by which Israel seizes or expropriates West Bank land were set forth in a detailed work by B'Tselem in 2002 and many practices outlined there were confirmed in the official Israeli Sasson Report of 2005, which focused on government subsidies and support for the creation of illegal Israeli outposts in knowing contravention of Israel's own laws. and after the government had, in the Oslo Accords, and in an undertaking by Ariel Sharon, frozen new settlements.

In the wake of the 1967 war, especially under the Likud governments (1977-1984), apart from expropriation, land requisitioning, zoning regulations and some purchases, Israel introduced legal definitions of what was to be regarded as "public" and what "private" land in the conquered territories.

With Military Order Number 59 issued on 31 July 1967 the Israeli commander asserted that therein state land would be whatever land had belonged to the enemy (Jordan) or its judicial bodies. But rather than assuming the task of being the custodian of that property until the occupation ended, Israel chose to transfer the use of unregistered land to Jewish settlers, and on that basis, from 1967 to 1984 the Israeli government requisitioned an estimated 5,500,000 dunams, or roughly half of the total area of the West Bank, setting aside much of the land for military training and camping areas. By defining such areas as "state land" its use by Palestinians was precluded. The first wave of land confiscations outside Jerusalem's walls began in January 1968, when 3,800 dunums of private Palestinian land were expropriated for Kalandia industrial park and to enable the building of 6,000 apartments in the areas of French Hill and Ramat Eshkol. By 1983 the expropriation was calculated to extend over 52% of the territory, most of its prime agricultural land and, just before the 1993 Oslo Accords, these confiscations had encompassed over three quarters of the West Bank.

Many of these early confiscations took place over private Palestinian land. This led to a complaint over a settlement at Elon Moreh, and the Supreme Court ruled such practices were forbidden except for military purposes, civilians only being permitted on what Israel defined as "state land". This ruling actually enhanced the settlement project since anywhere Israelis settled automatically became a security zone requiring the military to guarantee their safety. One technique being used is to drive the remaining Palestinian population from the Jordan Valley by declaring the land they work a "firing zone" (35% of the area) which thereby requires the people to evacuate temporarily. From January 2013 to 2017, 140 orders were issued to have communities leave their homes, with their flocks, sometimes in mid-winter. In addition water tankers, pipelines for spring water, solar panels and farm machinery are confiscated causing upheavals in their local economy and persistent insecurity about their future. The Israeli settlements occupy no more than 0.0041% of the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea but the land allocated for their future use as municipal areas is 28 times greater, covering 11.8% of the total area. By defining any area as a closed military zone, Israel has often used the classification to prepare the way for a civilian settlement.

Ariel was initially built on 462 hectares originally seized for security reasons. On the three successive occasions when security fences have been raised, they have incorporated hundreds of dunams of private Palestinian agricultural property. Land where pastoralists from Marda used to graze 10,000 animals were taken, leaving the village with land that can barely carry 100 head of livestock. Likewise at Tel Rumeida in 2015, a military closure guaranteed settlers free passage while Palestinians are denied access to visit those residents who remain. Another technique used was to offer a Palestinian proprietor a temporary swap, in which he leased his land for 3 years in exchange for a lease on absentee-owned land in the hands of the Israeli custodian. Such leases were not renewed after expiry, but, as with the case of Mehola, the Palestinian property leased became a permanent Israeli asset, while the absentee property offered in exchange technically could revert to its original owners if they returned (from Jordan) leaving the original Palestinian party to the contract landless. One innovative technique in 1999 came from settlers complaining of poor cellphone reception. They pointed out a nearby hill, which they had unsuccessfully tried to colonize earlier, as an appropriate site for antennae. It was a biblical site, moreover, they claimed, though excavations only yielded Byzantine ruins. The IDF declared the antennae would pose a security issue, and then expropriated the site from its owners, the villagers of Burqa and Ein Yabrud, who grazed sheep and cultivated figs and grapes there. Settlers then moved in and established the illegal outpost of Migron.

Using the Ottoman law code regarding miri lands (only 4% of the land north of Beersheva), which held that if were not worked for 3 consecutive years without a lawful excuse they reverted to the state, Israel dispossessed, by declaring it state land, even non-arable hilltop land used by pastoralists. The lands of the village of Umm al-Khair were expropriated in this way. In the Burqan case, where the plaintiff Mohammad Burqan's legal title to his former house in the Jewish Quarter was recognized, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected his request to be allowed to return to his home on the grounds that the area it was located in had "special historical significance" for Jews.

The precise extent of Islamic Waqf lands – Islamic property held in sacred trust for religious purposes – in 1967 is unknown but in 1992 Michael Dumper calculated West Bank waqf properties extended over 600,000 dunams. By 2013 the Israeli occupation authorities were estimated to have expropriated more than 104,996 dunams of waqf holdings, mostly around Jericho.

Legal redress for expropriated land exists, but the process can prove lengthy, and financially and mentally exhausting for villagers. Israeli human rights activists who try to encourage harassed Palestinians to resist expropriation, such as David Dean Shulman, rabbi Arik Ascherman, Amiel Vardi and Ezra Nawi have often been beaten up by settlers who regard them as "Nazis". Nawi himself has been imprisoned.

Settlement

Ariel Sharon viewed the primary function of settling the West Bank as one of precluding the possibility of the formation of a Palestinian state, and his aim in promoting the 1982 invasion of Lebanon was to secure perpetual control of the former. As of 2017, excluding East Jerusalem, 382,916 Israelis have settled in the West Bank, and 40% (approximately 170,000 in 106 other settlements) live outside the major settlement blocs, where 214,000 reside.

A continuity has often been observed between the Realpolitik processes governing the Zionist creation of Israel and the practices adopted with regard to the West Bank. Several analysts have likened the process to enclosure – the "establishment of exclusionary Jewish spaces on the Palestinian landscape" being heir to the English appropriation of common land and its conversion to private use – or to the conversion of Amerindian land into "white property".

Early Zionist policy for land appropriation was outlined by Menachem Ussishkin in 1904 and, aside from voluntary sales, foresaw the need also to seize land by war and compel sale through expropriation via the ruling authority. It called this practice "colonization", a word which, since 1967, has been replaced by the euphemism "settlement."

The technique developed over the decades of early settlement was one of incremental spread, setting up tower-and-stockade outposts, a pattern repeated in the West Bank after 1967. A quote attributed to Joseph Trumpeldor summed up Zionist logic: "Wherever the Jewish plow plows its last furrow, that is where the border will run". The principle of this slow steady establishing of "facts on the ground" before the adversary realizes what is going on, is colloquially known as "dunam after dunam, goat after goat". The model applied to the West Bank was that used for the Judaization of the Galilee, consisting of setting up a checkered pattern of settlements not only around Palestinian villages but in between them. In addition to settlements considered legal, with government sponsorship, there are some 90 Israeli outposts (2013) built by private settler initiatives which, though illegal even in Israeli terms, are defended by the IDF. From the mid-1990s to 2015 many of these, such as Amona, Avri Ran's Giv'ot Olam and Ma'ale Rehav'am – the latter on 50 dunams of private Palestinian land – were directly funded, according to Haaretz, by loans from the World Zionist Organization through Israeli taxpayer money, since its approximate $140 million income derives from Israel and is mostly invested in settlements in the West Bank.

The International Court of Justice, established by the Rome Statute of 1998 which classified resettlement as a war crime, seconding the reiterated views of other international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council, determined in 2004 that Israeli settlements in the West Bank were established in breach of international law. In 1980, Israel declined to sign the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which obliges national laws to give way to international law when the two conflict, and regulates settlements in terms of its own laws, in lieu of any compulsion to observe its treaty commitments and by arguing that all the relevant UN bodies adjudicating the matter are "anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic".

The first site chosen for settlement was Gush Etzion, on some 75 acres (30 ha) worked by Palestinian refugees. Hanan Porat was inspirational, intending by developing the settlement in order to put in place a practical application of the radical messianic Zionism of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, whose father Abraham Isaac Kook's Mercaz HaRav yeshiva in particular has exercised considerable influence on Israel's policies regarding the West Bank. According to Eyal Benvenisti, a 1972 judgement by Supreme Court justice Moshe Landau, siding with a military commander's decision to assign electrical supply in the Hebron area to the Israel Electric Corporation rather than to a Palestinian company, was to prove pivotal to encouraging the settlement project, since it placed the latter under the jurisdiction of the military authorities.

During the first decade of Israel occupation, when the Israeli Labour Party held power, settlement was concentrated on constructing a ring of "residential fortresses" around the Palestinian population of Jerusalem, and in the Jordan Valley. According to Ibrahim Matar, the purpose of this colonizing strategy around Jerusalem was to hem in and block the expansion of the Palestinian population, and to incentivize Palestinian emigration by inducing a sense among the Palestinians a sense of living in a ghetto.

Between 1967 and 1977, settlement was small-scale totaling the transfer of 3,200 Israelis into the West Bank. By the end of Labour's term of power in 1977, 4,500 Israelis had established themselves in 30 West Bank settlements and some 50,000 in settlements in East Jerusalem. It was with the rise to power of Menachem Begin's Likud Party, driven by a "Greater Israel theology" that year, which led to an incremental expansion of this projects, and marked in the view of Oren Yiftachel the peak of Israel's ethnocratic project, with the West Bank to become "the bedrock of Jewish national identity". A change in territorial focus took place, with settlements now promoted in the biblical heartland of the West Bank next to Palestinian population centres. The main plank of Likud's platform, still unaltered, called for the immediate annexation of the West Bank. If security calculations influenced the relatively small-scale settlements advanced by the Israeli Labour Party, the reconfirmation of Likud in 1981 led to a rapid escalation of settlement as a religious-national programme.

The local Palestinian press was forbidden by the military censors at the same time from reporting any news about settlements, expropriations or legal moves made to block them. By 1983, settlers in the West Bank numbered 28,400. Incentives consisting of government mortgage and housing subsidies, tax incentives, business grants, free schooling, infrastructure projects, and defense were provided. After the Oslo Accords down to 2002, the settler population doubled.

In 1972 the number of Israeli settlers in Area C were 1,200, in 1993 110,000, and in 2010 310,000 (excluding East Jerusalem). Before 1967 there were between 200,000 and 320,000 Palestinians in the Jordan Valley, which, together with the northern Dead Sea, covers 30% of the West Bank and constituted the "most significant land reserve" for Palestinians, 85% of whom are barred from entering it. By 2011, 37 settlements had been established among the 64,451 Palestinians there (who constitute 29 communities) 70% of whom live in Area A in Jericho. According to ARIJ, by 2015 only 3 of 291 Palestinian communities in Area C received Israeli building approval (on just 5.7 hectares), and any construction outside that was subject to demolition. In that one year, they calculate, Israel confiscated a further 41,509 hectares, demolished 482 homes – displacing 2,450 people – uprooted 13,000 trees, and subjected Palestinians and their property to assault on some 898 distinct occasions. Israeli settlements constituted 6% of the land, while military zones had been declared over 29%.

From 1967 to 2003, successive Israeli governments assisted the transfer of some 230,000 Jewish civilians into 145 West Bank and Gaza settlements and approximately 110 outposts. By 2016, approximately 42% of the settlement workforce (55,440) found employment in those settlements. The ultra-Orthodox have dominated the process from the beginning: from 2003 to 2007 alone the population of Beitar Illit, whose construction was facilitated by the expropriation of 1,500 dunams of Naḥḥālīn farmland, rose 40%, while Modi'in Illit, built on the Palestinian village lands of Ni'lin, Kharbata, Saffa, Bil'in and Dir Qadis, increased by 55%.

The majority of Israeli West Bank agriculture arises from contracts with the World Zionist Organization that bypass direct contracts with the Israeli Land Regulating Commissioner, and many were given to use private Palestinian land. With the Regularization Law of 2017, Israel retroactively legalized the settler takeover of thousands of hectares of privately owned Palestinian land and some 4,500 homes which settlers had built without obtaining official permits. By that year, the fifth decade of occupation, Israel had managed to establish (2017) 237 settlements, housing roughly 580,000 settlers.

One technique used to established settlements was to set up a paramilitary encampment for army personnel to be used for agricultural and military training for soldiers. These were then slowly transformed into civilian settlements, often without official approval. This could be justified as legal because they were initially IDF bases without civilians. Another technique was to render land momentarily unusable. Gitit for example was established by closing off 5,000 dunams of the village lands of Aqraba and then spraying it with defoliants.

On occasion, creating settlements is hailed as a measure to punish Palestinians collectively, as a reaction to a Palestinian killing of a settler, or in response to the granting of non-member observer status to the Palestinian State by the United Nations, an announcement which generated plans for a further 3,000 settler homes in the West Bank. Economic motivations also drive settlement: if one sells one's 50-60 sq. m. apartment in Jerusalem, one can purchase with less than the sale proceeds an apartment three times larger in settlements like Ma’aleh Adumim. One early metaphor likened the expansion of settlements to the baobab tree in The Little Prince, whose seeds take root and eventually cover the entire planet. By the early eighties, several authoritative observers, among them Eyal Benvenisti, already concluded that the settlement expansion was close to a point of no return from total annexation. The impression left of the landscape has been described as follows:

Israeli settlements form an upper-middle-class oasis of green grass, shopping malls, and swimming pools amidst open desert and enclaves of Palestinian refugee camps, villages, and towns with limited access to water.

American citizens lead the diaspora in moving into West Bank settlements, with 12% stating their first choice of residency is "Judea and Samaria". They now form the predominant block and number an estimated 60,000.

Settler violence

Though settler vigilantism dates back to the late 1970s, when they were authorized to bear arms in self-defense – one ordinance exempted them from military service in Israel while drafting them into West Bank units and another gave them powers to demand Palestinians provide identification and even to arrest them – settler terrorism formally dates back at least to the Jewish Underground movement of the early 1980s, which began by targeting and severely maiming, through the deployment of car bombs, West Bank mayors such as Bassam Shakaa of Nablus, and Karim Khalaf of Ramallah. In the first 2 years of the First Intifada, settlers killed at least 34 Palestinians, 4 below the age of 16, with 11 killed by settler initiative at home or while guarding flocks; a further 6 probably died through settler actions, and 8 were killed in response to stone throwing at cars. Only two died as a result of clashes. From 2009 such settler violence escalated rapidly, an uptick that coincided with a dramatic fall in Palestinian terror attacks. In 2009, 200 settler attacks took place, a figure which doubled to over 400 by 2011. Of the latter, nearly 300 consisted in attacks on Palestinian property, causing 100 Palestinian casualties, and the destruction of roughly 10,000 trees. Many of these are carried out as Price tag acts, which target innocent Palestinians and are designed to intimidate the local population. Yesh Din discovered that of 781 such incidents covered from 2005 to 2011, 90% of the Israeli investigations were closed without laying indictments, and many of the culprits were Hilltop Youth. In an analysis of 119 cases of settlers killing Palestinians, it emerged that only 13 were sent to gaol: 6 were convicted of murder, only one of whom was sentenced to life imprisonment, while of 7 convicted of manslaughter, 1 received a prison sentence of 7 and a half years for killing a child, and the rest got off with light sentences.

Writing in 2012, Daniel Byman and Natan Sachs judged that the pattern of settler violence was "undoubtedly working" and achieving its ends, by influencing the way Palestinians view Israelis, strengthening the hand of terrorists among them, and by seeding fears in the Israeli government that any pullout in exchange for peace will lead to conflict with settlers and a political disaster for the political parties involved.

State of asymmetric war

West Bank Palestinians have engaged in two uprisings that have led to an asymmetric set of wars of attrition, between the occupying power and the occupied people. This characterization has been further refined by classifying the conflict as structurally asymmetric, where the root cause of tension lies in the standoff between a colonizer and the colonized, and in which the large power imbalance in favour of the dominator leads to a resort to guerilla tactics or terrorism by the dominated.

The two fundamental preconditions for containing conflict – clearly defined borders and rough power parity between the parties at war – are absent, with a pronounced economic and military disparity favouring Israel. The disparity extends, according to Nathan Thrall, to the numerous negotiations over a peace settlement. According to Aharon Klieman, even Israeli negotiating tactics with Palestinians follow the principles of warfare used by the IDF.

Armaments

In terms of armaments, Israel is reputed to have "the strongest and best-equipped army of the Middle East" The arsenal at Israel's disposal to counteract major Palestinian uprisings ranges from F-16 fighters, Merkava tanks, Apache helicopters, Hellfire missiles, massive armoured D9 Caterpillar bulldozers. to the standard M-16 rifle and the use of snipers.

The Israeli techniques for daily dispersing protesting crowds differ according to the ethnicity of the protestors. With Jewish settlers by and large the methods are those policing approaches used in Western countries, and they are reported as not intervening when settlers go on the rampage against Palestinians. With Palestinians, contrariwise, military tactics are adopted, and observers such as B'Tselem claim lack of proportionality and recourse to firearms is characteristic. With the latter at demonstrations Israeli forces have drawn on rash gas, tear gas canisters (which have often produced fatalities); shooting into crowds with rubber-coated steel bullets, which can be lethal; high-velocity bullets; recourse to the use of live ammunition rounds; the deployment from 2008 of trucks dousing whole areas with putrid Skunk spray; stun grenades; water cannons; pepper spray; capsaisin projectiles; deployment of snatch squads and mista'arvim and sponge rounds. The use of rubber-coated metal bullets is allowed in the West Bank but forbidden from deployment against people within Israel. Also deployed on occasion since 2005 when they were used at Bil’in, are loud sound-wave generating devices, gravel-throwing machines; shock-inducing polystyrene and bismuth metal paintball pellets, and tasars. In the first Intifada, snipers targeted youths primarily to maim them, with dum dum shots to the right arm biceps crippling their use by stone-throwers for life.

The mainstay of Palestinian resistance techniques to the occupation during the First Intifada, which was generally non-lethal, consisted of throwing stones during clashes with at Israeli troops, or at military and settler vehicles bearing their distinctive yellow number plates, together with tire-burning, hurling Molotov cocktails and setting up roadblocks. The then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin's policy was that, "rioters must emerge with casualties or scars." The juxtaposition of this primitive method with Israeli power was striking, with children and youths throwing stones and deploying slingshots against a fully equipped and highly trained military power exerting "incredible superiority".

The military rules of engagement in the First Intifada were soon loosened to allow to be targeted for shooting stone-or Molotov throwers (or people suspecting of carrying them), youths masking their faces with keffiyeh, those building roadblocks, fleeing suspects, or anyone refusing to obey an order to halt. Israel prevented hospitals from reported statistics in the West Bank but roughly 90% of the 271 minors (16 and under) shot dead by Israeli forces between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1993 were not throwing stones when shot, half were not taking part in clashes, 19 were executed by mista'arvim at close range for simply writing graffiti or for being masked, and 44 were denied medical treatment while lying mortally wounded.

The disparity between Israel's military, economic and technological might and relatively unarmed Palestinians, though overwhelming, has its defenders. This specific tactic was addressed by Military Order No. 1108 which ratcheted up the penalty for such an offence from one and a half years to 20 years imprisonment. Bail for young children arrested for throwing stones was $400–500 (1988) and if the offense was repeated, the money was forfeited and the child could be placed in administrative detention for a year. The parents of children under 12 years of age could be imprisoned as punishment for their child's offense. Writing graffiti, an act vigorously censored by the military authorities, was also an important instrument for contesting the occupation. Years later, a spiral in escalation led to the increased use of knifing and Palestinian suicide attacks corresponding to the expansion of deployment of warplanes, helicopters, and recourse to assassinations by Israel. A high proportion of the suicide bombings during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 40% of the total number, originated in East Jerusalem.

The sentences of Palestinian prisoners are commonly based on an accusation that they are "members of illegal organizations" (meaning formerly the PLO, and now Hamas or Islamic Jihad), planning or taking part in sabotage against Israelis, or raising a Palestinian flag. Even mentioning the word "Palestine" was forbidden. Under Israeli Military Order 101, Palestinians under military law were prohibited from demonstrating and publishing anything relating to a "political matter." Surveillance of the internet, using software to ostensibly identify in social media posts potential threats led to the arrest of 800 Palestinians both by Israeli units and PA security forces, with 400 detained as "lone wolf terrorists" for what they wrote, though none had carried out attacks and, according to security expert, Ronen Bergman, no algorithm could identity lone-wolf attackers.

Violence and resistance (mūqāwama)

Two uprisings to "shake off", the literal translation of the root of the Arabic word intifada, the occupying power have so far been undertaken: the First Intifada and the Al Aqsa Intifada. The first Intifada was relatively unarmed, though Israeli soldiers were permitted to shoot at anyone throwing stones, building barricades, wearing masks or lighting tires. It was this uprising which led the Israeli government eventually to underwrite the Oslo Accords, which however did not put an end to the primary demands of the territories' Palestinian resistance movement. To the contrary, rather than freezing settlement, Israel managed to double the Jewish West Bank population from 1993 to 2000, while seizing more land, which led to popular disenchantment with the PA, seen as abetting Israel's occupational policies rather than resisting them. In the 24 months following its outbreak, 656 Palestinians died as a result of Israeli actions: 601 from gunfire, and 55 from non-bullet causes (mainly beatings). An additional 82 died from tear gas. 45 Israelis, as well as 150 Palestinians suspected of collaboration with the authorities, also died.

International law does not address the issue regarding the rights of an occupied people to resist an occupation which flagrantly violates fundamental human rights. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 established that force may not be used to deny self-determination, and that recourse to force to resist colonial or alien domination is legitimate.

The primary value developed by Palestinians to resist the occupation from 1967 has been ṣumūd, hanging on stubbornly, a steadfast perseverance in remaining on one's land, even if it turns into a prison, in the face of Jewish hitnahalut (settlement). The word itself was consistently repressed from Palestinian papers by Israeli censors in the early decades.

In the year before the First Intifada, from August 1985 to July 1986, 65 residences were either destroyed or sealed, 145 people were placed under administrative detention, 35 were deported, and 35 restriction orders were imposed in the West Bank area. Of the hundreds of thousands detained, most are tried in military courts, which boasted of a conviction rate of close to 100%.

In the first few days of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, according to Ma'ariv, 700,000 rounds of ammunition were fired at West Bank crowds protesting the shooting of Palestinians in and around the Haram al-Sharif, killing 118 Palestinians, of whom 33 were teenagers. From October to December that year, 83 children were killed, and by the end of 2002, 172 minors had been shot by Israeli troop incursions into areas formerly controlled by the PA. Missiles and gunfire from helicopters were employed to carry out extrajudicial killings, putting non-combatants at great risk. From 2001 to 2007 Israel killed more Palestinians annually than it had over the first two decades of occupation, averaging 674 as opposed to the earlier 32 per year. The PA itself sought to counter Israeli repression by resorting to a military confrontation, only to have its infrastructures – the Muqatas in Ramallah and other West Bank cities, ministries, governmental buildings, police facilities and even registry offices – smashed "with extreme violence" by the IDF.

With regard to the violence of Israeli forces, Israeli studies arrive at different conclusions. One study by N. Krin found that soldiers serving during the First Intifada experienced intense pleasure in inflicting harm on Palestinians, whereas research on combat soldiers and IDF snipers by Eyal Ben-Ari and Neta Bar concluded the former have low hate levels for their adversaries and the latter tend to humanize the Palestinians they targeted for shooting. The Israeli public, they contend, is far more extreme: Other studies show that the common practice of shooting indiscriminately at Palestinian houses reflects desires to let off steam, relieve boredom or exact revenge for some recent attack. Bivariate analysis of indiscriminate violence patterns suggests that the highest number of murders perpetrated by Palestinians take place in areas under complete Israeli control, and, concomitantly, the highest number of homicides perpetrated by Israeli forces takes place in areas under complete Palestinian control. The human toll arising from resisting the occupation is extremely high. In one sampling of West Bank children 24.7% had experienced multiple traumatic events, and 34% had post-traumatic stress reactions.

Aside from the statistics of the dead, injured and crippled, those deported or rendered homeless, the impact of widespread experience of arrest and imprisonment has left psychological scars, with side effects like clinical depression, post-traumatic stress and family violence, with a range of symptoms from bereavement, disturbed sleep, nightmares, flashbacks, hypervigilance to social withdrawal, numbness, hyperarousal, impaired school performance, bedwetting and anemia. Games are frequently played in which children pretend to have been killed, or in which war-games are enacted, with children preferring to act out being Jews, since they are more powerful than the children's fathers.

Making speeches calling on fellow Palestinians to resist the occupation is construed in Israeli law as tantamount to advocacy of terrorism. In the case of the parliamentarian Azmi Bishara, he was stripped of his immunity rights in the Knesset in order to pave the way for a criminal indictment on this charge. Mubarak Awad, founder of the Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence, endeavoured to inculcate Gandhian principles of non-violence in the West Bank, and was subsequently expelled and sent into exile by Israel on the grounds he preached non-violence as a cover an armed struggle for liberation. The village of Bil'in, one of the first villages, along with Budrus and Abu Dis, to practice Gandhian methods of non-violent resistance, has in one decade (2005-2015) been subjected to incessant night raids, seen hundreds of its residents arrested, its leader Abdullah Abu Rahmeh put on trial 5 times and sentenced to imprisonment, and thousands of demonstrators injured.

• Palestinians killed in the first Intifada 31/9/1987-13/9/1993.

By Israeli Defense Forces	Minors under 17	By settlers
1070	237	54

• Israelis killed in the First Intifada by Palestinians.

Civilians by militants	Minors under 17	Security Personnel
47	3	43

• West Bankers killed from the Second Intifada to Operation Cast Lead.(29/9/2000-26/12/2008)

Killed	Minors under 17	By settlers
1793	317	40

Of the 1793, B'Tselem states 835 did not participate in hostilities; 472 did, and it is not known if the remaining 404 were involved in events of conflict or not. The equivalent number of deaths in the United States would be more than 165,000 persons—at least 55 times the number killed in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001.

• Israelis killed in the West Bank from the Second Intifada to Operation Cast Lead.(29/9/2000-26/12/2008)

Civilians Killed	Minors under 17	Soldiers killed
201	35	146

After the takeover of Gaza by Hamas many Israelis feared that Hamas would likewise eventually take control of the West Bank. Unilateral withdrawal came to be seen as too risky. Hamas could use the West Bank hills to infiltrate in order to carry out suicide attacks. Worse, most of Israel's cities would be in range of inexpensive short range Qassam 1 rockets.

Technologies of control

Ben Ehrenreich, citing Gudrun Krämer's description of the British military suppression of the 1936 Palestinian Revolt, states that, aside from caning, all of the extreme measures adopted by the Mandatory authorities recur as standard practices in the way Israel manages the occupied territories. Scholars differ regarding how to classify the techniques of segregation and exclusion used to further Israeli control over the West Bank. For Jan Selby, there are five central planks to consolidate territorial colonization: (a) settlement construction; (b) land confiscation and engineering a bypass road network (c) drawing the local economy into dependence on Israel's larger one; (d) the creation of a dual legal system with different laws for Palestinians and Jewish settlers, with subsidies favouring the latter and (e) seeking local clients and patrons who would act according to Israel's bidding, and, in lieu of success in this regard, increased repression. Gershon Shafir has discerned a matrix of five technologies of Israeli domination over Palestinians (a) the permit system; (b) administrative detention; (c)deportation: (d) house demolitions, and (e) torture. Richard Falk adds political assassinations, extrajudicial punishments and the use of collective punishment to the list. According to Neve Gordon, Israel uses lawfare "to encode the field of human rights and in this way (has) help(ed) frame human rights work in Israel as a security threat."

Population transfer and deportations

Israel was one of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention dealing specifically with protection of civilians in a war zone, and, as a signatory, underwrote Article 49 which reads:

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive... The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

This final clause is absolute, allowing of no exceptions, and was ratified by Israel when it signed the Geneva Conventions on 6 July 1951. The sentence was written to prevent the repetition of the practice of colonization established by certain powers, by which Germany was to be understood, of transferring their population to conquered territories for political and racial reasons in WW2. Furthermore, Article 76 of that convention excludes deportation as a punitive measure in stating that

protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country and, if convicted, they shall serve their sentences therein.

The principle is unambiguous – "an occupier cannot expel a single person, however much that person constitutes a security risk".

According to one estimate, between 1967 and 1978 some 1,151 individuals were deported by Israel, including two whole tribes, dispatched into exile en masse from the area of the Jordan Valley in December 1967 and May 1969. To provide legal warrant for these measures, which contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel applied law 112 going back to the British Mandatory government's Defence (Emergency) Regulations which predated the Geneva Convention by 4 years. These in turn went back to military legislation devised to counteract the Palestinian war of opposition to British occupation and Jewish immigration in 1936-1939. Fathers were most frequently affected in the early days: sundering families, the practice was arrest household heads at night in their homes and take them to a desert south of the Dead Sea where they were forced, at gunpoint or gunshot, to cross over into Jordan. To this day, any Palestinian Jerusalemite can have his or her residency revoked by Israeli law if Jerusalem has not constituted, in the view of the Israeli authorities, their "centre of life" for seven consecutive years, a revocation constituting a forced population transfer that has been applied to at least 14,595 Palestinians since 1967 (2016). The PLO, inspired by the precedent of the SS Exodus, once endeavoured to sail a "Ship of Return" into Haifa harbour with 135 Palestinians Israel had deported from the territories. Mossad assassinated with a car-bomb the three senior Fatah officials organizing the event in Limassol, and then sunk the ship in the port.

The forced transfer of Palestinians still takes place in the West Bank: in 2018 the Israeli Supreme Court gave the green light to expel the people of Khan al-Ahmar from their township to a rubbish dump outside Abu Dis. Israel arrested at a checkpoint in February 2017 Maen Abu Hafez, a 23-year-old Palestinian, since he had no ID, and detained him under a deportation order in a prison for aliens in Ramla, Israel. He had been raised since the age of 3 in the Jenin Refugee Camp. Israel seeks to deport him to Brazil, though he speaks no Portuguese, his mother is Uruguayan and his Palestinian father deserted the family to return to Brazil in 1997 and has not been heard from since.

Collective punishment

Israel's use of collective punishment measures, such as movement restrictions, shelling of residential areas, mass arrests, and the destruction of public health infrastructure. violates Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 33 reads in part:

No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited

Collective punishment of Palestinians goes back to British mandatory techniques in suppressing the 1936-1939 revolt. and has been reintroduced and in effect since the early days of the occupation, and was denounced by Israel Shahak as early as 1974. Notoriety for the practice arose in 1988 when, in response to the killing of a suspected collaborator in the village, Israeli forces shut down Qabatiya, arrested 400 of the 7,000 inhabitants, bulldozed the homes of people suspected of involvement, cut all of its telephone lines, banned the importation of any form of food into the village or the export of stone from its quarries to Jordan, shutting off all contact with the outside world for almost 5 weeks (24 February-3 April). In 2016 Amnesty International stated that the various measures taken in the commercial and cultural heart of Hebron over 20 years of collective punishment have made life so difficult for Palestinians that thousands of businesses and residents have been forcibly displaced, enabling Jewish settlers to take over more properties.

House demolitions

House demolition is considered a form of collective punishment. According to the law of occupation, the destruction of property, save for reasons of absolute military necessity, is prohibited. The practice of demolishing Palestinian houses began within two days of the conquest of the area in the Old City of Jerusalem known as the Moroccan Quarter, adjacent to the Western Wall. One of the first measures adopted, without legal authorization, on the conquest of Jerusalem in 1967 was to evict 650 Palestinians from their homes in the heart of Jerusalem, reduce their homes and shrines to rubble in order to make way for the construction of the plaza. From the outset of the occupation of the Palestinian territories down to 2015, according to an estimate by the ICAHD, it has been estimated that Israel has razed 48,488 Palestinian structures, with a concomitant displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.

Israel regards its practice as a form of deterrence of terrorism, since a militant is thereby forced to consider the effect of his actions on his family. Between September 2000 and the end of 2004, of the 4,100 homes the IDF razed in the territories, 628, housing 3,983 people were undertaken as punishment because a member of a family had been involved in the Al Aqsa insurgency. From 2006 until 31 August 2018, Israel demolished at least 1,360 Palestinian residential units in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem), causing 6,115 people – including at least 3,094 minors – to lose their homes. 698 of these, homes to 2,948 Palestinians of whom 1,334 minors, were razed in the Jordan Valley (January 2006 – September 2017).

Before the first Intifada, the measure was considered to be used only in exceptional circumstances, but with that uprising it became commonplace, no longer requiring the Defense Minister's approval but a measure left to the discretion of regional commanders. Israel blew up 103 houses in 1987, but the following year the number skyrocketed to 423. 510 Palestinian homes of men alleged to be involved in or convicted of security offenses, or because the homes were said to function as screens for actions hostile to the Israeli army or settlers. A further 110 were shelled in the belief armed men were inside, and overall another 1,497 were razed for lacking Israeli building permits, leaving an estimated 10,000 children homeless. Violations of building codes are a criminal offense in Israeli law, and this was only extended to the West Bank in 2007. Israel has demolished or compelled the owners to demolish, 780 homes in East Jerusalem between 2004 and 2018, leaving 2,766 people of whom 1,485 minors, homeless. The number of homes demolished in the rest of the West Bank from 2006 until 30 September 2018 is estimated to be at least 1,373, resulting in homelessness for 6,133 Palestinians, including 3.103 minors. No settler has ever been prosecuted for engaging in such infractions, and only 3% of reported violations by settlers have led to demolitions. Even huts by shepherds, on which taxes have been duly paid, can be demolished.

Palestinian identity is deeply impregnated with the sense of national loss and place engendered by the "catastrophe" of 1948 (al-nakba), and according to physicians studying West Bankers who have had their homes destroyed, such events cause a retraumatization of the nakba in the families affected.

Permits

The Israeli permit or pass system for Palestinians was likened very early to that devised in South Africa under Apartheid. Under Israeli military rule, almost every aspect of ordinary everyday Palestinian life was subject to pervasive military regulations, calculated to number of 1,300 by 1996, from planting trees and importing books, to house extensions. In the first two decades of occupation Palestinians were required to apply to the military authorities for permits and licenses for an enormous number of things such as a driver's license, a telephone, trademark and birth registration, and a good conduct certificate which was indispensable to obtain entry into many branches of professions and to work places, with putative security considerations determining the decision, which was delivered by an oral communication. The overwhelming source of information on security risks came from the Shin Bet which however was found to have systematically lied to courts for 16 years. Obtaining such permits has been described as a via dolorosa for the Palestinians seeking them. In 2004, only 0.14% of West Bankers (3,412 out of 2.3 million) had valid permits to travel through West Bank checkpoints. Military order 101 denied West Bankers the right to purchase any form of printed matter –books, posters, photographs and even paintings – from abroad (including from Israel) unless prior authorization had been obtained from the military. Prohibitions even affected dress codes by disallowing certain colour combinations in clothing, or refusing to cover the sewage in the Negev detention centre of Ansar 111 where huge numbers of Palestinians did time. Zygmunt Bauman's warnings of the debilitating effect bureaucracy may have on the human condition has been cited to throw light on the Orwellian or Kafkaesque trap of red tape that, it is argued, places a stranglehold on Palestinian autonomy.

Since 1991 Israel has never publicly clarified with clear consistent rules the criteria governing permits. To get a permit in the 1980-1990s one was required to acquire an approval stamp, each time paying a fee, from several different offices: (i) the tax office; (ii) the local police (iii) the municipality; (iv) the Village League (both of the latter often staffed by collaborators), and the Shin Bet, and even with these attachments, permission was not automatically forthcoming. One Bethlehemite, trying to get his daughter's birth registered – Palestinian birth registries are controlled by Israel – was required to obtain seven stamps from seven different government offices. The income office denied him their stamp because he was behind in his tax payments, though they were deducted automatically from his pay. His wife, using her identity papers, had to do the same rounds, and eventually a birth certificate was conceded. Even when some powers were delegated to the Palestinian Authority, the appropriate Palestinian offices were reduced to acting as "mailmen", passing on requests for permits to the Israeli Civil Administration, 80-80% of which are then rejected on unexplained "security grounds".

Israel has imposed a permit system for building in East Jerusalem and Area C which makes home construction almost impossible for Palestinian residents. It is estimated that 85 percent of the Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem are "illegal" This implies that since 1967 approximately twenty thousand buildings were built by Palestinians in East Jerusalem without acquiring sufficient building permits. Israel has excluded hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from its population register, with serious consequences for their ability to dwell in or travel from the West Bank (and Gaza). The number of Palestinians who have had their residency permits revoked from 1967 to 2017 exceeds 130,000 people in the West Bank and 14,565 in East Jerusalem. In 2018 legislative measures were announced to strip a further 12,000 Palestinians of their right to live in East Jerusalem.

When pieces of land are fenced off from their traditional owners, often by declaring they lie within a closed military zone or on the Israeli seam land side of the Separation Barrier, a permit from the military administration is then required for the owner to access his fields: tending such fields becomes an arduous bureaucratic and physical task with access often allowed only once a year. The practice of denying usufruct in order to allow the 10 year expiry of rights to kick in was taken to the Israeli Supreme Court which, in 2006, arguing that the denial of access custom was akin to denying a person the right to enter his own home in order to defend himself from a thief, ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, and directed the IDF to ensure everything was done to ensure Palestinians could tend their olive groves. According to Irus Braverman, however, subsequent IDF regulations, guaranteeing tree protection in designated "friction zones" (ezorei hikuch) but not anywhere else, only complicated the issue. By 2018 it was calculated that of grants to people in the West Bank of areas Israel declared to be state lands, 99.7% was given to Israeli settlements, with 0.24% (400 acres (160 ha)) being earmarked for allocation to Palestinians who constitute 88% of the population.

Impact on education

Palestinians traditionally place a high priority on education and by 1979 it was estimated that 10% of all Arab university graduates were Palestinian.

During the first Intifada at one point Israel imposed a 19-month closure on all schools in the West Bank, including kindergartens, suggesting to at least one observer that Israel was intentionally aiming to disrupt the cognitive development of Palestinian youths. In the first two years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 100 schools were fired on by the IDF, some were bombed and others occupied as military outposts.

Night raids

According to Major General Tal Rousso, the IDF undertakes operations "all the time, every night, in all divisions." Israeli night raids are usually undertaken between 2 am and 4 am. The units, whose members are often masked and accompanied by dogs, arrive in full battle gear and secure entry by banging on doors or blowing them off their hinges. Surging blips in frequency may relate to rotation of new units into an area. Most occur in villages in close proximity to settlements. Such missions have several different purposes: to arrest suspects, conduct searches, map the internal structure of a dwelling, and photograph youths to improve recognition in future clashes. Laptops and cellphones are often seized, and, if returned, not infrequently damaged. Vandalism is commonplace, with looted objects given to needy soldiers or those on low pay, as in Operation Defensive Shield. Reports of stashes of money that go missing after a search are frequent. Many personal effects – photos of children or families, watches, medals, football trophies, books, Qur'ans, jewelry – are taken and stored away, and, according to one informant, intelligence officer trainees were allowed to take items of such Palestinian "memorabilia", called "booty," from storerooms.Template:Spf After international protests, in February 2014 a pilot scheme was begun to issue summonses instead of arresting children at night, and last until December 2015 The purpose of mapping raids is, reportedly, to work out how an area looks from Palestinian angles for future planning to enable an option for "straw widows" operations (mounting ambushes from inside those homes).

The practice by Israeli military units of raiding, making arrest in, and ransacking Palestinians homes deep in the night is a long-standing practice, persisting to the present day. In just three days over 21–23 January 2018, 41, 24 and 32 separate raids were made In 2006 Israel made 6,666 raids inside the occupied territories. In the first six months of 2007, 3,144 Israeli search/arrest raids were made in the West Bank the parents of 90% of minors arrested, blindfolded and handcuffed in night raids, were given no explanation for the abduction, nor information about where the child would be detained. In another study, 72.7% of children studied had witnessed night raids, the traumatic experience coming second after watching scenes of mutilated or wounded bodies on TV. An extrapolation from this figure would, according to the NGO WCLAC, suggest that since martial law was imposed in June 1967, over 65,000 night raids have been conducted by the Israeli military on Palestinian homes in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem).

Arrests and administrative detention

The military court system for the occupied territories, modeled partially on the British military court system set up in 1937, was established in 1967, and had been called the institutional centerpiece of the occupation, and within it West Bank Palestinians are treated as "foreign civilians". All of the judges are Jewish Israelis.

The measures it applies, combining elements of colonial administration and martial law, cover not only incidents involving recourse to violence but many other activities, non-violent protests, political and cultural statements and the way Palestinians are allowed to move or associate with each other. Among the problematical facets of the system are according to Lisa Hajjar,

• Prolonged detention of suspects incommunicado
• Impeding a client's access to his lawyer
• the routine use of coercion under interrogation to obtain confessions
• the introduction of "secret evidence".

Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been put on trial since 1967: according to Saree Makdisi the cumulative total of Palestinian detainees imprisoned by Israel from that date down to 2005 reached 650,000. Of these, according to Tamar Pelleg-Sryck (2011), tens of thousands have been subjected to the specific treatment of administrative detention. The incarceration rate was the highest in the world during the first uprising against Israeli rule (1987-1992) – and their conviction rates varied from 90 to 95%, being for the most part secured by plea bargainings in 97% of cases. According to Red Cross statistics, in the first two decades of the occupation, from 1967 to 1987, one in three Palestinians -500,000 – were subject to arrest and detention by Israeli forces, and on any given day the courts would be crammed with "children in handcuffs, women pleading with soldiers, anxious people thronging lawyers for information." After the Oslo Accords, courts in Palestinian towns were withdrawn to Area C, which however only meant that lawyers and family for the defendants had far greater difficulty, because of the permit system, in getting access to the tribunals.

The specific practice of administrative detention was initially introduced by the British to subdue Palestinians, but was then increasingly applied to cope with behaviour by Jewish political activists and suspected members of Jewish paramilitary organizations, an extension vigorously opposed by Jewish settlers at the time and one which Jewish lawyers in July 1936 argued should be repealed. Dov Yosef likewise argued in 1948 that the practice abolished the writ of habeas corpus and had led to the improper incarceration by the British of numerous Jewish activists. The state of Israel, on securing independence however, retained this body of regulations on the new state's statute book. Article 111 therein enabled military commanders to arrest and detain anyone, without public reasons given or the laying of formal charges or trial, for periods of up to one year, though a provision exists for indefinitely extending any person detained under the order. The Fourth Geneva Convention permits detentions, and on these precedents the IDF promulgated its Article 87 of the Order Concerning Security Instructions, and applied it to cases where the rules of evidence of Israeli courts would not allow the suspect to be convicted. Egregious examples of the practice took place early in the occupation. Taisir al-Arouri, a Bir Zeit University professor of Mathematics, was arrested at night on 21 April 1974 and released on 18 January 1978, after suffering 45 months of imprisonment without trial or charges being laid, only after Amnesty International issued a public protest.

Writing in 1978 Michael Goldstein called the detention system "an aberration of criminal justice", but temporary in nature and dictated by an ongoing war situation. He credited Israel with refraining from making it part of their judicial, as opposed to military, system. In a five-month period of the First Intifada alone, Israel put 1,900 Palestinians under an administrative detention order. For the decade from 2000 to 2009 it was estimated that at any one time anywhere between 600 and 1,000 Palestinians were subjected annually to administrative detention. Amnesty International stated that in 2017 Israeli authorities continue to adopt administrative detention rather than criminal prosecution to detain "hundreds of Palestinians, including children, civil society leaders and NGO workers, without charge or trial under renewable orders, based on information withheld from detainees and their lawyers", and that administrative detainees numbered 441.

Notable Palestinians who have been recently subjected to the process include Khalida Jarrar and Ahmad Qatamesh, both of whom are regarded by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience.

Torture

According to Lisa Hajjar (2005) and Dr. Rachel Stroumsa, the director of the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, torture has been an abiding characteristic of Israeli methods of interrogation of Palestinians. Though formally banned by the High Court in 1999, legalized exceptions, authorized by the Attorney General of Israel, persist:

Reports of torture as a means of extracting confessions arguably began early in the occupation, on evidence for the first decade. In June 1977 the Sunday Times claimed torture was used against the Arab population of the occupied territories. In early 1978 an employee of the US Consulate in East Jerusalem, Alexandra Johnson, sent two cables detailing evidence Israeli authorities were systematically using torture on West Bank suspects in Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron and the Russian compound of Jerusalem. Early reports indicated detainees were stripped naked and subject for long periods to cold showers or cold air ventilation. People were hung from meat hooks in Hebron and Ramallah. She concluded torture was applied at three rising levels of maltreatment, (a) level one: daily beatings with fists and sticks; (b) level two: alternate immersions of the victim in hot and cold water, beating of genitals and interrogation about twice daily over several hours; (c) level three: rotating teams of interrogators working on a nude person under detention by applying electrical devices, high frequency sonic noise, refrigeration, prolonged hanging by the hands or feet, and inserting objects into their penises or rectums. This last level was used on those who refused at earlier levels to denounce other Palestinians. 78-80% of a sample of detainees in 1985 said they had been sexually molested, and 67% stated they had been humiliated on religious grounds.

Other techniques include shabeh, a practice 76% of the Israel public (1998) thought a form of torture, but only 27% opposed its use against Palestinians. This consists of being forced to sit on a very small chair, with a filthy hood over one's head, as blaring music is drummed into one's ears. It could, as with one woman, last up to 10 days, night and day; also included among torture techniques was the beating of the bare soles of detainees' feet (falaqa), or subjecting them, while deprived of sleep, to endless lectures on themes like: "All Arabs are Bedouin, and Bedouin are Saudis, so Palestinians should go back to Saudi Arabia, where they came from. You don't belong here." Blindfolding is used so that the suspect can never anticipate when he is to be struck. In the First Intifada, other than prolonged beatings, people, including children, could be smeared with vomit or urine, be confined in a "coffin", be suspended by the wrists; be denied food and water or access to toilets, or be threatened to have their sisters, wives or mothers raped. Methods, including torture, practiced also on Palestinian children were reported to persist with Amnesty International stating in 2018 that though over 1,000 complaints have been filed regarding these practices since 2001, "no criminal investigations were opened."

One major case, in which 20 men from Beita and Huwara were taken from their homes, gagged and bound hand and foot and who then had their limbs broken with clubs, eventually reached the Israeli Supreme Court.

Such torture is not thought to be very effective. A West Bank member of Hamas gave evidence under torture implicating himself and that organization in the 2014 kidnapping and murder of Israeli teenagers. The extorted confession turned out to be false. Recourse to Israeli courts to obtain recompense and rehabilitation for the psychological damage caused by being tortured are rarely conceded and are exceptional. Financial settlements were given for cases in the 1980s and 1990s, but only if the victim underwrote a clause which absolved the state of Israeli of declaring that the plaintiff had been a victim of torture.

Children

According to a study by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, covering 10 years of allegations of the mistreatment of children in Israel's military practices in the West Bank, though International law requires that all children in contact with judicial systems be treated with dignity and respect at all times, the evidence from multiple outside observers over a decade suggests Palestinian children under Israel military detention suffer cruel and degrading treatment. In law, the prohibition against such practices is "absolute and unconditional," and even security considerations or threats of war cannot override the rule.

Children constitute half of the Palestinian population, and though often construed as "mute victims or misguided puppets", they actively engage in the resistance, with some arguing that in doing so they forfeit their rights. According to James Graff, Palestinian children comprise a notable segment of Palestinians targeted, and can be included in categories from which they are normally exempted, and be singled out as a group to be subject to traumatizing violence, and targeted in random shootings, gassings and violence by soldiers and by settlers sponsored by the state. Between 2014 and 2015, the military prosecuted indictments against 1,046 Palestinian minors. According to John Dugard, the UN Special Rapporteur, regarding the early years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2002), most child victims were not participating in demonstrations when they were killed by tank shelling, artillery fire and helicopter gunships.

Ill-treatment of Palestinian children in the Israeli military detention system appears to be widespread, systematic and institutionalized. According to the Swedish branch of Save the Children, between 23,600 and 29,900 children required medical treatment after suffering injuries from IDF beatings during the first two years of the First Intifada, a third of them aged 10 or under. Under Yitzhak Rabin's 19 January 1988 order to employ "might, power and beatings" and an interview in which he spoke of the need to "break their bones", beatings, which until then had usually been a hidden interrogation method, went public, until an outcry arose when journalists filmed the tactic, a scandal countered by issuing a ban on media entering the territories in the spring of 1988.

Minors (16 years old and under) adding up to 5% of the child population constituted 35-40% of the 130,000 Palestinians who suffered serious injuries from Israeli troops in this uprising. Of 15-year-olds and under requiring medical treatment, 35% were injured by Israeli gunfire, 50% by beatings, and 14.5% suffered from tear gassing. From 2009 to 2018 Israel Security squads shot dead 93 Palestinian minors in West Bank clashes. In the period of the Al-Aqsa uprising, the ratios of those killed indicate that roughly 20- 25% were children on both sides, with the difference that Israeli fatalities were from incidents of body-bombing in which they were not the primary targets, whereas a substantial proportion of Palestinian children were killed by Israeli sniper gun-fire directed individually, according to Frank Afflitto. From September 2000-to December 2003, 109 children were killed by "one-shot wonders" in the head, 4 in the neck, and 56 by exclusive heart-chest shots. A further 90 were killed with two or three gunshot wounds. Overall, in the 3.25 years after the second uprising 427 children were shot dead by IDF forces and settlers.

Each year approximately 700 Palestinian children aged 12 to 17, the great majority of them boys, are arrested, interrogated and detained by Israeli army, police and security agents. An estimated 7,000 children have been detained, interrogated, prosecuted and/or imprisoned within the Israeli military justice system – an average of two children each day. Israel, after it emerged that even 12 year-old children were prosecuted in adult military courts, instituted in September 2009 a juvenile military court, the only one known to exist in the world, which however uses the same staff and rooms as the military courts where Palestinian adults are put on trial. Two years later (27 September 2011) Military Order 1676 stipulated that only youths 18 and over could be tried in adult military courts. However the sentencing protocols applied to the 16–17 year old bracket remain those applied to adults. Most prosecutions of teenagers concern stone-throwing which is an offence under Section 212 of Military Order 1651, and carried a penalty of up to 10 years imprisonment, theoretically applicable to children between 14 and 15. Conviction for throwing anything at a moving vehicle with intent to harm carries a maximum penalty of 20 years.

The analysis of cases monitored by UNICEF identified examples of practices that amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified by Israel in 1991 and the PA in 1995) and the Convention against Torture. It is common for many children caught up in the system to be aggressively woken in the middle of the night by many armed soldiers and, tied and blindfolded, transported to Israeli settlements or official interrogation centres. Few children are informed of their rights to legal counsel, or their right to avoid self-incrimination. Confessions from children are extracted by a mixture of sleep-deprivation, threats –of death threats against them or their families, sexual assault and solitary confinement- and physical violence. Confessions to be signed are often written in Hebrew, which most Palestinian children do not know. Once the interrogation is finished, the children, in leg chains, shackles and prison uniforms, are taken before a military court where their confessions, extorted under duress, form the primary evidence for the prosecution. Sentences are served in three prisons, two of which are inside Israel, and critics argue that their incarceration in Israel violates the article 76 of the Geneva Convention, which states that "protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein."

Notable cases of Palestinian children shot dead by Israeli soldiers are Iman Darweesh Al Hams, Khalil al-Mughrabi and Faris Odeh.

Fragmentation

The official "Master Plan for the Development of Samaria and Judea to the year 2010" (1983) foresaw the creation of a belt of concentrated Jewish settlements linked to each other and Israel beyond the Green line while disrupting the same links joining Palestinian towns and villages along the north-south highway, impeding any parallel ribbon development for Arabs and leaving the West Bankers scattered, unable to build up larger metropolitan infrastructure, and out of sight of the Israeli settlements. The result has been called a process of "enclavization," ghettoization, typified most visibly by the enclosure of Qalqilya in a concrete wall, or what Ariel Sharon called the Bantustan model, an allusion to the apartheid system, and one which many argue, makes Israel's occupational policies not dissimilar, despite different origins, from the South African model. In particular it bears comparison to the policies applied in South Africa to the Transkei, a policy that may have a broader geopolitical reach, if the Yinon Plan is to be taken as an indication of Israeli policy. The World Bank argued in 2009 that creating economic islands in the West Bank and Gaza is a developmental dead-end that would only imperil the construction of an economically unified and viable Palestinian state.

One observed function of the Separation Barrier is to seize large swathes of land thought important for future settlement projects, notoriously in the case of the area of Susya absorbing land worked by Bedouin herders with proven Ottoman title to the terrain. The construction, significantly inspired by the ideas of Arnon Soffer to "preserve Israel as an Island of Westernization in a Crazy Region", had as its public rationale the idea of defending Israel against terroristic attacks, but was designed at the same time to incorporate a large swathe of West Bank Territory, much of it private Palestinian land: 73% of the area marked for inclusion into Israel was arable fertile and rich in water formerly constituting the "breadbasket of Palestine".

Had the barrier been constructed along the Green Line with the same purpose it would have run 313 kilometres, instead of 790 kilometres, and have cost far less than the $3.587 billion the extended wall is estimated to cost (2009). The disparity arises from the government's decision to rope in dozens of settlements west of the barrier. That it remains unfinished is said to be due to pressure from settler lobbies opposed to a completion that would restrict the further expansion of settlements or cut them off from Israel, as with Gush Etzion. There are only 12 gates through the 168 kilometres of the wall surrounding East Jerusalem, of which in theory four allow access to West Bankers who manage to obtain a permit. A whole generation of West Bankers have never seen the city, or the Haram al Sharif, a denial of international law stipulating the right of access to sites of worship.

Legal system

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by a legal asymmetry, which embodies a fragmented jurisdiction throughout the West Bank, where ethnicity determines what legal system one will be tried under. Down to 1967, people in the West Bank lived under one unified system of laws applied by a single judicial system. State law (qanun) is a relatively alien concept in Palestinian culture, where a combination of the Shari'a and customary law (urf) constitute the normal frame of reference for relations within the basic social unity of the clan ("hamula"). Settlers are subject to Israeli civil law, Palestinians to the occupying arm's military law. Overall the Israeli system has been described as one where "Law, far from limiting the power of the state, is merely another way of exercising it." A Jewish settler can be detained up to 15 days, a Palestinian can be detained without charges being laid for 160 days.

According to the legal framework of international law, a local population under occupation should continue to be bound by its own penal laws and tried in its own courts. However, under security provisions, local laws can be suspended by the occupying power and replaced with military orders enforced by military courts In 1988, Israel amended its Security Code in such a way that international law could no longer be invoked before the military judges in their tribunals. Israeli businesses in the West Bank employing Palestinian labour drew up employment laws according to Jordanian law. This was ruled in 2007 by the Israeli Supreme Court to be discriminatory, and that Israeli law must apply in this area, but as of 2016, according to Human Rights Watch, the ruling has yet to be implemented, and the government states that it cannot enforce compliance.

Extensive portions of Israeli civil law have been introduced to apply to settlements, their jurisdictions and settlers themselves, a system called Enclave law. The basic military laws governing the West Bank are influenced by what is called the "pipelining" of Israeli legislation. The High Court has upheld only one challenge to the more than 1,000 arbitrary military orders that have been imposed over the past two decades and that are legally binding in the occupied territories.

Freedom of movement

Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes freedom of movement as a fundamental human right.

Constant uncertainty and the inability to plan are the results for Palestinians of the Israeli military rules governing their movements. The World Bank noted that additional costs arising from longer travelling caused by restrictions on movement through three major routes in the West Bank alone ran to (2013) USD 185 million a year, adding that other, earlier calculations (2007) suggest restrictions on the Palestinian labour market cost the West Bank approximately US$229 million per annum. It concluded that such imposed restrictions had a major negative impact on the local economy, hindering stability and growth. In 2007, official Israeli statistics indicated that there were 180,000 Palestinians on Israel's secret travel ban list. 561 roadblocks and checkpoints were in place (October), the number of Palestinians licensed to drive private cars was 46,166 and the annual cost of permits was $454. These checkpoints, together with the separation wall and the restricted networks restructure the West Bank into "land cells", freezing the flow of normal everyday Palestinian lives. Israel sets up flying checkpoints without notice. Some 2,941 flying checkpoints were rigged up along West Bank roads, averaging some 327 a month, in 2017. A further 476 unstaffed physical obstacles, such as dirt mounds, concrete blocks, gates and fenced sections had been placed on roads for Palestinian use. Of the gates erected at village entrances, 59 were always closed. The checkpoint system did not ease up after the Oslo Accords, but was strengthened after them, which has been interpreted as suggesting their function is to assert control over Palestinians, and as a sign of an unwillingness to yield ground in the West Bank. According to PA Health Ministry statistics relating to the period from 2000 to 2006, of 68 Palestinian women who gave birth to their children while held up at checkpoints, 35 miscarried and 5 died while delivering their child there. Machsom Watch accumulated over a mere five years (2001-2006) some 10,000 eyewitness reports and testimonies regarding the innumerable difficulties faced by Palestinians trying to negotiate West Bank checkpoints.

Road system

It has been said that for "Jewish settlers, roads connect; for Palestinians, they separate." Between 1994 and 1997, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) built 180 miles of bypass roads in the territories, on appropriated land because they ran close to Palestinian villages. The given aim was said to be to afford protection to settlers from Palestinian sniping, bombing, and drive-by shootings. For TAU emeritus professor of geography Elisha Efrat, they ignored the historical topography, road systems and environmental characteristics of the West Bank, and simply formed an apartheid network of "octopus arms which hold a grip on Palestinian population centres".

A large number of embankments, concrete slabs and barriers impeded movement on primary and secondary roads. The result was to cantonize and fragment Palestinian townships, and cause endless obstacles to Palestinians going to work, schools, markets and relatives. Ramallah was cut off from all of its feeder villages in 2000.

Though prohibited by law, confiscation of Palestinian identity cards at checkpoints is a daily occurrence. At best drivers must wait for several hours for them to be returned, when, as can happen, the IDs themselves are lost as soldiers change shifts, in which case Palestinians are directed to some regional office the next day, and more checkpoints to get there. Even before the Al Aqsa Intifada, UNFPA estimated that 20% of pregnant West Bank women were unable to access prenatal care because of the difficulties and delays caused by crossing checkpoints, and dozens were forced to deliver their children on the roadside.

Village closures

The closure (Hebrew seger, Arabic ighlaq) policy operates on the basis of a pass system developed in 1991, and is divided into two types: a general closure restriction the movement of goods and people, except when a permit is given, from and to Israel and the West Bank and Gaza, developed in response to a series of stabbings in the former 1993, and the implementation of total closure over both areas. Aside from general closures, total closures were imposed for over 300 days from September 1993 after the Declaration of Principles of the Oslo I Accord and late June 1996. The strictest total closure was put in place in the spring of 1996 in the wake of a series of the suicide bombings executed by the Gaza-Strip based organization of Hamas in retaliation for the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, when the Israeli government imposed a total 2 week long ban on any movement by over 2 million Palestinians between 465 West Bank towns and villages, a measure repeated after the deadly clashes arising from the archaeological excavations under the Western Wall of the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount.

The IDF erected iron gates at the entrances to the overwhelming majority of Palestinian villages, allowing the army to shut them down at will, in minutes. Notable examples of villages that have undergone long term isolation, with residents suffering extreme restrictions on movement, are Nuaman, which was absorbed into the Jerusalem municipality while having its inhabitants classified as West Bankers, and Kafr Qaddum which has had a permanent roadblock at its entrance for 14 years, from 2003, the same time the settlement of Kedumim was established, and since 2011 its villagers have been protesting the roadblock, which requires them to travel a distance six times greater than the usual route to access Nablus.

It is routine for the Israeli authorities to impose a comprehensive closure over the West Bank during Jewish holidays like Yom Kippur, Pesach, Sukkot and Rosh Hashanah, with an exception made for Jewish industrial areas in the territory. The reason given is to prevent terror attacks, and also to enable security personnel at checkpoints time off to enjoy these holidays. Such closures can at times last 11 days.

Marriage difficulties

Coming to terms with the problem of the Palestinian right of return while negotiating for UN recognition in 1948, Israel came up with a family reunification programme, and was granted membership on the understanding that it would comply with international law in this regard. The very word "return" (awda) was censored from being used in Palestinian newspapers as implying an existential threat to Israel. In practice, Israel evaluates proposed family reunifications in terms of a perceived demographic or security threat. They were frozen in 2002. Families composed of a Jerusalemite spouse and a Palestinian from the West Bank (or Gaza) face enormous legal difficulties in attempts to live together, with most applications, subject to an intricate, on average decade-long, four-stage processing, rejected. Women with "foreign husbands" (those lacking a Palestinian identity card), are reportedly almost never allowed to rejoin their spouse. The 2003 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), or CEIL, subsequently renewed in 2016 imposed a ban on family unification between Israeli citizens or "permanent residents" and their spouses who are originally of the West Bank or Gaza. Such a provision does not apply, however, to Israeli settlers in the West Bank or (until 2005) Gaza. In such instances, the prohibition is explained in terms of "security concerns".

A Jerusalemite Palestinian who joins their spouse in the West Bank and thereby fails to maintain seven years of consecutive residence in East Jerusalem can have their residency right revoked. According to B'Tselem, any of the over 2,000 Palestinians registered as absentee owners of property in the West Bank have been denied permission to re-enter for purposes like family reunifications because their return would compel the Israeli authorities to return their property, on which settlements have been established, to their original Palestinian owners.

Targeted assassinations

Targeted assassinations are acts of lethal selective violence undertaken against specific people identified as threats. Rumours emerged in the press around September 1989 that Israel had drawn up a wanted list, several of whom were subsequently killed, and it was speculated that the time Israel might be operating "death squads". In its decision regarding the practice, the Israeli Supreme Court in 2006 refrained from either endorsing or banning the tactic, but set forth four conditions – precaution, military necessity, follow-up investigation and proportionality- and stipulated that the legality must be adjudicated on a case by case analysis of the circumstances. Nils Melzer found the judgement to be a step forward but flawed in several key regards, particularly for failing to provide guidelines to determine when the practice would be permissible. According to one former official, cited by Daniel Byman, on average Israel spends on average 10 hours planning a targeted killing operation and ten seconds on whether to proceed with the assassination or not.

Of the 8,746 violent Palestinian deaths registered from 1987 to 2008, 836 were executed following the identification of individuals based on information gathered from collaborators. Israel first publicly acknowledged its use of the tactic at Beit Sahour near Bethlehem in November 2000, when four lasar-guided missiles from an Apache helicopter were used to liquidate a Tanzim leader, Hussein Abayat, in his Mitsubishi pick-up truck, with collateral damage killing two 50 year-old housewives waiting for a taxi nearby, and wounding six other Palestinians in the vicinity. The public admission was due to the fact an attack helicopter had been used, which meant the execution could not be denied, something that remains possible when assassinations of activists by snipers takes place. According to B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, for the period between 2000 and the end of 2005, 114 civilians died as the result of collateral damage as Israeli security forces successfully targeted 203 Palestinian militants. The figures from 9 November 2000 to 1 June 2007 indicate that Israeli assassinations killed 362 people, 237 being directly targeted and 149 bystanders collaterally. One intelligence officer recounting the atmosphere in the operations room where assassinations were programmed and then witnessed on video, stated that worries about "collateral damage" never dampened the cheers greeting a successful targeting mission.Template:Spf

Surveillance

Israel, in its capillary monitoring of Palestinians has been called a Surveillance state par excellence. Soon after hostilities ceased, Israel began to count all items in households from televisions to refrigerators, stoves down to heads of livestock, orchards and tractors. Letters were checked and their addresses registered, and inventories were drawn up of workshops producing furniture, soap, textiles, sweets and even eating habits. While many innovations were introduced to improve workers' productivity, they can also be seen as control mechanisms. Forward military planners in Israel foresee the day when Israel will withdraw from parts of the West Bank: this will not end the Occupation, for thereafter they envisage an "invisible occupation"/"airborne occupation" or "occupation in disappearance" régime, with a continued capacity to control the physically evacuated territory with surveillance and strikes.

One former Israeli intelligence officer involved in Unit 8200 likened the surveillance system to that in the German film The Lives of Others, with the difference, in his view, that the Israeli monitoring was more efficient. While the Israeli public thinks, he stated, that this surveillance is focused on combating terrorism, in practice a significant amount of intelligence gathering targets innocent people with no record for militancy. No Palestinian was, he claimed, exempt from non-stop monitoring. Any information enabling "extortion" or blackmail, such as evidence of marital infidelity, health problems requiring treatment in Israel or sexual orientation is regarded as relevant. Israeli surveillance and strike presence over Palestinian areas is constant and intense, with former Shin Bet head Avi Dichter noting, "When a Palestinian child draws a picture of the sky, he doesn't draw it without a helicopter."

Censorship

In the West Bank both the British Mandatory "Defense Emergency Regulations of 1945, No. 88" – stipulating that "every article, picture, advertisement, decree and death notice must be submitted to military censors", – and "Israeli Military Order No. IOI (1967)", amended by "Order No. 718 (1977)" and "No. 938 (1981)" concerning "the prohibition of incitement and adverse propaganda" formed the basis for censoring West Bank publications, poetry and literary productions. The problem was that no guidelines clarified precisely what could or could not be said, and even articles translated directly from the Hebrew press could be prohibited, or love poems free of any nationalistic undertone could be suppressed from publication by a censor, or theatrical pieces approved in Israel could be blocked by arbitrary fiat by any military governor, or staging denied by simply not replying to requests for permission. Newspapers could lose their licenses, without any reason given, on the basis of 1945 Emergency Regulation (Article 92/2). There were two distinct censorship bureaus, one run by the military and the other by the civil administration, and what was allowed by one could be overturned by the other, and this double procedure applied to galley proofs of every article in newspapers. In the first decades of occupation, Palestinian publications were vetted and numerous books were censored to remove any phrase or expression which was considered as "incitement" or fostering national feelings among the Palestinians. Thus even obituaries stating that a family "in the homeland and the diaspora mourns" the deceased was struck out. Coverage of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon in Jerusalem's Arabic papers, and particularly condolence notices, were severely curtailed. The word "pride" used in an obituary for the fallen was objected to. Editors were harassed and papers closed for containing articles critical of settlements.

Censorship even extended to denying travel permits for notable Palestinians like Elias Freij, Major of Bethlehem, scheduled to be interviewed in the US on NBC's Meet the Press. That war, according to several Israeli observers like Ze'ev Schiff, Yehoshafat Harkabi and Avner Yaniv, was itself strategically motivated as necessary to "safeguard the occupation of the West Bank." When Yitzhak Laor appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court about the way the censorship board censored his play – which made analogies between the military government in the territory and Nazism, the Court backed the plaintiff, leading to the board's suspension. The court's decision had no effect on the military's censorship body in the West Bank and Gaza, and plays can be closed if it is thought their content threatens Israel's security. Graffiti (shi'arati) are a major medium for protesting occupation and flourished under the First Intifada. They were illegal by the fact that they were written without obtaining a permit. Julie Peteet states that "it was illegal to write for public dissemination without submission of the text to the censors". Under Military Order 1260 promulgated in November 1988, Israeli military authorities could fine $350 the owner of any property on whose walls the graffiti artist had written a slogan or painted a picture. This proved to be so lucrative a source of revenue for the Israelis that the intifada authorities themselves had to prohibit the practice. Soldiers blacked out or scrubbed walls of graffiti, or when incised, had them chiselled off: when book-long collections of such graffiti were published, they were banned by the military censor. Even works unrelated to the conflict have been banned in the occupied territories, as was Hamlet. Fathi Ghabin received a 6-month gaol sentence for using the PLO colours – red, black, green, and white – in one of his paintings.

The Palestinian National Authority also uses censorship. As early as 1996 it forbade circulation of Edward Said's Peace and Its Discontents.

Coercive collaboration

One of the first things Israel captured on conquering the West Bank were the archives of the Jordanian Security Police, whose information allowed them to turn informers in the territory for that service into informers for Israel. Collaborators (asafir), broken in interrogation, and then planted in cells to persuade other prisoners to confess, began to be recruited in 1979. The number of collaborators with Israel before the Oslo Accords was estimated at around 30,000. According to Haaretz, Shin Bet has used a number of "dirty" techniques to enlist Palestinians on its payroll as informers. These methods include exploiting people who have been identified as suffering from personal and economic hardships, people requesting family reunification, or a permit for medical treatment in Israel.

Taxation

Military Order 31 of 27 June 1967 assigned all powers of taxation to an Israeli official appointed by the Area Commander. Israel adopted the Jordanian Income Tax Law of 1964 to levy taxes on Palestinians in the West Bank, while making notable changes to its tax rate intervals, but applied Israeli tax laws to Israeli Jews moving into settlements there. Under the Jordanian system the highest tax rate of 55% started with incomes of 8,000 dinars. The Israeli military authorities squeezed the rates so that by 1988 this applied to Palestinians earning 5,231 JD (equal to 24,064 Israeli shekels, whereas in Israel the 48% rate only applied to Israeli wage earners earning nearly double that amount (45,600 shekels). This discrimination did not affect Israeli West Bank settlers, who were allowed to be taxed at the lower rates operant in Israel. Similarly the self-employed West Bankers appeared to pay more than their Israeli counterparts, but due to the different deductibility regimes, clearer conclusions about discriminations could not be ascertained.

Access to most public services in areas under Israeli control is conditional on proof one is not in arrears with paying one's taxes, income, property and value-added (VAT) and fines, to the military administration. The bureaucratic process is cumbersome and arbitrary. This system was legalized in the West Bank retroactively under two military order No. 1262 (17 December 1988). Israel's taxation allows broad leeway and discretion, taking in norms of appeal and the taxpayer's rights. The draconian provisions of Section 194 of the Israeli Income Tax Ordinance, allowing taxation officers to assess what a taxpayer may owe while limiting challenges, and making them conditional on the prior payment of a bond, rarely applied in Israel, has been routine in the West Bank. Likewise, imprisonment for tax offenses is uncommon in Israel but, according to Lazar, "in the territories it is used on a massive scale and for extensive periods of time." Palestinians deeply resented paying taxes on their business and commercial activities to the Occupation authority without receiving the same benefits Israeli taxpayers had in return. In the First Intifada, tax payments dropped 50%, and Israel responded by cutting health benefits.

The relatively affluent entrepreneurial Christian town of Beit Sahour, in response to military repression organized a sumud-inspired non-violent boycott of Israeli consumer products in favour of Palestinian-Jordanian wares, and shortly afterwards refused to pay taxes to the occupying power on the basis of the slogan "No taxation under Occupation" and the principle of the American colonial revolt against their British masters, namely No taxation without representation. They protested paying school taxes because under Israeli as opposed to Jordanian occupation they now had to pay for their education, and claimed tax monies received were not used to provide services but to cover the costs of IDF ammunition and tear gas fired at their children. There was even a tax on stones thrown. As a result, the IDF placed the town under total curfew for 42 days, blocking food imports, cutting telephone lines, impounding private cars, arresting over forty community leaders, who received year-long gaol sentences, and confiscating cash and property found in house raids amounting to millions of dollars, and one period seizing $US 1,500,000 worth of goods from 300 families, including living room furniture, fridges and stereos which were then sold in Israel at auctions. Closures of schools, medical clinics and food supply chains continued for months after the curfew was lifted. The revolt was crushed in nine months.

Towards the end of the Gulf War in Kuwait, Israel again imposed a curfew on the West Bank (and Gaza) lasting seven weeks, causing devastating economic setbacks, with thousands of Palestinians fired from their jobs in Israel. Nablus was subject to total curfews for 200 days in two years (2002-2004). During house raids, windows and doors have been smashed, food stocks mashed up into an indistinct mush; grain stores, TVs, solar panels, water tanks and radios destroyed or impounded.

Agriculture

The pastoral economy was a fundamental wing of the Palestinian economy. Of the 2,180 square kilometres (840 sq mi) of grazing land in the West Bank Israel permitted in the first years of the 21st century only 225 square kilometres (87 sq mi) for such use. In certain areas, such as the South Hebron Hills, Palestinian bedouin shepherds have their grazing lands disseminated with poison pellets that kill off their flocks, and require minute gleaning and disposal to restore the land to health. In Area C, nearly 500,000 dunams of arable land exist, Palestinian access to which is severely restricted while 137,000 are cultivated or occupied by Israeli settlements. Were the 326,400 dunams theoretically open to Palestinian use made available, the World Bank calculates, it would add $US 1,068 billion to Palestinian productive capacities. Another 1,000,000 dunams could be exploited for grazing or foresty, were Israel to lift its restrictions. The World Bank estimates that were Palestinian agriculture given access to better water resources, they would benefit by a boost in agricultural output of around $1 billion per annum.

Israel's control of land, water, trade and markets, and its specification and rigorous restrictions on what could be grown, is held responsible for the decline of agriculture as a share of West Bank GDP, and the drop of agricultural labourers in the work market from 46% to 27%, so that from 1993 to 1995 output declined by 40.12%. In the years directly preceding the Al Aqsa uprising (1998-1999) the IDF and settlers uprooted 21,705 trees throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. After 1967, restrictions were placed on the types of fruit tree and vegetables that could be planted, and even the importation of tractors required an Israeli permit. A trial study just after the occupation carried out on Deir Dibwan's land, rich in underground water, showed great promise as one of the best sites in the West Bank for growing oranges and bananas. An Israeli drilling permit could not be obtained, leading most of those involved in the project to emigrate to the U.S.

Destruction of agricultural goods was considerable during the second intifada. In the five months following its outbreak, 57,928 olive trees, 49,370 citrus trees, 22,270 stone-fruit trees, 11,514 date palms, 12,000 banana trees and 30,282 grapevines were uprooted. Olive oil production dropped 80% that year as a result. In the 15-month period from the outbreak, down to December 2001, the total damage was calculated ast 155,343 olive trees, 150,356 citrus trees, 54, 223 almond trees, 12,505 date palm trees, 39,227 grape vines, 18,400 banana trees, and 49,851 other varieties of tree. From September 2000 to December 2002, Israeli forces destroyed 14,196 forest trees. In the first two years, taking in the damage wrought by Israel in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, according to Cheryl Rubenberg, 667,000 trees were extirpated and 3,669,000 square metres of agricultural land destroyed. The restrictive allocation of water to Palestinian agriculture has remained constant, at 84 million cuibic metres per annum, since 1967, according to Palestinian authorities. The Oslo Accords foresaw a supplementary 70–80 million cubic metres to be supplied, but in two decades only about half of this additional supply had been provided.

The olive tree, aside from its economic function, is a symbol of Palestinian nationhood, of their quest for independence, much as the pine introduced by Zionist arboriculture. 15% of the territories – 45% of its arable land – is covered by olive groves, and is both a key resource, and its bimonthly autumnal harvesting a period of deep socioeconomic importance for families in most villages in the West Bank, for whom it provides roughly 40% (2009) of West Bank agricultural output. It has mopped up unemployment caused by job loss in Israel after the outbreak of the Second Intifada and is called colloquially shajara el-fakir (pauper's tree), and regarded as holy (shajara mubaraka). Their uprooting by state agencies or settlers is an everyday occurrence in the West Bank.

Israeli officials see olive grove cultivation as "one of the best ownership techniques around". One Israeli official likened Palestinian olive trees to Palestinian children. They look naïve but several years down the track they turn into ticking bombs. The centrality of such olive groves for Palestinians is, according to Michael Sfard, viewed in the Zionist narrative as emblematic of "Arab laziness", since it grows alone and can be shaken down once a year to yield its wealth. In one analysis in 2006 it emerged that only 4% of complaints against settler trespass and destruction of Palestinian olive trees ever led to prosecution.

Following an Ottoman practice of uprooting olive trees to punish tax evasion, Israel began destroying groves, but with the expressed purpose of increasing security for settlements, and visibility for its internal West Bank road system servicing the colonial infrastructure. Construction of the Separation Barrier, erected predominantly on West Bank land, led to the uprooting of tens of thousands of olive trees. In just one village, Qafeen, the wall's route led to the uprooting of 12,000 trees of this variety, while alienating the inhabitants from their groves with a further 100,000 trees left on the Israeli side in a seamzone, which they may access only once a year. Aside from state practices, settlers have waged what one scholar terms "tree warfare" consisting in the stealing, uprooting, chopping or burning of native Palestinian olive groves, often as part of price tag operations. Of the 708,000 dunums of irrigable land in ther West Bank only 247,000 dunums under aggregate irrigation, and it has been calculated (2009) the gross margin Palestinians forego touches close to $480 million per annum, roughly about 10% of GDP. The collateral effect of loss for potential employment runs close to (upper estimate) 10,000 jobs. The World Bank has observed that only 35 per cent of irrigable Palestinian land is actually irrigated, which costs the economy 110,000 jobs and 10 per cent of GDP.

Water

The region of Israel/Palestine is "water-stressed", like many other countries in the region, and macroanalysts consider working out how to share water resources the "single most important problem" for Middle Eastern peoples. One third of all water consumed in Israel was by the 1990s drawn from groundwater that in turn came from the rains over the West Bank, and the struggle over this resource has been described as a zero-sum game. According to Human Rights Watch Israel's confiscation of water violates the Hague Regulations of 1907, which prohibit an occupying power from expropriating the resources of occupied territory for its own benefit.

In the wake of 1967, Israel abrogated Palestinian water rights in the West Bank, and with Military Order 92 of August of that year invested all power over water management to the military authority, though under international law Palestinians were entitled to a share. Both of Israel's own acquifers originate in West Bank territory and its northern cities would run dry without them. According to John Cooley, West Bank Palestinian farmers' wells, which in Ottoman, British, Jordanian and Egyptian law were a private resource owned by villages, were a key element behind Israel's post-1967 strategy to keep the area and in order to protect "Jewish water supplies" from what was considered "encroachment" many existing wells were blocked or sealed, Palestinians were forbidden to drill new wells without military authorization, which was almost impossible to obtain, and restrictive quotas on Palestinian water use were imposed. 527 known springs in the West Bank furnish (2010) Palestinians with half of their domestic consumption. The historic wells furnishing Palestinian villages have often been expropriated for the exclusive use of settlements: thus the major well servicing al-Eizariya was taken over by Ma'ale Adumim in the 1980s, while most of its land was stripped from them leaving the villagers with 2,979 of their original 11,179 dunams.

Most of the Israeli water carrier Mekorot's drillings in the West Bank are located in the Jordan Valley, where Palestinians ended up by 2008 drawing 44% less water than what they accessed before the Interim Agreement of 1995. Under those Oslo Accords Israel obtained 80% of the West Bank's waters, with the remaining 20% Palestinian, a percentage which, however, did not concede the Palestinians any "ownership right". Of their agreed on allocation for 2011 of 138.5 MCM, Palestinians managed to extract only 87 MCM, given the difficulties in obtaining Israeli permits, and the shortfall caused by the drying up of half of Palestinian wells has to be partially offset by buying water from Israel, with the net effect that per capita Palestinian water use has declined 20%. The World Health Organization's minimum consumption per capita of water is 100 litres per diem By 2013, though some villages had only 15 litres per person, it was estimated West Bank Palestinians were supplied an average per capita 70 litres per day, as opposed to the 280-300 litres per person for Jewish settlers. Sometimes the contrast is starker: Al-Hadidiya's 20 litres per person versus the 431 litres per day consumed on the neighbouring Jewish moshav settlement of Ro'i, which draws 431 litres per person per day from a well it drilled on Al-Hadidiya land. Model Palestinian new town urban developments, like the city of Rawabi, have been severely hampered by restrictions on their access to water.

Waste zone

Israel ratified the international Basel Convention treaty on Israel on 14 December 1994, according to which, any transfer of waste must be performed with an awareness of the dangers posed to the disempowered occupied people. It forbids the creation among them of "environmental sacrifice zones." Israel, it is argued, uses the West Bank as a "sacrifice" zone for placing 15 waste treatment plants, which are there under less stringent rules that those required in Israel because a different legal system has been organized regarding hazardous materials that can be noxious to local people and the environment. The military authorities do not render public the details of these operations. These materials consist of such things as sewage sludge, infectious medical waste, used oils, solvents, metals, electronic waste and batteries.

In 2007 it was estimated that 38% (35 mcm a year) of all wastewater flowing into the West Bank derived from settlements and Jerusalem. Of the 121 settlements surveyed, 81 had wastewater treatrment plant, much of it inadequate or subject to breakdown, with much sewage flowing into lowland streams and terrain where Palestinian villages are located. Only 4 of 53 indictments for waste pollution were made over the years from 2000 to 2008, whereas in Israel the laws are strictly applied and, in 2006 alone, 230 enforcements for the same abuse were enforced. At the same time 90-95% of Palestinian wastewater was not treated, with only 1 of 4 Israeli plants built in the 1970s to that purpose functioning, and the neglect to improve the infrastructure is attributed to Israeli budgetry problems. After the Oslo Accords, the global community earmarked $250,000,000 for West Bank wastewater infrastructure. Israel at times insisted its approval was conditional on linking the grid to Israeli settlements, which neither the donors nor Palestinians accepted. Most the infrastructure was subsequently destroyed by IDF military operations. The PA did raise funds from Germany for 15 plants, but only managed to build one, at al-Bireh, within Area B, though even there Israel insisted the plant process waste from the settlement of Psagot, though refusing to pay fees for the treatment. Palestinian towns like Salfit have been deeply affected by sewage overflow channeled past the town from the settlement of Ariel.

Unlike the data available for sewage treatment within Israel, the Israeli Water Commission refuses to provide public reports on 15 million cubic metres of sewage flowing from Israeli settlements in the West Bank. It claims 75% is treated adequately but independent Israeli studies (2000) suggest that only 6% met Israeli treatment standards, while 48% was either not treated adequastely or discharged raw. Since then some improvements have been implemented.

The landfill near Al-Jiftlik in the Jericho Governorate, built on absentee Palestinian property without planning or an environment impact analysis, is for the exclusive use of waste, 1,000 tons per day, produced by Israeli settlements and cities within Israel. Palestinians are restricted to 3 landfills, and permits for more have been denied unless the sites can be used to dump settlement garbage. Even if a permit is given without this agreement, settler waste under military escort is still dumped there.

Loss of cultural property

An archaeological military service was instituted by Israel after the conquest but looting of the West Bank cultural heritage began early and Moshe Dayan, "the cat that got the cream," is said to have had his heyday from 1967 to 1973 in building his illegal collection. The Israeli Antiquities Law of 1978 (Law 885, Chapter 8), following on the Jordanian Provisional Antiquities Law No. 12 of 1967 allowed for the expropriation of any site if the relevant minister deemed it necessary for preservation, excavation or research. In areas under direct Israeli control, discovery of antiquities on and near Palestinian land means that the Civil Administration can deny the Palestinian owners a building permit, lead to confiscations and eventually the transformation of the land into an Israeli settlement.

According to the archaeologist Albert Glock, archaeology has been used selectively by both Christian and Jewish Zionists to reconstruct a version of Palestine consonant with their respective ideologues and to provide a warrant for occupyng the country He also argued that Israel is responsible for the disappearance of significant parts of the Palestinian cultural patrimony, by confiscating Arab cultural resources. In 1967 it appropriated the Palestine Archaeological Museum and its library in East Jerusalem. Often these losses are personal, as when homes are ransacked and looted of their valuables. The journalist Hamdi Faraj, gaoled for endangering public order, had his 500-volume library confiscated, including copies of the Bible and Qur'an and, when he applied for their restitution, was told all the books had been accidentally burnt.

Almost 60% of the West Bank's cultural archaeological heritage the lies in Area C, which falls under full Israeli control. Israel does not allow Palestinian institutes to explore, and safeguard this heritage with the result that much of the area is subject to sacking. According to the Palestinian Department of Antiquites and Cultural Heritage upwards of 120,000 objects are smuggled out of Palestine. Plundering of sites has increased dramatically on each occasion when an intifada broke out, closing off Israel to Palestinian labour. The groundwork is done by Palestinian looters, and the results funneled through Jerusalem, the main transit point for Palestinian middlemen offloading the wares on the Israeli antiquities market. Many looters regard these sites as "negative heritage" since were it retrieved it would not remain in the West Bank as part of Palestinian cultural heritage.

Israeli archaeology in the West Bank has focused on the Biblical remains to the exclusion of the ancient pagan, Christian Byzantine and Muslim strata. Some sites of no Jewish relevance are left to decay. The important prehistoric archaeological site the Shuqba cave was separated from the Palestinian villager of Shuqba from which it took its name, and the Wadi al-Natuf area became a dumping site full of garbage and litter or was crossed by a settlement road, with an exit ramp to allow trucks from settlements to offload their waste there. Many Palestinian heritage sites within the West Bank have been added to the Jewish heritage list. Notable examples where West Bank cultural properties have been expropriated wholly or in part from Palestinian control are the Herodium, Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron. Rachel's Tomb and the Tomb of Jesse and Ruth in Tel Rumeida, Hebron. Qumran is in the West Bank but entirely controlled by Israeli authorities, and Israeli advertisement abroad have suggested that the site is in Israel. The Israeli occupation has wrought a profound change in Palestinian identity, which clings to a sense of a "paradise lost" before the changes brought out by the 1967 conquest.

Tourism

The Palestinian territories contain several of the most significant sites for Muslims, Christians and Jews, and are endowed with a world-class heritage highly attractive to tourists and pilgrims. The West Bank Palestinians themselves have difficulties in accessing the territory for recreation.

Based on 1967 figures, the Palestinian Dead Sea Coastline is roughly 40 km in length, of which 15% (6 kilometres) could lend itself to the same tourist infrastructure deveeloped by Jordan and Israel in their respective areas. Were Israel to permit a parallel development of this Palestinian sector, the World Bank estimates that 2,900 jobs would be added, allowing the Palestinian economy a potential value-added input of something like $126 million annually. It is also the only maritime recreational outlet for West Bankers, but according to an Acri complaint to the Israeli Supreme Court in 2008 Palestinians are often barred or turned away from the beaches at their only access point, the Beit Ha'arava checkpoint on Route 90. Acri claimed the ban responds to fears by settlers who operate tourist concessions in this West Bank area that they will lose Jewish customers if there are too many West Bank Palestinians on the beaches.

The key Palestinian towns in the West Bank for tourism are East Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho. All access points are controlled by Israel and the road system, checkpoints and obstacles in place for visitors desiring to visit Palestinian towns leaves their hotels half-empty. From 92 to 94 cents in every dollar of the tourist trade goes to Israel. The general itineraries under Israeli management focus predominantly on Jewish history. Obstacles placed in the way of Palestinian-managed tourism down to 1995 included withholding licenses from tour guides, and hotels, for construction or renovation, and control of airports and highways, enabling Israel to develop a virtual monopoly on tourism.

Resource extraction

Based on the number of quarries per km in Areas A and B, it is calculated that, were Israel to lift restrictions, a further 275 quarries could be opened in Area C. The World Bank estimates that Israel's virtual ban on issuing Palestinians permits for quarries there costs the Palestinian economy at least US$241 million per year. In International law drawing on the Hague Conventions (Article 55), it is established that an occupying power may reap some value from the resources of the country occupied but not deplete its assets, and that the usufruct must benefit the people under occupation. The Oslo Accords agreed to hand over mining rights to the Palestinian Authority. Israel licenses eleven settlement quarries in the West Bank and they sell 94% of their material to Israel, which arguably constitutes "depletion" and pays royalties to its West Bank military government and settlement municipalities. Thus the German cement firm quarrying at Nahal Raba paid out €430,000 ($479,000) in taxes to the Samaria Regional Council in 2014 alone. The Israeli High Court rejected a petition that such quarrying was a violation by stating that after 4 decades Israeli law must adapt to "the realities on the ground". The state did undertake not to open more quarries. As an illustrative example, a Human Rights Watch report contrasts the difference between a Palestinian-owned quarry company in Beit Fajar and that of a European one working on what Israeli considers its state land. The European company obtained a concession and license to harvest stone, whereas Israel refuses permits for most of the roughly 40 Beit Fajar quarries, or nearly any other Palestinian-owned quarry in the West Bank under Israeli administration.

Israel had denied Palestinians permits to process minerals in that area of the West Bank. The products of the Israeli cosmetics firm Ahava, established in 1988, were developed in laboratories at the West Bank Dead Sea settlements of Mitzpe Shalem and Kalya. 60% of their production is sold in the EU market. In 2018 The UN, stating that the violations were both "pervasive and devastating" to the local Palestinian population, identified some 206 companies which do business with Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Roughly 73 percent of global bromine production comes from Israeli and Jordanian exploitation of the Dead Sea. The potential incremental value that could accrue to the Palestinian economy from the production and sales of potash, bromine and magnesium has been conservatively estimated at US$918 million per annum, or 9 percent of GDP. The lost earnings from not being allowed to process Dead Sea minerals such as potash, and for making bromide-based flame retardants, based on calculations of comparable use by Israel and Jordan, suggest a figure of $642 million.

Economic and social benefits and costs of the occupation

Many Israeli businesses operate in the West Bank, often run by settlers who enjoy the benefits of government subsidies, low rents, favourable tax rates and access to cheap Palestinian labour. Human Rights Watch claims that the "physical imprint", with 20 Israeli industrial zones covering by 2016 some 1,365 hectares, of such commercial operations, agricultural and otherwise, is more extensive than that of the settlements themselves. The restrictions on Palestinian enterprise in Area C cause unemployment which is then mopped up by industrial parks that can draw on a pool of people without job prospects if not in settlements. Some Palestinian workers at the Barkan Industrial Park have complained anonymously that they were paid less than the minimum Israeli wage per hour ($5.75), with payments ranging from $1.50 to 2-4 dollars, with shifts of up to 12 hours, no vacations, sick days, pay slips or social benefits. Many such businesses export abroad, making the world complicit in the settlement project.

Israeli policy aimed to impede any form of Palestinian competition with Israeli economic interests. The approach was set forth by Israel's then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1986, who stated:

"there will be no development initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel".

The World Bank estimated that the annual economic costs to the Palestinian economy of the Israeli occupation of Area C alone in 2015 was 23% of GNP in direct costs, and 12% in indirect costs, totally 35% which, together with fiscal loss of revenue at 800 million dollars, totals an estimated 5.2 billion dollars. Fiscally, one estimate places the "leakage" of Palestinian revenue back to the Israeli treasury at 17% of total Palestinian public revenue, 3.6% of GNP. A 2015 estimate put annual Israeli government expenditure on settlements at $US1.1 bllion, though this is an inference given that the government does not report its expenditures on settlements. By 1982 subsidized Israeli agricultural productions and unhampered flow of Israeli manufactures hindered the growth of manufacturing industries in the Palestinian territories. High tariffs imposed by Israel on imports from countries outside the area of Israel meant Palestinian consumers had a choice of paying high prices for imported goods from foreign countries, or purchasing them from high-cost Israeli suppliers. Palestinian goods exporting to Israel were hit by tariffs, which down to 1991 earned Israel annually $1,000,000, but Israeli exports to the Palestinian territories were exempted from import duties. Since internal economic growth is hampered by Israeli restrictions, and, to compernsate, 40% of the Palestinian economy relies on international aid, it is argued that such aid constitutes a subsidy to the occupation itself, making it "one of the cheapest occupations", for Israel. The Paris Protocol undersigned in 1994 allowed Israel to collect VAT on all Palestinian imports and good from that country or in transit through its ports, with the system of clearance revenue giving it effective control over roughly 75% of PA income. Israel can withhold that revenue as a punitive measure, as it did in response to the decision by the PA to adhere to the International Criminal Court in 2015.

A 2009 World Bank study concluded that "Very few economies have faced such a comprehensive array of obstacles to investment -- not just of physical impediments to movement, but also comprehensive institutional and administrative barriers to economies of scale and natural resources, along with an unclear political horizon and the inability to predictably plan movement of people and goods".

Communications

Under the Oslo Accords, Israel agreed that the Palestinian territories had a right to construct and operate an independent communications network. In 2016 a World Bank analysis concluded the provisions of this agreement had not been applied, causing notable detrimental effects to Palestinian development. It took 8 years for Israel to agree to a request for frequencies for 3G services, though they were limited, causing a bottleneck which left Israeli competitors with a distinct market advantage. The local Wataniya mobile operator's competitiveness suffered from Israeli restrictions and delays, and illegal Israeli operators in the West Bank, with 4G services available by that date, still maintained an unfair advantage over Palestinian companies. Israel imposes three other constraints that hamper Palestinian competitiveness: restrictions are imposed on imports of equipment for telecom and ICT companies, and movement to improve the development and maintenance of infrastructure in Area C, and finally, Palestinian telecommunications accessing international links must go through companies with Israeli registration. From 2008 to 2016, they concluded, progress in negotiating resolutions to these problems had been "very slim".

Overall economic costs

A joint study by the Palestinian Ministry of National Economy and researchers at the Applied Research Institute–Jerusalem argued that by 2010 the costs of occupation amounted in 2010 alone rose to 84.9% of the total Palestinian GDP ($US 6.897 billion). Their estimate for 2014 states that the total economic cost of Israel's occupation amounted to 74.27% of Palestinian nominal GDP, or some $(US) 9.46 billion. The cost to Israel's economy by 2007 was estimated at $50 billion.

Indirect costs to Israel

The indirect cost to the Israeli economy for defense outlays and maintaining operations in the territories has also been substantial. One analysis has concluded that the costs of maintaining Israel's occupation is a contributing factor to the rise of poverty in Israel, where poverty levels have jumped from one in ten families in the 1970s, compared to one in five at present. The high costs of subsidizing the settlement project shifted investment from Israel's development towns on its periphery and led to cutbacks in sectors like health care, education and welfare. The settlement surge under Begin's Likud government was detrimental to housing development for Israelis in Israel: 44% of the entire budget of the Ministry of Housing and Construction in 1982 went to West Bank settlements. The substitution of imported foreign labour for Palestinians has also arguably lowered the bargaining power of Israeli blue-collar workers. In the aftermath of the Second Intifada, the budgetary allocations for Israel's social security net were reduced drastically: between 2001 and 2005 as defense outlays ratcheted up, child allowances were cut by 45%, unemployment compensation by 47%, and income maintenance by 25%. The annual growth, NIS 4.6 billion, in the defence budget for the decade 2007 onwards recommended by the Brodet Commission was close to Israel's total annual expenditure on higher education. Defense specialists also claim that guarding settlers lowers the combat readiness of soldiers, since they have far less time to train. It is also argued that the logic of settlements undermines Israel's rule of law.

Cultural impact

Many studies, following the work of Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon, have analyzed the emergence and consolidation of an "ethos of conflict", one of what they see as three key components of Israeli Jewish society – the others being collective memory of the conflict and collective emotional orientations – which have developed to cope with the stress of an intractable conflict. This complex can be broken down into eight societal values informing a unilateral outlook: (a) The justice of Israel's cause; (b) Security (including national survival) (c) Positive collective etrhnocentric in-group images; (d) One's Own Victimization; (e) Delegitimizing the adversary by denying their humanity, allowing one to harm them; (f) Patriotism; (g) Beliefs reinforcing social solidarity, by ignoring internal disagreements; (h) Belief that peace is the goal. Recent research suggests that four of these – the persistence of a sense of historic trauma and an ethos of conflict (delegitimization of the opponent, security, own victimization and justness of one's own goals) – consistently influence decision-making on the conflict in the Israeli Supreme Court itself. The same model has been applied to Palestinian society, emphasizing that of all themes patriotism in the form of mūqāwama (resistance and readiness for self-sacrifice) form the keynote of Palestinian identity.

Wider implications

A concern for security in Israel has been said to "vastly exceed the norm for other Western countries". Israel's military-industrial sector, which by the early 1980s employed a quarter of all industrial workers with 28% of GNP devoted to defense expenditures, became the fastest growing sector of the economy after 1967. Since the late 1970s, according to Jan Nederveen Pieterse writing in 1984, Israeli counterinsurgency expertise developed in repressing the uprisings in both the West Bank and Gaza, together with an aspiration to play the role as "top proxy" for the United States, led to the export in the 1980s of these techniques to places like Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Sri Lanka to put down peasant revolts against land expropriation. One settlement project in Costa Rica is thought to be based on Israeli expertise honed in West Bank projects.

The Israeli techniques of controlling Palestinians in their territories has, it is argued, had a major influence on U.S. military doctrine since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was claimed that new methods developed for the war on terror were necessary since the situation was unprecedented and therefore was a legal no man's land (terra nulla), and thus allowed approaches like extrajudicial and preemptive assassination, a terminology already used by Israel with regard to its approach to resistance in the West Bank and Gaza. The high-tech security and urban warfare systems and surveillance devices developed while securing the occupation particularly during the Al-Aqsa Intifada have turned Israel into one of the major exporters of such systems in the world. Israel has become a pioneering leader in the manufacture of drones, border surveillance sensors, with the commercial advantage of having these devices "battle-tested" in the "laboratories" of the occupied territory.

Hoover Institution Fellow and Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University Thomas H. Henriksen writes that:-

The Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) military actions have been – and are – a crucible for methods, procedures, tactics, and techniques for the United States, which faces a similarly fanatical foe across the world in the Global War on Terror... Israeli experiences offer an historical record and a laboratory for tactics and techniques in waging counter-insurgencies or counterterrorist operations in America's Post-9/11 circumstances.

Israeli critical judgements

A tradition of Jewish opposition to Zionism has, in the post-1967 period of the occupation of the West Bank, found a certain continuirty in Israel among scholars and critics who have gone on record as protesting the extension of an Israeli presence into the Palestinian territories. Many organizations – B'Tselem, Yesh Din, Ta'ayush, Rabbis for Human Rights, Gush Shalom, Machsom Watch and Breaking the Silence, for example-either document the practices and abuses of occupational policy or are active in assisting Palestinians secure their rights. The rabbi and philosopher Yeshayahu Leibowitz considered the occupation a threat to Judaism, and vigorously protested throughout his life what he considered its consequence, a "Nazification" of Israeli society. Uri Avnery believed that it led to a militarization that threatened Israeli democracy. Many, such as the activist Jeff Halpern and the philosopher Avishai Margalit express concerns at the paralysing effect on Palestinians of intricate surveillance systems, of a "matrix of control" underlying the occupation, whose sum effect, according to the Palestinian scholar Rashid Khalidi is tantamount to "collective psychologcal torture." For Baruch Kimmerling, the occupation constitutes politicide.

For Ronit Lentin and Yehuda Elkana the sense of victimhood arising from the trauma of the Holocaust has had the effect of creating a complex that influences Israeli attitudes to Palestinians, while incrementing a siege mentality that is defensively sensitive to inrernational criticism.

Notes

1. On 7 June 1967, Israel issued "Proclamation Regarding Law and Administration (The West Bank Area) (No. 2)—1967" which established the military government in the West Bank and granted the commander of the area full legislative, executive, and judicial power. The proclamation kept in force local law that existed on 7 June 1967, excepting where contradicted by any new proclamation or military order.
2. Jordan claimed it had a provisional sovereignty over the West Bank, a claim revoked in 1988 when it accepted the Palestinian National Council's declaration of statehood in that year. Israel did not accept this passage of a claim to sovereignty, nor asserted its counter claim, holding that the Palestinian claim of sovereignty is incompatible with the fact that Israel is, in law, a belligerent occupant of the territory. Secondly it regards the West Bank as a disputed territory on the technical argument that the Fourth Geneva Convention's stipulations do not apply since, in its view, the legal status of the territory is sui generis and not covered by international law, a position rejected by the ICJ.
3. Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the rest of the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip are "Protected Persons" under the First Geneva Convention: "Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threat thereof and against insults and public curiosity."
4. "The colonial credentials of the Palestinian people are well established" (in law)..."The Palestinian right of self-determination under international law seems to be unassailable".
5. "Belligerent Occupation is regarded by the General Assembly as restrictive of the right to development"
6. The Hebrew word for Jewish settlement across the Green Line is hitnakhalut and for "settlers", mitnakhalim implying an inheritance (nakhal), whereas the contemporary Palestinian Arabic term for them, mustawtinin, etymologically suggests those who have taken root, or indigenized natives, a term that historically has not borne negative connotations. "There was nothing derogatory or prejudicial in the use of the term al-mustawtinin, nor did it apply to Jews alone. It could refer equally to any Muslim who had recently taken up residence in Jerusalem but who had been born elsewhere within the Empire". Down to 1948 Palestinians called Zionist settlements (but not traditional Jewish communities such as those in Hebron, Tiberias and Jerusalem whose residents were often called Yahud awlad Arab, "Arab Jews/Jews who are the sons of Arabs") kubaniya (companies) or musta'amara / mustawtana only in the written language, and settlers khawaja (master, foreigner), musta'amara (colony, implying invasion and musta'amarin (colonizers) entered colloquial usage after 1948. From 1967 to 1993 al-mustawtin ("one who has turned the land into his homeland") and al mustawtana came to the fore to denote respectively settlers and settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.
7. "The Israel-Palestine issue has a strong claim to be the most closely studied conflict on earth. 'Voluminous' does not even begin to capture the sheer quantity of the material about it."
8. "the climate of intimidation and censorship surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both inside (at all levels of the education hierarchy) and outside the U.S. academy, is real and longstanding".
9. "Decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court have held that the Israeli occupation of the territories has endured far longer than any occupation contemplated by the drafters of the rules of international law".
10. "With different degrees of interpretation, a number of scholars have regarded Israel as part of a colonial project. The views of the scholars range from tackling the roots of the problem starting from before the 1900s, whilst others talk about the 1967 lands within a colonial framework".
11. "As for terminology, it seems to me that the term colonial process is very suitable, considering the obvious parallel with phenomena everyone agrees to designate in this way."
12. "Israeli historians often hesitate to compare early Zionism with colonialism, but are more willing to apply the comparison to the period of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Israeli historians who invoked the difference between the colonial project and the Zionist project in the territories arguing that the latter has been totally focused on the dispossession of the natives, theorize that the Israeli project in the territories has been a nationalist project that nonetheless applies colonialist methods to achieve its goal".
13. "The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is as prototypical case of a conflict which meets the criteria describing an intractable conflict: it is prolonged, irreconcilable, violent and perceived as having zero-game nature and total".
14. "At least five categories of major violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law characterize the occupation: unlawful killings; forced displacement; abusive detention; the closure of the Gaza Strip and other unjustified restrictions on movement; and the development of settlements, along with the accompanying discriminatory policies that disadvantage Palestinians".
15. "more than 90 percent of network TV reporting on the occupied territories has failed to report that the territories are occupied."
16. "One of the most important aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the manipulation of terminology to create a linguistic map that conditions people's perceptions of the facts on the ground,"
17. 'To use the language of democracy to defend Israeli policy in the West Bank is linguistic fraud. Such fraud is necessary because to honestly defend the denial of democratic rights, for 46 years, to millions of people because they happen to be Palestinians and not Jews, would require language too coarse for the Upper West Side. It's an old story. "Things like the continuance of British rule in India," Orwell wrote almost seventy years ago, "can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of the political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness."
18. The Palestinian view is that Israel's insistence on negotiating a solution to its security concerns, extending to its settlements, is always formulated at the expense of Palestinian rights.
19. "No name has yet been determined for this series of incidents. Options range from 'the silent intifada', the 'individual intifada', the 'children's intifada', the 'knives intifada', the 'Jerusalem intifada', and the 'third intifada'."
20. "While identifying the agents as lone wolves, Chorev argues that Palestinian social media were responsible for creating the climate from which they emerged."
21. "A long-time focus on pinpoint warfare against the PLO and its leaders had concealed the swelling rage of the Palestinian people from Israel's intelligence community and its politicians. The Israelis' tactical achievements and ability to locate and eliminate PLO leaders and militants nearly anywhere in the world had given them the sense that Israel could forever impose its rule over the millions of Palestinians in the occupied territories without consequence."
22. When the film The Battle of Algiers was played in Israel, one reviewer remarked:"Any viewer who has served in the army in the West Bank will recognize the barb-wire barricades, the sullen Arab faces, the body searches, the frantic chases after shadowy suspects in narrow bazaar alleys and the officers telling reporters that with just a little more time and force the unrest will be quelled". Ariel Sharon told Jacques Chirac, "Mr President. You must understand that for us here it is like Algeria. We have no other place to go and, besides, we have no intention of leaving."
23. 'Settlement conjures the idea of a virgin, unpopulated territory: an image of building log cabins in the wilderness... "Settlement" also has a useful secondary sense "agreement", but Israeli settlements were deemed illegal by the UN Security Council and the International Court of justice...In 2002 attempts were made in the Israeli and US media to delete the shop-soiled euphemism "settlements" from the lexicon entirely and replace it with the even more euphemistic "neighbourhoods", where you indeed might expect to see white picket fences',
24. "Palestinians have called suicide bombers 'martyrs', or 'F-11s', a nickname that plays off the Palestinians' view that they don't have high-tech firepower like Israel's F-16 warplanes. 'We have F-11s', they say, wiggling their index and middle fingers simultaneously to approximate the legs of a suicide bomber walking toward a target."
25. "wherein the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has forced Palestinians in the West Bank to enter houses that were thought to be booby-trapped or to approach houses where wanted men were thought to be hiding, in advance of the soldiers who sought to arrest them."
26. The statement is contextualized within a general tradition, visible in the writings of many journalists and scholars, of orientalist put-downs of Arabs by Krishna, who quotes the full text."They (Palestinians) are products of a culture.. in which to tell a lie creates no dissonance. They don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category"
27. "The Arab countries are often dictatorships which exist thanks to lack of transparency. Everything is based on appearances. Both parties, but in particular the Arabs, lie the whole day. You have to check their statements there on the spot."
28. Müller found the assumption attributed to Israeli media reportage that "the whole world is against Israel" was born out by a comprehensive methodological examination of Israeli sources: "The reality mediated in Israeli newspapers indeed portrays an image of the world that is in large parts critical or even hostile towards the state of Israel, its actions and policies. Regardless of whether these portrayals correspond with a truth, media representations contribute to the perpetuation of such popular beliefs and sentiments, and in doing so may affect the conflict realities themselves".
29. Quoted by Yonatan Mendel who clarifies: 'This is not to say that Israeli journalism is not professional. Corruption, social decay and dishonesty are pursued with commendable determination by newspapers, TV and radio... When it comes to "security" there is no such freedom. It's "us" and "them", the IDF and the "enemy"; military discourse, which is the only discourse allowed, trumps any other possible narrative. It's not that Israeli journalists are following orders, or a written code: just that they'd rather think well of their security forces'. Ariel Sharon predicted that: "What will largely dictate public opinion in Israel is the attitude of the IDF".
30. "channelling public discourse in a pro-Israeli direction is crucially important, because an open and candid discussion of Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories, Israeli history, and the lobby's role in shaping America's Middle East policy might easily lead more Americans to question existing policy".
31. "The present study critically assesses reportage of these four themes to demonstrate not only that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appears – through the mainstream media lens – to consist of an unending cycle of failed diplomacy, brutal violence, impervious rhetoric, and dashed hopes for peace but also that many aspects of its organic reality are all but obscured in this refraction. Although the reportage offers no shortage of details and images, its lack of context, coherence, and, ultimately clarity severely limits the range of American public discourse on the conflict and ultimately stifles public opinion that could effect constructive change."
32. According to Mansour, the population stood at 803,600,
33. A sixth category existed, known as mahlul, land that reverted to the state if left uncultivated for 3 years or left vacant and up for re-grant.
34. (a) Waqf was property gifted to a pious end; (b) mülk was land given by the Ottoman conqueror to Muslims, or Khuraj lands given to Christians and taxed, in exchange for Muslim protection; (c) miri were neither (a) nor (b) but lands given out for conditional public use, while ultimate ownership lay with the Emir; (d) matruke were shared public/communal lands like roads,cemeteries and pastures; (e) mawat, lit. "dead" (uncultivated/uninhabited) land lying over 1.5 miles from any town or village.
35. "If I were an Arab leader I would never made terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country. Sure, God promised it to us, but what does that matter to them? Our God is not theirs. We come from Israel, it's true, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing, we have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?"
36. "A partial Jewish state is not the end, but only the beginning. The establishment of such a Jewish State will serve as a means in our historical efforts to redeem the country in its entirety...We will expel the Arabs and take their places.. with the force at our disposal." (1937); "I favour partition of the country because when we become a strong power after the establishment of the state, we will abolish partition and spread throughout all of Palestine."(1938)
37. "Events leading up to the Six-Day War show that the order established in 1957 had broken down long before Nasser decided to remilitarize the Sinai Peninsula. The greater the military advantage in relation to the Arab armies grew and the closer Israel came to developing a nuclear weapon, the larger and more extensive the IDF 'punitive operations' became. With the massive raid on Samu in November 1966, Israel destroyed 'the unwritten agreement which had neutralized the Jordan-Israel border', in the words of King Husayn."
38. "Dayan ordered his troops to dig in on the slopes east of Jerusalem. When an armoured brigade commander, on his own initiative, penetrated further east and reported having Jericho in his sights, Dayan angrily ordered him to turn his force around. It was only after Military Intelligence reported hours later that King Hussein had ordered his forces to retreat across the river that Dayan agreed to the capture of the entire West Bank."
39. Meron as a youth had survived 4 years in the Nazi concentration camp at Częstochowa and Gorenberg comments "The boy who received his first education in war crimes as a victim was on his way to becoming one of the world's most prominent experts on the limits that nations put on the conduct of war."
40. "The Israeli Foreign Ministry has also contributed a rationale for rejecting Israel's de jure obligation to uphold the Fourth Convention, arguing that the Convention only prohibits civilian transfers compelled by the government, not voluntary transfers undertaken by the civilians themselves. Recall the language of Article 49: 'The Occupying Power shall not transfer its own civilians into the territory it occupies' (emphasis added). On the Foreign Minister's reading, even if the Geneva Convention applies, voluntary transfers do not violate it, because the Occupying Power is not doing the transfer."
41. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, Palestine International Documents on Human Rights 1948-1972., UN General Assembly, 26 October 1970, UN Doc. A/8089, p. 19.
42. "two contemporaneous negotiations began to take place. On the one side, in 1992-1993, the Israeli government talked to the 'winner' of the confrontation, that is to say the Palestinians from the OPT, through bilateral meetings held in the US. On the other side, in 1993, Israel decided to negotiate with the PLO, without the Palestinians from the OPT even being informed. Finally, it was far away from the OPT and was at risk of losing its control of the Palestinian population living under the Israeli occupation. Obviously, the PLO was a weaker and softer negotiator compared with the Palestinians from the OPT. With the Oslo Agreements, the PLO relinquished at least two fundamental demands: the Israeli recognition of the existence of a Palestinian state and the interruption of construction of new Israeli settlements in the OPT. In exchange for these renunciations the PLO leadership was allowed to go back to the OPT and establish the Palestinian Authority (PA), and it was given a relevant economic and political power that it would never have been able to achieve otherwise."
43. "the PA is not a government; it is a government's subcontractor."
44. 'the "Authority" exists essentially to serve Israel's occupation and to help maintain it'.
45. "Why did this negotiation not lead to a sustainable peace? According to the model we have analysed in the first part of the article, confrontation should have allowed the weaker party in a conflict (i.e., the Palestinians) to strengthen itself so as to force the stronger party (i.e., the Israelis) to begin negotiating. However, the negotiation phase represented an interruption in this process of growing power balance. The Israelis succeeded in transforming the negotiations — later the Oslo Agreements — into a never-ending process of bargaining, while the Palestinians failed to create the embryo of a functioning and democratic state. The power balance started to drop off again (last downward arrow), and this led to a new confrontation in September 2000."
46. "Israel's top defense experts agree that while the settlements may have helped national security in the past, this is no longer the case. Having Israeli civilians living throughout the West Bank does not help defend the country; instead, it encumbers the security forces, is a drain on the national defense budget, and complicates the military's work by lengthening the lines of defense. Instead of concentrating on fighting terrorism against Israel, security forces have to divert considerable resources to protecting citizens who have chosen to live in the heart of Palestinian territory."
47. "On the Palestinian side there seems to be an apparent lack of interest in law, legal confusion and very serious lacunae in the laws passed after the agreements with Israel were concluded".
48. In Ariel Handel's analysis, the 124 "legal" settlements, though forming only 2% of the West Bank's land surface have municipal jurisdictions which extend over 42% of the territory, and form one single gated community within which the Palestinian towns and villages become "islands". For example, the Hebron Governorate has a Palestinian population of 684,247 (2013) but 7.4% of the land is set aside for the exclusive use of the 15,000 Jewish settlers who reside there in 23 settlements.
49. "In fact, Dayan had submitted his own secret plan Predictably, it was the photo negative of Allon's. The mountain ridge – not the lowlands along the Jordan – was the strategic land Israel needed, Dayan asserted."
50. Ilan Pappe holds a dissenting view, claiming that a Shacham Plan existed for the occupation and administration of the West Bank before 1967,
51. "Sasson implicated the full range of authorities –military and civilian- in breaking the law and pointed to the Civil Administration of the OPT as the hub of illegality."
52. Speaking of one family among the tens of thousands of Bedouins expelled from the Negev by Israel in 1948, Ben Ehrenreich writes: "Eid's grandfather...brought his family and his flocks to the rocky hilltop called Umm al-Kheir, which translates roughly as 'Mother of Goodness'. He purchased the land for the price of one hundred camels from farmers who lived in Yatta, the nearest city of any size. But when the Israelis occupied the West Bank in 1967, they began to selectively apply certain Jordanian laws based in the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, which ruled that any acreage left uncultivated for three consecutive years – hilltops were rarely farmed – would revert to the state, which could transfer the land to private owners, meaning settlers. In this way, Israel had confiscated nearly 40 percent of the West Bank's landmass by the early 1990s."
53. "The very nature of settler states, their establishment, consolidation and driving ideology, requires a realpolitik approach to the indigenous population(s) because the state itself can be established only at their expense and the expense of their descendants. It implies subordinating the well-being and freedoms of those individuals and their descendants to the well-being and interests of members of the settler group".
54. "It is important to emphasize that settler colonial objectives have informed Zionist actions pre-1948, post-1948, and post-1967. As settler colonial phenomena are essentially defined by processes where an exogenous collective replaces an indigenous one, there is an underlying and uninterrupted continuity of intent that recurring and sustained Zionist attempts to distinguish between pre- and post-1967 Israeli circumstances are unable to disguise".
55. "To export a European problem, a more or less shared anti-Semitism from East to West with an admitted peak in the Center of Europe and drop it, not at the doorstep, but well inside the house of the Arabs, can only be understood against a background of century-long traditions of Western colonialism".
56. "The state of Israel's ideology is explicitly an exclusionary ethnoculturally based nationalism. Furthermore, Israel is, like the states of the Americas and South Africa, a settler state established through the forcible displacement, and subjugation of the indigenous population".
57. 'The centrality of the "settlement enterprise" within the occupation is partially obscured by the use of the multivalent and anodyne term settlement, a word than among other meanings denotes the ending of a dispute or the calming of a contestation. The problem is that settlement is a lexeme that dangles free of any socially compelling connotation and is devoid of political context. It is not, however, the universal term of choice to describe the Israeli undertaking in the OP. The French prefer the term colonization, taken from their own historical vocabulary, where it was used synonymously with the English expression of "planting colonies.".. The term colonization was, in fact, the term of choice for many of the early Zionists as well. In the 1880s, the settlers of the first Aliya (wave of Zionist immigration to Palestine between 1882 and 1903) named their form of settlement moshavs, the Hebrew equivalent of colony. Arthur Ruppin, head of the World Zionist Organization's Jaffa office, titled his 1926 book The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine, and Ze'ev Jabotinsky not only used the term in his famed 1923 article (On)The Iron Wall but sought to dispel any confusion about its meaning and significance as follows:"Colonization carries its own explanation, the only possible explanation, unalterable and clear as daylight to every Jew and every Arab with his wits about him." Let us not be shy of restoring this word to its proper place and using it side by side with settlement to remind us what is at stake'.
58. Derek Penslar has argued that, "Israel, unlike the Jewish global conspiracy of the European antisemitic imagination, does exist. Precisely because Arab antisemitism's fantasies are far more thoroughly grounded in reality than those of their European predecessors, a necessary, although admittedly insufficient, precondition for deconstructing those fantasies will be a radical transformation of Israel's borders and policies towards Arabs both within and outside of the state".
59. Israeli advisers, from 1984 onwards, assisted the government of Sri Lanka in stamping out the Tamil Revolt, in a conflict where the Tamils were likened to Palestinians to be smoted hip and thigh like the Philistines, and the encroachment of Sinhalese settlements to fragment Tamil villages was likened to the function of Gush Etzion, in turning the Jaffna Peninsula into a kind of West Bank.
60. "The movement behind Israel's civilian settlement throughout the Occupied Territories has been driven by religious and ideological motivations from day one".
61. 42,650 dunams were set aside for colonial settlement in 1970-1971; 8,850 dunums in 1971-1972; 8,807 in 1973-1974; 10,722 in 1974-1975 and 1,653 in 1975-1976.
62. The main reason this was not acted on at the time was that Moshe Dayan made its preclusion a premise for his joining the new government as Defense Minister, and because inclusion would have immediately created a bi-national state, with a very large Arab internal population.
63. Yiftachel misprints 129,000 by the end of Likud's second term in 1984. Ian Lustick puts the figure at 44,000.
64. "Not so long ago, Yata was hardly more than a village; today it spills over the golden-brown hilltops for miles-many refugees from the caves and elsewhere have come to rest, for now, in the town. Yata is poor, dry, unfinished, littered with the inevitable flotsam and jetsam of modern Palestine-the wrecks of old cars, the dusty grocery shops, the graffiti left over from the last election, the sheep and goats and barefoot children, the disintegrating old stone houses dwarfed by ugly, recent buildings, the medieval ruins overgrown by scraggly grass and thorns."
65. "The goal of these acts of sabotage, known as 'Price Tag', is to send a message to the government that dismantling settlements and illegal outposts will be met with retaliation and rioting.. Contrary to popular belief, the origins of 'Price Tag' do not lie with the spontaneous action of some wayward teens. This is a carefully thought-out strategy set in motion by the very heart of the settler establishment – the Regional Councils in the West Bank, which initially also oversaw implementation".
66. "These terms are used in a neutral and value-free sense. In saying that someone is in the dominator position, we refer to the objective fact that he/she belongs to the stronger side in the relationship without necessarily attaching to this fact a value or an ethical judgment. An example is the relationship between a colonial power and the colonized people. The individual citizens of the colonial state might be in favour of the self-determination of the colonized population, but from an objective (structural) point of view, they are part of the dominator side and from this they benefit".
67. "Palestinians and Israelis would be trading fundamentally unlike assets, one tangible, the other intangible. Palestinians would give up moral claims, acquiescing in the denial of their right to return and bestowing legitimacy on their dispossessors by recognizing the vast majority of their homeland as a Jewish state. Israelis, by contrast, would be committing to a physical withdrawal from land under their full control. The crucial difference between these two types of assets is that, once the parties had accepted the parameters, only the intangible ones would disappear. The land, by contrast, would remain in Israel's possession until the parties reached a comprehensive settlement, an outcome that an agreed framework by no means guarantees".
68. "Applying many of the principles of IDF warfare to bargaining, soldiers in mufti are prone to treat diplomatic talks as analogous to wars of attrition and conducting them according to one of two models: either as a game of waiting out the opponent, or as a lightening offensive aimed at breaking the back of resistance. If the former, then the objective is to wear down one's adversary in a battle of wills through such stratagems as looking for the tactical high ground, refusing to budge, and fighting for every inch and centimeter by wrangling over even seemingly trivial technical details, if the latter, then the enemy's bargaining position is best taken by storm by using intimidating and bluff...The basic inclination is to assume neither goodwill nor magnanimity on the part of the Arab opponents".
69. Tanks have been reported pulping teenagers who had been shot while attempting to attack settlers.
70. "20,000 Israeli soldiers, accompanied by tanks, Apache helicopters, and F-16 warplanes,.. attacked the most populous residential areas of the West Bank...Members of humanitarian agencies were not allowed inside the areas of operation."
71. Bulldozers were used in the Battle of Jenin and razed houses with family members in them.
72. Between 2000 and 2012, at least 18 Palestinians, among them 12 minors, were killed by such bullets.
73. This was a new Riot Control Agent (RCA) first reported in the West Bank in July 2002. It consists of small plastic projectiles fired from launchers, and causing an effect like an electric shock, and reportedly its effects induced severe skin injuries are far more serious than those caused by pepperball tactical powder munitions
74. Dum dum ammunition was subsequently banned by Israel's Judge Advocate General.
75. Benny Morris:"I saw the first intifada that erupted in the winter of 1987 as an effort of a people to throw off a 20-year military occupation. This effort, in the main, was not lethal, and the protesters did not use live-fire weapons."
76. "Their powerlessness is all the more pronounced given their occupation by a major military power. The juxtaposition of technologies is striking. Offensively and defensively, Palestinians wield stones, one of the earliest forms of weaponry known to humankind."
77. 'These "children of the stones".. have been perhaps the single most important factor in sustaining the Palestinian resistance of the Israeli occupation of their lands. With the Palestinian Authority or militants unable to counter the overwhelming military superiority of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), it is the child protestors who continue to engage and frustrate the occupiers'.
78. Casualties in Gaza – 1,150, with 200 pre-schoolers, slain; 6,840 hit by live ammunition; 3,960 with plastic bullets and 44,460 with rubber-coated bullets, while of the 75,600 beaten up, 12,700, 1,000 five years or younger, required medical treatment – were far higher.
79. "Can the targeting of children, the breaking of hands, arms, skulls, the indiscriminate detention without trial of 'suspects', torture, 're-education', the lockdown of entire cities, the deprivation of food, water, shelter and deportations, etc., be justified in response to stones? Statman thinks so, for after all - it was war, the 'enemy' was everyone, everywhere, and of course stones can be 'very harmful'."
80. The first attempted suicide bombing in the West Bank took place at the Israeli settlement of Mehola on 16 April 1993, killing only the bomber, though injuring 8 Israelis in nearby buses. The beginning of slashing with knives is sometimes dated to the immediate aftermath of the killing of 18 Palestinians on the Black Monday clashes of 8 October 1990, after they threw stones at Jews at prayer at the Western Wall. A lone wolf, Omar Abu Sirah, then ran amok killing three Israelis with his butcher's knife. This however was a one-off event for the period.
81. "During the second intifada, from October 2000 until October 2005, 30 suicide bombings and other attacks killed 195 people and injured many more in Jerusalem. Of these, 186 casualties resulted from attacks perpetrated by Jerusalem residents."
82. "First, force to deny self-determination is prohibited under international law. Second, and conversely, 'forcible resistance to forcible denial of self-determination—by imposing or maintaining colonial or alien domination—is legitimate according to the Declaration.' Third, movements to achieve self-determination, although not qualifying as states, have standing in international law, including the right to receive support from outside actors. Finally, third-party governments can treat such movements as legitimate without encroaching on the rights of the state exercising control over the territory and its inhabitants."
83. "Sumūd is watching your home turn into a prison. You, Sāmid, choose to stay in that prison, because it is your home, and because you fear if you leave, your jailer will not allow you to return. Living like this you must constantly resist the twin temptations of either acquiescing in the jailer's plan in numb despair, or becoming crazed by consuming hatred for your jailer and yourself, the prisoner." Radi Shehadeh.
84. In talks that week with Jacques Chirac, Ehud Barak was told: "This morning, sixty-four Palestinians are dead, nine Israeli-Arabs were also killed, and you're pressing on. You cannot, Mr Prime Minister, explain this ratio in the number of wounded. You cannot make anyone believe that the Palestinians are the aggressors.... If you continue to fire from helicopters on people throwing rocks, and you continue to refuse an international inquiry, you are turning down a gesture from Arafat".
85. "house searches without warrants, night raids, preventive detention, collective punishment, caning and flogging, deportation, the confiscation or destruction of the homes of actual or presumed rebels, and in some cases even the torture of suspects and prisoners, and responding to demonstrations 'massive force..causing numerous casualties'. With the sole exception of caning, all of these tactics had, by the end of the Second Intifada, become standard practice in Israel's management of the occupied territories".
86. "The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 have their origins in the State of Emergency Laws of 1936 and the Defense Laws of 1939 which were introduced by the Mandatory Authority in Palestine (British) to deal with the rising Arab opposition to both the continuation of the British Mandate and Jewish immigration to Palestine between 1936-1945."
87. A representative from Israel's Ministry for the Interior explained that this West Banker lived in Israel and as an alien, must be deported: "Only the State of Israel is responsible for people residing in it and it has decided unequivocally, based on the deportation order against him, that he must return to Brazil".
88. "The Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) reported 174 documented attacks on their ambulances by Israeli soldiers and settlers between September 29, 2000, and March 15, 2002, resulting in the damage of 78 ambulances. There have also been 166 attacks on their emergency medical technicians (EMT), resulting in three deaths and 134 injuries among PRCS EMTs. Additionally, the PRCS headquarters in Al-Bireh was hit on several occasions by heavy machine gun fire from Israeli soldiers located at the nearby illegal Israeli settlement, Psagot".
89. Article 53: "Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."
90. "The instability caused by the revolt was augmented by increasingly brutal measures taken during the British counterinsurgency campaign: emergency regulations, military courts, collective punishment, the demolition of houses (and indeed entire neighbourhoods), looting, revenge killings, and the like."
91. When the Beit Hadassah settlement was established without Israeli government authority, a barbed wire fence to protect settlers was erected in front of the shops and all Palestinian shoppers had to be frisked before entering them.
92. "An old man, Salim Id Al-Hathalin, grabs hold of me. He is waving papers - one a receipt from the tax authorities, confirming that he has paid taxes on the land he owns here in the village; the other a demolition order issued by the Civil Administration against his makeshift tent-cum-hut, which he points out to me as he cries: 'Why do they want to destroy my house? Where can I go? Can I go to America? I have nothing and they want to take that nothing from me. Can you help me? Where am I supposed to go?'"
93. "To give an example of the arbitrary nature of the exercise, a university teacher who wanted to attend a conference in the U.S. in May 1989 succeeded, at considerable financial cost, in obtaining all the necessary stamps and then appeared before the permit official of the Civil Administration. The latter summarily tore up the application form with all the hard won stamps once he found out that the applicant was a lecturer at the local university."
94. "Every week thousands of soldiers, flesh of our flesh, create these statistics, which our amnesia devours."
95. "subsequent regulations issued by the then-Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein said interrogators who nevertheless used torture would not stand trial if they could demonstrate that it was 'immediately necessary to save his own or another person's life, freedom, person or property from a concrete danger of serious harm', and that 'there was no other way to do so.' The regulations stipulated, however, that only very senior officials could permit the use of these methods, and that any interrogator who used them must keep a detailed record of the number of blows, the painful positions and all other so-called special means used. In addition, the attorney general must be informed after every use of such methods."
96. She was dismissed from her position shortly afterwards, despite recognition of the excellence of her work as an analyst, on the ostensible grounds she did not get on well with her colleagues.
97. Speaking of completing course work for becoming an intelligence officer, one former member of Unit 8100 said it ended with a full dress performance of pretending to be Palestinians, with the students shouting: "Enough with Palestine, we want to relocate to Australia!"Template:Spf
98. One case, where a Palestinian woman was forced to undergo two successive vaginal and anal probes during a single night raid conducted by the IDF under Shin Bet instructions, may prove an exception. Her protest was ignored, she spent two years in prison for minor offenses, and was then re-imprisoned for "nationalist" activities, and finally fled abroad due to trauma and shame. Only the persistence of an Israeli woman attorney Jana Mudzgurishvilly, in the Mivtan unit that closed all the other 1,000 cases, brought her complaint to the attention of the Justice Department, which has yet to decide what steps to take.
99. The description is that of the Supreme Court judge Moshe Bejski, who had survived the Holocaust as one of those on Oskar Schindler's list.
100. "Though both Palestinian and Israeli children are victims of the conflict, Israeli Jewish children are seen as proper innocent victims of terrorism in contrast to Palestinian children who are often perceived as dangerous props of irresponsible parents, a conniving Palestinian Authority and desperate militant groups."
101. Zeev Schiff, an Israeli military correspondent at the time, wrote: "The extent of the injuries caused by the new policy was harrowing. Considering that whole corps of soldiers were engaged in battering away at defenseless citizens, it is hardly surprising that thousands of Palestinians – many of them innocent of any wrong-doing – were badly injured, some to the point of being handicapped. There were countless instances in which young Arabs were dragged behind walls or deserted buildings and systematically beaten all but senseless. The clubs descended on limbs, joints, and ribs until they could be heard to crack- especially as Rabin let slip a 'break their bones' remark in a television interview which many soldiers took as a recommendation, if not exactly an order".
102. For the first 3 years, from December 1987 to December 1990, the figure is 106,660.
103. "During the late 1970s and 1980s Israel also continued relentlessly to expand its land control over the territories.. This expansion was backed by a tight check over the development of Palestinian villages and towns, where hundreds of houses on private lands were demolished every year on the grounds that they were illegal or, more recently, a threat to the security of Jewish settlers. Other forms of Palestinian commercial and public development were stifled by the restrictive policies of military government, in effect ghettoizing the locals in their towns and villages and making them dependent on distant Jewish employment."
104. 'By carefully exploring the South African apartheid edifice, particularly the Bantustans, and comparing it with the structural developments set in place in the Palestinian territory since the Oslo process, it shows how the West Bank and Gaza Strip have moved towards a process of "Bantustanization" rather than of sovereign independence.
105. "South Africa's homeland policy exhibits a similar architecture of domination combined with racial arithmetic as applied by Israel: Transkei, for example, is characterized by 'physical fragmentation of territory, combined with ethnic dispersal'."
106. "legal asymmetry which probably most characterizes this conflict. From 1948 onwards, Israel has been a state with its own territory, internationally recognized borders, a clear political agenda, a defined foreign policy, and a powerful and well-organized army. In contrast, the Palestinians had to fight to move from the status of 'non-existence' – if not as 'refugees' — to recognition as a nation, with their own right to a national state. Also, during the years of the British Mandate (1922-1948), despite the fact that both Jews and Arabs were living in Palestine under British power, legal asymmetry was evident. Jews were recognized as a nation whose rights were guaranteed by the text of the Mandate, while the Palestinians were not. This asymmetry had not existed at the beginning of the conflict (1880-1920) when some Eastern European Jews started to immigrate to Palestinian territory, at the time under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire."
107. "This imposed network of roads could be characterized by lack of consideration for the existing historical road network in the region; by inappropriateness of topography; by construction in marginal areas for a small population; by land confiscation of Arab villages; by lack of a logical hierarchy of roads with defined traffic functions; and above all by the development of a new road system as a means of territorial dominance of the region."
108. " With Palestinian traffic banned from all the main and secondary roads, clusters of yellow group taxis gather at each such barrier, and groups of people trying to get to work, school, clinics, universities, relatives houses, or markets clamber up and down sand embankments or across ditches to circumvent concrete slabs and soldiers, who sometimes shoot at them."
109. "The term 'targeted killing' denotes the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons not in the physical custody of those targeting them".
110. In his study of the IDF fr:Samy Cohen claims that: "In over 60 years of counterterrorism, warfare, little seems to have changed in the Israeli army mindset since the foundation of the state of Israel. In response to a terrorist threat or an insurgency, be it armed or unarmed, the IDF employs the same sort of response - disproportionate response - striking both combatants and noncombatants at once when it is impossible to strike one without hitting the other, with a certain degree of intentional excess, while trying to refrain from spilling over into mass crime..Disproportionate response is.. an essential component of Israeli strategic culture".
111. Israeli intelligence had turned a neighbor, Mohamamad Deifallah, while he was detained in Ramallah prison, into providing them evidence on local movements, for $250 a week, and one such tip gave them the details and coordinates for this assassination.
112. "All Palestinians are exposed to non-stop monitoring without any legal protection. Junior soldiers can decide when someone is a target for the collection of information. There is no procedure in place to determine whether the violation of the individual's rights is necessarily justifiable. The notion of rights for Palestinians does not exist at all. Not even as an idea to be disregarded."Template:Spf
113. "If you're homosexual and know someone who knows a wanted person – and we need to know about it – Israel will make your life miserable. If you need emergency medical treatment in Israel, the West Bank or abroad – we searched for you. The state of Israel will allow you to die before we let you leave for treatment without giving information on your wanted cousin".Template:Spf
114. In 1991, the United National Leadership (UNL) issued a directive in a bayan (leaflet) that forbade writing graffiti on private property. Israel was collecting too much revenue from fining owners of walls with graffiti.
115. "This paper has demonstrated that the West Bank wage earner pays significantly more taxes as a percentage of income than a similarly stationed Israeli wage earner."
116. Only the top five deciles of Israel's population pay income tax, which means that Israeli Palestinians, like the ultra-orthodox Jews, being in a lower income bracket, with tax credits kicking in, have a far lower tax liability.
117. 'the Qur’an regards the olive tree as one of two trees blessed by Allah (the other is the fig)
118. 1967. The legal norm that has had the most effect on the shaping of tree struggles in the West Bank is Article 78 of the Ottoman Land Code (1274 to the Hijra, the Muslim calendar). Put simply, Article 78 grants a long- time cultivator the right of adverse possession... Article 78 of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code states that "every one who has possessed and cultivated Miri land for ten years without dispute acquires a right by prescription , and he shall be given a new title deed gratuitously"
119. "Like children, their trees look so naïve, as they cannot harm anyone- But like (their) children, several years later they turn into a ticking bomb."
120. In rabbinical tradition, felling olive trees is forbidden. The Beit El settlement's rabbi Zalman Melamed permits of only one exception, i.e. when they are known to serve as terrorist hideouts.
121. Following scandals suggesting many of these removed trees were being sold underhand in Israel, with a 600-year-old olive tree earning a market price of $8,000, the IDF undertook to offer to replant them if the Palestinian owner could find other land for them.
122. "Keeping Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the other cities of the Israeli coastal plain from running dry depends on blocking Arab water development in the West Bank that could stop the aquifers flow westward: hence the ban on Arab wells".
123. Military Order 158.44 Article 4(A) states that "it shall not be permissible for any person to set up or to assemble or to possess or to operate a water installation unless he has obtained a license from the area commander."
124. "The one center of archaeological activity that might have provided a base for Palestinian archaeologists was the Palestine Archaeological Museum in Jerusalem, which was under the control not of Jordan but of trustees made up of the directors of the several foreign schools of archaeology in the city. It is therefore not clear why persons like Dimitri Baramki did not continue their work as archaeologists employed by the Palestine Museum. In any event, Jordan nationalized the museum only months before the June 1967 war, enabling the Israelis to claim it as theirs by right of conquest,"
125. "Fourth, the disappearance of the Palestinian patrimony (material evidence) through the deliberate confiscation of Arab cultural resources by Israelis (such as the large library of Dr. Tawfiq Canaan in 1948, the Palestine Archaeological Museum and its library in Jerusalem in 1967, and the library of the Palestine Research Center in Beirut in 1982), as well as the destruction of cultural property in the form of entire villages in 1948-49. This last is particularly crucial, since the Palestinians' link to their past is largely through the villages, few towns, and fewer cities that predominated in their land during the last thirteen centuries."
126. The British Advertising Standards Committee demanded in 2008 that the Israeli Ministry of Tourism take down advertisements suggesting that Qumran was in Israel.
127. Israeli settlers forced to evacuate their settlements have also called their prior state as one of a "lost paradise".
128. 'The ban came to light after the testimony of two Israeli army reservists who said that at the beginning of their tour of duty in May they were told that the purpose of the checkpoint was to "prevent Palestinians coming from the Jordan Valley to the Dead Sea beaches".. One of the reservists, Doron Karbel, testified that as a "side note", the Jordan Valley Brigade Commander, Colonel Yigal Slovik, had said the reason for the checkpoint was that "when Jews and Palestinian vacationers were sitting on the beaches side by side it hurt the business of the surrounding yishuvim (Jewish communities)."
129. "These economic costs are partially paid by the international community's funds which are creating one of the cheapest occupations and relieve Israel from its duties and responsibilities as an Occupying Power".
130. Dr Ruby Nathanzon of the Macro Center for Political Economy: "Imagine how much less poverty there could have been in Israel.. There's a terrible distortion, an enormous economic cost in addition to the huge military burden".
131. "the settlements systematically undermine Israel's rule of law. The project of settling the West Bank was based on flaunting Israeli law from the outset (the Passover feast held to stake a claim in Hebron, the settling of Sebastia, and later the proliferation of outposts that are illegal even under Israeli law). Forging documents, deceiving authorities, flagrantly breaching the law – all these are what made the massive land grab possible, along with the covert mechanisms for channelling taxpayer funds into the settlements far from the public eye".
132. "In 1981, Ya'akov Meridor told a gathering of Israeli businessmen: 'Israel coveted the job of top Washington proxy in Central America'."

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• Ben-Naftali, Orna; Sfard, Michael; Viterbo, Hedi (2018). The ABC of the OPT: A Legal Lexicon of the Israeli Control over the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-15652-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ben-Simhon, Coby (20 September 2012). "Revealed: Israeli Taxpayers Helped Bankroll Illegal West Bank Outposts for Decades". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• Benvenisti, Eyal; Zamir, Eyal (April 1995). "Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement". The American Journal of International Law. 89 (2): 295–340. JSTOR 2204205. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Benvenisti, Eyal (2012). The International Law of Occupation. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-199-58889-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• Berger, Yotam (22 October 2018). "Revealed: Israeli Taxpayers Helped Bankroll Illegal West Bank Outposts for Decades". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector (PDF). UNCTAD. September 2015a.
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• Bhavnani, Ravi; Miodownik, Dan; Choi, Hyun Jin (2011b). "Violence and Control in Civil Conflict: Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza". Comparative Politics. 44 (1): 61–80. JSTOR 23040658. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• Bishara, Ghassan (Summer 1979). "The Human Rights Case against Israel: The Policy of Torture". Journal of Palestine Studies. 8 (4): 3–30. JSTOR 2536365. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Bisharat, George Emile (2012). Palestinian Lawyers and Israeli Rule: Law and Disorder in the West Bank. University of Texas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-73984-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• Bowker, Robert P. (2003). Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1-588-26202-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Braverman, Irus (Spring 2007). "Powers of Illegality: House Demolitions and Resistance in East Jerusalem". Law & Social Inquiry. 32 (2): 333–372. JSTOR 20108706. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Braverman, Irus (September 2008). ""The Tree Is the Enemy Soldier": A Sociolegal Making of War Landscapes in the Occupied West Bank". Law & Society Review. 42 (3): 449–482. JSTOR 29734134. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Braverman, Irus (November 2009). "Uprooting Identities: The Regulation of Olive Trees in the Occupied West Bank". Political and Legal Anthropology Review. 32 (2): 237–264. JSTOR 24497464. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Bregman, Ahron (2014). Cursed Victory: A History of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Penguin UK. ISBN 978-1-846-14735-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Breiner, Josh; Berger, Yotam (2 November 2018). "Shin Bet Officers Suspected of Ordering Unwarranted Search of Palestinian Woman's Private Parts". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Brown, John (24 April 2017). "Arrest of Palestinians for Potential Terror Attacks Brings New Meaning to 'Minority Report'". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Byman, Daniel (March–April 2006). "Do Targeted Killings Work?". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 85, no. 2. pp. 95–111. JSTOR 20031914. {{cite magazine}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Byman, Daniel (2011). A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-199-83045-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Byman, Daniel; Sachs, Natan (September–October 2012). "The Rise of Settler Terrorism: The West Bank's Other Violent Extremists". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 91, no. 5. pp. 73–86. JSTOR 41720862. {{cite magazine}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Cantarow, Ellen (Summer–Autumn 1982). "The War for the West Bank". Journal of Palestine Studies. 11–12 (4): 263–268. JSTOR 2538371. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• Cheshin, Amir; Hutman, Bill; Melamed, Avi (2009). Separate and Unequal. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-02952-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Children in Israeli Military Detention: Observations and Recommendations (PDF). UNICEF. February 2013.
• Chomsky, Noam; Achcar, Gilbert; Shalom, Stephan R. (2015). Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and Justice. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-25430-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Chorev, Harel (17 July 2017). "Palestinian Social Media and Lone-Wolf Attacks: Subculture, Legitimization, and Epidemic". Terrorism and Political Violence. 29: 1–23. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Cohen, Amnon (1984). Jewish life under Islam: Jerusalem in the sixteenth century. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978 -0-674-47436-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Cohen, Esther Rosalind (1985). Human Rights in the Israeli-occupied Territories, 1967-1982. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-719-01726-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Cohen, Hillel (2010a). "The Matrix of surveillance in times of national conflict: the Israeli-Palestinian case". In Zureik, Elia; Lyon, David; Abu-Laban, Yasmeen (eds.). Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power. Routledge. pp. 99–111. ISBN 978-1-136-93097-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Cohen, Samy (2010b). Israel's Asymmetric Wars. Springer. ISBN 978-0-230-11297-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Conroy, John (2001). Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-23039-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Cook, Jonathan (2013a). Palestine: Israel's Experiments in Human Despair. Zed Books. ISBN 978-1-848-13649-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• Cordesman, Anthony H. (2006). Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-99186-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Crowley, Michael; McLeish, Catriona; Revill, James (2018). "The Role of Civil Society in Combating the Development, Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons". In Shang, Lijun; Dando, Malcolm; Crowley, Michael (eds.). Preventing Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Disarmament as the Sciences Converge. Royal Society of Chemistry. pp. 580–619. ISBN 978-1-782-62649-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Cusack, Carole M. (2016). Sacred Suicide. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-06018-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Daulatzai, Sohail (2016). Fifty Years of "The Battle of Algiers": Past as Prologue. University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-1-452-95445-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• De Waart, P. J. I. M (1994). Dynamics of Self-determination in Palestine: Protection of Peoples as a Human Rights. Brill. ISBN 978-9-004-09825-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• "Demolition of houses in East Jerusalem, 2004-2018". B'Tselem. 22 October 2018c.
• Denes, Nick (2010). "From tanks to wheelchairs: unmanned aerial vehicles, Zionist battlefield experiments, and the transparence of the civilian". In Zureik, Elia; Lyon, David; Abu-Laban, Yasmeen (eds.). Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power. Routledge. pp. 171–195. ISBN 978-1-136-93097-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Dillman, Jeffrey D. (Autumn 1989). "Water Rights in the Occupied Territories". Journal of Palestine Studies. 19 (1): 46–71. JSTOR 2537245. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Dinstein, Yoram (2009). The International Law of Belligerent Occupation. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-89637-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• Drew, Catriona J. (1997). "Self-Determination, Population Transfer and the Middle East Peace Accords". In Bowen, Stephen (ed.). Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 119–167. ISBN 978-9-041-10502-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Dumper, Michael (2010). "Constructive Ambiguities: Jerusalem, international law, and the peace process". In Akram, Susan; Dumper, Michael; Lynk, Michael; Scobbie, Iain (eds.). International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Rights-Based Approach to Middle East Peace. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-136-85097-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Dunsky, Marda (2008). Pens and Swords: How the American Mainstream Media Report the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-50826-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Dzikansky, Mordecai; Kleiman, Gil; Slater, Robert (2016). Terrorist Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response. CRC Press. ISBN 978-1-439-87132-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Economic Costs of the Israeli occupation for the Palestinian people (PDF). UNCTAD. 21 July 2016. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• The economic costs of the Israeli occupation for the occupied Palestinian territory (PDF). ARIJ and the Palestinian Ministry of National Economy (PMNE). September 2011.
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• Ehrenreich, Ben (2016). The Way to the Spring: Life and Death in Palestine. Granta Books. ISBN 978-1-783-78312-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• El-Ahmed, Nabila; Abu-Zahra, Nadia (Spring 2016). "Unfulfilled Promise: Palestinian Family Reunification and the Right of Return". Journal of Palestine Studies. 45 (3): 24–39. JSTOR 4284056. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• El-Farra, Majed; MacMillen, Malcolm (January 2000). "External Constraints on Manufacturing Development in Israeli-Occupied Gaza". Middle Eastern Studies. 36 (1): 153–170. JSTOR 4284056. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Eldar, Akiva; Zertal, Idith (2007). The Lords of the Land: The Settlers and the State of Israel 1967-2004. Hachette UK. ISBN 978-0-786-74485-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Escribano, Marisa; El-Joubeh, Nazmi (Autumn 1981). "Migration and Change in a West Bank Village: The Case of Deir Dibwan". Journal of Palestine Studies. 11 (1): 150–160. JSTOR 2536052. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Esposito, Raffaele (2014). "Lexical wars: Hebrew euphemisms and dysphemisms in phrases relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict". 19. Materia giudaica: rivista dell'associazione italiana per lo studio del giudaismo: 537–547. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Falah, Ghazi-Walid (2005). "The Geopolitics of 'Enclavisation' and the Demise of a Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". Third World Quarterly. 26 (8): 1341–1372. JSTOR 4017718. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Falk, Richard (1997). "Some International Law Implications of the Oslo/Cairo Framework for the PLO/Israeli Peace Process". In Bowen, Stephen (ed.). Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 1–34. ISBN 978-9-041-10502-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Falk, Richard (Winter 2002). "Azmi Bishara, the Right of Resistance, and the Palestinian Ordeal". Journal of Palestine Studies. 31 (2): 19–33. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Farsakh, Leila (Spring 2005). "Independence, Cantons, or Bantustans: Whither the Palestinian State?". Middle East Journal. 59 (2): 230–245. JSTOR 4330126. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• "Fatalities". B'Tselem. 12 May 2011.
• "Fatalities before Operation "Cast Lead"". B'Tselem.
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• Fields, Gary (2017). Enclosure: Palestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-29104-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Findlay, Len (2010). "Academic and Artistic Freedom and the Israel-Palestine Conflict". 2 (2). Cultural and Pedagogical Inquiry: 5–18. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Finkelstein, Norman (Winter 1991). "Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard". Journal of Palestine Studies. 20 (2): 43–56. JSTOR 2537197. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Finkelstein, Norman (2003). Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. Verso Books. ISBN 1-85984-442-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Fisk, Robert (23 August 2018). "Israel is building another 1,000 homes on Palestinian land. Where's the outrage?". The Independent. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Francis, Sahar (Summer 2014). "Status of Palestinian Prisoners in International Humanitarian Law". Journal of Palestine Studies. 43 (4): 39–48. ISBN 978-1-466-80054-0. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Friedman, Robert (Autumn 1983). "Israeli Censorship of the Palestinian Press". Journal of Palestine Studies. 13 (1): 93–101. JSTOR 2536927. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Galchinsky, Michael (Fall 2004). "The Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: International Law and Israeli Jurisprudence". Israel Studies. 9 (3): 115–136. JSTOR 30245641. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gallo, Giorgio; Marzano, Arturo (2009). "The Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case". The Journal of Conflict Studies. 29: 1–18. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Galnoor, Itzhak (2010). Public Management in Israel: Development, Structure, Functions and Reforms. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-92386-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Galtung, Johan (1971). "The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict". Journal of Peace Research. 8 (3–4): 173–206. JSTOR 423072. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gautney, Heather (2009). "The Globalization of Violence in the 21st Century: Israel, Palestine, and the War on Terror". In Aronowitz, Stanley; Gautney, Heather (eds.). Implicating Empire. Hachette UK. pp. 65–82. ISBN 978-0-786-74992-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gazit, Shlomo (2003). Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories. Frank Cass Publisher. ISBN 978-0-714-65489-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gerstenfeld, Manfred; Green, Ben (Fall 2004). "Watching the Pro-Israeli Media Watchers". Jewish Political Studies Review. 16 (3–4): 33–58. JSTOR 25834603. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ghanim, Honaida (2017). "From Kubaniya to Outpost: A Genealogy of the Palestinian conceptualization of Jewish Settlement in a Shifting National Context". In Handel, Ariel; Allegra, Marco; Maggor, Erez (eds.). Normalizing Occupation: The Politics of Everyday Life in the West Bank Settlements. Indiana University Press. pp. 151–170. ISBN 978-0-253-02505-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gleim, Sarah (12 November 2015). "Skunk Water: A Weapon That Uses Stench to Control Crowds". HowStuffWorks. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glock, Albert (Spring 1994). "Archaeology as Cultural Survival: The Future of the Palestinian Past". Journal of Palestine Studies. 23 (3): 70–84. JSTOR 2537961. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Goldstein, Michael (Winter 1978). "Israeli Security Measures in the Occupied Territories: Administrative Detention". Middle East Journal. 32 (1): 35–44. JSTOR 4325711. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gordis, Avishay Ben-Sasson; Levi, Yonatan (12 December 2017). Israel's National Security and West Bank Settlements (PDF). Molad. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gordon, Neve (2008). Israel's Occupation. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-94236-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gordon, Neve (2010). "Israel's emergence as a homeland security capital". In Zureik, Elia; Lyon, David; Abu-Laban, Yasmeen (eds.). Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power. Routledge. pp. 153–169. ISBN 978-1-136-93097-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gordon, Neve (June 2014). "Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the Campaign against Human RightsNGOs". Law & Society Review. 48 (2): 311–344. JSTOR 43670395. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gorenberg, Gershom (2007). The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977. Macmillan Publishers. ISBN 978-1-466-80054-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Graff, James A. (2015). "Targeting Children: Rights versus Realpolitik". In Kapitan, Tomis (ed.). Philosophical Perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2nd ed.). Routledge. pp. 157–184. ISBN 978-1-317-46285-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Graham, Stephen (2010). "Laboratories of War: surveillance and US-Israeli collaboration in war and security". In Zureik, Elia; Lyon, David; Abu-Laban, Yasmeen (eds.). Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power. Routledge. pp. 133–152. ISBN 978-1-136-93097-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Grinberg, Lev Luis (2009). Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine: Democracy Versus Military Rule. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-27589-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Groiss, Arnon; Shaked, Ronni (September 2017). Groiss, Arnon (ed.). Schoolbooks of the Palestinian Authority (PA): The Attitude to the Jews, to Israel and to Peace (PDF). Simon Wiesenthal Center. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gross, Aeyal (28 December 2011). "Israel Is Exploiting the Resources of the Occupied West Bank". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Gross, Judah Ari (6 September 2018). "Israel to close West Bank, Gaza during upcoming holidays". The Times of Israel. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hajjar, Lisa (2005). Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24194-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Halpern, Jeff (2015). War Against the People: Israel, the Palestinians and Global Pacification. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-745-33430-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hammer, Joshua (2004). A Season in Bethlehem: Unholy War in a Sacred Place. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-0-743-25604-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Handel, Ariel (2010). "Exclusionary surveillance and spatial uncertainty in the occupied Palestinian territories". In Zureik, Elia; Lyon, David; Abu-Laban, Yasmeen (eds.). Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power. Routledge. pp. 259–274. ISBN 978-1-136-93097-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Handel, Ariel (2014). "Gated/gating community: the settlement complex in the West Bank" (PDF). Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. 39 (4): 504–517. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Harel, Amos (3 September 2003). "IDF's Guidelines for Field Officers in the Territories: Respect Palestinian Civilians and Use Common Sense". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hareuveni, Eyal (June 2009). Foul Play Neglect of Wastewater Treatment in the West Bank (PDF). B'Tselem. ISSN 0792-8114. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hareuveni, Eyal (May 2011). Dispossession and Exploitation: Israel's Policy in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea (PDF). B'Tselem. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hass, Amira (Spring 2002). "Israel's Closure Policy: an Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression". Journal of Palestine Studies. 31 (3): 5–20. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hass, Amira (29 January 2018a). "Israeli Soldiers in West Bank: Raiding, Arresting, Mapping and Getting Home for Shabbat". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hass, Amira (13 October 2018b). "Israel Seeks to Deport to Brazil Man Who Has Lived Almost Entire Life in West Bank". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Henckaerts, Jean-Marie; Doswald-Beck, Louise; Alvermann, Carolin (2005). Starvation and Access to Humanitarian Relief Customary International Humanitarian Law: pt. 1-2. Practice. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-83937-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Henriksen, Thomas H. (February 2007). The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and its Implications for the United (PDF). ISOU. ISBN 1-933749-06-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hiltermann, Joost R. (Winter 1990). "Israel's Strategy to Break the Uprising". Journal of Palestine Studies. 19 (3): 87–98. JSTOR 2537415. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hiltermann, Joost R. (1995). "Teddy Kollek and the Native Question". In Moors, Annelies; van Teeffelen, Toine; Kanaana, Sharif; Ghazaleh, Ilham Abu (eds.). Discourse and Palestine: Power, Text and Context. Het Spinhuis. pp. 55–65. ISBN 978-9-055-89010-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hirschhorn, Sara Yael (2017). City on a Hilltop: American Jews and the Israeli Settler Movement. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-97505-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hoffnung, Menachem; Weinshall–Margel, Keren (2010). "Judicial Rejection as Substantial Relief: The Israeli Supreme Court and the "War on Terror"". In Volcansek, Mary L.; Stack, John F. (eds.). Courts and Terrorism: Nine Nations Balance Rights and Security. Cambridge University Press. pp. 150–167. ISBN 978-1-139-49537-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hovsepian, Mary (2015). "Demography of Race and Ethnicity in Palestine". In Sáenz, Rogelio; Embrick, David G; Rodríguez, Néstor P. (eds.). The International Handbook of the Demography of Race and Ethnicity. Springer. pp. 339–352. ISBN 978-9-048-18891-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hulme, Karen (2004). War Torn Environment: Interpreting The Legal Threshold. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-9-004-13848-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hunt, Naomi, ed. (2013). Use With Care: A Reporter's Glossary of Loaded Language in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (PDF). International Press Institute. ISBN 978-3-9503007-9-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• ICG (20 December 2012). Extreme Makeover? (II): The Withering of Arab Jerusalem (PDF). International Crisis Group. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Imseis, Ardi (Autumn 2000). "Review: Law, Reality, and the Oslo 'Peace' Process". Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 20 (3): 469–476. JSTOR 20468333. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Isaac, Jad; Khalil, Manal; Rishmawi, Khaldoun; Dabouqi, Ahmad; Marinelli, Ludovico (2015). The Economic Cost of the Israeli Occupation of the occupied Palestinian Territories (PDF). ARIJ. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Isaac, Rami (2013). "Palestine: Tourism Under Occupation". In Butler, Richard; Suntikul, Wantanee (eds.). Tourism and War. Routledge. pp. 143–158. ISBN 978-1-136-26309-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• "Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories". Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The State of the World's Human Rights (PDF). Amnesty International. 2018b. pp. 207–211. ISBN 978-0-86210-499-3.
• "Israel: 50 Years of Occupation Abuses". Human Rights Watch. 4 June 2017a.
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• "The Jordan Valley". B'Tselem. 11 November 2017c.
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• Kadri, Ali (Autumn 1998). "A Survey of Commuting Labor from the West Bank to Israel". Middle East Journal. 52 (4): 517–530. JSTOR 4329251. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kamrava, Mehran (2016). The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography, and the Road Ahead. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-22085-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kane, Alex (7 July 2016). Post Share Arrest: Israel targeting Palestinian Protestors on Facebook. {{cite book}}: |website= ignored (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Karayanni, Michael (2014). Conflicts in a Conflict: A Conflict of Laws Case Study on Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-199-87371-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Katz, Yaakov; Bohbot, Amir (2017). The Weapon Wizards: How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower. St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-1-250-08834-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kelly, Tobias (November 2004). "Returning Home? Law, Violence, and Displacement among West Bank Palestinians". Political and Legal Anthropology Review. 27 (2): 95–112. JSTOR 24497425. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kelly, Tobias (2006). Law, Violence and Sovereignty Among West Bank Palestinians. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-46099-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kershner, Isabel (17 July 2018). "In West Bank, 99.7% of Public Land Grants by Israel Go to Settlers". The New York Times. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Keshet, Yehudit Kirstein (2013). Checkpoint Watch: Testimonies from Occupied Palestine. Zed Books. ISBN 978-1-848-13625-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Khalidi, Rashid (2013). Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East. Beacon Press. ISBN 978-0-807-04476-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Khalil, Asem; Del Sarto, Raffaella A. (2015). "The Legal Fragmentation of Palestine-Israel and European Union Policies Promoting the Rule of Law". In Del Sarto, Raffaella A. (ed.). Fragmented Borders, Interdependence and External Relations: The Israel-Palestine-European Union Triangle. Palgrave. pp. 129–154. ISBN 978-1-137-50413-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kimmerling, Baruch (2003). Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-859-84517-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kimmerling, Baruch (2008). Clash of Identities: Explorations in Israeli and Palestinian Societies. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-51249-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• King, Mary Elizabeth (2009). "Palestinian Civil Resistance Against Israeli Military Occupation". In Stephan, Maria J. (ed.). Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East. PalgraveMacmillan. pp. 131–156. ISBN 978-0-230-10175-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kletter, Raz (2014). Just Past?: The Making of Israeli Archaeology. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-49136-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Klieman, Aharon (2013). "Israel and the Middle East: on the unresolved matter of Israel's foreign policy orientation". In Tal, David (ed.). Israeli Identity: Between Orient and Occident. Routledge. pp. 26–50. ISBN 978-1-134-10738-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kober, Avi (2002). Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of Arab Anti-Israeli Coalitions in War and Peace. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-275-97722-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Krishna, Sankaran (2009). Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-742-55468-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Krämer, Gudrun (2011). A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-15007-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2015). Historical Dictionary of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-4422-5170-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kuntsman, Adi; Stein, Rebecca (2015). Digital militarism: Israel's occupation in the social media age. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-804-79497-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kårtveit, Bård (2014). Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians. Brill. ISBN 978-9-004-27639-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lazar, Hadara (February 1990). The system of taxation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an instrument for the enforcement of Authority during the Uprising (DOC). B'Tselem. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lazaroff, Tovah (2 July 2018). "U.N. expert: Israel moving closer to formal West Bank annexation". The Jerusalem Post. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (PDF). International Court of Justice. 9 July 2004.
• Lein, Yehezkel; Weizman, Eyal (May 2002). Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank (PDF). B'Tselem. ISSN 0793-520X. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lentin, Ronit (2018). Traces of Racial Exception: Racializing Israeli Settler Colonialism. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-350-03205-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lesch, Ann M. (Winter 1979). "Israeli Deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1967-1978". Journal of Palestine Studies. 8 (2): 101–131. JSTOR 2536512. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Levanon, Ofer Shinar (September 2015). Ethos of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as Reflected by the Judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court 1948 – 2006 (PDF) (Ph.D. thesis). Hebrew University of Jerusalem. {{cite thesis}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• LeVine, Mark (2005). Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine, 1880-1948. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-93850-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Levinson, Chaim (24 January 2017). "Torture, Israeli-style - as Described by the Interrogators Themselves". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Likhovski, Assaf (2017). Tax Law and Social Norms in Mandatory Palestine and Israel. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-316-82019-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lionis, Chrisoula (2016). Laughter in Occupied Palestine: Comedy and Identity in Art and Film. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-1-784-53288-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lonergan, Stephen C.; Brooks, David B. (1994). Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. International Development Research Centre. ISBN 978-1-552-50097-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Luft, Gal (Winter 2003). "The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing". Middle East Quarterly. 10 (1). {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lustick, Ian (2018). Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-501-73194-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Macintyre, Donald (14 June 2008). "Palestinians barred from Dead Sea beaches to 'appease Israeli settlers'". The Independent. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Makdisi, Saree (2010). Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 978-0-393-06996-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Malki, Riad (2000). "The Physical Planning of Jerusalem". In Maʻoz, Moshe; Nusseibeh, Sari (eds.). Jerusalem: Points Beyond Friction, and Beyond. Kluwer Law International. pp. 25–63. ISBN 90-411-8843-6. OCLC 43481699. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Maltz, Judy (23 June 2017). "Americans Disproportionately Leading the Charge in Settling the West Bank". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mansour, Antoine (2015). "The West Bank Economy: 1948-1984". In Abed, George T. (ed.). The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development under Prolonged Occupation. Routledge. pp. 71-. ISBN 978-1-317-59291-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Matar, Ibrahim (Autumn 1981). "Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip". Journal of Palestine Studies. 11 (1): 93–110. JSTOR 2536048. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mearsheimer, John; Walt, Stephen (March 2006). "The Israel Lobby". London Review of Books. Vol. 28, no. 6. pp. 3–12. {{cite magazine}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mearsheimer, John; Walt, Stephen (2007). The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Aid. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-141-92066-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Melzer, Nils (2008). Targeted Killing in International Law. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-199-53316-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mendel, Yonatan (6 March 2008). "Diary". London Review of Books. Vol. 30, no. 5. pp. 30–31. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Michaeli, Sarit (January 2013). Crowd Control: Israel's Use of Crowd Control Weapons in the West Bank (PDF). B'Tselem. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mintz, Alex (1983). "The military‐industrial complex: The Israeli case". Journal of Strategic Studies. 6 (3): 623–639. JSTOR 174246. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Montell, Jessica (Spring 2000). "Uncharted Territory: Generating Opposition to Torture in Israel". 8 (1–2). Bridges: 106–108. JSTOR 40358554. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Musaee, Anwar H. M; Abbas, Eeman Muhammad; Mujan, Wan Kamal; Sidik, Roziah (2014). "Waqf Land in the West Bank and Investment Current State of Affairs". 10 (14). Asian Social Science: 23–39. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Myre, Greg (25 August 2002). "In Mideast Conflict, a War of Euphemisms". Los Angeles Times. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Müller, Margret (2017). The World According To Israeli Newspapers: Representations of International Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Frank & Timme. ISBN 978-3-732-90286-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Nebehay, Stephanie (1 February 2018). "UN lists 206 companies with business ties to Israeli settlements in West Bank". The Independent. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Nicoletti, Claudia; Hearne, Anne-Maria (2012). Pillage of the Dead Sea: Israel's Unlawful Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Al-Haq. ISBN 978-9-950-32734-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Niksic, Orhan; Eddin, Nur Nasser; Cali, Massimiliano (2014). Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy. World Bank Publications. ISBN 978-1-464-80196-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Nusseibeh, Sari (2015). Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-1-250-09875-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• "Occupation, Inc.How Settlement Businesses Contribute to Israel's Violations of Palestinian Rights". Human Rights Watch. 19 January 2016.
• Opportunities and Challenges of Palestinian Development actions in Area C (PDF). ARIJ. 2016. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Overview of Israel's Demolition Policy (PDF). Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. December 2017.
• "Palestinian minors killed by Israeli security forces in the West Bank, since Operation Cast Lead". B'Tselem. 2018b.
• Pappe, Ilan (2017). The Biggest Prison on Earth: A History of the Occupied Territories. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-1-780-74433-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Parker, Richard B. (Spring 1992). "The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored". Middle East Journal. 46 (2): 177–197. JSTOR 4328429. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Parsons, Nigel (2005). The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-135-94523-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Peled, Yoav (2006). "From Zionism to Capitalism: The Political Economy of the Neoliberal Warfare State". In Beinin, Joel; Stein, Rebecca L. (eds.). The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993-2005. Stanford University Press. pp. 38–53. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Peleg, Ilan (1995). Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0-815-62682-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Pelleg-Sryck, Tamar (2011). "The Mysteries of Administrative Detention". In Baker, Abeer; Matar, Anat (eds.). Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel. Pluto Press. pp. 123–135. ISBN 978-0-745-33021-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Penslar, Derek (2007). Israel in History: The Jewish State in Comparative Perspective. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-14669-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Peri, Yoram (2006). Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy. United States Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 978-1-929-22381-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Perugini, Nicola (Spring 2014). "The Moral Economy of Settler Colonialism: Israel and the "Evacuation Trauma"". 4 (1). History of the Present: 49–74. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Peteet, Julie (February 1994). "Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian "Intifada": A Cultural Politics of Violence". American Ethnologist. 21 (1): 31–49. JSTOR 646520. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Peteet, Julie (May 1996). "The Writing on the Walls: The Graffiti of the Intifada". Cultural Anthropology. 11 (2): 139–159. JSTOR 656446. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Peters, Joel (2012). "Israel". In Peters, Joel (ed.). The European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East. Lexington Books. pp. 77–92. ISBN 978-0-739-17444-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Peterson, Luke (2014). Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media: Contending Discourses. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-67036-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Pieterse, Jan (1984). "State Terrorism on a Global Scale: The Role of Israel". Crime and Social Justice. 21–22 (4): 58–80. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Playfair, Emma (Fall 1988). "Israel's Security Needs in the West Bank, Real and Contrived". Arab Studies Quarterly. 10 (4): 406–423. JSTOR 41857980. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• PM: IDF to keep operating in West Bank areas under full PA control. 21 April 2016. ISBN 978-1-137-50401-2. {{cite book}}: |newspaper= ignored (help)
• Poole, Steven (2007). Unspeak: How Words Become Weapons, How Weapons Become a Message, and How That Message Becomes Reality. Grove Atlantic. ISBN 978-1-555-84872-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Popp, Roland (Spring 2006). "Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War". Middle East Journal. 60 (2): 281–309. JSTOR 4330250. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Pratt, David (2007). Intifada: Palestine and Israel - The Long Day of Rage. Casemate Publishers. ISBN 978-1-935-14999-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Punamäki, Raija-Leena (Summer 1988). "Experiences of Torture, Means of Coping, and Level of Symptoms among PalestinianPolitical Prisoners". Journal of Palestine Studies. 17 (4): 81–96. JSTOR 2537292. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-822-33539-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Quigley, John B. (2009). "Palestine: The Issue of Statehood". In Silverburg, Sanford R. (ed.). Palestine and International Law: Essays on Politics and Economics. Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland & Company. pp. 37–43. ISBN 978-0-786-44248-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Quigley, John B. (2018). The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Palestinian People and Their Human Right to Development (PDF). UNCTAD. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Raheb, Mitri (1995). I Am a Palestinian Christian. Fortress Press. ISBN 978-1-451-41485-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rahmeh, Abdullah Abu (26 February 2015). "A Decade of Civil Disobedience in My West Bank Village". Haaretz. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rechnitzer, Haim O. (Fall 2008). "Redemptive Theology in the Thought of Yeshayahu Leibowitz". Israel Studies. 13 (3): 137–159. JSTOR 30245835. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Reinhart, Tanya (2011). Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (2nd ed.). Seven Stories Press. ISBN 978-1-609-80122-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• "Restrictions on Movement". B'Tselem. 11 November 2017b.
• Reuveny, Rafael (Winter 2008). "The Last Colonialist: Israel in the Occupied Territories since 1967" (PDF). The Independent Review. 12 (3): 325–374. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Richman, Jackson (24 May 2018). "More than 60 organizations plead with colleges to protect Jewish students' civil rights". Washington Examiner. {{cite news}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rivlin, Paul (2010). The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-49396-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Roberson, Mary (2013). "Birth, Transformation, and Death of Refugee Identity: Women and Girls of the Intifida". In Cole, Ellen; Rothblum, Esther; Espin, Oliva (eds.). Refugee Women and Their Mental Health: Shattered Societies, Shattered Lives. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-135-83760-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Roberts, Adam (January 1990). "Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967". The American Journal of International Law. 84 (1): 44–103. JSTOR 2203016. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rodinson, Maxime (2002) . Israel, a Colonial-settler State? (PDF). Monad Press. ISBN 978-0-873-48866-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ross, Dennis; Makovsky, David (2009). Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East. Penguin. Israel could not be expected to withdraw its forces until someone could demonstrate they were willing and able to ensure that the West Bank would not be a launching pad for attacks against Israel. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• "A Routine Founded on Violence". B'Tselem. 11 November 2017a.
• Roy, Sara (Winter 2010). "Reflections on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in U.S. Public Discourse: Legitimizing Dissent". Journal of Palestine Studies. 39 (2): 23–38. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Rubenberg, Cheryl (2003). The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 978-1-588-26225-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Said, Edward W. (Summer 1991). "Reflections on Twenty Years of Palestinian History". Journal of Palestine Studies. 20 (4): 5–22. JSTOR 2537432. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Sait, M. Siraj (Spring 2004). "Have Palestinian Children Forfeited Their Rights?". Journal of Comparative Family Studies. 35 (2): 211–228. JSTOR 41603933. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Samman, Maha (2013). Trans-Colonial Urban Space in Palestine: Politics and Development. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-66885-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Schipper, Friedrich T. (2013). "Holy Places: Contested Heritrage - Dealing with Cultural Heritage in the Region of Palestine from the Ottoman period until Today". In Kila, Joris D.; Zeidler, James (eds.). Cultural Heritage in the Crosshairs. Brill. pp. 263–286. ISBN 978-9-004-25142-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Schnell, Izhak; Mishal, Shaul (April 2008). "Place as a Source of Identity in Colonizing Societies: Israeli Settlements in Gaza". 98 (2). Geographical Review: 242–259. JSTOR 30034230. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Selby, Jan (2003a). "Dressing up Domination as 'Cooperation': The Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water Relations". Review of International Studies. 29 (1): 121–138. JSTOR 20097837. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
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• 1967 establishments in Israel
• 1967 in military history
• June 1967 events
• Israeli-occupied territories
• Israeli–Palestinian conflict
• Military occupation
• Six-Day War
• West Bank