Misplaced Pages

War in Dagestan (1999): Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editContent deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 12:08, 30 March 2010 editHellerick (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users2,042 edits Conspiracy Theories← Previous edit Latest revision as of 02:14, 24 December 2024 edit undoCitation bot (talk | contribs)Bots5,408,803 edits Removed parameters. | Use this bot. Report bugs. | #UCB_CommandLine 
(685 intermediate revisions by more than 100 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Short description|Conflict in the Dagestan Russian Republic}}
{{Infobox War
{{Infobox military conflict
|image=<!-- Deleted image removed: ] -->
| image = Locator map of Dagestan, Russia (2014–2022).svg
|caption=Russian special forces in Dagestan
| image_size =
|partof=]
| caption = Location of the Republic of Dagestan (red)
|date=August 5, 1999 - September 28, 1999
|place=], ] within European Russia
|result=Russian victory,<br>] | partof = the spillover of the ], ]
| date = 7 August – 14 September 1999<ref name="mdb.cast.ru">{{cite news|author=Alexander Pashin|url=http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/|title=Russian Army Operations and Weaponry During Second Military Campaign in Chechnya|work=]|publisher=Mdb.cast.ru|issue=#3|date=2002|access-date=2015-02-23|archive-date=2009-01-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090129141108/http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="vestnikmostok.ru">{{cite web|author=Oleg Lukin|url=http://www.vestnikmostok.ru/index.php?categoryid=17&id_item=154&action=view|title= Новейшая история: Российско-чеченские войны|work=Vestnik "Mostok"|publisher=Vestnikmostok.ru|issue=#3|date=2008|access-date=2015-02-23|language=ru}}</ref><br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=08|day1=07|year=1999|month2=09|day2=14|year2=1999}})
|combatant2={{flagicon|Russia}} ]
| place = ], Russia
|combatant1=] ]<br>] Shura of Dagestan
| result = Russian victory
|commander2={{flagicon|Russia}} ]
| combatant1 = {{flagicon image|Flag of Jihad.svg}} ]
|commander1=] ] <br>] ]
* {{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]
|strength2=17,000 soldiers
{{flag|Chechnya|1991}}
|strength1=~1,500 militants initially,<ref name= meria/><br>Up to 3,000 total
* {{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]
|casualties2=279 dead<ref>http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter7_3.html</ref>
* ] ]
|casualties1=~2,500 dead
* ] ]
}}{{Campaignbox Post-Soviet Conflicts}}
| combatant2 = {{flag|Russia}}
* ] ]
** {{flagicon image|Flag of the Russian Federation Ground Forces.svg}} ]
** {{flagicon image|Naval Ensign of Russia.svg}} ]
** {{flagicon image|Flag of the Russian Air Force.svg}} ]
** {{flagicon image|Flag of the Russian Airborne Troops.svg}} ]
** ] ]
* {{flagicon image|Flag of the Russian Federal Security Service.svg}} ]
* {{flagicon image|Flag of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (MVD of Russia).svg}} ]
** ] ]
** {{flagicon image|Flag of Internal Troops of Russia.svg}} ]
* ] ]
* {{flagicon|Dagestan|1994}} ]
** {{flagicon|Dagestan|1994}} Dagestani police and local militia
| commander1 = {{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ] (''Gerat'')<br>{{flagicon image|Chechen Special Operations Regiment patch.jpg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Chechen Special Operations Regiment patch.jpg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Chechen_Islamic_religious_police_patch.jpg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Abdul-Vahhab Shishani<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Ismail Razakov (''Bagram'')<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Hakim al-Medani{{KIA}}<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Yaqub al-Ghamidi<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Abu Jafar al-Yemeni<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Abdurrahman az-Zarki (''Chechen from Jordan'')<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ] <br>{{flagicon image|Chechen Special Operations Regiment patch.jpg}} ]{{KIA}}<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ] (''Abdurrahman''){{KIA}}<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Garib Shishani<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Umar Edilsultanov<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} Isa Umarov<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image|Flag of the Majlis of Muslims of Ichkeria and Dagestan.svg}} ]
| commander2 = {{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br>{{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br>{{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br> {{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br>{{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br>{{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br>{{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br>{{flagdeco|Russia}} ]<br>{{flagdeco|Russia}} ]
| strength1 = Up to 1,500–2,000 fighters in early August,<br>more than 10,000 militants by the end of September <ref>{{cite web|title=АНТИТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ОПЕРАЦИЯ НА СЕВЕРНОМ КАВКАЗЕ (август 1999–2000 г.) {{!}} Операция на территории Республики Дагестан|url=http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter7_3.html |date=10 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090414193131/http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter7_3.html |archive-date=2009-04-14 }}</ref>
| strength2 = 17,000 soldiers,<br>thousands of policemen and volunteers
| casualties1 = Russian claim: 2,500 militants killed<ref></ref>
| casualties2 = 275 servicemen killed,<br>15 missing and 937 wounded (per Russia)<ref name="mdb.cast.ru"/><br>Significant losses to local Dagestani police and militias<ref name="mdb.cast.ru"/>
| casualties3 = Unknown number of civilian casualties
| conflict = War in Dagestan
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Chechen–Russian conflict}}
{{Campaignbox Post-Soviet Conflicts}}
{{Campaignbox Russia terrorism}}
}}


The '''1999 war in Dagestan''', also known as the '''Dagestan incursions'''<ref>{{cite web |last1=Lieven |first1=Anatol |title=Why Dagestan Needs the Russians |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/20/opinion/why-dagestan-needs-the-russians.html |website=The New York Times |access-date=4 August 2023}}</ref> ({{langx|ru|Война в Дагестане}}), was an armed conflict that began when the ]-based ] (IIPB), an ] group led by ], ], ] and ], invaded the neighboring Russian republic of ] on 7 August 1999, in support of the ] of Dagestan ] rebels. The war ended with a major victory for the ] and ] and the retreat of the IIPB. The invasion of Dagestan alongside ] in September 1999 served as the main '']'' for the ].
The '''Invasion of Dagestan''',<ref>
The Jamestown Foundation. , 05.11.2005</ref> also known as the '''War in Dagestan'''<ref></ref> and '''Dagestan War''',<ref></ref> began, when the ]-based ] (IIB), ] ] led by warlords ] and ] invaded the neighbouring Russian republic of ], on August 7, 1999, in support of the Shura of Dagestan ] rebels. The war ended with a major Russian victory and the retreat of the IIB. The Invasion of Dagestan was one of the major causes of, and served as the ''casus belli'' for the ].


== Background == == Background ==
During the inter-war period from 1996 to 1999, the war-ravaged Chechnya descended into anarchy and economic collapse. ]'s government was unable to rebuild the region and to prevent a number of warlords of taking effective control. Relationship between the government and radicals polarized. In March, 1999, Maskhadov closed down the Chechen parliament and introduced aspects of ]. Despite this concession, extremists such as ] and the ]-born Islamist ] continued to undermine the Maskhadov Government. In April, 1998, this radical group publicly declared its long-term aim to be the creation of a union of Chechnya and Dagestan under Islamic rule and the expulsion of Russians from the entire Caucasian Region.<ref name="bowker">{{cite book|title=Chechnya: From Past to Future|editor=Richard Sakwa|publisher=Anthem Press|date=2005|pages=223–318|chapter=Mike Bowker: Western Views of the Chechen Conflict|isbn=978-1-84331-164-5}}</ref> During the inter-war period of 1996 to 1999, a war-ravaged Chechnya descended into chaos and economic collapse. ]'s government was unable to rebuild the region or to prevent a number of warlords from taking effective control. The relationship between the government and radicals deteriorated. In March 1999, Maskhadov closed down the ] and introduced aspects of ]. Despite this concession, extremists such as ] and the ]-born Islamist ] continued to undermine the Maskhadov government. In April 1998, the group publicly declared that its long-term aim was the creation of a union of ] and ] under ] rule and the expulsion of ] from the entire ].<ref name="bowker">{{cite book|title=Chechnya: From Past to Future|editor=Richard Sakwa|publisher=Anthem Press|year=2005|pages=223–318|chapter=Mike Bowker: Western Views of the Chechen Conflict|isbn=978-1-84331-164-5}}</ref>


In late 1997, Bagauddin Magomedov, the ethnic ] leader of the radical wing of the Dagestani ] (]), fled with his entourage to Chechnya. There he established close ties with Al-Khattab and other leaders of Chechnya's Wahhabi community. In January 1999, Khattab began the formation of an "Islamic Legion" with foreign Muslim volunteers. At the same time, he commanded the "peacemaking unit of the Majlis (Parliament) of Ichkeria and Dagestan."<ref name = meria>Middle East Review of International Affairs, , Volume 9, No. 4, Article 4 - December 2005</ref> A series of invasions from Chechnya to Dagestan took place during the inter-war period, culminating in the 1997 attack on a federal military garrison of the 136th Motorized Rifle Regiment near the Dagestani town of ]. Other attacks targeted civilians and Dagestani police on a regular basis.<ref name="ware">{{cite book|title=Chechnya: From Past to Future|editor=Richard Sakwa|publisher=Anthem Press|date=2005|pages=79–115|chapter=Robert Bruce Ware: Mythology and Political Failure in Chechnya|isbn=978-1-84331-164-5}}</ref> In late 1997, ] (also known as Bagaudtin Magomedov), the ethnic ] leader of the radical wing of the Dagestani ] (]), fled with his followers to Chechnya. There he established close ties with Ibn Al-Khattab and other leaders of Chechnya's Wahhabi community. In January 1999, Khattab began the formation of an "Islamic Legion" with foreign ] volunteers. At the same time, he commanded the "peacemaking unit of the Majlis (Parliament) of Ichkeria and Dagestan".<ref name = meria>{{cite journal|author= Emil Souleimanov|title=Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan|journal=The Middle East Review of International Affairs|volume=9|issue=4|date=December 2005|url=http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue4/jv9no4a4.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120420105113/http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue4/jv9no4a4.html|archive-date=2012-04-20}}</ref> A series of invasions of Dagestan from Chechnya took place during the inter-war period, culminating in the 1997 attack on a federal military garrison of the 136th Motorized Rifle Regiment near the Dagestani town of ]. Other attacks targeted civilians and Dagestani police on a regular basis.<ref name="ware">{{cite book|title=Chechnya: From Past to Future|editor=Richard Sakwa|publisher=Anthem Press|year=2005|pages=79–115|chapter=]: Mythology and Political Failure in Chechnya|isbn=978-1-84331-164-5}}</ref>


In April 1999, Magomedov, the "Emir of the Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan," made an appeal to the "Islamic patriots of the ]" to "take part in the ]" and to do their share in "liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus from the Russian colonial yoke." According to this "prominent" Wahhabi's vision, proponents of the idea of a free Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the "Islamic Army of the Caucasus" that he founded, and report to the army's headquarters (in the village of ]) for military duty. Chechen separatist government official ] claimed that he alerted the ] (FSB) Director ], in the summer of 1999, of the imminent invasion of Dagestan.<ref></ref> In April 1999, Kebedov, the "Emir of the ]," made an appeal to the "Islamic patriots of the ]" to "take part in the ]" and participate in "liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus from the Russian colonial yoke." According to this "prominent" Wahhabi's vision, proponents of the idea of a free Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the "Islamic Army of the Caucasus" that he founded, and report to the army's headquarters in the village of ] for military duty. Chechen separatist government official ] claimed that he alerted the ] (FSB) Director ], in the summer of 1999, of the imminent invasion of Dagestan.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02-08-23.rferl.html|title=RFE/RL Newsline, 02-08-23|publisher=Hri.org|access-date=2013-08-24}}</ref>


== The Invasion and the Russian Counter-Attack == == Invasion and the Russian counterattack ==
On August 4, 1999, several ] (MVD) servicemen were killed in a border clash with a group of Magomedov's fighters led by Bagaudin Kebedov. On August 7 Basayev and Khattab launched an invasion into Dagestan with a group of roughly 1,500-2,000 armed militants consisting of Islamic radicals from Chechenya and Dagestan, as well as other international Islamists.<ref name="wolvesofislam"/> On 4 August 1999, several ] (MVD) servicemen were killed in a border clash with a group of Kebedov's fighters. On 7 August ] and ] officially launched an invasion into Dagestan with a group of roughly 1,500–2,000 armed militants consisting of ] radicals from ], including other international ].<ref name="wolvesofislam"/>{{page needed|date=August 2020}}


Khattab described himself as the "military commander of the operation" while Basayev was the "overall commander in the battlefield."<ref name="wolvesofislam"/> They seized the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata and Shadroda and reached the village of ], close to the district town of ].<ref>, ], August 9, 1999</ref> On August 10, they announced the birth of the "independent ] of Dagestan" and declared war on "the traitorous Dagestani government" and "Russia's occupation units."<ref name = meria/><ref name="ware"/><ref>, ], August 11, 1999</ref> Khattab described himself as the "military commander of the operation", while Basayev was the "overall commander in the battlefield".<ref name="wolvesofislam"/>{{page needed|date=August 2020}} They seized villages in the districts of ]<ref name="Tsumadinskiy Rayon">{{cite web|url=https://www.google.de/maps/place/Tsumadinskiy+rayon/@42.448627,46.0164925,9z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x404f647c53fb2dfb:0xa1f09259f151d86b?hl=de|title=Tsumadinskiy Rayon|publisher=Google Maps|access-date=2015-02-23}}</ref> (], Gakko, ], Kvanada, Gadiri and Gigatl) and ]<ref name="Botlikhskiy Rayon">{{cite web|url=https://www.google.de/maps/place/Botlikhskiy+rayon/@42.7443135,46.2654379,9z/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x404f0863b12644f1:0x5db311f42f612ebe?hl=de|title=Botlikhskiy Rayon|publisher=Google Maps|access-date=2015-02-23}}</ref> (], ], ], ], ] and Inkhelo).<ref name="mdb.cast.ru"/> On 10 August, they announced the birth of the "independent ] of Dagestan" and declared war on "the traitorous Dagestani government" and "Russia's occupation units".<ref name = meria/><ref name="ware"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9908/09/russia.unrest.03/ |title=Rebels pick Chechen warlord in Dagestan insurgency; Government focuses on crisis in southern Russia |website=] |access-date=2006-08-22 |url-status=bot: unknown |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080103014339/http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9908/09/russia.unrest.03/ |archive-date=3 January 2008 }}, ], 11 August 1999</ref>


The federal military response to the invasion was slow, and the efforts were initially fumbling and disorganized. Because of this, all of the early resistance, and much of the later resistance as well, was undertaken by Dagestani police, by spontaneously organized citizen militias, and by individual Dagestani villagers.<ref name="ware"/> Basayev and Khattab were not welcomed as "liberators" as they had expected; the Dagestani villagers considered the invading force as occupiers and unwelcome religious fanatics. Instead of a mass anti-Russian uprising, the border areas saw mass mobilization of volunteers against Basayev's and Khattab's army.<ref name="meria"/><ref name="wolvesofislam">{{cite book |title=The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror |last=Murphy |first=Paul |authorlink= |coauthors= |year=2004 |publisher=Potomac Books Inc. |location= |isbn=978-1574888300}}</ref> The federal military response to the invasion was slow, and the efforts were initially fumbling and disorganized. As a result, all of the early resistance, and much of the later resistance, was undertaken by Dagestani police, spontaneously organized citizen militias, and individual Dagestani villagers.<ref name="ware"/> Basayev and Khattab were not welcomed as "liberators" as they had expected; the Dagestani villagers considered the invaders as unwelcome religious fanatics. Instead of an anti-Russian uprising, a mass mobilization of volunteers formed in the border areas against the invading army.<ref name="meria"/><ref name="wolvesofislam">{{cite book|title=The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror|last=Murphy|first=Paul|year=2004|publisher=Potomac Books Inc.|isbn=978-1574888300}}</ref>{{page needed|date=August 2020}}


As resistance to the invaders stiffened, Russian ] and ] strikes materialized. This conflict saw the first use of aerial-delivered ]s (FAE) against populated areas, notably on the village of Tando by the federal forces.<ref>{{Ru icon}} , ], February 2001</ref><ref>Williams, Bryan Glyn (2001). . '']'' 8.1.</ref> The rebels were stalled by the ferocity of the bombardments: their supply lines were cut and scattered with remotely detonating ]. This gave ] time to assemble a ] under ] ], commander of the ]. On August 23 the Basaev and Khattab announced they were withdrawing from Botlikh district to "redeploy" and begin a "new phase" in their operations.<ref>, ], August 23, 1999</ref> One of the units introduced in the war was the ] tank. In the Kadar zone, a group of 8 to 12 T-90S tanks pushed through stubborn resistance. One of the tanks was hit by 7 RPG rockets, and remained in action.<ref>http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/</ref> This showed the Putin Government's willingness to use innovation when fighting military conflicts, contrasting with the Yeltsin Government's approach, that did not introduce any new units or tactics in the ]. As resistance to the invaders stiffened, Russian ] and ] came into action. The first use of aerially delivered ]s (FAEs) against populated areas occurred in this conflict, notably on the village of ] by the federal forces.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/russian/reports/russia/2001/feb/|title=Справочный материал по объемно–детонирующим боеприпасам ("вакуумным бомбам")|date=February 2001|publisher=]|language=ru|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090216045553/http://www.hrw.org/legacy/russian/reports/russia/2001/feb/|archive-date=2009-02-16|access-date=2015-03-19}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=Brian Glyn Williams|title=The Russo-Chechen War: A Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Eurasia?|journal=Middle East Policy|publisher=Blackwell-synergy.com|volume=8|issue=1|date=2001|doi=10.1111/1475-4967.00012|pages=128–148}}</ref> The rebels were stalled by the ferocity of the bombardments: their supply lines were cut and scattered with remotely detonating ]. This gave ] time to assemble a ] under ] ], commander of the ]. On 23 August, Basayev and Khattab announced they were withdrawing from ] to "redeploy" and begin a "new phase" in their operations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Harrigan |first=Steve |date=2018-07-22 |title=CNN - Rebels say they're out of Dagestan; Russia says war contiues - August 23, 1999 |url=https://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9908/23/dagestan.withdraw/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180722230959/https://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9908/23/dagestan.withdraw/ |archive-date=2018-07-22 |access-date=2024-11-12 }}</ref> The war also saw the first use of the ] tank. In the ] zone, a group of 8 to 12 T-90S tanks pushed through stubborn resistance. One of the tanks was hit by seven ] and remained in action.<ref name="defensebrief"/>


On the night of September 4, as the federal forces were wiping out the last bastions of resistance in the Kadar region, a ] destroyed a military housing building in the Dagestani town of ], killing 64 people and starting the first in the wave of the ]. On the morning of September 5, Chechen rebels launched a second invasion into the lowland Novolakskoye region of Dagestan, this time with a larger force. The rebels came within a mere five kilometers of the major city of ]. The second invasion at the height of the hostilities in the Karamakhi zone on September 5 came as unpleasant surprise to Moscow and Makhachkala. According to Basayev, the purpose of the second invasion was to distract federal forces attacking ] and Chabanmakhi. Intensive fighting continued until September 12, when federal forces supported by local volunteers finally forced the Islamists back to Chechnya, even though sporadic armed clashes continued for some time.<ref> by ]</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Putin, Russia's choice |last=Sakwa |first=Richard |authorlink=] |coauthors= |year=2008 |edition=2nd |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-40765-6 |page=21 }}</ref><ref name="defensebrief"></ref> On the night of 4 September, as the federal forces were wiping out the last bastions of resistance in the ] region, a ] destroyed a military housing building in the Dagestani town of ], killing 64 people, the first in a wave of ]. On the morning of 5 September, ] rebels launched a second invasion into the lowland ] of Dagestan, ], this time with a larger force numbering 200 fighters led by ]. Several Russian and Dagestani troops were executed on the way as they captured the village. The rebels came within a mere five kilometers of the major city of ]. The second invasion at the height of the hostilities in the ] zone on 5 September came as an unpleasant surprise to ] and ]. According to Basayev, the purpose of the second invasion was to distract federal forces attacking ] and ]. Intensive fighting continued until 12 September, when federal forces supported by local volunteers finally forced the ] back to ], even though sporadic armed clashes continued for some time.<ref name="defensebrief">{{cite web|url=http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/|title=Moscow Defense Brief|publisher=Mdb.cast.ru|access-date=2013-08-24|archive-date=2009-01-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090129141108/http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/3-2002/ac/raowdsmcc/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Jonathan Littell|author-link=Jonathan Littell|url=http://www.psan.org/document519.html|title=The Security Organs of the Russian Federation. A Brief History 1991–2004|chapter=The Security Organs of the Russian Federation (Part III): Putin returns to the organs|publisher=Psan Publishing House|date=2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070314022541/http://www.psan.org/document519.html|archive-date=2007-03-14}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Putin, Russia's choice|url=https://archive.org/details/putinrussiaschoi00sakw_537|url-access=limited|last=Sakwa|first=Richard|author-link=Richard Sakwa|year=2008|edition=2nd|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-0-415-40765-6|page=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.1tv.ru/news/2002/06/28/267592-prokuratura_dagestana_rassleduet_obstoyatelstva_kazni_shesteryh_rossiyskih_soldat_osenyu_1999_god |title=Прокуратура Дагестана расследует обстоятельства казни шестерых российских солдат осенью 1999 год|date=28 June 2002|website=1tv.ru|publisher=]|language=ru-RU|trans-title=Dagestan Prosecutor's Office is Investigating the Circumstances of the Execution of Six Russian Soldiers in Autumn 1999|access-date=2016-05-12}}</ref><ref name="shtab.su">{{Cite web|url=http://shtab.su/video/rf/vtoraya-chechenskaya-vojna/ubiystvo_rossiyskih_voennosluzghashih_v_sele_tuhchar_smotret_onlayn.html|title=Убийство российских военнослужащих в селе Тухчар (полное видео) 1999 год|date=7 October 2015|website=shtab.su|trans-title=The murder of Russian troops in the village Tukhchar (full video) 1999|access-date=2016-05-12|language=ru|archive-date=2022-05-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220519225203/https://shtab.su/video/rf/vtoraya-chechenskaya-vojna/ubiystvo_rossiyskih_voennosluzghashih_v_sele_tuhchar_smotret_onlayn.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>


By mid-September 1999 the villages were recaptured from the routed militants, and they were pushed back into Chechnya. Meanwhile, the ] already began bombing targets inside Chechnya. At least several hundred people were killed in the fighting, including an unknown number of civilians. The federal side stated that they suffered 279 dead and approximately 987 wounded. By 13 September, all the villages had been recaptured, and the militants were routed and pushed back fully into Chechnya the following day. Meanwhile, the ] had already begun bombing targets inside Chechnya. The federal side announced that they suffered 275 dead, 15 missing and approximately 937 wounded. The number of civilians killed were never compiled.


== Aftermath == ==Aftermath==
Russia followed up with a bombing campaign of southeastern Chechnya; on September 23, Russian fighter jets bombed targets in and around the Chechen capital ]. ], the separatist president of Chechnya (ChRI), opposed the invasion of Dagestan, and offered a crackdown on the renegade warlords{{Citation needed|date=October 2009}}. It was refused by the ] and on October 1999, after a string of four apartment bombings, Russian ground forces invaded Chechnya, starting the ]. Since then, Dagestan has been a site of an ongoing, low-level ], which became part of the new Chechen War. This conflict between the government and the armed Islamist underground in Dagestan (in particular the ] group) was aided by the Chechen guerrillas. It claimed the lives of hundreds of people, mostly civilians. ] followed up with a bombing campaign of southeastern ]; on 23 September, Russian ] bombed targets in and around the Chechen capital ]. ], the president of the ], opposed the invasion of ], and offered a crackdown on the renegade warlords.{{fact|date=July 2021}} This offer was refused by the Russian government.{{fact|date=July 2021}} In October 1999, after a string of ] for which Russia blamed the Chechens, Russian ground forces invaded Chechnya, starting the ]. After the Russian victory, Dagestan has been a site of an ongoing, low-level ], which became part of the whole ]. This conflict between the government and the armed ] underground in Dagestan (in particular the ] group) was aided by the Chechen guerrillas. It claimed the lives of hundreds of people, mostly civilians.


The Invasion of Dagestan resulted in displacement of 32,000 Dagestani civilians. According to researcher Robert Bruce Ware, Basayev and Khattab's invasions were potentially genocidal in that they attacked mountain villages destroying entire populations of small ethno-linguistic groups. Furthermore, Ware asserts that the invasions are properly described as terrorist attacks because they initially involved attacks against Dagestani civilians and police officers.<ref name="ware"/> The invasion of Dagestan resulted in the displacement of 32,000 Dagestani civilians. According to researcher ], ] and ]'s invasions were potentially ], in that they attacked mountain villages and destroyed entire populations of small ethno-linguistic groups. Furthermore, Ware asserts that the invasions are properly described as terrorist attacks because they initially involved attacks against Dagestani civilians and police officers.<ref name="ware"/>


== Opposing forces == ==Opposing forces==
{{more citations needed|section|date=August 2017}}<!--Federal forces and Insurgent forces sections have no references-->
=== Federal forces ===
Despite the initial poor showing of the government forces (for example, military helicopters were hit by anti-tank guided missiles during a rebel raid on the Botlikh airfield), Moscow and Makhachkala were able to put together an impressive fighting force. For instance, the light infantry units were partially drawn from the ], ], ] and ]) crucial to mountain and ] ].


===Federal forces===
The government forces consisted of three main elements: ] and ] units able to operate in the mountains and in small ambush and assault forces; larger mechanized units to seal areas off and maintain area security; and artillery with air support elements that were able to interdict supply lines and box in the rebels. Most of the 'teeth' were drawn from regular army units, with the exception of the MVD's Internal Troops' 102nd Brigade, the ] commando force and the local Dagestani ]. Makhachala long expected an incident of this sort, and since its OMON troops proved ineffectual in 1996 when Chechen rebels seized ]s in the Dagestani city of ], it placed a part of its scarce resources into turning this force into a small local army. The Dagestani OMON force numbers almost 1,000 men and, bar the absence of ] and artillery, they are equipped as ]; the force even had a number of ] and ] ]s and heavy support weapons.
Despite the initial poor showing of the government forces (for example, military helicopters were hit by ] during a rebel raid on the ] airfield), ] and ] were able to put together an impressive fighting force. For instance, the light infantry units were partially drawn from the ], ] and ], crucial to ] and ] ].


The government forces consisted of three main elements: ] and ] units able to operate in the mountains and in small ambush and assault forces; larger mechanized units to seal areas off and maintain area security; and artillery with air support elements that were able to interdict supply lines and box in the rebels. Most of the 'teeth' were drawn from regular army units, with the exception of the MVD's ]' 102nd Brigade, the ] ] force and the local Dagestani ]. Makhachala long expected an incident of this sort, and since its OMON troops proved ineffectual in 1996 when ] rebels ] in the Dagestani city of ], it placed a part of its scarce resources into turning this force into a small local army. The Dagestani OMON force numbered almost 1,000 men and, bar the absence of heavy armored vehicles and artillery, they were equipped as ]; the force even had a number of antiquated ] and ] ]s, as well as heavy support weapons.
At the end of 1997 the republic also began raising volunteer territorial militia. During the emergency, its ranks of reservists and volunteers almost reached 5,000. Their training and equipment were minimal, making them little more than a home guard force.


At the end of 1997 the republic also began raising volunteer territorial ]. During the emergency, its ranks of reservists and volunteers almost reached 5,000. Their training and equipment were minimal, making them little more than a home guard force. However, their motivation to defend and recapture their homes as well as intimate knowledge of the terrain made them a reliable garrison force.
=== Rebel forces ===
The insurgents proved to be a collection of Chechen Guerrillas, Dagestani rebels, ] and ] from across the Arab world and Central Asia. Estimates of the insurgent forces' strength has been estimated of being 1,500-3,000 men. While mostly experienced veterans of the Chechen and other wars, they were lightly equipped. They possessed ample supplies of small arms, support weapons, several ] ATGMs, mortars and ample ammunition but they appeared to have only two BTR-60s possibly captured from government forces in the first days of the attack, a single ] and a few truck-mounted ] anti-aircraft guns to use as fire support.


===Insurgent forces===
Their first-among-equals leader was Basayev, Chechen rebel leader, erstwhile prime minister and founder of the CPCD. Basayev's position was in many ways an ambiguous one. He was a staunch Muslim but didn't share the extreme Wahhabism of many of his allies; however, he strongly believed that Dagestan and Chechnya should be one state. Although a seasoned and wily guerrilla commander, this war saw him used as a political figurehead. His CPCD was officially charged with forming new "structures of Islamic self-government" in rebel-held areas. The brevity of the occupation and the opposition of the indigenous population to their "liberation" meant that this was never a serious process.
The insurgents proved to be a collection of ], ] and ] guerrillas. Estimates of the insurgent forces' strength has been estimated of being 1,500-2,000 men. While mostly experienced veterans of the ] and other wars, they were lightly equipped. They possessed ample supplies of small arms, support weapons, several ] ], ] and ample ammunition but they appeared to have only two ], possibly captured from government forces in the first days of the attack, a single ] and a few truck-mounted ] ] to use as fire support.


Their first-among-equals leader was ], Chechen rebel leader, erstwhile prime minister. Basayev's position was in many ways an ambiguous one. He was a staunch ] but didn't share the extreme ] of many of his allies; however, he strongly believed that ] and ] should be one state. Although a seasoned and wily guerrilla commander, this war saw him used as a political figurehead. His CPCD was officially charged with forming new "structures of Islamic self-government" in rebel-held areas. The brevity of the occupation and the opposition of many locals to their "liberation" meant that this was never a serious process.
Ibn al-Khattab's ] formed the core of the insurgent forces, accounting for roughly half of the rebel fighters. Having fought against the Russians during the First Chechen War, he waged an open campaign against President Maskhadov, whom he regarded as too close to Moscow. Khattab concluded a marriage of political convenience with Basayev, but in effect retained operational command and a veto on political direction.


]'s ] formed the core of the insurgent forces, accounting for perhaps half of the rebel fighters. Having fought against the ] during the ], he went on to wage an open campaign against President ], whom he regarded as too close to ]. Khattab concluded a marriage of political convenience with Basayev, but in effect retained operational command and a veto on political direction.
The third element in the loose rebel ] were the Dagestani Islamic militants. Besides Bagauddin Magomedov, the two key figures were Nadir Khachilayev and Siradjin Ramazanov. An ethnic ] and former leader of the Union of Muslims in Russia, Khachilayev has a long pedigree of opposition to the local regime of ]. In 1998 he launched an abortive attempt to storm the government buildings in the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala. Khachilayev escaped to Chechnya where he found sanctuary with Islamist guerrilla movements, eventually forging an ] with Khattab. Despite their Dagestani origins, he and the self-styled prime minister of 'Islamic Dagestan', Ramazanov, proved marginal, reflecting their failure to bring recruits to their side after they launched the operation. The self-proclaimed ] (Islamic council) of Dagestan welcomed the "liberation" and declared an Islamic state, but proved to have relatively little authority, primary due to lack of support from the indigenous population.


The third element in the loose rebel ] were the Dagestani Islamic militants. Besides ], the two key figures were ] and ]. An ethnic ] and former leader of the Union of Muslims in Russia, Khachilayev had a long pedigree of opposition to the local regime of ]. In 1998 he launched an abortive attempt to storm the government buildings in the Dagestani capital, ]. Khachilayev escaped to ] where he found sanctuary with Islamist guerrilla movements, eventually forging an alliance with Khattab. Despite their Dagestani origins, he and the self-styled prime minister of 'Islamic Dagestan', Ramazanov, proved marginal, reflecting their failure to bring recruits to their side after they launched the operation. The self-proclaimed ] welcomed the "liberation" and declared an Islamic state, but proved to have relatively little authority.
== Conspiracy Theories ==
Because the Invasion of Dagestan served as a trigger for the Second Chechen War that led to an eventual Russian victory, a number of conspiracy theories claimed that the Invasion of Dagestan was not a Wahhabi attempt to create a Caucasian Emirate, but rather orchestrated by either Putin, as the Berezovsky Camp alleges, or Berezovsky, as KPRF Duma Member Viktor Ilyukhin alleges. While both theories seem somewhat credible on the top, not a single person that actually participated in the Dagestan War, including the the military members from either side of the conflict, was able to confirm a single major detail of either conspiracy theory.
=== Conspiracy Theory of Russian government involvement ===
According to ], he had a conversation with the Chechen Islamist ideologist and Basayev's propaganda chief ] six months before the beginning of the rebel invasion of Dagestan.<ref name="Dissident">], with ] '']'', The Free Press, 2007, ISBN 1-416-55165-4, page 216.</ref> Allegedly, Udugov proposed to start the Dagestan war to provoke the Russian response, topple the Chechen president Maskhadov and establish new ] made of Chechnya and Ingushetia that would be friendly to Russia. Berezovsky asserted that he refused the offer, but "Udugov and Basayev conspired with Stepashin and Putin to provoke a war to topple Maskhadov..., but the agreement was for the Russian army to stop at the ]. According to Berezovski, Putin double-crossed the Chechens and started an all-out war."<ref name="Dissident"/> A transcript of the conversation was leaked to one of Moscow tabloids on September 10, 1999.<ref> "Death of a Dissident", page 189.</ref> Nevertheless, even if the Russian Army would have stopped at the Terek River, they could have still taken over Chechnya, as most of the Terek River does not serve as a border, because flows through Chechnya, and the part that borders Dagestan, where the Russian Army was to allegedly stop, had no major river crossings. Basaev, who was an ace at Caucasian Geography because he commanded numerous battles in the region, claims that he would never sell Chechnya to Putin, and denies the makings of such a deal.<ref></ref>
The Invasion of Dagestan, which lead to the start of the ], was regarded by the Russian journalist ] as a provocation initiated from Moscow to start war in Chechnya, because Russian forces provided safe passage for Islamic fighters back to Chechnya.<ref name="Anna"></ref> However there were no Russian forces in the Chechen rear to prevent said passage from being safe. It was reported that ] of the Yeltsin administration paid money to Basayev to stage this military operation.<ref name="Dunlop1"> - by John B. Dunlop, ACPC, October 17, 200</ref><ref name="Klebnikov"> Paul Klebnikov: Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism, ISBN 0-15-601330-4</ref><ref name="Pribylovsky"> by Vladimir Pribylovsky and Yuriy Felshtinsky (in Russian).</ref> Basayev allegedly worked for Russian ].<ref name="Glucksmann"> - by Andre Glucksmann. Prima-News, March 11, 2005</ref><ref name="Basaev"> The Jamestown Foundation, September 08, 2006</ref><ref name="Fuller">
- by Liz Fuller, RFE/RL, March 1, 2005</ref> However, Basayev denied any involvement with the GRU, nor was there any actual evidence of Basaev's involvement as a GRU agent.<ref></ref>
=== Conspiracy Theory of Berezovsky's Involvement ===
A member of Russia's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) Duma Faction, Viktor Ilyukhin who served as a co-chair of the defense committee, charged the FSB with "failing to timely disclose the information about Berezovksy's financing of Chechen Rebel Leaders". Ilyukhin believes that had Berezovsky's finances been timely exposed, the number of civilian and military casualties in Chechenya, on both sides, would have been greatly diminished. Berezovsky had the motive of seizing the Caucasian Region due to its oil and gas reserves. Ilyukhin fails to mention how Berezovsky would have controlled said Caucasian Region's Government if his "plan" worked. One way of the finances is that the Chechens would capture civilians, and demand monetary compensation; yet Maskhadov and Basaev often complained that parts of the compensation were siphoned to mysterious third party.<ref name="businesspress.ru">http://www.businesspress.ru/newspaper/article_mId_33_aId_99279.html</ref>
When the FSB published their charges against Berezovsky, he responded by blaming the FSB for the Apartment Bombings, and stating that he had a movie to show the Russian Public that would be shown on TV-6 in 2002. However TV-6 was shut down by the Russian Government, and the movie is yet to be seen or published, despite other media outlets being offered to Berezovksi.<ref name="businesspress.ru"/>


==Alleged agreement between Basayev and Russian authorities to start the war==
== Notes ==
<!--See http://en.wikipedia.org/Wikipedia:Footnotes for an explanation of how to generate footnotes using the <ref(erences/)> tags-->
{{Reflist}}


The invasion of ] leading to the start of the ] was regarded by the ] journalist ] as a provocation initiated from ] to start war in ], because Russian forces provided safe passage for ] fighters back to Chechnya.<ref name="Anna">{{cite book|author=Politkovskaya, Anna|url=http://www.press.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/hfs.cgi/00/16135.ctl|title=A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya|others=Translated by Alexander Burry and Tatiana Tulchinsky|date=2003|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050205010828/http://www.press.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/hfs.cgi/00/16135.ctl|archive-date=2005-02-05}} </ref>
== See also ==

*]
According to ], the war was planned for six months before the Dagestan events, over his objections.<ref name="Dissident_p_216">], with ] '']'', The Free Press, 2007, {{ISBN|1-416-55165-4}}, page 216.</ref> Berezovsky confirmed that ] came to see him, but denied that he conspired with Udugov. However, according to Berezovsky "] and ] conspired with ] and ] to provoke a war to topple ]..., but the Chechen condition was for the Russian army to stop at the ]. Instead, Putin double-crossed the Chechens and started an all-out war."<ref name="Dissident_p_216"/> In September 1999, transcripts of a number of alleged phone conversations conducted by ] with ], ] and other radical ] in June and July 1999 were published by '']'' newspaper.<ref>{{in lang|ru}} {{cite news|title=БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ СЛУШАЕТ|url=http://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/article/1999/09/14/136080-berezovskiy-slushaet.html|publisher=]|date=14 September 1999}}</ref>
*]

*]
It has also been reported that the head of the Russian presidential administration of the ], ], administration paid money to Shamil Basayev to stage this military operation.<ref name="Dunlop1">{{cite web|author=John B. Dunlop|url=http://www.peaceinthecaucasus.org/reports/paper_dunlop.htm|title=The Second Russo-Chechen War Two Years On|date=17 October 2001|publisher=The American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070421144511/http://www.peaceinthecaucasus.org/reports/paper_dunlop.htm|archive-date=2007-04-21}}</ref><ref name="Pribylovsky">{{cite web|author=Vladimir Pribylovsky and Yuriy Felshtinsky|url=http://www.lib.ru/HISTORY/FELSHTINSKY/naslednik.txt|title=Операция "Наследник". Главы из книги|publisher=Lib.ru|access-date=2015-02-23|language=ru}}</ref> In early August 1999, the investigative Russian journal ''Versiya'' published a report that Voloshin had met secretly with Basayev on 4 July 1999. The meeting was arranged by a retired officer of the ], Anton Surikov, and took place at a villa owned by the arms dealer ] between ] and ]. Many of the participants of the meeting had fought on the same side during the ] during the early 1990s. According to ], those who arranged the meeting made one mistake; the security system blocked monitoring from the outside but provided perfect conditions for monitoring from the inside. ] was able to listen in on everything that transpired.<ref name="Dunlop_Sgovor1999">{{cite book|authorlink=John B. Dunlop|author=John Dunlop|title=The Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin's Rule|location=Stuttgart|publisher=Ibidem|year=2012|isbn=978-3-8382-0388-1|pages=66–70}}</ref> However, ] believed that Basayev hadn't actually been in Nice. According to Akhmadov, Basayev was portrayed in shorts<ref>The photo can be seen in the updated version of the original article, "Sgovor-2": {{in lang|ru}} {{cite news|last1=Прянишников|first1=Пётр|title=Волошин и Басаев на Лазурном берегу. Фото на память|url=http://www.compromat.ru/main/voloshin/Basaev.htm|date=4 July 2000|website=compromat.ru|url-status=bot: unknown|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070228104406/http://www.compromat.ru/main/voloshin/Basaev.htm|archive-date=28 February 2007|df=dmy-all}}</ref> while Chechen men, especially fighters, do not wear shorts. Additional reasons not to take the story seriously were that Basayev had been a participant of a rally in ] on 3 July 1999, and that Akhmadov didn't know an instance when Basayev left the ] in the years after the ].<ref>p. 167, Akhmadov, Lanskoy, Brzezinski, "The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost", Palgrave Macmillan (2010)</ref> According to a press report cited by Timur Muzayev from the International Institute of Humanities and Political Research, speakers at the rally in Grozny on 3 July 1999 included Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, and ]; these men and others called for reconciliation and unity.<ref>{{in lang|ru}} {{cite web|last1=Muzayev|first1=Timur|title=Political Monitoring of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, July 1999|url=http://www.igpi.ru/monitoring/1047645476/1999/0799/20.html|website=International Institute of Humanities and Political Research}}</ref>

Shamil Basayev allegedly worked for Russian GRU, at least prior to the Second Chechen War.<ref name="Glucksmann">{{cite web|author=Andre Glucksmann|url=http://prima-news.ru/eng/news/articles/2005/3/11/31434.html|title=Western leaders betray Aslan Maskhadov|date=11 March 2005|publisher=Prima-News|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025013340/http://prima-news.ru/eng/news/articles/2005/3/11/31434.html|archive-date=2007-10-25}}</ref><ref name="Basaev">{{cite web|url=http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nc/single/?tx_ttnews&#91;tt_news&#93;=3333&tx_ttnews&#91;backPid&#93;=188&no_cache=1|title=Chechen Parliamentary Speaker: Basayev was G.R.U. Officer|publisher=The Jamestown Foundation|date=2006-09-08|access-date=2015-02-23|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402134931/http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nc/single/?tx_ttnews&#91;tt_news&|archive-date=2015-04-02}}</ref><ref name="Fuller">{{cite web|last=Fuller|first=Liz|url=http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/03/533b2aa8-dfbd-4837-9dfe-ec64e3206aa6.html|title=Analysis: Has Chechnya's Strongman Signed His Own Death Warrant?|publisher=Rferl.org|access-date=2015-02-23}}</ref> According to ], who worked for Basayev's ] and accepted a Foreign Minister position in Maskhadov's government in 1999, allegations that Shamil Basayev was working for Russians should be viewed as an element of the political strife among Chechen leaders, as he criticized what he called "tangents about how Shamil was Russia's agent", noting that "Shamil equally strongly believed that Maskhadov's various calls for peace benefited only Russia".<ref>p. 204, Akhmadov, Lanskoy, Brzezinski, "The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost", Palgrave Macmillan (2010)</ref>

==References==
{{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}

==External links==
*{{commonscatinline}}
*
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417112912/http://www.isn.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=22365 |date=2021-04-17 }}


{{Chechen wars}} {{Chechen wars}}
{{Russian Conflicts}} {{Russian Conflicts}}
{{Boris Yeltsin}}


] ]
] ]
] ]
]
] ]
] ]
] ]
]

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Latest revision as of 02:14, 24 December 2024

Conflict in the Dagestan Russian Republic
War in Dagestan
Part of the spillover of the Second Chechen War, Post-Soviet conflicts

Location of the Republic of Dagestan (red) within European Russia
Date7 August – 14 September 1999
(1 month and 1 week)
LocationDagestan, Russia
Result Russian victory
Belligerents

Islamic Djamaat of Dagestan

 Chechnya

 Russia

Commanders and leaders
Shamil Basayev
Ramzan Akhmadov
Dokka Umarov
Movladi Udugov
Ibn al-Khattab
Abu Zarr Shishani (Gerat)
Arbi Barayev
Movsar Suleimanov
Abdul-Malik Mezhidov
Abdul-Vahhab Shishani
Ismail Razakov (Bagram)
Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov
Shirvani Basaev
Abu al-Walid
Hakim al-Medani 
Yaqub al-Ghamidi
Abu Jafar al-Yemeni
Rappani Khalilov
Abdurrahman az-Zarki (Chechen from Jordan)
Magomed Tsagarayev
Ruslan Haihoroev 
Huta Ahmadov (Abdurrahman
Garib Shishani
Baudi Bakuyev
Umar Edilsultanov
Isa Umarov
Adallo Aliev
Sirazhudin Ramazanov
Bagaudin Kebedov
Magomed Tagaev
Boris Yeltsin
Vladimir Putin
Viktor Kazantsev
Gennady Troshev
Alexander Baranov
Adilgerei Magomedtagirov
Magomed Omarov
Magomedali Magomedov
Said Amirov
Strength
Up to 1,500–2,000 fighters in early August,
more than 10,000 militants by the end of September
17,000 soldiers,
thousands of policemen and volunteers
Casualties and losses
Russian claim: 2,500 militants killed 275 servicemen killed,
15 missing and 937 wounded (per Russia)
Significant losses to local Dagestani police and militias
Unknown number of civilian casualties
Chechen–Russian conflict
Tsardom of Russia
Russian Empire
Soviet Union
Russian Federation
Post-Soviet conflicts
Caucasus

Central Asia

Eastern Europe
Terrorism in Russia
Bold italics indicate incidents resulting in more
than 50 deaths. Incidents are bombings,
unless described otherwise.
1977
1995
1996
1999
2002
2003
2004
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2022
2023
2024

The 1999 war in Dagestan, also known as the Dagestan incursions (Russian: Война в Дагестане), was an armed conflict that began when the Chechen-based Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), an Islamist group led by Shamil Basayev, Ibn al-Khattab, Ramzan Akhmadov and Arbi Barayev, invaded the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan on 7 August 1999, in support of the Shura of Dagestan separatist rebels. The war ended with a major victory for the Russian Federation and Republic of Dagestan and the retreat of the IIPB. The invasion of Dagestan alongside a series of apartment bombings in September 1999 served as the main casus belli for the Second Chechen War.

Background

During the inter-war period of 1996 to 1999, a war-ravaged Chechnya descended into chaos and economic collapse. Aslan Maskhadov's government was unable to rebuild the region or to prevent a number of warlords from taking effective control. The relationship between the government and radicals deteriorated. In March 1999, Maskhadov closed down the Chechen parliament and introduced aspects of Sharia. Despite this concession, extremists such as Shamil Basayev and the Saudi-born Islamist Ibn Al-Khattab continued to undermine the Maskhadov government. In April 1998, the group publicly declared that its long-term aim was the creation of a union of Chechnya and Dagestan under Islamic rule and the expulsion of Russians from the entire Caucasian Region.

In late 1997, Bagaudtin Kebedov (also known as Bagaudtin Magomedov), the ethnic Avar leader of the radical wing of the Dagestani Wahhabis (Salafists), fled with his followers to Chechnya. There he established close ties with Ibn Al-Khattab and other leaders of Chechnya's Wahhabi community. In January 1999, Khattab began the formation of an "Islamic Legion" with foreign Muslim volunteers. At the same time, he commanded the "peacemaking unit of the Majlis (Parliament) of Ichkeria and Dagestan". A series of invasions of Dagestan from Chechnya took place during the inter-war period, culminating in the 1997 attack on a federal military garrison of the 136th Motorized Rifle Regiment near the Dagestani town of Buinaksk. Other attacks targeted civilians and Dagestani police on a regular basis.

In April 1999, Kebedov, the "Emir of the Islamic Djamaat of Dagestan," made an appeal to the "Islamic patriots of the Caucasus" to "take part in the jihad" and participate in "liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus from the Russian colonial yoke." According to this "prominent" Wahhabi's vision, proponents of the idea of a free Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the "Islamic Army of the Caucasus" that he founded, and report to the army's headquarters in the village of Karamakhi for military duty. Chechen separatist government official Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev claimed that he alerted the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) Director Vladimir Putin, in the summer of 1999, of the imminent invasion of Dagestan.

Invasion and the Russian counterattack

On 4 August 1999, several Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) servicemen were killed in a border clash with a group of Kebedov's fighters. On 7 August Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab officially launched an invasion into Dagestan with a group of roughly 1,500–2,000 armed militants consisting of Islamic radicals from Chechnya, including other international Islamists.

Khattab described himself as the "military commander of the operation", while Basayev was the "overall commander in the battlefield". They seized villages in the districts of Tsumadi (Echeda, Gakko, Kedy, Kvanada, Gadiri and Gigatl) and Botlikh (Godoberi, Miarso, Shodroda, Ansalta, Rakhata and Inkhelo). On 10 August, they announced the birth of the "independent Islamic State of Dagestan" and declared war on "the traitorous Dagestani government" and "Russia's occupation units".

The federal military response to the invasion was slow, and the efforts were initially fumbling and disorganized. As a result, all of the early resistance, and much of the later resistance, was undertaken by Dagestani police, spontaneously organized citizen militias, and individual Dagestani villagers. Basayev and Khattab were not welcomed as "liberators" as they had expected; the Dagestani villagers considered the invaders as unwelcome religious fanatics. Instead of an anti-Russian uprising, a mass mobilization of volunteers formed in the border areas against the invading army.

As resistance to the invaders stiffened, Russian artillery and airstrikes came into action. The first use of aerially delivered fuel-air explosives (FAEs) against populated areas occurred in this conflict, notably on the village of Tando by the federal forces. The rebels were stalled by the ferocity of the bombardments: their supply lines were cut and scattered with remotely detonating mines. This gave Moscow time to assemble a counter-attack under Colonel-General Viktor Kazantsev, commander of the North Caucasus Military District. On 23 August, Basayev and Khattab announced they were withdrawing from Botlikhsky District to "redeploy" and begin a "new phase" in their operations. The war also saw the first use of the T-90 tank. In the Kadar zone, a group of 8 to 12 T-90S tanks pushed through stubborn resistance. One of the tanks was hit by seven rocket-propelled grenades and remained in action.

On the night of 4 September, as the federal forces were wiping out the last bastions of resistance in the Kadar region, a car bomb destroyed a military housing building in the Dagestani town of Buynaksk, killing 64 people, the first in a wave of Russian apartment bombings. On the morning of 5 September, Chechen rebels launched a second invasion into the lowland Novolaksky region of Dagestan, seizing the border village of Tukhchar, this time with a larger force numbering 200 fighters led by Umar Edilsultanov. Several Russian and Dagestani troops were executed on the way as they captured the village. The rebels came within a mere five kilometers of the major city of Khasavyurt. The second invasion at the height of the hostilities in the Karamakhi zone on 5 September came as an unpleasant surprise to Moscow and Makhachkala. According to Basayev, the purpose of the second invasion was to distract federal forces attacking Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. Intensive fighting continued until 12 September, when federal forces supported by local volunteers finally forced the Islamists back to Chechnya, even though sporadic armed clashes continued for some time.

By 13 September, all the villages had been recaptured, and the militants were routed and pushed back fully into Chechnya the following day. Meanwhile, the Russian Air Force had already begun bombing targets inside Chechnya. The federal side announced that they suffered 275 dead, 15 missing and approximately 937 wounded. The number of civilians killed were never compiled.

Aftermath

Russia followed up with a bombing campaign of southeastern Chechnya; on 23 September, Russian fighter jets bombed targets in and around the Chechen capital Grozny. Aslan Maskhadov, the president of the Chechen republic of Ichkeria, opposed the invasion of Dagestan, and offered a crackdown on the renegade warlords. This offer was refused by the Russian government. In October 1999, after a string of four apartment bombings for which Russia blamed the Chechens, Russian ground forces invaded Chechnya, starting the Second Chechen War. After the Russian victory, Dagestan has been a site of an ongoing, low-level insurgency, which became part of the whole insurgency in the North Caucasus. This conflict between the government and the armed Islamist underground in Dagestan (in particular the Shariat Jamaat group) was aided by the Chechen guerrillas. It claimed the lives of hundreds of people, mostly civilians.

The invasion of Dagestan resulted in the displacement of 32,000 Dagestani civilians. According to researcher Robert Bruce Ware, Basayev and Khattab's invasions were potentially genocidal, in that they attacked mountain villages and destroyed entire populations of small ethno-linguistic groups. Furthermore, Ware asserts that the invasions are properly described as terrorist attacks because they initially involved attacks against Dagestani civilians and police officers.

Opposing forces

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
Find sources: "War in Dagestan" 1999 – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (August 2017) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Federal forces

Despite the initial poor showing of the government forces (for example, military helicopters were hit by anti-tank guided missiles during a rebel raid on the Botlikh airfield), Moscow and Makhachkala were able to put together an impressive fighting force. For instance, the light infantry units were partially drawn from the Spetsnaz, paratroopers and naval infantry, crucial to mountain and counter-insurgency warfare.

The government forces consisted of three main elements: light and air mobile infantry units able to operate in the mountains and in small ambush and assault forces; larger mechanized units to seal areas off and maintain area security; and artillery with air support elements that were able to interdict supply lines and box in the rebels. Most of the 'teeth' were drawn from regular army units, with the exception of the MVD's Internal Troops' 102nd Brigade, the Rus commando force and the local Dagestani OMON. Makhachala long expected an incident of this sort, and since its OMON troops proved ineffectual in 1996 when Chechen rebels seized hostages in the Dagestani city of Kizlyar, it placed a part of its scarce resources into turning this force into a small local army. The Dagestani OMON force numbered almost 1,000 men and, bar the absence of heavy armored vehicles and artillery, they were equipped as motorised infantry; the force even had a number of antiquated BTR-60 and BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers, as well as heavy support weapons.

At the end of 1997 the republic also began raising volunteer territorial militia. During the emergency, its ranks of reservists and volunteers almost reached 5,000. Their training and equipment were minimal, making them little more than a home guard force. However, their motivation to defend and recapture their homes as well as intimate knowledge of the terrain made them a reliable garrison force.

Insurgent forces

The insurgents proved to be a collection of Chechen, Dagestani and Arab guerrillas. Estimates of the insurgent forces' strength has been estimated of being 1,500-2,000 men. While mostly experienced veterans of the Chechen Wars and other wars, they were lightly equipped. They possessed ample supplies of small arms, support weapons, several 9M111 Fagot ATGMs, mortars and ample ammunition but they appeared to have only two BTR-60s, possibly captured from government forces in the first days of the attack, a single T-12 antitank gun and a few truck-mounted ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns to use as fire support.

Their first-among-equals leader was Shamil Basayev, Chechen rebel leader, erstwhile prime minister. Basayev's position was in many ways an ambiguous one. He was a staunch Muslim but didn't share the extreme Wahhabism of many of his allies; however, he strongly believed that Dagestan and Chechnya should be one state. Although a seasoned and wily guerrilla commander, this war saw him used as a political figurehead. His CPCD was officially charged with forming new "structures of Islamic self-government" in rebel-held areas. The brevity of the occupation and the opposition of many locals to their "liberation" meant that this was never a serious process.

Ibn al-Khattab's Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade formed the core of the insurgent forces, accounting for perhaps half of the rebel fighters. Having fought against the Russians during the First Chechen War, he went on to wage an open campaign against President Maskhadov, whom he regarded as too close to Moscow. Khattab concluded a marriage of political convenience with Basayev, but in effect retained operational command and a veto on political direction.

The third element in the loose rebel triumvirate were the Dagestani Islamic militants. Besides Bagauddin Kebedov, the two key figures were Nadir Khachilayev and Siradjin Ramazanov. An ethnic Lak and former leader of the Union of Muslims in Russia, Khachilayev had a long pedigree of opposition to the local regime of Magomedali Magomedov. In 1998 he launched an abortive attempt to storm the government buildings in the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala. Khachilayev escaped to Chechnya where he found sanctuary with Islamist guerrilla movements, eventually forging an alliance with Khattab. Despite their Dagestani origins, he and the self-styled prime minister of 'Islamic Dagestan', Ramazanov, proved marginal, reflecting their failure to bring recruits to their side after they launched the operation. The self-proclaimed Shura of Dagestan welcomed the "liberation" and declared an Islamic state, but proved to have relatively little authority.

Alleged agreement between Basayev and Russian authorities to start the war

The invasion of Dagestan leading to the start of the Second Chechen War was regarded by the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya as a provocation initiated from Moscow to start war in Chechnya, because Russian forces provided safe passage for Islamic fighters back to Chechnya.

According to Boris Berezovsky, the war was planned for six months before the Dagestan events, over his objections. Berezovsky confirmed that Movladi Udugov came to see him, but denied that he conspired with Udugov. However, according to Berezovsky "Udugov and Basayev conspired with Stepashin and Putin to provoke a war to topple Maskhadov..., but the Chechen condition was for the Russian army to stop at the Terek River. Instead, Putin double-crossed the Chechens and started an all-out war." In September 1999, transcripts of a number of alleged phone conversations conducted by Boris Berezovsky with Movladi Udugov, Gaji Makhachev and other radical Chechens in June and July 1999 were published by Moskovskij Komsomolets newspaper.

It has also been reported that the head of the Russian presidential administration of the Boris Yeltsin, Alexander Voloshin, administration paid money to Shamil Basayev to stage this military operation. In early August 1999, the investigative Russian journal Versiya published a report that Voloshin had met secretly with Basayev on 4 July 1999. The meeting was arranged by a retired officer of the GRU, Anton Surikov, and took place at a villa owned by the arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi between Nice and Monaco. Many of the participants of the meeting had fought on the same side during the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict during the early 1990s. According to Boris Kagarlitsky, those who arranged the meeting made one mistake; the security system blocked monitoring from the outside but provided perfect conditions for monitoring from the inside. French intelligence was able to listen in on everything that transpired. However, Ilyas Akhmadov believed that Basayev hadn't actually been in Nice. According to Akhmadov, Basayev was portrayed in shorts while Chechen men, especially fighters, do not wear shorts. Additional reasons not to take the story seriously were that Basayev had been a participant of a rally in Grozny on 3 July 1999, and that Akhmadov didn't know an instance when Basayev left the North Caucasus in the years after the First Chechen War. According to a press report cited by Timur Muzayev from the International Institute of Humanities and Political Research, speakers at the rally in Grozny on 3 July 1999 included Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, and Ruslan Gelayev; these men and others called for reconciliation and unity.

Shamil Basayev allegedly worked for Russian GRU, at least prior to the Second Chechen War. According to Ilyas Akhmadov, who worked for Basayev's 1997 election campaign and accepted a Foreign Minister position in Maskhadov's government in 1999, allegations that Shamil Basayev was working for Russians should be viewed as an element of the political strife among Chechen leaders, as he criticized what he called "tangents about how Shamil was Russia's agent", noting that "Shamil equally strongly believed that Maskhadov's various calls for peace benefited only Russia".

References

  1. ^ Alexander Pashin (2002). "Russian Army Operations and Weaponry During Second Military Campaign in Chechnya". Moscow Defense Brief. No. #3. Mdb.cast.ru. Archived from the original on 2009-01-29. Retrieved 2015-02-23.
  2. Oleg Lukin (2008). "Новейшая история: Российско-чеченские войны". Vestnik "Mostok" (in Russian). Vestnikmostok.ru. Retrieved 2015-02-23.
  3. "АНТИТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ОПЕРАЦИЯ НА СЕВЕРНОМ КАВКАЗЕ (август 1999–2000 г.) | Операция на территории Республики Дагестан". 10 March 2020. Archived from the original on 2009-04-14.
  4. За время антитеррористической операции на Северном Кавказе боевики потеряли порядка 7 тыс. человек убитыми.
  5. Lieven, Anatol. "Why Dagestan Needs the Russians". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 August 2023.
  6. Richard Sakwa, ed. (2005). "Mike Bowker: Western Views of the Chechen Conflict". Chechnya: From Past to Future. Anthem Press. pp. 223–318. ISBN 978-1-84331-164-5.
  7. ^ Emil Souleimanov (December 2005). "Chechnya, Wahhabism and the Invasion of Dagestan". The Middle East Review of International Affairs. 9 (4). Archived from the original on 2012-04-20.
  8. ^ Richard Sakwa, ed. (2005). "Robert Bruce Ware: Mythology and Political Failure in Chechnya". Chechnya: From Past to Future. Anthem Press. pp. 79–115. ISBN 978-1-84331-164-5.
  9. "RFE/RL Newsline, 02-08-23". Hri.org. Retrieved 2013-08-24.
  10. ^ Murphy, Paul (2004). The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror. Potomac Books Inc. ISBN 978-1574888300.
  11. "Tsumadinskiy Rayon". Google Maps. Retrieved 2015-02-23.
  12. "Botlikhskiy Rayon". Google Maps. Retrieved 2015-02-23.
  13. "Rebels pick Chechen warlord in Dagestan insurgency; Government focuses on crisis in southern Russia". CNN. Archived from the original on 3 January 2008. Retrieved 2006-08-22.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link), CNN, 11 August 1999
  14. "Справочный материал по объемно–детонирующим боеприпасам ("вакуумным бомбам")" (in Russian). Human Rights Watch. February 2001. Archived from the original on 2009-02-16. Retrieved 2015-03-19.
  15. Brian Glyn Williams (2001). "The Russo-Chechen War: A Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Eurasia?". Middle East Policy. 8 (1). Blackwell-synergy.com: 128–148. doi:10.1111/1475-4967.00012.
  16. Harrigan, Steve (2018-07-22). "CNN - Rebels say they're out of Dagestan; Russia says war contiues - August 23, 1999". Archived from the original on 2018-07-22. Retrieved 2024-11-12.
  17. ^ "Moscow Defense Brief". Mdb.cast.ru. Archived from the original on 2009-01-29. Retrieved 2013-08-24.
  18. Jonathan Littell (2006). "The Security Organs of the Russian Federation (Part III): Putin returns to the organs". The Security Organs of the Russian Federation. A Brief History 1991–2004. Psan Publishing House. Archived from the original on 2007-03-14.
  19. Sakwa, Richard (2008). Putin, Russia's choice (2nd ed.). Routledge. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-415-40765-6.
  20. "Прокуратура Дагестана расследует обстоятельства казни шестерых российских солдат осенью 1999 год" [Dagestan Prosecutor's Office is Investigating the Circumstances of the Execution of Six Russian Soldiers in Autumn 1999]. 1tv.ru (in Russian). Channel One Russia. 28 June 2002. Retrieved 2016-05-12.
  21. "Убийство российских военнослужащих в селе Тухчар (полное видео) 1999 год" [The murder of Russian troops in the village Tukhchar (full video) 1999]. shtab.su (in Russian). 7 October 2015. Archived from the original on 2022-05-19. Retrieved 2016-05-12.
  22. Politkovskaya, Anna (2003). A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya. Translated by Alexander Burry and Tatiana Tulchinsky. Archived from the original on 2005-02-05.
  23. ^ Alex Goldfarb, with Marina Litvinenko Death of a Dissident: The Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the Return of the KGB, The Free Press, 2007, ISBN 1-416-55165-4, page 216.
  24. (in Russian) "БЕРЕЗОВСКИЙ СЛУШАЕТ". Moskovskij Komsomolets. 14 September 1999.
  25. John B. Dunlop (17 October 2001). "The Second Russo-Chechen War Two Years On". The American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus. Archived from the original on 2007-04-21.
  26. Vladimir Pribylovsky and Yuriy Felshtinsky. "Операция "Наследник". Главы из книги" (in Russian). Lib.ru. Retrieved 2015-02-23.
  27. John Dunlop (2012). The Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin's Rule. Stuttgart: Ibidem. pp. 66–70. ISBN 978-3-8382-0388-1.
  28. The photo can be seen in the updated version of the original article, "Sgovor-2": (in Russian) Прянишников, Пётр (4 July 2000). "Волошин и Басаев на Лазурном берегу. Фото на память". compromat.ru. Archived from the original on 28 February 2007.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  29. p. 167, Akhmadov, Lanskoy, Brzezinski, "The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost", Palgrave Macmillan (2010)
  30. (in Russian) Muzayev, Timur. "Political Monitoring of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, July 1999". International Institute of Humanities and Political Research.
  31. Andre Glucksmann (11 March 2005). "Western leaders betray Aslan Maskhadov". Prima-News. Archived from the original on 2007-10-25.
  32. "Chechen Parliamentary Speaker: Basayev was G.R.U. Officer". The Jamestown Foundation. 2006-09-08. Archived from the original on 2015-04-02. Retrieved 2015-02-23.
  33. Fuller, Liz. "Analysis: Has Chechnya's Strongman Signed His Own Death Warrant?". Rferl.org. Retrieved 2015-02-23.
  34. p. 204, Akhmadov, Lanskoy, Brzezinski, "The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost", Palgrave Macmillan (2010)

External links

Chechen–Russian conflict
First Chechen War
Second Chechen War
Major attacks
Related topics
Wars in culture
Federalists
Combatants
Leaders
Separatists
Combatants
Leaders
Mujahideen
Combatants
Leaders
Armed conflicts involving Russia (including Tsarist, Imperial and Soviet times)
Related
Lists by opponent
Internal
Tsardom of
Russia
18th–19th
century
20th
century
21st
century
Boris Yeltsin
Life and politics
Presidency
Elections
Commemoration
Books
Films
Family
Categories: