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			{{Short description\|2000 battle in the Second Chechen War}}
	{{Copyedit\|date=August 2009}}
			{{Use dmy dates\|date=March 2020}}
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	{{Infobox ~~Military~~ ~~Conflict~~		{{Infobox military conflict
	\|conflict=Battle for Height 776		\| conflict = Battle for Height 776
	\|height=230		\| height = 230
			\| image = 776-Battle-DE.svg
	\|image=
			\| image_size = 300
	\|caption=
			\| caption = Map of the breakthrough, including the fight at the Height 776
	\|partof=]
			\| partof = the ]
	\|place=Height 776, ], ]
			\| place = Height 776, ], ]
	\|date=29 February – 1 or 3 March<ref name=claims/> 2000
			\| date = 29 February – 1 March 2000
	\|result=Chechen separatist Pyrrhic victory
			\| result = Chechen victory
	\|combatant1=] ] and ]
			\| combatant1 = {{flagicon\|Chechen Republic of Ichkeria}} ]
	\|combatant2=] ]<br>] ]
			\| combatant2 = {{flag\|Russia}}
	\|commander1=] ]{{KIA}}<ref name=laststand/>
			\| commander1 = {{flagicon\|Chechen Republic of Ichkeria}} ] <br> {{flagicon image\|Flag of Jihad.svg}} ]<br>{{flagicon image\|Flag of Jihad.svg}} ]
	\|commander2=] ] {{Citation needed\|date=December 2008}}
			\| commander2 = {{flagicon\|Russia}} ]{{KIA}}<ref name=laststand/><br>{{flagicon\|Russia}} Viktor Romanov{{KIA}}
	\|strength1=91<ref name="miracle"/>
			\| strength1 = ''Disputed'' <br>70 (per Chechnya)<ref>{{Cite web\|url=https://www.warchechnya.ru/news/khattab_o_boe_pod_ulus_kertom_s_desantnikami_6_roty_104_polka_vdv_quot_ehto_byla_ne_nasha_rabota_a_angelov_allakha_quot/2011-10-07-1686/\|title=Хаттаб о бое под Улус-Кертом, с десантниками 6 роты 104 полка ВДВ: "Это была не наша работа, а ангелов Аллаха"\|date=7 October 2011}}</ref> <br>First day; 1,000+ (per Russia)<br>Subsequently; 1,500–2,000+ (per Russia)<br>
	\|strength2= uncertain
			\| strength2 = 90{{cn\|date=April 2023}}
	\|casualties1=84 killed<ref name="miracle"/>
			\| casualties1 = 21–25 killed<ref>{{Cite web\|url=https://www.warchechnya.ru/news/khattab_o_boe_pod_ulus_kertom_s_desantnikami_6_roty_104_polka_vdv_quot_ehto_byla_ne_nasha_rabota_a_angelov_allakha_quot/2011-10-07-1686/\|title=Хаттаб о бое под Улус-Кертом, с десантниками 6 роты 104 полка ВДВ: "Это была не наша работа, а ангелов Аллаха"\|date=7 October 2011}}</ref> (per Chechnya) <br>100 killed<ref>{{Cite web\|url=https://www.mk.ru/politics/2020/03/01/desantnik-rasskazal-kak-pogibala-pskovskaya-6ya-rota-v-chechne.html\|title=Десантник рассказал, как погибала псковская 6-я рота в Чечне}}</ref> (per Russian veteran Lobanov)<br>400–700<ref> {{cite web\|url=http://expert.ru/2014/03/1/zabyityij-podvig-6-rotyi\|script-title=ru:Забытый подвиг 6 роты\|trans-title=Forgotten Feat of 6 Companies\|language=Russian\|publisher=Эксперт\|date=1 March 2014}}</ref> killed (per Russia)
	\|casualties2=more than 400
			\| casualties2 = 84 killed<br>6 wounded <ref>{{web archive\|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121022212206/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-4528734.html}}</ref>
	\|casualties3=Note: Their respective official figures according to the both sides involved in direct combat at Height 776 (not the entire operation of the breakthrough from the Argun Gorge).}}
			\| casualties3 = {{small\|Note: Their respective official figures according to both sides involved in direct combat at Height 776 (not the entire operation of the breakthrough from the Argun Gorge, which also included other skirmishes in the area ).}}
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			}}
	{{Campaignbox Second Chechen War}}		{{Campaignbox Second Chechen War}}
			The '''Battle for Height 776''', part of the larger '''Battle of Ulus-Kert''', was an engagement in the ] that took place during fighting for control of the ] ] in the highland ] of central ], between the villages of Ulus-Kert and ].
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			In late February 2000, the ] attempted to encircle and destroy a large ] withdrawing from the Chechen capital ] to ] and ] in the southern mountains of Chechnya following the 1999–2000 ].<ref name=bbc>BBC News (6 March 2000) </ref> On 29 February 2000, just hours after Russian Defense Minister ] had assured his government that the Second Chechen War was over,<ref name="nation">'']'' (15 March 2000) </ref> an isolated Russian force composed mainly of a company of ] of the ] from the city of ] found itself cut off by a retreating Chechen column led by ] and ].<ref name="fairy"/> After heavy close-quarters overnight fighting, the Russian position was overrun and almost entirely wiped out. The incident inspired a Kremlin-funded film, and fascinated Russian leader Vladimir Putin.<ref>{{cite web \|last1=Osborn \|first1=Andrew \|title=Kremlin film makes heroes out of paratroops it left to be massacred \|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kremlin-film-makes-heroes-out-of-paratroops-it-left-to-be-massacred-478266.html \|website=The Independent \|access-date=17 March 2023}}</ref>
	The '''Battle for Height 776''', the best known part of the larger '''Battle of Ulus-Kert''' (there was also fighting over the small town of Ulus-Kert, the village of Selmentausen, the Heights 705.6 and 787, and elsewhere in area), was a controversial engagement in the ] during fierce fighting over control of the ] ] in the highland ] of central ]. The ] forces unsuccessfully attempted to surround and destroy a large ] force ] from the Chechen capital ] to ] and ] in the southern mountains of Chechnya following the 1999–2000 ].<ref name=bbc>BBC News (6 March 2000) </ref>

			Uncertainty continues to surround many aspects of the engagement, including the number of combatants, casualties, how much ] and ] was provided, and how long the battle even lasted.
	In four days of desperate fighting,
	from 29 February to 3 March
	2000, a large force of Chechen fighters
	wiped out a Russian paratroop
	company in the harsh defiles and
	ridges of the Argun Gorge in the
	mountains of southern Chechnya.
	Although the battle was a catastrophic
	tactical defeat for the
	Russian airborne force, the
	company?s stubborn defense to
	the last man and the concentration
	of Russian relief forces inflicted
	a strategic setback on the
	Chechens. The Russians stumbled
	into this catastrophe through poor
	unit leadership, but Russian blood
	and valor transformed it into victory.

			==Battle==
	==Hatred to the Bone==
			The goal of a regimental combat group ] of the ] (VDV) tactical group in the area, based on the ] of the ] and including also teams from the ], and the elite ] group of the ], was to block an exit from a gorge, while other Russian forces attempted to ] a large Chechen force departing the village of Ulus-Kert. The 6th Company, part of the regiment's 2nd Battalion, was part of this blocking force. The company's nominal commander was Major Sergey Molodov; however, it was actually led personally by Lieutenant Colonel ], commander of the entire battalion. With him were a ] platoon and an artillery ] team led by Captain Viktor Romanov.<ref name=laststand>] (July 2001) </ref>
	In Fall 1999, the Second Chechen
	War began. The Russian Army
	sought to reimpose the Russian
	Federation?s authority in lawless,
	breakaway Chechnya. The Russians
	and Chechens? shared 200-
	year history had been punctuated
	by convulsions of blood and cruelty.
	The First Chechen War, from
	1994 to 1996, had ended in the Russian
	Army?s humiliation and left
	Russia with its highest loss of resources
	and professionalism since
	the Soviet Union?s demise. The loss
	of basic combat skills also had been
	horrific. This second round was the
	Russian Army?s opportunity to
	show that it had recovered something
	of its former ability.
	Nothing expressed the depth of
	Russian-Chechen animosity more
	than the battle cries hurled back and
	forth across the firing lines during
	the siege of Groznyy. To the Chechen
	shouts of ?Allah Akhbar!? the Russians
	would respond, ?Christ is
	Risen!?
	After Groznyy fell, Chechen forces
	regrouped in the rough, mountainous
	areas of southern Chechnya. By
	late February, a large Chechen force
	of from 1,600 and 2,500 fighters had
	concentrated in the town of Ulus-
	Kert, where the Abazolgul and Sharoargun
	rivers join.1 The area was one
	in which the Russians had not dared
	enter during the First Chechen War.
	This time, they did not hesitate to
	follow.
	A Russian Airborne Forces (VDV)
	tactical group attacked Chechen
	forces at Ulus-Kert, forcing them
	southeast. One of the VDV tactical
	group?s regimental task forces,
	based on the 104th Guards Parachute
	Regiment (GPR) of the 76th
	Guards Airborne Division (GAD),
	was to block the gorge while the
	VDV tactical group encircled the
	Chechens.

			At dawn of 29 February, in dense fog, the Russians were surprised by a large-scale Chechen breakthrough and were attacked from their rear by a reconnaissance group of about 20 rebel fighters, soon joined by many more who then had them surrounded. After suffering heavy losses (including the death of Major Molodov) from the initial ambush, the rest of the Russians retreated to a hilltop designated Height 776, where they hastily dug defensive positions. They received fire support, including from the regimental artillery battalion's ] self-propelled 120 mm mortars; however, a pair of ] attack helicopters reportedly turned back after being shot at en route.<ref>{{in lang\|ru}} </ref> The only Russian reinforcement that made it to Height 776 were 14 men of the 4th Company's third platoon, personally led by the battalion's deputy commander, Major Alexander Dostavalov. Attempts by the 1st and 3rd Companies, as well as the rest of the 4th Company, to rescue their surrounded comrades or to stop the breakthrough were unsuccessful. Eventually, seriously wounded Captain Romanov called for fire support on his own position before being overrun in the final Chechen attack. According to the Russians, 84 of their soldiers were killed in combat at Height 776, including all of the officers. Only six rank-and-file soldiers survived the battle, four of them seriously injured.<ref name=laststand/><ref>{{in lang\|ru}} </ref>
	=Area of Operations=
	The small town of Ulus-Kert is
	surrounded by extremely steep,
	mountainous terrain. Approximately
	6 kilometers south of the town and
	extending far to the southeast are the
	Dargenduk Mountains. A road leading
	generally south out of Ulus-Kert
	and up the northeastern edge of the
	Dargenduks crosses over a 1,410-
	meter hill, referred to as Hill 1410.
	Approximately 1.5 kilometers directly
	southeast of Ulus-Kert is Hill 705.6.
	Just about one-half kilometer south
	of Hill 705.6 is a narrow opening to
	a small gorge. Three and one-half kilometers
	southeast of Ulus-Kert, on
	the gorge?s easternmost side, is Hill
	776. Hill 787 is only 1 kilometer farther
	south.
	A road leading southeast from
	Ulus-Kert over Hill 705.6 turns south
	into the gorge. Another road intersects
	the first then leads to the western
	edge of the saddle between hills
	776 and 787 where it divides into
	mountain paths crossing the saddle.
	Hill 787 is approximately 4.3 kilometers
	north of Hill 1410. At the time of
	the operation, the weather was
	foggy and cold, with snow on the
	ground.
	The Chechens planned to escape
	advancing Russian forces by using
	the advantage of the mountainous
	terrain southeast of Ulus-Kert. After
	slipping through the passes, the
	fighters could seize the strategic
	population centers of Makhkety,
	Elistanzhi, Zaduli, Kirov-Yurt and
	Vedeno, which provided a west-toeast
	corridor in relatively low, flat
	terrain through which remaining
	Chechen forces could withdraw to
	Dagestan.2 From Dagestan, they
	could renew the struggle on more favorable
	terms.
	The VDV tactical group?s mission
	was to counter the Chechen force?s
	objectives by blocking its escape
	through the mountains then encircling
	it so artillery and combat air
	support could be used. Engaging infantry
	soldiers in direct combat was
	to be kept to a minimum. The plan to
	encircle Chechen forces?a common
	Russian tactic?reflects the Russians
	? desire to minimize casualties.
	The First Chechen War had not
	been popular with the Russian populace
	because of the high death rate.
	Tension was also rife in the Russian
	command arrangement. Airborne
	forces felt they were being used as
	cannon fodder to reduce casualties
	among motorized infantry troops.
	Underlying this tension was the old
	rivalry between Russian airborne
	forces and ground forces. Historically,
	the VDV had been a separate
	service. Briefly in the late 1990s, it
	had been subordinated to ground
	forces. Newly appointed commander
	of Russian airborne forces Colonel
	General Georgiy Shpak had obtained
	a reversal of this decision and zealously
	guarded the VDV?s independence.
	Shpak streamlined the organization
	and obtained new missions for
	it, primarily in peacekeeping operations.
	By the time operations around
	Ulus-Kert were under way, the
	grouping of airborne forces had
	been subordinated to Colonel General
	Gennadiy N. Troshev, Commander
	of the Eastern Grouping of
	Federal Forces, who reported directly
	to General of the Army Viktor
	Kazantsev, who commanded the
	Operations Group, Joint Grouping
	of Federal Forces, in the North
	Caucasus. The arrangement was not
	a happy one; airborne forces felt
	they were not being properly supported.

			==Controversies==
	=The Battle Begins=
			The battle embarrassed Russian military officials, who attempted to downplay or conceal the casualties they had suffered. Senior military leaders (including ] ],<ref name="nation"/> VDV commander General ],<ref name=bbc/><ref name="conflicting">] (7 March 2000) </ref> and the commander of federal forces in Chechnya, General ]<ref name="cbc">] (7 March 2000) </ref>) initially insisted that only 31 of their men were killed in the battle and denied the unofficial rumours of 86 dead. ], Russian President ]'s spokesman on Chechnya, also claimed 31 fatalities were "the total losses of that company for several days".<ref>GlobalSecurity.org (6 March 2000) </ref> After days of denials, Russian officials eventually admitted the losses, some of them apparently caused by ] from their own artillery.<ref>'']'' (12 March 2000): </ref> Russian newspapers reported that Marshal Sergeyev had ordered the losses to be covered up,<ref name=stranded>'']'' (11 March 2000): </ref> as the loss came just a week after 25 men from the 76th Airborne Division were killed in another battle in Chechnya.<ref>] (11 May 2006) ({{webarchive \|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060515231512/http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=416&issue_id=3726&article_id=2371084 \|date=15 May 2006 }})</ref> Even after the figure of "at least 85" killed has been confirmed by Sergeyev, VDV deputy commander Nikolai Staskov said they were killed over four days, from 29 February to 3 March.<ref name=claims>'']'' (10 March 2000): </ref> According to one source, "unofficially the losses sustained by Russian paratroopers on 1 March are blamed on the decision of the Eastern group's commander Gen. Sergey Makarov and the VDV tactical group's commander Aleksandr Lentsov."<ref>Venik's Aviation (7 March 2000) {{webarchive \|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20010421012906/http://www.aeronautics.ru/chechnya/030700.htm \|date=21 April 2001 }} ()</ref> The final figure ultimately stood at 84. However the total Russian strength and the losses among the other Russian units operating in the area of Ulus-Kert were never officially disclosed.
	The VDV tactical group was a
	task force based on divisional parachute
	regiments augmented with
	VDV command-level assets, such as
	reconnaissance subunits. The 104th
	GPR task force was assigned the
	mission of blocking Chechen escape
	routes east through the mountains.
	104th GPR, like most Soviet/Russian
	parachute regiments, had three airborne
	battalions, an artillery battalion
	equipped with two S9, 120-millimeter,
	self-propelled guns and various
	support assets. Each airborne battalion
	had three airborne companies
	numbered sequentially one through
	nine, with the first, second and third
	companies composing the 1st Airborne
	Battalion and so on. Each 104th
	GPR company was augmented with
	reconnaissance and/or SPETSNAZ
	subunits from the VDV command to
	form company tactical groups.4
	Hills 705.6, 776, 787 and 1410 were
	the main features of the net 104th
	GPR used to encircle the Chechen
	force. The VDV tactical group?s main
	body crossed the Sharoargun and
	Abazolgul rivers, pushing the
	Chechen force out of Ulus-Kert toward
	the southeast. 104th GPR?s 1st
	Company, 1st Airborne Battalion,
	still had not crossed either the
	Abazolgul or the Sharoargun. An
	unidentified 104th GPR company
	was on or near Hill 705.6. 4th Company
	and an unidentified 104th GPR
	airborne company, two VDV SPETSNAZ
	groups and an elite Federal
	Security Service (FSB)?successor
	to the KGB?SPETSNAZ group,
	known as Vympel, were on Hill
	1410. Present at 2d Airborne Battalion
	Headquarters on Hill 776 were
	Commander, 2d Airborne Battalion,
	Lieutenant Colonel Mark Nikolayevich
	Yevtyukhin, and Captain
	Viktor Romanov, the commander of
	an artillery battery of the regimental
	artillery battalion who was heading a
	forward observer team. 6th Company,
	commanded by Major Sergey
	Molodov, was en route to the saddle
	between Hills 776 and 787. 104th
	GPR was engaged in positioning
	companies to block escape routes
	over the mountains.
	The Chechen force, retreating to
	the southeast of Ulus-Kert along a
	road leading over Hill 705.6 away
	from the main advancing body of the
	VDV tactical group, was looking for
	the first unguarded or weakly held
	way over the mountains. The 1,600
	to 2,500 fighters wore winter camouflage
	and were well equipped with
	various small arms, grenade launchers
	and mortars. They were supported
	by a logistics train of hundreds
	of pack animals.

			In the first days after the battle, Gen. Troshev said 1,000 rebel fighters were involved.<ref name="cbc"/> This figure was subsequently raised to 1,500–2,000 by Yastrzhembsky<ref name=bbc/> and eventually to 2,500 by Troshev.<ref name=claims/> However, according to a statement by Colonel General Valery Manilov, first deputy chief of the ], there were only 2,500 to 3,500 separatist fighters left in all of Chechnya at this time.<ref>BBC News (10 March 2000): </ref> According to Yastrzhembsky on 6 March, some 70 rebels had laid down their arms at what he called a "pocket" at Selmentausen, while "up to 1,000 might have succeeded in escaping".<ref name=bbc/> The very first Russian official statements mentioned the death of 100 Chechen fighters at the price of 31 Russian soldiers. According to the article in '']'' (''Red Star''), the official newspaper of the ], separatist casualties in the Argun Gorge area totaled approximately 400 dead, including 200 bodies allegedly found at Height 776.<ref name=laststand/> However, the official federal estimate was later raised to about 500 enemy dead, according to the Russian government website.<ref>Russian Embassy to ] (undated): {{webarchive \|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110724084157/http://www.thailand.mid.ru/chech3.html \|date=24 July 2011 }}</ref>
	=Day 1, 29 February 2000=
	Early on 29 February, a 104th GPR
	airborne company encountered a
	significant Chechen force on the
	road leading southeast out of Ulus-
	Kert. Russian paratroopers engaged
	the Chechen fighters for control of
	Hill 705.6. The Russian company,
	significantly stressed during the
	fight, gained control of the hill and
	pushed the Chechen force southeast
	into the small gorge below. The company
	was most likely heavily supported
	by artillery and helicopters,
	as was the usual Russian operation
	in this war.
	The 104th GPR commander ordered
	2d Airborne Battalion elements
	to block the saddle between hills 776
	and 787, which was the next possible
	path over the mountains for
	the Chechens. The 2d Airborne
	Battalion headquarters was already
	in place on Hill 776. The 2d Airborne
	Battalion element was to be in place
	by 1400. In the early morning, 6th
	Company, including the third platoon,
	4th Company, and two reconnaissance
	groups, probably from the
	regimental reconnaissance platoon,
	started on foot toward the saddle.5
	6th Company, with the other elements,
	minus the company?s third
	platoon, arrived by late morning,
	ahead of schedule. The company
	commander established a linear defense
	in the saddle between the hills,
	fronted by a minefield facing west
	toward the gorge. The defense focused
	on the Chechen forces? expected
	direction of escape. No access
	routes through the minefield
	were prepared nor were platoon positions
	sited to be mutually supportive.
	6 After establishing company positions,
	troops began their afternoon
	meal, leaving their positions and
	congregating in the open.7
	The Chechen force clearly had a
	better grasp of the situation. The
	fighters had been listening to 104th
	GPR communications and used this
	advantage and good ground reconnaissance
	to locate 104th GPR subunits
	and to set ambushes. At 1230,
	a 6th Company reconnaissance patrol
	encountered approximately 20
	fighters just outside company defensive
	positions. That the Chechens
	could approach that close without
	detection shows that the Russians
	had conducted no deep reconnaissance
	of the approaches to the
	saddle.
	The Chechens, armed with automatic
	weapons, grenade launchers
	and mortars, reacted quickly, seizing
	the initiative. The small force was
	probably followed by a combat element,
	which would have been consistent
	with Soviet-style reconnaissance
	doctrine that places great
	value on immediately seizing the initiative
	in any engagement by having
	a strong combat element close behind
	the advance reconnaissance
	ele-ment.8 Chechen reconnaissance
	elements also worked their way
	around the Russian position in the
	saddle and attacked from the rear
	where there were no defenses.9
	With Chechens in the rear and no
	escape routes through their own
	minefield, 6th Company pulled back
	and dug in on Hill 776. Their retreat
	was so precipitous that they abandoned
	mess kits still full of food.10
	Chechen fighters, laying down
	constant fire on 6th Company, received
	reinforcements as the main
	body arrived. The force encircled 6th
	Company and sent waves of fighters
	into the attack.11 By the end of
	the first day, 6th Company had suffered
	31 dead?a 33 percent killed in
	action (KIA) rate.12 6th Company
	had barely survived three basic errors:
	failure to establish an allaround
	defense; failure to aggressively
	conduct reconnaisance of the
	enemy?s expected approach route,
	especially given the Chechen reputation
	for tactical skill, reconnaisance
	and working around the flanks; and
	failure to heed warnings about the
	Chechen force?s approach.13
	For some reason, 6th Company
	did not anticipate with sufficient seriousness
	and energy the danger it
	had been assigned to forestall. It
	seems likely that weak command at
	the company level was compounded
	by a lack of timely supervision by
	the adjacent battalion headquarters.

			On 10 March, Chechen President ] announced a general order to begin "an all-out partisan war"<ref name=stranded/> and the separatist forces remaining in the still unoccupied territories scattered to launch a long guerrilla war. The Russians thus lost one of their last chances to defeat a large number of the pro-independence fighters in a concentrated position, although in March the federal forces managed to inflict devastating losses against a different column of some 1,000–1,500 fighters (trapping the group under ] in the village of ] on 6 March and then killing hundreds of them in the ]).
	=Day 2, 1 March 2000=
	Early in the morning on Hill 1410,
	a reinforcement group of two VDV
	SPETSNAZ platoons, one Vympel
	SPETSNAZ group and two airborne
	companies departed on foot for the
	saddle. The group encountered several
	ambushes while traversing terrain
	as steep as 70 degrees. At approximately
	0330, one VDV SPETSNAZ
	platoon broke through to Hill 787 but
	was forced to dig in because of stiff
	Chechen opposition.
	The 1st Company was also sent
	to reinforce 6th Company. While attempting
	to cross the Abazolgul
	River northeast of Ulus-Kert, the
	unit encountered a Chechen ambush
	force of up to 60 men. Despite repeated
	attempts to fight through the
	Chechen ambush, the 1st Company
	was forced to dig in on the river?s
	bank. At 0300, during a brief lull, 2d
	Airborne Battalion deputy commander
	Major Aleksandr Dostovalov,
	with 4th Company?s third platoon,
	broke through to the encircled company.
	While relief forces were being
	held back by ambushes, waves of
	Chechen fighters continued to assault
	6th Company on Hill 776.14
	When Romanov?s legs were blown
	off by a mortar round, the battalion
	commander took over.
	While some reports question the
	lack of artillery and combat air support,
	others indicate that both where
	present throughout the four-day
	engagement. In his report to defense
	minister Igor Sergeyev, Shpak
	states that 2d Airborne Battalion
	?was supported by a self-propelled
	artillery battalion of the 104th Parachute
	Regiment and by army aviation.
	?15 The presence of an artillery
	forward team with 6th Company,
	which included a battery commander,
	indicates that artillery support was
	at least adequate. While Shpak?s
	statement and other reports make it
	certain that VDV artillery was employed
	throughout the engagement,
	it is unclear how effective it was at reducing
	Chechen numbers. Also unanswered
	is whether additional artillery
	assets were employed to support
	6th Company.
	Press reports also cite use of
	?Grads??122-millimeter BM-21 multiple-
	rocket launchers that VDV units
	do not have.16 Accounts of other
	engagements in the southern mountains
	show that the Russians employed
	available artillery from a number
	of units in coordination with
	army aviation helicopters. These accounts
	stress that artillery continued
	to fire when helicopters disappeared
	with daylight. Only one Russian helicopter
	in the Chechen theater had
	night capability. This supports
	Shpak?s statement that 6th Company
	received no aviation support at
	night. Helicopter support was further
	limited by foggy conditions during
	the fighting.17
	The Chechens continued heavy
	attacks on Hill 776 from all directions
	throughout the early morning. Paratrooper
	officers showed an unhesitating
	willingness to sacrifice themselves,
	a trait the Germans had
	frequently noted in the grandfathers
	of the men on the hill. Dostovalov,
	already wounded, attacked a group
	of Chechens trying to carry off a
	wounded soldier and dispatched
	them with a grenade. Junior soldiers
	were equally valiant. After Private
	Aleksandr Lebedev ran out of ammunition,
	he threw himself and his
	last live grenade into a group of
	Chechens who had wanted him to
	surrender.
	At approximately 0500, the Chechens
	breached 6th Company defenses.
	Cumulative casualties and
	odds of at least 10 to one were too
	much for the dwindling Russian
	force. As Chechens overran Hill 776,
	fighting became hand-to-hand, and
	Chechens began shooting wounded
	Russians. The already wounded
	battalion commander took over the
	radio from the wounded Romanov
	and called in artillery fire on his
	own position, shouting into the radio,
	?I call artillery on myself!?18
	The Chechens suffered grievously
	from the artillery, and at 0610, communications
	with the battalion commander
	were lost.
	As the second day of fighting
	closed, 6th Company counted another
	26 paratroopers killed and
	many wounded. Counting the 31
	men who had fallen the day before,
	6th Company had suffered a KIA rate
	of almost two-thirds?57 out of 90
	men.19 Chechen casualties also continued
	to mount. Repeated humanwave
	attacks are costly, especially
	when the defenders are supported
	by artillery and aviation.
	The Chechens had been throwing
	themselves at Hill 776 to keep
	open a path for the rest of their force.
	This movement was interrupted by
	the arrival of the relief force from Hill
	1410. Major Andrey Lobanov, commanding
	a 45th VDV Reconnaisance
	Regiment SPETSNAZ group, was
	with this force. He noted that hundreds
	of pack animals had already
	passed by. The Russians moved into
	the saddle and found 6th Company?s
	abandoned positions and soon encountered
	a large Chechen group.
	The Russians retreated to Hill 787
	from which they could cover the
	saddle.
	The Russians intercepted the
	Chechen commander?s desperate orders:
	?Do not engage in battle.
	Force your way forward.?20 With the
	remnants of 6th Company still holding
	out on Hill 776 and new Russian
	forces on neighboring Hill 787, the
	Chechen escape route was dangerously
	constricted. The Russians
	sent a reconnaissance platoon into
	the saddle to find a better position.
	Instead, it found an ambush by Arab
	volunteers, covering an attempt by
	the main Chechen convoy to escape.
	Having suffered five wounded, the
	Russians committed another company,
	hoping to stop the Chechen
	escape attempt

			While there were no civilians in the immediate proximity of the clashes at the uninhabited Height 776, there were severe civilian casualties during the struggle for the broader Argun Gorge area, in particular from the artillery and air attacks on Ulus-Kert, Yaryshmardy and other villages, where thousands of locals and ]s from Grozny were trapped.<ref name=stranded/> Furthermore, there were many credible reports of direct atrocities against the population. For example, on 6 March, a group of civilians was detained by soldiers at the notorious Russian checkpoint on the road between Ulus-Kert and Duba-Yurt; 12 men from the group "]" and the bodies of three of them were unearthed at the nearby village of Tangi-Chu two months later.<ref>] (March 2001): </ref> In an infamous incident later in March, a local girl, ], was abducted from her home in Tangi-Chu, then raped and strangled to death by ] Colonel ].
	=Day 3, 2 March 2000=
	Late in the morning, the 1st Company
	broke through Chechen forces
	and reached the battle area. However,
	it could not relieve 6th Company,
	which was still under close attack.
	One officer and 32 men were
	still alive. Deputy company commander
	Captain Roman Sokolov had
	arrived in Chechnya barely 13 days
	before. Wounded in the hand, he organized
	the survivors? final defense.
	He placed the six most junior soldiers
	in the care of Sergeant Andrey
	Proshev and ordered them to escape.
	Then, as the Chechens pressed the
	attack, Sokolov called artillery fire
	down on his position as a desperate
	attempt to fend off the enemy. Another
	16 paratroopers on Hill 776
	were killed in the continuing fighting

	=Day 4, 3 March 2000=
	The struggle for control of Hills
	776 and 787 ended on the fourth day
	of the fighting. The last 11 paratroopers
	on Hill 776 were killed.23
	The relief force found Proshev?s
	small band of survivors.24 The surviving
	Chechens, who had not been
	able to escape over the saddle before
	the relief?s arrival, slipped back
	down into the gorge pursued by
	paratroopers and hunted by helicopters.
	The Russian pursuit took
	them about 5 kilometers east to the
	village of Selmentausen where a
	number of escaping Chechens had
	concentrated.

	=Mopping Up=
	The Chechens won a Pyrrhic victory.
	Tarrying to bludgeon through
	6th Company allowed VDV forces to
	fight through difficult terrain and
	Chechen ambushes to close off the
	main body?s escape. Most surviving
	Chechens were ultimately forced
	back into the gorge, where troops
	from 104th GPR took a number of
	prisoners.
	While no 6th Company personnel
	surrendered or were taken prisoner,
	the four-day struggle resulted in the
	death of at least 84 VDV soldiers, including
	13 officers. Even after losing
	its senior officers, 6th Company held
	its final positions against a much
	larger force.
	Chechen casualties included approximately
	400 dead. According to
	Krasnaya Zvezda, the official newspaper
	of the Russian Ministry of
	Defense (MOD), this figure was
	based on radio-intercept data, intelligence
	reports, eyewitnesses, local
	residents and captured Chechens.25
	The Arab volunteers fighting
	with the Chechens appeared, in particular,
	to have suffered severely.
	Heavy Arab casualties would not be
	unusual among particularly fanatical
	units, nor would it be unusual for the
	Chechens to have pushed the Arabs
	first into harm?s way. Lobanov
	counted 200 enemy dead on Hill 776
	alone, along with 75 Russian paratroopers.
	Survivor Viktor Sokirko
	stated, ?I took a notebook from the
	pocket of one of the gunmen with a
	roster of 100 people; the bullet had
	hit him right in his heart; it had gone
	through his Koran.?26
	The bodies of the 84 fallen VDV
	troops were evacuated on foot, with
	combat aviation providing support.
	It was shaping up to be a bloody
	month for the Russian Army; it had
	a total of 156 dead?a higher KIA
	rate than during the grimmest comparable
	period in the storming of
	Groznyy.27
	6th Company accomplished its
	mission. The Chechen force was
	blocked from escaping the encirclement.
	More important, Chechen
	commanders realized that they could
	not seize strategic population centers
	in the low terrain and would be
	forced to stay in the mountains. In
	the next few days, a number of
	Chechen fighters surrendered to the
	Russians. The day after the battle
	ended, a Chechen field commander
	surrendered with 73 men, including
	30 wounded?the largest surrender
	to that date. Made up largely of
	Chechen teenagers, this band had
	actually escaped over the saddle before
	the relief arrived on 2 March. It
	surrendered on the outskirts of
	Selmentausen. The young men had
	had enough of war.

	=Recriminations=
	The loss of 6th Company provoked
	an interservice exchange of
	recriminations. At a news conference,
	Shpak bluntly blamed the disaster
	on the Eastern Grouping of
	Forces? commander, to whom the airborne
	troops had been subordinated.
	Shpak?s subordinates added their fire:
	?It all began back in Dagestan, when
	Kazantsev sent the airborne troops
	to their death and protected his own
	infantry.?29 They claimed airborne
	forces had been stretched too thin
	and ?in isolation from the main
	forces. . . . he grouping command
	treats the airborne troops as cannon
	fodder.?30
	By the middle of March, cumulative
	airborne casualties gave ammunition
	for their charges. Shpak reported
	that 181 airborne soldiers had
	been killed and 395 wounded in
	Chechnya out of a force of about
	5,100 men. The total Russian force
	in Chechnya had averaged about
	100,000 and had lost 1,291 Defense
	Ministry troops and 617 Interior
	Ministry troops for a total of 1,908,
	suffering 3,190 and 2,107 wounded.
	Airborne forces had numbered five
	percent of the force and suffered 10
	percent of the deaths.31
	Shpak had a point. While the operational
	concept of blocking and
	trapping the Chechens was sound,
	the net was too weak. 104th GPR
	was forced to commit individual
	companies, which could not be easily
	reinforced, to oppose the breakthrough
	attempt of a lethal brigadesize
	unit. The airborne net should
	have been backed up with larger
	motorized rifle formations. Shpak?s
	complaints carried enough weight to
	have the Grouping of Airborne
	Forces transferred from Troshev?s
	command to the Joint Grouping of
	Federal Forces?the overall headquarters
	for operations in Chechnya.

	=Reconnaissance and Security=
	Kazantsev, former commander of
	the Grouping of Airborne Troops in
	Chechnya, accurately described the
	situation: ?Such heavy losses could
	have been avoided. Reconnaissance
	must be carried out more carefully.?32
	After walking over the battlefield,
	Lobanov, who fought forward with
	the relief, also said pointedly, ?There
	is a continual question in my head:
	Why was there no information that
	such a horde of gunmen was breaking
	through??33 Compounding this
	failure was the lackadaisical attitude
	toward the company?s security. 6th
	Company had blinded itself, allowing
	Chechens the priceless element
	of surprise. Had 6th Company been
	properly alerted and ready in proper
	defenses, it might have been able to
	hold off the Chechens successfully
	until relief arrived. One elemental failure
	cascaded into another, which
	might explain why the battalion commander
	suddenly emerged as the
	defense?s motivating force once the
	disaster unfolded.
	However much the Russian official
	line emphasizes the heroism of
	6th Company paratroopers, the results
	of the official inquiry ordered
	by President Vladmir Putin was professionally
	blunt. The force was accused
	of ?slovenliness, laxity and
	unprofessionalism.?34 The force
	showed a glaring loss of basic tactical
	skills at the company level during
	the encounters. Such basic tactical
	considerations should have been
	uppermost in the company officers?
	minds. Whether this was a local aberration
	or indicates pervasive problems
	throughout Russian Army elite
	forces, the VDV?s failure poses important
	questions about Russian capabilities.
	While the VDV performed
	credibly and often with distinction in
	the Second Chechen War, there
	have been enough blatant exceptions
	to conclude that even the
	VDV?s skills are no longer of a uniform
	high standard, despite Shpak?s
	reforms.

	=Pride of Corps=
	On the positive side, 6th Company
	recovered and fought well
	against enormous odds once it
	moved to Hill 776 under the effective
	leadership of the battalion commander
	and his deputy. Other Russian
	airborne and SPETSNAZ forces
	in the area, responding to reinforce
	6th Company, fought their way into
	the area and eventually stopped the
	Chechen breakout. All this occurred
	in enormously difficult terrain and
	weather conditions and against tenacious
	Chechen resistance. Because
	the Chechens are notoriously atrocity-
	prone, especially toward members
	of the more elite Russian military
	organizations, fighting to the
	death makes a necessity.
	Media reports consistently indicate
	that no 6th Company soldiers
	were taken prisoner. They refused to
	give up their position, even while
	knowing they would be overrun and
	killed. The VDV is known as an elite
	force composed of soldiers with high
	morale, discipline and a sense of purpose.
	Their actions make it clear that
	this characterization held true. Despite
	glaring tactical mistakes in security
	and reconnaissance, the Russian
	airborne spirit successfully
	imbued its men with the morale and
	courage that come with pride of
	corps.
	Despite the bad publicity surrounding
	the casualty figures in this
	battle, the Russian Army achieved
	an important victory. By holding Hill
	776 long enough for additional VDV
	troops to fill the area, 6th Company
	defeated the Chechen strategy to
	break out of the mountains and regain
	the initiative. Chechen fighters,
	seeing they could not break through
	Russian lines, were forced to scale
	back their objectives. Instead of employing
	relatively large groups
	against vulnerable population centers,
	Chechen leaders realized they
	had to break up into smaller formations
	to wage war at a much lower
	level.
	But, this was an expensive Russian
	victory. Russian blood and
	valor had to make up for the deficit
	in basic combat skills, an issue larger
	than one small-unit leadership failure.
	The entire Russian force has suffered
	too many similar catastrophies
	for the fate of 6th Company to be
	just a tragic exception. Still, there was
	significant improvement in battlefield
	performance between the First
	and Second Chechen Wars, although
	performance levels still remained low,
	which reflected how bad things had
	become. The failure of an elite force
	such as the Russian airborne shows
	how fragile and perishable such
	skills are.
	<ref>http://www.profcartoon.com/pictures/icons/bobja01.pdf</ref>

	==Aftermath==		==Aftermath==
	] at a speech in ] at the ceremony unveiling a memorial stone erected on the ~~site of a future~~ monument to paratroopers of the 6th Company]]		] at a speech in Pskov at the ceremony unveiling a memorial stone erected for the monument to paratroopers of the 6th Company]]
	] in Pskov in honor of the 6th Company]]		] in Pskov in honor of the 6th Company]]

	The battle was viewed in Russia in two ways: at first as a shameful defeat for the Russian military, and then increasingly as a glorious ] made by the paratroopers, confirming the VDV's reputation in the same way that the ] did for the ], and the events have been quickly enshrined in ]. Even though some in the Russian army view it as a defeat that could have been avoided, it is officially seen in Russia as an example of bravery and sacrifice.<ref name=independent/> In 2001, Putin flew to Chechnya to ~~personally~~ visit the former battlefield.<ref>'']'' (16 April 2001) </ref> In 2008, a day before Russia's ], a street in Grozny was officially renamed as "84 Pskov Paratroopers Street",~~<ref name~~=~~"miracle">] (23 February 2008) </ref>~~ a move that sparked further controversy in Chechnya.<ref name="fairy">'']'' (19 March 2008) </ref><ref>] (29 January 2008) </ref><ref>] (22 February 2008) </ref>		In 2001, Putin flew to Chechnya to visit the former battlefield.<ref>'']'' (16 April 2001) </ref> In 2008, a day before Russia's ], a street in Grozny was officially renamed as "84 Pskov Paratroopers Street",{{cn\|date=April 2023}} a move that sparked further controversy in Chechnya.<ref name="fairy">'']'' (19 March 2008) </ref><ref>Prague Watchdog (29 January 2008) </ref><ref>Prague Watchdog (22 February 2008) </ref>

	===Awards===		==Awards==
	{{Wikisourcelang\|ru\|~~????~~ ~~??????????~~ ?? ?? 21.07.2000 ? 1334\|Battle of Hill 776}}		{{Wikisourcelang\|ru\|Указ Президента РФ от 21.07.2000 № 1334\|Battle of Hill 776}}
	On 12 March 2000, President Putin signed an '']'' conferring ] upon members of the 6th Company,<ref name="fairy"/> of whom 63 received the ]. Twenty-two of the soldiers (all 13 officers and nine enlisted men) were awarded the highest ] and title of the ] (for comparison, only 65 medals of the ] medals were awarded for the entire duration of the 10-year ], in which more than 14,000 ] soldiers died):<ref>{{ru icon}} </ref>

			On 12 March 2000, President Putin signed an '']'' conferring ] upon participants of the battle.<ref name="fairy" /> 63 soldiers received the ] and 22 (all 13 officers and nine enlisted men) were awarded the country's highest honorary medal and title of the ].<ref></ref> In comparison, only 65 medals of the ] medal were awarded for the entire duration of the 10-year ].
	<div style="-moz-column-count:3; column-count:3;">

	* ]{{KIA}}
			Hero of the Russian Federation recipients for this incident are:<ref>{{in lang\|ru}} </ref>
	* Sergey Molodov{{KIA}}
			{{div col\|colwidth=22em}}
	* Alexander Dostavalov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Roman~~ ~~Sokolov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Lt. Colonel ]{{KIA}}
	* ~~Viktor~~ ~~Romanov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Major Sergey Molodov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Alexey~~ ~~Vorobyov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Major Alexander Dostavalov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Andrey~~ ~~Sherstyannikov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Captain Roman Sokolov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Andrey~~ ~~Panov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Captain Viktor Romanov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Dmitry~~ ~~Petrov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Lieutenant Alexey Vorobyov{{KIA}}
			* Guard Lieutenant Andrey Sherstyannikov{{KIA}}
	* Alexander Kolgatin{{KIA}}
	* ~~Oleg~~ ~~Yermakov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Lieutenant Andrey Panov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Alexander~~ ~~Ryazantsev~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Lieutenant Dmitry Petrov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Dmitry~~ ~~Kozhemyakin~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Lieutenant Alexander Kolgatin{{KIA}}
	* ~~Sergey~~ ~~Medvedev~~{{KIA}}		* Lieutenant Oleg Yermakov{{KIA}}
	* Alexander ~~Komyagin~~{{KIA}}		* Lieutenant Alexander Ryazantsev{{KIA}}
	* Dmitry ~~Grigoriyev~~{{KIA}}		* Lieutenant Dmitry Kozhemyakin{{KIA}}
	* Sergey ~~Vasilyov~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Sergeant (contract service) Sergey Medvedev{{KIA}}
			* Guard Sergeant (contract service) Alexander Komyagin{{KIA}}
	* Vladislav Dukhin{{KIA}}
			* Guard Sergeant (contract service) Dmitry Grigoriyev{{KIA}}
	* Alexander Lebedev{{KIA}}
	* ~~Alexander~~ ~~Gerdt~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Sergeant Sergey Vasilyov{{KIA}}
	* ~~Alexey~~ ~~Rasskaza~~{{KIA}}		* Guard Sergeant Vladislav Dukhin{{KIA}}
			* Guard Corporal (contract service) Alexander Lebedev{{KIA}}
	* Alexander Suponinsky
			* Guard Corporal Alexander Gerdt{{KIA}}
	</div>
			* Guard Private Alexey Rasskaza{{KIA}}
			* Guard Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky (survivor, )
			{{div col end}}

	==In popular culture==		==In popular culture==
	A series of productions loosely based on these events, were produced in the ~~next few~~ years after the battle, including ~~the~~ 2004 ] show,<ref>] (18 June 2004) </ref> the 2004 television series ("I Have the Honour"), the 2006 four-part television film ("The Storm Gate")<ref>] (21 February 2006) </ref> and the 2006 movie ''Proriv'' ("Breakthrough").<ref name=independent>'']'' (15 May 2006) </ref> ~~Some~~ of ~~them~~ ~~were~~ ~~supported~~ by the ~~Russian~~ ~~government~~.		A series of Russian productions loosely based on these events were produced in the years after the battle, including a 2004 ] show,<ref>] (18 June 2004) </ref> the 2004 television series ("I Have the Honour"), the 2006 four-part television film ("The Storm Gate")<ref>] (21 February 2006) </ref> and the 2006 movie ''Proriv'' ("Breakthrough").<ref name=independent>'']'' (15 May 2006) </ref> In 2022, Russian heavy metal band ] released a song about the battle called ''Высота 776'' as the second track on the albulm ''Наследие'' (Heritage).<ref>{{Citation \|last=Radio Tapok \|title=Наследие \|url=https://www.amazon.com/%D0%9D%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B5-Radio-Tapok/dp/B09VLHFW27 \|access-date=2022-03-24}}</ref>

			During the ] ] raised the "Alexander Dostavalov Battalion" volunteer unit, named after Major Dostavalov, commander of the 4th Company's third platoon that reinforced the hill.<ref name="ISW Volunteer List">{{cite web \|last1=Stepanenko \|first1=Kateryna \|last2=Barros \|first2=George \|last3=Kagan \|first3=Frederick W. \|title=Russian Volunteer Units and Battalions \|url=https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-volunteer-units-and-battalions \|website=] \|access-date=7 August 2023}}</ref>

	==See also==		==See also==
			* ], a successful defense of the Soviet paratroopers against an attack by the Afghan mujahideen in 1988
	*]

	==References==		==References==
	{{reflist\|2}}		{{reflist}}

	==External links==		== External links ==
	{{Commons category\|Battle for Height 776}}		{{Commons category\|Battle for Height 776}}
	* (July 2001 ] ~~paper~~ ~~based~~ ~~on the article in ''Red Star'')~~		* (July 2001 ]). Archived link:
			*, ], April 2002 (based mostly on General Troshev's memoir)
	* {{ru icon}}
			* {{in lang\|ru}}

			{{Chechen wars}}
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			{{DEFAULTSORT:Battle For Height 776}}
	{{use dmy dates}}
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Latest revision as of 14:48, 18 November 2024

2000 battle in the Second Chechen War

Battle for Height 776

Part of the Second Chechen War

Map of the breakthrough, including the fight at the Height 776

Date	29 February – 1 March 2000
Location	Height 776, Argun Gorge, Chechnya
Result	Chechen victory

Belligerents

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Russia

Commanders and leaders

Shamil Basayev

Ibn al-Khattab

Abu al-Walid

Mark Yevtyukhin †

Viktor Romanov †

Strength

Disputed
70 (per Chechnya)
First day; 1,000+ (per Russia)
Subsequently; 1,500–2,000+ (per Russia)

Casualties and losses

21–25 killed (per Chechnya)
100 killed (per Russian veteran Lobanov)
400–700 killed (per Russia)

84 killed
6 wounded

Note: Their respective official figures according to both sides involved in direct combat at Height 776 (not the entire operation of the breakthrough from the Argun Gorge, which also included other skirmishes in the area ).

v t e Second Chechen War
Russian offensive (1999–2000) Russian air bombardment Elistanzhi cluster bombing Grozny missile attack Shami-Yurt bombing Goity incident Grozny Staropromyslovsky massacre Katyr-Yurt bombing Novye Aldi massacre Height 776 Komsomolskoye OMON fratricide incident 1st Zhani-Vedeno Guerrilla phase (2000–2009) Insurgency since May 2000 Galashki 1st suicide bombings 2nd suicide bombings Alkhan-Kala Vedeno 1st Grozny crash Tsotsin-Yurt Shelkovskaya crash 2nd Grozny Khankala crash Grozny truck bomb Znamenskoye suicide bombing Nazran 1st Avtury 4th Grozny Dagestan sieges Borozdinovskaya Makhachkala bombing Nalchik Gimry 2nd Avtury Vladikavkaz crash Border incident Shatoy crash 2nd Zhani-Vedeno

Second Chechen War

Russian offensive (1999–2000)

Guerrilla phase (2000–2009)

Insurgency since May 2000

The Battle for Height 776, part of the larger Battle of Ulus-Kert, was an engagement in the Second Chechen War that took place during fighting for control of the Argun River gorge in the highland Shatoysky District of central Chechnya, between the villages of Ulus-Kert and Selmentauzen.

In late February 2000, the Russian military attempted to encircle and destroy a large Chechen force withdrawing from the Chechen capital Grozny to Shatoy and Vedeno in the southern mountains of Chechnya following the 1999–2000 siege and capture of Grozny. On 29 February 2000, just hours after Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev had assured his government that the Second Chechen War was over, an isolated Russian force composed mainly of a company of paratroopers of the 76th Airborne Division from the city of Pskov found itself cut off by a retreating Chechen column led by Shamil Basayev and Ibn Al-Khattab. After heavy close-quarters overnight fighting, the Russian position was overrun and almost entirely wiped out. The incident inspired a Kremlin-funded film, and fascinated Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

Uncertainty continues to surround many aspects of the engagement, including the number of combatants, casualties, how much artillery support and close air support was provided, and how long the battle even lasted.

Battle

The goal of a regimental combat group task force of the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV) tactical group in the area, based on the 104th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 76th Division and including also teams from the GRU Spetsnaz, and the elite Vympel group of the FSB, was to block an exit from a gorge, while other Russian forces attempted to encircle a large Chechen force departing the village of Ulus-Kert. The 6th Company, part of the regiment's 2nd Battalion, was part of this blocking force. The company's nominal commander was Major Sergey Molodov; however, it was actually led personally by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin, commander of the entire battalion. With him were a reconnaissance platoon and an artillery forward observer team led by Captain Viktor Romanov.

At dawn of 29 February, in dense fog, the Russians were surprised by a large-scale Chechen breakthrough and were attacked from their rear by a reconnaissance group of about 20 rebel fighters, soon joined by many more who then had them surrounded. After suffering heavy losses (including the death of Major Molodov) from the initial ambush, the rest of the Russians retreated to a hilltop designated Height 776, where they hastily dug defensive positions. They received fire support, including from the regimental artillery battalion's 2S9 Nona self-propelled 120 mm mortars; however, a pair of Mil Mi-24 attack helicopters reportedly turned back after being shot at en route. The only Russian reinforcement that made it to Height 776 were 14 men of the 4th Company's third platoon, personally led by the battalion's deputy commander, Major Alexander Dostavalov. Attempts by the 1st and 3rd Companies, as well as the rest of the 4th Company, to rescue their surrounded comrades or to stop the breakthrough were unsuccessful. Eventually, seriously wounded Captain Romanov called for fire support on his own position before being overrun in the final Chechen attack. According to the Russians, 84 of their soldiers were killed in combat at Height 776, including all of the officers. Only six rank-and-file soldiers survived the battle, four of them seriously injured.

Controversies

The battle embarrassed Russian military officials, who attempted to downplay or conceal the casualties they had suffered. Senior military leaders (including Marshal of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeyev, VDV commander General Georgy Shpak, and the commander of federal forces in Chechnya, General Gennady Troshev) initially insisted that only 31 of their men were killed in the battle and denied the unofficial rumours of 86 dead. Sergey Yastrzhembsky, Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesman on Chechnya, also claimed 31 fatalities were "the total losses of that company for several days". After days of denials, Russian officials eventually admitted the losses, some of them apparently caused by friendly fire from their own artillery. Russian newspapers reported that Marshal Sergeyev had ordered the losses to be covered up, as the loss came just a week after 25 men from the 76th Airborne Division were killed in another battle in Chechnya. Even after the figure of "at least 85" killed has been confirmed by Sergeyev, VDV deputy commander Nikolai Staskov said they were killed over four days, from 29 February to 3 March. According to one source, "unofficially the losses sustained by Russian paratroopers on 1 March are blamed on the decision of the Eastern group's commander Gen. Sergey Makarov and the VDV tactical group's commander Aleksandr Lentsov." The final figure ultimately stood at 84. However the total Russian strength and the losses among the other Russian units operating in the area of Ulus-Kert were never officially disclosed.

In the first days after the battle, Gen. Troshev said 1,000 rebel fighters were involved. This figure was subsequently raised to 1,500–2,000 by Yastrzhembsky and eventually to 2,500 by Troshev. However, according to a statement by Colonel General Valery Manilov, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, there were only 2,500 to 3,500 separatist fighters left in all of Chechnya at this time. According to Yastrzhembsky on 6 March, some 70 rebels had laid down their arms at what he called a "pocket" at Selmentausen, while "up to 1,000 might have succeeded in escaping". The very first Russian official statements mentioned the death of 100 Chechen fighters at the price of 31 Russian soldiers. According to the article in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), the official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense, separatist casualties in the Argun Gorge area totaled approximately 400 dead, including 200 bodies allegedly found at Height 776. However, the official federal estimate was later raised to about 500 enemy dead, according to the Russian government website.

On 10 March, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov announced a general order to begin "an all-out partisan war" and the separatist forces remaining in the still unoccupied territories scattered to launch a long guerrilla war. The Russians thus lost one of their last chances to defeat a large number of the pro-independence fighters in a concentrated position, although in March the federal forces managed to inflict devastating losses against a different column of some 1,000–1,500 fighters (trapping the group under Ruslan Gelayev in the village of Komsomolskoye on 6 March and then killing hundreds of them in the following siege).

While there were no civilians in the immediate proximity of the clashes at the uninhabited Height 776, there were severe civilian casualties during the struggle for the broader Argun Gorge area, in particular from the artillery and air attacks on Ulus-Kert, Yaryshmardy and other villages, where thousands of locals and refugees from Grozny were trapped. Furthermore, there were many credible reports of direct atrocities against the population. For example, on 6 March, a group of civilians was detained by soldiers at the notorious Russian checkpoint on the road between Ulus-Kert and Duba-Yurt; 12 men from the group "disappeared" and the bodies of three of them were unearthed at the nearby village of Tangi-Chu two months later. In an infamous incident later in March, a local girl, Elza Kungayeva, was abducted from her home in Tangi-Chu, then raped and strangled to death by Russian Ground Forces Colonel Yuri Budanov.

Aftermath

In 2001, Putin flew to Chechnya to visit the former battlefield. In 2008, a day before Russia's Defender of the Fatherland Day, a street in Grozny was officially renamed as "84 Pskov Paratroopers Street", a move that sparked further controversy in Chechnya.

Awards

On 12 March 2000, President Putin signed an ukaz conferring Russian state awards upon participants of the battle. 63 soldiers received the Order of Courage and 22 (all 13 officers and nine enlisted men) were awarded the country's highest honorary medal and title of the Hero of the Russian Federation. In comparison, only 65 medals of the Hero of the Soviet Union medal were awarded for the entire duration of the 10-year Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Hero of the Russian Federation recipients for this incident are:

Guard Lt. Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin †
Guard Major Sergey Molodov †
Guard Major Alexander Dostavalov †
Guard Captain Roman Sokolov †
Guard Captain Viktor Romanov †
Guard Lieutenant Alexey Vorobyov †
Guard Lieutenant Andrey Sherstyannikov †
Guard Lieutenant Andrey Panov †
Guard Lieutenant Dmitry Petrov †
Guard Lieutenant Alexander Kolgatin †
Lieutenant Oleg Yermakov †
Lieutenant Alexander Ryazantsev †
Lieutenant Dmitry Kozhemyakin †
Guard Sergeant (contract service) Sergey Medvedev †
Guard Sergeant (contract service) Alexander Komyagin †
Guard Sergeant (contract service) Dmitry Grigoriyev †
Guard Sergeant Sergey Vasilyov †
Guard Sergeant Vladislav Dukhin †
Guard Corporal (contract service) Alexander Lebedev †
Guard Corporal Alexander Gerdt †
Guard Private Alexey Rasskaza †
Guard Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky (survivor, interview in Russian)

In popular culture

A series of Russian productions loosely based on these events were produced in the years after the battle, including a 2004 theatrical musical show, the 2004 television series Chest imeyu ("I Have the Honour"), the 2006 four-part television film Grozovye vorota ("The Storm Gate") and the 2006 movie Proriv ("Breakthrough"). In 2022, Russian heavy metal band Radio Tapok released a song about the battle called Высота 776 as the second track on the albulm Наследие (Heritage).

During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Bashkortostan raised the "Alexander Dostavalov Battalion" volunteer unit, named after Major Dostavalov, commander of the 4th Company's third platoon that reinforced the hill.