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== Request: Rewrite categories to follow more standard, four-family classification ==
== Can we get a source other than “Cardinal Voting: The Way to Escape the Social Choice Impossibility”? ==

Below are the problems I see with by Sergei Vasiljev:

1. Assumes voter preferences A:87, B56, C:13 on an approval ballot AB means voter’s cardinal and ordinal preferences are A=B (contradiction).

2. Proves non-dictatorship by assuming a voter can approve candidate A to offset the dictator who approves B, but contradicts by assuming same voter cannot approve A in order to satisfy IIA.

Is there a consensus yet among theorists and how can we know to use this article? Is see no affiliations. Saying all cardinal methods pass Arrow's Impossibility seems like a fantastical claim, given that voters having cardinal weights only adds information to the voter model but does not subtract ordinal information from the voter model.

] (]) 09:04, 27 October 2013 (UTC)

:They all "pass" because Arrow's Impossibility theorem applies to preferential voting systems only. It doesn't mean however that cardinal voting should be preferred over preferential voting. Claiming that is like claiming that dictatorship is to be preferred over non-dictatorship. Dictatorship is the easiest way to satisfy IIA. ] 01:32, 13 November 2013 (UTC)
::Cardinal models that are dictatorial don't pass Arrow's Impossibility. The point is Vasiljev claims a cardinal model for which all Arrow's criterion are in fact interpreted, applied and pass, but the logic seems to me to have errors. This is why I am asking editors if we can find a better source or if there is any consensus yet in the field. I do not understand the idea that cardinal voting models are not preferential when a voter's cardinal preferences A:87, B:56, C:13 implies A>B>C axiomatically. It seems logically they can not be exempt from preferential theorems.
:: I see your point and we agree that in order to pass IIA we must adopt a dictatorial model for cardinals, but that doesn't make sense to me to adopt such a model, for say, approval voting, which is not inherently dictatorial. Approval voting only stipulates to vote for any number of candidates. Only by imposing a particular cutoff regime we make it dictatorial. That's why, I am quite confident, Approval voting fails IIA. Approval voting is a preferential system because the voter may express or disguise preferences arbitrarily.
::] (]) 01:03, 15 November 2013 (UTC)
:::The reason (most) cardinal systems can be said to "pass" all of Arrow's "incompatible" criteria is that in such systems, erasing a candidate from a ballot does not affect the others. However, doing so can leave an obviously-unstrategic ballot; for instance, an approval ballot that approves all or none, or a score ballot that rates the only two options at 36 and 37 instead of 0 and 100. Arrow's theorem does not account for the possibility of such "strategically incompetent"/"non-admissible"/"watered-down" ballots; it assumes that A>B is always just A>B, not A>>>B or A(>)B.
:::As soon as you take (competent) strategy into account, you are back in the realm of irresolvable dilemmas (as Gibbard and Satterthwaite proved). ] (]) 20:54, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

== Additional Criteria? ==

When researching voting systems on the web, I've come across two more interesting criteria. Are they excluded on purpose?

Favorite Betrayal:
If the winner is a candidate who is top-voted by you, then moving an additional candidate to top on your ballot shouldn't change the winner to a candidate who is not then top-voted by you.

Chicken Dilemma:
http://wiki.electorama.com/Symmetrical_ICT
Basically, you shouldn't be able to make your first choice win by rearranging your lower choices.

] (]) 21:04, 5 November 2013 (UTC)

:Those are not widely accepted criteria. ] 08:30, 6 November 2013 (UTC)

:Not excluded on purpose, but they appeared only recently, and long after the voting system article was created. But I would point out that these criteria are very similar to ] and are all incompatible with ]. ] 02:34 12 November 2013 (UTC)

::The favorite-betrayal criterion has certainly been known for many years. It had a Misplaced Pages article which seems to have been deleted just last summer. Here is the most recent of it, from June, 2013.
::Moreover, this very Voting Systems page had the favorite-betrayal criterion included in its table of compliance for nearly all of the last two years, from , through .
::Additionally, and I know this is not at all scientific, a Google search for ("favorite betrayal criterion" -site:wikipedia.org) yields 45,300 results, while ("reversal symmetry criterion" -site:wikipedia.org) yields only 2,360. That is over 18 times more non-Misplaced Pages hits for favorite betrayal criterion than reversal symmetry criterion.
::So I propose we reintroduce FBC into the discussion and table of voting system compliance. ] (]) 01:27, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

:::For "favorite betrayal criterion", there are no hits in Google Books. And there are only 4 hits from 3 different authors in Google Scholar. ] 15:08, 2 February 2014 (UTC)

::::Just as a note on books: "Gaming the Vote" by William Poundstone does mention the FBC, but it calls it a "property", not a "criterion". ] (]) 20:38, 20 March 2014 (UTC)

== Add Symmetrical ICT? ==

I found another voting system which I think complies with the Condorcet Criterion and is designed to also comply with the two criteria mentioned above, Favorite Betrayal and Chicken Dilemma. I don't see it mentioned on Misplaced Pages, so maybe somebody should add a page for it and analyze whether or not it meets the criteria in the table on this page.


Standard, four-family classification of voting systems is:
http://wiki.electorama.com/Symmetrical_ICT


# Positional voting: ''f(k)'' points for each ballot ranking a candidate in ''k''-th place. Candidate with most points is the winner. Includes ], ], ].
] (]) 21:03, 5 November 2013 (UTC)
# Sequential methods: Sequentially eliminate biggest losers according to some other method. Rerun election excluding them. Includes ], ] (sequential-loser plurality), ].
# Round-Robin methods: Compare every candidate in a ]. Winner is the candidate who is "closest to winning every match" (different methods define "closest" differently). Includes ], ], ]
# Cardinal methods: Every candidate gets a rating or grade; candidate with highest grade wins. Includes ], ], ].
# (Optional) Hybrids: Combine 2 of the above. Includes ], Smith//Score (can be grouped with Cardinal), ] (grouped with sequential?)


Notably, "majoritarian" is an incorrect name, as it applies only to Condorcet methods. Plurality+IRV do not require a majority of the vote.
:Again, those are not widely accepted criteria. ] 08:30, 6 November 2013 (UTC)


::{{citation needed}} ] (]) 02:47, 2 February 2014 (UTC) ] (]) 17:54, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
:This isn't the right place to discuss categories. If you want to rename a category, use ]. Cheers, ] ]] 19:44, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
::Sorry if I was unclear; I meant the article should be rewritten to explain the common classification of voting systems, which groups them into these 4 families (which I called categories). Each family should have its own section. This is not related to Misplaced Pages categories. ] (]) 21:15, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
:::I don't think that would work as the list above omits multiple types of elections (where does PR fit into it?). Based on your comments elsewhere, I think you are overcomplicating matters unnecessarily. ] ]] 21:43, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
::::This categorization is only related to single-member elections (PR is a separate class of systems). This is to replace the current "Plurality" and "Majority" categorization shown here.
::::My main issue with the current taxonomy is "majoritarian" or "majority" are used in voting system literature to refer to Condorcet methods, not to IRV (a variant of plurality). Sometimes "majoritarian" is used to mean single-member (though that's a bit of a misnomer), in which case plurality would count as well. ] (]) 22:06, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
:Do you have any source for this being standard? I have not really seen it like this before. ] (]) 07:29, 12 March 2024 (UTC)
::I'll try and find a better (textbook) reference when I'm not on mobile, but They use the terms "graded" (for cardinal), "iterative" (for sequential), and "margin" (for round-robin), but the classes are the same. —] (]) 16:53, 12 March 2024 (UTC)
::I found another example of it being used . Like I said elsewhere, this categorization isn't unique/universal, but it's used in several texts. ("Standard" was the wrong word—"common" would've been better.) –] 02:42, 25 April 2024 (UTC)
:::Maybe we should group together the "Core support" systems (FPP, DAC/DSC, IRV) instead? Then the other categories would be majority-rule (Condorcet) and rated voting. –] 21:25, 26 April 2024 (UTC)
::::I'm not really seeing the need to deviate from the existing classification, although I think we could perhaps make the first four listed (plurality, majority, proportional and mixed) separate from the subsequent ones (primary, indirect, others). ] ]] 22:02, 27 April 2024 (UTC)
:::::I'm in the process of writing some articles that will explain the research on this by social choice theorists. The upshot is that under strategic voting patterns, FPP turns into a "de facto" instant-runoff system: in the early stages of a campaign, strategic voters abandon the weakest candidates and consolidate around two major candidates, leading to a "runoff" dynamic where only these two candidates get a meaningful share of the vote. In the United States, you can think of the "consolidation" process as being the primaries for each party, and then the runoff is the general election (where only the major-party nominees have a real chance, so other candidates can be safely ignored).
:::::As a result, IRV and FPP tend to behave very similarly to each other, but very differently from other systems (like score or Condorcet voting). IRV and FPP tend to lead to polarized two-party systems, whereas score (under strategic behavior) or Condorcet methods select winners who are ]. –] 15:17, 28 April 2024 (UTC)
::::::Oh, to clarify—single-winner and multi-winner (including proportional) systems should definitely be kept in separate articles. Worth noting that any single-winner system can be made proportional by using the Single Transferable Vote technique, though. –] 04:06, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
:::::@] I think maybe this will help clear things up. There are two distinct branches of science that study electoral systems:
:::::# The ] study of electoral systems as actually existing sets of laws in different countries. This kind of cataloging would fall under law or political science.
:::::# The ] study of electoral systems as abstract objects or rules for mapping individual preferences to social preferences (called ]). This is a branch of economics and mathematics called ], which includes results like ] or everything at ].
:::::So far, Wiki articles have been written mostly from the first perspective; this can be a bit of a problem because these fields have different terminologies and focuses. As an example, single-member plurality or IRV would never be called "majoritarian" in social choice theory. The term "majoritarian" is reserved exclusively for the ] (which guarantee a majority of voters always gets their way). However, political scientists will sometimes call any winner-take-all system "majoritarian", because these tend to produce legislatures where one party has a majority. –] 21:19, 5 May 2024 (UTC)
::Found another example of it being used—
::https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/archive/condorcet/Monroe/004004MonroeBurt.pdf –Sincerely, ] 01:50, 15 May 2024 (UTC)


== Suggestion: Split portions off into multiwinner and single-winner systems ==
== Removal of Condorcet-IRV method ==


We can leave a smaller article behind here. I think splitting this into two separate articles should help us give each family of methods the focus it deserves. –Sincerely, ] 19:28, 17 May 2024 (UTC)
Why was the method removed from the article? ] 16:03, 11 November 2013 (UTC)
:I don't think this is a good idea. There should be a single overarching article on electoral systems IMO. ] ]] 01:28, 18 May 2024 (UTC)
::I think it's perfectly fine to include something here! I've got no objections to keeping something here—there should definitely be ''some'' kind of article here.
::My suggestion is more that we try slimming this down and putting the details in new articles on single-winner and multi-winner systems. –Sincerely, ] 02:34, 18 May 2024 (UTC)


== STV ==
== Changes made to citations ==


Ireland and Northern Ireland both use STV, yet have different scores on gallagher index, 2.22 for Ireland and 7.8 for Northern Ireland, so how they can be protional
I changed a few citations formats, and replaced the shortened citations with the full citations. I also used named references to make those changes. This is the link to my sandbox. https://en.wikipedia.org/User:Lisax31/sandbox1 I am looking forward to your suggestions and feedbacks. Thanks!
] (]) 04:13, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
::Unrelated topic: I deleted the section that I myself created. I did this after I realized that what I said did not make sense. Sorry - oops - ] (]) 16:50, 22 March 2014 (UTC)


Ireland 2020 GE, 160
== Blacklisted Links Found on the Main Page ==


Fianna Fail
Cyberbot II has detected that page contains external links that have either been globally or locally blacklisted.
Vote share 22.2%
Links tend to be blacklisted because they have a history of being spammed, or are highly innappropriate for Misplaced Pages.
Seat share 23.75
This, however, doesn't necessaryily mean it's spam, or not a good link.
Seat won 38
If the link is a good link, you may wish to request whitelisting by going to the ].
160×22.2%=35 seats
If you feel the link being caught by the blacklist is a false positive, or no longer needed on the blacklist, you may request the regex be removed or altered at the ].
If the link is blacklisted globally and you feel the above applies you may request to whitelist it using the before mentioned request page, or request its removal, or alteration, at the ].
When requesting whitelisting, be sure to supply the link to be whitelisted and wrap the link in nowiki tags.
The whitelisting process can take its time so once a request has been filled out, you may set the invisible parameter on the tag to true.
Please be aware that the bot will replace removed tags, and will remove misplaced tags regularly.


Sinn Fein
'''Below is a list of links that were found on the main page:'''
vote share 24.5%
Seat share 23.125%
Seat won 37
160×24.5=39 seats


*<nowiki>http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/12/17/51/PDF/stratapproval4.pdf</nowiki>
*:''Triggered by <code>\bhalshs\.archives-ouvertes\.fr</code> on the global blacklist''


Fine Gael
If you would like me to provide more information on the talk page, contact ] and ask him to program me with more info.
Vote share 20.9%
Seat share 21.875%
Seats won 35
160×20.9%=33 seats


Northern ireland 2022 Assembly elections
From your friendly hard working bot.—] ]<sub style="margin-left:-6.1ex;color:green;font-family:arnprior">Online</sub> 15:28, 27 March 2014 (UTC)


Sinn Fein
{{done|Resolved}} This issue has been resolved, and I have therefore removed the tag, if not already done. No further action is necessary.—] ]<sub style="margin-left:-6.1ex;color:green;font-family:arnprior">Online</sub> 07:28, 29 March 2014 (UTC)
Vote share 29%
Seat share 30%
Seats won 27
90×29%=26 seat


DUP
== Deletion review on ] ==
Vote share 21.3%
Seat share 27.7%
Seat won 25
90×21.3%=19 seats


Alliance
The ] page has been deleted in accordance with Misplaced Pages policy; that deletion is now undergoing a ]. Your comments are welcome. ] (]) 14:33, 14 April 2014 (UTC)
Alliance
Vote share 13.5
Seat share 18.8%
Seat won 17
90×13.5=12 seats


jamestwice ] (]) 10:35, 4 July 2024 (UTC)
== RFC - favorite betrayal? ==


== Move discussion for "Condorcet paradox" ==
{{rfc|pol|sci|rfcid=9EDDB78}}
Should the favorite betrayal criterion (FBC) be included in the criteria table on this article?


Your participation could help Misplaced Pages decide on the best title for the page:
===Survey===
* ''']'''
*'''Support''' as RFC originator. This criterion has adequate sourcing and is sufficiently distinct from the other criteria in the table to merit inclusion. In general, this article is improved by including the various criteria that are in regards to voting systems, and one more criterion in the context of many others is not ]. ] (]) 13:23, 19 April 2014 (UTC) (UNDUE is the issue here, not notability. As ] clearly states, "If a topic does not meet these criteria but still has some verifiable facts, it might be useful to discuss it within another article.") ] (]) 15:18, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
] (]) 03:48, 22 August 2024 (UTC)
*'''Oppose''' The "favorite betrayal criterion" doesn't meet Misplaced Pages's notability criteria. See ] and ]. ] 14:56, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
*'''Oppose''' The FBC refers to how a particular "]" is handled, rather than a voting criterion per se for this article - and is like all "voting strategies" not ''directly related'' to differences in "voting systems." Other strategies include "bullet voting" and "wrong party voting in primaries" etc. None of which are in this article. See ] ] (]) 22:09, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
::Huh? This RfC is about the favorite betrayal ''criterion'', not the phenomenon/strategy of favorite betrayal in general. I think that even Schulze wouldn't deny that the FBC is a well-defined criterion which is passed by some voting systems and failed by others — exactly like all the other criteria in this article. What we have to decide here is whether it merits mention here. Perhaps would help clarify this point. ] (]) 22:50, 20 April 2014 (UTC)
:::I read the article. I looked up papers. The "criterion" is with reference to a ''particular voting strategy'' which has been postulated (but ''not'' shown to have had any wide usage as it requires fairly precise knowledge of where the vote percentages will end up). It is not, however, ''directly relevant'' to this article, but I suggest it ''might'' be relevant to the "voting strategy" article. RfCs are "Requests for Comment" and not "Requests for Agreement" by the way. ] (]) 23:47, 20 April 2014 (UTC)


== Request: More information on importance ==
===Discussion===
To see references on the FBC, see ] (as the older deletion processes linked from there). These references show that the FBC easily clears the hurdle of ] so this debate is about ]. Or, in plain English: nobody disputes the fact that the term "favorite betrayal criterion" refers to something with certain undisputed mathematical properties and a bearing on voting theory; the only question is whether it merits mention in this article. I believe that in cases like this (as long as, as in the current case, there are no other concerns such as ]) the presumption should be on the side of inclusion.


Lots of people I talk to are basically convinced that electoral systems don't matter, mostly because of the big wave of recent studies showing ] has no effect on most outcomes of interest when compared to ]. I'm pretty sure that's not the case when you look outside of the plurality-with-elimination family, and particularly when you look at proportional representation. This seems like a very important thing to talk about—I'd love to have more information on studies relating to the importance of electoral systems to outcomes like democratic backsliding, voter satisfaction, and overall stability. ] (]) 17:25, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
The reason this merits an RFC, rather than the regular editing process, is that it's reasonable to guess that this would lead to an edit war without an RfC. The ] article has been the subject of an extraordinary 12 processes related to deletion and undeletion, one of which is ]. In recent years, these processes have been spearheaded by two users — ] and ]. I am convinced that both of us have acted in good faith in these processes, and that part of the reason that issue has been hard to resolve is that it is a genuine borderline case. However, I think it also bears mention that Schulze is the originator of the Schulze method, and that excluding the FBC from this page here makes his method look better. That's not a clear-cut ], but it does make me view his arguments with a certain extra skepticism. ] (]) 13:23, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
:(Note: I believe that, however this RfC is resolved, it will take the pressure off of the deletion/undeletion debate, and, like a beautiful layer of nacre, prevent that debate from being a perpetual grain of sand in the Wikipedian oyster.) ] (]) 14:17, 19 April 2014 (UTC)


: In the United States, ranked choice ballots have not yet been used to elect state legislators, or a meaningful number of members of Congress. When that happens laws and taxes are likely to be reformed. Then the economic advantages (reduced corruption, fewer unfair monopolies, fewer unfair tax subsidies, fewer unfair tax breaks, etc.) will become evident. In the meantime it's nearly impossible to research and yield evidence of these advantages. Remember the role of governors and presidents is to enforce the laws and taxes passed in legislatures. ] (]) 18:18, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
'''Questions'''
::I'm not talking about effects on government policy. I doubt any study could show effects on that because . I'm just referring to papers showing no difference on the results of elections—null effects on electoral competition, number of parties, or descriptive representation of groups like minorities and women. And in ~96% of cases where voting goes into multiple rounds, IRV and FPP line up. So, if it has no effect on the candidates who run, and no effect on which candidate wins, that's some pretty airtight evidence that there's no effect at all. ] (]) 19:17, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
* Given the history, won't this RfC just get appealed, through one process or another, by whichever of the involved editors considers themselves to have 'lost'? (and then that appeal get appealed, and so on and so on for round after round).
:::(Note that I'm referring to the American political context, where my read on the literature is that IRV is basically reinventing the existing primary system, which already prevents spoilers from substantially affecting the results of an election.) ] (]) 18:12, 4 September 2024 (UTC)
* If this is only going to be the first round of an everlasting Kafkaesque bureaucratic rivalry then is it worth the time of independent editors getting fully acquainted with the issues, arguments and history in this case?
:::We cannot yet prove or disprove that a method "... ''has no effect on the candidates who run'' ..." because party politics is dominated by the worst vote-counting system within a nation. There will be a change in who enters elections when a full election system is well-designed, but so far no nation uses a well-designed vote-counting system. For example, the electoral college in the US constrains what can happen in Congressional elections; the ability of a parliament to trigger a new election through a vote of no confidence is linked to how ministers, including prime ministers, are selected, which affects parties, which limits the ability of a reform-minded candidate to get elected, which means reform-minded candidates do not enter politics; "open primaries" in the US do not yet use a well-chosen vote-counting method in the first/nomination round; etc. ] (]) 15:58, 5 September 2024 (UTC)
] (]) 17:10, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
::I for one will abide by this RfC in letter and spirit even if it goes "against" me, and would trust Schulze if he made a similar commitment.
::Caveats that should go without saying:
::*If the decision is "no", then a new source appears that is unequivocally better than all current sources, such as a peer-reviewed paper with a significant focus on this criterion, I would consider the matter ripe for re-evaluation.
::*Obviously, I hope that my reasonableness won't be used against me (ie, I don't want people to argue "let's resolve against homunq simply because he's promised to shut up and Schulze hasn't." But if they don't specifically say that, I won't worry.)
::] (]) 17:44, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
:::Also, of course, the more people participate in this RfC now, the less likely it is that any future wikilawyering from either side will be able to overturn the result. ] (]) 12:01, 20 April 2014 (UTC)


== Please you can help me I want I need present language translation ==
*I am a bit confused as to *exactly* what is being proposed here, but I did read up on the issue of "Favorite Betrayal" and I think it definitely deserves to be discussed somewhere on Misplaced Pages. ] (]) 15:51, 20 April 2014 (UTC)


I respect for see in Delhi please you can help me I need present I need I want they thank you so much ] (]) 08:52, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
== Split out criteria and table to separate article and transclude? ==


سلامم دری زرورت دارم ] (]) 08:53, 12 December 2024 (UTC)
I'm not going to do this right now, as it would probably be disruptive to the above RfC. However, as soon as that's done with, I think that the criteria and table should be put in their own separate article, transcluded here. That would simplify and separate the discussion; after all, there have already been attempts to effectively give the table ], but I think that without splitting it out as a sub-article, such attempts are doomed to fail. ] (]) 16:10, 20 April 2014 (UTC)

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Request: Rewrite categories to follow more standard, four-family classification

Standard, four-family classification of voting systems is:

  1. Positional voting: f(k) points for each ballot ranking a candidate in k-th place. Candidate with most points is the winner. Includes Plurality, Borda, Dowdall.
  2. Sequential methods: Sequentially eliminate biggest losers according to some other method. Rerun election excluding them. Includes Nanson, instant-runoff voting (sequential-loser plurality), descending solid coalitions.
  3. Round-Robin methods: Compare every candidate in a round-robin tournament. Winner is the candidate who is "closest to winning every match" (different methods define "closest" differently). Includes Ranked pairs, Schulze's method, Minimax Condorcet
  4. Cardinal methods: Every candidate gets a rating or grade; candidate with highest grade wins. Includes score (highest average), approval, highest median.
  5. (Optional) Hybrids: Combine 2 of the above. Includes STAR voting, Smith//Score (can be grouped with Cardinal), Tideman alternative (grouped with sequential?)

Notably, "majoritarian" is an incorrect name, as it applies only to Condorcet methods. Plurality+IRV do not require a majority of the vote.

Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 17:54, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

This isn't the right place to discuss categories. If you want to rename a category, use WP:CfD. Cheers, Number 57 19:44, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
Sorry if I was unclear; I meant the article should be rewritten to explain the common classification of voting systems, which groups them into these 4 families (which I called categories). Each family should have its own section. This is not related to Misplaced Pages categories. Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 21:15, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
I don't think that would work as the list above omits multiple types of elections (where does PR fit into it?). Based on your comments elsewhere, I think you are overcomplicating matters unnecessarily. Number 57 21:43, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
This categorization is only related to single-member elections (PR is a separate class of systems). This is to replace the current "Plurality" and "Majority" categorization shown here.
My main issue with the current taxonomy is "majoritarian" or "majority" are used in voting system literature to refer to Condorcet methods, not to IRV (a variant of plurality). Sometimes "majoritarian" is used to mean single-member (though that's a bit of a misnomer), in which case plurality would count as well. Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 22:06, 11 March 2024 (UTC)
Do you have any source for this being standard? I have not really seen it like this before. Jannikp97 (talk) 07:29, 12 March 2024 (UTC)
I'll try and find a better (textbook) reference when I'm not on mobile, but here's an example of social choice theorists using it. They use the terms "graded" (for cardinal), "iterative" (for sequential), and "margin" (for round-robin), but the classes are the same. —Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 16:53, 12 March 2024 (UTC)
I found another example of it being used here. Like I said elsewhere, this categorization isn't unique/universal, but it's used in several texts. ("Standard" was the wrong word—"common" would've been better.) –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 02:42, 25 April 2024 (UTC)
Maybe we should group together the "Core support" systems (FPP, DAC/DSC, IRV) instead? Then the other categories would be majority-rule (Condorcet) and rated voting. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 21:25, 26 April 2024 (UTC)
I'm not really seeing the need to deviate from the existing classification, although I think we could perhaps make the first four listed (plurality, majority, proportional and mixed) separate from the subsequent ones (primary, indirect, others). Number 57 22:02, 27 April 2024 (UTC)
I'm in the process of writing some articles that will explain the research on this by social choice theorists. The upshot is that under strategic voting patterns, FPP turns into a "de facto" instant-runoff system: in the early stages of a campaign, strategic voters abandon the weakest candidates and consolidate around two major candidates, leading to a "runoff" dynamic where only these two candidates get a meaningful share of the vote. In the United States, you can think of the "consolidation" process as being the primaries for each party, and then the runoff is the general election (where only the major-party nominees have a real chance, so other candidates can be safely ignored).
As a result, IRV and FPP tend to behave very similarly to each other, but very differently from other systems (like score or Condorcet voting). IRV and FPP tend to lead to polarized two-party systems, whereas score (under strategic behavior) or Condorcet methods select winners who are close to the median voter's ideology. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 15:17, 28 April 2024 (UTC)
Oh, to clarify—single-winner and multi-winner (including proportional) systems should definitely be kept in separate articles. Worth noting that any single-winner system can be made proportional by using the Single Transferable Vote technique, though. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 04:06, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
@Number 57 I think maybe this will help clear things up. There are two distinct branches of science that study electoral systems:
  1. The positive study of electoral systems as actually existing sets of laws in different countries. This kind of cataloging would fall under law or political science.
  2. The normative study of electoral systems as abstract objects or rules for mapping individual preferences to social preferences (called social choice functions). This is a branch of economics and mathematics called social choice theory, which includes results like Arrow's theorem or everything at comparison of electoral systems.
So far, Wiki articles have been written mostly from the first perspective; this can be a bit of a problem because these fields have different terminologies and focuses. As an example, single-member plurality or IRV would never be called "majoritarian" in social choice theory. The term "majoritarian" is reserved exclusively for the Condorcet methods (which guarantee a majority of voters always gets their way). However, political scientists will sometimes call any winner-take-all system "majoritarian", because these tend to produce legislatures where one party has a majority. –Maximum Limelihood Estimator 21:19, 5 May 2024 (UTC)
Found another example of it being used—
https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/archive/condorcet/Monroe/004004MonroeBurt.pdf –Sincerely, A Lime 01:50, 15 May 2024 (UTC)

Suggestion: Split portions off into multiwinner and single-winner systems

We can leave a smaller article behind here. I think splitting this into two separate articles should help us give each family of methods the focus it deserves. –Sincerely, A Lime 19:28, 17 May 2024 (UTC)

I don't think this is a good idea. There should be a single overarching article on electoral systems IMO. Number 57 01:28, 18 May 2024 (UTC)
I think it's perfectly fine to include something here! I've got no objections to keeping something here—there should definitely be some kind of article here.
My suggestion is more that we try slimming this down and putting the details in new articles on single-winner and multi-winner systems. –Sincerely, A Lime 02:34, 18 May 2024 (UTC)

STV

Ireland and Northern Ireland both use STV, yet have different scores on gallagher index, 2.22 for Ireland and 7.8 for Northern Ireland, so how they can be protional

Ireland 2020 GE, 160

Fianna Fail Vote share 22.2% Seat share 23.75 Seat won 38 160×22.2%=35 seats

Sinn Fein vote share 24.5% Seat share 23.125% Seat won 37 160×24.5=39 seats


Fine Gael Vote share 20.9% Seat share 21.875% Seats won 35 160×20.9%=33 seats

Northern ireland 2022 Assembly elections

Sinn Fein Vote share 29% Seat share 30% Seats won 27 90×29%=26 seat

DUP Vote share 21.3% Seat share 27.7% Seat won 25 90×21.3%=19 seats

Alliance Alliance Vote share 13.5 Seat share 18.8% Seat won 17 90×13.5=12 seats

jamestwice Jamestwice (talk) 10:35, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

Move discussion for "Condorcet paradox"

Your participation could help Misplaced Pages decide on the best title for the page:

Jruderman (talk) 03:48, 22 August 2024 (UTC)

Request: More information on importance

Lots of people I talk to are basically convinced that electoral systems don't matter, mostly because of the big wave of recent studies showing ranked-choice voting has no effect on most outcomes of interest when compared to first-past-the-post. I'm pretty sure that's not the case when you look outside of the plurality-with-elimination family, and particularly when you look at proportional representation. This seems like a very important thing to talk about—I'd love to have more information on studies relating to the importance of electoral systems to outcomes like democratic backsliding, voter satisfaction, and overall stability. – Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 17:25, 3 September 2024 (UTC)

In the United States, ranked choice ballots have not yet been used to elect state legislators, or a meaningful number of members of Congress. When that happens laws and taxes are likely to be reformed. Then the economic advantages (reduced corruption, fewer unfair monopolies, fewer unfair tax subsidies, fewer unfair tax breaks, etc.) will become evident. In the meantime it's nearly impossible to research and yield evidence of these advantages. Remember the role of governors and presidents is to enforce the laws and taxes passed in legislatures. VoteFair (talk) 18:18, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
I'm not talking about effects on government policy. I doubt any study could show effects on that because reality is underpowered. I'm just referring to papers showing no difference on the results of elections—null effects on electoral competition, number of parties, or descriptive representation of groups like minorities and women. And in ~96% of cases where voting goes into multiple rounds, IRV and FPP line up. So, if it has no effect on the candidates who run, and no effect on which candidate wins, that's some pretty airtight evidence that there's no effect at all. – Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 19:17, 3 September 2024 (UTC)
(Note that I'm referring to the American political context, where my read on the literature is that IRV is basically reinventing the existing primary system, which already prevents spoilers from substantially affecting the results of an election.) – Closed Limelike Curves (talk) 18:12, 4 September 2024 (UTC)
We cannot yet prove or disprove that a method "... has no effect on the candidates who run ..." because party politics is dominated by the worst vote-counting system within a nation. There will be a change in who enters elections when a full election system is well-designed, but so far no nation uses a well-designed vote-counting system. For example, the electoral college in the US constrains what can happen in Congressional elections; the ability of a parliament to trigger a new election through a vote of no confidence is linked to how ministers, including prime ministers, are selected, which affects parties, which limits the ability of a reform-minded candidate to get elected, which means reform-minded candidates do not enter politics; "open primaries" in the US do not yet use a well-chosen vote-counting method in the first/nomination round; etc. VoteFair (talk) 15:58, 5 September 2024 (UTC)

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