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* The ''motive'' is political or religious * The ''motive'' is political or religious
* The ''target'' is civilian * The ''target'' is civilian
* The act is mainly ''islamic''
* The ''objective'' is to intimidate * The ''objective'' is to intimidate
* The intimidation is directed at ''government'' or ''society'' * The intimidation is directed at ''government'' or ''society''

Revision as of 11:30, 23 July 2005

Part of a series on
Terrorism and political violence
By ideology
Religious
Special-interest / Single-issue
Related topics
Organizational structures
  • Methods
  • Tactics
Terrorist groups
Relationship to states
State terrorism
State-sponsored terrorism
Response to terrorism

The term "terrorism" is controversial and has many definitions, none of which are universally accepted. For most of the 20th century, the word was used primarily to describe the attacks of "a clandestine or expatriate organization aiming to coerce an established government by acts of violence against it or its subjects" (OED). However, it was always a perjorative term, and has largely been used to assert the violence of an enemy as being immoral or wanton, relative to acceptable forms.

The word is used exclusively to refer to others. No known group self-identifies as 'terrorist'. The use of the term broadened considerably since the United States declared its "international War on terrorism (IWOT)," in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks.

21st century definitions of the word range very widely. They typically involve some subset of the following criteria:

  • The act is violent
  • The motive is political or religious
  • The target is civilian
  • The objective is to intimidate
  • The intimidation is directed at government or society
  • The perpetrator is non-governmental
  • The act is unlawful

None of these are universally accepted as being either necessary or sufficient.

Definition

Main article: Definitions of terrorism

Etymology

The term "terrorism" comes from the French 18th century word terrorisme based on the Latin language verbs terrere (to frighten) and deterrere (to frighten from). It dates to 1795, and originally used to describe the actions of the Jacobins in their rule of post-Revolutionary France, the so-called "Reign of Terror". The Jacobins are even said to have coined the term "terrorists" to refer to themselves, although that is not certain. Note that the method employed was in most cases simply the arrest, and sometimes execution, of opponents. Terrorism and terror therefore originally referred to methods employed by regimes to control their own populations through fear, a tactic seen again in many totalitarian regimes, such as Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. The terms did not refer to bomb attacks, but rather to what is now called a police state. The current use of the term state terrorism, and the use of the term "terrorist", have much broader meanings.

Official definitions

Many definitions of terrorism exist. Definitions are produced by the media, politicians, other political actors such as think-tanks, by academics, but above all by government. Law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies formulated most of these official definitions. Official definitions have the most impact, because they determine anti-terrorism policy. Most of them outline primary criteria: the target, objective, motive, perpetrator, and legitimacy or legality of the act.

  • Target – It is commonly held that the distinctive nature of terrorism lies in its deliberate and specific selection of civilians as targets. Furthermore, an act is more likely to be considered terrorism if it targets a general populace than if it purposefully targets a specific individual or group. See also Noncombatant and Collateral damage.
This criterion excludes: conventional warfare in accordance with the laws of war, any attacks on military targets (such as the bombing of the USS Cole), guerrilla warfare and revolution when limited to military targets, and assassination of a head of state or other leader of comparable stature (such as Martin Luther King, Jr.).
This criterion may also be held to exclude actions where the attackers make at least some attempt to reduce civilian casualties. For example, the Zionist organization Irgun preceded many, though not all, of its attacks (notably the 1946 King David Hotel bombing) with warnings to the press, the target, or the authorities of the British Mandate of Palestine. They were nevertheless considered to be terrorists by the British. The Basque ETA group is also known for pre-emptive warnings. By contrast, groups who use suicide bombing attacks against civilians (such as Hamas, al-Qaida and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades) rely on the element of surprise in order to maximize casualties, and therefore never issue warnings.
  • Objective – As the name implies, terrorism is understood as an attempt to provoke fear and intimidation. Hence, terrorist acts are designed and intended to attract wide publicity and cause public shock, outrage, and/or fear. The intent may be to provoke disproportionate reactions from states.
This criterion excludes: the Holocaust and other cases of genocide, which are undertaken to exterminate rather than to intimidate, and which are usually hidden rather than publicized. Also, any violence against targets unlikely to attract public notice and having little effect on the populace at large.
  • Motive – These acts are intended to achieve political or religious goals, not for personal gain. For example, a gang of bank robbers who kill a bank manager, blow up his vault and escape with the contents would normally not be classed as terrorists, because their motive was profit. However, if a gang were to execute the same assault with the intent of causing a crisis in public confidence in the banking system, followed by a run on the banks and a subsequent destabilization of the economy, then the gang would be classed as terrorists.
This criterion excludes: organized crime (the Mafia, etc.)
  • Perpetrator – Some hold that a legitimate government cannot, by definition, commit terrorism of any kind. In this view, a state can commit war crimes or crimes against humanity, but these actions are distinct from terrorism.
This criterion excludes: warfare between states, government repression of its own civilians, the Holocaust, the Hiroshima bombing, and possibly even the Lockerbie bombing.
  • Legitimacy – Many definitions include a proviso that the action must be "unlawful" or "illegitimate". This is by far the least objective of the criteria, in the absence of any objective interpreter of international law. For example, the laws of war generally exclude the deliberate targeting of civilians, yet in World War II it is unquestioned that acts such as the bombing of Hiroshima or Dresden were carried out with the knowledge that civilian casualties would greatly exceed military ones. Whether the actions were legally justified, either in self-defense or on the grounds that they actually minimised civilian suffering by bringing the war to an earlier end, is not a question that can be objectively determined.

No definition of terrorism has been accepted as authoritative by the United Nations. However, the "academic consensus definition", written by terrorism expert A.P. Schmid and widely used by social scientists, defines terrorism as follows:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby — in contrast to assassination — the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought."

Schmid has also proposed a short legal definition of terrorism to the UN, namely that an act of terrorism should be defined as "the peacetime equivalent of a war crime". This brings the question of legitimacy to the front.

Definitions of terrorism are not static: like all politicised concepts they are subject to historical evolution. In response to the 2001 attacks, western politicians have placed terrorism in the context of a global struggle against democracy itself. That implies that the emphasis in definition should lay on the nature of a country's government, rather the specific targets or methods. It also implies that 'coercion' is no longer relevant to the definition - the terrorists don't want the government to do anything specific, they want it to disappear. The European Union includes the aim of "destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country" in its 2004 definition of terrorism. The idea of a 'war against democracy' is related to the theory of the Clash of Civilisations, and they are sometimes quoted together.

Subjectivity

The saying "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" is older than the War on terrorism. However, since the September 11th attacks, the term "terrorist" has become much more heavily politicized. Because the term has strong negative connotations without having any widely-accepted definition, there is a definite tendency to use the term only when politically convenient. Indeed, the actual definition of terrorism is not as much debated as which parties and which acts of violence are to be labelled "terrorist". That can shift over the course of time, as this quote illustrates:

The tragedy of Afghanistan continues as the valiant and courageous Afghan freedom fighters persevere in standing up against the brutal power of the Soviet invasion and occupation... The Soviet forces are pitted against an extraordinary people who, in their determination to preserve the character of their ancient land, have organized an effective and still spreading country-wide resistance. The resistance of the Afghan freedom fighters is an example to all the world of the invincibility of the ideals we in this country hold most dear, the ideals of freedom and independence. ~Ronald Reagan, Proclamation of Afghanistan Day, 1983. Ronald Reagan Library

For many critics of anti-terrorism policy, it is the anti-terrorism which requires theoretical attention, and especially its internal political uses. In this view, terrorism exists primarily as a social construct, more accurately a political construct. According to the Thomas theorem, widely held beliefs can determine social realities. Obviously that is even more true, if the beliefs are held by the government. The 'war on terror' has had a substantial social and political impact on the United States, for instance, although in no way comparable with the impact on the home front during the Second World War.

The longstanding critic of US foreign and military policy, Noam Chomsky comments that "the term 'terrorism' is used, standardly, to refer to the terrorism that they carry out against us, whoever 'we' happen to be. Even the worst mass murderer - the Nazis for example - adopted this practice. Since the rich and powerful set the terms for discussion, the term 'terrorism' is restricted, in practice, to the terror that affects the US and its clients and allies." He argues that "terrorism" is used not objectively to describe any particular type of behavior, but as a characterization that demonizes a perceived enemy in order to promote moral repulsion and outrage.

A frequent response is to dispute the attribution of terrorism. Often that is accompanied by a counter-charge. The controversy about "eco-terrorism" is a good example. This term was coined in the United States to refer to violent environmentalist actions, for instance attacks on logging machinery. The response of those who sympathise with the environmentalists has been to describe the timber companies as being the real eco-terrorists, for destroying forests and damaging the ecosystem. In the long term, this type of dispute tends to polarize the population. That undermines political legitimacy, that is, the willingness of the population to accept government and court decisions, even if they personally disagree with them. It implies a sense of shared values and a minimal respect, which can not survive if wide sections of the population believe each other to be terrorists.

In most western countries there are now political disputes of this kind, about Who is the real terrorist? As an example, Noam Chomsky believes that terrorism is typically sponsored by governments through the organisation, funding or training of death squads and similar paramilitary groups, often under the banner of counter-terrorism. In his view the causes of terrorism include attempts to gain or consolidate power either by instilling fear in the population to be controlled, or by stimulating another group into becoming a hardened foe, thereby increasing social polarisation. US policy in Nicaragua is often cited by Chomsky as an example, see Nicaragua v. United States.

Counter-accusations are not the same as the issue of provocation. The 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings were followed by political debate about whether the Aznar government had brought the bombings on Spain by deploying troops to Iraq, and that contributed to its defeat in the national election a few days later. Similarly, London mayor Ken Livingstone declared that "80 years of western intervention into predominantly Arab lands because of the western need for oil" was one cause of the London train bombings.

Groups accused of terrorism, and their supporters, invariably use neutral or positive terms to describe their actions, such as "freedom fighters" or paramilitaries. Even terms like "guerrilla" or "rebel" are considered much less pejorative than "terrorist". Islamist groups would refer to themselves as 'jihadi' or mujaheddin.

Causes

Theories on the causes of terrorism include:

  • sociological explanations, which focus on the position of the perpetrators in society
  • conflict theory which includes their relationship to those in power
  • ideological explanations, which focus on the differences in ideology, and the different goals of the ideologies
  • media theory explanations, which treat terrorist acts as a form of communication.

Some anti-terrorist commentators refuse to consider the causes, since that implies justification. For them, the terrorists are simply evil people. Some theories of the ethics of terrorism also exist, and they too are concerned with moral judgment on terrorism and specific actions. They do not attempt to explain its origins. They often treat terrorism as a form of warfare, and refer to the just war theory, and to war crimes law.

The existing social order within countries, and the global order of states, include structural compromises and agreements between various groups and interests. Often they arose in resolution of past conflicts. Over time, these arrangements may become less relevant to the current situation. New groups and interests may not be foreseen. Liberal democracy itself is intended to prevent small groups redesigning society according to their norms - but then they have to live in a society which they often reject. Some theories assume that groups resort to terrorism when other avenues for change, including economic campaigns, protest, public appeal, and standard warfare, hold no hope of success. This is related to the criterion of ultima ratio (last resort), in just war theory. In this perspective, terrorist acts are calculated to disrupt the existing order and provoke conflicts, in the expectation that the outcome will be a new order, more favourable to their interests. This is, crudely, the seat-at-the-table theory of terrorism. Applied to anti-terrorism policy, this approach implies policies to create and sustain an alternative, peaceful, avenue of problem resolution, particularly in the case of marginalised and oppressed populations. Ideological theories, on the other hand, often imply that nothing can be 'resolved', because the conflicting ideologies are logically incompatible.

The Clash of Civilisations is also a theory of the causes of terrorism, at least ‘inter-civilisation’ terrorism, but also suggests it is historically inevitable. It sees history as a millennia long conflict between very large-scale units, founded on incompatible values: violence is then simply part of the historical process. Ironically, the theory coincides with the world view of the radical Islamists, who see the mediaeval Crusades as the standard expression of western culture, and war as inevitable.

An increasingly relevant causal factor, at least for recruitment to terrorist groups, is the often draconian counter-terrorist policy which was intended to defeat them. For instance, the conditions of detention in Guantanamo Bay are such, that any reasonable person could be expected to resist them, and there is no legal means of exit either. If large sections of the population fear that they might end up in such conditions, on the basis of their religion or ethnic origin, then a vicious circle can arise, and terrorism becomes a defensive response to counter-terror policy.

Separatism

During much of the 20th century, the term terrorism was primarily applied with nationalist movements of some kind. Most of them were separatists, seeking to create a new independent nation-state, on the territory of a larger existing state. There were also some cases of non-state irredentist violence, seeking to annex territory. Classic counter-terrorist operations were a feature of the decolonisation in Africa and the Middle East. Now-forgotten campaigns, such as the Mau Mau and the FLOSY, were well known in western media, but unlike Al-Qaeda their violence was remote, confined to the disputed colony. However, Irish republican groups did consistently target England, and the Basque ETA often targeted Madrid. The motives of these groups always derive from their nationalist ideology, and an underlying territorial conflict about which state should control what. In this respect no separate theory of the causes is required, since violence is the standard instrument of geopolitical change. For example, given the competing claims on the former British mandate of Palestine, the chance that the Zionist movement could ever have reached agreement on the peaceful transfer of millions of Jews to the region, seems non-existent. One explanation for the resulting violence is: inevitability.

Stated motives of groups

Actions defined as ‘terror’ are sometimes followed by statements or communiques by the perpetrators. They often issue additional information, and may even have representative offices in countries which sympathise with them. Several themes recur, and they can be considered as categories, without implying that they are true or not. The stated motives include:

  • reference to the ideals of the group, implying that they justify, in themselves, the actions. Separatist groups, for instance, often emphasise the name and flag of their future independent state.
  • reference to historical grievances - usually the oppression of an ethnic or religious group.
  • retaliation for specific acts, including ongoing military campaigns. Islamist groups, for instance, repeatedly refer to the occupation of Iraq in this context.
  • a specific demand related to the above factors, for instance the demand to withdraw troops from Iraq.

Some other attributed motives of terrorists, such as nihilism, are never quoted in these statements or communiques.

Perpetrators

Acts of terrorism can be perpetrated by individuals, groups, or states. The most common image of terrorism is that it is carried out by relatively small and highly secretive groups, highly motivated to serve a particular cause. However, some acts have been committed by individuals acting alone, while others are alleged to have the backing of established states.

Terrorist groups

See the main article: Terrorist groups

"Lone wolves"

Main article: Independent terrorist actor

Law enforcement agencies such as the FBI have identified a pattern of "lone wolf" terrorism resulting in unannounced attacks on civilians. These individuals appear to operate independently, but only become terrorists due to early indoctrination, training, and support by organized groups. They function under the tacit approval of the group, and protect it by operating alone. This stands in contrast to more "conventional" terrorist operations carried out by groups following a more or less consistent chain of command: not only indoctrination, but also logistics, timing, and direction of operatives to perform attacks. Terrorists cited as "lone wolves" include Cave of the Patriarchs gunman Baruch Goldstein (1994), Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh (1995), Centennial Olympic park bomber Eric Robert Rudolph (1996), "London Nailbomber" David Copeland (1999), and North Valley Jewish Community Center gunman Buford O. Furrow, Jr. (1999).

States

Main article: State terrorism

The violence committed by state combatants in conventional wars is often considered more acceptable than that of the "terrorist", who by definition refuses to follow the established laws of war, and hence cannot share in the acceptance given to establishment violence. The common public distinction between state violence and terrorism is based on a perception that terrorism targets noncombatants as a consistent policy, and therefore more irrational than state violence, which is assumed to be more considerate of human life, or at least does not consistently pursue unarmed civilian targets with the same zeal. Of course, this does not mean that acts of conventional warfare cannot be condemned. When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941, the level of outrage from the Americans was similar to what one might expect from a terrorist incident, even though the bombing is not usually classified as terrorism.

However, history does not always bear out the above generalization. States who engage in warfare often do so outside of the laws of war and carry out violence against civilian populations, yet rarely receive the label of "terrorist". Those for whom "terrorism" is a term characterising the violence of an enemy as being immoral, often claim that deliberate attacks on civilians have no right to be portrayed as more justifiable than similar attacks by non-governmental groups. As the attacks are attempts to achieve political goals through "terror" inflicted on civilians, they designate them "state terrorism".

State sponsors of terrorism

Some states have been accused of sponsoring terrorist actions in foreign countries, as an alternative to carrying them out directly and risking an open declaration of war. State sponsored terrorism is widely denounced by the international community, and all but a few isolated countries have subscribed to protocols denouncing terrorist sponsorship or activity, the exceptions being Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, and until recently, Iraq.

When states do provide funding for such groups, they rarely acknowledge them as terrorist. For example, Iran has been linked to a number of organisations, but maintains that where funds have been transferred, these have been legitimate.

When comprehensive proof has been mounted, the reaction is usually open criticism, from which sanctions (in the form of money or trade) follow. Sometimes state sponsors of terrorism are forced to back down by offering incentives. An example is that of Pakistan that supported the Taliban which in turn sheltered Al-Qaeda. After much pressure Pakistan was forced to sever its links with Afghanistan, though it still maintains its covert relationship with Kashmir terrorists.

Tactics

Terrorists often seek to demoralize and paralyze their enemy with fear, using their acts as a form of blackmail to apply pressure on governments for goals the terrorists could not achieve by other means.

Terrorism relies heavily on surprise. Terrorist attacks can trigger sudden transitions into conflict or war. Frequently, after a terrorist attack, a number of unassociated groups may claim responsibility for the action; this may be considered "free publicity" for the organization's aims or plans. Because of its anonymous and sometimes self-sacrificial nature, it is not uncommon for the reasons behind the terrorist action to remain unknown or murky for a considerable period.

Where terrorism occurs in the context of open warfare or insurgency, its perpetrators may shelter behind a section of the local population. Examples include the Intifada on Israeli-occupied territory, and the occupation of Iraq. This population, which is usually ethnically distinct from the counter-terrorist forces, is either sympathetic to their cause, indifferent, or under duress. The 'counter-terror' forces (on their own definition, that is) are often prevented from retaliating by the prospect of high civilian casualties. Even small US units in Iraq may have enough firepower to destroy an entire village, but if they do that in retaliation for every attack, they would kill most of the rural population. Civilian casualties always damage the public image of the state responsible, and may generate further sympathy for the terrorist cause. This is a recurrent dilemma in such insurgences. Not all terror campaigns take place in an insurgency context, but the one-off urban attacks now typical of radical Islamist terrorism in the West are carried out by people from a specific religious context. Counter-terror policy directed at one section of the population may not result in direct civilian casualties, but has long-term political effects, which may be equally counterproductive.

Terrorist groups sometimes arrange for secondary devices to detonate at a slightly later time in order to kill emergency response personnel attempting to attend to the dead and wounded. Repeated or suspected use of secondary devices can also delay emergency response out of concern that such devices may exist. Examples include a (failed) cyanide gas device that was meant to explode shortly after the February 26, 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and a second car bomb that detonated 20 minutes after the December 1, 2001 Ben Yehuda bombing by Hamas in Jerusalem.

In the absence of state funding, terrorists often rely on organized crime to fund their activities. This can include kidnapping, drug trafficking, or robbery. But terrorists have also found many more legitimate sources of revenue. Osama bin Laden, for example, invested millions in terrorism that his family made in the construction industry building luxury castles for those making their money from selling the country's oil. The diamond industry emerged early in the twenty-first century as an important new source of funding for terrorism, and Islamist terrorist groups in particular have been very effective at procuring funding through a system of charitable contributions.

Since the September 11, 2002 attack on the United States of America the overlap between smuggling organizations and terrorists has become an area of discussion among law enforcement, intelligence and state department officials. The structure of smuggling organizations is described in Terrance G. Lichtenwald's (2003, 2004) seven year research study. The Developmental Smuggling Model (DSM) described how Phase III smugglers and organizations developed sophisticated smuggling techniques, such as document forgery ranging from manipulating identy papers to cargo manifests. A behavioral analysis of the terrorists who attacked the United States by Janice Kephart in the 9/11 and Terrorists Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States found that terrorists have employed techniques commonly found among Phase II and Phase III smuggling organizations. On July 25, 2003, Charles H, Denmore, interim assistant director of investigations at the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that terrorists and human smugglers combining their efforts for three reasons: "the growing number and sohistication of criminal organizations, their ability to exploit public corruption, and the weak immigration controls in may source and transit countries". The probability that Phase II and Phase III smuggling organizations will work with terrorists on a shared goal is addressed by Lichtenwald (2003).

Guerrilla warfare is sometimes confused with terrorism, in that a relatively small force attempts to achieve large goals by using organized acts of directed violence against a larger force. But in contrast to terrorism, these acts are almost always against military targets, and civilian targets are minimized in an attempt to increase public support. For this reason, guerrilla tactics are generally considered military strategy rather than terrorism, although both terrorism and guerrilla warfare could be considered forms of asymmetric warfare.

Responses to terrorism

Main article: Counter-terrorism

Responses to terrorism, and anti-terrorism policy, are very broad in scope. The can include re-alignments of the political spectrum and reassessments of fundamental values. It usually includes an identification of certain groups as an enemy. The term counter-terrorism has a more narrow connotation, implying that it is directed at terrorist acts or terrorist groups.

A typical sequence of events, following a major terrorist attack in a country with no recent equivalent, is this. First, there is widespread condemnation of the attack, not only by the government. The government then tries to gain political support for a response, and appeals to national unity. It introduces anti-terrorism legislation, and possibly special courts. The government takes security measures to hinder further attacks, and implements plans for emergency response to future attacks. It establishes special police and military units, to deal with the terrorist threat. It usually seeks more international cooperation against terrorism unless the threat is purely internal. If the threat is from an identifiable foreign state it may launch a military operation which is in most cases legally an act of war, and may result in a prolonged overseas war.

Backlash

One of the fastest reactions to terrorism is non-state and generally unorganised: aggression and threats against sections of the population considered to be associated with the perpetrators. With the rise of radical Islamist terrorism, this has become a significant factor, especially in western Europe, where some countries have very substantial Muslim minorities. In the United States, the September 11 attacks were followed by many threats against Muslims, and some violence, but they are a relatively small minority in the US. In some large European cities, they are approaching a majority. Defusing potential backlash is now a standard item of European counter-terrorism policy.

Target-hardening

Common targets of terrorists are areas of high population concentration, such as mass transit vehicles (metro, bus, and trains), aircraft, office buildings, and crowded restaurants. Whatever the target of terrorists, there are multiple ways of hardening the targets so as to prevent the terrorists from hitting their mark. Perhaps the single most effective of these is bag-searching (for explosives), which is obviously only effective if it is conducted before the search subjects enter an area of high population concentration. It might have prevented the Madrid train bombings, which utilised 10 backpack bombs, that were left on trains.

Another method is to place concrete barriers a sufficient distance outside of buildings, so as to prevent truck bombing. There is also the method of keeping aircraft cockpits locked throughout every flight, and with reinforced doors, in which only the pilots in the cabin are capable of opening the doors (as distinguished from other aircraft personnel). Some people think that would have prevented the September 11 attacks.

Preemptive neutralisation

Depending on the political culture, some countries see pre-emptive attacks as a legitimate strategy. Israel, the United States, and Russia have taken this approach, western European states are generally more cautious. The neutralisation strategy includes capturing, killing, or disabling suspected terrorists before they can mount an attack. Another major method of preemptive neutralisation is interrogation of known or suspected terrorists, so as to learn of specific plots, specific targets, the identity of other terrorists, and whether the interrogation subject himself is guilty of terrorist involvement. Sometimes torture is used, or milder means of increasing suggestibility such as sleep deprivation or drugs. Apart from the human rights objections, such methods carry a risk that the captive will give false information, either in an an attempt to stop the treatment or from confusion brought on by it.

Domestic intelligence and surveillance

Most anti-terrorism strategies involve a dramatic increase in standard police and domestic intelligence. The central activities are traditional: interception of communications, and the tracing of persons. New technology has however vastly expanded the range of such operations. Domestic intelligence is often directed at specific groups, defined on the basis of origin, or religion. This may be unavoidable, but it is a source of political controversy. Mass surveillance of the entire population raises objections on civil liberties grounds.

Military intervention

Terrorism has often been used to justify military intervention, in countries where terrorists are said to originate. That was the main stated justification for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and one reason for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was also a stated justification for the second Russian invasion of Chechnya.

History

Although there are earlier related examples, terrorism in the modern sense seems to have emerged around the mid 19th-century.

In the 1st century, Zealots conducted a fierce and unrelenting terror campaign against the Roman occupiers of the eastern Mediterranean. The Zealots enlisted sicarii to strike down rich Jewish collaborators and others who were friendly to the Romans.

In the 11th century, the radical Islamic sect known as the Hash-Ishiim (This word, derived from the word "Hashish," which the Hash-Ishiim reputedly used to drug their victims, translates directly to the word "Assassin" in the english language) employed systematic murder for a cause they believed to be righteous. For two centuries, they resisted efforts to suppress their religious beliefs and developed ritualized murder into a fine art taught through generations. Political aims were achieved through the power of intimidation. Similarly, the Christian warriors of the Crusades pursued political aims by means of genocidal assaults on Muslim civilian populations.

During the French Revolution (1789 - 1799), the most severe period of the rule of the Committee of Public Safety (1793 - 1795) was labelled "The Terror" (1793 - 1794) and described Jacobin extensive use of death penalty by guillotine. Certainly, this induced fear and outrage not only in the domestic population of France, but also throughout the European aristocracy, and this period is the first known use of the term "terrorism". However, it does not correspond to the modern use of the term state terrorism.

In 1867 the Irish Republican Brotherhood, a revolutionary nationalist group with support from Irish-Americans, carried out attacks in England. These were the first acts of "republican terrorism", which became a recurrent feature of British history, and these Fenians were the precursor of the Irish Republican Army. The ideology of the group was Irish nationalism.

In Russia, by the mid-19th century, the intelligentsia grew impatient with the slow pace of Tsarist reforms, and sought instead to transform peasant discontent into open revolution. Anarchists like Mikhail Bakunin maintained that progress was impossible without destruction. Their objective was nothing less than complete destruction of the state. Anything that contributed to this goal was regarded as moral. With the development of sufficiently powerful, stable, and affordable explosives, the gap closed between the firepower of the state and the means available to dissidents. Organized into secret societies like the People's Will, Russian terrorists launched a campaign of terror against the state that climaxed in 1881 when Tsar Alexander II of Russia was assassinated.

In 1893 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization was founded in Thessaloniki, now in Greece but then part of the Ottoman Empire. The organisation was driven by Slavic nationalism, and later acquired a reputation for ferocious attacks, including the 1934 assassination of Alexander I of Yugoslavia during a state visit to France. The Fenians/IRA and the IMRO may be considered the prototype of all 'nationalist terrorism', and equally illustrate the expression that "one man's terrorist is another mans freedom fighter". Both groups achieved their goal, an independent Ireland and an independent Macedonia.

Today, modern weapons technology has made it possible for a "super-empowered angry man" (Thomas Friedman) to cause a large amount of destruction by himself or with only a few conspirators. It can be, and has been, conducted by small as well as large organizations.

Some people considered at some point in their lives to be terrorists, or supporters of terrorism, have gone on to become dedicated peace activists (Uri Avnery), respected statesmen (Yitzhak Shamir) or even Nobel Peace Prize laureates (Nelson Mandela, Yasser Arafat). This illustrates the plasticity of the term.

Global trends

Since 1968, the U.S. State Department has tallied deaths due to terrorism. In 1985, it counted 816 deaths, the highest annual toll until then. The deaths decreased since the late 1980s, then rose to 3,295 in 2001, mainly as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks. In 2003, more than 1,000 people died as a result of terrorist acts. Many of these deaths resulted from suicide bombings in Chechnya, Iraq, India and Israel. It does not tally victims of state terrorism.

Data from the Terrorism Knowledge base showed a similar decline since the 1980s, especially in Western Europe. On the other hand, Asia experienced an increase in international terrorist attacks. Other regions experienced less consistent patterns over time. From 1991 to 2003, there was a consistent increase in the number of casualties from international terrorist attacks in Asia, but few other consistent trends in casualties from international terrorist attacks. Three different regions had, in three different years, a few attacks with a large number of casualties.

Examples of major incidents

Main article: List of terrorist incidents
"International Terrorist Incidents, 2000" by the US Department of State

The following incidents have been described as domestic and international terrorism: the 1993 Mumbai bombings, the Oklahoma City bombing in the USA (April 19, 1995); the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland (August 15, 1998); the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, and Washington DC, USA; the Munich Massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in 1972; the Bali bombing in October 2002, the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, attack on Indian Parliament (December 13, 2001), the Centennial Olympic Park bombing in 1996, the March 11, 2004 attacks in Madrid, and the July 7, 2005 bombings in London.

The deadliest events described as terrorism and not known to have been sponsored by a state were the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon, in Arlington County, Virginia. So far as is known, the deadliest attack planned but not executed was Operation Bojinka, which aimed to murder Pope John Paul II and blow up 11 airliners. The plot was aborted after an apartment fire in Manila, Philippines on January 5, 1995 exposed the operation to police. The militants who were planning it were just over two weeks away from implementing their plot. Other plots, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, were designed to kill thousands but failed to do so.

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Etymology (history and first use of "terrorism")

Official definitions and law

Controversy about definition

Accounts of terrorism

Terrorism and smuggling organizations

Essays and analysis

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