Misplaced Pages

Hyderabad State: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editNext edit →Content deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 17:17, 6 March 2015 editJohnbod (talk | contribs)Autopatrolled, Extended confirmed users, IP block exemptions, Rollbackers280,316 edits Early history: para← Previous edit Revision as of 09:01, 11 March 2015 edit undoPktlaurence (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users2,549 editsNo edit summaryTags: Mobile edit Mobile web editNext edit →
Line 31: Line 31:
|p1 = Mughal Empire |p1 = Mughal Empire
|p2 = Maratha Empire |p2 = Maratha Empire
|flag_p1 = Flag_of_the_Mughal_Empire_(triangular).svg |flag_p1 = Flag of the Mughal Empire.svg
|border_p1 = no
|flag_p2 = Flag of the Maratha Empire.svg |flag_p2 = Flag of the Maratha Empire.svg
|border_p2= no
|s1 = Union of India |s1 = Union of India
|flag_s1 = Flag of India.svg |flag_s1 = Flag of India.svg

Revision as of 09:01, 11 March 2015

This article is about the princely state in British India ruled by the Nizam from 1803 to 1948. For other uses, see Hyderabad (disambiguation).

This article includes a list of general references, but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (September 2010) (Learn how and when to remove this message)
State of Hyderabad ریاست حیدرآباد
హైదరాబాద్ రాష్ట్రం
1803–1948
Flag of Hyderabad Flag Coat of arms of Hyderabad Coat of arms
Hyderabad (dark green) and Berar Province not a part of Hyderabad State but also the Nizam's Dominion between 1853 and 1903 (light green).Hyderabad (dark green) and Berar Province not a part of Hyderabad State but also the Nizam's Dominion between 1853 and 1903 (light green).
StatusPrincely state of British India (1803–1947)
Unrecognized state (1947–1948)
CapitalHyderabad
Common languagesDakhini, Telugu, Persian, Marathi, Kannada
Religion Hinduism, Islam
GovernmentPrincely State (1803–1948)
Province of the Dominion of India (1948–1950)
State of the Republic of India (1950–1956)
Nizam 
• 1720–48 Qamaruddin Khan (first)
• 1911–48 Osman Ali Khan (last)
Prime Minister 
• 1724–1730 Iwaz Khan (first)
• 1947–1948 Mir Laiq Ali (last)
History 
• Established 1803
• Telangana Rebellion 1946
• Accession in India 18 September 1948
• Division 1 November 1956
Area
215,339 km (83,143 sq mi)
CurrencyHyderabadi rupee
Preceded by Succeeded by
Mughal Empire
Maratha Empire
Union of India
Princely state
Individual residencies
Agencies
Lists

Hyderābād State pronunciation was an Indian princely state located in the south-central region of India, and was ruled, from 1724 until 1948, by a hereditary Nizam. The capital city was Hyderabad.

The Asaf Jahi Dynasty was a dynasty of Turkic origin from the region around Samarkand in modern-day Uzbekistan, who came to India in the late 17th century, and became employees of the Mughal Empire. The region became part of the Mughal Empire in the 1680s. When the empire began to weaken in the 18th century, Asif Jah defeated a rival Mughal governor's attempt to seize control of the empire's southern provinces, declaring himself Nizam-al-Mulk of Hyderabad in 1724. The Mughal emperor, under renewed attack from the Marathas, was unable to prevent it.

Following the decline of the Mughal power, India saw the rise of Maratha Empire, Nizam himself saw many invasions by the Marathas. Some of the major battles fought between Marathas and Nizam include the Battle of Rakshasbhuvan, the Battle of Palkhed and the Battle of Kharda, all of which resulted in Maratha victory and suzerainty over the territory of Nizam and collection of tributary by the Marathas.

In 1798 Hyderabad became a princely state under the British East India Company's suzerainty. By a subsidiary alliance it had ceded to the British East India company the control of its external affairs. In 1903 the Berar region of the state was separated and merged into the Central Provinces of British India, to form the Central Provinces and Berar.

In 1947, at the time of the partition of India, British offered the various princely states in the sub-continent the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan, or staying on as an independent state.

At the time of the partition of India, the State of Hyderabad was the largest of all princely states in India. It covered 82,698 square miles (214,190 km) of fairly homogenous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. Hyderabad State had its own army, airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service.

Nizam decided to keep Hyderabad independent. The leaders of the new Union of India however, were wary of having an independent - and possibly hostile - state in the heart of their new country. Most of the other 565 princely states had already acceded to India or to Pakistan voluntarily. The Indian government was therefore determined to annex Hyderabad into the Indian Union, by force if necessary.

In September 1948, India launched a military operation named Operation Polo, led by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, then Minister of Home Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of India. The Indian Armed Forces invaded the State of Hyderabad and overthrew Nizam.

Seven Nizams had ruled Hyderabad State for two centuries until the Indian conquest of Hyderabad in 1948 brought about the end of the dynasty. The Asaf Jahi rulers were great patrons of literature, art, architecture, culture, jewellery, and rich food. The Nizams patronized Persian art, Persian Architecture, and Persian culture, which became central to the Hyderabadi Muslim identity. They also introduced electricity, developed the railways and the roads, air communications, irrigation and reservoirs. The last Nizam was well known for his huge wealth and jewelry collection; he had been the richest man in the world until the end of his reign. Indeed, all major public buildings in Hyderabad City were built during his reign, while the British Raj was supreme. He pushed education, science, and the establishment of Osmania University.

Early history

The Nizam of Hyderabad was earlier the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan. The Asaf Jahi was a dynasty of Turkic origin from the region around Samarkand in modern-day Uzbekistan, who came to India in the late 17th century, and became employees of the Mughal Empire. As the Mughals were great patron of Persian culture, language, literature: the family found a ready patronage. However, with the decline of the Mughals the Deccan attained independence, though the first Nizam continued to owe allegiance to the Mughal Emperor. The Deccan territories were thus the last survivors of the Mughal empire, along with the Princely state of Awadh (in North India). These territories soon came to be known as the 'Nizam's Dominions', which (in the year 1760) included areas from south of Maharashtra to the southern end of Tamil Nadu, encompassing vast territories in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana. The Nawab of the Carnatic, who accepted the suzerainty of the Nizam, ruled southern territories that are now part of Tamil Nadu and southern Andhra Pradesh. However, Hyder Ali administered the regions in and around Mysore and did not owe any allegiance to the Nizam.

With the Mughal empire in disarray, this was a time when the French and British were competing for supremacy in the Indian sub-continent. The French exercised considerable influence in the Deccan from their stronghold of Pondicherry. In fact, the Nizam had a French regent stationed at Hyderabad in the later years of the 18th century as an important adviser, and there remains to this day a street of Hyderabad city named Troop Bazaar, which recalls where the French originally had their military barracks. The Nizam's dominions were at their greatest territorial extent at the time of the first Nizam, Nizam-ul-mulk, Asaf Jah-I. However, after his death there arose a succession struggle, with the British and French supporting competing factions. This resulted in a period of internal instability as two Nizams (Nasir Jung and Muzaffar Jung) ruled in rapid succession, each being assassinated by a rival faction. The combined duration of their rule was just four years. The fourth Nizam, Mir Ali Salabat Jung, came to the throne on French instigation and his rule prevailed for 12 years. This period marked the height of French influence in the Nizam's dominions.

Mir Ali Salabat Jung's successor was Nizam Ali Khan Asaf Jah II, who gained the territories of Aurangabad, Bidar and Sholapur in various battles with the Marathas. Though Asaf Jah-II ruled for over 50 years, the Nizam's dominions lost considerable power and more importantly, land to both the British and the French due to infighting and debts owed to the foreign powers. He ceded the territory of Northern Circars (present day Coastal Andhra region of the state of Andhra Pradesh) to the French as a gift 'for perpetuity', while British, French and Hyder Ali annexed the Carnatic regions. The Nizam was criticized for failing to form an alliance with Hyder Ali of the Kingdom of Mysore, a move which could have countered the increasing influence of the British in the Deccan. In this time, with the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte at Waterloo, the British also replaced the French as the supreme colonial power in the Indian sub-continent. The British also fought a war with Mysore, which increased its clout in the Deccan and, by 1800, the Nizam's dominions came into a state of near-suzerainty under the British.

During the British Raj

See also: Northern Circars
Main street of Hyderabad with Charminar, 1890

By 1801, the Nizam's dominion assumed the shape it is now remembered for: that of a landlocked princely state with territories in central Deccan, bounded on all sides by British India, whereas 150 years earlier it had considerable coastline on the Bay of Bengal.

During the Mutiny of 1857, Salar Jung chose to side with the British, thereby earning the title of 'Faithful Ally' for Hyderabad. This action causes some regret among modern patriots, because had the Nizam's dominions sided with the rebel forces, the British would have been greatly weakened. Hyderabad was as important to the South of India as Delhi was to the North. However, this did not happen and Hyderabad was one of several independent kingdoms of India to side with the British. In 1857, when the rule of the East India Company came to an end and British India came under the direct rule of the Crown, Hyderabad continued to be one of the most important of the princely states. Twenty years later, Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India.

The senior-most (23-gun) salute state during the period of British India, Hyderabad was an 82,000 square mile (212,000 km²) region in the Deccan, ruled by the head of the Asif Jahi dynasty, who had the title of Nizam and on whom was bestowed the style of "His Exalted Highness" by the British. Development within the state of Hyderabad grew as Salar Jung and the Nizams founded schools, colleges, madrasas and a university that imparted education in Urdu. Inspired by the elite and prestigious Indian Civil Service, the Nizam founded the Hyderabad Civil Service. The pace with which the last Nizam, Osman Ali Khan, amassed wealth made him one of the world's richest men in the 1930s. Carrying a gift, called Nazrana, in accordance with one's net worth while meeting the Nizam, was a de facto necessity.

Industries in Hyderabad under the Nizams

Various major industries emerged in various parts of the State of Hyderabad before its incorporation into the Union of India, especially during the first half of the twentieth century. Hyderabad city had a separate powerplant for electricity. However, the Nizams focused industrial development on the region of Sanathnagar, housing a number of industries there with transportation facilities by both road and rail.

Industries in pre-Independence Hyderabad
Company Year
Singareni Collieries 1921
Nizam Sugar Factory 1937
Allwyn Metal Works 1942
Praga Tools 1943
Sirsilk 1946
Hyderabad Asbestos (HIL Ltd.) 1946
Karkhana Zinda Tilismat 1920
Charminar Cigarette 1925
Vazir Sultan Tobacco Company 1930
Azam Jahi Mills Warangal 1934
Deccan Airways Limited 1945

Banking

The Imperial Bank of India opened a branch in Hyderabad in 1868, and a second branch in Secunderabad in 1906. Central Bank of India opened its branch in Hyderabad in 1918 and a second branch in Secunderabad in 1925.

Until 1948, Gulbarga district, now part of Karnataka state, was part of Hyderabad state. Saraswati Bank, established in Gulbarga in 1918, had a branch in Hyderabad. The Gulbarga Banking Company, established in 1930, however, did not.

In 1935 Raja Pannalal Pitti founded the Mercantile Bank of Hyderabad.

In 1942 the Nizam established Hyderabad State Bank to conduct treasury operations for the state government, and other banking. In 1947 there was a proposal that Hyderabad State Bank would be allowed to establish a branch in Karachi, and that as a quid-pro-quo Habib Bank would be allowed to establish a branch in Hyderabad. Partition and Operation Polo, the Indian invasion of Hyderabad that annexed Hyderabad to India, put an end to this idea. Then in 1952-53, Hyderabad State Bank acquired Mercantile Bank. Next, in 1956 State Bank of India took over Hyderabad State Bank, which in 1959 became State Bank of Hyderabad, a subsidiary bank of State Bank of India.

After Indian Independence (1947–48)

Main article: Operation Polo

In 1947 India gained independence and Pakistan came into existence; the British left the local rulers of the princely states the choice of whether to join one or the other, or to remain independent. On June 11, 1947, the Nizam issued a declaration to the effect that he had decided not to participate in the Constituent Assembly of either Pakistan or India.

On 9 July 1947, in a letter to the Crown Representative, the Nizam requested that Hyderabad be accorded dominion status. This was, however, problematical. Given the Nizam's determination not to join India, this would leave Hyderabad as an independent country entirely surrounded by the new Union of India. The Nizam was a Muslim but the Hindus outnumbered the Muslims by about eight to one in the State.

Keeping in mind Hyderabad's geographical position and the existence of a Hindu majority in his state, and countering India's insistence on accession, pending a settlement the Nizam signed a Stand-still Agreement with India on 29 November 1947. The Agreement was to remain in force for a period of one year. The Agreement provided that disputes arising out of it could be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties, and an umpire appointed by those arbitrators.

The Nizam was in a weak position as his army numbered only 24,000 men, of whom only some 6,000 were fully trained and equipped. The Indian government refused to accept Hyderabad's independence and prepared to carry out a so-called "Hyderabad Police Action" against the Nizam.

On 21 August 1948, the Secretary-General of the Hyderabad Department of External Affairs requested the President of the United Nations's Security Council, under Article 35(2) of the United Nations Charter, to consider the "grave dispute, which, unless settled in accordance with international law and justice, is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

On 4 September the Prime Minister of Hyderabad Mir Laiq Ali announced to the Hyderabad Assembly that a delegation was about to leave for Lake Success, headed by Moin Nawaz Jung. The Nizam also appealed, without success, to the British Labour Government and to the King for assistance, to fulfill their obligations and promises to Hyderabad by "immediate intervention". Hyderabad only had the support of Winston Churchill and the British Conservatives.

General El Edroos (at right) offers his surrender of the Hyderabad State Forces to Major General (later General and Army Chief) Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad.

At 4 a.m. on 13 September 1948, India's Hyderabad Campaign, code-named "Operation Polo" by the Indian Army, began. Indian troops invaded Hyderabad from all points of the compass. On 13 September 1948, the Secretary-General of the Hyderabad Department of External Affairs in a cablegram informed the United Nations Security Council that Hyderabad was being invaded by Indian forces and that hostilities had broken out. The Security Council took notice of it on 16 September in Paris. The representative of Hyderabad called for immediate action by the Security Council under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Hyderabad representative responded to India's excuse for the intervention by pointing out that the Stand-still Agreement between the two countries had expressly provided that nothing in it should give India the right to send in troops to assist in the maintenance of internal order.

At 5 p.m. on 17 September the Nizam surrendered. India then incorporated the state of Hyderabad into the Union of India and ended the rule of the Nizams. The annexation of Hyderabad was generally welcomed by many Hindus in the state, but Muslims emphasized the unlawfulness of the invasion. Some Muslims migrated to Pakistan, mainly to Karachi, which has a sizeable Hyderabadi muhajir community.

On 6 October 1948, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafarullah, requested the President of the United Nations' Security Council that Pakistan be permitted to participate in the discussion of the Hyderabad question in accordance with Article 31 of the United Nations' Charter.

Hyderabad became a state of India.

Communal Violence

1948 military invasion of Hyderabad State by the Dominion of India

Operation Polo

The State of Hyderabad in 1909 (excluding Berar)
Date13–18 September 1948
(5 days)
LocationHyderabad State, (parts of South and Western India)17°00′N 78°50′E / 17.000°N 78.833°E / 17.000; 78.833
Result Indian victory
Territorial
changes
Belligerents
 Dominion of India  Hyderabad
Commanders and leaders
Strength
35,000 Indian Armed Forces
Casualties and losses
Less than 10 killed Hyderabad State forces:
  • 807 killed
  • unknown wounded
  • 1,647 POWs

Razakars:

  • 1,373 killed
  • 1,911 captured
  • Sunderlal Committee: 30,000–40,000 civilians killed
  • Responsible observers: 200,000 civilians killed

The princely state of Hyderabad was annexed by India in September 1948 through a military operation code-named Operation Polo, which was dubbed a "police action".

At the time of partition of India in 1947, the princely states of India, who in principle had self-government within their territories, were subject to subsidiary alliances with the British, which gave control of external relations to the British. With the Indian Independence Act 1947, the British abandoned all such alliances, leaving the states with the option of opting for full independence. However, by 1948 almost all had acceded to either India or Pakistan. One major exception was that of the wealthiest and most powerful principality, Hyderabad, where the Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII, a Muslim ruler who presided over a largely Hindu population, chose independence and hoped to maintain this with an irregular army. The Nizam was also beset by the Telangana rebellion, which he was unable to crush.

In November 1947, Hyderabad signed a standstill agreement with the Dominion of India, continuing all previous arrangements except for the stationing of Indian troops in the state. India felt that the establishment of a Communist state in Hyderabad would be a threat to the country. Nizam's power had weakened because of the Telangana Rebellion and the rise of a radical militia known as the Razakars whom he could not put down. On 7 September, Jawaharlal Nehru gave ultimatum to Nizam, demanding ban on the Razakars and return of Indian troops to Secunderabad. India invaded the state by 13 September 1948, following a crippling economic blockade, and multiple attempts at destabilising the state through railway disruptions, the bombing of government buildings, and raids on border villages. After the defeat of Razakars, the Nizam signed an instrument of accession, joining India.

The operation led to massive violence on communal lines, at times perpetrated by the Indian Army. The Sunderlal Committee, appointed by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, concluded that between 30,000 and 40,000 people had died in total in the state, in a report which was not released until 2013. Other responsible observers estimated the number of deaths to be 200,000 or higher.

Background

After the Siege of Golconda by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1687, the region was renamed as Deccan Subah (due to its geographical proximity in the Deccan Plateau) and in 1713 Qamar-ud-din Khan (later known as Asaf Jah I or Nizam I) was appointed its Subahdar and bestowed with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk by the Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar. Hyderabad's nominal independence is dated to 1724 when the Nizam won a military victory over a rival military appointee. In 1798, Hyderabad became the first Indian princely state to accede to British protection under the policy of Subsidiary Alliance instituted by Arthur Wellesley, and was thus named as the State of Hyderabad.

The State of Hyderabad under the leadership of its 7th Nizam, Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, was the largest and most prosperous of all the princely states in India. With annual revenues of over Rs. 9 crore, it covered 82,698 square miles (214,190 km) of fairly homogeneous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. The state had its own army, airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service. Hyderabad was a multi-lingual state consisting of people speaking Telugu (48.2%), Marathi (26.4%), Kannada (12.3%) and Urdu (10.3%). Despite the overwhelming Hindu majority, Hindus were severely under-represented in government, police and the military. Of 1765 officers in the State Army, 1268 were Muslims, 421 were Hindus, and 121 others were Christians, Parsis and Sikhs. Of the officials drawing a salary between Rs. 600 and 1200 per month, 59 were Muslims, 5 were Hindus and 38 were of other religions. The Nizam and his nobles, who were mostly Muslims, owned 40% of the total land in the state.

When the British departed from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, they offered the various princely states in the subcontinent the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan or staying on as an independent state. As stated by Sardar Patel at a press conference in January 1948, "As you are all aware, on the lapse of Paramountcy every Indian State became a separate independent entity." In India, a small number of states, including Hyderabad, declined to join the new dominion. In the case of Pakistan, accession happened far more slowly. Hyderabad had been part of the calculations of all-India political parties since the 1930s. The leaders of the new Dominion of India were wary of a Balkanization of India if Hyderabad was left independent.

Hyderabad state has been steadily becoming more theocratic since the beginning of the 20th century. In 1926, Mahmud Nawazkhan, a retired Hyderabad official, founded the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (also known as Ittehad or MIM). Its objectives were to unite the Muslims in the State in support of Nizam and to reduce the Hindu majority by large-scale conversion to Islam. The MIM became a powerful communal organisation, with the principal focus to marginalise the political aspirations of the Hindus and moderate Muslims.

Events preceding hostilities

Main articles: Political integration of India and Partition of India

Political and diplomatic negotiations

Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, Nizam of Hyderabad, initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status of an independent constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth of Nations. This request was, however, rejected by the last Viceroy of India, The 1st Viscount Mountbatten of Burma.

At the time of the British withdrawal from India, the Nizam announced that he did not intend to join either new dominion, and proceeded to appoint trade representatives in European countries and to begin negotiations with the Portuguese, seeking to lease or buy Goa to provide his state with access to the sea.

B. R. Ambedkar, the Law Minister in the first independent Indian government considered the state of Hyderabad to be "a new problem which may turn out to be worse than the Hindu-Muslim problem as it is sure to result in the further Balkanisation of India". According to the writer A. G. Noorani, Indian Prime Minister Nehru's concern was to defeat what he called Hyderabad's "secessionist venture", but he favoured talks and considered military option as a last resort. In Nehru's observation, the state of Hyderabad was "full of dangerous possibilities". Sardar Patel of the Indian National Congress, however, took a hard line, and had no patience with talks.

Accordingly, the Indian government offered Hyderabad a standstill agreement which made an assurance that the status quo would be maintained and no military action would be taken for one year. According to this agreement, India would handle Hyderabad's foreign affairs, but Indian Army troops stationed in Secunderabad would be removed. In Hyderabad city there was a huge demonstration by Razakars led by Syed Qasim Razvi in October 1947, against the administration's decision to sign the Standstill Agreement. This demonstration in front of the houses of the main negotiators, the Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chattari, Sir Walter Monckton, advisor to the Nizam, and Minister Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung, forced them to call off their Delhi visit to sign the agreement at that time.

Hyderabad violated all clauses of the agreement: in external affairs, by carrying out intrigues with Pakistan, to which it secretly loaned 15 million pounds; in defence, by building up a large semi-private army; in communications, by interfering with the traffic at the borders and the through traffic of Indian railways. India was also accused of violating the agreement by imposing an economic blockade. It turned out that the state of Bombay was interfering with supplies to Hyderabad without the knowledge of Delhi. The Government promised to take up the matter with the provincial governments, but scholar Lucien Benichou states that it was never done. There were also delays in arms shipments to Hyderabad from India.

Jawaharlal Nehru in a reception to the Bombay Union of Journalists on 26 April 1948 laid out his government's position:

"If the safety of the people in Hyderabad was endangered by the activities of Razakars, the Government would intervene in Hyderabad State. The time had arrived when this hostility must cease. If the Hyderabad Government could not stop it, other measures would be adopted."

Muhammad Ali Jinnah reportedly warned the then Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, "If Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, every Muslim throughout the whole of India, yes, all the hundred million Muslims, would rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India." According to Taylor C. Sherman, "India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and inviting recruits to its army and its irregular forces, the Razakars." The Hyderabadi envoys accused India of setting up armed barricades on all land routes and of attempting to economically isolate their nation.

In the summer of 1948, Indian officials, especially Patel, signalled an intention to invade; Britain encouraged India to resolve the issue without the use of force but refused Nizam's requests to help.

The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek the intervention of the United Nations.

Telangana Rebellion

Main article: Telangana Rebellion

In late 1945, there started a peasant uprising in the Telangana area, led by communists. The communists drew their support from various quarters. Among the poor peasants, there were grievances against the jagirdari system, which covered 43% of land holding. Initially, they also drew support from wealthier peasants who also fought under the communist banner, but by 1948, the coalition had disintegrated. According to the Indian Intelligence Bureau Deputy Director, the social and economic programs of the communists were "positive and in some cases great...The communists redistributed land and livestock, reduced rates, ended forced labour and increased wages by one hundred per cent. They inoculated the population and built public latrines; they encouraged women's organisations, discouraged sectarian sentiment and sought to abolish untouchability."

Initially, in 1945, the communists targeted zamindars and even the Hindu deshmukhs, but soon they launched a full-fledged revolt against the Nizam. Starting in mid-1946, the conflict between the Razakars and the Communists became increasingly violent, with both sides resorting to increasingly brutal methods. According to an Indian government pamphlet, the communists had killed about 2,000 people by 1948.

Communal violence before the operation

In the 1936–37 Indian elections, the Muslim League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah had sought to harness Muslim aspirations and had won the adherence of MIM leader Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, who campaigned for an Islamic State centred on the Nizam as the Sultan dismissing all claims for democracy. The Arya Samaj, a Hindu revivalist movement, had been demanding greater access to power for the Hindu majority since the late 1930s and was curbed by the Nizam in 1938. The Hyderabad State Congress joined forces with the Arya Samaj as well as the Hindu Mahasabha in the State.

Noorani regards the MIM under Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung as explicitly committed to safeguarding the rights of religious and linguistic minorities. However, this changed with the ascent of Qasim Razvi after the Nawab died in 1944.

Even as India and Hyderabad negotiated, most of the sub-continent had been thrown into chaos as a result of communal Hindu-Muslim riots pending the imminent partition of India. Fearing a Hindu civil uprising in his kingdom, the Nizam allowed Razvi to set up a voluntary militia of Muslims called the 'Razakars'. The Razakars – who numbered up to 200,000 at the height of the conflict – swore to uphold Islamic domination in Hyderabad and the Deccan plateau in the face of growing public opinion amongst the majority Hindu population favouring the accession of Hyderabad into the Indian Union.

According to an account by Mohammed Hyder, a civil servant in Osmanabad district, a variety of armed militant groups, including Razakars and Deendars and ethnic militias of Pathans and Arabs claimed to be defending the Islamic faith and made claims on the land. "From the beginning of 1948, the Razakars had extended their activities from Hyderabad city into the towns and rural areas, murdering Hindus, abducting women, pillaging houses and fields, and looting non-Muslim property in a widespread reign of terror." "Some women became victims of rape and kidnapping by Razakars. Thousands went to jail and braved the cruelties perpetuated by the oppressive administration. Due to the activities of the Razakars, thousands of Hindus had to flee from the state and take shelter in various camps". Precise numbers are not known, but 40,000 refugees were received by the Central Provinces. This led to terrorising of the Hindu community, some of whom went across the border into independent India and organised raids into Nizam's territory, which further escalated the violence. Many of these raiders were controlled by the Congress leadership in India and had links with extremist religious elements in the Hindutva fold. In all, more than 150 villages (of which 70 were in Indian territory outside Hyderabad State) were pushed into violence.

Hyder mediated some efforts to minimise the influence of the Razakars. Razvi, while generally receptive, vetoed the option of disarming them, saying that with the Hyderabad state army ineffective, the Razakars were the only means of self-defence available. By the end of August 1948, a full-blown invasion by India was imminent.

Hyderabadi military preparations

Portrait of a Rohilla warrior in service of the Hyderabad Nizam

The Nizam was in a weak position as his army numbered only 24,000 men, of whom only some 6,000 were fully trained and equipped. These included Arabs, Rohillas, North Indian Muslims and Pathans. The State Army consisted of three armoured regiments, a horse cavalry regiment, 11 infantry battalions and artillery. These were supplemented by irregular units with horse cavalry, four infantry battalions (termed as the Saraf-e-khas, paigah, Arab and Refugee) and a garrison battalion. This army was commanded by Major General El Edroos, an Arab. 55 per cent of the Hyderabadi army was composed of Muslims, with 1,268 Muslims in a total of 1,765 officers as of 1941.

In addition to these, there were about 200,000 irregular militia called the Razakars under the command of a civilian leader Kasim Razvi. A quarter of these were armed with modern small firearms, while the rest were predominantly armed with muzzle-loaders and swords.

Skirmish at Kodad

On 6 September an Indian police post near Chillakallu village came under heavy fire from Razakar units. The Indian Army command sent a squadron of The Poona Horse led by Abhey Singh and a company of 2/5 Gurkha Rifles to investigate who was also fired upon by the Razakars. The tanks of the Poona Horse then chased the Razakars to Kodad, in Hyderabad territory. Here they were opposed by the armoured cars of 1st Hyderabad Lancers. In a brief action, the Poona Horse destroyed one armoured car and forced the surrender of the state garrison at Kodad.

Indian military preparations

On receiving directions from the government to seize and annex Hyderabad, the Indian army came up with the Goddard Plan (laid out by Lt. Gen. E. N. Goddard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command). The plan envisaged two main thrusts – from Vijayawada in the East and Solapur in the West – while smaller units pinned down the Hyderabadi army along the border. Overall command was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Rajendrasinghji, DSO.

The attack from Solapur was led by Major General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri and was composed of four task forces:

  1. Strike Force comprising a mix of fast-moving infantry, cavalry and light artillery,
  2. Smash Force consisting of predominantly armoured units and artillery,
  3. Kill Force composed of infantry and engineering units,
  4. Vir Force which comprised infantry, anti-tank and engineering units.

The attack from Vijayawada was led by Major General Ajit Rudra and comprised the 2/5 Gurkha Rifles, one squadron of the 17th (Poona) Horse, and a troop from the 19th Field Battery along with engineering and ancillary units. In addition, four infantry battalions were to neutralise and protect lines of communication. Two squadrons of Hawker Tempest aircraft were prepared for air support from the Pune base.

Nehru, in a letter to V. K. Krishna Menon dated to 29 August 1948, wrote that "I am convinced that it is impossible to arrive at any solution of the Hyderabad problem by settlement or peaceful negotiation. Military action becomes essential, we call it as you have called it Police Action." It was also believed that there could be a possible military response by Pakistan. The Time magazine pointed out that if India invaded Hyderabad, Razakars would massacre Hindus, which would lead to retaliatory massacres of Muslims across India. On September 7, Jawaharlal Nehru gave ultimatum to Nizam, demanding ban on the Razakars and return of Indian troops to Secunderabad. Pakistan foreign minister Muhammad Zafarullah Khan warned India against this ultimatum. Nehru then launched the invasion on 13 September, after the death of Jinnah on 11 September.

Commencement of hostilities

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2012) (Learn how and when to remove this message)
Indian Army movements during the Operation Polo

Day 1, 13 September

Indian forces entered the state at 4 a.m. The first battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Solapur Secunderabad Highway between a defending force of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade. Using speed and surprise, the 7th Brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori River intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh Regiment. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade – part of the Smash force – moved into the town of Jalkot, 8 km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours, paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh Commanding Officer of 9 Dogra (a motorised battalion) to pass through. This armoured column reached the town of Umarga, 61 km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile, another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, a troop from 9 Para Field Regiment, 10 Field Company Engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry, and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34 km north-west of Naldurg. They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The first day on the Western Front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory. Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg.

In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from two armoured car cavalry units of the Hyderabad State Forces, equipped with Humber armoured cars and Staghounds, namely the 2nd and 4th Hyderabad Lancers, but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Munagala by the afternoon.

There were further incidents in Hospet – where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans – and at Tungabhadra – where the 5/5 Gurkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army.

Day 2, 14 September

The force that had camped at Umarga proceeded to the town of Rajeshwar, 48 km east. As aerial reconnaissance had shown well-entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajeshwar by the afternoon.

The assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed by an anti-tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st Lancers and 5th Infantry 6 km from Suryapet. The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gurkha – veterans of the Burma Campaign – and were neutralised, with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties.

At the same time, the 3/11 Gurkha Rifles and a squadron of 8th Cavalry attacked Osmanabad and took the town after heavy street combat with the Razakars who determinedly resisted the Indians.

A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by six columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians.

There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikhs, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.

Day 3, 15 September

Leaving a company of 3/11 Gurkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave token resistance before surrendering.

At the town of Suryapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gurkhas who occupied the town. The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.

Day 4, 16 September

The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn but was slowed by a minefield, which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Solapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions. However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall despite sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas. The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75 mm guns.

Day 5, 17 September

In the early hours of 17 September, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60 km from Hyderabad, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. At 5 pm on 17 September, the Nizam announced a ceasefire, thus ending the armed action.

Hyderabad at the United Nations

The Government of Hyderabad, on 21 August 1948 informed Security Council that a "grave dispute which had arisen between Hyderabad and India" be brought to its attention. Later on 12 September reported first the "threat of invasion, and then an actual invasion by India". The issue was admitted to the agenda of the Security Council at its 357th meeting, held at Paris on 16 September 1948. Nizam deputed five men to represent Hyderabad at the United Nations. These five were Moin Nawaz Jung, Muhammad Hamidullah, Yousuf Hussain Khan, Zaheer Ahmad and Pingle Venkatram Reddy. The representative of Hyderabad stated that Hyderabad had obtained full independence on 15 August 1947 when British suzerainty over the territory ended. Hyderabad representatives expressed a willingness to hold a plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations. They asked the council to use its powers to halt the invasion and ask India to withdraw its troops. The representative of India maintained that Hyderabad was not competent to bring any question before the Security Council as it was neither a State nor independent. India also informed the Security Council the reign of terror by private armies in Hyderabad, and other events which, he said, had obliged the Government of India to take action.

On September 20, 1948s, during the 359th meeting of Security Council a representative from India informed that Nizam had instructed the representative of Hyderabad to withdraw the complaint from Security Council. On 22 September 1948 a cable sent by Nizam to Secretary General confirmed the same. The cable also stated that that Hyderabad delegation at United Nations ceased to have any authority to either represent Hyderabad or the Nizam. The Hyderabad delegation denied this, however on 24 September the delegation of Hyderabad confirmed the same and informed Security Council that Hyderabad State has surrendered and Government India had instructed Agents-General of Hyderabad to suspend all overseas activities. In December 1948, Moin Nawaz Jung later once again approached the Security Council claiming that Nizam had given instructions to withdraw the complaint under duress.

Out of the five men who represented Hyderabad at United Nations, Moin Nawaz Jung and Muhammed Hameedullah never returned to India. Yousuf Hussain Khan quit his job at Osmania University and moved to Aligarh Muslim University. Zaheer Ahmed joined Government of India and later got important postings in Foreign Services. However Pingle Venkatram Reddy was arrested on his return and interned in Chanchalguda Jail and later was put under house arrest.

Capitulation and surrender

Consultations with Indian envoy

The first page of Deccan Chronicle that was published on 18 September 1948

On 16 September, faced with imminent defeat, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan summoned his Prime Minister, Mir Laiq Ali, and requested his resignation by the morning of the following day. The resignation was delivered along with the resignations of the entire cabinet. On the noon of 17 September, a messenger brought a personal note from the Nizam to India's Agent General to Hyderabad, K. M. Munshi, summoning him to the Nizam's office at 1600 hours. At the meeting, the Nizam stated "The vultures have resigned. I don't know what to do". Munshi advised the Nizam to secure the safety of the citizens of Hyderabad by issuing appropriate orders to the Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, Major-General El Edroos. This was immediately done.

Broadcast by Nehru

On 18 September, Jawaharlal Nehru in his broadcast said on the military action:

Jawaharlal Nehru addressing crowds at Fateh Maidan after the integration

"It is natural that we should rejoice at this swift termination of the action we undertook after prolonged and painful thought and each deliberation. As I have repeatedly said we are men of peace, hating war and the last thing we desire is to come into an armed conflict with anyone. Nevertheless, circumstances which you will know well, compelled us to take this action in Hyderabad. Fortunately, it was brief and we return with relief to the paths of peace again."

Radio broadcast by the Nizam

Major General Syed Ahmed El Edroos (at right) offers his surrender of the Hyderabad State Forces to Major General (later General and Army Chief) Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad

It was Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan's first visit to the radio station. The Nizam of Hyderabad, in his radio speech on 23 September 1948, said "In November last , a small group which had organised a quasi-military organisation surrounded the homes of my Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, in whose wisdom I had complete confidence, and of Sir Walter Monkton, my constitutional Adviser, by duress compelled the Nawab and other trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on me. This group headed by Kasim Razvi had no stake in the country or any record of service behind it. By methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany it took possession of the State, spread terror ... and rendered me completely helpless."

The surrender ceremony

According to the records maintained by the Indian Army, General Chaudhari led an armoured column into Hyderabad at around 4 p.m. on 18 September and the Hyderabad army, led by Major General El Edroos, surrendered.

Communal violence during and after the operation

Main article: Hyderabad Massacre

There were reports of looting, mass murder and rape of Muslims in reprisals by Hyderabadi Hindus. Jawaharlal Nehru appointed a mixed-faith committee led by Pandit Sunder Lal to investigate the situation. The findings of the report (Pandit Sunderlal Committee Report) were not made public until 2013 when it was accessed from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi.

The Committee concluded that while Muslim villagers were disarmed by the Indian Army, Hindus were often left with their weapons. The violence was carried out by Hindu residents, with the army sometimes indifferent, and sometimes participating in the atrocities. The Committee stated that large-scale violence against Muslims occurred in Marathwada and Telangana areas. It also concluded: "At several places, members of the armed forces brought out Muslim adult males from villages and towns and massacred them in cold blood." The Committee generally credited the military officers with good conduct but stated that soldiers acted out of bigotry. The official "very conservative estimate" was that 27,000 to 40,000 died "during and after the police action." Other scholars have put the figure at 200,000, or even higher. Among Muslims some estimates were even higher and Smith says that the military government's private low estimates were at least ten times the number of murders with which the Razakars were officially accused.

Patel reacted angrily to the report and disowned its conclusions. He stated that the terms of reference were flawed because they only covered the part during and after the operation. He also cast aspersions on the motives and standing of the committee. These objections are regarded by Noorani as disingenuous because the commission was an official one, and it was critical of the Razakars as well.

According to Mohammed Hyder, the tragic consequences of the Indian operation were largely preventable. He faulted the Indian army for neither restoring local administration nor setting up their military administration. As a result, the anarchy led to several thousand "thugs", from the camps set up across the border, filling the vacuum. He stated "Thousands of families were broken up, children separated from their parents and wives, from their husbands. Women and girls were hunted down and raped."

Hyderabad after integration

Main article: Hyderabad State (1948–1956)

Detentions and release of people involved

(From left to right): Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, and Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri after Hyderabad's accession to the Dominion of India.

The Indian military detained thousands of people during the operation, including Razakars, Hindu militants, and communists. This was largely done based on local informants, who used this opportunity to settle scores. The estimated number of people detained was close to 18,000, which resulted in overcrowded jails and a paralysed criminal system.

The Indian government set up Special Tribunals to prosecute these. These strongly resembled the colonial governments earlier, and there were many legal irregularities, including denial or inability to access lawyers and delayed trials – about which the Red Cross was pressuring Nehru.

The viewpoint of the government was: "In political physics, Razakar action and Hindu reaction have been almost equal and opposite." A quiet decision was taken to release all Hindus and for a review of all Muslim cases, aiming to let many of them out. Regarding atrocities by Muslims, Nehru considered the actions during the operation as "madness" seizing "decent people", analogous to experience elsewhere during the partition of India. Nehru was also concerned that disenfranchised Muslims would join the communists.

The government was under pressure to not prosecute participants in communal violence, which often made communal relations worse. Patel had also died in 1950. Thus, by 1953 the Indian government released all but a few persons.

Overhaul of bureaucracy

Junior officers from neighbouring Bombay, CP and Madras regions were appointed to replace the vacancies. They were unable to speak the language and were unfamiliar with local conditions. Nehru objected to this "communal chauvinism" and called them "incompetent outsiders", and tried to impose Hyderabadi residency requirements: however, this was circumvented by using forged documents.

See also

References

  1. Tony Jaques (2007). Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: F-O. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-313-33538-9.
  2. Pradeep Barua (2005). The State at War in South Asia. U of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-1344-1.
  3. "Official Website of Indian Army". Retrieved 13 September 2014.
  4. http://www.hyderabad.co.uk/policeaction.htm
  5. "Top ten richest men of all time". inStash. Retrieved 13 September 2014.
  6. Time dated 22 February 1937, cover story
  7. "Kaleidoscopic view of Deccan". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 25 August 2009.
  8. Lucien D. Benichou, From autocracy to integration: political developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-1948 (2000), p. 19
  9. Benichou (2000), p. 229
  10. "The Hyderabad Question" (PDF). United Nations. Retrieved 23 September 2014.
  11. Benichou (2000), p. 230
  12. Benichou (2000), p. 231
  13. United Nations Document S/986
  14. Benichou (2000), p. 232
  15. United Nations Security Council Document S/1031
  16. "Press Communique" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 21 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  17. "RIAF in Hyderabad" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 23 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  18. ^ Sherman, Taylor C. (2007). "The integration of the princely state of Hyderabad and the making of the postcolonial state in India, 1948 – 56" (PDF). Indian Economic & Social History Review. 44 (4): 489–516. doi:10.1177/001946460704400404. S2CID 145000228.
  19. "585 Mohan Guruswany, There once was a Hyderabad". www.india-seminar.com. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
  20. ^ Guruswamy, Mohan (May 2008). "There once was a Hyderabad!". Seminar Magazine. Retrieved 3 August 2010.
  21. ^ Noorani 2014, Appendix 15: Confidential notes attached to the Sunderlal Committee Report, pp. 372–373 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFNoorani2014 (help)
  22. ^ Smith 1950, p. 46. sfn error: no target: CITEREFSmith1950 (help)
  23. ^ Noorani, A.G. (3–16 March 2001), "Of a massacre untold", Frontline, 18 (5), retrieved 8 September 2014, The lowest estimates, even those offered privately by apologists of the military government, came to at least ten times the number of murders with which previously the Razakars were officially accused...
  24. "Hyderabad had tried 'NRC' 71 years ago, and failed". The Times of India. 15 September 2019.
  25. "Hyderabad Police Action". Indian Army. Retrieved 13 September 2014.
  26. B. Cohen (2007). Kingship and Colonialism in India's Deccan: 1850–1948. Springer. pp. 159–161. ISBN 978-0-230-60344-8.
  27. ^ Mehrotra, S.R. (1979). Towards Indias Freedom And Partition. Delhi: Vikash Publishing House. p. 247. Retrieved 17 August 2019.
  28. See Section 7 (1) (b): "the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise."
  29. ^ Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf (2006). A Concise History of India (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521682251.
  30. "Delhi felt Razakars, communists a threat to India". Deccan Chronicle. 15 September 2018. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  31. Ernst, Waltraud; Pati, Biswamoy (2007). India's Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-11988-2.
  32. ^ Siddiqi, A. (1960). Pakistan Seeks Security. Longmans, Green, Pakistan Branch. p. 21.
  33. ^ Benichou, L.D. (2000). From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-1948. Orient Longman. p. 231. ISBN 978-81-250-1847-6.
  34. Desai, V.H. (1990). Vande Mataram to Jana Gana Mana: Saga of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. p. 142.
  35. ^ Sunil Purushotham (20 March 2015). "Internal Violence: The "Police Action" in Hyderabad". Comparative Studies in Society and History. 57 (2). Cambridge University Press: 439. doi:10.1017/S0010417515000092. JSTOR 43908352. S2CID 145147551. Retrieved 13 July 2022.
  36. "New book on Hyderabad's Invasion, 1948's Police Action". The Milli Gazette – Indian Muslims Leading News Source. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  37. Chandra, Mukherjee & Mukherjee 2008, p. 96. sfn error: no target: CITEREFChandraMukherjeeMukherjee2008 (help)
  38. Apparasu, Srinivasa Rao (16 September 2022). "How Hyd merger with Union unfolded". Hindustan Times.
  39. ^ Thomson, Mike (24 September 2013). "Hyderabad 1948: India's hidden massacre". BBC. Retrieved 24 September 2013.
  40. Leonard, Karen (May 1971). "The Hyderabad Political System and its Participants" (PDF). Journal of Asian Studies. XXX (3): 569–570. doi:10.2307/2052461. JSTOR 2052461. S2CID 162185903.
  41. The India Office and Burma Office List: 1945. Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1945. pp. 33–37.
  42. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 13. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  43. R. P. Bhargava, The Chamber of Princes (Northern Book Centre, 1991) p. 313
  44. Roychowdhury, Adrija (17 August 2017). "Five states that refused to join India after Independence". Indian Express. Retrieved 17 January 2018.
  45. Noorani, AG (21 June 2003). "C.P. and independent Travancore". Frontline. Vol. 20. Retrieved 17 January 2018.
  46. Yaqoob Khan Bangash, A Princely Affair: The Accession and Integration of the Princely States of Pakistan, 1947–1955 (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 7–12
  47. Copland, "'Communalism' in Princely India", Roosa, 'Quadary of the Qaum' cited in Sherman, "Integration of Princely States" (2007)
  48. ^ Kate, P. V., Marathwada Under the Nizams, 1724–1948, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987, p. 73
  49. Ashok Krishna (1998). India's Armed Forces: Fifty Years of War and Peace. Lancer Publishers. p. 6. ISBN 978-1-897829-47-9.
  50. E. W. R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1945–1947 (1954), p. 232
  51. Morris-Jones, W. H. (Autumn 1983). "Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten's Transfer of Power". International Affairs. 59 (4): 624–625. doi:10.2307/2619473. JSTOR 2619473. Retrieved 15 January 2023 – via JSTOR. Sir Walter Monckton, Mountbatten's self-styled 'dear friend', at that time Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam of Hyderabad, managed to involve Lord Templewood in a conspiracy to persuade the Portuguese government to cooperate in supplying a rail link to the sea at Goa for the use of Hyderabad.
  52. Moore, R. J. (1988). "India in 1947: The Limits of Unity". Endgames of Empire; Studies of Britain's Indian Problem. Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 193. ISBN 978-0-19-562143-3. Retrieved 15 January 2023. Since late in 1945, landlocked Hyderabad had been seeking access to a port. In April 1947 Monckton was in touch with Templewood about the acquisition of port facilities at Mormugao, in Portuguese Goa, with a rail link to be built from the state to the sea. The businessman Sir Alexander Roger was employed as an intermediary, but Monckton himself seems to have visited Portugal in April.
  53. Liddell, Guy (1948). Diary of Guy Liddell, Deputy Director General of the Security Service, 1948. London. p. 16. Retrieved 15 January 2023.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  54. Mhamai, S K (2001). "The Geostrategic and Geopolitical Importance of Goa in the Indian Sub-Continent". Goa in the Indian Sub-Continent (PDF). Panaji: Directorate of Archaeology and Archives. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  55. Bègue, Sandrine (2007). "Les Origines du Conflit Luso-Indien (1947-1950)". La Fin de Goa et de Estado da Índia : Décolonisation et Guerre Froide dans le Sous-Continent Indien (1945-1962) (in French). Vol. 1. Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Instituto diplomático. pp. 234–242. ISBN 9789729245558. OCLC 493408796. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  56. Noorani 2014, pp. 213–4. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNoorani2014 (help)
  57. VENKATESHWARLU, K. "Destructive merger". Frontline (19 September 2014).
  58. Venkateshwarlu, K. (14 August 2012). "How the Nizam lost Hyderabad in 1948". The Hindu. Retrieved 20 June 2018.
  59. Hodson, The Great Divide (1969), pp. 480–481. sfnp error: no target: CITEREFHodson,_The_Great_Divide1969 (help)
  60. Hodson, The Great Divide (1969), pp. 480–481 harvp error: no target: CITEREFHodson,_The_Great_Divide1969 (help); Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 77 harvp error: no target: CITEREFRaghavan,_War_and_Peace_in_Modern_India2010 (help); Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration (2000), pp. 214–215 harvp error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  61. Munshi, K.M. (1957). The End of an Era; Hyderabad Memories. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. p. 320. ISBN 978-0-8426-0032-3.
  62. "The Hyderabad Question" (PDF). United Nations. Retrieved 23 September 2014.
  63. Noorani 2014, pp. 51–61. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNoorani2014 (help)
  64. Muralidharan 2014, pp. 128–129. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  65. By Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mumbai: Jaico.2007, p.394
  66. ^ Kate, P. V., Marathwada Under the Nizams, 1724–1948, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987, p.84
  67. Muralidharan 2014, p. 132. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  68. Muralidharan 2014, p. 134. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  69. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 229. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  70. ^ "Bharat Rakshak-MONITOR". Bharat-rakshak.com. Archived from the original on 27 November 2005. Retrieved 12 September 2014.
  71. Archived 26 September 2008 at the Wayback Machine
  72. Osmania Journal of Historical Research. Department of History, Osmania University. 2006. p. 82.
  73. ^ Hangloo, Rattan Lal; Murali, A. (2007). New Themes in Indian History: Art, Politics, Gender, Environment, and Culture. Black & White. pp. 240–241. ISBN 978-81-89320-15-7.
  74. Joseph, T.U. (2006). Accession of Hyderabad: The Inside Story. Sundeep Prakashan. p. 176. ISBN 978-81-7574-171-3.
  75. Nayar, K. (2012). Beyond The Lines: An Autobiography. Roli Books. p. 146. ISBN 978-81-7436-821-8.
  76. Lubar, Robert (30 August 1948). "Hyderabad: The Holdout". Time. p. 26. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 20 May 2010. If the Indian army invaded Hyderabad, Razvi's Razakars would kill Hyderabad Hindus. Throughout India, Hindus would retaliate against Muslims.
  77. Best, A. (2003). British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. From 1946 through 1950. Asia 1949. Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, The Philippines and South-East Asia and the Far East (general), january 1949- december 1949. Asia / ed. Anthony Best. Univ. Publ. of America. p. 224. ISBN 978-1-55655-768-2.
  78. "Vol. 17, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1964". Pakistan Horizon. 17 (2). Pakistan Institute of International Affairs: 169. 1964. ISSN 0030-980X. JSTOR 41392796. Retrieved 25 August 2023.
  79. "Press Note" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 13 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  80. Prasad, S. N. (1972). Operation Polo: The Police Action Against Hyderabad, 1948. Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, Government of India; distributors: Manager of Publications, Government of India, Delhi. p. 75.
  81. ^ "When the Indian Army liberated thousands". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 14 September 2005. Archived from the original on 4 May 2009.
  82. "The Hyderabad Question" (PDF). Security Council. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
  83. ^ Khan, Ayoob Ali (14 April 2008). "A misfortune of five men". Times of India. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
  84. Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49 (PDF). United Nations. p. 299. ISBN 9789210602204.
  85. Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49 (PDF). United Nations. p. 299. ISBN 9789210602204.
  86. "HYDERABAD'S CASE AGAIN SENT TO U.N.; Letter to Council Says ..." The New York Times. 15 December 1948. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
  87. India. Bureau of Public Information (1948). Indian Information Series. Bureau of the public information of the government of India. p. 247.
  88. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 237. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  89. "When the Indian Army liberated thousands". The Hindu. 14 September 2005. Archived from the original on 4 May 2009. Retrieved 19 September 2011.
  90. "Lessons to learn from Hyderabad's past", The Times of India, 16 December 2013, ProQuest 1468149022
  91. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 238. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  92. Muralidharan 2014, p. 136. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  93. Muralidharan 2014, p. 135. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)

Bibliography

External links

Indian Armed Forces
Leadership
Organisation
Ministry and
committees/councils
Commands
Joint
Army
Navy
Air Force
Other components
Personnel
Operations
Wars
External
conflicts
Annexations
Insurgencies
Equipment
Army
Navy
Air Force
Documents
Other topics
Hyderabad topics
History
Government
Public buildings
Tourist attractions
Historical
monuments
Parks
Places of
worship
Museums and
libraries
Bridges
Education
Higher education
Universities
Technical institutions
Medical colleges
Business schools
Healthcare
Industry
Transport
Air
Rail
Road
Culture
Water bodies
in and around Hyderabad
National parks
around Hyderabad
Monuments and memorials
Sport
Events
Teams
Stadiums
Other topics
icon Hyderabad portal

Districts of Hyderabad State

Hyderabad state in 1909

Administratively, Hyderabad State was made up of sixteen districts, grouped into four divisions:

Hyderabad state in 1956 (in yellowish green). After reorganization in 1956, Regions of the state west of Red and Blue lines merged with Bombay and Mysore states respectively and rest of the state (Telangana) was merged with Andhra State to form the state of Andhra Pradesh.

1948–56

After the incorporation of Hyderabad State into India, M. K. Vellodi was appointed as Chief Minister of the state on 26 January 1950. He was a Senior Civil servant in the Government of India. He administered the state with the help of bureaucrats from Madras state and Bombay state.

In the 1952 Legislative Assembly election, Dr. Burgula Ramakrishna Rao was elected Chief minister of Hyderabad State. During this time there were violent agitations by some Telanganites to send back bureaucrats from Madras state, and to strictly implement 'Mulki-rules'(Local jobs for locals only), which was part of Hyderabad state law since 1919.

Rajpramukhs

Hyderabad State had its last Nizam, HEH Mir Osman Ali Khan (b. 1886 -d. 1967) as Rajpramukh from 26 January 1950 to 31 October 1956.

Dissolution

In 1956 during the Reorganisation of the Indian States based along linguistic lines, the state of Hyderabad was split up among Andhra Pradesh, Bombay state (later divided into states of Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1960 with the original portions of Hyderabad becoming part of the state of Maharashtra) and Karnataka.

In December 1953, the States Reorganization Commission was appointed to prepare for the creation of states on linguistic lines. The commission, due to public demand, recommended disintegration of Hyderabad state and to merge Marathi speaking region, Maratwada, with Bombay state and Kannada speaking region with Mysore state. The Telangana region of Hyderabad state with Andhra state.

Andhra state and Telangana were merged to form Andhra Pradesh state on 1 November 1956 after providing safeguards to Telangana in the form of Gentlemen's agreement (though recently on 2 June 2014, Telangana was separated from Andhra Pradesh as a new 29th state of India, with Hyderabad as its capital.) Gulshanabad Division or Medak Division and Warangal Division were considered as area of Hyderabad's Telangana. However when Hyderabad was merged in Andhra Pradesh state, substantial area of Adilabad (the area between Godavari and Penganga/Wardha/Pranahita rivers) was transferred to Maharashtra state.(refer Hyderabad state map) And later on 2014, the state of Telangana was formed splitting from the rest of Andhra Pradesh region.

State institutions

Palaces of Hyderabad State era

See also

References

1948 military invasion of Hyderabad State by the Dominion of India

Operation Polo

The State of Hyderabad in 1909 (excluding Berar)
Date13–18 September 1948
(5 days)
LocationHyderabad State, (parts of South and Western India)17°00′N 78°50′E / 17.000°N 78.833°E / 17.000; 78.833
Result Indian victory
Territorial
changes
Belligerents
 Dominion of India  Hyderabad
Commanders and leaders
Strength
35,000 Indian Armed Forces
Casualties and losses
Less than 10 killed Hyderabad State forces:
  • 807 killed
  • unknown wounded
  • 1,647 POWs

Razakars:

  • 1,373 killed
  • 1,911 captured
  • Sunderlal Committee: 30,000–40,000 civilians killed
  • Responsible observers: 200,000 civilians killed

The princely state of Hyderabad was annexed by India in September 1948 through a military operation code-named Operation Polo, which was dubbed a "police action".

At the time of partition of India in 1947, the princely states of India, who in principle had self-government within their territories, were subject to subsidiary alliances with the British, which gave control of external relations to the British. With the Indian Independence Act 1947, the British abandoned all such alliances, leaving the states with the option of opting for full independence. However, by 1948 almost all had acceded to either India or Pakistan. One major exception was that of the wealthiest and most powerful principality, Hyderabad, where the Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII, a Muslim ruler who presided over a largely Hindu population, chose independence and hoped to maintain this with an irregular army. The Nizam was also beset by the Telangana rebellion, which he was unable to crush.

In November 1947, Hyderabad signed a standstill agreement with the Dominion of India, continuing all previous arrangements except for the stationing of Indian troops in the state. India felt that the establishment of a Communist state in Hyderabad would be a threat to the country. Nizam's power had weakened because of the Telangana Rebellion and the rise of a radical militia known as the Razakars whom he could not put down. On 7 September, Jawaharlal Nehru gave ultimatum to Nizam, demanding ban on the Razakars and return of Indian troops to Secunderabad. India invaded the state by 13 September 1948, following a crippling economic blockade, and multiple attempts at destabilising the state through railway disruptions, the bombing of government buildings, and raids on border villages. After the defeat of Razakars, the Nizam signed an instrument of accession, joining India.

The operation led to massive violence on communal lines, at times perpetrated by the Indian Army. The Sunderlal Committee, appointed by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, concluded that between 30,000 and 40,000 people had died in total in the state, in a report which was not released until 2013. Other responsible observers estimated the number of deaths to be 200,000 or higher.

Background

After the Siege of Golconda by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1687, the region was renamed as Deccan Subah (due to its geographical proximity in the Deccan Plateau) and in 1713 Qamar-ud-din Khan (later known as Asaf Jah I or Nizam I) was appointed its Subahdar and bestowed with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk by the Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar. Hyderabad's nominal independence is dated to 1724 when the Nizam won a military victory over a rival military appointee. In 1798, Hyderabad became the first Indian princely state to accede to British protection under the policy of Subsidiary Alliance instituted by Arthur Wellesley, and was thus named as the State of Hyderabad.

The State of Hyderabad under the leadership of its 7th Nizam, Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, was the largest and most prosperous of all the princely states in India. With annual revenues of over Rs. 9 crore, it covered 82,698 square miles (214,190 km) of fairly homogeneous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. The state had its own army, airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service. Hyderabad was a multi-lingual state consisting of people speaking Telugu (48.2%), Marathi (26.4%), Kannada (12.3%) and Urdu (10.3%). Despite the overwhelming Hindu majority, Hindus were severely under-represented in government, police and the military. Of 1765 officers in the State Army, 1268 were Muslims, 421 were Hindus, and 121 others were Christians, Parsis and Sikhs. Of the officials drawing a salary between Rs. 600 and 1200 per month, 59 were Muslims, 5 were Hindus and 38 were of other religions. The Nizam and his nobles, who were mostly Muslims, owned 40% of the total land in the state.

When the British departed from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, they offered the various princely states in the subcontinent the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan or staying on as an independent state. As stated by Sardar Patel at a press conference in January 1948, "As you are all aware, on the lapse of Paramountcy every Indian State became a separate independent entity." In India, a small number of states, including Hyderabad, declined to join the new dominion. In the case of Pakistan, accession happened far more slowly. Hyderabad had been part of the calculations of all-India political parties since the 1930s. The leaders of the new Dominion of India were wary of a Balkanization of India if Hyderabad was left independent.

Hyderabad state has been steadily becoming more theocratic since the beginning of the 20th century. In 1926, Mahmud Nawazkhan, a retired Hyderabad official, founded the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (also known as Ittehad or MIM). Its objectives were to unite the Muslims in the State in support of Nizam and to reduce the Hindu majority by large-scale conversion to Islam. The MIM became a powerful communal organisation, with the principal focus to marginalise the political aspirations of the Hindus and moderate Muslims.

Events preceding hostilities

Main articles: Political integration of India and Partition of India

Political and diplomatic negotiations

Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, Nizam of Hyderabad, initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status of an independent constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth of Nations. This request was, however, rejected by the last Viceroy of India, The 1st Viscount Mountbatten of Burma.

At the time of the British withdrawal from India, the Nizam announced that he did not intend to join either new dominion, and proceeded to appoint trade representatives in European countries and to begin negotiations with the Portuguese, seeking to lease or buy Goa to provide his state with access to the sea.

B. R. Ambedkar, the Law Minister in the first independent Indian government considered the state of Hyderabad to be "a new problem which may turn out to be worse than the Hindu-Muslim problem as it is sure to result in the further Balkanisation of India". According to the writer A. G. Noorani, Indian Prime Minister Nehru's concern was to defeat what he called Hyderabad's "secessionist venture", but he favoured talks and considered military option as a last resort. In Nehru's observation, the state of Hyderabad was "full of dangerous possibilities". Sardar Patel of the Indian National Congress, however, took a hard line, and had no patience with talks.

Accordingly, the Indian government offered Hyderabad a standstill agreement which made an assurance that the status quo would be maintained and no military action would be taken for one year. According to this agreement, India would handle Hyderabad's foreign affairs, but Indian Army troops stationed in Secunderabad would be removed. In Hyderabad city there was a huge demonstration by Razakars led by Syed Qasim Razvi in October 1947, against the administration's decision to sign the Standstill Agreement. This demonstration in front of the houses of the main negotiators, the Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chattari, Sir Walter Monckton, advisor to the Nizam, and Minister Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung, forced them to call off their Delhi visit to sign the agreement at that time.

Hyderabad violated all clauses of the agreement: in external affairs, by carrying out intrigues with Pakistan, to which it secretly loaned 15 million pounds; in defence, by building up a large semi-private army; in communications, by interfering with the traffic at the borders and the through traffic of Indian railways. India was also accused of violating the agreement by imposing an economic blockade. It turned out that the state of Bombay was interfering with supplies to Hyderabad without the knowledge of Delhi. The Government promised to take up the matter with the provincial governments, but scholar Lucien Benichou states that it was never done. There were also delays in arms shipments to Hyderabad from India.

Jawaharlal Nehru in a reception to the Bombay Union of Journalists on 26 April 1948 laid out his government's position:

"If the safety of the people in Hyderabad was endangered by the activities of Razakars, the Government would intervene in Hyderabad State. The time had arrived when this hostility must cease. If the Hyderabad Government could not stop it, other measures would be adopted."

Muhammad Ali Jinnah reportedly warned the then Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, "If Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, every Muslim throughout the whole of India, yes, all the hundred million Muslims, would rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India." According to Taylor C. Sherman, "India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and inviting recruits to its army and its irregular forces, the Razakars." The Hyderabadi envoys accused India of setting up armed barricades on all land routes and of attempting to economically isolate their nation.

In the summer of 1948, Indian officials, especially Patel, signalled an intention to invade; Britain encouraged India to resolve the issue without the use of force but refused Nizam's requests to help.

The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek the intervention of the United Nations.

Telangana Rebellion

Main article: Telangana Rebellion

In late 1945, there started a peasant uprising in the Telangana area, led by communists. The communists drew their support from various quarters. Among the poor peasants, there were grievances against the jagirdari system, which covered 43% of land holding. Initially, they also drew support from wealthier peasants who also fought under the communist banner, but by 1948, the coalition had disintegrated. According to the Indian Intelligence Bureau Deputy Director, the social and economic programs of the communists were "positive and in some cases great...The communists redistributed land and livestock, reduced rates, ended forced labour and increased wages by one hundred per cent. They inoculated the population and built public latrines; they encouraged women's organisations, discouraged sectarian sentiment and sought to abolish untouchability."

Initially, in 1945, the communists targeted zamindars and even the Hindu deshmukhs, but soon they launched a full-fledged revolt against the Nizam. Starting in mid-1946, the conflict between the Razakars and the Communists became increasingly violent, with both sides resorting to increasingly brutal methods. According to an Indian government pamphlet, the communists had killed about 2,000 people by 1948.

Communal violence before the operation

In the 1936–37 Indian elections, the Muslim League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah had sought to harness Muslim aspirations and had won the adherence of MIM leader Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, who campaigned for an Islamic State centred on the Nizam as the Sultan dismissing all claims for democracy. The Arya Samaj, a Hindu revivalist movement, had been demanding greater access to power for the Hindu majority since the late 1930s and was curbed by the Nizam in 1938. The Hyderabad State Congress joined forces with the Arya Samaj as well as the Hindu Mahasabha in the State.

Noorani regards the MIM under Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung as explicitly committed to safeguarding the rights of religious and linguistic minorities. However, this changed with the ascent of Qasim Razvi after the Nawab died in 1944.

Even as India and Hyderabad negotiated, most of the sub-continent had been thrown into chaos as a result of communal Hindu-Muslim riots pending the imminent partition of India. Fearing a Hindu civil uprising in his kingdom, the Nizam allowed Razvi to set up a voluntary militia of Muslims called the 'Razakars'. The Razakars – who numbered up to 200,000 at the height of the conflict – swore to uphold Islamic domination in Hyderabad and the Deccan plateau in the face of growing public opinion amongst the majority Hindu population favouring the accession of Hyderabad into the Indian Union.

According to an account by Mohammed Hyder, a civil servant in Osmanabad district, a variety of armed militant groups, including Razakars and Deendars and ethnic militias of Pathans and Arabs claimed to be defending the Islamic faith and made claims on the land. "From the beginning of 1948, the Razakars had extended their activities from Hyderabad city into the towns and rural areas, murdering Hindus, abducting women, pillaging houses and fields, and looting non-Muslim property in a widespread reign of terror." "Some women became victims of rape and kidnapping by Razakars. Thousands went to jail and braved the cruelties perpetuated by the oppressive administration. Due to the activities of the Razakars, thousands of Hindus had to flee from the state and take shelter in various camps". Precise numbers are not known, but 40,000 refugees were received by the Central Provinces. This led to terrorising of the Hindu community, some of whom went across the border into independent India and organised raids into Nizam's territory, which further escalated the violence. Many of these raiders were controlled by the Congress leadership in India and had links with extremist religious elements in the Hindutva fold. In all, more than 150 villages (of which 70 were in Indian territory outside Hyderabad State) were pushed into violence.

Hyder mediated some efforts to minimise the influence of the Razakars. Razvi, while generally receptive, vetoed the option of disarming them, saying that with the Hyderabad state army ineffective, the Razakars were the only means of self-defence available. By the end of August 1948, a full-blown invasion by India was imminent.

Hyderabadi military preparations

Portrait of a Rohilla warrior in service of the Hyderabad Nizam

The Nizam was in a weak position as his army numbered only 24,000 men, of whom only some 6,000 were fully trained and equipped. These included Arabs, Rohillas, North Indian Muslims and Pathans. The State Army consisted of three armoured regiments, a horse cavalry regiment, 11 infantry battalions and artillery. These were supplemented by irregular units with horse cavalry, four infantry battalions (termed as the Saraf-e-khas, paigah, Arab and Refugee) and a garrison battalion. This army was commanded by Major General El Edroos, an Arab. 55 per cent of the Hyderabadi army was composed of Muslims, with 1,268 Muslims in a total of 1,765 officers as of 1941.

In addition to these, there were about 200,000 irregular militia called the Razakars under the command of a civilian leader Kasim Razvi. A quarter of these were armed with modern small firearms, while the rest were predominantly armed with muzzle-loaders and swords.

Skirmish at Kodad

On 6 September an Indian police post near Chillakallu village came under heavy fire from Razakar units. The Indian Army command sent a squadron of The Poona Horse led by Abhey Singh and a company of 2/5 Gurkha Rifles to investigate who was also fired upon by the Razakars. The tanks of the Poona Horse then chased the Razakars to Kodad, in Hyderabad territory. Here they were opposed by the armoured cars of 1st Hyderabad Lancers. In a brief action, the Poona Horse destroyed one armoured car and forced the surrender of the state garrison at Kodad.

Indian military preparations

On receiving directions from the government to seize and annex Hyderabad, the Indian army came up with the Goddard Plan (laid out by Lt. Gen. E. N. Goddard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command). The plan envisaged two main thrusts – from Vijayawada in the East and Solapur in the West – while smaller units pinned down the Hyderabadi army along the border. Overall command was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Rajendrasinghji, DSO.

The attack from Solapur was led by Major General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri and was composed of four task forces:

  1. Strike Force comprising a mix of fast-moving infantry, cavalry and light artillery,
  2. Smash Force consisting of predominantly armoured units and artillery,
  3. Kill Force composed of infantry and engineering units,
  4. Vir Force which comprised infantry, anti-tank and engineering units.

The attack from Vijayawada was led by Major General Ajit Rudra and comprised the 2/5 Gurkha Rifles, one squadron of the 17th (Poona) Horse, and a troop from the 19th Field Battery along with engineering and ancillary units. In addition, four infantry battalions were to neutralise and protect lines of communication. Two squadrons of Hawker Tempest aircraft were prepared for air support from the Pune base.

Nehru, in a letter to V. K. Krishna Menon dated to 29 August 1948, wrote that "I am convinced that it is impossible to arrive at any solution of the Hyderabad problem by settlement or peaceful negotiation. Military action becomes essential, we call it as you have called it Police Action." It was also believed that there could be a possible military response by Pakistan. The Time magazine pointed out that if India invaded Hyderabad, Razakars would massacre Hindus, which would lead to retaliatory massacres of Muslims across India. On September 7, Jawaharlal Nehru gave ultimatum to Nizam, demanding ban on the Razakars and return of Indian troops to Secunderabad. Pakistan foreign minister Muhammad Zafarullah Khan warned India against this ultimatum. Nehru then launched the invasion on 13 September, after the death of Jinnah on 11 September.

Commencement of hostilities

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2012) (Learn how and when to remove this message)
Indian Army movements during the Operation Polo

Day 1, 13 September

Indian forces entered the state at 4 a.m. The first battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Solapur Secunderabad Highway between a defending force of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade. Using speed and surprise, the 7th Brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori River intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh Regiment. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade – part of the Smash force – moved into the town of Jalkot, 8 km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours, paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh Commanding Officer of 9 Dogra (a motorised battalion) to pass through. This armoured column reached the town of Umarga, 61 km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile, another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, a troop from 9 Para Field Regiment, 10 Field Company Engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry, and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34 km north-west of Naldurg. They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The first day on the Western Front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory. Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg.

In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from two armoured car cavalry units of the Hyderabad State Forces, equipped with Humber armoured cars and Staghounds, namely the 2nd and 4th Hyderabad Lancers, but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Munagala by the afternoon.

There were further incidents in Hospet – where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans – and at Tungabhadra – where the 5/5 Gurkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army.

Day 2, 14 September

The force that had camped at Umarga proceeded to the town of Rajeshwar, 48 km east. As aerial reconnaissance had shown well-entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajeshwar by the afternoon.

The assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed by an anti-tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st Lancers and 5th Infantry 6 km from Suryapet. The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gurkha – veterans of the Burma Campaign – and were neutralised, with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties.

At the same time, the 3/11 Gurkha Rifles and a squadron of 8th Cavalry attacked Osmanabad and took the town after heavy street combat with the Razakars who determinedly resisted the Indians.

A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by six columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians.

There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikhs, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.

Day 3, 15 September

Leaving a company of 3/11 Gurkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave token resistance before surrendering.

At the town of Suryapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gurkhas who occupied the town. The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.

Day 4, 16 September

The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn but was slowed by a minefield, which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Solapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions. However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall despite sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas. The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75 mm guns.

Day 5, 17 September

In the early hours of 17 September, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60 km from Hyderabad, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. At 5 pm on 17 September, the Nizam announced a ceasefire, thus ending the armed action.

Hyderabad at the United Nations

The Government of Hyderabad, on 21 August 1948 informed Security Council that a "grave dispute which had arisen between Hyderabad and India" be brought to its attention. Later on 12 September reported first the "threat of invasion, and then an actual invasion by India". The issue was admitted to the agenda of the Security Council at its 357th meeting, held at Paris on 16 September 1948. Nizam deputed five men to represent Hyderabad at the United Nations. These five were Moin Nawaz Jung, Muhammad Hamidullah, Yousuf Hussain Khan, Zaheer Ahmad and Pingle Venkatram Reddy. The representative of Hyderabad stated that Hyderabad had obtained full independence on 15 August 1947 when British suzerainty over the territory ended. Hyderabad representatives expressed a willingness to hold a plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations. They asked the council to use its powers to halt the invasion and ask India to withdraw its troops. The representative of India maintained that Hyderabad was not competent to bring any question before the Security Council as it was neither a State nor independent. India also informed the Security Council the reign of terror by private armies in Hyderabad, and other events which, he said, had obliged the Government of India to take action.

On September 20, 1948s, during the 359th meeting of Security Council a representative from India informed that Nizam had instructed the representative of Hyderabad to withdraw the complaint from Security Council. On 22 September 1948 a cable sent by Nizam to Secretary General confirmed the same. The cable also stated that that Hyderabad delegation at United Nations ceased to have any authority to either represent Hyderabad or the Nizam. The Hyderabad delegation denied this, however on 24 September the delegation of Hyderabad confirmed the same and informed Security Council that Hyderabad State has surrendered and Government India had instructed Agents-General of Hyderabad to suspend all overseas activities. In December 1948, Moin Nawaz Jung later once again approached the Security Council claiming that Nizam had given instructions to withdraw the complaint under duress.

Out of the five men who represented Hyderabad at United Nations, Moin Nawaz Jung and Muhammed Hameedullah never returned to India. Yousuf Hussain Khan quit his job at Osmania University and moved to Aligarh Muslim University. Zaheer Ahmed joined Government of India and later got important postings in Foreign Services. However Pingle Venkatram Reddy was arrested on his return and interned in Chanchalguda Jail and later was put under house arrest.

Capitulation and surrender

Consultations with Indian envoy

The first page of Deccan Chronicle that was published on 18 September 1948

On 16 September, faced with imminent defeat, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan summoned his Prime Minister, Mir Laiq Ali, and requested his resignation by the morning of the following day. The resignation was delivered along with the resignations of the entire cabinet. On the noon of 17 September, a messenger brought a personal note from the Nizam to India's Agent General to Hyderabad, K. M. Munshi, summoning him to the Nizam's office at 1600 hours. At the meeting, the Nizam stated "The vultures have resigned. I don't know what to do". Munshi advised the Nizam to secure the safety of the citizens of Hyderabad by issuing appropriate orders to the Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, Major-General El Edroos. This was immediately done.

Broadcast by Nehru

On 18 September, Jawaharlal Nehru in his broadcast said on the military action:

Jawaharlal Nehru addressing crowds at Fateh Maidan after the integration

"It is natural that we should rejoice at this swift termination of the action we undertook after prolonged and painful thought and each deliberation. As I have repeatedly said we are men of peace, hating war and the last thing we desire is to come into an armed conflict with anyone. Nevertheless, circumstances which you will know well, compelled us to take this action in Hyderabad. Fortunately, it was brief and we return with relief to the paths of peace again."

Radio broadcast by the Nizam

Major General Syed Ahmed El Edroos (at right) offers his surrender of the Hyderabad State Forces to Major General (later General and Army Chief) Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad

It was Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan's first visit to the radio station. The Nizam of Hyderabad, in his radio speech on 23 September 1948, said "In November last , a small group which had organised a quasi-military organisation surrounded the homes of my Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, in whose wisdom I had complete confidence, and of Sir Walter Monkton, my constitutional Adviser, by duress compelled the Nawab and other trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on me. This group headed by Kasim Razvi had no stake in the country or any record of service behind it. By methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany it took possession of the State, spread terror ... and rendered me completely helpless."

The surrender ceremony

According to the records maintained by the Indian Army, General Chaudhari led an armoured column into Hyderabad at around 4 p.m. on 18 September and the Hyderabad army, led by Major General El Edroos, surrendered.

Communal violence during and after the operation

Main article: Hyderabad Massacre

There were reports of looting, mass murder and rape of Muslims in reprisals by Hyderabadi Hindus. Jawaharlal Nehru appointed a mixed-faith committee led by Pandit Sunder Lal to investigate the situation. The findings of the report (Pandit Sunderlal Committee Report) were not made public until 2013 when it was accessed from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi.

The Committee concluded that while Muslim villagers were disarmed by the Indian Army, Hindus were often left with their weapons. The violence was carried out by Hindu residents, with the army sometimes indifferent, and sometimes participating in the atrocities. The Committee stated that large-scale violence against Muslims occurred in Marathwada and Telangana areas. It also concluded: "At several places, members of the armed forces brought out Muslim adult males from villages and towns and massacred them in cold blood." The Committee generally credited the military officers with good conduct but stated that soldiers acted out of bigotry. The official "very conservative estimate" was that 27,000 to 40,000 died "during and after the police action." Other scholars have put the figure at 200,000, or even higher. Among Muslims some estimates were even higher and Smith says that the military government's private low estimates were at least ten times the number of murders with which the Razakars were officially accused.

Patel reacted angrily to the report and disowned its conclusions. He stated that the terms of reference were flawed because they only covered the part during and after the operation. He also cast aspersions on the motives and standing of the committee. These objections are regarded by Noorani as disingenuous because the commission was an official one, and it was critical of the Razakars as well.

According to Mohammed Hyder, the tragic consequences of the Indian operation were largely preventable. He faulted the Indian army for neither restoring local administration nor setting up their military administration. As a result, the anarchy led to several thousand "thugs", from the camps set up across the border, filling the vacuum. He stated "Thousands of families were broken up, children separated from their parents and wives, from their husbands. Women and girls were hunted down and raped."

Hyderabad after integration

Main article: Hyderabad State (1948–1956)

Detentions and release of people involved

(From left to right): Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, and Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri after Hyderabad's accession to the Dominion of India.

The Indian military detained thousands of people during the operation, including Razakars, Hindu militants, and communists. This was largely done based on local informants, who used this opportunity to settle scores. The estimated number of people detained was close to 18,000, which resulted in overcrowded jails and a paralysed criminal system.

The Indian government set up Special Tribunals to prosecute these. These strongly resembled the colonial governments earlier, and there were many legal irregularities, including denial or inability to access lawyers and delayed trials – about which the Red Cross was pressuring Nehru.

The viewpoint of the government was: "In political physics, Razakar action and Hindu reaction have been almost equal and opposite." A quiet decision was taken to release all Hindus and for a review of all Muslim cases, aiming to let many of them out. Regarding atrocities by Muslims, Nehru considered the actions during the operation as "madness" seizing "decent people", analogous to experience elsewhere during the partition of India. Nehru was also concerned that disenfranchised Muslims would join the communists.

The government was under pressure to not prosecute participants in communal violence, which often made communal relations worse. Patel had also died in 1950. Thus, by 1953 the Indian government released all but a few persons.

Overhaul of bureaucracy

Junior officers from neighbouring Bombay, CP and Madras regions were appointed to replace the vacancies. They were unable to speak the language and were unfamiliar with local conditions. Nehru objected to this "communal chauvinism" and called them "incompetent outsiders", and tried to impose Hyderabadi residency requirements: however, this was circumvented by using forged documents.

See also

References

  1. "Mulki agitation in Hyderabad state". Hinduonnet.com. Retrieved 9 October 2011.
  2. "SRC submits report". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 1 October 2005. Retrieved 9 October 2011.
  3. "Press Communique" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 21 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  4. "RIAF in Hyderabad" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 23 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  5. ^ Sherman, Taylor C. (2007). "The integration of the princely state of Hyderabad and the making of the postcolonial state in India, 1948 – 56" (PDF). Indian Economic & Social History Review. 44 (4): 489–516. doi:10.1177/001946460704400404. S2CID 145000228.
  6. "585 Mohan Guruswany, There once was a Hyderabad". www.india-seminar.com. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
  7. ^ Guruswamy, Mohan (May 2008). "There once was a Hyderabad!". Seminar Magazine. Retrieved 3 August 2010.
  8. ^ Noorani 2014, Appendix 15: Confidential notes attached to the Sunderlal Committee Report, pp. 372–373 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFNoorani2014 (help)
  9. ^ Smith 1950, p. 46. sfn error: no target: CITEREFSmith1950 (help)
  10. ^ Noorani, A.G. (3–16 March 2001), "Of a massacre untold", Frontline, 18 (5), retrieved 8 September 2014, The lowest estimates, even those offered privately by apologists of the military government, came to at least ten times the number of murders with which previously the Razakars were officially accused...
  11. "Hyderabad had tried 'NRC' 71 years ago, and failed". The Times of India. 15 September 2019.
  12. "Hyderabad Police Action". Indian Army. Retrieved 13 September 2014.
  13. B. Cohen (2007). Kingship and Colonialism in India's Deccan: 1850–1948. Springer. pp. 159–161. ISBN 978-0-230-60344-8.
  14. ^ Mehrotra, S.R. (1979). Towards Indias Freedom And Partition. Delhi: Vikash Publishing House. p. 247. Retrieved 17 August 2019.
  15. See Section 7 (1) (b): "the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise."
  16. ^ Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf (2006). A Concise History of India (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521682251.
  17. "Delhi felt Razakars, communists a threat to India". Deccan Chronicle. 15 September 2018. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  18. Ernst, Waltraud; Pati, Biswamoy (2007). India's Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-11988-2.
  19. ^ Siddiqi, A. (1960). Pakistan Seeks Security. Longmans, Green, Pakistan Branch. p. 21.
  20. ^ Benichou, L.D. (2000). From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-1948. Orient Longman. p. 231. ISBN 978-81-250-1847-6.
  21. Desai, V.H. (1990). Vande Mataram to Jana Gana Mana: Saga of Hyderabad Freedom Struggle. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. p. 142.
  22. ^ Sunil Purushotham (20 March 2015). "Internal Violence: The "Police Action" in Hyderabad". Comparative Studies in Society and History. 57 (2). Cambridge University Press: 439. doi:10.1017/S0010417515000092. JSTOR 43908352. S2CID 145147551. Retrieved 13 July 2022.
  23. "New book on Hyderabad's Invasion, 1948's Police Action". The Milli Gazette – Indian Muslims Leading News Source. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
  24. Chandra, Mukherjee & Mukherjee 2008, p. 96. sfn error: no target: CITEREFChandraMukherjeeMukherjee2008 (help)
  25. Apparasu, Srinivasa Rao (16 September 2022). "How Hyd merger with Union unfolded". Hindustan Times.
  26. ^ Thomson, Mike (24 September 2013). "Hyderabad 1948: India's hidden massacre". BBC. Retrieved 24 September 2013.
  27. Leonard, Karen (May 1971). "The Hyderabad Political System and its Participants" (PDF). Journal of Asian Studies. XXX (3): 569–570. doi:10.2307/2052461. JSTOR 2052461. S2CID 162185903.
  28. The India Office and Burma Office List: 1945. Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1945. pp. 33–37.
  29. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 13. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  30. R. P. Bhargava, The Chamber of Princes (Northern Book Centre, 1991) p. 313
  31. Roychowdhury, Adrija (17 August 2017). "Five states that refused to join India after Independence". Indian Express. Retrieved 17 January 2018.
  32. Noorani, AG (21 June 2003). "C.P. and independent Travancore". Frontline. Vol. 20. Retrieved 17 January 2018.
  33. Yaqoob Khan Bangash, A Princely Affair: The Accession and Integration of the Princely States of Pakistan, 1947–1955 (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 7–12
  34. Copland, "'Communalism' in Princely India", Roosa, 'Quadary of the Qaum' cited in Sherman, "Integration of Princely States" (2007)
  35. ^ Kate, P. V., Marathwada Under the Nizams, 1724–1948, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987, p. 73
  36. Ashok Krishna (1998). India's Armed Forces: Fifty Years of War and Peace. Lancer Publishers. p. 6. ISBN 978-1-897829-47-9.
  37. E. W. R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, 1945–1947 (1954), p. 232
  38. Morris-Jones, W. H. (Autumn 1983). "Thirty-Six Years Later: The Mixed Legacies of Mountbatten's Transfer of Power". International Affairs. 59 (4): 624–625. doi:10.2307/2619473. JSTOR 2619473. Retrieved 15 January 2023 – via JSTOR. Sir Walter Monckton, Mountbatten's self-styled 'dear friend', at that time Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam of Hyderabad, managed to involve Lord Templewood in a conspiracy to persuade the Portuguese government to cooperate in supplying a rail link to the sea at Goa for the use of Hyderabad.
  39. Moore, R. J. (1988). "India in 1947: The Limits of Unity". Endgames of Empire; Studies of Britain's Indian Problem. Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 193. ISBN 978-0-19-562143-3. Retrieved 15 January 2023. Since late in 1945, landlocked Hyderabad had been seeking access to a port. In April 1947 Monckton was in touch with Templewood about the acquisition of port facilities at Mormugao, in Portuguese Goa, with a rail link to be built from the state to the sea. The businessman Sir Alexander Roger was employed as an intermediary, but Monckton himself seems to have visited Portugal in April.
  40. Liddell, Guy (1948). Diary of Guy Liddell, Deputy Director General of the Security Service, 1948. London. p. 16. Retrieved 15 January 2023.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  41. Mhamai, S K (2001). "The Geostrategic and Geopolitical Importance of Goa in the Indian Sub-Continent". Goa in the Indian Sub-Continent (PDF). Panaji: Directorate of Archaeology and Archives. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  42. Bègue, Sandrine (2007). "Les Origines du Conflit Luso-Indien (1947-1950)". La Fin de Goa et de Estado da Índia : Décolonisation et Guerre Froide dans le Sous-Continent Indien (1945-1962) (in French). Vol. 1. Lisbon: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Instituto diplomático. pp. 234–242. ISBN 9789729245558. OCLC 493408796. Retrieved 15 January 2023.
  43. Noorani 2014, pp. 213–4. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNoorani2014 (help)
  44. VENKATESHWARLU, K. "Destructive merger". Frontline (19 September 2014).
  45. Venkateshwarlu, K. (14 August 2012). "How the Nizam lost Hyderabad in 1948". The Hindu. Retrieved 20 June 2018.
  46. Hodson, The Great Divide (1969), pp. 480–481. sfnp error: no target: CITEREFHodson,_The_Great_Divide1969 (help)
  47. Hodson, The Great Divide (1969), pp. 480–481 harvp error: no target: CITEREFHodson,_The_Great_Divide1969 (help); Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), p. 77 harvp error: no target: CITEREFRaghavan,_War_and_Peace_in_Modern_India2010 (help); Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration (2000), pp. 214–215 harvp error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  48. Munshi, K.M. (1957). The End of an Era; Hyderabad Memories. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. p. 320. ISBN 978-0-8426-0032-3.
  49. "The Hyderabad Question" (PDF). United Nations. Retrieved 23 September 2014.
  50. Noorani 2014, pp. 51–61. sfn error: no target: CITEREFNoorani2014 (help)
  51. Muralidharan 2014, pp. 128–129. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  52. By Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mumbai: Jaico.2007, p.394
  53. ^ Kate, P. V., Marathwada Under the Nizams, 1724–1948, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987, p.84
  54. Muralidharan 2014, p. 132. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  55. Muralidharan 2014, p. 134. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  56. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 229. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  57. ^ "Bharat Rakshak-MONITOR". Bharat-rakshak.com. Archived from the original on 27 November 2005. Retrieved 12 September 2014.
  58. Archived 26 September 2008 at the Wayback Machine
  59. Osmania Journal of Historical Research. Department of History, Osmania University. 2006. p. 82.
  60. ^ Hangloo, Rattan Lal; Murali, A. (2007). New Themes in Indian History: Art, Politics, Gender, Environment, and Culture. Black & White. pp. 240–241. ISBN 978-81-89320-15-7.
  61. Joseph, T.U. (2006). Accession of Hyderabad: The Inside Story. Sundeep Prakashan. p. 176. ISBN 978-81-7574-171-3.
  62. Nayar, K. (2012). Beyond The Lines: An Autobiography. Roli Books. p. 146. ISBN 978-81-7436-821-8.
  63. Lubar, Robert (30 August 1948). "Hyderabad: The Holdout". Time. p. 26. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 20 May 2010. If the Indian army invaded Hyderabad, Razvi's Razakars would kill Hyderabad Hindus. Throughout India, Hindus would retaliate against Muslims.
  64. Best, A. (2003). British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. From 1946 through 1950. Asia 1949. Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, The Philippines and South-East Asia and the Far East (general), january 1949- december 1949. Asia / ed. Anthony Best. Univ. Publ. of America. p. 224. ISBN 978-1-55655-768-2.
  65. "Vol. 17, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1964". Pakistan Horizon. 17 (2). Pakistan Institute of International Affairs: 169. 1964. ISSN 0030-980X. JSTOR 41392796. Retrieved 25 August 2023.
  66. "Press Note" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 13 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  67. Prasad, S. N. (1972). Operation Polo: The Police Action Against Hyderabad, 1948. Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, Government of India; distributors: Manager of Publications, Government of India, Delhi. p. 75.
  68. ^ "When the Indian Army liberated thousands". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 14 September 2005. Archived from the original on 4 May 2009.
  69. "The Hyderabad Question" (PDF). Security Council. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
  70. ^ Khan, Ayoob Ali (14 April 2008). "A misfortune of five men". Times of India. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
  71. Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49 (PDF). United Nations. p. 299. ISBN 9789210602204.
  72. Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49 (PDF). United Nations. p. 299. ISBN 9789210602204.
  73. "HYDERABAD'S CASE AGAIN SENT TO U.N.; Letter to Council Says ..." The New York Times. 15 December 1948. Retrieved 12 November 2024.
  74. India. Bureau of Public Information (1948). Indian Information Series. Bureau of the public information of the government of India. p. 247.
  75. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 237. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  76. "When the Indian Army liberated thousands". The Hindu. 14 September 2005. Archived from the original on 4 May 2009. Retrieved 19 September 2011.
  77. "Lessons to learn from Hyderabad's past", The Times of India, 16 December 2013, ProQuest 1468149022
  78. Benichou, From Autocracy to Integration 2000, p. 238. sfn error: no target: CITEREFBenichou,_From_Autocracy_to_Integration2000 (help)
  79. Muralidharan 2014, p. 136. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)
  80. Muralidharan 2014, p. 135. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMuralidharan2014 (help)

Bibliography

External links

Indian Armed Forces
Leadership
Organisation
Ministry and
committees/councils
Commands
Joint
Army
Navy
Air Force
Other components
Personnel
Operations
Wars
External
conflicts
Annexations
Insurgencies
Equipment
Army
Navy
Air Force
Documents
Other topics
Hyderabad topics
History
Government
Public buildings
Tourist attractions
Historical
monuments
Parks
Places of
worship
Museums and
libraries
Bridges
Education
Higher education
Universities
Technical institutions
Medical colleges
Business schools
Healthcare
Industry
Transport
Air
Rail
Road
Culture
Water bodies
in and around Hyderabad
National parks
around Hyderabad
Monuments and memorials
Sport
Events
Teams
Stadiums
Other topics
icon Hyderabad portal

Further reading

External links

Hyderabad topics
History
Government
Public buildings
Tourist attractions
Historical
monuments
Parks
Places of
worship
Museums and
libraries
Bridges
Education
Higher education
Universities
Technical institutions
Medical colleges
Business schools
Healthcare
Industry
Transport
Air
Rail
Road
Culture
Water bodies
in and around Hyderabad
National parks
around Hyderabad
Monuments and memorials
Sport
Events
Teams
Stadiums
Other topics
icon Hyderabad portal
Gun salute princely states (salute states) during the British Raj
21-gun salute
19-gun salute
17-gun salute
15-gun salute
13-gun salute
11-gun salute
9-gun salute
States of India on 26 January 1950
Part A States India
Part B States
Part C States
Part D States

17°00′N 78°50′E / 17.000°N 78.833°E / 17.000; 78.833

Categories: