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Emperor Shōwa
Emperor of Japan
Reign	25 December, 1926 – 7 January, 1989
Coronation	25 December, 1926
Predecessor	Emperor Taishō
Successor	Emperor Akihito
Issue	Princess Teru Princess Hisa Princess Taka Princess Yori Crown Prince Tsugu Prince Yoshi Princess Suga
House	Imperial House of Japan
Father	Emperor Taishō
Mother	Empress Teimei

Emperor Shōwa (昭和天皇, Shōwa tennō) (April 29, 1901 – January 7, 1989) was the 124th Emperor of Japan according to the traditional order of succession, reigning from December 25 1926 until his death in 1989. In the Western World, he is most known by the name he had while he was alive, Hirohito.

The word Shōwa is the name of the era that corresponded with the Emperor's reign, and was made the Emperor's own name upon his death, the name by which he is now exclusively referred to in Japan. Although he was and continues to be known outside of Japan by his personal name, Hirohito (裕仁), in Japan use of an emperor's personal name is considered overly familiar or derogatory. His reign was the longest of any historical Japanese emperor, and he oversaw many significant changes to Japanese society.

Early life

Born in the Aoyama Palace in Tokyo, Prince Hirohito was the first son of Crown Prince Yoshihito (the future Emperor Taishō) and Crown Princess Sadako (the future Empress Teimei). His childhood title was Prince Michi (迪宮, Michi no miya). He became heir apparent upon the death of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, on July 30, 1912. His formal investiture as crown prince took place on November 2, 1916.

He attended the boy's department of Gakushuin Peers School from 1908 to 1914 and then a special institute for the crown prince (Tōgū-gogakumonsho) from 1914 to 1921. In 1921, Prince Hirohito took a six month tour of Europe, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, becoming the first Japanese crown prince to travel abroad. After his return to Japan, he became regent of Japan on November 29, 1921, in place of his ailing father affected with a mental illness.

Marriage and issue

He married his distant cousin Princess Nagako Kuni (the future Empress Kōjun), the eldest daughter of Prince Kuni Kuniyoshi, on January 26, 1924. They had two sons and five daughters:

1. Princess Shigeko, childhood appellation Teru no miya (照宮成子, teru no miya Shigeko), 9 December 1925–23 July 1961; m. October 10 1943 Prince Higashikuni Morihiro (May 6 1916 — February 1 1969), the eldest son of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko and his wife, Princess Toshiko, the eighth daughter of Emperor Meiji; lost status as imperial family members, October 14, 1947;
2. Princess Sachiko, childhood appellation Hisa no miya (久宮祐子, hisa no miya Sachiko), 10 September 1927–8 March 1928;
3. Princess Kazuko, childhood appellation Taka no miya (孝宮和子, taka no miya Kazuko), 30 September 1929–28 May 1989; m. May 5, 1950 Takatsukasa Toshimichi (August 26 1923 — January 27 1966), eldest son of Nobusuke ; and adopted a son Naotake.
4. Princess Atsuko, childhood appellation Yori no miya (順宮厚子, yori no miya Atsuko), b. 7 March 1931; m. October 10 1952 Ikeda Takamasa (b. October 21 1927), eldest son of former Marquis Nobumasa Ikeda;
5. Crown Prince Akihito, childhood appellation Tsugu no miya (継宮明仁, tsugu no miya Akihito) became the present Emperor of Japan, b. 23 December 1933; m. April 10 1959 Shōda Michiko (the present Empress of Japan, b. October 20 1934), elder daughter of Shōda Hidesaburo, former president and chairman of Nisshin Flour Milling Company;
6. Prince Masahito, childhood appellation Yoshi no miya (義宮正仁, yoshi no miya Masahito), b. 28 November 1935, titled Prince Hitachi (常陸宮, hitachi no miya) since 1 October 1964; m. September 30 1964 Tsugaru Hanako (b. July 19 1940), fourth daughter of former Count Tsugaru Yoshitaka;
7. Princess Takako, childhood appellation Suga no miya (清宮貴子, suga no miya Takako), b. 3 March 1939; m. March 3 1960 Shimazu Hisanaga, son of former Count Shimazu Hisanori and has a son Yoshihisa.

The daughters who lived to adulthood left the imperial family as a result of the American reforms of the Japanese imperial household in October 1947 (in the case of Princess Higashikuni) or under the terms of the Imperial Household Law at the moment of their subsequent marriages (in the cases of Princesses Kazuko, Atsuko, and Takako).

Ascension

On December 25, 1926, Hirohito assumed the throne upon the death of his father Yoshihito. The Taishō era ceased at once and a new era, the Shōwa era (Enlightened Peace), was proclaimed. The deceased Emperor was posthumously renamed Emperor Taishō a few days later. Following Japanese custom, the new Emperor was never referred to by his given name, but rather was referred to simply as "His Majesty the Emperor" (天皇陛下, tennō heika), which may be shortened to "His Majesty" (陛下, heika). In writing, the emperor was also referred to formally as "The Reigning Emperor" (今上天皇, kinjō tennō).

Early reign

The first part of Emperor Shōwa's reign as sovereign (between 1926 and 1945) took place against a background of increasing military power within the government, through both legal and extralegal means. The Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy had held veto power over the formation of cabinets since 1900, and between 1921 and 1944 there were no fewer than 64 incidents of political violence.

One notable case was the assassination of moderate Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932, which marked the end of any real civilian control of the military. This was followed by an attempted military coup in February 1936, the February 26 incident, mounted by junior Army officers of the Kōdōha faction who had the sympathy of many high-ranking officers including Prince Chichibu (Yasuhito), one of the Emperor's brothers. This revolt was occasioned by a loss of ground by the militarist faction in Diet elections. The coup resulted in the murder of a number of high government and Army officials, and was put down with Emperor Shōwa angrily assuming a major role in confronting them.

When Chief Aide-de-camp Shigeru Honjō informed him of the revolt, the Emperor immediately ordered that it be put down and referred to the officers as rebels (bōto). Shortly thereafter, he ordered Army minister Yoshiyuki Kawashima to suppress the rebels within one hour, and he asked reports from Honjō every thirty minutes. The next day, when told by Honjō that little progress was being made by the high command in quashing the rebels, the emperor told him "I Myself, will lead the Konoe Division and subdue them." This he was not forced to do but the rebellion was suppressed following his orders on February 29.

Still, from the 1930s on, the military clique held almost all political power in Japan, and pursued policies that eventually led Japan to fight the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and World War II.

The Sino-Japanese War and World War II

The problem of imperial responsibility

Many people from countries once part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere see Emperor Shōwa as the mastermind behind the atrocities committed by the imperial forces in the Second Sino-Japanese War and in World War II. Some feel that he, some members of the imperial family such as his brother Prince Chichibu, his cousins Prince Takeda and Prince Fushimi, and his uncles Prince Kan'in, Prince Asaka, and Prince Higashikuni, should have been tried for war crimes. Because of this, many Asians residing in countries that were subject to Japanese invasion, as well as others in nations that fought Japan retain a hostile attitude towards the Japanese imperial family.

The central question is how much real control the Emperor had over the Japanese military during the two wars. Officially, the imperial constitution, adopted under Emperor Meiji, gave full power to the Emperor. Article 4 prescribed that "The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution" while, according to article 6 "The Emperor gives sanction to laws and orders them to be promulgated and executed" and article 11, "The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and the Navy." The Emperor was thus the leader of the Imperial General Headquarters.

However, the view promoted by both the Japanese Imperial Palace and the American occupation forces immediately after World War II had Emperor Shōwa as a powerless figurehead behaving strictly according to protocol, while remaining at a distance from the decision-making processes.

Many historians such as Akira Fujiwara (Shōwa Tennō no Jū-go Nen Sensō, 1991) and Peter Wetzler (Hirohito and War, 1998), based on the primary sources and the monumental work of Shirō Hara, have produced evidence suggesting that the Emperor worked through intermediaries to exercise a great deal of control over the military and was neither bellicose nor a pacifist, but an opportunist who governed in a pluralistic decision-making process. American historian Herbert Bix argues that Emperor Shōwa may even have been the prime mover of most of the events of the two wars. Historians such as Bix, Fujiwara, Wetzler, and Akira Yamada recognize that the post-war view focusing on imperial conferences misses the importance of numerous "behind the chrysanthemum curtain" meetings where the real decisions were made between the emperor, his chiefs of staff, and the cabinet.

Primary sources, such as the "Sugiyama memo" and the diaries of Kido and Konoe, describe in detail the informal meetings Emperor Shōwa had with his chiefs of staff and ministers (For example, Prince Fumimaro Konoe had a very good firsthand view of the surrender events). These documents show that the Emperor was kept informed of all main military operations and that he frequently questioned his senior staff and asked for changes.

Entering World War II

Prior to World War II, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and the rest of China in 1937 (the Second Sino-Japanese War). The primary sources reveal that Emperor Shōwa never really had any objection to the invasion of China in 1937, which was recommended to him by his chiefs of staff and prime minister Fumimaro Konoe. His main concern seems to have been the possibility of an attack by the Soviets in the north and his questions to his chief of staff Prince Kan'in and minister of the army Hajime Sugiyama were mostly about the time it could take to crush the Chinese resistance.

According to Akira Fujiwara, the Emperor even personally ratified the proposition of his army to remove the constraints of international law on the treatment of Chinese prisoners on August 5. Moreover, the works of Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno show that he authorized by specific orders (rinsanmei) the use of chemical weapons against the Chinese. For example, during the invasion of Wuhan, from August to October 1938, the emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions, despite the resolution adopted by the League of Nations on May 14 condemning the use of toxic gas by the Japanese Army.

During World War II, ostensibly under Emperor Shōwa's leadership, Japan formed alliances with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, forming the Axis Powers. The Emperor, who had a predilection for the United Kingdom, was reluctant to form this alliance. In July 1939, he even had a bad quarrel on this subject with one of his brothers, Prince Chichibu, who was visiting him three times a week to support the treaty, and reprimanded the army minister Seishiro Itagaki, but he finally gave his consent after the success of the Wehrmacht in Europe.

On September 4, 1941, the Japanese Cabinet met to consider the war plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, and decided that:

Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defense and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war ... ... resolved to go to war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands if necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.

The "objectives" to be obtained were clearly defined: a free hand to continue with the conquest of China and Southeast Asia, no increase in US or British military forces in the region, and cooperation by the West "in the acquisition of goods needed by our Empire."

On September 5, Prime Minister Konoe informally submitted a draft of the decision to the emperor, just one day in advance of the Imperial Conference at which it would be formally implemented. On this evening, Emperor Shōwa had a meeting with chief of staff of the army Sugiyama, chief of staff of the navy Osami Nagano and Konoe. The emperor then questioned Sugiyama about the chances of success of an open war with the Occident. As Sugiyama answered positively, the Emperor scolded him:

—At the time of the China incident, the army told me that we could make Chiang surrender after three months but you still can't beat him even today! Sugiyama, you were minister at the time.
—China is a vast area with many ways in and ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties.
—You say the interior of China is huge; isn't the Pacific Ocean even bigger than China? Didn't I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me?

Chief of Naval General Staff Admiral Nagano, a former Navy Minister and vastly experienced, later told a trusted colleague, "I have never seen the emperor reprimand us in such a manner, his face turning red and raising his voice."

According to the traditional view, Emperor Shōwa was deeply concerned by the decision to place "war preparations first and diplomatic negotiations second," and he announced his intention to break with tradition. At the Imperial Conference on the following day, he directly questioned the chiefs of the Army and Navy general staffs, a quite unprecedented action.

Nevertheless, all speakers at the Imperial Conference were united in favor of war rather than diplomacy. Baron Yoshimichi Hara, President of the Imperial Council and the Emperor's representative, then questioned them closely, producing replies to the effect that war would only be considered as a last resort from some, and silence from others.

At this point, the sovereign astonished all present by addressing the conference personally, and in breaking the tradition of Imperial silence left his advisors "struck with awe." (Prime Minister Konoe's description of the event.) Emperor Shōwa stressed the need for peaceful resolution of international problems, expressed regret at his ministers' failure to respond to Baron Hara's probings, and recited a poem written by his grandfather, Emperor Meiji which, he said, he had read "over and over again":

Methinks all the people of the world are brethren, then.
Why are the waves and the wind so unsettled nowadays?

Recovering from their shock, the ministers hastened to express their profound wish to explore all possible peaceful avenues. The Emperor's presentation was in line with his practical role as leader of the Shinto religion.

At this time, Army Imperial Headquarters was continually communicating with the Imperial household in detail about the military situation. On October 8, Sugiyama signed a 47 page report to the emperor (sōjōan) outlining in minute detail plans for the advance in Southeast Asia and, on the third week, gave him a 51 page document, "Materials in Reply to the Throne," about an operational outlook on the war.

As the war preparations continued, however, Konoe found himself more and more isolated and gave his demission on October 16. He justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita :

Of course His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me : You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much. Thus, gradually, he began to lead toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me : my prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more. In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and navy high commands.

The army and the navy recommended at this point the candidacy of Prince Higashikuni, one of the emperor's uncles. According to the Shōwa "Monologue," written after the war, the Emperor then said that if the war were to begin while a member of the imperial house was prime minister, the imperial house would have to carry the responsibility and this he opposed.

He thus chose the hard-line General Hideki Tōjō, who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution and asked him to make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the imperial conferences. On November 2, Tōjō, Sugiyama and Nagano reported to the emperor that the review of eleven points had been in vain. Emperor Shōwa gave his consent to the war and then asked: "Are you going to provide justification for the war?"

On November 3, Nagano explained in detail the Pearl Harbor attack plan to the emperor. On November 5, Emperor Shōwa approved in imperial conference the operations plan for a war against the Occident and had many meetings with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month. On December 1, an imperial conference finally sanctioned the "War against the United States, United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands." On 8 December (7 December in Hawaii) 1941, in simultaneous attacks, Japanese forces struck at the US Fleet in Pearl Harbor and began the invasion of Malaysia. From this point, there was no turning back.

With the nation now fully committed to the war, Emperor Shōwa took a keen interest in military progress and sought to boost morale. According to Akira Yamada and Akira Fujiwara, the emperor even made major interventions in some military operations. For example, he pressed Sugiyama four times, on January 13 and 21 and February 9 and 26, to increase troop strength and launch an attack on Bataan. On February 9, March 19 and May 29, he ordered the Army Chief of staff to examine the possibilities for an attack on Chungking which led to operation Gogo.

As the tide of war gradually began to turn (around late 1942 and early 1943), some people argue that the flow of information to the palace gradually began to bear less and less relation to reality, while others suggest that the emperor worked closely with Prime Minister Tōjō, continued to be well and accurately briefed by the military, and knew Japan's military position precisely right up to the point of surrender. The chief of staff of the General Affairs section of the Prime Minister's office, Shuichi Inada, remarked to Tōjō's private secretary, Sadao Akamatsu:

There has never been a cabinet in which the prime minister, and all the ministers, reported so often to the throne. In order to effect the essence of genuine direct imperial rule and to relieve the concerns of the emperor, the ministers reported to the throne matters within the scope of their responsibilities as per the prime minister's directives... In times of intense activities, typed drafts were presented to the emperor with corrections in red. First draft, second draft, final draft and so forth, came as deliberations progressed one after the other and were sanctioned accordingly by the emperor.

In the first six months of war, all the major engagements had been victories. However, as the tide turned in the summer of 1942 with the battle of Midway and the landing of the American forces on Guadalcanal and Tulagi in August, the Emperor immediately recognized the potential danger and pushed the navy and the army for greater efforts. When informed in August 1943 by Sugiyama that the American advance through the Solomon islands could not be stopped, he asked his chief of staff to consider other places to attack : "When and where on are you ever going to put up a good fight? And when are you ever going to fight a decisive battle?" On August 24, he reprimanded Nagano for the defeat of Bela Bela and on September 11, he ordered Sugiyama to work with the Navy to implement better military preparation and give adequate supply to soldiers fighting in Rabaul.

Throughout the following years, the sequence of drawn and then decisively lost engagements was also reported to the public as a series of great victories. Only gradually did it become apparent to the people in the home islands that the situation was very grim. U.S. air raids on the cities of Japan starting in 1944 made a mockery of the unending tales of victory. Later that year, with the downfall of Hideki Tōjō's government, two other prime ministers were appointed to continue the war effort, Kuniaki Koiso and Kantaro Suzuki—again, with the formal approval of the emperor. Both were unsuccessful and Japan was nearing defeat.

Last days of the war

In early 1945, in the wake of the loss of Leyte, Emperor Shōwa began a series of individual meetings with senior government officials to consider the progress of the war. All but one advised continuing. The exception was ex-Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, who feared a communist revolution even more than defeat and urged a negotiated surrender. According to some accounts, the Emperor apparently took the view that peace was essential, but that the armed forces would have to engineer a conspicuous military victory somewhere in order to provide a stronger bargaining position. With each passing week this became less likely. In April the Soviet Union issued notice that it would not renew its neutrality agreement. Japan's ally Germany surrendered in early May 1945. In June, the cabinet reassessed the war strategy, only to decide more firmly than ever on a fight to the last man. This was officially affirmed at a brief Imperial Council meeting, to which the emperor listened in stony-faced silence.

The following day, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kōichi Kido prepared a draft document which summarized the hopeless military situation and proposed a negotiated settlement. According to some sources, the Emperor privately approved of it and authorized Kido to circulate it discreetly amongst the less hawkish cabinet members; others suggest that the Emperor was indecisive, and that the delay cost many tens of thousands of Japanese and Allied lives. Extremists in Japan were also calling for a death-before-dishonor mass suicide, modeled on the "47 Ronin" incident. By mid-June the cabinet had agreed to approach the Soviet Union to act as a mediator, though not before the bargaining position had been improved by a repulse of the coming Allied invasion of mainland Japan.

On June 22, the Emperor met his ministers, saying "I desire that concrete plans to end the war, unhampered by existing policy, be speedily studied and that efforts be made to implement them." The attempt to negotiate a peace via the Soviet Union came to nothing. There was always the threat that extremists would carry out a coup or foment other violence. On July 26, the Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration demanding unconditional surrender. The Japanese government council, the Big Six, considered that option and recommended to the emperor that it be accepted only if one to three conditions were agreed, beginning with a guarantee of the emperor's continued position in Japanese society.

On August 9 1945, following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet declaration of war, Emperor Shōwa told Kido to "quickly control the situation" because "the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us." On August 10, the cabinet drafted an "Imperial Rescript ending the War" following the emperor's indications that the declaration did not compromise any demand which prejudiced the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.

On August 12, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai (national polity) could not be preserved. The Emperor simply replied "of course." On August 14, the Suzuki government notified the Allies that it had accepted the Potsdam Declaration. On August 15, a recording of the Emperor's surrender speech was broadcast over the radio signifying the unconditional surrender of Japan's military forces (known as Gyokuon-hōsō).

Objecting to the surrender, die-hard army fanatics attempted a coup d'état by conducting a full military assault and takeover of the Imperial Palace. The physical recording of the surrender speech was hidden and preserved overnight, and the coup was quickly crushed on the Emperor's order. The surrender speech noted that "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage" and ordered the Japanese to "endure the unendurable" in surrender. It was the first time the public had heard the Emperor's voice. He was purposely vague, because the Emperor of Japan was not regarded merely as a human saying "We surrender to the Americans," but rather, was viewed as the sacred symbol, embodiment, and leader of Japan, and as such this required a more vague tone that preserved this mystique. Indeed, the formal, stilted Japanese used by the Emperor in the speech was not readily understood by many common Japanese. According to historian Richard Storry in A History of Modern Japan, the Emperor typically used "a form of language familiar only to the well-educated" and to the more traditional samurai families. The most important immediate result of this surrender was that food relief shipments could be arranged within weeks, where otherwise the urban population of Japan was in danger of mass starvation similar to Germany and Central Europe after World War I. He was the only leader of the Axis Powers to remain alive and in office following the end of the Second World War.

Post-war reign

As the Emperor chose his uncle Prince Higashikuni as prime minister to assist the occupation, there were attempts by numerous leaders to have him put on trial for alleged war crimes. Many members of the imperial family such as Princes Chichibu, Takamatsu and Higashikuni pressured the Emperor to abdicate so one of the Princes could serve as regent until Crown Prince Akihito came of age. On February 27, 1946, the emperor's youngest brother, Prince Mikasa (Takahito), even stood up in the privy council and indirectly urged the emperor to step down and accept responsibility for Japan's defeat. According to Minister of Welfare Ashida's diary, "Everyone seemed to ponder Mikasa's words. Never have I seen His Majesty's face so pale."

U.S. General Douglas MacArthur insisted that Emperor Shōwa retain the throne. MacArthur saw him as a symbol of the continuity and cohesion of the Japanese people. Many historians criticize this decision to exonerate the Emperor and all members of the imperial family implicated in the war such as Prince Chichibu, Prince Asaka, Prince Higashikuni and Prince Hiroyasu Fushimi from criminal prosecutions Before the war crimes trials actually convened, the SCAP, the IPS and Japanese officials worked behind the scenes not only to prevent the Imperial family from being indicted, but also to slant the testimony of the defendants to ensure that no one implicated the emperor. High officials in court circles and the Japanese government collaborated with Allied GHQ in compiling lists of prospective war criminals, while the individuals arrested as Class A suspects and incarcerated in Sugamo prison solemnly vowed to protect their sovereign against any possible taint of war responsibility. Thus, "months before the Tokyo tribunal commenced, MacArthur's highest subordinates were working to attribute ultimate responsibility for Pearl Harbor to Hideki Tōjō" by allowing "the major criminal suspects to coordinate their stories so that the Emperor would be spared from indictment." According to John Dower, "This successful campaign to absolve the Emperor of war responsibility knew no bounds. Hirohito was not merely presented as being innocent of any formal acts that might make him culpable to indictment as a war criminal. He was turned into an almost saintly figure who did not even bear moral responsibility for the war." According to Bix, "MacArthur's truly extraordinary measures to save Hirohito from trial as a war criminal had a lasting and profoundly distorting impact on Japanese understanding of the lost war."

The Emperor was not put on trial, but he was forced to explicitly reject (in the Ningen-sengen (人間宣言)) the traditional claim that the Emperor of Japan was an arahitogami, an incarnate divinity. There is however consensus amongst authors such as Dower and Bix that the emperor never rejected the claim that he was a descendant of Amaterasu. Immediately after the Imperial Rescript usually regarded as a repudiation of divinity, he asked the occupation authorities for permission to worship the Sun Goddess. Some have seen this as an implicit reaffirmation of the claim to divine status; others have seen it as simply an expression of the emperor's personal religious beliefs, with no political or social implications. In any case, the "renunciation of divinity" was noted more by foreigners than by Japanese, and seems to have been intended for the consumption of the former.

Although the Emperor had supposedly rejected claims to divine status, his public position was deliberately left vague, partly because General MacArthur thought him likely to be a useful partner to get the Japanese to accept the occupation, and partly due to behind-the-scenes maneuverings by Shigeru Yoshida to thwart attempts to cast him as a European-style monarch.

While Emperor Shōwa was usually seen abroad as a head of state, there is still a broad dispute about whether he became a common citizen or retained special status related to his religious offices and participations in Shinto and Buddhist calendar rituals. Many scholars claim that today's tennō (usually translated Emperor of Japan in English) is not an emperor. See the Emperor of Japan article for discussion of the position of Emperor of Japan.

For the rest of his life, Emperor Shōwa was an active figure in Japanese life, and performed many of the duties commonly associated with a constitutional head of state. The emperor and his family maintained a strong public presence, often holding public walkabouts, and making public appearances on special events and ceremonies.

Emperor Shōwa also played an important role in rebuilding Japan's diplomatic image, traveling abroad to meet with many foreign leaders, including numerous American presidents and Queen Elizabeth II. In 1975, the Emperor and the Empress were honored guests at Colonial Williamsburg in Virginia, the first such visit by Japanese royalty.

He was deeply interested in and well-informed about marine biology, and the Imperial Palace contained a laboratory from which the emperor published several papers in the field under his personal name "Hirohito." His contributions included the description of several dozen species of jellyfish new to science.

Yasukuni Shrine

Emperor Shōwa maintained an official boycott of Yasukuni shrine after it was revealed to him that the remains of class-A war criminals had secretly been transferred to the shrine after its post war rededication. this boycott lasted from 1978 until the time of his death. This boycott has been maintained by his son Akihito, who has also refused to attend Yasukuni.

On 20 July 2006, Nihon Keizai Shimbun front-paged an article about the discovery of a memorandum detailing the reason the Emperor stopped visiting Yasukuni. The memorandum, kept by former chief of Imperial Household Agency Tomohiko Tomita, confirms for the first time the enshrinement of the 14 Class A War Criminals was the reason. Tomita wrote down the contents of his conversations with the emperor in his diaries and notebooks in detail. According to the memorandum, the emperor expressed his strong displeasure in 1988 at the decision made by Yasukuni Shrine to include Class A war criminals in the list of war dead honored there by saying, "At some point, Class-A criminals became enshrined, including Matsuoka and Shiratori. I heard Tsukuba acted cautiously," Tsukuba is believed to refer to Fujimaro Tsukuba, the former chief Yasukuni priest at the time, who decided not to enshrine the war criminals despite receiving in 1966, the list of war dead compiled by the government containing their names. "What's on the mind of Matsudaira's son, who is the current head priest?". "Matsudaira had a strong wish for peace, but the child didn't know the parent's heart. That's why I have not visited the shrine since. This is my heart," Matsudaira is believed to refer to Yoshitami Matsudaira, who was the grand steward of Imperial Household immediately after the end of World War II. His son, Nagayoshi, succeeded Fujimaro Tukuba as the chief priest of Yasukuni and he decided to enshrine the war criminals in 1978. Nagayoshi Matsudaira passed away a year ago, which is speculated as a reason for the release of the memo.

For journalist Masanori Yamaguchi, who analyzed the "memo" and comments made by the emperor in his first-ever press conference in 1975, his evasive and opaque attitude about his own responsibility for the war and the fact he said that the bombing of Hiroshima "could not be helped" , could mean that he was afraid that the enshrinement would reignite the debate over his own responsibility for the war.

Death and state funeral

On September 22, 1987, the Emperor underwent surgery on his pancreas after having digestive problems for several months. This was the very first time a Japanese emperor underwent surgery. The doctors discovered that he had duodenal cancer, but in accordance with Japanese tradition, they did not tell him. He seemed to be recovering well for several months after the surgery. About a year later, however, on September 19, 1988, he collapsed in his palace, and his health worsened over the next several months as he suffered from continuous internal bleeding. On January 7, 1989, at 7:55 AM, the grand steward of Japan's Imperial Household Agency, Shoichi Fujimori, officially announced the Emperor's death, and revealed details about his cancer for the first time. At last, he was succeeded by his son, Akihito.

The emperor's death ended the Shōwa era. On the same day a new era began: the Heisei era. From January 7 until January 31, the emperor's formal appellation was "Taikō Tennō (大行天皇)", which means the departed emperor. His definitive posthumous name, Emperor Shōwa (Shōwa Tennō), was determined on January 13 and formally released on January 31 by Toshiki Kaifu, the prime minister.

On February 24, Emperor Shōwa's state funeral was held, and unlike that of his predecessor, it was formal but not done in a strictly Shinto manner. A large number of world leaders attended the funeral, including U.S. President George H.W. Bush. Japanese public opinion at this time was that Emperor Shōwa had greatly helped Japan to regain economic and political stability during the postwar era. Emperor Shōwa is buried in the Imperial mausoleum in Hachiōji, alongside Emperor Taishō, his father.

In Popular Culture

Hirohito has been portrayed in the following movies:

• The movie The Sun is loosely based upon Hirohito's meeting with General MacArthur following the surrender of Japan.
• Hirohito is a supporting character in many WWII Japanese movies.
• Hirohito briefly appears in Bertolucci's The Last Emperor.

Awards

• Grand Cordon of the Supreme Order of the Chrysanthemum
• Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun with Sun Paulownia Blossoms
• Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure
• Grand Cross of the Order of Saint Olav
• Knight of the Order of the Garter
• Knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece

See also

• Gyokuon-hōsō
• Japanese nationalism
• Imperial Japan
• The Sun—a biographical film about the Emperor

Footnotes

1. In Japanese the reigning Emperor is referred to without a personal name as "his Majesty the Emperor" (天皇陛下, Tennō Heika) or "his current Majesty" (今上陛下, Kinjō Heika).
2. Mikiso Hane, Emperor Hirohito and His Chief Aide-de-camp, The Honjō Diary, 1983; Honjō Nikki, Hara Shobō, 1975
3. Former member of section 20 of War operations of the Army high command, Hara has made a detailed study of the way military decisions were made, including the Emperor's involvement published in five volumes in 1973–74 under the title Daihon'ei senshi; Daitōa Sensō kaisen gaishi; Kaisen ni itaru seisentyaku shidō (Imperial Headquarters war history; General history of beginning hostilities in the Greater East Asia War; Leadership and political strategy with respect to the beginning of hostilities).
4. Fujiwara, Nitchū Sensō ni Okeru Horyo Gyakusatsu, Kikan Sensō Sekinin Kenkyū 9, 1995, p.22.
5. Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II, Kaisetsu, 1997, pp.25–29.
6. Yoshimi and Matsuno, ibid. p.28.
7. Terasaki Hidenari, Shōwa tennō dokuhakuroku, Bungei Shūnjusha, 1991, p.106–108, Wetzler, Hirohito and War, pp.25, 231.
8. Conversation in Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, pp.411, 745.
9. Wetzler, Hirohito and War, pp. 52–54.
10. Fujiwara, Shôwa tennô no ju-go nen sensô, 1991, p.126, citing Kenji Tomita's diary.
11. Hidenari, ibid., p.118.
12. Bix, ibid p.421; Wetzler, ibid. pp. 47–50.
13. Wetzler, ibid pp. 29, 35.
14. Yamada, Daigensui Shōwa tennō, 1994, pp. 180, 181, 185; Fujiwara, Shōwa tennō no jū-go nen sensō, pp. 135–138.
15. Akamatsu's diary, in Wetzler, ibid. p.50.
16. Bix, ibid. p.466, citing the Sugiyama memo, p.24.
17. Yamada, ibid. p. 240–242.
18. Kido Kōichi Nikki, p.1223.
19. Terasaki Hidenari, Shōwa tennō dokuhakuroku, 1991, p.129.
20. Bix, ibid, pp.571–573.
21. Ashida Hitoshi Nikki, Dai Ikkan, Iwanami Shoten, 1986, p.82.
22. John Dower, Embracing defeat, 1999, Bix, ibid.
23. Dower, ibid., p.325.
24. Ibid., p.585.
25. Ibid. p.583.
26. Dower, ibid. p. 326.
27. Bix, ibid. p.545.
28. Dower, Embracing defeat, p.308-318
29. According to the Japanese constitution of 1889, the Emperor had a divine power over his country, which was derived from the mythology of the Japanese Imperial Family who were said to be the offspring of the creator of Japan, Amaterasu. When Tatsukichi Minobe advocated the theory that sovereignty resides in the states, of which the emperor is just an organ (the tennō kikan setsu), it caused a furor. He was forced to resign from the House of Peers and his post at the Tokyo Imperial University in 1935, his books were banned and an attempt was made on his life.(Large, Stephen S.; Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography, p. 60; Routledge, 1992.) It was not until 1946 that the tremendous step was made to alter the Emperor's title from "imperial sovereign" to "constitutional monarch."
30. "-Does your majesty feel responsibility for the war itself, including the opening of hostilities ? -I can't answer that kind of question because I haven't thoroughly studied the literature in this field, and so I don't really appreciate the nuances of your words." H. Bix, Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, 2001, p.676
31. Yasukuni and a week that will live in infamy, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fd20060820pb.html
32. http://navalhistory.flixco.info/H/177028x19846/8330/a0.htm

References

• Behr, Edward Hirohito: Behind the Myth, Villard, New York, 1989. - A controversial book that posited that Hirohito had a more active role in WWII than had publicly been portrayed; it contributed to the re-appraisal of his role.
• Bix, Herbert P. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, HarperCollins, 2000. ISBN 0-06-019314-X, A recent scholarly (and copiously sourced) look at the same issue.
• Drea, Edward J. (1998). "Chasing a Decisive Victory: Emperor Hirohito and Japan's War with the West (1941-1945)". In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-1708-0. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Fujiwara, Akira, Shōwa Tennō no Jū-go Nen Sensō (Shōwa Emperor's Fifteen-year War), Aoki Shoten, 1991. ISBN 4-250-91043-1 (Based on the primary sources)
• Hoyt, Edwin P. Hirohito: The Emperor and the Man, Praeger Publishers, 1992. ISBN 0-275-94069-1
• Kawahara, Toshiaki Hirohito and His Times: A Japanese Perspective, Kodansha International, 1997. ISBN 0-87011-979-6 (Japanese official image)
• Mosley, Leonard Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966. ISBN 1-111-75539-6 ISBN 1-199-99760-9, The first full-length biography, it gives his basic story.
• Wetzler, Peter Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan, University of Hawaii Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8248-1925-X
• Yamada, Akira, Daigensui Shōwa Tennō (Shōwa Emperor as Commander in Chief), Shin-Nihon Shuppansha, 1994. ISBN 4-406-02285-6 (Based on the primary sources)

External links

• Hirohito, Emperor @A Trivial Encyclopedia of Japan (with links in multiple languages)
• Kunaicho • Emperor Showa
• Hirohito biography and timeline at the Rotten Library
• Reflections on emperor Hirohito's death

v t e Emperors of Japan (list)
Legendary	Jōmon 660 BC–291 BC Jimmu Suizei Annei Itoku Kōshō Kōan Yayoi 290 BC–269 AD Kōrei Kōgen Kaika Sujin Suinin Keikō Seimu Chūai Jingū
Yamato	Kofun 269–539 Ōjin Nintoku Richū Hanzei Ingyō Ankō Yūryaku Seinei Kenzō Ninken Buretsu Keitai Ankan Senka Asuka 539–710 Kinmei Bidatsu Yōmei Sushun Suiko Jomei Kōgyoku Kōtoku Saimei Tenji Kōbun Tenmu Jitō Monmu Genmei
Nara	710–794 Genmei Genshō Shōmu Kōken Junnin Shōtoku Kōnin Kanmu
Heian	794–1185 Kanmu Heizei Saga Junna Ninmyō Montoku Seiwa Yōzei Kōkō Uda Daigo Suzaku Murakami Reizei En'yū Kazan Ichijō Sanjō Go-Ichijō Go-Suzaku Go-Reizei Go-Sanjō Shirakawa Horikawa Toba Sutoku Konoe Go-Shirakawa Nijō Rokujō Takakura Antoku Go-Toba
Kamakura	1185–1333 Go-Toba Tsuchimikado Juntoku Chūkyō Go-Horikawa Shijō Go-Saga Go-Fukakusa Kameyama Go-Uda Fushimi Go-Fushimi Go-Nijō Hanazono Go-Daigo
Northern Court	1333–1392 Kōgon Kōmyō Sukō Go-Kōgon Go-En'yū Go-Komatsu
Muromachi	1333–1573 Go-Murakami Chōkei Go-Kameyama Go-Komatsu Shōkō Go-Hanazono Go-Tsuchimikado Go-Kashiwabara Go-Nara Ōgimachi
Azuchi-Momoyama	1573–1603 Ōgimachi Go-Yōzei
Edo	1603–1868 Go-Yōzei Go-Mizunoo Meishō Go-Kōmyō Go-Sai Reigen Higashiyama Nakamikado Sakuramachi Momozono Go-Sakuramachi Go-Momozono Kōkaku Ninkō Kōmei Meiji
Empire of Japan	1868–1947 Meiji Taishō Shōwa
Japan	1947–present Shōwa Akihito Naruhito
Unless otherwise noted (as BC), years are in CE / AD  Imperial Consort and Regent Empress Jingū is not traditionally listed. Imperial family tree Imperial House Order of succession Imperial tombs Category

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