Battle of Jenin (2002): Difference between revisions

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	After the ] ambush, the ] changed tactics, presumably in order to continue the operation without risking more Israeli deaths, and began operating the heavily-]ed ] ]s. Earlier, the IDF maintained that heavy bulldozers were mainly used to clear ]s and open routes to ]s. After April 9, the bulldozers demolished each house that was allegedly used by the militants attacks on Israeli soldiers. The Israelis insist a warning was given over a loud speaker before each of the houses were destroyed. Some Palestinians claim that were cases when the IDF bulldozed houses while there were people inside. During this phase of the battle senior Palestinian militants (which Israel considers ]s due to their involvement in dozens of suicide attacks against Israeli civilians) were killed (such as ]) and arrested (] and ]).		After the ] ambush, the ] changed tactics, presumably in order to continue the operation without risking more Israeli deaths, and began operating the heavily-]ed ] ]s. Earlier, the IDF maintained that heavy bulldozers were mainly used to clear ]s and open routes to ]s. After April 9, the bulldozers demolished each house that was allegedly used by the militants attacks on Israeli soldiers. The Israelis insist a warning was given over a loud speaker before each of the houses were destroyed. Some Palestinians claim that were cases when the IDF bulldozed houses while there were people inside. During this phase of the battle senior Palestinian militants (which Israel considers ]s due to their involvement in dozens of suicide attacks against Israeli civilians) were killed (such as ]) and arrested (] and ]).

	After the conflict Israeli reports claim that 8-9% of the houses within the refugee camp were destroyed. This was largely within an area of intense fighting of approximately 100m by 100m according to the IDF. .

	Most of the demolition occurred in the ''Hawashin neighborhood'', where most of the militants and explosives remained. Israel states that it demolished those houses because they were densely rigged with explosives.		Most of the demolition occurred in the ''Hawashin neighborhood'', where most of the militants and explosives remained. Israel states that it demolished those houses because they were densely rigged with explosives.

Revision as of 14:19, 7 November 2005

Jenin's refugee camp was the site of one of the most controversial battles of Operation Defensive Shield (April 2002). The Jenin refugee camp came under full Palestinian civil and security control in 1995. The battle itself drew enormous international attention at the time, especially as Israel sealed off the area to journalists and many media sources reported that a massacre of Palestinians had taken place during the fighting. Allegations about hundreds of deaths were later proven false and the actual number of Palestinians killed was estimated by a United Nations report to be 52 (of whom up to 22 "may have been" civilians) as well as 23 Israeli soldiers . A section of the camp was destroyed during the fighting.

Precursors to the battle of Jenin

From the beginning of March until the first week in May 2002, there were approximately 16 bombings in Israel, mostly suicide attacks. More than 100 persons were killed and scores wounded. 18 Israelis were killed in two separate Palestinian attacks on March 8 and 9, and a terrorist attack in Netanya killed 28 and injured 140 on March 29. Of some 100 bombers who carried out suicide attacks since the intifada began in October 2000, 23 or 28 were from Jenin depending on the source.

The UN Report later comments:

According to both Palestinian and Israeli observers, the Jenin camp had, by April 2002, some 200 armed men from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas who operated from the camp.

When Jenin came under Palestinian Authority control in 1995 per the Oslo agreement, it was under an agreement to protect Israeli civilians from attacks, including suicide bombings, emanating from areas under its security control.

The battle

An UNRWA administrated refugee camp near Jenin was entered by Israeli forces in early April 2002, as part of Israel's Operation Defensive Shield, an operation the IDF described as intending "to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure operating out of the P.A.-controlled areas". Over the next few days a battle took place between the IDF and Palestinians. At that time, media reports were conflicting as to the nature of the conflict.

According to the Israel Defense Forces, Israel chose not to bomb the spots of resistance using aircraft as it entered, in order to minimize civilian losses , but rather to take hold of the city using infantry, although there appears to have been a limited use of helicopters .

According to one imprisoned Palestinian militant from Islamic Jihad; Tabaat Mardawi there were "between 1000 and 2000 bombs and booby traps" throughout the camp.

According to a CNN report Palestinian Islamic Jihad militant Tabaat Mardawi, told CNN enthusiastically from his prison in Israel, that, after learning the IDF was going to use troops, and not planes, "It was like hunting ... like being given a prize. ....He added: "I've been waiting for a moment like that for years."

Mardawi told CNN that Palestinian fighters had spread "between 1000 and 2000 bombs and booby traps" throughout the camp. . Time Magazine said that "some of the bombs were huge – as much as 250 lbs. of explosives...compared with the usual 25 lbs. a suicide bomber uses." A senior Palestinian military officer told Time that "it was probably the gunmen's own booby traps that buried some civilians and fighters alive."

A total of 33 Israeli soldiers were killed in the street fighting. 13 died in a single day (April 9), when, Palestinian fighters lured the IDF into a trap.

Change in Israeli tactics

After the April 9 ambush, the Israel Defense Forces changed tactics, presumably in order to continue the operation without risking more Israeli deaths, and began operating the heavily-armored IDF Caterpillar D9 bulldozers. Earlier, the IDF maintained that heavy bulldozers were mainly used to clear booby traps and open routes to armored fighting vehicles. After April 9, the bulldozers demolished each house that was allegedly used by the militants attacks on Israeli soldiers. The Israelis insist a warning was given over a loud speaker before each of the houses were destroyed. Some Palestinians claim that were cases when the IDF bulldozed houses while there were people inside. During this phase of the battle senior Palestinian militants (which Israel considers terrorists due to their involvement in dozens of suicide attacks against Israeli civilians) were killed (such as Mahmoud Tawallbe) and arrested (Ali Sefuri and Thabet Mardawi).

Most of the demolition occurred in the Hawashin neighborhood, where most of the militants and explosives remained. Israel states that it demolished those houses because they were densely rigged with explosives.

After the battle

The introduction of the heavily armored bulldozers, which shrugged off explosives and RPGs alike , and the threat of being buried alive, the Palestinian militants surrendered. Later, IDF forces withdrew gradually from the refugee camp under international pressure.

After the conflict Israeli reports claim that 8-9% of the houses within the refugee camp were destroyed. This was largely within an area of intense fighting of approximately 100m by 100m according to the IDF. . An area within the refugee camp, 100m by 200m according to some (up to 400m by 500m by other estimates ) was reported to have been flattened .

Most of the demolition occurred in the Hawashin neighborhood, where most of the militants and explosive remained.

In October 2002, according to the Walla news agency, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas websites reported that their forces in Jenin before the Israeli entry included 250 armed militants. The official Kol Yisrael radio station reported that 15,000 explosive charges were at the militants' disposal, as well as a large number of handguns. The militants were well organized and had an extensive system of communications. Walla also mentioned sources who claimed that Palestinians youngsters contributed to the fighting, sometimes even carrying explosive charges in their schoolbags.

Time Magazine also wrote about the heavily wired (booby-trapped) refugee camp. It stated, for example, that on the outskirts of Jenin, an IDF armoured Caterpillar D9 detonated 124 explosive charges. Time also quoted an unnamed Palestinian who admitted that the gunmen's own booby traps caused some of the civilian deaths.

Al-Ahram Online has an interview with "Omar the Engineer", a Palestinian bombmaker who claims that some 50 homes were booby trapped. "We chose old and empty buildings and the houses of men who were wanted by Israel because we knew the soldiers would search for them," he said.

According to Israeli authorities, numerous buildings, passages and even bodies were booby-trapped, often prompting Israelis to use armored bulldozers to level sections of the city. The Israelis also claimed to have found more than a dozen explosives-making labs, as well as the bodies of foreign citizens, most of whom were operatives of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement who had been brought over from Jordan.

Allegations of a Massacre

Rumors of massacres in Jenin swirled through Palestinian communities which were then echoed in the world press for several weeks, pitting world public opinion against Israel. This was not helped as Israeli authorities prevented the international press from entering the refugee camp for two weeks.

Later inquiries by human rights groups and the UN commission did not find evidence of widespread massacres by Israeli forces in Jenin.

Inflated body counts

Both sides had inflated, or made overly cautious estimates of the number of dead in the refugee camp at the time. The Palestinian Authority did not provide an official count until around two weeks after fighting ended, although unofficial accounts perpetrated much of the inflation detailed before. Analysing the news reports finds a timeline of the inflated estimates which explain the reason for the hysteria caused in much of the world media (note that the following numbers include both civilians and armed combatants unless specifically stated otherwise):

April 3

Fighting begins

April 6

The Arab League hears in a speech where Nabil Shaath compares "Israeli actions in the West Bank towns of Jenin and Nablus to the 1982 massacres of hundreds of Palestinans", probably refering to Israel's part in the Sabra and Shatila Massacre where possibly up to 3500 Palestinian refugees were killed

April 7

Saeb Erekat, a Palestinian minister for Local Government is quoted in the Washington Post making the first mention of a massacre
NBC news hears from Abdel Rahman that "over 250 Palestinians killed"

April 10

Israel estimates 150 dead
Saeb Erekat estimates 500 or more dead

April 12

Fighting ends
IDF spokesman Brigadier-General Ron Kitrey reports on Israeli Army Radio that there are apparently hundreds killed, the IDF quickly clarify he meant hundreds of casualties (killed or injured).
An IDF source reportedly puts the number of dead at 250
Palestinian Information Minister, Yasser Abed Rabbo, accuses Israel of digging mass graves for 900 Palestinians in the camp, whilst Secretary-General of the Palestinian Authority, Ahmed Abdel Rahman claimed that "thousands" had died, the most serious accusations of the episode

April 14

After the IDF reportedly estimate 250, and 188 a final figure of 45 is given

April 30

Kadoura Mousa Kadoura, the director of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement for the northern West Bank set the total dead to 56

Further investigation by the United Nations and international reporters found that only 52 Palestinians where killed in the operation, 22 of whom were civilians.

Massacre

Massacres refer not only to the numbers killed, but also to the method used.

In an article about the battle in Jenin, Time Magazine ruled out Palestinian allegations of massacre, writing that:

A Time investigation concludes that there was no wanton massacre in Jenin, no deliberate slaughter of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers. But the 12 days of fighting took a severe toll on the camp.

As of 2005, this view is widely supported by the international community.

On May 2, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have filmed adult Palestinians carrying out a mock funeral procession. The funeral was fake and the "body" was able to get up and walk. The tape was shown in the documentary The Road to Jenin by Pierre Rehov. On May 8th, 2002, The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment issued a press release stating that it was only Palestinian children playing "funeral". Israeli groups reject this claim outright.

Human Rights Reports

In late April and on May 3, 2002, the United Nations (UN), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch released reports about the Israeli military incursions into Jenin. The reports documented that 32 Palestinian militants, 22 Palestinian civilians, and 23 Israeli soldiers were killed in the fighting and thus felt no evidence that a massacre took place.

UN report

Fifty-two Palestinian deaths had been confirmed by the hospital in Jenin by the end of May 2002. IDF also places the death toll at approximately 52. A senior Palestinian Authority official alleged in mid-April that some 500 were killed, a figure that has not been substantiated in the light of the evidence that has emerged. Article (56).

UN Report was strongly criticized by Human Rights Watch as "flawed" for not having any first-hand evidence and failing to address serious questions.

Human Rights Watch report

The HRW report found "no evidence to sustain claims of massacres or large-scale extrajudicial executions by the IDF". The report agreed with the total casualty figures provided by the IDF but documented a higher proportion of civilian casualties. Amnesty International concurred. The HRW report documented instances of unlawful or willful killing by the IDF, some of which could have been avoided if proper procedures were followed, as well as instances of summary executions. It also documented use of Palestinians as 'human shields', by the IDF, and prevention of humanitarian organizations from accessing the camp despite the great need. The report concluded:

Israeli forces committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, some amounting prima facie to war crimes. Human Rights Watch found no evidence to sustain claims of massacres or large-scale extrajudicial executions by the IDF in Jenin refugee camp.

While focusing mainly on the actions of the IDF, the report also stated that:

Palestinian gunmen did endanger Palestinian civilians in the camp by using it as a base for planning and launching attacks, using indiscriminate tactics such as planting improvised explosive devices within the camp, and intermingling with the civilian population during armed conflict, and, in some cases, to avoid apprehension by Israeli forces.

The report notes that:

The presence of armed Palestinian militants inside Jenin refugee camp, and the preparations made by those armed Palestinian militants in anticipation of the IDF incursion, does not detract from the IDF's obligation under international humanitarian law to take all feasible precautions to avoid harm to civilians ... Unfortunately, these obligations were not met.

Amnesty International report

Unlawful killings violate the "right to life" laid down in Article 6 of the ICCPR. Amnesty International considers that some of these abuses of the right to life would amount to "willful killings" and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" within the meaning of Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention dealing with grave breaches of the Convention; "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention are war crimes. -.

Notes on the independent reports

Israeli critics pointed out that the inquiries included no urban or counter-terrorist warfare specialists and therefore they believe that the investigators were unable to assess the justifiability of the IDF actions. Israel claimed that humanitarian organizations were rash to jump to conclusions about Israeli conduct without investigating thoroughly the conduct of the Palestinian guerrilla forces in the area. Moreover, Israel complained that although terrorists are civilians by definition, they are still combatants, which made their status different from that of the unarmed civilians. Finally, the human rights groups had not investigated the incidents in which ambulances of the Palestinian Red Crescent and equipment of other aid agencies were allegedly being used by Palestinian militants to transport weapons and combatants, thus voiding their nonbelligerent status as defined in the Geneva Convention.

UN fact finding mission

To settle the contradictory claims, a fact finding mission was proposed by the United Nations on April 19 2002. Israel initially agreed to co-operate with the inquiry, but demanded a set of conditions to do so. Among the conditions, Israel demanded that the mission should include anti-terrorism experts (this was supported by one Amnesty International advisor), that the UN agree not to prosecute Israeli soldiers for potential violations of international law, and that it limit its scope exclusively to events in Jenin.

The UN refused to accept the last two conditions and were forced to ultimately disband their mission. Israel argued that the conditions under which the UN proposed the mission were unfair, as the UN did not agree to give the anti-terrorism expert full membership, would not give the mission a strict mandate, nor declare the mission solely investigatory (as opposed to having a judicial purpose). According to Israel, all three positions violate of the UN's own principles (as stated in the "Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations", A/RES/46/59 of December 9, 1991).

External links

Reports by Human Rights groups, the UN, the IDF and the PA

Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations
Full Text of UN Report
The Secretary General's report on Jenin
Human Rights Watch: Jenin War Crimes Investigation Needed
Full Text of Human Rights Watch Report
Executive Summary, The Battle in Jenin – The Israel Defence Force’s , Response to the Report by Amnesty International (IDF spokesman's official response to the report)
Human Rights Watch - Jenin: IDF Military Operations
Palestinian view of UN report
Israeli aerial photographs of the combat area
Collection of Israeli statements regarding Operation Defensive Shield, at Israel's Foreign Ministry website

Press reports, opinions and articles about Jenin battle

Whilst considering these press and news reports, it is important to consider the date. At first, many international newspapers reported the possibility of a massacre, whereas 3-4 weeks on, they often describe the massacre as particularly unlikely.