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Lebanese Civil War
The Martyr's Square statue in Beirut, 1982, during the civil war
Date 13 April 1975 – 13 October 1990 Location Lebanon Result An estimated 130,000–250,000 people killed (some report the number much higher), 1,000,000 wounded (half of whom were left with lifetime disability) Billions of dollars of damage, collapse of the economy Complete destruction of central Beirut Presence of a multitude of foreign troops, foreign occupation and invasion. A Syrian occupation of Lebanon. An Israeli occupation of the Southern region of Lebanon which lasted until 2000. The creation of a resistance movement led by Kataeb and PNL then the Lebanese Forces against the syrian presence in Lebanon. The creation of a resistance movement led by Hezbollah against the Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon. The Taif Agreement.
Belligerents
Lebanese Front File:Sør-Libanon-Arméen.png South Lebanon Army (from 1976)  Israel (from 1978; see Operation Litani and 1982 Lebanon War) Syria (in 1976)	Lebanese National Movement (until 1982) Lebanese National Resistance Front‎ (from 1982) PLO Amal Movement Hezbollah Syria (from 1983)	Lebanese Armed Forces Arab Deterrent Force (1976-1983) UNIFIL (from 1978) Multinational Force in Lebanon (1982-1984)
Commanders and leaders
File:Logo Kataeb.svgBachir Gemayel File:Logo Kataeb.svgSamir Geagea File:Logo Kataeb.svgAmin Gemayel File:SLA patch.pngSaad Haddad Michel Aoun Camille Chamoun Menachem Begin Ariel Sharon	Kamal Jumblatt Walid Jumblatt George Hawi Yasser Arafat Nabih Berri Musa al-Sadr (until 1978) Abbas al-Musawi Hafez al-Assad	Emmanuel A. Erskine William O'Callaghan Gustav Hägglund Timothy J. Geraghty

The Lebanese Civil War (Template:Lang-ar) was a long and brutal war which lasted from 1975 to 1990 in Lebanon. The designation of "civil" however is objected to by many Lebanese given the extensive use of foreign forces in the country by political factions such as the PLO, and the deployment of foreign guerrillas to the country by foreign states such as Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Syria in the early years of the war.The war resulted in an estimated 130,000 to 250,000 civilian fatalities. Another one million people (one fourth of the population) were wounded, and today approximately 450,000 people remain displaced, the majority of them Christian Lebanese who were forced out of Mount Lebanon and the Chouf mountains (Assaf & El-fill 2000 p31). There was also a mass exodus of almost one million people from Lebanon, mostly of Christian descent. The Post-war occupation of the country by Syria was particularly politically disadvantageous to the Christian population as most of their leadership was driven into exile, or had been assassinated or imprisoned. Syrian engineered elections from 1992 to 2005 further disadvantaged the Lebanese Christians diminishing the power of their votes (Baroudi & Tabar 2009 p205.)

There is much controversy amongst researchers on what triggered the Lebanese Civil War. However, there is little disagreement amongst political scientists and Political anthropologists that the militarization of the Palestinian refugee population, with the arrival of the Palestine Liberation Organization PLO guerrilla forces did spark an arms-race amongst the different Lebanese political factions. In addition, the political ambitions of the Druze leader Kamal Jumblat, who used the Palestinian cause to disrupt consensus amongst different Lebanese factions also contributed to the general chaos. In his seminal work, Yezid Sayigh(1997) , the son of prominent PLO members, demonstrated that Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO and his closest aides also sought to split the Lebanese army in order to mount a coup to change the political landscape of the country (Sayigh 1997 p379-380). The occupation of army barracks after the army split, by the PLO and allied Lebanese factions, trained and funded by Fatah also contributed to a further arms race by other Lebanese factions (Johnson 1986 p174-176 & Sayigh 1997 p375).

It has often been argued that such instability as seen in Lebanon was inevitable and preceded by other civil crisis which often threatened to re-emerge. However such analysis come from journalistic sources and are not consistent with specialist academic scholarship which involves a comparative approach to political research. These scholars (such as Michael Johnson) argue that the earlier conflicts in Lebanon, were an expression of bourgeoisie war for influence amongst different political personalities. The 1958 war for example, often referred to as the "War of the Pashas" was an insurrection mounted by traditional political bosses who had lost elections to the parliament in 1957 (Johnson 1986 p123-124).

In previous years, tensions with Egypt had escalated in 1956 when the non-aligned President, Camille Chamoun, did not break off diplomatic relations with the Western powers that attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis, angering Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Chamoun has often been called pro-Western, yet he had signed several trade deals with the Soviet union (Alin 1994 54 & Gendzier 1997 210). However Nasser had attacked Chamoun because of his 'suspected' support for the US led Baghdad Pact which he in fact never endorsed (Alin 1994 41).

By July 1958, Lebanon was threatened by a civil war when president Camille Chamoun had attempted to break the stranglehold on Lebanese politics exercised by traditional political families. These families maintained their electoral appeal by cultivating strong client-patron relations with their local communities. But this prevented the emergence of an educated political class into the parliament. Although he succeeded in sponsoring alternative political candidates to enter the elections in 1957, causing the traditional families to lose their positions, these families then embarked upon a war with Chamoun, referred to as the War of the Pashas. However, due to Lebanon's historic openness towards the press and political organization, such local conflagration were always given more regional meaning because of the co-optation of such events by parasitic groups and politicians. The founding members of Fatah for example, although not as yet officially formed, had flocked to Lebanon and participated in the insurrections, aiding in the take over of the streets in Tripoli by armed protesters who had been directed onto the streets by the defeated political bosses (Sayigh 1997 p91). They hoped they could gain power and prestige through their contribution to such a conflagration at a time when they were trying to build the political party which would become known as Fatah.This crisis in 1958 was not deep and ended very quickly once the ousted parliamentarians were permitted to regain their seats through an expanded parliament.

First phase 1977–1976

However by 1975, the presence of a foreign armed force in the form of the PLO guerrillas, dominated now by a well armed Fatah and sponsored by foreign states such as Egypt and Syria and funded to the tune of 250 million USD per year by Saudi Arabia and other oil producing states ( Sayigh 1997 p441)undermined the authority of the Lebanese army and its government. The army had already been displaced from their own barracks in the south in 1969, when Fatah and other PLO guerilla groups attacked and then occupied them, under threats by Arafat made through the media that more bases would be occupied (Sayigh 1997 196). Under pressure from Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Lebanese president, Charles Helou, was forced to endorse the "armed" presence of the PLO formally. Helou refused but six months later, with more Lebanese army soldiers dead at the hands of the PLO, the Lebanese president Helou, was unable to reject Nasser's pressure to conclude an agreement officially endorsing the PLO presence, confined to certain areas in the south of the country, for fear that more Lebanese soldiers would be killed (Brynen 1990, p50 & Sayigh 1997 p190). The Lebanese establishment was up in arms at the treaty signed in November of 1969 in Cairo whose text has remained secret. This treaty between the PLo was known as the Cairo accords (defunct since 1987) but which was breached by the PLO from the first day of its signing when PLO guerrilla forces proceeded to expand their territorial control over Lebanon (Brynen 1990, p50& 55-56).

The PLO was so entrenched now in Lebanon, that it began to exercise a veto on Lebanese politics and exercise their own foreign policy within a period of regional polarization, which had a visible effect on Lebanon.

The strike of fishermen at Sidon in February 1975 could also be considered the first important episode that set off the outbreak of hostilities. That event involved a specific issue: the attempt of former President Camille Chamoun (also head of the Maronite-oriented National Liberal Party) to monopolize fishing along the coast of Lebanon. The demonstrations against the fishing company were quickly transformed into a political action supported by the political left and their allies in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). During the demonstration a sniper reportedly killed a popular figure in the city, the former Mayor of Sidon, Maroof Saad. He was buried in a Palestinian flag, and in the media, the Sidon riots became somehow fused with the Palestinian war with Israel in the minds of media watchers. However the event appeared to have been hi-jacked by the Palestinians because Saad was on bad terms with the PLO. Fatah controlled the heart of Sidon and the port and had attempted to fund the electoral campaigns of competing candidates which eventually saw Saad lose both his bid for a parliamentary seat and then in 1973, lose the mayor-ship. This meant that the Fatah sponsored rival had not only won Sidon, but was now representing Fatah's wishes in the Lebanese parliament! (Khazen 2000 268-272). When Saad died, there was bitter enmity between him and the PLO/ Fatah .

Many non- academic sources claim a government sniper killed Saad, however there is no support for such a claim, and it appears that whomever had killed him had intended for what began as a small and quite demonstration to evolve into something more. The sniper targeted Saad right at the end of the demonstration as it was dissipating. Farid Khazen, sourcing the local histories of Sidon academics and eye-witnesses, gives a run-down of the puzzling events of the day that based on their research. Other interesting facts that Khazen reveals, based on the Sidon academic's work include; Saad was not in dispute with the fishing consortium made up of Yugoslav nationals. In fact the Yugoslavian representatives in Lebanon had negotiated with the fisherman's union to make the fisherman shareholders in the company; the company offered to modernize the Fisherman's equipment and buy their catch; give their fisherman's union and annual subsidy and Saad as a union representative (and not the mayor of Sidon at the time as many erroneous sources claim) was offered a place on the company's board too (Khazen 2000 271). There has been some speculation that Saad's attempts to narrow the differences between the fishermen and the consortium, and his acceptance of a place on the board made him a target of attack by the conspirator who sought a full conflagration around the small protest (Khazen 2000 272).

The events in Sidon were not contained for long. The government began to lose control of the situation in 1975. On the morning of 13 April 1975, PLO Palestinian guerrilla's in a speeding car fired on a church in the Christian East Beirut suburb of Ain El Rummaneh, killing four people, including two Maronite Phalangists. The Church was being opened and thus the presence of the Phalange party was well known at the new church. In the preceding weeks, the PLO guerrilla group had come to and signed an agreement with the Lebanese government, that their armed convoys would refrain from passing through the area (as this was againt the terms of the Caior accords and often taken as provocation by the residents) . Because political figures such a Pierre Gemayel, head of the Kataeb were known to be visiting the area, the Lebanese security force had set up checkpoints and would be diverting traffic away from the area. Palestinian guerrilla forces had clashed with Lebanese security on the day a number of times insisting on being allowed into the area. One of these vehicles proceeded into the area despite Lebanese security forces attempts to dissuade them, and as they drove towards the crowd gathering at the entrance of the church, the driver was shot by Kataeb members guarding the entrance to the church. Some hours later, another car load of Palestinian guerillas breached the security checkpoints and proceeded to the church where they shot at a crowd, killing two members of the Kataeb. As news of the attack spread, Christian men of the area set up their own checkpoints around the suburb of Ain el Rummaneh during which they encountered a busload of armed guerillas setting off a battle at the end of whihc most of the occupants of the bus were killed (Khazen 2000 286-287).

The 13th of April 1975 is often cited as the day the sixteen year Lebanese civil war started. But this is an arbitrary date settled upon by journalistic accounts to provide a simplistic explanation for what had been a long process of state decline.

The PLO had taken over the heart of Sidon and Tyre in the early 1970s, it controlled great swath of south Lebanon, in which the indigenous Shiite population had to suffer the humiliation of passing though PLO checkpoints and now they had worked their way by force into Beirut. The PLo did this with the assistance of so-called "volunteers" from Libya and Algeria shipped in through the ports it controlled, as well as a number of Sunni Lebanese groups who had been trained and armed by PLO/ Fatah and encouraged to declare themselves as separate militias. However as Rex Brynen makes clear in his publication on the PLO, these militias were nothing more than "shop-fronts" or in Arabic "Dakakin" for Fatah, armed gangs with no ideological foundation and no organic reason for their existence save the fact their individual members were put on PLO/ Fatah payroll (Brynen 1990 p60).

Such descriptions demonstrate that much of the membership of the so-called leftist groups which allied themselves to the PLO were nothing more than a collection of unemployed young men seeking the security of a regular wage. According to Johnson “there was considerable overlap between the “leftist” militias and criminal gangs. Although some groups were more principled than others, it was extremely difficult to impose discipline on young sub-proletarian militiamen, many of whom were fighting as little more than mercenaries who saw the salaries paid to them by their leaders as extremely attractive alternative to unemployment, especially when their incomes could be supplemented by a share in the spoils of war… and there were many cases of people being tortured, raped and murdered simply for having the wrong religion entered on their Lebanese identity card. The evidence is that there was no deliberate policy on the part of the National Movement to perpetrate such crimes. But to pretend that individuals and groups of fighters within or associated with the movement did not commit atrocities would be a serious distortion of the truth” (1986 p182).

In the spring of 1975, this build-up erupted in an all-out conflict, with the PLO pitted against the Christian Phalange, and the ever-weaker national government wavering between the need to maintain order and catering to its constituency.

In East Beirut, in 1976, Christian leaders of the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Renewal Party joined in the Lebanese Front, a political counterpoint to the LNM. Their militias - the Tigers, Kataeb Regulatory Forces (KRF) and Guardians of the Cedars - entered a loose coalition known as the Lebanese Forces, to form a military wing for the Lebanese Front. From the very beginning, the Kataeb and its Regulatory Forces' militia, under the leadership of Bashir Gemayel, dominated the LF. In 1977-80, through absorbing or destroying smaller militias, he both consolidated control and strengthened the LF into the dominant Christian force.

Christian East Beirut was ringed by heavily fortified Palestinian camps . The Kateb or Phalanges and their allied Christian militias as they besieged the Palestinian camps embedded in Christian East Beirut. The first was on 18 January 1976 when the heavily fortified Karantina camp, located near the strategic Beirut Harbor, was sacked during the Karantina massacre: About 1,000 PLO fighters and civilians were killed. The Palestinian PLO, LNM and al-Saika forces retaliated by attacking the isolated Christian town of Damour about 20 miles south of Beirut on the coast, during the Damour massacre in which 1,000 Christian civilians were killed and 5,000 were sent fleeing north by boat, since all roads were blocked off. The Maronites retaliated with the Tel al-Zaatar massacre that same year. These massacres prompted a mass exodus of Muslims and Christians, as people fearing retribution fled to areas under the control of their own sect. The ethnic and religious layout of the residential areas of the capital encouraged this process, and East and West Beirut were increasingly transformed into an effective Christian and Muslim Beirut. Also, the number of Christian leftists who had allied with the LNM, and Muslim conservatives with the government, dropped sharply, as the war gradually changed from an essentially Palestinian versus Lebanese confrontation into a more sectarian conflict.

The nation was now effectively divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the PLO and Muslim-based militias, and the Christians in control of East Beirut and the Christian section of Mount Lebanon. The main confrontation line in divided Beirut was known as the Green Line.

Major militias

Most militias claimed that they were non-sectarian forces, but in fact they recruited mainly from the community or region of their chiefs.

Christian militias

Christian militias acquired arms from Romania and Bulgaria as well as from West Germany, Belgium and Israel, and drew supporters from the larger Christian population in the north of the country. They were generally nationalist and Lebanonist in their political outlook,rejecting pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ideologies.Although dominated by Maronite Christians, they also had other members form the Shiite sect, who shared the Lebanonist orientation. Sunni Lebanese have historically rejected the notion that Lebanon be an independent state, separated form other Arab states. Historically, the Sunni Lebanese have dominated movements calling for the dissolution of the Lebanese state. Lebanon's territorial specificity and sovereignty however has a long historical roots (the province of the Mutasarrifiyya) rarely matched by other recently formed states int he Middle East (Egypt being an exception).

The most powerful of the Christian militias was the Kataeb, or Phalanges, under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel. This Militia eventually became a strong ally of Israel due to the civil war. Initially many Muslims welcomed Israel to rid Lebanon of the PLO. Shiite muslim women in the south who had suffered the "excesses" of the Palestinian guerilla presence (theft of property, rape etc see Sayigh 1997 p496) , threw rose-petals and rice at the invading Israeli soldiers in 1982. The Phalange went on to help found the Lebanese Forces in 1977 which came under the leadership of Samir Geagea in 1986. A smaller faction was the nationalist non-sectarian Guardians of the Cedars. These militias quickly established strongholds in Christian-dominated East Beirut, also the site of many government buildings. In the north, the Marada Brigades served as the private militia of the Franjieh family and Zgharta.

Another mainly Christian Militia was the South Lebanon Army which was controlled by Saad Haddad. This militia was installed in South Lebanon by the Israelis. Their goal was to minimize the U.N peace keeping movement and to attack the PLO.

Also, another notable militia; Noumour (نمور) was the military wing of the National Liberal Party (NLP/ AHRAR) during the Lebanese Civil War. The Tigers formed in Saadiyat in 1968, as Noumour Al Ahrar (Tigers of the Liberals, نمور الأحرار ), under the leadership of Camille Chamoun. The group took its name from his middle name, Nemr - "Tiger". Trained by Naim Berdkan, the unit was led by Chamoun's son Dany Chamoun. After the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, the Tigers, strong of 3,500 militiamen fought the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and its Palestinian allies.Christian militias armed members were accused of several massacres that took place during the war (sabra & shatila massacre & the shahar massacre in mount Lebanon , ETC.....)

Shi'a militias

The Shi'a militias were slow to form and join in the fighting. Initially, many Shi'a had sympathy for the Palestinians and a few had been drawn to the Lebanese Communist Party, but after 1970's Black September, there was a sudden influx of armed Palestinians to the Shi'a areas. South Lebanon's population is mainly Shi'a and the Palestinians soon set up base there for their attacks against the Israelis. The Palestinian movement quickly squandered its influence with the Shi'ite, as radical factions ruled by the gun in much of Shi'ite-inhabited southern Lebanon, where the refugee camps happened to be concentrated, and the mainstream PLO proved either unwilling or unable to rein them in.

The Palestinian radicals' behaviour had alienated the traditionalist Shi'ite community, the Shi'a didn't want to pay the price for the PLO's rocket attacks from Southern Lebanon. The PLO created a State within a State in South Lebanon and this instigated a fury among Lebanon's Shi'a who feared a retaliation from the Israelis to their native land in the South. Initially the Shi'a had been sympathetic towards the Palestinians, but when the PLO created chaos in South Lebanon these feelings were reversed. The Shiʿa predominated in the area of southern Lebanon that in the 1960s became an arena for Israel-Palestinian conflict. The state of Lebanon, which always avoided provoking Israel, simply abandoned southern Lebanon. Many of the people there migrated to the suburbs of Beirut which are known as "poverty belts." The young Shi'a migrants, who had not participated in the prosperity of prewar Beirut, joined many Lebanese and some Palestinian organizations. After many years without their own independent political organizations, there suddenly arose Musa Sadr's Amal Movement in 1974-75. The Amal movement was created to expel foreign forces from Lebanese land, solely the PLO at the time. Its Islamist ideology immediately attracted the unrepresented people, and Amal's armed ranks grew rapidly. Amal fought against the PLO in the early days. Later, in the early 1980s, Amal proved to be a strong militia in the face of the Israelis. Amal fighters had delivered the first attack against their Israeli occupiers and succeeded. The Lebanese Shi'a soon proved that the Israelis were not as invincible as everyone thought. Later a hard line faction would break away to join with Shi'a groups fighting Israel to form the organization Hezbollah also known as the National Resistance, who to this day remain the most powerful militia of Lebanon after the Lebanese Forces (A Christian Militia) also known as LF. Hezbollah was created as a faction split from Amal Movement, and an Islamist organization which deemed Amal to be too secular. Hezbollah original aims included to the establishment of an Islamic state ruled by cleric in Lebanon, inspired and funded by the Iranians.

There was great support by Iran during the Lebanese Civil War for shi'ite factions, Amal Movement and Hezbollah. Hezbollah and it's leaders were inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution and therefore in 1982 emerged as a faction set on resisting the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, and its forces were trained and organized by a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Support was greatly met by both military training and funding support.

The Lebanese Alawites, followers of a sect of Shia Islam, were represented by the Red Knights Militia of the Arab Democratic Party, which was pro-Syrian due to the Alawites being dominant in Syria, and mainly acted in Northern Lebanon around Tripoli.

Sunni militias

Some Sunni factions received support from Libya and Iraq, and a number of minor militias existed, the more prominent with Nasserist or otherwise pan-Arab and Arab nationalist leanings, but also a few Islamist ones, such as the Tawhid Movement. The main Sunni-led organization was the al-Murabitun a major west-Beirut based force.

Al Mourabitoun were lead by Ibrahim Qulaylat, now exiled in Paris, who emerged during the 1975 outbreak of civil war leading a rag-tag bunch of Sunni gangs, members of which understood little of Nasserist ideology but expressed sectarian prejudice especially against the Christians of Lebanon. When Nasser died in 1970, Qulaylat swapped allegiance for Libya, who offered to be the Mourabitoun’s next pay master (Johnson 1986 179). Al Mourabitoun was a Fatah trained militia which took part in the massacre against the Christian town of the Damour with PLO forces. Besides receiving training from Fatah, the PLO also provided the Mourabitoun with material support (Johnson 1986 199-200 &212).

Druze Progressive Socialist Party

The Progressive Socialist Party (or PSP) (Arabic: الحزب التقدمي الاشتراكي‎, al-hizb al-taqadummi al-ishtiraki)

The small Druze sect, strategically seated on the Chouf in central Lebanon, was the foremost ally of the Palestinian guerillas. Under the leadership of the Jumblatt family, first Kamal Jumblatt (the LNM leader) and then his son Walid, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) served as a Druze militia, building ties to the Soviet Union mainly, and with Syria upon the withdrawal of Israel to the south of the country. However Jumblatt's brand of socialism has often been referred to as "quixotic" at best (Gendzier 1997 163) refusing to submit . However, many Druze in Lebanon at the time were members of the non-religious party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Under Kamal Jumblatt's leadership, the PSP was a major element in the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) which supported the notion that Lebanon should have an Arab identity, usually a euphemism for an Islamic state. The PSP occupied some areas of Mount Lebanon and the Chouf District, expelling the Christian inhabitants who until today are not permitted to return by the PSP forces to their homes. Its main adversaries were the Maronite Christian Phalangist militia, and later the Lebanese Forces militia (which absorbed the Phalangists). The PSP suffered a major setback in 1977, when Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated. His son Walid succeeded him as leader of the party.

From the Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf in 1983 to the end of the civil war, the PSP ran a an effective civil administration, the Civil Administration of the Mountain, in the area under its control. Tolls levied at PSP militia checkpoints provided a source of income for the administration, which succeeded in providing a high standard of social and public services to its Druze population.

However the PSP took part in several massacres during that war in which Christian civilian villagers were targeted amounting to a campaign of ethnic cleansing (31 August 1983: 36 civilians in Bmarian, 7 September 1983: 200 Christian civilians killed in Bhamdoun, 10 September 1983: 64 in Bireh, 10 September 1983: 30 in Ras el-Matn, 11 September 1983: 15 in Maasser Beit ed-Dine, 11 September 1983: 36 in Chartoun, 13 September 1983: 84 in Maasser el-Chouf, and many others...).

Non-religious groups

Although several Lebanese militias claimed to be secular, most were little more than vehicles for sectarian interests. Still, there existed a number of non-religious groups, primarily but not exclusively of the left and/or Pan-Arab right.

Examples of this was the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the more radical and independent Communist Action Organization (COA). Another notable example was the fascist Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which promoted the concept of Greater Syria, in contrast to Pan-Arab or Lebanese nationalism. The SSNP was generally aligned with the Syrian government , although it did not ideologically approve of Hafez al-Assad's Ba'thist regime, and up to this day, it still opposes the Syrian Government's regime and the Syrian regime that was implemented in Lebanon during the Civil War.

Two competing Baath party factions were also involved in the early stages of the war: a nationalist one known as "pro-Iraqi" headed by Dr. 'Abdul-Majeed Al-Rafei (Sunni) and Nicola Y. Ferzli (Greek Orthodox Christian), and a Marxist one known as "pro-Syrian" headed by Assem Qanso (Shiite).

Palestinians

The Palestinian movement relocated most of its fighting strength to Lebanon at the end of 1970 after being expelled from Jordan in the events known as Black September. The umbrella organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—by itself undoubtedly Lebanon's most potent fighting force at the time—was little more than a loose confederation, but its leader, Yassir Arafat, controlled all factions by buying their loyalties. Arafat allowed little oversight to be exercised over PLO finances an he was the ultimate source for all decisions made in directing financial matters. Rex Brynen provides a detailed account of how this worked. Arafat's control of funds, channeled directly to him by the oil producing countries like Saudi Arabia and by Iraq and Libya meant that he had little real functional opposition to his leadership and although ostensibly rival factions in the PLO existed , this masked a stable loyalty towards Arafat so long as he was able to dispense financial rewards to his followers and members of the PLO guerrilla factions (Sayigh 1997 p454-456).

The PLO mainstream was represented by Arafat's powerful Fatah, which waged guerrilla warfare but did not have a strong core ideology, except the claim to seek the liberation of Palestine. As a result, they gained broad appeal with a refugee population with conservative Islamic values (who resisted secular ideologies). The more ideological factions however included Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and its splinter, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Fatah was actually instrumental in splitting the DF form the PFLP in the early days of the PFLPs formation so as to diminish the appeal and competition the PFLP posed to Fatah. Helen Cobban's history of the PFLP is an interesting source of information covering this event. Lesser roles were played by the fractious Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and another split-off from the PFLP, the Syrian-aligned Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). To complicate things, the Ba'thist systems of Syria and Iraq both set up Palestinian puppet organizations within the PLO. The as-Sa'iqa was a Syrian-controlled militia, paralleled by the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) under Iraqi command. The Syrian government could also count on the Syrian brigades of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), formally but not functionally the PLO's regular army. Some PLA units sent by Egypt were under Arafat's command.

Second phase 1977–1982

Syrian intervention

In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal of the Arab League summit in Riyadh. This gave Syria a mandate to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab Deterrent Force charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm. Other Arab nations were also part of the ADF, but they lost interest relatively soon, and Syria was again left in sole control, now with the ADF as a diplomatic shield against international criticism. The Civil War was officially ended at this point, and an uneasy quiet settled over Beirut and most of the rest of Lebanon. In the south, however, the climate began to deteriorate as a consequence of the gradual return of PLO combatants, who had been required to vacate central Lebanon under the terms of the Riyadh Accords.

After a short break in the fighting in 1976 due to Arab League mediation and Syrian intervention, Palestinian–Lebanese strife continued, with fighting primarily focused in south Lebanon, which had been occupied by the PLO since 1969, in contravention of the Cairo accords signed with the Lebanese government.

In March of 1977, Lebanese National Movement leader Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated. The murder was widely blamed on the Syrian government. While Jumblatt's role as leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party was filled by his son, Walid Jumblatt, the LNM disintegrated after his death.

During the course of the fighting, alliances shifted rapidly and unpredictably: by the end of the war, nearly every party had allied with and subsequently betrayed every other party at least once. The 1980s were especially bleak: much of Beirut lay in ruins as a result of the 1976 Karantina war carried out by the Lebanese Front, the Syrian Army shelling of Christian neighborhoods in 1978 and 1981, and the Israeli invasion that evicted the PLO from the country.

Israel intervenes in South Lebanon, 1978

Operation Litani

PLO attacks from Lebanon into Israel in 1977 and 1978 escalated tensions between the countries. On 11 March 1978, eleven Fatah fighters landed on a beach in northern Israel and proceeded to hijack two buses full of passengers on the Haifa - Tel-Aviv road, shooting at passing vehicles. They killed 37 and wounded 76 Israelis before being killed in the firefight with the Israeli forces. Israel invaded Lebanon four days later in Operation Litani. The Israeli Army occupied most of the area south of the Litani River The UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace.

Security Zone

Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, but retained control of the southern region by managing a 12-mile (19 km) wide "security zone" along the border. To hold these positions, Israel installed the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian-Shi'a proxy militia under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad. Israel supplied the SLA with arms and resources, and posted "advisers" to strengthen and direct the militia. The Israeli Prime Minister, Likud's Menachem Begin, compared the plight of the Christian minority in southern Lebanon to that of European Jews during World War II.

Violent exchanges resumed between the PLO, Israel, and the SLA, with the PLO attacking SLA positions and firing rockets into northern Israel, Israel conducting air raids against PLO positions, and the SLA continuing its efforts to consolidate power in the border region.

Conflicts between Syria and the Phalange

Syria, meanwhile, clashed with the Phalange, a Maronite militia led by Bachir Gemayel, whose increasingly aggressive actions - such as his April 1981 attempt to capture the strategic city of Zahlé in central Lebanon - were designed to thwart the Syrian goal of brushing aside Gemayel and installing Suleiman Frangieh as president. Consequently, the de facto alliance between Israel and Gemayel strengthened considerably. In April 1981, for instance, during fighting in Zahle, Gemayel called for Israeli assistance. Israeli Prime Minister Begin responded by sending Israeli fighter jets to the scene, which shot down two Syrian helicopters. This led to Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad's decision to place surface-to-air missiles on the hilly perimeter of Zahle.

Israeli bombing of Beirut

On 17 July 1981, Israeli aircraft bombed multi-story apartment buildings in Beirut that contained offices of PLO associated groups. The Lebanese delegate to the United Nations Security Council reported that 300 civilians had been killed, and 800 wounded. The bombing led to worldwide condemnation, and a temporary embargo on the export of U.S. aircraft to Israel.

Israel plans for attack

In August, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was re-elected, and in September, Begin and his defense minister Ariel Sharon began to lay plans for a second invasion of Lebanon for the purpose of driving out the PLO. Sharon's intention was to "destroy the PLO military infrastructure and, if possible, the PLO leadership itself; this would mean attacking West Beirut, where the PLO headquarters and command bunkers were located".

Sharon also wanted to ensure the presidency of Bashir Gemayel. In return for Israeli assistance, Sharon expected Gemayel, once installed as president, to sign a peace treaty with Israel, presumably stabilizing forever Israel's northern border. Begin brought Sharon's plan before the Knesset in December 1981; however, after strong objections were raised, Begin felt compelled to set the plan aside. But Sharon continued to press the issue. In January 1982, Sharon met with Gemayel on an Israeli vessel off the coast of Lebanon and discussed a plan "that would bring Israeli forces as far north as the edge of Beirut International Airport". In February, with Begin's input, Yehoshua Seguy, the chief of military intelligence, was sent to Washington to discuss the issue of Lebanon with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. In the meeting, Haig "stressed that there could be no assault without a major provocation from Lebanon".

Israel-PLO security situation

The PLO routinely attacked Israel during the period of the cease-fire, with over 270 documented attacks. People in Galilee regularly had to leave their homes during these shellings. Documents captured in PLO headquarters after the invasion showed they had come from Lebanon.

Third phase 1982–1983

Israeli invasion of Lebanon

Argov assassination

On 3 June 1982, the Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. Abu Nidal had assassinated numerous PLO diplomats, and attempted to kill both Arafat and Mahmud Abbas, and was in fact condemned to death by the PLO. Additionally, British intelligence reported that the attempt had likely been sponsored by Iraq, and Israeli intelligence agreed. However, Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin ordered a retaliatory aerial attack on PLO and PFLP targets in West Beirut that led to over 100 casualties.

The PLO responded by launching a counterattack from Lebanon, without consulting its government, with rockets and artillery, which also constituted a clear violation of the cease-fire. This was the immediate excuse of Israel's subsequent decision to invade. Meanwhile, on 5 June, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 508 calling for "all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982."

Israel invades

Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee on 6 June 1982, attacking PLO bases in Lebanon. Israeli forces quickly drove 25 miles (40 km) into Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the tacit support of Maronite leaders and militia. When the Israeli cabinet convened to authorize the invasion, Sharon described it as a plan to advance 40 kilometers into Lebanon, demolish PLO strongholds, and establish an expanded security zone that would put northern Israel out of range of PLO rockets. In fact, Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan and Sharon had already ordered the invading forces to head straight for Beirut, in accord with Sharon's blueprint dating to September 1981. After the invasion had begun, the UN Security Council passed a further resolution on 6 June 1982, Resolution 509, which reaffirms UNSCR 508 and "demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon". Thus far the US had not used its veto. However, on 8 June 1982, the US vetoed a proposed resolution that "reiterates demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon", thereby giving implicit assent to the Israeli invasion.

Siege of Beirut

By 15 June 1982, Israeli units were entrenched outside Beirut. The United States called for PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, and Sharon began to order bombing raids of West Beirut, targeting some 16,000 PLO fedayeen who had retreated into fortified positions. Meanwhile, Arafat attempted through negotiations to salvage politically what was clearly a disaster for the PLO, an attempt which eventually succeeded once the multinational force arrived to evacuate the PLO.

The fighting in Beirut killed more than 6,700 people of whom the vast majority were civilians. Combatants killed included 500 PLO, more than 400 Lebanese, over 100 Syrians and 88 Israelis. Fierce artillery duels between the IDF and the PLO, and PLO shelling of Christian neighborhoods of East Beirut at the outset gave way to escalating aerial IDF bombardment beginning on 21 July 1982. It is commonly estimated that during the entire campaign, approximately 20,000 were killed on all sides, including many civilians, and 30,000 were wounded.

Negotiations for a cease-fire

On 26 June, a UN Security Council resolution was proposed that "demands the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a distance of 10 kilometers from the periphery of that city, as a first step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps"; the United States vetoed the resolution because it was "a transparent attempt to preserve the PLO as a viable political force", However, President Regean made an impassioned plea to Prime Minister Begin to end the siege. Begin called back within minutes informing the President that he had given the order to end the attack. </ref> http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Ronald_Reagan_War_+_Peace.htm </ref>

Finally, amid escalating violence and civilian casualties, Philip Habib was once again sent to restore order, which he accomplished on 12 August on the heels of IDF's intensive, day-long bombardment of West Beirut. The Habib-negotiated truce called for the withdrawal of both Israeli and PLO elements, as well as a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units that would ensure the departure of the PLO and protect defenseless civilians.

International intervention

A multinational force landed in Beirut on 20 August 1982 to oversee the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon and U.S. mediation resulted in the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French, Italian and British units. However, Israel reported that some 2,000 PLO militants were hiding in Palestinian refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut.

Bachir Gemayel was elected president under Israeli military control on 23 August. Many, especially in the Muslim circles, feared his relationship with Israel. He was assassinated on 14 September.

Sabra and Shatila Massacre

After conferring with Phalange members (as 19 of the Phalange leaders had been killed with Gemayel), Sharon and Eitan bypassed the Israeli cabinet and sent Israeli troops into West Beirut, violating the Habib agreement; these troops helped transport approximately 200 Phalange personnel to the camps. On 16 September at 6:00 P.M. the forces arrived at the broad Sabra slum which surrounded the tightly packed Palestinians camp. The Phalangists remained in the slum until the morning of 19 September, killing an estimated 700-3,000 people, most of whom were poor Lebanese and Syrian slum squatters. The forces could not penetrate the tightly packed camp of Shatila, which still housed many combatants that fired back. Merip reporters who have interviewed some of the attacking soldiers found that these soldiers were victims of the Damour massacre, having lost their families to the attacking PLO forces.

The Kahan Commission was set up by the Israeli government to investigate the circumstances of the massacre. The Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, was found to bear personal responsibility "for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge" and "not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed". Sharon's negligence in protecting the civilian population of Beirut, which had come under Israeli control amounted to a non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defence Minister was charged. The Commission arrived to similar conclusions with respect to Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan, finding his actions were tantamount to a breach of duty that was incumbent upon the Chief of Staff. The Commission recommended that Sharon resign his post as Defense Minister, which he did, though he remained in the government as an influential Minister without Portfolio.

The massacres made the headlines all over the world, and calls were heard for the international community to assume responsibility for stabilizing Lebanon. As a result, the multinational forces that had begun exiting Lebanon after the PLO's evacuation returned as peace keepers. With U.S. backing, Amine Gemayel was chosen by the Lebanese parliament to succeed his brother as President and focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces.

17 May Agreement

On 17 May 1983, Lebanon's Amine Gemayel, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement text on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops; reportedly after the US and Israel exerted severe pressure on Gemayel. The agreement stated that "the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists." Thus, the agreement in effect amounted to a peace agreement with Israel, and was additionally seen by many Lebanese Muslims as an attempt for Israel to gain a permanent hold on the Lebanese South. The 17 May Agreement was widely portrayed in the Arab world as an imposed surrender, and Amin Gemayel was accused of acting as a Quisling President; tensions in Lebanon hardened considerably. Syria strongly opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress.

In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Chouf District (southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting. By September, the Druze had gained control over most of the Chouf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone. The IDF would remain in this zone until 2000.

Resurging violence

The virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984, following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias, was a major blow to the government. With the U.S. Marines looking ready to withdraw, Syria and Muslim groups stepped up pressure on Gemayel. On 5 March the Lebanese Government canceled the 17 May Agreement, and the Marines departed a few weeks later.

This period of chaos witnessed the beginning of attacks against U.S. and Western interests, such as the 18 April 1983 suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut, which killed 63. Following the bombing, the Reagan White House "ordered naval bombardments of Druze positions, which resulted in numerous casualties, mostly non-combatant," and the "reply to the American bombardments" was the suicide attack. Then, on 23 October 1983, a devastating suicide bombing in Beirut targeted the headquarters of the U.S. and French forces, killing 241 American and 58 French servicemen. On 18 January 1984, American University of Beirut President Malcolm Kerr was murdered. After US forces withdrew in February 1984, anti-US attacks continued, including a second bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut on 20 September 1984, which killed 9, including 2 U.S. servicemen. The situation became serious enough to compel the U.S. State Department to invalidate US passports for travel to Lebanon in 1987, a travel ban that was only lifted 10 years later in 1997.

During these years, Hezbollah emerged from a loose coalition of Shi'a groups resisting the Israeli occupation, and splintered from the main Shi'a movement, Nabih Berri's Amal Movement. The group found inspiration for its revolutionary Islamism in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and gained early support from about 1,500 Iranian Pasdaran Guards. With Iranian assistance, and a large pool of disaffected Shi'a refugees from which to draw support, Hezbollah quickly grew into a strong fighting force.

Fourth phase 1984–1990

Worsening conflict and political crisis

Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Heavy fighting took place in the War of the Camps of 1985-86 as a Syrian-backed coalition headed by the Amal militia sought to rout the PLO from their Lebanese strongholds. Many Palestinians died, and the Sabra, Shatila, and Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camps were largely destroyed. (Fisk, 609)

Major combat returned to Beirut in 1987, when Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hezbollah. Hezbollah swiftly seized command of several Amal-held parts of the city, and for the first time emerged as a strong force in the capital.

Aoun government

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on 1 June 1987. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Conflict in this period was also exacerbated by increasing Iraqi involvement, as Saddam Hussein searched for proxy battlefields for the Iran–Iraq War. To counter Iran's influence through Amal and Hezbollah, Iraq backed Christian groups; Saddam Hussein helped Aoun and the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea between 1988-1990.

Muslim groups rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian military government in East Beirut and a civilian government in West Beirut.

Aoun's "War of Liberation"

On 14 March 1989, Aoun launched what he termed a "war of liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. As a result, Syrian pressure on his Lebanese Army and militia pockets in East Beirut grew. Still, Aoun persisted in the "war of liberation", denouncing the regime of Hafez al-Assad and claiming that he fought for Lebanon's independence. While he seems to have had significant Christian support for this, he was still perceived as a sectarian leader among others by the Muslim population, who distrusted his agenda. He was also plagued by the challenge to his legitimacy put forth by the Syrian-backed West Beirut government of Selim al-Hoss. Militarily, this war did not achieve its goal. Instead, it caused considerable damages to East Beirut and provoked massive emigration among the Christian population.

Taif Agreement

The Taif Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The agreement provided a large role for Syria in Lebanese affairs. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on 4 November and elected Rene Mouawad as President the following day. Military leader Michel Aoun in East Beirut refused to accept Mouawad, and denounced the Taif Agreement.

Mouawad was assassinated 16 days later in a car bombing in Beirut on 22 November as his motorcade returned from Lebanese independence day ceremonies. He was succeeded by Elias Hrawi (who remained in office until 1998). Aoun again refused to accept the election, and dissolved Parliament.

Infighting in East Beirut

On 16 January 1990, General Aoun ordered all Lebanese media to cease using terms like "President" or "Minister" to describe Hrawi and other participants in the Taif government. The Lebanese Forces, which had grown into a rival power broker in the Christian parts of the capital, protested by suspending all its broadcasts. Tension with the LF grew, as Aoun feared that the LF was planning to link up with the Hrawi administration.

On 31 January 1990, LF forces, fearing Aoun's growing popularity, attacked Lebanese army positions all along the northern Christian parts of Lebanon and took over most of the area. At that point, the LF's popularity among the Christian sect dropped drastically due to its attack on their army and its alliance with Syria becoming clearer. This also brought fierce fighting to East Beirut, and the LF made initial advances, in the second intra-Christian war.

In August 1990, the Lebanese Parliament, which, didn't heed Aoun's order to dissolve, and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Taif. The National Assembly expanded to 128 seats and was for the first time divided equally between Christians and Muslims.

As Saddam Hussein focused his attention on Kuwait, Iraqi supplies to Aoun dwindled.

On 13 October, Syria launched the 13 October attack, a major operation involving its army, air force (for the first time since Zahle's siege in 1981) against Aoun's stronghold around the presidential palace, taking advantage of the internal Christian war between Aoun and the LF, where hundreds of Aoun supporters were killed by Syrian troops. It then cleared out the last Aounist pockets. Aoun went to the French Embassy to negotiated a cease-fire with the Syrians and all militias from West Beirut. However some say the cease-fire negotiations turned out to be a scam in order to remove Aoun away from the Presidential palace and command center. Later on, he announced over the radio that the war is over and stayed in Beirut until a safe exit to Paris was available because of the Syrian political agenda of eliminating Aoun.

William Harris claims that the Syrian operation could not take place until Syria had reached an agreement with the United States, that in exchange for support against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War, it would convince Israel not to attack Syrian aircraft approaching Beirut. Aoun claimed in 1990 that the United States "has sold Lebanon to Syria".

The war in Lebanon and the fighting in East Beirut is a main theme in Rahbi Almedene's novel Kooliaids; the Art of War.

End

In March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. The amnesty was not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.

Some violence still occurred. In late December 1991 a car bomb (estimated to carry 220 pounds of TNT) exploded in the Muslim neighborhood of Basta. At least thirty people were killed, and 120 wounded, including former Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan, who was riding in a bulletproof car.

Legacy

Since the end of the war, the Lebanese have conducted several elections, most of the militias have been weakened or disbanded, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. Following the cease-fire which ended the 12 July 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, the army has for the first time in over three decades moved to occupy and control the southern areas of Lebanon. Only Hezbollah retains its weapons, due to what it claims is legitimate resistance against Israel in the Shebaa farms area.

Lebanon still bears deep scars from the civil war. In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed, and another 100,000 permanently handicapped by injuries. Approximately 900,000 people, representing one-fifth of the pre-war population, were displaced from their homes. Perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently. Thousands of land mines remain buried in the previously contested areas. Some Western hostages kidnapped during the mid-1980s (many claim by Hezbollah, though the movement denies this) were held until June 1992. Lebanese victims of kidnapping and wartime "disappeared" number in the tens of thousands.

Car bombs became a favored weapon of violent groups worldwide, following their frequent, and often effective, use during the war. In the 15 years of strife, there were at least 3,641 car bombs, which left 4,386 people dead and thousands more injured. Other favorite weapons were the AK-47 and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

References

1. Bregman and El-Tahri (1998), 158pp. (This reference only mentions Israel.)
2. "133 Statement to the press by Prime Minister Begin on the massacre of Israelis on the Haifa - Tel Aviv Road- 12 March 1978", Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977-79
3. Smith, op. cit., 355.
4. Smith, op. cit., p. 373.
5. "The Bombing of Beirut". Journal of Palestine Studies. 11 (1): 218–225. 1981. doi:10.1525/jps.1981.11.1.00p0366x.
6. Smith, op. cit., p. 377.
7. Time, 15 February 1982, cited in Chomsky, op. cit., 195.
8. ^ Smith, op. cit., p. 378.
9. Jillian Becker, The PLO, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), pp. 202, 279.
10. Chomsky, op. cit., p. 196.
11. "United Nations Security Council Resolution 508", Jewish Virtual Library
12. "United Nations Security Council Resolution 509", Global Policy Forum
13. "United Nations Security Council Draft Resolution of 8 June 1982 (Spain), United Nations
14. George W. Gawrych, "Siege of Beirut, GlobalSecurity.org
15. "United Nations Security Council Revised Draft Resolution of 25 June 1982 (France), United Nations
16. New York Times, 27 June 1982, cited in Chomsky, op. cit., p. 198
17. Schiff, Ze'ev (1984). Israel's Lebanon War. Simon and Schuster. p. 284. ISBN 0-671-47991-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
18. Chomsky, op. cit., 406.
19. "17 May Agreement", Lebanese Armed Forces
20. "Israel and South Lebanon", Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 5 March 1984, Page 3
21. Smith, op. cit., 383.
22. "Iran responsible for 1983 Marine barracks bombing, judge rules", CNN, 30 May 2003
23. "Doctrine, Dreams Drive Saddam Hussein", Washington Post, 12 August 1990
24. Harris, p. 260
25. "Lebanon (Civil War 1975-1991)", GlobalSecurity.org
26. "Lebanon: The Terrible Tally of Death". Time. 23 March 1992. Retrieved 7 May 2010.

Further reading

• Al-Baath wa-Lubnân ("The Baath and Lebanon"), NY Firzli, Beirut, Dar-al-Tali'a Books, 1973.
• The Iraq-Iran Conflict, NY Firzli, Paris, EMA, 1981. ISBN 2-86584-002-6
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2
• Bregman, Ahron and El-Tahri, Jihan (1998). The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs. London: BBC Books. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-026827-8
• The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 Khazen Farid El (2000) (ISBN 0-674-08105-6)
• The Bullet Collection, a book by Patricia Sarrafian Ward, is an excellent account of human experience during the Lebanese Civil War.
• Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 O'Ballance Edgar (1998) (ISBN 0-312-21593-2)
• Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 Salibi Kamal S. (1976) (ISBN 0-88206-010-4)
• Death of a country: The civil war in Lebanon. Bulloch John (1977) (ISBN 0-297-77288-0)
• Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton Series on the Middle East) Harris William W (1997) (ISBN 1-55876-115-2)
• The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians Noam Chomsky (1983, 1999) (ISBN 0-89608-601-1)
• History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine, Vol. 2 Hitti Philip K. (2002) (ISBN 1-931956-61-8)
• Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, Revised Edition Picard, Elizabeth (2002) (ISBN 0-8419-1415-X)
• Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) Haley P. Edward, Snider Lewis W. (1979) (ISBN 0-8156-2210-4)
• Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War by Hiro, Dilip (1993) (ISBN 0-312-09724-7)
• Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War Fisk, Robert (2001) (ISBN 0-19-280130-9)
• Syria and the Lebanese Crisis Dawisha A. I. (1980) (ISBN 0-312-78203-9)
• Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process Deeb Marius (2003) (ISBN 1-4039-6248-0)
• The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 Rabinovich Itamar (1985) (ISBN 0-8014-9313-7)
• Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, fourth edition, Charles D. Smith (2001) (ISBN 0-312-20828-6) (paperback)
• From Beirut to Jerusalem. Thomas Friedman.

External links

This article's use of external links may not follow Misplaced Pages's policies or guidelines. Please improve this article by removing excessive or inappropriate external links, and converting useful links where appropriate into footnote references. (August 2010) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

• Center for Lebanese Study-Oxford University
• A detailed chronology on the Lebanese War-Cederland
• Lebanon's Forgotten Civil War-Washington Post Foreign Service 20 December 1999
• Pictures of Battle Scared Beirut-Travel Adventures.

Primary sources

• Lebanese civil war from 13 April 1975 to 13 October 1990 & War on Lebanon 2006 Full of pictures
• “Another Battle of Beirut ” (Time Magazine, 14 May 1973)
• “The Palestinian Fedayeen” (Declassified CIA Report, 1971)
• The Lebanese civil war and the Taef agreement
• Full Lebanese War Photo System
• A 15-episode documentary about the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

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• Misplaced Pages external links cleanup from August 2010
• Lebanese Civil War
• Civil wars involving the states and peoples of Asia
• Civil wars of the Modern era
• Israel–Lebanon conflict
• Palestine Liberation Organization
• History of Palestine
• Religion-based civil wars
• 20th century in Lebanon