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Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in 1942
Nickname(s)	Wüstenfuchs (Desert Fox)
Born	(1891-11-15)15 November 1891 Heidenheim, Kingdom of Württemberg, Germany
Died	14 October 1944(1944-10-14) (aged 52) Herrlingen, State of Württemberg, Germany
Buried	Cemetery of Herrlingen
Allegiance	German Empire (to 1918)  Weimar Republic (to 1933)  Nazi Germany (to 1944)
Service / branch	Imperial German Army Reichswehr Heer
Years of service	1911–44
Rank	Generalfeldmarschall
Commands	7th Panzer Division Afrika Korps Panzer Army Africa Army Group Africa Army Group B
Battles / wars	See battles World War I First Battle of the Argonne (1915) Masivul Lesului and Oituz Campaigns (1916–1917) Battle of Caporetto (1917) World War II Invasion of Poland Fall of France Battle of Arras (1940) Siege of Lille (1940) North African Campaign Operation Sonnenblume (1941) Siege of Tobruk (1941) Operation Brevity (1941) Operation Battleaxe (1941) Operation Crusader (1941) Battle of Gazala (1942) Battle of Bir Hakeim (1942) First Battle of El Alamein (1942) Battle of Alam Halfa (1942) Second Battle of El Alamein (1942) Battle of El Agheila (1942) Battle of the Kasserine Pass (1943) Battle of Medenine (1943) Battle of Normandy (1944)
Awards	Pour le Mérite Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds Military Merit Cross (Austria-Hungary) Order of Michael the Brave
Spouse(s)	Lucia Maria Mollin ​(m. 1916)​
Relations	Manfred Rommel (1928–2013), son Gertrud Stemmer (1913–2000), daughter
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Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (15 November 1891 – 14 October 1944), popularly known as the Desert Fox (Wüstenfuchs, listen), was a German Generalfeldmarschall (general field marshal) of World War II. He earned the respect of both his own troops and his enemies.

Rommel was a highly decorated officer in World War I and was awarded the Pour le Mérite for his exploits on the Italian Front. In World War II, he further distinguished himself as the commander of the 7th Panzer Division during the 1940 invasion of France. His leadership of German and Italian forces in the North African campaign established him as one of the most able commanders of the war, and earned him the appellation of the Desert Fox. He is regarded as one of the most skilled commanders of desert warfare in the conflict. He later commanded the German forces opposing the Allied cross-channel invasion of Normandy.

Rommel is regarded as having been a humane and professional officer. His Afrika Korps was never accused of war crimes, and Allied soldiers captured during his Africa campaign were reported to have been treated humanely. Orders to kill Jewish soldiers, civilians and captured commandos were ignored. Later in the war, Rommel was indirectly linked to the conspiracy to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Because Rommel was a national hero, Hitler desired to eliminate him quietly. He forced Rommel to commit suicide with a cyanide pill, in return for assurances that Rommel's family would not be persecuted following his death. He was given a state funeral, and it was announced that Rommel had succumbed to his injuries from an earlier strafing of his staff car in Normandy.

Early life and career

Rommel was born on 15 November 1891 in Southern Germany at Heidenheim, 45 kilometres (28 mi) from Ulm, in the Kingdom of Württemberg, then part of the German Empire. He was the second of four children of Erwin Rommel Senior (1860–1913), a teacher and school administrator, and his wife Helene von Lutz, who headed the local government council. As a young man Rommel's father had been a lieutenant in the artillery. Rommel had one older sister and three younger brothers, one of whom died in infancy.

At the age of 14, Rommel and a friend built a full-scale glider and were able to fly it short distances. He later purchased a motorcycle, and upon getting home immediately set about taking it apart and putting it back together. Rommel considered becoming an aeronautical engineer, but at age 18 he acceded to his father's wishes and joined the local 124th Württemberg Infantry Regiment as a Fähnrich (ensign), in 1910, studying at the Officer Cadet School in Danzig. He graduated in November 1911 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912 and was assigned to the 124th Infantry in Weingarten. He was posted to Ulm in March 1914 to command the No.4 Battery, 46th Field Artillery Regiment, XIII (Royal Württemberg) Corps. Until the start of the First World War he trained new recruits and gave refresher courses to reserve officers, and then returned to the 124th when war was declared. While at Cadet School, Rommel met his future wife, 17-year-old Lucia (Lucie) Maria Mollin (1894–1971). They married in November 1916 in Danzig.

World War I

During World War I, Rommel fought in France as well as in the Romanian and Italian Campaigns. He gained success leading small groups of men, using tactics such as infiltrating through enemy lines under cover of darkness, moving forward rapidly to a flanking position to arrive at their rear, and attacking defenders using the element of surprise. Arriving at the front near Verdun on 22 August 1914, Rommel initially commanded a platoon in 2nd Battalion, 124th Regiment. They were assigned to reconnaissance and courier tasks. His first combat experience was on 22 August 1914, when – catching the French garrison unprepared at the village of Bleid – he and three men engaged the enemy without waiting for the rest of their platoon to arrive. Rommel was often ill while on active duty, particularly with stomach troubles and exhaustion, a problem that manifested itself from the beginning of his career. He was appointed Battalion Adjutant in September. The armies continued to skirmish in open engagements throughout September, as the static trench warfare typical of the First World War was still in the future. On 24 September Rommel was shot in the leg when he engaged several French soldiers armed only with his bayonet (he had run out of ammunition). For this action, he was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class.

On his return in January 1915, Rommel was assigned to command 9th Company, 124th Regiment, stationed in the trenches near Argonne. On 29 January, he and his platoon crawled through 100 yards (91 m) of barbed wire to engage the French, who were positioned in blockhouses and earthworks. His company was running low on ammunition and were ordered to retreat. Rommel ordered an attack on one of the blockhouses to keep the enemy from opening fire on the withdrawing men. For his work that day, he was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class.

He continued to soldier in the trenches of France for another nine months, and received a minor shrapnel wound to the leg on 29 June 1915. He was promoted to Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) and transferred to the newly created Königliche Wurttemberg Gebirgsbataillon (Royal Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion) of the Alpenkorps in September. He was commander of 2nd Company, which trained in mountain warfare in Austria until December, when they were posted on a 6-mile (9.7 km) stretch of front in the Vosges mountains of Alsace. They remained there, seeing action in reconnaissance work and raids on enemy positions until October 1916, when they were moved to the Southern Carpathians to fight the Romanians, who had joined the conflict in August. In August 1917, his unit was involved in the battle for Mount Cosna, a heavily fortified objective on the border between Hungary and Romania. They succeeded after nearly two weeks of difficult uphill fighting and were withdrawn to reserve on 25 August. The unit spent six weeks recuperating in Carinthia, and Rommel received leave to return to Danzig to see his wife and recover from a gunshot wound to the arm that he had received in the fight at Mount Cosna.

The Mountain Battalion was next assigned to fight on the Isonzo front, a mountainous area which had been the scene of near-constant fighting since the entry of Italy into the war on the Allied side on 23 May 1915. The offensive known as the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, or the Battle of Caporetto, began on 24 October 1917 with a four-hour artillery barrage. Rommel's Abteilung, consisting of three rifle companies and a machine gun unit, was part of an attempt to take enemy positions on three mountains: Kolovrat, Matajur, and Stol. Beginning at dawn on 25 October, Rommel took advantage of the terrain to outflank the Italians and gain control of the ridge on Kolovrat, taking 1,500 prisoners in the first three hours. Noticing that there was no field of fire on a supply road leading down to the village of Luico (now Livek), Rommel and 150 of his men proceeded down and captured the town, 2 miles (3.2 km) behind enemy lines. Believing the presence of Rommels' group to be proof that their lines had collapsed, a column of Italian light infantry, 2,000 strong, surrendered after a brief firefight. Before dawn on the 26th, Rommel led his Abteilung, now reinforced with two additional machine gun companies, toward Matajur. They took the village of Jevszek without a fight, capturing another 1,600 men. In spite of orders not to attack, they assaulted Matajur from an unexpected direction from behind the Italian lines, arriving at the summit shortly before noon on 27 October. In two and a half days, he and his small contingent of men had captured 81 guns and 9,000 men (including 150 officers), at the loss of six dead and 30 wounded. Acting as advance guard in the capture of Longarone on 9 November, he again decided to attack with a much smaller force. Reinforcements continued to arrive, and fighting continued through the night. Convinced that they were surrounded by an entire German division, the 1st Italian Infantry Division – 10,000 men – surrendered to Rommel at dawn. For this and his work at Matajur, he (and his battalion commander, Major Theodor Sproesser [de]) received the order of Pour le Mérite. After a week on leave in January 1918, Rommel was promoted to Hauptmann (captain) and assigned to a staff position with XLIV Army Corps, where he served for the remainder of the war.

Between the wars

Rommel remained with the 124th Regiment until 1 October 1920, when he was named company commander of the 13th Infantry Regiment in Stuttgart, a post he held with the rank of captain for the next nine years. His regiment was involved in quelling riots and civil disturbances that were occurring throughout Germany at this time. Wherever possible, he avoided the use of force in these confrontations. He was assigned as an instructor at the Dresden Infantry School from 1929 to 1933, and was promoted to major in April 1932. While at Dresden, he wrote Gefechts-Aufgaben für Zug und Kompanie : Ein Handbuch für den Offizierunterricht (Combat tasks for platoon and company: A manual for the officer instruction in infantry training, published in 1934) and his book Infanterie Greift An (Infantry Attacks), a description of his wartime experiences along with his analysis, published in 1937. It became a bestseller; Adolf Hitler was one of many people who owned a copy. During this period he indulged his interest in engineering and mechanics by learning about the inner workings and maintenance of internal combustion engines and heavy machine guns. He memorized logarithm tables in his spare time, and enjoyed skiing and other outdoor sports.

Rommel was promoted to Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) in October 1933 given his next command, the 3rd Jäger Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, stationed at Goslar. Here he first met Hitler, who inspected his troops on 30 September 1934. On this occasion the SS major in charge of Hitler's bodyguard tried to place a row of his men in front of Rommel's men, ostensibly to protect the Führer. Insulted, Rommel refused to turn out his battalion. The S.S. were ordered to stand down.

In September 1935 Rommel was moved to the War Academy at Potsdam as an instructor, a post he held for the next three years. Hearing of Rommel's reputation as an outstanding military instructor, in February 1937 Hitler assigned him as the War Ministry liaison officer to the Hitler Youth, in charge of military training. Here he clashed with Baldur von Schirach, the Hitler Youth leader, over the amount of military training that the boys should receive. Accounts differ: Rommel himself said that he wished to concentrate on basic education and minimize the military aspects, while von Schirach's version was that Rommel wished to focus on nothing else. Rommel left the programme in 1938.

In 1938 Rommel, who had been promoted to Oberst (colonel) on 1 August 1937, was appointed commandant of the Theresian Military Academy War Academy at Wiener Neustadt. In October 1938 Hitler specially requested that Rommel be seconded to command the Führerbegleitbrigade (his escort battalion) for his entry into Prague during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. This unit accompanied him whenever he traveled outside of Germany. While Rommel developed an admiration for Hitler, he never joined the Nazi Party. He refused to permit his son to join the SS.

World War II

Poland 1939

Rommel was promoted to Generalmajor on 23 August 1939 and assigned as commander of the Führerbegleitbrigade, tasked with guarding Hitler and his field headquarters during the invasion of Poland, which began on 1 September. The invasion is considered as the starting point of the Second World War. Hitler took a personal interest in the campaign, often moving close to the front in the Führersonderzug (headquarters train). Rommel attended Hitler's daily war briefings and accompanied him everywhere, making use of the opportunity to observe first-hand the use of tanks and other motorized units. On 26 September Rommel returned to Berlin to set up a new headquarters for his unit in the Reich Chancellery, and returned briefly to Warsaw on 5 October for the German victory parade in that city.

France 1940

Panzer commander

Following the campaign in Poland, Rommel made it known that charge of a guard detail was not the best use of his services and began lobbying for command of one of Germany's panzer divisions, of which there were then only ten. Rommel's successes in World War I were based on surprise and maneuver, two elements for which the new panzer units were ideally suited. With Hitler's support and in spite of his lack of experience commanding mechanized units, Rommel was given command of 7th Panzer Division on 10 February 1940. The unit had been recently converted to a fully armoured division consisting of 218 tanks in three battalions, with two rifle regiments, a motorcycle battalion, an engineer battalion, and an anti-tank battalion. Upon taking command he quickly set his unit to practicing the maneuvers they would need in the upcoming campaign.

Invasion of France and Belgium

The plan for the invasion of France, called the Manstein Plan after its author, Generalleutnant (lieutenant general) Erich von Manstein, called first for an invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands by Army Group B, led by Generaloberst Fedor von Bock. Then, in a surprise move later described as the Sichelschnitt (sickle cut), Army Group A, commanded by Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt, would move through the Ardennes forest and drive for the English Channel, thus cutting off the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and a large part of the French Army, trapping them along the coast. The 7th Panzer Division was assigned a position on Army Group A's right flank, as part of the armoured thrust of the Sichelschnitt. Rommel quickly proved adept at applying the techniques of Blitzkrieg style warfare. The invasion began on 10 May 1940, and by the third day Rommel, along with three panzer divisions commanded by Generalleutnant Heinz Guderian, had reached the River Meuse, where they found the bridges had already been blown up. Rommel brought up tanks and flak units to provide suppressive counter-fire. With no smoke units available, he improvised by having nearby houses set on fire to create smoke. He sent infantry across in rubber boats, appropriated the bridging tackle of the 5th Panzer Division, and went into the water himself, encouraging the sappers and helping lash together the pontoons. Once the bridge was functional, he was in the second tank across. By 16 May Rommel had reached his assigned objective at Avesnes, where the original plan called for him to stop and await further orders. But Rommel pressed on.

Battle of Arras

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was astonished to learn on 17 May that the French had committed all their troops to the ongoing engagements and had no strategic reserves. On 19 May, Lord Gort, commander of the BEF, saw that evacuation across the Channel was the best course of action, and began planning a withdrawal to Dunkirk.

On 20 May Rommel reached Arras. General Hermann Hoth received orders that the town should be bypassed and its British garrison thus isolated. He ordered the 5th Panzer Division to move to the west and 7th Panzer Division to the east, flanked by the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf. The following day the British launched a counterattack, meeting the SS Totenkopf with two infantry battalions supported by heavily armoured Matilda Mk I and Matilda II tanks in the Battle of Arras. The German 37 mm anti-tank gun proved ineffective against the heavily-armoured Matildas. The 25th Panzer Regiment and a battery of 88mm anti-aircraft guns were called in to support, and the British withdrew.

On 24 May, Hitler issued a halt order. The reason for this decision is still a matter of debate. He may have overestimated the size of the British forces in the area, or he may have wished to reserve the bulk of the armour for the drive on Paris. The halt order was lifted on 26 May. 7th Panzer continued its advance, reaching Lille on 27 May. For the assault, Hoth placed the 5th Panzer Division under Rommel's command. The Siege of Lille continued until 31 May, when the French garrison of 40,000 men surrendered. 7th Panzer was given six days leave, during which Rommel was summoned to Berlin to meet with Hitler. He was the only divisional commander present at the planning session for Fall Rot (Case Red), the second phase of the conquest of France. By this time the evacuation of the BEF was complete; over 338,000 Allied troops had been evacuated across the Channel, though they had to leave behind all their heavy equipment and vehicles.

Drive for the Channel

Rommel, resuming his advance on 5 June, drove for the River Seine to secure the bridges near Rouen. Advancing 100 kilometres (62 mi) in two days, the division reached Rouen only to find the bridges destroyed. On 10 June, Rommel reached the coast near Dieppe, sending Hoth the laconic message "Am at coast". On 17 June, 7th Panzer was ordered to advance on Cherbourg, where additional British evacuations were underway. The Division advanced 240 kilometres (150 mi) in 24 hours, and after two days of shelling, the French garrison surrendered on 19 June. The speed and surprise it was consistently able to achieve, to the point where both the enemy and the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH; German High Command) at times lost track of its whereabouts, earned the 7th Panzers the nickname Gespensterdivision (Ghost Division).

After the armistice with the French was signed on 22 June, the division was placed in reserve, being sent first to the Somme and then to Bordeaux to re-equip and prepare for Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), the planned invasion of Britain. This invasion was later cancelled as Germany was not able to acquire the air superiority deemed a necessity for a successful outcome.

North Africa 1941–43

On 6 February 1941, Rommel was appointed commander of the newly created Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK), consisting of the 5th Light Division (later redesignated 21st Panzer Division) and of the 15th Panzer Division. He was promoted to the rank of Generalleutnant three days later and flew to Tripoli on 12 February. The DAK had been sent to Libya in Operation Sonnenblume, to support Italian troops that had been severely defeated by British Commonwealth forces in Operation Compass. His efforts in the Western Desert Campaign earned Rommel the nickname the "Desert Fox" from British journalists. Allied troops in Africa were commanded by General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command.

First Axis offensive

Rommel and his troops were technically subordinate to Italian commander-in-chief General Italo Gariboldi. Disagreeing with the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)'s orders to assume a defensive posture along the front line at Sirte, Rommel resorted to subterfuge and insubordination to take the war to the British. He took advantage of his connections with Hitler to obtain approval to launch a limited offensive on 24 March with 5th Light Division, supported by two Italian divisions. This thrust was not anticipated by the British, who had Ultra intelligence showing that Rommel had orders to remain on the defense until at least May, when the 15th Panzers were due to arrive.

The British Western Desert Force had meanwhile been weakened by the transfer in mid-February of three divisions to help defend Greece. They fell back to Mersa El Brega and started constructing defensive works. Rommel continued his attack against these positions to prevent the British from building up their fortifications. After a day of fierce fighting on 31 March, the Germans captured Mersa El Brega. Splitting his force into three groups, Rommel resumed the advance on 3 April. Benghazi fell that night as the British pulled out of the city. Gariboldi, who had ordered Rommel to stay in Mersa El Brega, was furious. Rommel was equally forceful in his response, telling Gariboldi: "One cannot permit unique opportunities to slip by for the sake of trifles." At that point a signal arrived from General Franz Halder reminding Rommel that he was to halt in Mersa El Brega. Knowing Gariboldi could not speak German, Rommel told him the message gave him complete freedom of action. Gariboldi backed down.

On 4 April Rommel was advised by his supply officers that fuel was running short, which could result in a delay of up to four days. The problem was ultimately Rommel's fault, as he had not advised his supply officers of his intentions, and no fuel dumps had been set up. Rommel ordered the 5th Light Division to unload all their lorries and return to El Agheila to collect fuel and ammunition. Driving through the night, they were able to reduce the halt to a single day. Fuel supply was problematic throughout the campaign, as no petrol was available locally; it had to be brought from Europe via tanker and then carried by road to where it was needed. Food and fresh water were also in short supply, and it was difficult to move tanks and other equipment off-road through the sand. In spite of these problems, Cyrenaica was captured by 8 April, except for the port city of Tobruk, which was surrounded on the landward sides on 11 April.

Siege of Tobruk

The siege of Tobruk was not technically a siege, as the defenders were still able to move supplies and reinforcements into the city via the port. Rommel knew that by capturing the port he could greatly reduce the length of his supply lines and increase his overall port capacity, which was insufficient even for day-to-day operations and only half that needed for offensive operations. The city, which had been heavily fortified by the Italians during their 30-year occupation, was garrisoned by the 18th Infantry Brigade of the Australian 7th Division, the Australian 9th Division, HQ 3rd Armoured Brigade, several thousand British infantrymen, and one regiment of Indian infantry, for a total of 36,000 men. The commanding officer was Australian Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead. Hoping to catch the defenders off-guard, Rommel launched a failed attack on 14 April.

Rommel requested reinforcements, but the OKW, then completing preparations for Operation Barbarossa, refused. General Friedrich Paulus, head of the Operations Branch of OKH, arrived on 25 April to review the situation. He was present for a second failed attack on the city on 30 April. On 4 May Paulus ordered that no further attempts should be made to take Tobruk via a direct assault. This order was not open to interpretation, and Rommel had no choice but to comply. Aware of this order from intelligence reports, Churchill urged Wavell to seize the initiative. While awaiting further reinforcements and a shipment of 300 tanks that were already on their way, Wavell launched a limited offensive code named Operation Brevity on 15 May. The British briefly seized Sollum, Fort Capuzzo, and the important Halfaya Pass, a bottleneck along the coast near the border between Libya and Egypt. Rommel soon forced them to withdraw. On 15 June Wavell launched Operation Battleaxe. The attack was defeated in a four-day battle at Sollum and Halfaya Pass, resulting in the loss of 98 British tanks. The Germans lost 12 tanks, while capturing and putting into service over 20 British tanks. The defeat resulted in Churchill replacing Wavell with General Claude Auchinleck as theatre commander. Rommel appointed Heinrich Kirchheim as commander of 5th Light Division on 16 May, became displeased and replaced him with Johann von Ravenstein on 30 May 1941.

In August, Rommel was appointed commander of the newly created Panzer Group Africa, with Fritz Bayerlein as his chief of staff. The Afrika Korps, comprising the 15th Panzer Division and the 5th Light Division, now reinforced and redesignated 21st Panzer Division, was put under command of Generalleutnant Ludwig Crüwell. In addition to the Afrika Korps, Rommel's Panzer Group had the 90th Light Division and four Italian divisions, three infantry divisions investing Tobruk, and one holding Bardia. The two Italian armoured divisions, Ariete and Trieste, were still under Italian control. They formed the Italian XX Motorized Corps under the command of General Gastone Gambara. Two months later Hitler decided he must have German officers in better control of the Mediterranean theatre, and appointed Field Marshal Albert Kesselring as Commander in Chief, South. Kesselring was ordered to get control of the air and sea between Africa and Italy.

Operation Crusader

Following his success in Battleaxe, Rommel returned his attention to the capture of Tobruk. He made preparations for a new offensive, to be launched between 15 and 20 November. Meanwhile, Auchinleck reorganised Allied forces and strengthened them to two corps, XXX and XIII, which formed the British Eighth Army, which was placed under the command of Alan Cunningham. Auchinleck had 770 tanks and double the number of Axis aircraft. Rommel opposed him with the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions with a total of 260 tanks, the 90th Light Infantry division, five Italian infantry divisions, and one Italian armoured division of 278 tanks.

Auchinleck launched Operation Crusader, a major offensive to relieve Tobruk, on 18 November 1941. The XIII Corps on the right were assigned to attack Sidi Omar, Capuzzo, Sollum, and Bardia; the XXX Corps (which included most of the armour) were to move on the left southern flank to a position about 30 miles (48 km) south of Tobruk, with the expectation that Rommel would find this move so threatening that he would move his armour there in response. Once Rommel's tanks were written down, the British 70th Infantry Division would break out of Tobruk to link up with XXX Corps. Rommel reluctantly decided on 20 November to call off his planned attack on Tobruk.

Some elements of the 7th Armoured Division were stopped on the 19th by the Italian Ariete Armoured Division at Bir el Gobi, but they also managed to capture the airfields at Sidi Rezegh, 10 miles (16 km) from Tobruk. Engaging the Allied tanks located there became Rommel's primary objective. Noting that the British armour was split into three discontiguous groups, he concentrated his Panzers so as to gain local superiority. The expected breakout from Tobruk, which took place on 20 November, was stopped by the Italians. The airfield at Sidi Rezegh was retaken by 21st Panzer on 22 November. In four days of fighting, the Eighth Army lost 530 tanks and Rommel only 100. The German forces near Halfaya Pass were cut off on 23 November.

Wanting to exploit the British halt and their apparent disorganisation, on 24 November Rommel counterattacked near the Egyptian border in an operation that became known as the "dash to the wire". Unknown to Rommel, his troops passed within 6 kilometres (4 mi) of a major British supply dump. Cunningham asked Auchinleck for permission to withraw into Egypt, but Auchinleck refused, and soon replaced Cunningham as commander of Eighth Army with Major General Neil Ritchie. The German attack, which began with only 100 operational tanks remaining, stalled as it outran its supplies and met stiffening resistance. The counterattack was criticised by the German High Command and some of Rommel's staff officers. In his memoirs, Friedrich von Mellenthin said "Unfortunately, Rommel overestimated his success and believed the moment had come to launch a general pursuit."

While Rommel drove into Egypt, the remaining Commonwealth forces east of Tobruk threatened the weak Axis lines there. Unable to reach Rommel for several days, Rommel's Chief of Staff, Siegfried Westphal, ordered the 21st Panzer Division withdrawn to support the siege of Tobruk. On 27 November the British attack on Tobruk linked up with the defenders, and Rommel, having suffered losses that could not easily be replaced, had to concentrate on regrouping the divisions that had attacked into Egypt. By 7 December Rommel fell back to a defensive line at Gazala, just west of Tobruk, all the while under heavy attack from the Desert Air Force. The Bardia garrison surrendered on 2 January and Halfaya on 17 January 1942. Although they were almost as exhausted and disorganised as Rommel's force, the Allies kept up the pressure, and Rommel was forced to retreat all the way back to the starting positions he had held in March, reaching El Agheila in December 1941. The British had retaken almost all of Cyrenaica, but Rommel's retreat dramatically shortened his supply lines.

Battle of Gazala and capture of Tobruk

On 5 January 1942 the Afrika Korps received 55 tanks and new supplies and Rommel started planning a counterattack. On 21 January, Rommel launched the attack. Caught by surprise by the Afrika Korps, the Allies lost over 110 tanks and other heavy equipment. The Axis forces retook Benghazi on 29 January and Timimi on 3 February, with the Allies pulling back to a defensive line just before the Tobruk area south of the coastal town of Gazala. Rommel placed a thin screen of mobile forces before them, and held the main force of the Panzerarmee well back near Antela and Mersa Brega. Between December 1941 and June 1942, Rommel had excellent information about the disposition and intentions of the Commonwealth forces. Bonner Fellers, the US diplomat in Egypt, was sending detailed reports to the US State Department using a compromised code.

Following Kesselring's successes in creating local air superiority around the British naval and air bases at Malta in April 1942, an increased flow of supplies reached the Axis forces in Africa. With his forces strengthened, Rommel contemplated a major offensive operation for the end of May. He knew the British were planning offensive operations as well, and he hoped to pre-empt them. While out on reconnaissance on 6 April, he was severely bruised in the abdomen when his vehicle was the target of artillery fire.

The British had 900 tanks in the area, 200 of which were new Grant tanks. Unlike the British, the Axis forces had no armoured reserve; all operable equipment was put into immediate service. Rommel's Panzer Army Africa had a force of 320 German tanks; 50 of these were the light Panzer II model. In addition, 240 Italian tanks were in service, but these were also under-gunned and poorly armoured.

Early in the afternoon of 26 May 1942, Rommel attacked first and the Battle of Gazala commenced. Italian infantry supplemented with small numbers of armoured forces assaulted the centre of the Gazala fortifications. To give the impression that this was the main assault, spare aircraft engines mounted on trucks were used to create huge clouds of dust. Ritchie was not convinced by this display, and left the 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades in position at the south end of the Commonwealth position. Under the cover of darkness, the bulk of Rommel's motorized and armoured forces (15th and 21st Panzers, 90th Light Division, and the Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions) drove south to skirt the left flank of the British, coming up behind them and attacking to the north the following morning. Throughout the day a running armour battle occurred, where both sides took heavy losses. The Grant tanks proved to be impossible to knock out except at close range. Renewing the attack on the morning of 28 May, Rommel concentrated on encircling and destroying separate units of the British armour. Repeated British counterattacks threatened to cut off and destroy the Afrika Korps. Running low on fuel, Rommel assumed a defensive posture, forming "the Cauldron". He made use of the extensive British minefields to shield his western flank. Meanwhile, Italian infantry cleared a path through the mines to provide supplies. On 30 May Rommel resumed the offensive, attacking westwards to link with elements of Italian X Corps, which had cleared a path through the Allied minefields to establish a supply line. On 1 June, Rommel accepted the surrender of some 3,000 soldiers of the 150th Brigade. On 6 June, 90th Light Division and the Trieste Division assaulted the Free French strongpoint in the Battle of Bir Hakeim, but the defenders continued to thwart the attack until finally evacuating on 10 June. With his communications and the southern strongpoint of the British line thus secured, Rommel shifted his attack north again, relying on the British minefields of the Gazala lines to protect his left flank. Threatened with being completely cut off, the British began a retreat eastward toward Egypt on 14 June, the so-called "Gazala Gallop."

On 15 June Axis forces reached the coast, cutting off the escape for the Commonwealth forces still occupying the Gazala positions. With this task completed, Rommel struck for Tobruk while the enemy was still confused and disorganised. Tobruk's defenders were at this point the 2nd South African Infantry Division, 4th Antiaircraft Brigade, 11th Indian Infantry, 32nd Army Tank, and 201st Guards Brigades, all under command of Generalmajor (major general) Hendrik Klopper. The assault on Tobruk began at dawn on 20 June, and Klopper surrendered at dawn the following day. With Tobruk, Rommel achieved the capture of 32,000 defenders, the port, and huge quantities of supplies. Only at the fall of Singapore, earlier that year, had more British Commonwealth troops been captured at one time. On 22 June, Hitler promoted Rommel to Generalfeldmarschall (general field marshall) for this victory.

Rommel's gains caused considerable alarm in the Allied camp. He was poised to deliver a crippling blow to the British by taking Alexandria, gaining control of the Suez Canal, and pushing the British out of Egypt. The Allies feared Rommel would then turn north-eastward to conquer the valuable oil fields of the Middle East and then link up with the German forces besieging the equally valuable Caucasian oil fields. However, such moves required substantial reinforcements that Hitler was unwilling to allocate. Ironically, Hitler had been skeptical about sending Rommel to Africa in the first place. He had only done so after constant begging by naval commander Erich Raeder, and even then only to relieve the Italians. Hitler's interest was focused upon the east. He never understood global warfare, despite Raeder and Rommel's attempts to get him to see the strategic value of Egypt.

Following his success at Gazala and Tobruk Rommel wanted to seize the moment and not allow 8th Army a chance to regroup. He strongly argued that the Panzerarmee should advance into Egypt and drive on Alexandria and the Suez. Hitler was concerned that losses in the proposed Operation Herkules, the proposed attack on Malta, would be great, and he did not trust the Italian navy to support the operation with vigor. Operation Herkules was cancelled and Rommel given permission to pursue 8th Army. Auchinleck took responsibility of command of 8th Army upon himself, and relieved Ritchie on 25 June. Rommel pressed eastward. Defensive preparations at the wire had to be abandoned, as the Afrika arrived soon after the British. Pressing on into Egypt he reached the fortified coastal port of Mersa Matruh, which 8th Army had chosen to fight a defensive battle. In the Battle of Mersa Matruh, the Afrika Korps was able to get behind both of the two British Corps fighting there and blocked their retreat eastward, however it was too weak following hte Gazala battles to prevent them from braking out. The 2nd New Zealand Division fought its way through 21st Panzer on 27 June, but X Corps at Mersa Matruh did not receive the signal to withdraw until the next morning. X Corps broke out the following night, but 6,000 of its men were captured at Mersa Matruh and many more were lost in the break out and drive to El Alamein. 90th Light entered Mersa Matruh on 29 June. A fall back position at Fuka was exploded, as the Germans arrived before many of the British did. The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in the afternoon and attempted to hold the town, but was overrun a few hours later by 21st Panzer, and was destroyed there. In addition to stockpiles of fuel and other supplies, the British lost 40 tanks there and abandoned hundreds of trucks and guns. Many of these were put into service by the Panzerarmee.

El Alamein

First Battle of El Alamein

Rommel continued his pursuit of the Eighth Army, which had fallen back to heavily prepared defensive positions at El Alamein. This region is a natural choke point, where the Qattara Depression creates a relatively short line to defend that could not be outflanked to the south because of the steep escarpment. On 1 July the First Battle of El Alamein began. Rommel had around 100 available tanks. The Allies were able to achieve local air superiority, with heavy bombers attacking the 15th and 21st Panzers, who had also been delayed by a sandstorm. The 90th Light Division veered off course and were pinned down by South African artillery fire. Rommel continued to attempt to advance for two more days, but repeated sorties by the RAF meant he could make no progress. On 3 July, he wrote in his diary that his strength had "faded away". Attacks by 21st Panzer on 13 and 14 July were repulsed, and an Australian attack on 16-17 July was held off with difficulty. Throughout the first half of July, Auchinleck concentrated attacks on the Italian 60th Infantry Division Sabratha at Tel el Eisa. The ridge was captured by the 26th Australian Brigade on 16 July. Both sides suffered similar losses throughout the month, but the Axis supply situation remained less favourable. Rommel realised that the tide was turning. A break in the action took place at the end of July as both sides rested and regrouped.

Preparing for a renewed drive, the British replaced Auchinleck with General Harold Alexander on 8 August. Bernard Montgomery was made the new commander of Eighth Army that same day. The Eighth Army had initially been assigned to General William Gott, but he was killed when his plane was shot down on 7 August. Rommel knew that a British convoy carrying over 100,000 tons of supplies was due to arrive in September. He decided to launch an attack at the end of August with the 15th and 21st Panzer Division, 90th Light Division, and the Italian XX Motorized Corps in a drive through the southern flank of the El Alamein lines. Expecting an attack sooner rather than later, Montgomery fortified the Alam el Halfa ridge with the 44th Division, and positioned the 7th Armoured Division about 15 miles (24 km) to the south.

Battle of Alam El Halfa

The Battle of Alam el Halfa was launched on 30 August. The terrain left Rommel with no choice but to follow a similar tactic as he had at previous battles: the bulk of the forces attempted to sweep around from the south while secondary attacks were launched on the remainder of the front. It took much longer than anticipated to get through the minefields in the southern sector, and the tanks got bogged down in unexpected patches of quicksand (Montgomery had arranged for Rommel to acquire a falsified map of the terrain). Under heavy fire from British artillery and aircraft, and in the face of well prepared positions that Rommel could not hope to outflank due to lack of fuel, the attack stalled. By 2 September, Rommel realized the battle was unwinnable, and decided to withdraw.

Montgomery had made preparations to cut the Germans off in their retreat, but in the afternoon of 2 September he visited Corps commander Brian Horrocks and gave orders to allow the Germans to retire. This was to preserve his own strength intact for the main battle which was to come. On the night of 3 September the 2nd New Zealand Division and 7th Armoured Division positioned to the north engaged in an assault, but they were repelled in a fierce rearguard action by the 90th Light Division. Montgomery called off further action to preserve his strength and allow for further desert training for his forces. In the attack Rommel had suffered 2,940 casualties and lost 50 tanks, a similar number of guns, and 400 lorries, vital for supplies and movement. The British losses, except tank losses of 68, were much less, further adding to the numerical inferiority of Panzer Army Afrika. The Desert Air Force inflicted the highest proportions of damage to Rommel's forces. He now realized the war in Africa could not be won. Physically exhausted and suffering from a liver infection and low blood pressure, Rommel flew home to Germany to recover his health. General Georg Stumme was left in command in Rommel's absence.

Second Battle of El Alamein

Improved decoding by British intelligence meant that the Allies had advance knowledge of virtually every Mediterranean convoy, and only 30 per cent of shipments were getting through. In addition, Mussolini diverted supplies intended for the front to his garrison at Tripoli, and refused to release any additional troops to Rommel. The increasing Allied air superiority and lack of fuel meant Rommel was forced to take a more defensive posture than he would have liked for the second Battle of El Alamein. The German defences to the west of the town included a minefield 5 miles (8.0 km) deep with the main defensive line – itself several thousand yards deep – to its west. This, Rommel hoped, would allow his infantry to hold the line at any point until motorized and armoured units in reserve could move up and counterattack any Allied breaches. The British offensive began on 23 October. Stumme, in command in Rommel's absence, died of an apparent heart attack while examining the front on 24 October, and Rommel was ordered to return from his medical leave, arriving on the 25th. Montgomery's intention was to clear a narrow path through the minefield at the northern part of the defenses, at the area called Kidney Ridge, with a feint to the south. By the end of 25 October, 15th Panzers, the defenders in this sector, had only 31 serviceable tanks remaining of their initial force of 119. Rommel brought north the 21st Panzer and Ariete Divisions on 26 October to bolster the sector. On the 28th, Montgomery shifted his focus to the coast, ordering his 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions to attempt to swing around and cut off Rommel's line of retreat. Meanwhile Rommel concentrated his attack on the Allied salient at Kidney Ridge, inflicting heavy losses. However, Rommel had only 150 operational tanks remaining, and Montgomery had 800, many of them Shermans.

Montgomery, seeing his armoured brigades losing tanks at an alarming rate, stopped major attacks until the early hours of 2 November, when he opened "Operation Supercharge" with a massive artillery barrage. This was followed by penetration at the salient by two armoured and two infantry divisions. Rommel's counterattack at 11:00 inflicted severe casualties on the Commonwealth troops, but by 20:00, with only 35 tanks remaining, he ordered his forces to disengage and begin to withdraw. At midnight, he informed the OKW of his decision, and received a reply directly from Hitler the following afternoon: he ordered Rommel and his troops to hold their position to the last man. Rommel, who believed that the lives of his soldiers should never be squandered needlessly, was stunned. While he (like all members of the Wehrmacht) had pledged an oath of absolute obedience to Hitler, he thought this order was pointless, even madness, and had to be disobeyed. Rommel initially complied with the order, but after discussions with Kesselring and others, he issued orders for a retreat on 4 November. The delay proved costly in terms of his ability to get his forces out of Egypt. He later said the decision to delay was what he most regretted from his time in Africa. Meanwhile the British 1st and 7th Armoured Division had broken through the German defences and were preparing to swing north and surround the Axis forces. On the evening of the 4th, Rommel finally received word from Hitler authorizing the withdrawal. By this time it was impossible for Rommel to save his non-motorized units.

End of Africa campaign

Retreat across Africa

As Rommel attempted to withdraw his forces before the British could cut off his retreat, he was forced to fight a series of delaying actions. Heavy rains slowed movements and grounded the Desert Air Force, which aided the withdrawal. Those parts of Panzerarmee Africa that were motorized slipped away from El Alamein, but were under pressure from the pursuing Eighth Army. A series of short delaying actions were fought over the coastal highway, but no line could be held for any length of time, as Rommel lacked the armour and fuel to defend his open southern flank. Rommel continued to do the only thing sensible, and moved his army west, abandoning Halfaya Pass, Sollum, Mersa Brega and El Agheila. Tripolitania, with its many steep scarps cut in places by dried-up watercourses, made for useful defensive terrain, but the line Rommel was aiming for was 'Gabes gap' in Tunisia. Luftwaffe Field Marshal Kesselring strongly criticized Rommel's decision to retreat all the way to Tunisia, as each airfield the Germans abandoned extended the range of the Allied bombers and fighters. Rommel defended his decision, pointing out that if he tried to assume a defensive position the Allies would destroy his forces and take the airfields anyway; the retreat saved the lives of his remaining men and shortened his supply lines. By now, Rommel's remaining forces fought in reduced strength combat groups, whereas the Allied forces had great numerical superiority and control of the air. Upon his arrival in Tunisia, Rommel noted with some bitterness the reinforcements, including the 10th Panzer Division, arriving in Tunisia following the Allied invasion of Morocco. He felt these could have made all the difference at El Alamein. Their arrival in Tunisia was to a position which he knew Germany ultimately could not hold.

Tunisia

Having reached Tunisia, Rommel launched an attack against the U.S. II Corps which was threatening to cut his lines of supply north to Tunis. Rommel inflicted a sharp defeat on the American forces at the Kasserine Pass in February—what proved to be his last battlefield victory of the war, as well as his first battle against the United States Army.

Rommel immediately turned back against the British forces, occupying the Mareth Line (old French defences on the Libyan border). But Rommel could only delay the inevitable. While Rommel was at Kasserine at the end of January 1943, the Italian General Giovanni Messe was appointed commander of Panzer Army Africa, renamed the Italo-German Panzer Army in recognition of the fact that it consisted of one German and three Italian corps. Though Messe replaced Rommel, he diplomatically deferred to him, and the two coexisted in what was theoretically the same command. On 23 February Armeegruppe Afrika was created with Rommel in command. It included the Italo-German Panzer Army under Messe (renamed 1st Italian Army) and the German 5th Panzer Army in the north of Tunisia under General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim.

The last Rommel offensive in North Africa was on 6 March 1943, when he attacked Eighth Army at the Battle of Medenine. The attack was made with 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions. Warned by Ultra intercepts, Montgomery deployed large numbers of anti-tank guns in the path of the offensive. After losing 52 tanks, Rommel called off the assault. On 9 March he returned to Germany in an effort to get Hitler to comprehend the reality of the changing situation. In this he was unsuccessful. Command was handed over to General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim. Rommel never returned to Africa. The fighting there continued on for another two months, until 13 May 1943, when General Messe surrendered the exhausted remnants of Armeegruppe Afrika to the Allies.

Italy 1943

On 23 July 1943 Rommel was moved to Greece as commander of Army Group E to counter a possible British invasion of the Greek coast. This was an idea highly thought of by Churchill but which ultimately never occurred. British intelligence, however, used the idea as part of their ongoing efforts to mislead and extend the German army, this aspect being known as "Operation Mincemeat". Rommel returned to Germany upon the overthrow of Mussolini, and on 17 August 1943 was sent to Northern Italy to prepare a northern line of defense. Rommel was headquartered in Lake Garda as commander of the newly formed Army Group B.

In Italy, Rommel and Hitler's disagreement reached a new level. Rommel had wrongly predicted that the collapse of the German line in Italy would be fast. Hitler in 1944 expressed these doubts: "In Italy too he predicted our collapse as being just around the corner. It still has not occurred. Events have proved him completely wrong, and thoroughly justified my decision to leave Field Marshal Kesselring there. My view is that without optimism you cannot be a military commander".

On 21 November Hitler gave Kesselring overall command of the Italian theater, moving Rommel and Army Group B to Normandy in France with responsibility for defending the French coast against the long anticipated Allied invasion.

Defending the Atlantic Wall 1944

There was broad disagreement in the German High Command as to how best to meet the expected allied invasion of Northern France. The Commander-in-Chief West, Gerd von Rundstedt, believed there was no way to stop the invasion near the beaches due to the firepower possessed by the Allied navies, as had been experienced at Salerno. He argued that the German armour should be held in reserve well inland near Paris where they could be used to counter-attack in force in a more traditional military doctrine. The allies could be allowed to extend themselves deep into France where a battle for control would be fought, allowing the Germans to envelop the allied forces in a pincer movement, cutting off their avenue of retreat. These ideas were supported by other officers, most notably Heinz Guderian and Panzer Group West commander Leo Geyr. They feared the piecemeal commitment of their armoured forces would cause them to become caught in a battle of attrition which they could not hope to win. The notion of holding the armour inland to use as a mobile reserve force from which they could mount a powerful counterattack applied the classic use of armoured formations as seen in France 1940. These tactics were still effective on the Eastern Front, where control of the air was important but did not dominate the action. Rommel's own experiences at the end of the North African campaign revealed to him that the Germans would not be allowed to preserve their armour from air attack for this type of massed assault. Rommel believed their only opportunity would be to oppose the landings directly at the beaches, and to counterattack there before the invaders could become well established. Though there had been some defensive positions established and gun emplacements made, the Atlantic Wall was a token defensive line. Rommel believed if the Wehrmacht would have any chance, beach defenses would have to be created and the forces available brought close enough to the allied invaders as to make airstrikes against them difficult.

Upon arriving in Northern France Rommel was dismayed by the lack of completed works and the slow building pace. He feared he had just a few months before an invasion. His presence greatly invigorated the fortification effort along the Atlantic Wall. He had millions of mines laid and thousands of tank traps and obstacles set up on the beaches and throughout the countryside, including in fields suitable for glider aircraft landings, the so-called Rommelspargel ("Rommel's asparagus"). Rommel's arrival in Northern France instilled a great deal of purpose to the demoralized units that were simply waiting for the inevitable attack. His efforts to buttress the Atlantic Wall went a long way in improving their effectiveness. If given more time, he may have succeeded. U.S. Navy Commander Edward Ellsberg said of the various Atlantic Wall obstacles, "Rommel had thoroughly muddled our plans. Attacking at high tide as we had intended, we'd never get enough troops in over those obstacles..." The obstructions compelled the Allies to land at low tide, which narrowed the time frames they could land and increased the length of the beach to be crossed, but uncovered and revealed the obstacles, reducing their effectiveness.

Von Rundstedt expected the Allies to invade in the Pas-de-Calais because it was the shortest crossing point from Britain, its port facilities were essential to supplying a large invasion force, and the distance from Calais to Germany was relatively short. Hitler and his various intelligence services largely agreed with this assessment. Rommel, believing that Normandy was indeed a likely landing ground, argued that it did not matter to the Allies where they landed, just that the landing was successful.

Hitler vacillated between the two strategies. In late April, he ordered the 1st SS Panzer Corps placed near Paris, far enough inland to be useless to Rommel, but not far enough for von Rundstedt. Rommel moved those armoured formations under his command as far forward as possible, ordering General Erich Marcks, commanding the 84th Corps defending the Normandy section, to move his reserves into the frontline. Rommel's strategy of an impregnable, armor-supported defense line was scoffed at by most of his fellow commanders including von Rundstedt, but his support from Hitler and Goebbels meant he could put all of it into effect except the Panzer divisions; however, these were, in his view, the most critical parts of the plan.

The Allies staged elaborate deceptions for D-Day (see Operation Fortitude), giving the impression that the landings would be at Calais. Although Hitler himself expected a Normandy invasion for a while, Rommel and most Army commanders in France believed there would be two invasions, with the main invasion coming at the Pas-de-Calais. Rommel drove defensive preparations all along the coast of Northern France, particularly concentrating fortification building in the River Somme estuary. By D-Day on 6 June 1944 nearly all the German staff officers, including Hitler's staff, believed that Pas-de-Calais was going to be the main invasion site, and continued to believe so even after the landings in Normandy had occurred.

A part of the difficulty in the German response to the landings in Northern France was a split command structure. Anxious of the power of the regular army, Hitler had created a second service, the Waffen-SS, which was not under command of the regular army but under his own direct command. In addition, a great number of the land forces included units under the control of the Luftwaffe, including the paratrooper forces and various flak units, while others were under command of the Kriegsmarine. 14 of the 62 divisions in the west, and 7 of the 25 first grade formations were not part of the army. This weakened the ability of the army to control and respond to the battle. To make matters worse for the Germans, the 5 June storm in the channel seemed to make a landing very unlikely, and a number of the senior officers were away from their units for training exercises and various other efforts. All this made the German command structure in France in disarray during the opening hours of the D-Day invasion. On 4 June the chief meteorologist of the 3 Air Fleet reported that weather in the channel was so poor there could be no landing attempted for two weeks. On 5 June Rommel set out to visit his family on 6 June, planning to then go on to meet with Hitler at the Berchtesgaden to persuade him that the 12th SS Panzer Division should be moved forward to the St. Lo-Carantan area.. Several units, notably the 12th SS Panzer Division and Panzer-Lehr-Division, were near enough that they could have caused serious havoc. However Hitler refused to release these units over his continued concern over a second landing at the Pas de Calais. Facing relatively small-scale German counterattacks, the Allies quickly secured all beachheads except Omaha. Rommel personally oversaw the bitter fighting around Caen where only the determined defence of Kampfgruppe von Luck prevented a British breakout on the first day. Here, again, the on-site commanders were denied freedom of action and the Germans did not launch a concentrated counterattack until mid-day on 6 June.

The Allies pushed ashore and expanded their beachhead despite the best efforts of Rommel's troops. By mid-July the German position was crumbling. On 17 July 1944, Rommel was returning from visiting the headquarters of Sepp Dietrich, the commander of 1st SS Panzer Corps, being driven back to Army Group B headquarters in his staff car. According to a widely accepted version of events, an RCAF Spitfire of 412 Squadron piloted by Charley Fox strafed the car near Sainte-Foy-de-Montgommery. The car sped up and attempted to get off the main roadway, but a 20 mm round shattered the driver's left arm, causing the vehicle to come off the road and crash into some trees. Rommel was thrown from the car, suffering injuries to the left side of his face from glass shards and three fractures to his skull. He was hospitalised with major head injuries.

Plot against Hitler

There had always been opposition to Hitler in conservative circles and in the Army, the Schwarze Kapelle (Black Orchestra), but Hitler's dazzling successes in 1938–1941 had stifled it. However, after the Soviet campaign failed, and the Axis suffered more defeats, this opposition underwent a revival.

Early in 1944, three of Rommel's closest friends—the Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart, Karl Strölin (who had served with Rommel in the First World War), Alexander von Falkenhausen, and Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel—began efforts to bring Rommel into the anti-Hitler conspiracy. They felt that as by far the most popular officer in Germany, he would lend their cause badly needed credibility with the populace. Meetings between Rommel and them were organized by chief of staff Hans Speidel, who also played a role in the daring letter Rommel wrote against Hitler. Additionally, the conspirators felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active duty. Erwin von Witzleben, who would have become commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht if Hitler had been overthrown, was a field marshal, but had not been on active duty since 1942. Sometime in February, Rommel agreed to lend his support to the conspiracy in order to, as he put it, "come to the rescue of Germany."

Rommel opposed assassinating Hitler. After the war, his widow—among others—maintained that Rommel believed an assassination attempt would spark civil war in Germany and Austria, and Hitler would have become a martyr for a lasting cause. Instead, Rommel insisted that Hitler be arrested and brought to trial for his crimes. After the failed bomb attack of 20 July, many conspirators were arrested and the dragnet expanded to anyone even suspected of participating. It did not take long for Rommel's involvement to come to light. Rommel's name was first mentioned when Stülpnagel blurted it out during an interrogation after he failed in an attempt at suicide. Later, another conspirator, Caesar von Hofacker, admitted under particularly severe Gestapo interrogation that Rommel was actively involved.

Additionally, Carl Goerdeler, the main civilian leader of the Resistance, wrote on several letters and other documents that Rommel was a potential supporter and an acceptable military leader to be placed in a position of responsibility should their coup succeed. Nazi party officials in France reported that Rommel extensively and scornfully criticised Nazi incompetence and crimes. Gestapo agents went to Rommel's house in Ulm and placed him under partial house arrest.

Death

The "Court of Military Honour"—a drumhead court-martial convened to decide the fate of officers involved in the conspiracy—included three men with whom Rommel had crossed swords before: Heinz Guderian, Gerd von Rundstedt and Heinrich Kirchheim (the latter whom Rommel had fired after Tobruk in 1941). The Court decided that Rommel should be expelled from the Army in disgrace and brought before Roland Freisler's People's Court, a kangaroo court that always decided in favour of the prosecution. Although being hauled before the People's Court was tantamount to a death sentence, Hitler knew that having Rommel branded as a traitor would severely damage morale on the home front. He and Wilhelm Keitel thus decided to offer Rommel the chance to take his own life.

Two generals from Hitler's headquarters, Wilhelm Burgdorf and Ernst Maisel, visited Rommel at his home on 14 October 1944. Burgdorf informed him of the charges and offered him a choice: he could either face the People's Court or choose a quiet suicide. In the former case, his staff would be arrested and executed as well, and his family would suffer even before the all-but-certain conviction and execution. In the latter case, the government would assure him a state funeral claiming he had died a hero, and his family given full pension payments. Burgdorf had brought a cyanide capsule. After a few minutes alone, Rommel announced that he chose to end his own life and explained his decision to his wife and son. Carrying his field marshal's baton, Rommel went to Burgdorf's Opel, driven by SS Master Sergeant Heinrich Doose, and was driven out of the village. After stopping, Doose and Maisel walked away from the car, leaving Rommel with Burgdorf. Five minutes later Burgdorf gestured to the two men to return to the car, and Doose noticed that Rommel was slumped over, having taken the cyanide. Ten minutes later the group phoned Rommel's wife to inform her of Rommel's death.

The official story of Rommel's death, as initially reported to the public, stated that Rommel had succumbed to his injuries from the earlier strafing of his staff car. To further strengthen the story, Hitler ordered an official day of mourning in commemoration and Rommel was buried with full military honours. The fact that his state funeral was held in Ulm instead of Berlin had, according to his son, been stipulated by Rommel. Hitler sent Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who was unaware that Rommel had died as a result of Hitler's orders, as his representative at Rommel's funeral. Rommel had specified that no political paraphernalia be displayed on his corpse, but the Nazis made sure his coffin was festooned with swastikas. The truth behind Rommel's death became known to the Allies when intelligence officer Charles Marshall interviewed Rommel's widow, Lucia Rommel, as well as from a letter by Rommel's son Manfred in April 1945.

Following the war, Rommel's diary and letters were edited by military historian B. H. Liddell Hart and published as The Rommel Papers. His grave can be found in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm. For decades after the war on the anniversary of his death, veterans of the Africa campaign, including former opponents, would gather at Rommel's tomb in Herrlingen. He is the only member of the Third Reich establishment to have a museum dedicated to him.

In 2013, it was revealed that Friedrich Breiderhoff wrote a report for the Cologne police on 22 July 1960, describing the circumstances which forced him to falsify Rommel's death certificate in 1944.

Rommel's style as military commander

Manoeuvre warfare

Taking his opponent by surprise and creating uncertainty in the mind of the adversarial commander were key elements in Rommel's thinking on offensive warfare. Rommel understood the impact of striking quickly, and his offensive campaigns are noted for his ability to arrive in force where his opponents did not expect him. Rommel would take advantage of sand storms and the dark of night to conceal the movement of his forces. In France and later in Africa, Rommel made use of the Luftwaffe as a forward, mobile artillery to support the advance and help overcome difficult obstacles. He viewed the essential aspect of successful use of armour was the ability to concentrate all available strength at one point and then hit that point with everything at hand to force a breakthrough. Maintaining momentum was critical. He was willing to trade the tenuous logistical support of such moves for the advantage in creating havoc and confusion in the enemy. A former Afrika Korps soldier recalled: "When the kampfgruppe leader would say 'Jawohl Herr Feldmarschall. According to my estimates the proposed drive behind the lines to encircle the enemy would require a drive of 150 km. Our fuel supply is barely enough for 50 km.' Rommel would reply in his Schwaebisch dialect, 'Fahren Sie, fahren Sie, dann brauchen Sie keinen Treibstoff' (Drive, drive, then you do not need fuel), which was understood to mean 'Get there quickly, take the enemy by surprise, then use the fuel available from the enemy's supply.'"

Leadership

The 7th Panzer's drive through the Belgian, French and British lines in 1940 succeeded to a remarkable degree from Rommel's driving presence with his forces. The boldness of his attacks often led larger enemy formations to surrender, as they were overwhelmed by the pace of the action and became unsure of themselves. This was even more evident in North Africa. A central aspect of his thinking on command was the high value he placed on a commander being physically present at the point of contact. Rommel's experiences in the First World War of successes gained by rapid forward movement, flanking opponents and attacking their rear areas, and catching the defenders by surprise were amplified with the mobility afforded to armoured formations. To augment his force at the point of attack he made use of the Luftwaffe as a forward mobile artillery. A major aspect of his success was his grasp of the psychological shock such attacks had upon the morale and fighting spirit of the enemy forces. When the British mounted a commando raid deep behind German lines in an effort to kill Rommel and his staff on the eve of their Crusader offensive, Rommel was indignant, not that the British had singled him out to be killed, but that the British could believe his headquarters would be found 250 miles behind his front. In terms of making tactical decisions quickly, he believed the commander needed to be at the crucial place at the crucial time. If Rommel did find it necessary to keep his headquarters well behind the lines, he would often personally pilot a reconnaissance aircraft over the battle lines to get a view of the situation. Although Rommel did not have a pilot's license, he was a competent pilot, and none of the Luftwaffe officers had the nerve to stop him.

Rommel led by example. In 1933 when he became commander of a Hanoverian Jaeger battalion, which was composed of soldiers with skiing expertise, its officers gave him the mandatory test on the snow slopes. No lift was present, and the men had to climb to ski down the hillside. They trudged to the top and descended, and honour was satisfied, but the 41-year-old commander led his officers up and down the slope twice more before he let them fall out. He felt a commander should be physically more robust than the troops he led, and should always show them an example. He expected his subordinate commanders to do the same. They had to live hard. He felt it the obligation of a commander to be willing to suffer whatever hardships the soldier in the line was facing, and he understood the effect of this on the morale of his men.

Rommel received both praise and criticism for his tactics during the French campaign. Many, such as General Georg Stumme, who had previously commanded 7th Panzer Division, were impressed with the speed and success of Rommel's drive. Others, however, were more reserved, some out of envy, others over concerns about risks Rommel was willing to accept, and others in the German High Command out of their limited appreciation and acceptance of maneuver warfare. With Rommel's campaign in North Africa to view in retrospect, Hoth's reservations can be seen as unfounded. Commented Georg Ralf: "Wegen seiner steilen Karriere, seiner Popularität und vor allem aufgrund der Gunst, die er bei Hitler genoss, hatte er viele Feinde in der Wehrmacht," which can be translated: "Because of his stellar career, his popularity, and especially because of the favor he enjoyed with Hitler, he had many enemies in the armed forces."

The respect afforded Rommel by his soldiers was the result of their observation of him. Said staff officer Friedrich von Mellenthin: "The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them. ... the men knew that Rommel was the last man to spare Rommel." Hard on his officers, he demanded they take proper care of their men and materiel. Once he saw things were properly attended to he could be easy and comfortable, but if unhappy with the way an officer was applying himself he could be very severe, being quick to fire officers who did not maintain standards or dithered over his commands. Von Mellenthin said: "While very popular with young soldiers and N.C.O.s, with whom he cracked many a joke, he could be most outspoken and offensive to commanders of troops if he did not approve of their measures." When asked what he thought of James Mason's portrayal in the film The Desert Fox, von Mellenthin smiled before replying "Altogether too polite".

Rommel spoke German with a pronounced southern German or Swabian accent. He was not a part of the Prussian aristocracy that dominated the German high command, and as such was looked upon somewhat suspiciously by the Wehrmacht's traditional power structure. His successes caused a certain amount of resentment among headquarters staff officers, who criticized him for failing to keep them in contact and properly informed of his intentions. For Rommel this was not always an oversight, but was sometimes preferred.

Personality

In battle, Rommel was often directing fire or leading an assault in the hottest point of decision. Wounded multiple times in both world wars, his notoriety was partly the result of his having the luck to survive long enough to become prominent. In addition, Rommel was also the possessor of a great deal of moral courage. German historian Hans-Adolf Jacobson commented: "Rommel was one of the few generals who had the strength to refuse to carry out one of Hitler's orders." He could be difficult on his subordinate commanders and superiors. He expected a great deal of himself and much the same for them. He had little patience for junior officers who did not do their jobs properly. He was not open to objections to his plans, and he did not tolerate incompetence.

Friedrich von Mellenthin, who was a key aide on Rommel's staff during the Africa campaign, wrote that Rommel was willing to take chances, sometimes gambling an entire battle on a decision made at the point of contact. Rommel first displayed this type of initiative during the First World War as a junior officer in Belgium and later in the mountains of northern Italy. There he found a sudden, bold, decisive move could reap large dividends. This was reinforced by Rommel's experiences at the head of the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France in 1940, where it was clear that his presence at the forefront of the battle was instrumental in creating successful outcomes. But at times in North Africa his absence from a position of communication made command of the battles of the Afrika Korps very difficult. Rommel's counterattack during Operation Crusader is one such instance. It should be noted though, that throughout the desert war Rommel was acting from a position of relative weakness. To succeed he had to accept risks that commanders like Montgomery were never forced to take. General Fritz Bayerlein, Rommel's chief of staff through much of the campaign, noted that risks taken were made only after carefully weighing the potential dangers and rewards.

Aggressive subordinate commanders, such as Hans von Luck, praised his leadership from the front. Though Mellenthin was in agreement on forward command of armoured units, a broadly held principle of the Panzerwaffe, he believed that losing contact with headquarters led to disinvolvement of his staff officers and created difficulty in maintaining an overview of the tactical situation. Long absences from contact with headquarters meant that at times subordinate commanders had to make decisions without first consulting Rommel. Even when Rommel was present at headquarters, his impatient personality made it difficult for his subordinates—and sometimes his superiors—to work with him.

Relations with the Italians

Rommel's contemptuous opinion of the Italian military stemmed initially from his experiences fighting against them in the mountains of Northern Italy in the First World War. His initial disdain was tempered when he came to realise their lack of success was principally due to poor leadership and equipment, remarking succinctly in his typical fashion: "Good soldiers, bad officers." When these difficulties were overcome, he found them equal to German soldiers. Rommel's relationship with the Italian High Command in North Africa was generally poor. Rommel was sent to Africa to shore up a crumbling situation created under the direction of the Italian command, and though he was nominally subordinate to the Italians for much of the campaign, he was under no illusions as to why he was there. Further, he enjoyed direct access with the highest German political authority, which allowed him a certain degree of autonomy from his Italian counterparts; since he was directing their troops in battle as well as his own, this was bound to cause hostility among Italian commanders. Conversely, as the Italian command had control over the supplies of the forces in Africa, they resupplied Italian units preferentially, which was a source of resentment for Rommel and his staff. Rommel's direct and abrasive manner did nothing to smooth these issues.

While certainly much less proficient than Rommel in their leadership, aggressiveness, tactical outlook and mobile warfare skills, Italian commanders were competent in logistics, strategy and artillery doctrine: their troops were ill-equipped but well-trained. As such, the Italian commanders were repeatedly at odds with Rommel over concerns with issues of supply. Field Marshal Kesselring was assigned Supreme Commander Mediterranean, at least in part to alleviate command problems between Rommel and the Italians. This effort does not seem to have succeeded, Kesselring claiming Rommel ignored him as easily as he ignored the Italians.

Very different, however, was the perception of Rommel by Italian common soldiers and NCOs, who, like the German field troops, had the deepest trust and respect for him.

Humanitarianism

Rommel understood and accepted that with war would come casualties, but he was not one to accept the unnecessary loss of life. "Germany will need men after the war as well" was a comment he frequently made. His view went beyond Germans to include the captured soldiers of his adversaries. Numerous examples exist of Rommel's chivalry towards Allied POWs, including ensuring they were provided with adequate rations. The Afrika Korps was never accused of any war crimes; indeed, during the desert campaign, interactions between German and British troops encountering each other between battles were sometimes openly friendly. Rommel defied Hitler's order to execute captured commandos. After the capture of commandos Lieutenant Roy Wooldridge and Lieutenant George Lane following Operation Fortitude, he placed them in a POW camp. When British Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Keyes was killed during a failed commando raid to kill or capture Rommel behind German lines, Rommel ordered him buried with full military honours.

During Rommel's time in France, Hitler ordered him to deport the country's Jewish population; Rommel disobeyed. Several times he wrote letters protesting against the treatment of the Jews. He also refused to comply with Hitler's order to execute Jewish POWs. At his 17 June 1944 meeting with Hitler at Margival, he protested against the atrocity committed by the 2nd SS Panzer division Das Reich, which in retribution had massacred the citizens of the French town of Oradour-sur-Glane. Rommel asked to be allowed to punish the division. While he implemented the construction of the many obstacles to strengthen the Atlantic Wall, Rommel directed that French workers were to be paid for their labour, and were not to be used as slave labourers.

Popular perception

Rommel had been extraordinarily well known in his lifetime, not only by the German people, but also by his adversaries. His tactical prowess and consistent decency in the treatment of allied prisoners earned him the respect of many opponents, including Claude Auchinleck, Winston Churchill, George S. Patton, and Bernard Montgomery. Rommel reciprocated their respect. He at one time said Montgomery "never made a serious strategic mistake" and credited Patton with "the most astounding achievement in mobile warfare". Rommel's admiration of the British was particularly notable; while having tea with George Lane, a captured British commando, he expressed regret that Germany and Britain had not been allies during both world wars.

Rommel was among the few Axis commanders (the others being Isoroku Yamamoto and Reinhard Heydrich) who were directly targeted for assassination by Allied planners. At least two attempts were made against Rommel's life, the first being Operation Flipper, which attempted to kill Rommel in North Africa on the eve of Operation Crusader in 1941, and the second being Operation Gaff, undertaken shortly after the invasion of Normandy in 1944. Both missions failed because Rommel was not where the planners had supposed him to be.

When Rommel's involvement in the plot to kill Hitler became known after the war, his stature was enhanced in the eyes of his former adversaries. Rommel was often cited in Western sources as a loyal German willing to stand up to Hitler. The release of the film The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel (1951) increased his fame and furthered his standing as the most widely-known and well-regarded leader in the German Army. In 1970, a Lütjens-class destroyer was named the Rommel in his honour.

In the course of the war, during parliamentary debate following the fall of Tobruk, Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke of Rommel as a "daring and skillful opponent ... a great general". Writing about him years later, Churchill offered the following:

His ardour and daring inflicted grievous disasters upon us, but he deserves the salute which I made him—and not without some reproaches from the public—in the House of Commons in January, 1942. ... He also deserves our respect because, although a loyal German soldier, he came to hate Hitler and all his works, and took part in the conspiracy of 1944 to rescue Germany by displacing the maniac and tyrant. For this he paid the forfeit of his life. In the sombre wars of modern democracy chivalry finds no place.

Family life

While at Cadet School in 1911, Rommel met and became engaged to 17-year-old Lucia (Lucie) Maria Mollin (1894–1971). While stationed in Weingarten in 1913, Rommel developed a relationship with Walburga Stemmer, which produced a daughter, Gertrude, born 8 December 1913. Because of elitism in the officer corps, Stemmer's working-class background made her unsuitable as an officer's wife, and Rommel felt honour-bound to uphold his previous commitment to Mollin. With Lucie's cooperation, he accepted financial responsibility for the child.

Rommel and Mollin were married in November 1916 in Danzig. After the end of the First World War, the couple settled initially in Stuttgart, and Stemmer and her child lived with them. Gertrude was referred to as Rommel's niece, a fiction that went unquestioned due to the enormous number of women widowed during the war. Walburga died suddenly in October 1928, and Gertrude remained a member of the household until Rommel's death in 1944.

Rommel's marriage was a happy one, and he wrote his wife at least one letter every day while he was in the field. Their son Manfred, born 24 December 1928, served as Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart from 1974 to 1996. He died on 7 November 2013, survived by a daughter, Catherine.

Medals and decorations

• Württembergische Goldene Verdienstmedaille on 25 February 1915
• Military Merit Order Fourth Class with Swords (Bavaria)
• Military Merit Order Second Class (Bavaria)
• Friedrich Order with Swords First Class (Württemberg)
• Military Merit Order (Württemberg)
• Military Merit Cross 3rd class (Austria-Hungary)
• Iron Cross
  • 2nd Class on 24 September 1914
  • 1st Class on 29 January 1915
• Pour le Mérite on 18 December 1917
• Wound Badge (1918) in Silver
• Honour Cross of the World War 1914/1918 in 1934
• Sudetenland Medal
• Memel Medal
• Wehrmacht Long Service Award 4th to 1st class
• Clasp to the Iron Cross
  • 2nd Class on 13 May 1940
  • 1st Class on 15 May 1940
• Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds
  • Knight's Cross on 27 May 1940 as Generalmajor and commander of the 7. Panzer-Division
  • 10th Oak Leaves on 20 March 1941 as Generalleutnant and commander of the 7. Panzer-Division
  • 6th Swords on 20 January 1942 as General der Panzertruppe and commander of the Panzergruppe Afrika
  • 6th Diamonds on 11 March 1943 as Generalfeldmarschall and commander in chief of the Heeresgruppe Afrika
• Wound Badge in Gold on 7 August 1944
• Panzer Badge in Silver
• Italian Gold Medal of Military Valour in February 1942
• Knight of the Colonial Order of the Star of Italy in February 1942
• Grand Officer of the Italian Military Order of Savoy Mid-1942
• Romanian Order of Michael the Brave 3rd and 2nd Class on 12 July 1944
• Mentioned twice on the Wehrmachtbericht (26 June 1942 and 10 September 1943)

References

Explanatory notes

1. Rommel was a great admirer of Wavell, and kept a translated copy of Wavell's Lees Knowles Lectures on Generals and Generalship with him throughout the desert campaign. Many years later Frau Rommel presented the annotated and weathered little volume to Lady Wavell.
2. 23 to 28 November according to von Mellenthin.
3. As recounted by von Luck in his memoirs, Rommel commented to his wife that he wished Hitler had given him another division instead.
4. "I finally decided to fly once again to the Fuhrer's H.Q. I felt it my duty to do all in my power to rouse a true understanding of the practical operational problems of Tunisia".
5. von Runstedt had confided to Rommel that it was for propaganda purposes only.
6. Rommel's chief of staff, Hans Speidel commented "The organization and chain of command of the major commands in the West was somewhere between confusion and chaos."
7. His diary for 3 June reads: 'The most urgent need was to speak to the Führer personally, convey to him the extent of the manpower and material inferiority we would suffer in the event of a landing, and request the dispatch of two further Panzer divisions, an A.A. Corps, and a Nebelwerfer brigade to Normandy...' But he was recalled by the news of the invasion, and did not see Hitler, so the 12 SS was not moved: a mischance which must have saved many American lives.
8. Commenting on 5th Light Division's inability to succeed in its early attempts upon Tobruk, Rommel wrote: "The division's command had not mastered the art of concentrating its strength at one point, forcing a breakthrough, rolling up and securing the flanks on either side, and then penetrating like lighting, before the enemy has time to react, deep into his rear." Said B. H. Liddell Hart, the Blitzkrieg method could not be better epitomised in a single sentence.
9. As a typical example, in the final assault on the 150th Brigade in "the Cauldron", Rommel went in with the foremost platoon.
10. Rommel survived the protest. Hitler told him it was none of his business, and took no further action against him
11. Details several specific instances of Rommel's disinclination to go along with the Nazi antisemitic policy and consequent orders.
12. According to Scherzer as Generalmajor.

Citations

1. Coggins 1980, p. 30.
2. Rommel 1982, p. xv, Quote from Liddell Hart in his intro: Awe for his dynamic generalship developed into an almost affectionate admiration for him as a man.
3. Rommel 1982, p. xiv, comment from Liddell Hart.
4. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 241.
5. Rommel 1982, p. xv, Quote from Liddel Hart in his intro: This was inspired primarily by the speed and surprise of his operations, but it was fostered by the way he maintained in African warfare the decencies of the soldierly code, and by his own chivalrous behavior toward the many prisoners of war whom he met in person.
6. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 242.
7. Fraser 1993, p. 8.
8. Butler 2015, pp. 26–27.
9. Lewin 1998, p. 219.
10. Hoffmann 2004, p. 10.
11. Butler 2015, pp. 30–31.
12. Butler 2015, p. 43.
13. ^ Fraser 1993, p. 19.
14. Lewin 1998, p. 4.
15. Fraser 1993, p. 25.
16. Fraser 1993, pp. 27–29.
17. ^ Douglas-Home 1973, p. 25.
18. Fraser 1993, p. 31.
19. ^ Fraser 1993, p. 36.
20. Fraser 1993, p. 39.
21. ^ Fraser 1993, p. 43.
22. Butler 2015, p. 50.
23. Fraser 1993, pp. 43, 45.
24. Fraser 1993, pp. 48–49.
25. Fraser 1993, pp. 53–60.
26. Butler 2015, p. 65.
27. Butler 2015, pp. 65–67.
28. Hoffmann 2004, p. 14.
29. Butler 2015, p. 71.
30. Butler 2015, pp. 72–73.
31. Butler 2015, pp. 74–77.
32. ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 15.
33. Butler 2015, pp. 78–81.
34. Butler 2015, p. 99.
35. Butler 2015, p. 100.
36. Fraser 1993, p. 86.
37. Fraser 1993, p. 98.
38. Butler 2015, pp. 133–134.
39. Butler 2015, pp. 100, 103.
40. Fraser 1993, p. 99.
41. Fraser 1993, p. 100.
42. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 9.
43. Fraser 1993, p. 117.
44. Butler 2015, p. 132.
45. Fraser 1993, pp. 120–121.
46. Butler 2015, p. 137.
47. Butler 2015, p. 142.
48. Butler 2015, p. 138.
49. Fraser 1993, p. 119.
50. Rommel 1982, p. 429: As related by Manfred Rommel: "One day I decided to join the Waffen-SS and told my father of my decision in order to get his consent. He reacted strongly. 'That's out of the question,' he said. 'You will join the same force as I've served in for over thirty years.' My father normally used to leave me a great deal of freedom in matters of this kind, and so I began to argue my point of view. But this time he cut me off short."
51. Butler 2015, p. 144.
52. Butler 2015, p. 146.
53. Fraser 1993, p. 141.
54. Fraser 1993, p. 146, 149.
55. Butler 2015, p. 151.
56. Hoffmann 2004, p. 114.
57. Fraser 1993, p. 151.
58. Fraser 1993, pp. 156–157.
59. Fraser 1993, p. 161.
60. Butler 2015, pp. 149–150, 154.
61. Rommel 1982, p. xviii, from Liddell-Hart's introduction.
62. Butler 2015, pp. 154–155.
63. Lewin 1998, p. 14.
64. ^ von Luck 1989, p. 38.
65. Butler 2015, pp. 160–161.
66. Churchill 1949, p. 47.
67. Thompson 2011, pp. 64–65.
68. Butler 2015, p. 164.
69. Fraser 1993, p. 183.
70. Butler 2015, pp. 165–166.
71. Butler 2015, p. 166.
72. ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 24.
73. Butler 2015, pp. 169–171.
74. Butler 2015, pp. 172, 174.
75. Fraser 1993, pp. 204–206.
76. Fraser 1993, pp. 191–192.
77. Butler 2015, p. 177.
78. Hoffmann 2004, p. 26.
79. ^ Fraser 1993, p. 223.
80. ^ Fraser 1993, p. 217.
81. Butler 2015, p. 17.
82. Butler 2015, p. 182.
83. Lewin 1998, p. 238.
84. Butler 2015, pp. 187–190.
85. Butler 2015, p. 193.
86. Butler 2015, p. 199.
87. Butler 2015, p. 198.
88. Lewin 1998, p. 33.
89. Fraser 1993, p. 229.
90. Fraser 1993, p. 231.
91. Butler 2015, pp. 204–205.
92. Lewin 1998, p. 36.
93. Butler 2015, p. 205.
94. Lewin 1998, p. 35.
95. Butler 2015, p. 205–206.
96. Butler 2015, pp. 207, 214.
97. Fraser 1993, p. 236.
98. Butler 2015, p. 220.
99. Butler 2015, p. 221.
100. Butler 2015, p. 258.
101. Butler 2015, pp. 221, 224.
102. Hoffmann 2004, p. 35.
103. Fraser 1993, p. 242.
104. Hoffmann 2004, p. 39.
105. Butler 2015, pp. 240–241.
106. Butler 2015, p. 244.
107. Douglas-Home 1973, p. 100.
108. Butler 2015, p. 250.
109. Butler 2015, p. 271.
110. Lewin 1998, p. 48.
111. ^ Mitcham 2007, pp. 28, 175.
112. Mitcham 2008, p. 436.
113. Lewin 1998, p. 53.
114. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 54.
115. Lewin 1998, p. 57.
116. Butler 2015, pp. 292–293.
117. Butler 2015, p. 293.
118. Fraser 1993, p. 277.
119. Fraser 1993, pp. 278–280.
120. Butler 2015, p. 294.
121. Butler 2015, p. 295.
122. Butler 2015, pp. 294–295.
123. Butler 2015, p. 297.
124. ^ Butler 2015, p. 298.
125. Fraser 1993, pp. 287–289.
126. Butler 2015, pp. 300–301.
127. ^ von Mellenthin 1956, p. 88.
128. Fraser 1993, p. 288.
129. von Luck 1989, p. 58.
130. Fraser 1993, pp. 291–293.
131. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 99.
132. Butler 2015, p. 304.
133. Douglas-Home 1973, p. 131.
134. Lewin 1998, pp. 99–101, Quote from Rommel: I had maintained secrecy over the Panzer Group's forthcoming attack eastwards from Mersa el Brega and informed neither the Italian nor the German High Command. We knew from experience that Italian Headquarters cannot keep things to themselves and that everything they wireless to Rome gets round to British ears. However, I had arranged with the Quartermaster for the Panzer Group's order to be posted in every Cantoniera in Tripolitinia on 21 January....
135. Butler 2015, pp. 308, 311.
136. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 106.
137. Butler 2015, pp. 309–310.
138. Butler 2015, p. 321.
139. Butler 2015, p. 319.
140. Rommel 1982, p. 196.
141. Butler 2015, pp. 323–324.
142. Hoffmann 2004, p. 45.
143. Butler 2015, p. 326.
144. Butler 2015, pp. 325–327.
145. Butler 2015, p. 330.
146. Butler 2015, p. 331.
147. Rommel 1982, p. 217.
148. Fraser 1993, p. 334.
149. Rommel 1982, p. 224.
150. Butler 2015, pp. 334–335.
151. Fraser 1993, p. 337.
152. Butler 2015, p. 337.
153. von Luck 1989, p. 103.
154. Shirer 1960, pp. 911–912.
155. Playfair 1960, p. 296.
156. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 123.
157. Playfair 1960, p. 277.
158. Butler 2015, pp. 339, 343.
159. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 127.
160. Rommel 1982, p. 239.
161. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 129.
162. Butler 2015, pp. 338–339.
163. Butler 2015, pp. 347–350.
164. Shirer 1960, p. 913.
165. Fraser 1993, p. 345.
166. Butler 2015, p. 351.
167. Fraser 1993, p. 346.
168. Butler 2015, p. 354.
169. Butler 2015, pp. 355, 370.
170. ^ Douglas-Home 1973, p. 171.
171. Douglas-Home 1973, map, p.163.
172. Hoffmann 2004, pp. 47–48.
173. Hoffmann 2004, p. 48.
174. Douglas-Home 1973, p. 165.
175. Carver 1962, p. 67.
176. Lewin 1998, p. 160.
177. Carver 1962, p. 70.
178. Rommel 1982, p. 286.
179. Butler 2015, p. 372.
180. Hoffmann 2004, p. 50.
181. Hoffmann 2004, p. 52.
182. Butler 2015, p. 362.
183. Douglas-Home 1973, p. 172.
184. Fraser 1993, p. 370.
185. Rommel 1982, p. 299.
186. Butler 2015, pp. 375–377.
187. Fraser 1993, p. 373.
188. Butler 2015, pp. 378–380.
189. Fraser 1993, p. 378.
190. Butler 2015, p. 385.
191. Fraser 1993, pp. 379–380.
192. Butler 2015, pp. 385–386.
193. Butler 2015, pp. 387–388.
194. Fraser 1993, pp. 381–383.
195. Rommel 1982, p. 327.
196. Butler 2015, p. 389.
197. Fraser 1993, p. 383.
198. Douglas-Home 1973, p. 179.
199. Lewin 1998, p. 190.
200. Coggins 1980, p. 11.
201. Lewin 1998, p. 192.
202. Rommel 1982, pp. 342–357.
203. Coggins 1980, p. 129.
204. Coggins 1980, p. 134.
205. Coggins 1980, p. 135.
206. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 209.
207. Coggins 1980, p. 136.
208. Hoffmann 2004, p. 117.
209. ^ Willmott 1984, p. 69.
210. Lewin 1998, p. 213.
211. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 220.
212. Lewin 1998, pp. 218–220.
213. Whitlock pp. 93–107
214. ^ Willmott 1984, p. 60.
215. Rommel 1982, p. 510.
216. Willmott 1984, p. 89.
217. Willmott 1984, p. 67.
218. Lewin 1998, p. 217.
219. Willmott 1984, p. 83.
220. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 223.
221. ^ "Obituary: Flight Lieutenant Charley Fox". Telegraph. 4 November 2008. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
222. Hoffmann 2004, p. 65.
223. Shirer 1960, p. 1031.
224. Speidel 1950, pp. 68, 73.
225. Lewin 1998, p. 236.
226. Shirer 1960, p. 1076.
227. SPIEGEL ONLINE, Hamburg, Germany (1978). "Rommel: Ende einer Legende". spiegel.de.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
228. Shirer 1960, p. 967.
229. Shirer 1960, p. 967-969.
230. Manfred Rommel, Nuremberg testimony
231. "Manfred Rommel, son of the Desert Fox, forged a great friendship with Monty’s son which became a symbol of post-war reconciliation". The Daily Telegraph. 10 November 2013.
232. "'The Desert Fox' commits suicide". History. Retrieved 23 August 2014.
233. Rommel 1982, p. 505, Letter from Goering to Frau Rommel, 26 October 1944: "The fact that your husband, Field Marshal Rommel, has died a hero's death as a result of his wounds, after we had all hoped he would remain for the German people, has deeply touched me.".
234. Manfred Rommel: Trotz allem heiter. Stuttgart 1998, 3rd edition, p. 69.
235. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 321.
236. Marshall p.
237. "Letter reveals Rommel's son account of his general father's last moments after being ordered to commit suicide by Hitler - Daily Mail Online". Mail Online. 30 December 2012.
238. Mausshardt, Philipp (20 October 1989). "Stramm am Grab". Die Zeit.
239. "Rommel-Ausstellung in der Villa Lindenhof". Retrieved 15 October 2013. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
240. Hall, Allan (17 November 2013). "Doctor's notes tell of SS Rommel plot: Report reveals how physician was forced to put 'heart attack' on death certificate to cover up his forced suicide". Daily Mail. DMG Media. Retrieved 18 November 2013.
241. Hoffman p. 101
242. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 40.
243. "Deutches Afrikakorps".
244. Hoffmann 2004, p. 25.
245. Rommel 1982, p. xv, Quote from Liddel Hart in his intro: This was inspired primarily by the speed and surprise of his operations....
246. ^ Lewin 1998, p. 243.
247. Rommel 1982, p. xix, from Liddell Hart's introduction.
248. Brighton 2008, p. 108.
249. Young 1950, p. 114.
250. Young 1950, p. 113.
251. Rommel 1982, p. xiv, from the introduction by Liddell-Hart.
252. Jackson, Robert (2010), Tanky a další vojenská vozidla, Grada Publishing a.s., p. 75
253. Lewin 1998, p. 239.
254. Lewin 1998, p. 16.
255. Rommel 1982, p. xv, Said Liddell Hart in his intro to the Rommel Papers: "Until I delved into Rommel's papers I regarded him as a brilliant tactician and great fighting leader, but did not realize how deep a sense of strategy he had...".
256. Ralf p. 115
257. Lewin 1998, p. 55.
258. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 45.
259. Lewin 1998, p. 1.
260. Hoffmann 2004, p. 92.
261. Hoffmann 2004, p. 94.
262. Lewin 1998, p. 244.
263. Lewin 1998, p. 240.
264. Lewin 1998, p. 191, Quoted from Hans-Adolf Jacobson, Sunday Times 1967.
265. Von Luck p. 44 Quote: "I was able to observe again and again—especially in North Africa—how commanders opposed his orders, which often seemed impossible to carry out, and were promptly replaced."
266. Rommel 1982, p. 110.
267. Lewin 1998.
268. Rommel 1982, p. 165.
269. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 24.
270. von Mellenthin 1956, p. 48.
271. Lewin 1998, p. 28.
272. Rommel p.
273. Current Biography Yearbook 1942 New York: H.W. Wilson, 1943. pp. 701–04. See also: http://www.storico.org/Rommel.htm
274. "Diario storico del Comando Supremo", vol.5 to 9, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office
275. "Verbali delle riunioni tenute dal Capo di SM Generale", vol.2 and 3, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office
276. Montanari, "Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale", vol. 1 to 4, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office
277. Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 124–125
278. M.Montanari, Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale, Vol.IV, chapter III, pp. 119–197
279. Young 1950, pp. 127–128.
280. von Luck 1989, pp. 125–128.
281. Young 1950, p. 85.
282. Patton, Benjamin; Scruby, Jennifer (6 March 2012). Growing Up Patton: Reflections on Heroes, History, and Family Wisdom. Penguin. ISBN 9781101560013.
283. Perry, Marvin (22 February 2012). World War II in Europe: A Concise History. Cengage Learning. p. 165. ISBN 1285401794.
284. Lewin 1998, p. 225.
285. Rigg pp. 40, 103, 131–132, 314
286. Terry Brighton. Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War. New York: Crown, 2008. p. xvii
287. Moorhouse 2007, pp. 157–158.
288. Green 1993, p. 137.
289. Silverstone, Paul (6 April 2011). The Navy of the Nuclear Age, 1947–2007. Routledge. p. 1982. ISBN 9781135864651.
290. Churchill 1950, p. 200.
291. Bierman & Smith 2002, p. 56.
292. Butler 2015, p. 32.
293. Butler 2015, p. 32–33.
294. Butler 2015, p. 101.
295. Butler 2015, pp. 33, 104.
296. Fraser 1993, pp. 98–99.
297. Grill 2002.
298. Butler 2015, p. 546.
299. Martin 2013.
300. Butler 2015, photos after p. 240.
301. Butler 2015, p. 561.
302. Butler 2015, p. 134.
303. ^ Fraser 1993, p. 172.
304. ^ Scherzer 2007, p. 638.
305. Fellgiebel 2000, p. 363.
306. Von Seemen 1976, p. 286.
307. Fellgiebel 2000, p. 54.
308. Von Seemen 1976, p. 25.
309. Fellgiebel 2000, p. 39.
310. Von Seemen 1976, p. 14.
311. Fellgiebel 2000, p. 36.
312. Von Seemen 1976, p. 12.
313. ^ Butler 2015, p. 315.

Bibliography

• Bierman, John; Smith, Colin (2002). The Battle of Alamein: Turning Point, World War II. ISBN 978-0-670-03040-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Brighton, Terry (2008). Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War. New York: Crown. ISBN 978-0-307-46154-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Butler, Daniel Allen (2015). Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel. Havertown, PA; Oxford: Casemate. ISBN 978-1-61200-297-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Carver, Michael (1962). El Alamein. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. ISBN 978-1-84022-220-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Churchill, Winston (1949). Their Finest Hour. The Second World War. Vol. II. Boston; Toronto: Houghton Mifflin. OCLC 396145. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Churchill, Winston (1950). The Grand Alliance. The Second World War. Vol. III. Boston; Toronto: Houghton Mifflin. OCLC 396147. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Coggins, Jack (1980). The Campaign for North Africa. New York: Doubleday & Company. ISBN 0-385-04351-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Douglas-Home, Charles (1973). Rommel. The Great Commanders. New York: Saturday Review Press. ISBN 0-8415-0255-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Fellgiebel, Walther-Peer (2000). Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939–1945 — Die Inhaber der höchsten Auszeichnung des Zweiten Weltkrieges aller Wehrmachtteile (in German). Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas. ISBN 978-3-7909-0284-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Fraser, David (1993). Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. New York: HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-06-018222-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Green, Leslie C. (1993). The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-3540-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Grill, Markus (10 October 2002). "Was Macht Eigentlich...: Manfred Rommel". Stern (in German). {{cite web}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hoffmann, Karl (2004). Erwin Rommel, 1891-1944. Commanders in Focus. London: Brassey's. ISBN 1-85753-374-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Lewin, Ronald (1998) . Rommel As Military Commander. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• von Luck, Hans (1989). Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck. New York: Dell Publishing of Random House. ISBN 0-440-20802-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Martin, Douglas (9 November 2013). "Manfred Rommel, Son of German Field Marshal, Dies at 84". The New York Times. {{cite web}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• von Mellenthin, Friedrich (1956). Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. London: Cassell. ISBN 978-0-345-32158-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mitcham, Samuel W. (2007). Rommel's Desert Commanders — The Men Who Served the Desert Fox, North Africa, 1941–42. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-3510-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mitcham, Samuel W. (2008). The Rise of the Wehrmacht. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International. ISBN 978-0-275-99641-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Moorhouse, Roger (2007). Killing Hitler: The Third Reich and the Plots Against the Führer. London: Random House. ISBN 978-1-844133-22-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; with Flynn, Captain F. C. RN; Molony, Brigadier C. J. C.; Gleave, Group Captain T. P. (2004) . Butler, Sir James (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-845740-67-X. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |lastauthoramp= ignored (|name-list-style= suggested) (help)
• Rommel, Erwin (1982) . Liddell Hart, B. H. (ed.). The Rommel Papers. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-80157-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Scherzer, Veit (2007). Die Ritterkreuzträger 1939–1945 Die Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939 von Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm sowie mit Deutschland verbündeter Streitkräfte nach den Unterlagen des Bundesarchives (in German). Jena, Germany: Scherzers Miltaer-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-938845-17-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Shirer, William L. (1960). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-0-671-62420-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Speidel, Hans (1950). Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign. Chicago: Henry Regnery. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Thompson, Julian (2011) . Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory. New York: Arcade. ISBN 978-1-61145-314-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Von Seemen, Gerhard (1976). Die Ritterkreuzträger 1939–1945 : die Ritterkreuzträger sämtlicher Wehrmachtteile, Brillanten-, Schwerter- und Eichenlaubträger in der Reihenfolge der Verleihung : Anhang mit Verleihungsbestimmungen und weiteren Angaben (in German). Friedberg, Germany: Podzun-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-7909-0051-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Willmott, H.P. (1984). June, 1944. Poole: Blandford Press. ISBN 0-7137-1446-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Young, Desmond (1950). Rommel: The Desert Fox. New York: Harper & Row. OCLC 48067797. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

Further reading

• Almásy, László (2001). With Rommel's Army in Libya. Bloomington, IN: 1st Books Libr. ISBN 978-0-7596-1608-0.
• Carell, Paul (1960). The Foxes of the Desert. New York: Dutton.
• De Lannoy, Francois (2002). Afrikakorps, 1941–1943: The Libya Egypt Campaign. Bayeux: Heimdal. ISBN 978-2-84048-152-2.
• Forty, George (1998). The Armies of Rommel. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-379-0.
• Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (1994). Rommel's North Africa Campaign: September 1940 – November 1942. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books. ISBN 978-1-58097-018-1.
• Jentz, Thomas L. (1998). Tank Combat in North Africa: The Opening Rounds: Operations Sonnenblume, Brevity, Skorpion and Battleaxe February 1941 – June 1941. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. ISBN 978-0-7643-0226-8.
• Kelly, Orr (2002). Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia. New York: J. Wiley. ISBN 978-0-471-41429-2.
• Kriebel, Rainer; Gudmundsson, Bruce I (1999). Inside the Afrika Korps: The Crusader Battles, 1941–1942. London: Greenhill. ISBN 978-1-85367-322-1.
• Latimer, Jon (2002). Alamein. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-01016-1.
• Latimer, Jon (2001). Tobruk 1941: Rommel's Opening Move. Oxford: Osprey Military. ISBN 978-1-84176-092-6.
• Liddell Hart, B.H. (1948). The German Generals Talk. New York: Morrow. ISBN 978-0-688-06012-1.
• Marshall, Charles F. (1994). The Rommel Murder: The Life and Death of the Desert Fox. Stackpole Marshall Books. ISBN 978-0-8117-2472-2.
• Mitcham, Samuel W. (2001) . Rommel's Greatest Victory. Novato, CA: Presidio. ISBN 978-0-89141-730-9.
• Reuth, Ralf Georg (2006). Rommel: The End of a Legend. London: Haus Books. ISBN 978-1-904950-20-2.
• Rommel, Erwin (1934). Gefechts-Aufgaben für Zug und Kompanie : Ein Handb. f. d. Offizierunterricht (in German). Mittler & Sohn.
• Rommel, Erwin; Kidde, G. E. (2006) . Infantry Attacks. OCLC 22898178.
• Rommel, Erwin; Pimlott, John (2006) . Rommel and his Art of War. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-543-0.
• Schraepler, Hans-Joachim; Schraepler, Hans-Albrecht (September 2009). At Rommel's Side: The Lost Letters of Hans-Joachim Schraepler. London: Frontline Books. ISBN 978-1-84832-538-8.
• Showalter, Dennis (2005). Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century. ISBN 978-0-425-20663-8.
• Windrow, Martin (1976). Rommel's Desert Army. Osprey. ISBN 978-0-85045-095-8.

External links

• Neitzel, Sönke (2005), "Rommel, Eugen Johannes Erwin", Neue Deutsche Biographie (in German), vol. 22, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 23–24; (full text online)
• The Forced Suicide of Field Marshal Rommel, 1944
• Erwin Rommel—The Idol – German documentary
• Who Was Erwin Rommel? – Post detailing Rommel's life
• The Real Rommel—Channel 4's Portrait
• Erwin Rommel – Jewish Virtual Library
• Rommel in Libya
• Rommel's battlefields in Libya today
• Erwin Rommel in the French castle in la Roche Guyon, some pictures and video
• Template:Worldcat id
• Erwin Rommel Desert War.net
• Daily Mail article from December 2012 re a letter dictated by Manfred Rommel about the circumstances of his father's death
• Erwin Rommel Memorial – Find A Grave

Links to related articles

Military offices Preceded byNew Creation Commandant of the Theresian Military Academy NCO WarSchool 1938 Succeeded by? Preceded by? Commander of the Führer Begleit Battalion 1938 – 5 February 1940 Succeeded by? Preceded byGeneral der Kavallerie Georg Stumme Commander of 7th Panzer Division 5 February 1940 – 15 February 1941 Succeeded byGeneral der Panzertruppen Hans Freiherr von Funck Preceded byNew creation Commander of the Afrika Korps 19 February – 15 August 1941 Succeeded byGeneralleutnant Ludwig Crüwell Preceded byNew creation Commander of Heeresgruppe Afrika 15 August 1941 – 9 March 1943 Succeeded byGeneral Hans-Jürgen von Arnim Preceded byNew creation Commander of Heeresgruppe B 15 July 1943 – 19 July 1944 Succeeded byGeneralfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge Awards and achievements Preceded byThe American Flag Cover of Time Magazine 13 July 1942 Succeeded byDmitri Shostakovich v t e German Field Marshals and Grand Admirals of Nazi Germany Marshal of the Reich (Reichsmarschall) Wehrmacht Hermann Göring Field Marshals (Generalfeldmarschall) Heer Werner von Blomberg Fedor von Bock Eduard Freiherr von Böhm-Ermolli (honorary) Walther von Brauchitsch Ernst Busch Wilhelm Keitel Ewald von Kleist Günther von Kluge Georg von Küchler Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb Wilhelm List Erich von Manstein Walter Model Friedrich Paulus Walter von Reichenau Erwin Rommel Gerd von Rundstedt Ferdinand Schörner Maximilian von Weichs Erwin von Witzleben Luftwaffe Robert Ritter von Greim Albert Kesselring Erhard Milch Wolfram von Richthofen Hugo Sperrle Grand Admirals (Großadmiral) Kriegsmarine Karl Dönitz Erich Raeder v t e Recipients of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds 1941 Werner Mölders 1942 Adolf Galland Gordon Gollob Hans-Joachim Marseille Hermann Graf 1943 Erwin Rommel Wolfgang Lüth Walter Nowotny Adelbert Schulz 1944 Hans-Ulrich Rudel Hyacinth Graf Strachwitz Herbert Otto Gille Hans-Valentin Hube Albert Kesselring Helmut Lent Sepp Dietrich Walter Model Erich Hartmann Hermann Balck Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer Albrecht Brandi 1945 Ferdinand Schörner Hasso von Manteuffel Theodor Tolsdorff Karl Mauss Dietrich von Saucken Golden Oak Leaves Template:KCwithOLandSW Template:KCwithOL Template:Knight's Cross recipients of the 7th PD Template:Combined Pilots-Observation Badge with Diamonds v t e Recipients of the Pour le Mérite and Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross Fedor von Bock Kuno-Hans von Both Ernst Busch Hermann Göring Robert Ritter von Greim Siegfried Haenicke Alfred Keller Heinrich Kirchheim Otto Lancelle Bruno Loerzer Theo Osterkamp Johann von Ravenstein Erwin Rommel Karl Rothenburg Ferdinand Schörner Wolff von Stutterheim Ernst Udet Names are in alphabetical order

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