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Template:Campaignbox Arab-Israeli conflict
First Intifada | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israeli-Palestinian conflict | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
Israel | Unified National Leadership of the Uprising | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Yitzhak Shamir | Yasser Arafat | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
160 | 1,162 |
The First Intifada (1987 - 1993) (also "war of the stones") was a mass uprising against Israeli military occupation, that began in Jabalia refugee camp and spread to Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Palestinian actions took a number of forms, including civil disobedience, general strikes, boycotts on Israeli products, graffiti, and barricades, but it was the stone-throwing demonstrations by youth against the heavily-armed Israeli Defense Forces that brought the intifada international renown.
Over the course of the first intifada, an estimated 1,100 Palestinians and 160 Israelis were killed in the fighting. Another 1,000 Palestinians were assassinated by their own people as alleged collaborators, although fewer than half had any proven contact with the Israeli authorities.
General causes
Background
Since Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip from neighboring Arab countries during the Six-Day War in 1967, a growing sense of frustration among Palestinians living in the occupied territories had developed. There was not much progress being made in finding a durable solution for their sufferings and nationalist claims. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) - the official representative of the Palestinians - continuously fought against Israeli forces since the late 1960s, and after the Lebanese Civil War in 1975-1982, the PLO had been forced to relocate its offices to Tunis. Although all Arab states with the exception of Egypt maintained an official state of war with Israel, the rhetoric was toned down somewhat in the mid-1980s, and Palestinians found advocacy on their behalf weakened. The Arab summit in Amman in November 1987 focused on the Iran-Iraq War, and the Palestinian issue was shunted to the sidelines for the first time in years. Israeli military occupation of Southern Lebanon and the continued Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip contributed to growing discontent with the status quo.
Catalysts
Muslim clerics in the territories used their pulpits to speak against the Israeli government. Prior events included an ambush by the Israeli Defense Forces, killing seven men from Gaza believed to be members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad on October 1, 1987. Several days later an Israeli settler shot a Palestinian schoolgirl in the back.
Rumors reinforced by real incidents caused anger and street fights against Israeli policemen and soldiers. More catalysts formed when an Israeli was stabbed to death on December 6, while shopping in Gaza City. Two days later, four Palestinian refugees from the Jabalia camp were killed in a traffic accident near the Erez crossing sparking riots the Gaza area. An 18-year old Palestinian was killed by Israeli soldiers during the riots, further heightening tensions.
Palestinians and their supporters assert that the Intifada was a protest of Israel's 'brutal repression' which included extra-judicial killings, mass detentions, house demolitions, deportations, and so on. While relatively few houses were demolished in the years before the Intifada, house demolitions "appeared to have deterrent value" to Israel. After the start of the Intifada, and after the PLO began compensating affected families, demolitions "were transformed into a stimulus to further escalation of resistance." In addition to the political and national sentiment, further causes to the Intifada can be seen in the Egyptian withdrawal from their claims to the Gaza Strip as well as the Jordanian monarchy growing weary of supporting its claims to the West Bank.
High birth rates and the limited allocation of land for new building and agriculture contributed to the increasing density of population in the Palestinian territories and a rise in unemployment. While income from manual labor in Israel was beneficial to the Palestinian economy, jobs were growing scarcer, even for those with university degrees. In fact, at the time of the intifada, only one in eight college-educated Palestinians could find degree-related work.
Leadership
The Palestinians felt abandoned by their Arab allies and the PLO had failed to successfully challenge Israel and establish a Palestinian state in its stead, as promised, despite thwarting Israeli attempts to organize puppet elections in the territories. Many Palestinians were bitter at the thought of spending the rest of their lives as second-class citizens, without full political rights.
The Intifada was not initiated by any single individual or organization, but the PLO soon established itself at the forefront, sponsoring provocateurs and enhancing their presence in the territories. The PLO's rivals in this activity were the Islamic organizations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as local leadership in cities such as Beit Sahour and Bethlehem. However, the uprising was predominantly led by community councils led by Hanan Ashrawi, Faisal Husseini and Haidar Abdel-Shafi, that promoted armed resistance and underground activities while developing independent networks for education, medical care and food aid.
The uprising
After the traffic incident at the Erez Crossing, rumor spread quickly that the wreck was deliberate and an act of vengeance in response to the Israeli stabbed to death several days earlier in the Gaza market. That evening, an uprising began in Jabalia where hundreds of Palestinians burned tires and attacked the IDF troops stationed there. The uprising spread to other Palestinian refugee camps and eventually to several major cities. On December 22, the United Nations Security Council condemned Israel for violating the Geneva Conventions due to the number of Palestinian deaths in these first few weeks of the Intifada.
Much of the Palestinian violence was low-tech; dozens of Palestinian teenagers would confront patrols of Israeli soldiers, showering them with stones. However, at times this tactic gave way to Molotov cocktail attacks, over 100 hand-grenade attacks and more than 500 attacks using guns, killing many Israeli civilians and soldiers.
The IDF was given truncheons and encouraged to break the bones of Palestinian protestors. The Swedish branch of Save the Children estimated that in the first two years of the intifada, "23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating injuries in the first two years of the intifada", and that a third of these children were under the age of ten years old.
Additionally, an estimated 1,000 alleged informers were killed by Palestinian civilian militias, though human rights groups contend that many were not "collaborators" but victims of revenge murders.
On April 19, 1988, a leader of the PLO, Abu Jihad, was assassinated in Tunis. During the resurgence of rioting that followed, about 16 Palestinians were killed. In November of the same year and October of the next, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions condemning Israel.
In 1989, local committees in Beit Sahour initiated a nonviolence movement to withhold taxes - the legality of which under international law is disputed. When time in prison did not stop the activists, Israel crushed the boycott by imposing heavy fines while seizing and disposing the equipment, furnishings, and goods from local stores, factories, and homes.
As the Intifada progressed, Israel introduced various riot control methods that had the effect of reducing the number of Palestinian fatalities. Another contributor to the high initial casualties was Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin's aggressive stance towards the Palestinians. On a tour of the Jalazon Refugee Camp in January 1988, Rabin said, "The first priority of the security forces is to prevent violent demonstrations with force, power and blows ... We will make it clear who is running the territories". His successor Moshe Arens subsequently proved to have a better understanding of pacification, which perhaps reflects in the lower casualty rates for the following years. In July 1989, the first suicide attack occurred inside Israel's borders: the Tel Aviv Jerusalem bus 405 massacre. This is not to be confused with the first suicide bombing by Palestinian militants, carried out in the last year of the first intifada in 1993.
Benny Morris describes the situation by June 1990: "By then the Intifada seemed to have lost direction. A symptom of the PLO's frustration was the great increase in the killing of suspected collaborators; in 1991 the Israelis killed fewer Palestinians - about 100 - than the Palestinians did themselves - about 150." Attempts at the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were made at the Madrid Conference of 1991.
Outcome
Prior to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 1,162 Palestinians (241 of them children, some of whom took an active role in the violence) had been killed by Israelis and 160 Israelis (5 of them children) had been killed by Palestinians. In addition, approximately 1,000 Palestinians had been killed by Palestinians as alleged collaborators, though only 40-45% of those killed had maintained contacts with Israeli authorities. In the first thirteen months of the Intifada, 332 Palestinians and 12 Israelis had been killed.
The Intifada was not a military endeavor in either a conventional or guerrilla sense. The PLO (which had limited control of the situation) never expected the uprising to make any direct gains against the Israeli state, as it was a grassroots, mass movement and not their venture. However, the Intifada did produce a number of results the Palestinians considered positive:
- By engaging the Israelis directly, rather than relying on the authority or the assistance of neighboring Arab states, the Palestinians were able to globally cement their identity as a separate nation worthy of self-determination. The era marked the end of the Israeli discussion of a "Jordanian solution" to merge the Palestinian territories with Jordan.
- The harsh Israeli countermeasures (particularly during the earlier years of the Intifada) resulted in international attention returning to the plight of the Palestinians, as prisoners in their own land. The fact that 159 Palestinian children below the age of 16 (many of them shot while throwing stones at IDF soldiers) were killed was especially alarming for international observers. Significantly, numerous American media outlets openly criticized Israel in a way that they had not previously. The conflict succeeded in putting the Palestinian question back on the international agenda, particularly in the United Nations, but also for the European Union and the United States as well as the Arab states - which during the 1980s were concentrated on the Iran-Iraq War. Europe became an important economic contributor towards the nascent Palestinian Authority, and American aid and support of Israel became - at least in appearance - more conditional than it was previously.
- The Intifada also dealt a heavy economic blow to Israel. The Bank of Israel estimated it cost the country $650 million in lost exports, largely through successful Palestinian boycotts and the creation of local micro industries. The impact on the services sector, including the important Israeli tourist industry, was notably bad.
- The uprising can be linked to the Madrid Conference of 1991, and thereby to the return of the Palestinian Liberation Organization from their Tunisian exile. Although the negotiations failed to fulfill their potential, it is notable that prior to the first Intifada, it was doubtful whether there would ever be a Palestinian state. After the Oslo accords, somewhat of an independent Palestinian entity - at sometime - in the future seemed relatively certain.
Ultimately, Israel was successful in containing the uprising. The Palestinians' force was inferior in relation to the well equipped and trained Israeli Defense Forces. However, the Intifada pinpointed numerous problems with the IDF's conduct in the operative and tactical fields, as well as the general problem of Israel's prolonged control of the West Bank and Gaza strip. These problems were noticed and widely criticized, both in international forums (in particular, when humanitarian questions were at stake), but also in Israeli public opinion, in which the Intifada had caused a split.
Template:Timeline of Intifadas
Notes
- "uprising by Palestinians against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories." Intifada, Microsoft Encarta.
- ^ The Intifada - An Overview: The First Two Years
- BBC: A History of Conflict
- HAJ-YAHIA Y. et al. Alleged Palestinian Collaborators with Israel and their Families. A Study of Victims of Internal Political Violence. Peace Papers, No 12, Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Summer 1999, p. 19
- Aryeh Shalev (1991). The Intifada: Causes and Effects. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post & Westview Press. p. 33. ISBN 0-8133-8303.
{{cite book}}
: Check|isbn=
value: length (help) - Ackerman, P and Duvall, A: "A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict", page 403. St. Martin's Press,2000
- Aryeh Shalev (1991). The Intifada: Causes and Effects. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post & Westview Press. pp. 111–114. ISBN 0-8133-8303.
{{cite book}}
: Check|isbn=
value: length (help) - Ackerman, P and Duvall, A: "A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict", page 401. St. Martin's Pres, 2000
- ^ Template:Title=The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence
- ^ Aburish, Said K. (1998). Arafat: From Defender to Dictator. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing pp.201-228 ISBN 1-58234-049-8
- Jeffrey Ivan Victoroff (2006). Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism. IOS Press. p. 204. ISBN 158603670X.
- Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999, Knopf, 1999. p.612
- "It appears that a substantial number, if not the majority, of troops of the intifada are young people, including elementary schoolchildren. They are engaged in throwing stones and Molotov cocktails and other forms of violence." (William V. O'Brien, Law and Morality in Israel's War With the PLO, New York: Routledge, 1991. p. 249. (Quoting THE USE OF PALESTINIAN CHILDREN IN THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA by Justus Reid Weiner)
- "Statistics:First Intifada". B'Tselem. Retrieved 2007-12-01.
- Collaborators, One Year Al-Aqsa Intifada, The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, October 2001. Accessed May 15, 2007.
Further Reading
- Eitan Alimi (2006). Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415385601.
- Geoffrey Aronson (1990). Israel, Palestinians, and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank. London: Kegan Paul International. ISBN 0-7103-0336-X.
- Joel Beinin; Zachary Lockman (1989). Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation. Boston: South End Press. ISBN 0-89608-363-2.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Joost R. Hiltermann (1991). Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-07869-6.
- Mary Elizabeth King (2007). A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance. New York: Nation Books. ISBN 1560258020.
- Benny Morris (1999). Righteous Victims: a History of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-1999. New York: Knopf. ISBN 0-679-74475-4.
- Don Peretz (1990). Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-0860-7.
- Andrew Rigby (1991). Living the Intifada. London: Zed Books. ISBN 1-85649-040-8.
- Aryeh Shalev (1991). The Intifada: Causes and Effects. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post & Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-8303-X.
- Ze'ev Schiff, Ehud Ya'ari (1989). Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising: Israel's Third Front. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-67530-3.
External links
- The Intifada in Palestine:Introduction (www.intifada.com)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 605
- Palestinian Arab "collaborators" (Guardian, UK)
- The Future of a Rebellion - PalestineAn anaysis of the 1980s intifada revolt of Palestinian youth. on libcom.org