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1948 Arab-Israeli War
Part of Arab-Israeli conflict
Captain Avraham "Bren" Adan raising the Ink Flag at Umm Rashrash (a site now in Eilat), marking the end of the war
Date 15 May 1948 – 10 March 1949 (9 months, 3 weeks and 2 days) Final armistice agreement concluded on 20 July 1949 Location Former Mandatory Palestine, Sinai Peninsula, southern Lebanon Result Israeli victory, Transjordanian victory, Arab failure, Palestinian's defeat, Armistice Agreements Territorial changes Israel keeps area allotted to it by Partition Plan, captures 50% of area allotted to Arab state, Jordanian occupation of West Bank, Egyptian occupation of the Gaza Strip
Belligerents
Israel Before 26 May 1948 : Haganah Palmach File:Pantani.jpg Irgun File:Lehi.jpg Lehi Allied Bedouin tribes After 26 May 1948 : IDF Minorities Unit Foreign volunteers: Mahal	Egypt Transjordan Iraq Syria  Lebanon Foreign volunteers and irregulars: Holy War Army Arab Liberation Army Muslim Brotherhood Saudi Arabia Yemen Anglo-Egyptian Sudan  Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Politicians : David Ben-Gurion Commanders : Yisrael Galili Yaakov Dori Yigael Yadin Mickey Marcus  † Yigal Allon Yitzhak Rabin David Shaltiel Moshe Dayan Shimon Avidan	Politicians : Azzam Pasha King Abdallah Muzahim al-Pachachi Haj Amin al-Husseini King Farouk I Husni al-Za'im Commanders : John Bagot Glubb Habis al-Majali Fawzi Al-Qawuqji Hasan Salama  † Ahmed Ali al-Mwawi Muhammad Naguib
Strength
Israel: 29,677 initially rising to 115,000 by March 1949. This includes the entire military personnel count—both combat units and logistical units.	Egypt: 10,000 initially, rising to 20,000 Iraq: 3,000 initially, rising to 15,000–18,000 Syria: 2,500–5,000 Transjordan: 8,000–12,000 Lebanon: 1,000 Saudi Arabia: 800–1,200 Yemen: 300 Arab Liberation Army: 3,500–6,000 These numbers include only the combat units sent to the former mandate-territory of Palestine, not the entire military strength.
Casualties and losses
6,373 killed (about 4,000 troops and 2,400 civilians)	8,000–15,000 killed. An estimated breakdown is 3000 Palestinians, 2000 Egyptians, 1000 Jordanians, and 1000 Syrians

The 1948 Arab–Israeli War or the First Arab-Israeli War was fought between the State of Israel and a military coalition of Arab states and Palestinian Arab forces. This war was the second stage of the 1948 Palestine war, known in Arabic as al-Nakba (Template:Lang-ar, "The Catastrophe") and in Hebrew as the Milkhemet Ha'atzma'ut (Template:Lang-he, "War of Independence") or Milkhemet Hashikhrur (Template:Lang-he "War of Liberation").

The war was preceded by a period of civil war in the territory of the Mandatory Palestine between Jewish Yishuv forces and Palestinian Arab forces in response to the UN Partition Plan. An alliance of Arab states intervened on the Palestinian side, turning the civil war into a war between sovereign states. The fighting took place mostly on the former territory of the British Mandate and for a short time also in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Lebanon. The war concluded with the 1949 Armistice Agreements, which established armistice demarcation lines between Israeli and Arab military forces, commonly known as the Green Line.

The war is also considered one of the main triggers for the Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries.

Background

Following World War II, on 14 May 1948, the British Mandate of Palestine came to an end. The surrounding Arab nations were also emerging from mandatory rule. Transjordan, under the Hashemite ruler Abdullah I, gained independence from Britain in 1946 and was called Jordan in 1949, but it remained under heavy British influence.

Egypt, while nominally independent, signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that included provisions by which Britain would maintain a garrison of troops on the Suez Canal. From 1945 on, Egypt attempted to renegotiate the terms of this treaty, which was viewed as a humiliating vestige of colonialism. Lebanon became an independent state in 1943, but French troops would not withdraw until 1946, the same year that Syria won its independence from France.

In 1945, at British prompting, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen formed the Arab League to coordinate policy between the Arab states. Iraq and Transjordan coordinated policies closely, signing a mutual defence treaty, while Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia feared that Transjordan would annex part or all of Palestine, and use it as a steppingstone to attack or undermine Syria, Lebanon, and the Hijaz.

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the adoption and implementation of a plan to resolve the Arab-Jewish conflict by partitioning Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, and the City of Jerusalem. Each state would comprise three major sections, linked by extraterritorial crossroads; the Arab state would also have an enclave at Jaffa. The Jews would get 56% of the land, of which most was in the Negev Desert; their area would contain 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs. The Palestinian Arabs would get 43% of the land, which had a population of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. In consideration of its religious significance, the Jerusalem area, including Bethlehem, with 100,000 Jews and an equal number of Palestinian Arabs, was to become a Corpus separatum, to be administered by the UN. The Jewish leadership accepted the partition plan, without reservation, as "the indispensable minimum," glad to gain international recognition but sorry that they did not receive more.

Arguing that the partition plan was unfair to the Arabs with regard to the population balance at that time, the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab League firmly opposed the UN action and rejected its authority to involve itself in the entire matter. They upheld "that the rule of Palestine should revert to its inhabitants, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."

1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine

Part of a series on the
Nakba
Precipitating events Background Mandatory Palestine 1947 partition plan Jewish insurgency in Mandatory Palestine 1948 Palestine war Civil war in Palestine Plan Dalet Deir Yassin massacre Battle of Haifa Israeli Declaration of Independence Arab–Israeli War Timeline Expulsion from Lydda and Ramle Transfer Committee
1948 expulsion and flight Palestinian refugees Camps Palestinian return to Israel Right of return Present absentee UN Resolution 194 UNRWA Hebraization of Palestinian place names Paraguay plan
Discourse Causes New Historians Nakba denial Nakba Law
Notable writers Aref al-Aref Yoav Gelber Efraim Karsh Rashid Khalidi Walid Khalidi Nur Masalha Benny Morris Ilan Pappé Edward Said Tom Segev Avraham Sela Avi Shlaim Constantin Zureiq
Symbols and memory Palestinian key Handala Nakba Day Land Day Great March of Return March of Return (Israel)
Ongoing Ongoing Nakba Palestinian genocide accusation Gaza genocide
Lists List of depopulated towns and villages Estimates of the number of Palestinians who fled
v t e

The 1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine started on 30 November 1947, the date after the UN General Assembly vote on the UN Partition Plan. It finished on 14 May 1948 when the Jewish People's Council approved a proclamation which declared the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.

During this period, the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine clashed, while the British, who had the obligation to maintain order, organised their own withdrawal and intervened only on an occasional basis.

Arab Palestinians left, fled or were expelled in large numbers, especially after Jewish forces took the major seaport of Haifa in April 1948.

Political objectives

Yishuv

Benny Morris states that the Yishuv's aims evolved during the war.

Initially, the aim was "simple and modest": to survive the assaults of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states. "The Zionist leaders deeply, genuinely, feared a Middle Eastern reenactment of the Holocaust, which had just ended; the Arabs' public rhetoric reinforced these fears". As the war progressed, the aim of expanding the Jewish state beyond the UN partition borders appeared: first to incorporate clusters of isolated Jewish settlements and later to add more territories to the state and give it defensible borders. A third and further aim that emerged among the political and military leaders after four or five months was to "reduce the size of Israel's prospective large and hostile Arab minority, seen as a potential powerful fifth column, by belligerency and expulsion."

Plan Dalet, or Plan D, (Hebrew: תוכנית ד', Tokhnit dalet) was a plan worked out by the Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary group and the forerunner of the Israel Defense Forces, in autumn 1947 to spring 1948, which was sent to Haganah units in early March 1948. According to the academic Ilan Pappe, its purpose was to conquer as much of Palestine and to expel as many Palestinians as possible, though according to Benny Morris there was no such intent. In his book The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Pappé asserts that Plan Dalet was a "blueprint for ethnic cleansing" with the aim of reducing both rural and urban areas of Palestine. The intent of Plan Dalet is subject to much controversy, with historians on the one extreme asserting that it was entirely defensive, and historians on the other extreme asserting that the plan aimed at maximum conquest and expulsion of the Palestinians.

The Arab League as a whole

The Arab League before partition affirmed the right to the independence of Palestine, while blocking the creation of a Palestinian government. Towards the end of 1947, the League established a military committee commanded by the Iraqi general Isma'il Safwat, whose mission was to raise an army of Palestinian and Arab volunteers. The Arab strategy was to support an armed opposition to the Partition Plan, while excluding any participation of their regular armed forces. In the introduction to the cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the UN Secretary-General on 15 May 1948, the Arab League gave reaons for its intervention, On the occasion of the intervention of Arab States in Palestine to restore law and order and to prevent disturbances prevailing in Palestine from spreading into their territories and to check further bloodshed,. Clause 10.(a) of the Cablegram provided:-

10. Now that the Mandate over Palestine has come to an end, leaving no legally constituted authority behind in order to administer law and order in the country and afford the necessary and adequate protection to life and property, the Arab States declare as follows:

(a) The right to set up a Government in Palestine pertains to its inhabitants under the principles of self-determination recognized by the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as the United Nations Charter;

The Cablegram goes on to note in subclause (b) Peace and order have been completely upset in Palestine, and, in consequence of Jewish aggression, approximately over a quarter of a million of the Arab population have been compelled to leave their homes and emigrate to neighbouring Arab countries. It further notes in subclause (c) The Mandatory has already announced that on the termination of the Mandate it will no longer be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine except in the camps and areas actually occupied by its forces, and only to the extent necessary for the security of those forces and their withdrawal.

The Cablegram also noted other clauses

5. Great Britain however placed Palestine in such a position as made it possible for the Jews to flood the country with waves of immigrants

7. The Governments of Arab states recognize the independence of Palestine, which has so far been suppressed by the British Mandate.

7. ..the only solution of the Palestine problem is the establishment of a unitary Palestinian

10. (b) The prevailing events in Palestine exposed the concealed aggressive intentions of the Zionists

10. (e) ..the Arab Governments find themselves compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of restoring peace and security and establishing law and order in Palestine.

Some unofficial statements before the war had been more aggressive. Arab League Secretary Azzam Pasha, according to an interview in an 11 October 1947 article of Akhbar al-Yom, said: "I personally wish that the Jews do not drive us to this war, as this will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades".

According to Yoav Gelber, the Arab countries were "drawn into the war by the collapse of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab Liberation Army the Arab governments' primary goal was preventing the Palestinian Arabs' total ruin and the flooding of their own countries by more refugees. According to their own perception, had the invasion not taken place, there was no Arab force in Palestine capable of checking the Haganah's offensive".

The Yishuv perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs's true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly."

King Abdullah I of Jordan

King Abdullah was the commander of the Arab Legion, the strongest Arab army involved in the war. The Arab Legion had about 10,000 soldiers, trained and commanded by British officers.

In 1946–47, Abdullah said that he had no intention to "resist or impede the partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish state." Hostile towards Palestinian nationalism, Abdullah wished to annex as much of Palestine as possible. Ideally, Abdullah would have liked to annex all of Palestine, but he was prepared to compromise. He supported the partition, intending that the West Bank area of the British Mandate allocated for the Arab state be annexed to Jordan.

Abdullah had secret meetings with the Jewish Agency (at which the future Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was among the delegates) that reached an agreement of Jewish non-interference with Jordanian annexation of the West Bank (although Abdullah failed in his goal of acquiring an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea through the Negev desert) and of Jordanian agreement not to attack the area of the Jewish state contained in the United Nations partition resolution (in which Jerusalem was given neither to the Arab nor the Jewish state, but was to be an internationally administered area). In one stunning diplomatic coup, the strongest Arab army agreed not to attack the Jewish state.

However, by 1948, the neighbouring Arab states pressured Abdullah into joining them in an "all-Arab military intervention" against the newly created State of Israel, that he used to restore his prestige in the Arab world, which had grown suspicious of his relatively good relationship with Western and Jewish leaders.

Abdullah's role in this war became substantial. He saw himself as the "supreme commander of the Arab forces" and "persuaded the Arab League to appoint him" to this position. Through his leadership, the Arabs fought the 1948 war to meet Abdullah's political goals.

The other Arab states

King Farouk of Egypt was anxious to prevent Abdullah from being seen as the main champion of the Arab world in Palestine, which he feared might damage his own leadership aspirations of the Arab world. In addition, Farouk wished to annex all of southern Palestine to Egypt. Nuri as-Said, the strongman of Iraq, had ambitions for bringing the entire Fertile Crescent under Iraqi leadership. Both Syria and Lebanon wished to take certain areas of northern Palestine.

One result of the ambitions of the various Arab leaders was a distrust of all the Palestinian leaders who wished to set up a Palestinian state, and a mutual distrust of each other. Co-operation was to be very poor during the war between the various Palestinian factions and the Arab armies.

Arab Higher Committee of Amin al-Husayni

At the beginning of 1948, the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, Amin al-Husayni was in exile in Egypt. He was involved in some of the high level negotiations between Arab leaders at a meeting held in Damascus in February 1948 to organize Palestinian Field Commands. Total distrust existed between him and the Arab League. He thought they had territorial ambitions in Palestine, while they took pains not to alienate the Hashemite kingdom. As a result, the Higher Committee had at its disposal some £750,000 as opposed to the $28 million dollars for the purchase of foreign armaments at the disposal of the Jewish Agency. The commanders of his Holy War Army, Hasan Salama and Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, were allocated only the Lydda district and Jerusalem. This decision

paved the way for an undermining of the Mufti's position among the Arab States. On 9 February, only four days after the Damascus meeting, a severe blow was suffered by the Mufti at the Arab League session in Cairo the appointment of a Palestinian to the General Staff of the League, the formation of a Palestinian Provisional Government, the transfer of authority to local National Committees in areas evacuated by the British, a loan for administration in Palestine and appropriation of large sums to the Arab Higher Executive for Palestinians entitled to war damages .

The Arab League blocked recruitment to al-Husayni's forces, which collapsed following the death of his most charismatic commander, his cousin Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, on 8 April.

Following rumours that King Abdullah was re-opening the bilateral negotiations with Israel that he had previously conducted in secret with the Jewish Agency, the Arab League, led by Egypt, decided to set up the All-Palestine Government in Gaza on 8 September under the nominal leadership of the Mufti. Historian Avi Shlaim wrote:

The decision to form the Government of All-Palestine in Gaza, and the feeble attempt to create armed forces under its control, furnished the members of the Arab League with the means of divesting themselves of direct responsibility for the prosecution of the war and of withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against popular outcry. Whatever the long-term future of the Arab government of Palestine, its immediate purpose, as conceived by its Egyptian sponsors, was to provide a focal point of opposition to Abdullah and serve as an instrument for frustrating his ambition to federate the Arab regions with Jordan.

Abdullah regarded the attempt to revive al-Husayni's Holy War Army as a challenge to his authority and on 3 October his Minister of Defence ordered all armed bodies operating in the areas controlled by the Arab Legion to be disbanded. Glubb Pasha carried out the order ruthlessly and efficiently.

Initial line-up of forces

Military assessments

Benny Morris has argued that although, by the end of 1947, the Palestinians "had a healthy and demoralising respect for the Yishuv's military power", they believed that in decades or centuries "the Jews, like the medieval crusader kingdoms, would ultimately be overcome by the Arab world".

On the eve of the war, the number of Arab troops likely to be committed to the war was about 23,000 (10,000 Egyptians, 4,500 Jordanians, 3,000 Iraqis, 3,000 Syrians, 2,000 ALA volunteers, 1,000 Lebanese and some Saudi Arabians), in addition to the irregular Palestinians already present. The Yishuv had 35,000 troops of the Haganah, 3,000 of Stern and Irgun, and a few thousand armed settlers.

On 12 May, David Ben-Gurion was told by his chief military advisers, "who over-estimated the size of the Arab armies and the numbers and efficiency of the troops who would be committed", that Israel's chances of winning a war against the Arab states were only about even.

Yishuv forces

In November 1947, the Haganah was an underground paramilitary force that had existed as a highly organized, national force, since the riots of 1920–21, and throughout the riots of 1929, and Great Uprising of 1936–39. It had a mobile force, the HISH, which had 2,000 full-time fighters (men and women) and 10,000 reservists (all aged between 18 and 25) and an elite unit, the Palmach composed of 2,100 fighters and 1,000 reservists. The reservists trained three or four days a month and went back to civilian life the rest of the time. These mobile forces could rely on a garrison force, the HIM (Heil Mishmar, lit. Guard Corps), composed of people aged over 25. The Yishuv's total strength was around 35,000 with 15,000 to 18,000 fighters and a garrison force of roughly 20,000.

The two clandestine groups, Irgun and Lehi, had 2,000–4,000 and 500–800 members, respectively. Irgun, whose activities were considered by MI5 to be terrorism, was monitored by the British. There were also several thousand men and women who had served in the British Army in World War II who did not serve in any of the underground militias but would provide valuable military experience during the war. Walid Khalidi says the Yishuv had the additional forces of the Jewish Settlement Police, numbering some 12,000, the Gadna Youth Battalions, and the armed settlers. Few of the units had been trained by December 1947.

In 1946, Ben-Gurion decided that the Yishuv would probably have to defend itself against both the Palestinian Arabs and neighbouring Arab states and accordingly began a "massive, covert arms acquisition campaign in the West". By September 1947 the Haganah had "10,489 rifles, 702 light machine-guns, 2,666 submachine guns, 186 medium machine-guns, 672 two-inch mortars and 92 three-inch (76 mm) mortars" and acquired many more during the first few months of hostilities. The Yishuv also had "a relatively advanced arms producing capacity", that between October 1947 and July 1948 "produced 3 million 9 mm bullets, 150,000 Mills grenades, 16,000 submachine guns (Sten Guns) and 210 three-inch (76 mm) mortars", along with a few "Davidka" homemade mortars that were highly inaccurate but had a spectacularly loud explosion that demoralized the enemy. Initially, the Haganah had no heavy machine guns, artillery, armored vehicles, anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, nor military aircraft or tanks.

On 5 December 1947, conscription was instituted for all men and women aged between 17 and 25. By the end of March, 21,000 had been conscripted. On 30 March, the call-up was extended to men and single women aged between 26 to 35. Five days later, a General Mobilization order was issued for all men under 40.

Sources disagree about the amount of arms at the Yishuv's disposal at the end of the Mandate. According to Karsh before the arrival of arms shipments from Czechoslovakia as part of Operation Balak, there was roughly one weapon for every three fighters, and even the Palmach could arm only two out of every three of its active members. According to Collins and LaPierre, by April 1948, the Haganah had managed to accumulate only about 20,000 rifles and Sten guns for the 35,000 soldiers who existed on paper. According to Walid Khalidi "the arms at the disposal of these forces were plentiful". The one weapon of which there was no shortage was locally produced explosives.

The Yishuv forces were divided into a number of brigades:

Arab forces

There was no national military organization in the Arab Palestinian community. There were two paramilitary youth organizations, the pro-Husayni Futuwa and the anti-Husayni Najjada ("auxiliary corps"). According to Karsh, these groups had 11,000–12,000 members, but according to Morris, the Najjada, which was based in Jaffa and had 2,000–3,000 members, was destroyed in the run-up to the 1948 war, during Husayni's attempt to seize control of it, and the Futuwa never numbered more than a few hundred. At the outbreak of the war, new local militia groups, the National Guard, mushroomed in towns and cities. Each was answerable to its local Arab National Committee.

The tendency of the Palestinians to dissipate their forces along village and clan lines would be a major weakness of the Palestinian side. In particular there was a split within the Palestinian community between those loyal to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haji Amin Husseini and those opposed to his leadership. In December, Abd al-Qadir Husseini, who was a protégé of his uncle the Grand Mufti arrived in Jerusalem with one hundred combatants who had trained in Syria and that would form the cadre of the Holy War Army. His forces were joined by a few hundred young villagers and veterans of the British army. There were 7,000 Palestinians who served in the British Army during World War II, and 10,500 Palestinians in the Mandate's para-military police force most of whom deserted during the winter of 1947–48 fight in the war.

The equipment of the Palestinian forces was very poor. The British confiscated most of their arsenal during the 1936–39 rebellion and World War II. A report of 1942 by the Haganah intelligence service assessed the number of firearms at the disposal of the Palestinians at 50,000 this was probably an overestimate or even "highly exaggerated". In early February 1948 the Arab League's military Committee delivered 1,700 rifles to the Palestinian Arabs; at the same time the Egyptians gave the Mufti 1,200 rifles, Iraq sent 1,000 rifles and Syria gave 645 rifles, 78 machine guns and 8 mortars. The Arab Liberation Army (Jaysh al-Inqadh al-Arabi) had been set up by the Arab League. It was made up of around 6,000 volunteers, mostly from Syria, and was led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji. Its officially allotted area was northern Palestine, including Samaria.

Jordan's Arab Legion was considered the most effective Arab force. Armed, trained and commanded by British officers, this 8,000–12,000 strong force was organised in four infantry/mechanised regiments supported by some 40 artillery pieces and 75 armoured cars. Until January 1948, it was reinforced by the 3,000-strong Transjordan Frontier Force. As many as 48 British officers served in the Arab Legion. Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Legion, organized his forces into four brigades as follows:

The Arab Legion joined the war in May 1948, but fought only in the areas that King Abdullah wanted to secure for Jordan: the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The Jordanian forces were probably the best trained of all combatants. Other combatant forces lacked the ability to make strategic decisions and tactical maneuvers, as evidenced by positioning the fourth regiment at Latrun, which was abandoned by other combatants before the arrival of the Jordanian forces. In the later stages of the war, Latrun proved to be of extreme importance, and a decisive factor for Jerusalem's fate.

In 1948, Iraq had an army of 21,000 men in 12 brigades and the Iraqi Air Force had 100 planes, mostly British. Initially the Iraqis committed around 3,000 men to the war effort, including four infantry brigades, one armoured battalion and support personnel. These forces were to operate under Jordanian guidance During the first truce, the Iraqis increased their force to about 10,000. Ultimately, the Iraqi expeditionary force numbered around 15,000 to 18,000 men.

The first Iraqi forces to be deployed reached Jordan in April 1948 under the command of Gen. Nur ad-Din Mahmud. On 15 May, Iraqi engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Jordan River and attacked the Israeli settlement of Gesher with little success. Following this defeat, Iraqi forces moved into the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm strategic triangle, where they suffered heavy casualties in the Israeli attack on Jenin which began on 3 June, but they managed to hold on to their positions. Active Iraqi involvement in the war effectively ended at this point.

In 1948, Egypt was able to put a maximum of around 40,000 men into the field, 80% of its military-age male population being unfit for military service and its embryonic logistics system being limited in its ability to support ground forces deployed beyond its borders. Initially, an expeditionary force of 10,000 men was sent to Palestine under the command of Maj. Gen. Ahmed Ali al-Mwawi. This force consisted of five infantry battalions, one armoured battalion equipped with British Light Tank Mk VI and Matilda tanks, one battalion of sixteen 25-pounder guns, a battalion of eight 6-pounder guns and one medium-machine-gun battalion with supporting troops.

The Egyptian Air Force had over 30 Spitfires, 4 Hawker Hurricanes and 20 C47s modified into crude bombers.

By the time of the second truce, the Egyptians had 20,000 men in the field in thirteen battalions equipped with 135 tanks and 90 artillery pieces.

Syria had 12,000 soldiers at the beginning of the 1948 War, grouped into three infantry brigades and an armoured force of approximately battalion size. The Syrian Air Force had fifty planes, the 10 newest of which were World War II–generation models.

On 14 May Syria invaded Palestine with the 1st Infantry Brigade supported by a battalion of armoured cars, a company of French R 35 and R 37 tanks, an artillery battalion and other units. On 15–16 May they attacked the Israeli village Tzemah, which they captured, following a renewed offensive, on 18 May. The village was abandoned following the Syrian forces' defeat at the Deganias a few days later. Subsequently, the Syrians scored a victory at Mishmar HaYarden on 10 June, after which they reverted to a defensive posture, conducting only a few minor attacks on small, exposed Israeli settlements.

The Lebanese army was the smallest of the Arab armies, consisting of only 3,500 soldiers. According to Gelber, in June 1947, Ben-Gurion "arrived at an agreement with the Maronite religious leadership in Lebanon that cost a few thousand pounds and kept Lebanon's army out of the War of Independence and the military Arab coalition." According to Rogan and Shlaim, a token force of 1,000 was committed to the invasion. It crossed into the northern Galilee and was repulsed by Israeli forces. Israel then invaded and occupied southern Lebanon until the end of the war.

Saudi Arabia sent a contingent of 800–1,200 men. Saudi troops were attached to the Egyptian command.

During the first truce, Sudan sent six companies of regular troops to fight alongside the Egyptians. Yemen also committed a small expeditionary force to the war effort.

British forces in Palestine

There were 100,000 British troops deployed in Palestine "in two ground forces divisions, two independent infantry brigades, two mechanized regiments, some artillery units and a number of RAF squadrons". The peak deployment was in July 1947, when 70,200 British troops were stationed in Palestine, supported by 1,277 civilian drivers and 28,155 civilian employees.

British forces were gradually withdrawn in 1948. British High Commissioner Cunningham left Palestine on 14 May 1948 yet British forces overseeing the withdrawal remained in Palestine for several weeks thereafter, maintaining an enclave in and around Haifa and its port. Four Royal Air Force airmen were killed on 22 May when the Royal Egyptian Air Force struck RAF Ramat David, mistaking the airfield for one occupied by the Israeli Air Force. The last British soldiers left Palestine on 30 June 1948.

1948 Arab–Israeli War

First phase: 15 May – 11 June 1948

Within hours of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, five of the seven countries of the Arab League at that time, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, backed by Saudi Arabian and Yemenite contingents invaded territory in the former British Mandate of Palestine on the night of 14–15 May 1948. The forces of Syria and Egypt launched attacks outside of the proposed Arab section of the Partition Plan. Jordan invaded the proposed "Corpus Separatum", which had yet to be instituted, including the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem.

The Arab plans called for Syrian and Lebanese forces to invade from north while Jordanian and Iraqi forces were to invade from east. The Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi forces to link up in Galilee and then turn towards Haifa. In the south, the Egyptians were to advance and take Tel Aviv. Co-operation between the various Arab armies was extremely poor, so the plan was not entirely carried out in the spirit envisioned. The first mission of the Jewish paramilitary organizations and later the IDF was to hold on against the Arab armies and stop them from destroying major Jewish settlements, until reinforcements and weapons arrived.

Two Royal Egyptian Air Force (REAF) Spitfires bombed Tel Aviv. One of them was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and its pilot taken prisoner. However, the Egyptians continued their bombing raids over the city, killing about 40 people. Most civilian casualties in Tel Aviv occurred on a 18 May raid against the Tel Aviv Central Bus Station. Efforts were also made to shell the city from the ground. For the first few weeks of the war, Egyptian warplanes were able to bomb Tel Aviv with almost complete impunity, meeting only ground fire. The Egyptians also attacked rural settlements and airfields, though few casualties were caused.

On 22 May, REAF Spitfires attacked Ramat David, an airbase in Israeli territory still occupied by the British Royal Air Force (RAF) to cover the withdrawal of British forces from Israel. The Egyptians believed that the base had already been taken over by the Israelis, and attacked it three times. Five RAF Spitfires, a transport plane, and a hangar were destroyed, and four airmen were killed. During the third attack, RAF Spitfire FR18s shot down four of the attacking Egyptian Spitfires, and a fifth was shot down by a British Bren gun crew. The British left Ramat David Airbase and turned it over to the Israelis a few days later.

Two Egyptian columns with air, armored, and artillery cover attacked from the south, but were met with fierce resistance from numerous settlements defended by armed inhabitants and Israeli troops. Joining the Egyptian Army were a large number of volunteers from the Muslim Brotherhood. One Egyptian column headed towards Tel Aviv to be joined by more Egyptian troops who arrived via sea at Majdal and another column advanced towards Beersheba.

To secure their flanks, the Egyptians laid siege to a number of kibbutzim in the Negev. The Egyptians met fierce resistance from the lightly armed defenders of the besieged kibbutzim. They were stalled in their advance and took heavy losses, while losses sustained by the defenders were comparatively light.

In one instance, Kfar Darom, after withstanding an attack by the Muslim Brotherhood, was attacked by Egyptian tanks who retreated after losing one tank to a PIAT. Another example was the battle at kibbutz Nirim, where about 40 Israelis fought off repeated Egyptian attacks backed by artillery, armor and air power. The most notable of these engagements was the Battle of Yad Mordechai, where an inferior force of 100 Israelis armed with nothing more than rifles, a medium machinegun and a PIAT anti-tank weapon, held up a column of 2,500 Egyptians, well-supported by armor, artillery and air units, for five days. At the fifth night, the Israeli defenders, exhausted from the fighting and low on ammunition, withdrew from the settlement. This was unknown to the Egyptians who, on the following day, bombed the now empty kibbutz for four hours. The Egyptians attacked Kibbutz Nitzanim which surrendered after a long firefight. Several Kibbutz members were killed after surrendering, but Egyptian soldiers prevented the local militiaman who had fought beside them from killing more POWs. These battles were delaying actions, designed to give the Haganah time to prepare for the Egyptian attack.

Over the next few days, approximately 1,000 Lebanese, 5,000 Syrian, 5,000 Iraqi, and 10,000 Egyptian troops (initial numbers) invaded the newly established state, while 4,000 Jordanian troops invaded the Corpus separatum region encompassing Jerusalem and its environs, as well as areas designated as part of the Arab state by the UN partition plan. They were aided by corps of volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Yemen. The Arab nations gradually increased the number of troops by the thousands as the war later progressed. Both sides increased their manpower over the following months, but the Israeli advantage grew steadily as a result of the progressive mobilization of Israeli society and the influx of an average of 10,300 immigrants each month.

Syrian forces advanced into Galilee on 15 May, but were bogged down by resistance from numerous kibbutzim. The Syrians were forced to besiege the kibbutzim rather than advance. Throughout the Galilee, numerous isolated Israeli settlement outposts were exposed to Arab attack on all sides, and had to rely on their own armories for defense. The Lebanese Army took the village of Malkiya, which was recaptured by the Israelis three days later.

An Iraqi division comprising two infantry and one armoured brigade arrived in an area known as the "triangle" between Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm, where on 25 May 1948 it started an offensive with the aim of taking Netanya, which failed. On 29 May, an Israeli counter-attack against the Iraqis led to three days of heavy fighting over Jenin, which was finally retained by the Iraqis. After these battles, the Iraqi forces became stationary. On 6 June, a Syrian-Lebanese-Arab Liberation Army force retook Malkiya.

On 26 May 1948, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was officially established, and the Haganah, Palmach, Irgun and Lehi were incorporated into the IDF.

On 29 May, Israeli forces stopped the Egyptian drive towards Tel Aviv in Operation Pleshet. In the first combat mission performed by Israel's fledgeling air force, four Avia S-199s attacked Egyptian armored column of 500 vehicles on its way to Ashdod. The Israeli planes dropped 70 kilogram bombs and strafed the column, although their machine guns jammed quickly. Two of the planes crashed, killing a pilot. The attack caused the Egyptians to scatter, and they had lost the initiative by the time they had regrouped. The attack was followed by small-scale Israeli harassment of the Egyptian lines. Givati Brigade forces then launched a counterattack. Although the counterattack was repulsed, the Egyptian offensive was halted as Egypt changed its strategy from offensive to defensive.

As the war progressed, the IDF managed to field more troops than the Arab forces. By July 1948, the IDF had 63,000 troops; by early spring 1949, they had 115,000. The Arab armies had an estimated 40,000 troops in July 1948, rising to 55,000 in October 1948, and slightly more by the spring of 1949.

All Jewish aviation assets were placed under the control of the Sherut Avir (Air Service, known as the SA) in November 1947 and flying operations began in the following month from a small civil airport on the outskirts of Tel Aviv called Sde Dov, with the first ground support operation (in an RWD-13) taking place on 17 December. The Galilee Squadron was formed at Yavne'el in March 1948, and the Negev Squadron was formed at Nir-Am in April. By 10 May, when the SA suffered its first combat loss, there were three flying units, an air staff, maintenance facilities and logistics support. At the outbreak of the war on 15 May, the SA became the Israeli Air Force. With its fleet of light planes it was no match for Arab forces during the first few weeks of the war with their T-6s, Spitfires, C-47s and Avro Ansons. In the first few weeks of the war, the Israelis' light airplanes bombed Arab encampments and columns. The raids were usually carried out at night to avoid interception. These raids usually had little effect, except on morale.

It was also during this time that the balance of air power began to swing in favor of the Israeli Air Force following the purchase of 25 Avia S-199s from Czechoslovakia, the first of which arrived in Israel on 20 May. This created the ironic situation of the young Jewish state using derivatives of the Bf-109 designed in Nazi Germany to help counter the British-designed Spitfires flown by Egypt.

On 3 June, Israel scored its first victory in aerial combat when pilot Modi Alon shot down a pair of Egyptian bombers over Tel Aviv. From then on, the Israeli Air Force began engaging the Arabs in air-to-air combat. By the fall of 1948, the IAF had achieved air superiority and had superior firepower and more knowledgeable personnel, many of whom had seen action in World War II. Israeli planes then began intercepting and engaging Arab aircraft on bombing missions, and Arab air raids gradually fell.

Following Israeli air attacks on Egyptian and Iraqi columns, the Egyptians repeatedly bombed Ekron Airfield, where IAF fighters were based. During a 30 May raid, bombs aimed for Ekron hit central Rehovot, killing 7 civilians and wounding 30. In response to this, and probably to the Jordanian victories at Latrun, Israel began bombing targets in Arab cities. On the night of 31 May/1 June, the first Israeli raid on an Arab capital took place when three IAF planes bombed Amman, hitting the King's Palace and an adjacent British airbase, killing around a dozen people and damaging a number of British planes. Israel did not bomb Amman again, as the British had threatened to attack Israeli airfields and planes. Israel also bombed Arish, Gaza, Damascus and Cairo. Israeli B-17 bombers coming to Israel from Czechoslovakia bombed Egypt on their way to Israel. According to Alan Dershowitz, Israeli planes focused on bombing military targets in these attacks, though Benny Morris wrote that an 11 June air raid on Damascus was indiscriminate.

At the outset of the war, the Israeli Navy consisted of four former Aliyah Bet ships that had been seized by the British and impounded in Haifa harbor. These ships were refurbished by a newly formed naval repair facility with the assistance of two private shipbuilding and repair companies. In October 1948, a submarine chaser was purchased from the United States. The five warships were manned by former merchant seamen, former crewmembers of Aliyah Bet ships, Israelis who had served in the Royal Navy during World War II, and foreign volunteers. The newly refurbished and crewed warships served on coastal patrol duties and bombarded Egyptian coastal installations in and around the Gaza area all the way to Port Said.

Jerusalem and other fronts

The heaviest fighting occurred in Jerusalem and on the Jerusalem – Tel Aviv road, between Jordan's Arab Legion and Israeli forces. As part of the redeployment to deal with the Egyptian advance, the Israelis abandoned the Latrun fortress overlooking the main highway to Jerusalem, which the Arab Legion immediately seized. The Arab Legion also occupied the Latrun Monastery. From these positions, the Jordanians were able to cut off supplies to Israeli troops and civilians in Jerusalem.

Though some supplies, mostly munitions, were airdropped into the city, the shortage of food, water, fuel and medicine was acute. King Abdullah ordered Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Arab Legion, to enter Jerusalem on 17 May, and heavy house-to-house fighting occurred between 19 and 28 May, with the Arab Legion eventually succeeding in pushing Israeli forces from the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem as well as the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. The Israeli forces were seriously short of food, water and ammunition. The Arab Legion fired 10,000 artillery and mortar shells a day.

The 1,500 Jewish inhabitants of the Old City's Jewish Quarter were expelled, and several hundred were detained. The Jews had to be escorted out by the Jordanian army to protect them against Palestinian Arab mobs that intended to massacre them. The Arab Legion also attacked West Jerusalem with sniper fire. Israeli attempts to take the Latrun fortress were unsuccessful.

Israeli forces suffered some 586 casualties, among them Mickey Marcus, Israel's first general, who was killed by friendly fire. The Arab Legion had about 30 casualties, though among the Jordanian dead was the fort's commander. The Israeli position in Jerusalem was only saved via the opening of the so-called "Burma Road", a makeshift bypass road built by Israeli forces that allowed Israeli supply convoys to pass into Jerusalem.

Parts of the area where the road was built were cleared of Jordanian snipers in May and the road was completed on 14 June. Supplies had already begun passing through before the road was completed, with the first convoy passing through on the night of 1–2 June. The Jordanians spotted the activity and attempted to shell the road, but were ineffective, as it could not be seen. However, Jordanian sharpshooters killed several road workers, and an attack on 9 June left eight Israelis dead. On 18 July, elements of the Harel Brigade took about 10 villages to the south of Latrun to enlarge and secure the area of the Burma Road.

Iraqi forces failed in their attacks on Israeli settlements with the most notable battle taking place at Gesher, and instead took defensive positions around Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm, from where they could put pressure on the Israeli center. On 25 May, Iraqi forces advanced from Tulkarm, taking Geulim and reaching Kfar Yona and Ein Vered on the Tulkarm-Netanya road. The Alexandroni Brigade then stopped the Iraqi advance and retook Geulim. On 1 June, the Carmeli and Golani Brigades captured Jenin from Iraqi forces. They were pushed out by an Iraqi counterattack, and lost 34 dead and 100 wounded.

On 21 May, the Syrian army was stopped at kibbutz Degania Alef in the north, where local militia reinforced by elements of the Carmeli Brigade halted Syrian armored forces with Molotov cocktails, hand grenades and a single PIAT. One tank that was disabled by Molotov cocktails and hand grenades still remains at the kibbutz. The remaining Syrian forces were driven off the next day with four Napoleonchik mountain guns—Israel's first use of artillery during the war.

On 22 May, Arab forces attacked kibbutz Ramat Rachel south of Jerusalem. After a fierce battle in which 31 Arabs and 13 Israelis were killed, the defenders of Ramat Rachel withdrew, only to partially retake the kibbutz the following day. Fighting continued until 26 May, until the entire kibbutz was recaptured. Radar Hill was also taken from the Arab Legion, and held until 26 May, when the Jordanians retook it in a battle that left 19 Israelis and 2 Jordanians dead. A total of 23 attempts by the Palmach's Harel Brigade to capture Radar Hill in the war failed.

On 23 May, the Alexandroni Brigade captured Tantura, south of Haifa. The same day, Thomas C. Wasson, the US Consul-General in Jerusalem and a member of the UN Truce Commission was shot dead in West Jerusalem. It was disputed whether Wasson was killed by the Arabs or Israelis.

Throughout the following days, the Arabs were only able to make limited gains due to fierce Israeli resistance, and were quickly driven off their new holdings by Israeli counterattacks, though the Arab Legion was able to repel an Israeli attack on Latrun. On 2 June, Holy War Army commander Hasan Salama was killed in a battle with Israeli forces at Ras al-Ein, north of Jaffa. The Jordanians launched two counterattacks, temporarily taking Beit Susin before being forced back, and capturing Gezer after a fierce battle.

On 6 June, nearly two brigades of the Arab Liberation Army and the Lebanese Army took Malkiya and Kadesh, while Syrian forces attacked Mishmar HaYarden, but were repulsed. In the Battle of Nitzanim, Egyptian forces attacked the kibbutz of Nitzanim on the same day, and the Israeli defenders surrendered after resisting for five days. On 10 June, the Syrians overran Mishmar HaYarden and advanced to the main road, where they were stopped by units of the Oded Brigade.

First truce: 11 June – 8 July 1948

The UN declared a truce on 29 May, which came into effect on 11 June and lasted 28 days. The ceasefire was overseen by UN mediator Folke Bernadotte and a team of UN Observers made up of army officers from Belgium, United States, Sweden and France. Bernadotte was voted in by the General Assembly to "assure the safety of the holy places, to safeguard the well being of the population, and to promote 'a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine'".

The truce was designed to last 28 days and an arms embargo was declared with the intention that neither side would make any gains from the truce. Neither side respected the truce; both found ways around the restrictions placed on them. Both the Israelis and the Arabs used this time to improve their positions, a direct violation of the terms of the ceasefire. "The Arabs violated the truce by reinforcing their lines with fresh units and by preventing supplies from reaching isolated Israeli settlements; occasionally, they opened fire along the lines".

At the time of the truce, the British view was that "the Jews are too weak in armament to achieve spectacular success". As the truce commenced, a British officer stationed in Haifa stated that the four-week-long truce "would certainly be exploited by the Jews to continue military training and reorganization while the Arabs would waste feuding over the future divisions of the spoils". During the truce, the Israelis sought to bolster their forces by massive import of arms. The IDF was able to acquire weapons from Czechoslovakia as well as improve training of forces and reorganization of the army during this time. Yitzhak Rabin, an IDF commander at the time of the war and later Israel's fifth Prime Minister, stated "ithout the arms from Czechoslovakia... it is very doubtful whether we would have been able to conduct the war".

The Israeli army increased its manpower from approximately 30,000–35,000 men to almost 65,000 during the truce. It was also able to increase its arms supply to more than 25,000 rifles, 5,000 machine guns, and fifty million bullets. As well as violating the arms and personnel embargo, they also sent fresh units to the front lines like the Arabs.

During the truce, Irgun attempted to bring in a private arms shipment aboard a ship called "Altalena". When they refused to hand the arms to the Israeli government, Ben-Gurion ordered that the ship be sunk. Several Irgun members were killed in the fighting.

After the truce was in place, Bernadotte began to address the issue of achieving a political settlement. The main obstacles in his opinion were "the Arab world's continued rejection of the existence of a Jewish state, whatever its borders; Israel's new 'philosophy', based on its increasing military strength, of ignoring the partition boundaries and conquering what additional territory it could; and the emerging Palestinian Arab refugee problem".

Taking all the issues into account, Bernadotte presented a new partition plan. He proposed there be a Palestinian Arab state alongside Israel and that a "Union" "be established between the two sovereign states of Israel and Jordan (which now included the West Bank); that the Negev, or part of it, be included in the Arab state and that Western Galilee, or part of it, be included in Israel; that the whole of Jerusalem be part of the Arab state, with the Jewish areas enjoying municipal autonomy and that Lydda Airport and Haifa be 'free ports'—presumably free of Israeli or Arab sovereignty". Israel rejected the proposal, in particular the aspect of losing control of Jerusalem, but they did agree to extend the truce for another month. The Arabs rejected both the extension of the truce and the proposal.

On 8 July, the day before the expiration of the truce, Egyptian forces under General Muhammad Naguib renewed the war by attacking Negba. The following day, Israeli forces launched a simultaneous offensive on all three fronts. The fighting continued for ten days until the UN Security Council issued the Second Truce on 18 July. During the fighting, the Israelis were able to open a lifeline to a number of besieged kibbutzim.

Second phase: 8–18 July 1948

The fighting that followed was dominated by large-scale Israeli offensives and a defensive posture from the Arab side. Operation Danny was the most important Israeli offensive, aimed at securing and enlarging the corridor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by capturing the roadside cities Lod (Lydda) and Ramle.

In a second planned stage of the operation the fortified positions of Latrun—overlooking the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway—and the city of Ramallah were also to be captured. Hadita, near Latrun, was captured by the Israelis at a cost of 9 dead.

The second plan was Operation Dekel, which was aimed at capturing the lower Galilee including Nazareth. The third plan, to which fewer resources were allocated, Operation Kedem, was to secure the Old City of Jerusalem, but failed. To the north, Operation Brosh was launched in a failed attempt to dislodge Syrian forces from the Eastern Galilee and the Benot Yaakov Bridge. During the operation, 200 Syrians and 100 Israelis were killed. The Israeli Air Force also bombed Damascus for the first time.

In the south, the IDF carried out several offensives, including Operation An-Far and Operation Death to the Invader. On 12 July, the Egyptians launched an offensive action, and again attacked Negba, which they had previously failed to capture, using three infantry battalions, an armored battalion, and an artillery regiment. In the battle that followed, the Egyptians were repulsed, suffering 200–300 casualties, while the Israelis lost 5 dead and 16 wounded.

After failing to take Negba, the Egyptians turned their attention to more isolated settlements and positions. On 14 July, an Egyptian attack on Gal On was driven off by a minefield and by resistance from Gal On's residents. The Egyptians then assaulted the lightly defended village of Be'erot Yitzhak. The Egyptians managed to penetrate the village permimeter, but the defenders concentrated in an inner position in the village and fought off the Egyptian advance until IDF reinforcements arrived and drove out the attackers. The Egyptians suffered an estimated 200 casualties, while the Israelis had 17 dead and 15 wounded. The battle was one of Egypt's last offensive actions during the war, and the Egyptians did not attack any Israeli villages following this battle.

Operation Danny

The objectives of Operation Danny were to capture territory east of Tel Aviv and then to push inland and relieve the Jewish population and forces in Jerusalem. Lydda had become an important military center in the region, lending support to Arab military activities elsewhere, and Ramle was one of the main obstacles blocking Jewish transportation. Lydda was defended by a local militia of around 1,000 residents, with an Arab Legion contingent of 125–300.

The IDF forces gathered to attack the city numbered around 8,000. It was the first operation where several brigades were involved. The city was attacked from the north via Majdal al-Sadiq and al-Muzayri'a, and from the east via Khulda, al-Qubab, Jimzu and Daniyal. Bombers were also used for the first time in the conflict to bombard the city. The IDF captured the city on 11 July.

Up to 450 Arabs and 9–10 Israeli soldiers were killed. The next day, Ramle fell. The civilian populations of Lydda and Ramle fled or were expelled to the Arab front lines, and following resistance in Lydda, the population there was expelled without provision of transport vehicles; some of the evictees died on the long walk under the hot July sun.

On 15–16 July, an attack on Latrun took place but did not manage to occupy the fort. A desperate second attempt occurred on 18 July by units from the Yiftach Brigade equipped with armored vehicles, including two Cromwell tanks, but that attack also failed. Despite the second truce, which began on 18 July, the Israeli efforts to conquer Latrun continued until 20 July.

Operation Dekel

While Operation Danny proceeded in the centre, Operation Dekel was carried out in the north. Nazareth was captured on 16 July, and by the time the second truce took effect at 19:00 18 July, the whole lower Galilee from Haifa Bay to the Sea of Galilee was captured by Israel.

Operation Kedem

Originally Operation Kedem was to begin on 8 July, immediately after the first truce, by Irgun and Lehi forces. However, it was delayed by David Shaltiel, possibly because he did not trust their ability after their failure to capture Deir Yassin without Haganah assistance.

Irgun forces commanded by Yehuda Lapidot were to break through at the New Gate, Lehi was to break through the wall stretching from the New Gate to the Jaffa Gate, and the Beit Horon Battalion was to strike from Mount Zion.

The battle was planned to begin on the Sabbath, at 20:00 on 16 July, two days before the second ceasefire of the war. The plan went wrong from the beginning and was postponed first to 23:00 and then to midnight. It was not until 02:30 that the battle actually began. The Irgun managed to break through at the New Gate, but the other forces failed in their missions. At 05:45 on 17 July, Shaltiel ordered a retreat and to cease hostilities.

On 14 July 1948, Irgun occupied the Arab village of Malha after a fierce battle. Several hours later, the Arabs launched a counterattack, but Israeli reinforcements arrived, and the village was retaken at a cost of 17 dead.

Second truce: 18 July – 15 October 1948

At 19:00 on 18 July, the second truce of the conflict went into effect after intense diplomatic efforts by the UN.

On 16 September, Count Folke Bernadotte proposed a new partition for Palestine in which the Negev would be divided between Jordan and Egypt, and Jordan would annex Lydda and Ramla. There would be a Jewish state in the whole of Galilee, with the frontier running from Faluja northeast towards Ramla and Lydda. Jerusalem would be internationalized, with municipal autonomy for the city's Jewish and Arab inhabitants, the Port of Haifa would be a free port, and Lydda Airport would be a free airport. All Palestinian refugees would be granted the right of return, and those who chose not to return would be compensated for lost property. The UN would control and regulate Jewish immigration.

The plan was once again rejected by both sides. On the next day, 17 September, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by the militant Zionist group Lehi. A four-man team ambushed Bernadotte's motorcade in Jerusalem, killing him and a French UN observer sitting next to him. Lehi saw Bernadotte as a British and Arab puppet, and thus a serious threat to the emerging State of Israel, and feared that the provisional Israeli government would accept the plan, which it considered disastrous. Unbeknownst to Lehi, the government had already decided to reject it and resume combat in a month. Bernadotte's deputy, American Ralph Bunche, replaced him.

On 22 September 1948, the Knesset passed the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordnance, 5708-1948. The law officially added to Israel's size by annexing all land it had captured since the war began. It also declared that from then on, any part of Palestine captured by the Israeli army would automatically become part of Israel.

Operation Shoter

The Arabs had blocked Israeli traffic along the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway. Assaults on 18 June and 8 July failed due to poor planning and stiff resistance by Arab militia in superior positions.

Operation Shoter was launched a week after the truce came into effect against an area known as the "Little Triangle" south of Haifa, with the aim of taking the final Arab pocket on the Tel Aviv-Haifa road. The Arabs had blocked the road to Israeli traffic along the highway, and poorly planned assaults on 18 June and 8 July had failed to dislodge Arab militia from their superior positions. The operation was launched on 24 July, in response to the killings of two Israeli civilians.

Israeli assaults on 24 and 25 July were beaten back by stiff resistance. The Israelis then broke the Arab defenses with an infantry and armour assault backed by heavy artillery shelling and aerial bombing. Three Arab villages surrendered, and Israeli soldiers and aircraft struck at one of the Arab retreat routes, killing 60 Arab soldiers.

The Arabs claimed that the Israelis had massacred Arab civilians, but the Israelis rejected the claims. A United Nations investigation found no evidence of a massacre. Following the operation, the Tel Aviv-Haifa road was open to Israeli military and civilian traffic, and Arab roadblocks along the route were removed. Traffic along the Haifa-Hadera coastal railway was also restored.

Third phase: 15 October 1948 – 10 March 1949

Israeli operations

Israel launched a series of military operations in order to drive out the Arab armies and secure the borders of Israel. However, invading the West Bank might have brought into the borders of the expanding State of Israel a massive Arab population it couldn't absorb. The Negev desert was an empty space for expansion, so the main war effort shifted to Negev from early October.

On 15 October, the IDF launched Operation Yoav in the northern Negev. Its goal was to drive a wedge between the Egyptian forces along the coast and the Beersheba-Hebron-Jerusalem road and ultimately to conquer the whole Negev. This was a special concern on the Israeli part because of a British diplomatic campaign to have the entire Negev handed over to Egypt and Jordan, and which thus made Ben-Gurion anxious to have Israeli forces in control of the Negev as soon as possible.

Operation Yoav was headed by the Southern Front commander Yigal Allon. Committed to Yoav were three infantry and one armoured brigades, who were given the task of breaking through the Egyptian lines. The Egyptian positions were badly weakened by the lack of a defense in depth, which meant that once the IDF had broken through the Egyptian lines, there was little to stop them. The operation was a huge success, shattering the Egyptian ranks and forcing the Egyptian Army from the northern Negev, Beersheba and Ashdod.

In the so-called "Faluja Pocket", an encircled Egyptian force was able to hold out for four months until the 1949 Armistice Agreements, when the village was peacefully transferred to Israel and the Egyptian troops left. Four warships of the Israeli Navy provided support by bombarding Egyptian shore installations in the Ashkelon area, and preventing the Egyptian Navy from evacuation retreating Egyptian troops by sea.

On 19 October, a naval battle took place between three Israeli warships near Majdal, and an Egyptian corvette with air support. An Israeli sailor was killed and four wounded, and two of the ships were damaged. One Egyptian plane was shot down, but the corvette escaped. Israeli naval vessels also shelled Majdal on 17 October, and Gaza on 21 October, with air support from the Israeli Air Force. The same day, the IDF captured Beersheba, and took 120 Egyptian soldiers prisoner. On 22 October, Israeli naval commandos using explosive boats sank the Egyptian flagship Emir Farouk, and damaged an Egyptian minesweeper.

On 22 October, the third truce went into effect. Irregular Arab forces refused to recognize the truce, and continued to harass Israeli forces and settlements in the north. On the same day that the truce came into effect, the Arab Liberation Army violated the truce by attacking Manara, capturing the strongpoint of Sheikh Abed, repulsing counterattacks by local Israeli units, and ambushed Israeli forces attempting to relieve Manara. The IDF's Carmeli Brigade lost 33 dead and 40 wounded. Manara and Misgav Am were totally cut off, and Israel's protests at the UN failed to change the situation.

On 24 October, the IDF launched Operation Hiram and captured the entire upper Galilee, driving the ALA and Lebanese Army back to Lebanon, and successfully ambushing and destroying an entire Syrian battalion. The Israeli force of four infantry brigades was commanded by Moshe Carmel. The entire operation lasted just 60 hours, during which numerous villages were captured, often after locals or Arab forces put up resistance. Arab losses were estimated at 400 dead and 550 taken prisoner, with low Israeli casualties.

Some prisoners were reportedly executed by the Israeli forces. An estimated 50,000 Palestinian refugees fled into Lebanon, some of them fleeing ahead of the advancing forces, and some expelled from villages which had resisted, while the Arab inhabitants of those villages which had remained at peace were allowed to remain and became Israeli citizens. The villagers of Iqrit and Birim were persuaded to leave their homes by Israeli authorities, who promised them that they would be allowed to return. Israel eventually decided not to allow them to return, and offered them financial compensation, which they refused to accept.

At the end of the month, the IDF had captured the whole Galilee, driven all Lebanese forces out of Israel, and had advanced 5 miles (8.0 km) into Lebanon to the Litani River, occupying thirteen Lebanese villages. In the village of Hula, two Israeli officers killed between 35 and 58 prisoners as retaliation for the Haifa Oil Refinery massacre. Both officers were later put on trial for their actions.

On 9 November 1948, the IDF launched Operation Shmone to capture the Tegart fort in the village of Iraq Suwaydan. The fort's Egyptian defenders had previously repulsed eight attempts to take it, including two during Operation Yoav. Israeli forces bombarded the fort before an assault. After breaching the outlying fences without resistance, the Israelis blew a hole in the fort's outer wall, prompting the 180 Egyptian soldiers manning the fort to surrender without a fight. The defeat prompted the Egyptians to evacuate several nearby positions, including hills the IDF had failed to take by force. Meanwhile, IDF forces were met with stiff resistance in Iraq Suwaydan itself, losing 6 dead and 14 wounded.

From 5 to 7 December, the IDF conducted Operation Assaf to take control of the Western Negev. The main assaults were spearheaded by mechanized forces, while Golani Brigade infantry covered the rear. An Egyptian counterattack was repulsed. The Egyptians planned another counterattack, but it failed after Israeli aerial reconnaissance revealed Egyptian preparations, and the Israelis launched a preemptive strike. About 100 Egyptians were killed, and 5 tanks were destroyed, with the Israelis losing 5 killed and 30 wounded.

On 22 December, the IDF drove the remaining Egyptian forces out of Israel with Operation Horev (also called Operation Ayin). The goal of the operation was to secure the entire Negev from Egyptian presence, destroying the Egyptian threat on Israel's southern communities and forcing the Egyptians into a ceasefire. During five days of fighting, the Israelis expelled the Egyptians from the Negev.

Israeli forces subsequently launched raids into the Nitzana area, and entered the Sinai Peninsula on 28 December. The IDF captured Umm Katef and Abu Ageila, and advanced north towards Al Arish, with the goal of encircling the entire Egyptian expeditionary force. Israeli forces pulled out of the Sinai on 2 January 1949 following joint British-American pressure and a British threat of military action. IDF forces regrouped at the border with the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces attacked Rafah the following day, and after several days of fighting, Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip were surrounded. The Egyptians agreed to negotiate a ceasefire on 7 January, and the IDF subsequently pulled out of Gaza.

On 28 December, the Alexandroni Brigade failed to take the Falluja Pocket, but managed to seize Iraq el-Manshiyeh and temporarily hold it. The Egyptians counterattacked, but were mistaken for a friendly force and allowed to advance, trapping a large number of men. The Israelis lost 87 soldiers.

On 5 March, Operation Uvda was launched following nearly a month of reconnaissance, with the goal of securing the southern Negev from Jordan. The IDF entered and secured the territory, but did not meet significant resistance along the way, as the area was already designated to be part of the Jewish state in the UN Partition Plan, and the operation meant to establish Israeli sovereignty over the territory rather than actually conquer it. The Golani, Negev, and Alexandroni brigades participated in the operation, together with some smaller units and with naval support.

On 10 March, Israeli forces reached the southern tip of Palestine: Umm Rashrash on the Red Sea (where Eilat was built later) and took it without a battle. Israeli soldiers raised a hand-made Israeli flag ("The Ink Flag") at 16:00 hours on 10 March, claiming Umm Rashrash for Israel. The raising of the Ink Flag is considered to be the end of the war.

Anglo-Israeli air clashes

As the fighting progressed and Israel mounted an incursion into the Sinai, the Royal Air Force began conducting almost daily reconnaissance missions over Israel and the Sinai. RAF reconnaissance aircraft took off from Egyptian airbases and sometimes flew alongside Royal Egyptian Air Force planes. High-flying British aircraft frequently flew over Haifa and Ramat David Airbase, and became known to the Israelis as the "shuftykeit."

On 20 November 1948, an unarmed RAF photo-reconnaissance De Havilland Mosquito of No. 13 Squadron RAF was shot down by an Israeli Air Force P-51 Mustang flown by American volunteer Wayne Peake as it flew over the Galilee towards Hatzor Airbase. Peake opened fire with his cannons, causing a fire to break out in the port engine. The aircraft turned to sea and lowered its altitude, then exploded and crashed off Ashdod. Both of the crew were killed.

Just before noon on 7 January 1949, four Spitfire FR18s from No. 208 Squadron RAF on a reconnaissance mission in the Deir al-Balah area flew over an Israeli convoy that had been attacked by five Egyptian Spitfires fifteen minutes earlier. The pilots had spotted smoking vehicles, and were drawn to the scene out of curiosity. Two planes dived to below 500 feet altitude to take pictures of the convoy, while the remaining two covered them from 1,500 feet.

Israeli soldiers on the ground, alerted by the sound of the approaching Spitfires and fearing another Egyptian air attack, opened fire with machine guns. One Spitfire was shot down by a tank-mounted machine gun, while the other was lightly damaged and rapidly pulled up. The remaining three Spitfires were then attacked by patrolling IAF Spitfires flown by Slick Goodlin and John McElroy, volunteers from the United States and Canada respectively. All three Spitfires were shot down, and one pilot was killed.

Two pilots were captured by Israeli soldiers and taken to Tel Aviv for interrogation, and were later released. Another was rescued by Bedouins and handed over to the Egyptian Army, which turned him over to the RAF. Later that day, four RAF Spitfires from the same squadron escorted by seven No. 213 Squadron RAF and eight No. 6 Squadron RAF Hawker Tempests went searching for the lost planes, and were attacked by four IAF Spitfires. The Israeli formation was led by Ezer Weizman. The remaining three were manned by Weizman's wingman Alex Jacobs and American volunteers Bill Schroeder and Caesar Dangott.

The Tempests found they could not jettison their external fuel tanks, and some had non-operational guns. Schroeder shot down a British Tempest, killing pilot David Tattersfield. Weizmann severely damaged a British plane flown by Douglas Liquorish, but his own plane was lightly damaged by RAF pilot Brian Spragg. Two other British aircraft were lightly damaged during the engagement. The battle ended after the British wiggled their wings to be more clearly identified, and the Israelis eventually realized the danger of their situation and disengaged, returning to Hatzor Airbase.

Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion personally ordered the wrecks of the RAF fighters that had been shot down to be dragged into Israeli territory. Israeli troops subsequently visited the crash sites, removed various parts, and buried the other aircraft. However, the Israelis did not manage to conceal the wrecks in time to prevent British reconnaissance planes from photographing them. An RAF salvage team was deployed to recover the wrecks, entering Israeli territory during their search. Two were discovered inside Egypt, while Tattersfield's Tempest was found north of Nirim, four miles inside Israel. Interviews with local Arabs confirmed that the Israelis had visited the crash sites to remove and bury the wrecks. Tattersfield was initially buried near the wreckage, but his body was later removed and reburied at the British War Cemetery in Ramla.

In response, the RAF readied all Tempests and Spitfires to attack any IAF aircraft they encountered and bomb IAF airfields. British troops in the Middle East were placed on high alert with all leave cancelled, and British citizens were advised to leave Israel. The Royal Navy was also placed on high alert. At Hatzor Airbase, the general consensus among pilots, most of whom had flown with or alongside the RAF during World War II, was that the RAF would not allow the loss of five aircraft and two pilots to go without retaliation, and would probably attack the base at dawn the next day.

That night, in anticipation of an impending British attack, some pilots decided not to offer any resistance and left the base, while a number of pilots prepared their Spitfires and were strapped into the cockpits at dawn, preparing to repel a retaliatory airstrike. However, British commanders refused to authorize any retaliation. The day following the incident, British pilots were issued a directive to regard any Israeli aircraft infiltrating Egyptian or Jordanian airspace as hostile and to shoot them down, but were also ordered to avoid activity close to Israel's borders.

British diplomacy in support of the Arabs

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Britain, which at the time was one of the major powers in the Middle East, supported the Arabs. The reasons for this was laid out in a British staff memo which stated "No solution of the Palestine problem should be proposed which would alienate the Arab states. If one of the two communities had to be antagonised, it was preferable, from the purely military angle, that a solution should be found which did not involve the continuing hostility of the Arabs; for in the that event our difficulties would not be confined to Palestine, but would extend throughout the whole of the Middle East". The diplomat Sir John Toutbeck wrote:

"We are partners in adversity on this question. A Jewish state is no more in our interest than it is in the Arabs.... Our whole strategy in the ME is founded upon holding a secure base in Egypt, but the usefulness of the base must be gravely impaired if we cannot move out of it except through a hostile country".

Moreover, it was an article of faith for most British policy-makers that most Jews were Communists, and that Israel would be bound to become a Communist state, thus giving the Soviet Union a toe-hold in the Middle East. For these reasons, the British in the months before May 1948 did their best to encumber and block partition. Trygve Lie wrote in his memoirs with some anger:

"Great Britain had placed the Palestine matter before the Assembly with the declared conviction that agreement between the Arabs and Jews was unattainable. This did not deter the British representative, Arthur Creech Jones, from informing the Assembly that Britain would give effect only to a plan accepted by the Arabs and the Jews.... The British approach proved to be not in accord, in my opinion with the either the letter or the spirit of the partition plan.

The United Kingdom could not progressively turn over authority to the Palestine Commission as the Assembly resolution provided, but only abruptly and completely on 15 May. Neither did it "regard favourably any proposal by the Commission to proceed to Palestine earlier than two weeks before the date of the termination of the Mandate". London would not permit the formation of the militia which the Assembly's resolution called for, nor would it facilitate frontier delimitation. The Assembly had further recommended that the United Kingdom endeavour to evacuate by 1 February a seaport and hinterland in the area of the Jewish state adequate to provide facilities for immigration".

General Sir Alan Cunningham wrote to Creech Jones at this time to complain "It appears to me that H.M.G.'s policy is now simply to get out of Palestine as quickly as possible without regard to the consequences in Palestine". In February 1948, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin assured the Jordanian Prime Minister Tawfiz Abu al-Huda of British support for a Jordanian invasion once the British left Palestine. British officials regarded the prospect of an Arab invasion favorably as offering an excellent chance to overturn the UN partition resolution and cut Israel "down to size". Bernard Burrows of the British Foreign Office's Middle East Department wrote:

"It is tempting to think that Transjordan might transgress the boundaries of the United Nations' Jewish state to the extent of establishing a corridor across the Southern Negev joining the existing Transjordan territory to the Mediterranean and Gaza. This would have immense strategic advantages for us, both in cutting the Jewish State, and therefore Communist influence, off from the Red Sea and by extending up to the Mediterranean the area in which our military and political influence is predominant by providing a means of sending the necessary military equipment etc. into Transjordan other than by the circuitous route through Aqaba".

On 20 May, Bevin informed Baron Inverchapel, the British Ambassador to the United States:

"I do not (repeat not) intend in the near future to recognise the Jewish State and still less to support any proposal that it should become a member of the United Nations. In this connection I hope that even through the Americans have recognised the Jewish State de facto they will not commit themselves to any precise recognition of boundaries. It might well be that if the two sides ever accept a compromise it would be on the basis of boundaries differing from those recommended in the Partition Plan of the General Assembly".

In this regard, the British launched a sustained diplomatic offensive to have the United Nations recognize all of the areas taken by the Arabs as belonging to those Arab states, especially Jordan and to reduce the borders of Israel to being more or less what the Peel Plan of 1937 had advised. In the early days of the war, the British delegation at the UN blocked all efforts at a ceasefire (which was felt to hurt the Arabs, who winning the war at this point more than the Israelis) and because of fears that Article 39 of the Chapter 7 of the UN Covenant might involve sanctions against the Arab states. The British changed position on the ceasefire in the spring of 1948 when the Arab armies were in possession of substantial chunks of Palestine with the Egyptians holding much of the Negev and the Jordanians holding a large section of central Palestine. Sir Ronald Ian Campbell, the British Ambassador to Egypt was instructed by Bevin to tell the Egyptian government after the first ceasefire:

"It might be presumed that the period of truce will be utilised by the Jews to establish an effective administration not only in those parts of their November State which are behind the military lines, but also in the Arab areas which they have occupied, such as the Central and Northern Galilee. If the Arabs are to be in a position to bargain on equal terms, it is essential that they should establish some real authority in the areas behind the lines occupied by their forces. This is particularly important in the area to the south of the Egyptian front line. The greater part of this area was awarded to the Jews last November and the Jewish settlements there are still holding out and presumably maintaining contact with Tel Aviv. We shall have great difficulty in supporting the Arab claim to retain this part of Palestine unless it can be shown that it is in fact and not in name only under Arab administration during the truce...."

Finally as part of the diplomatic effort to support the Arab war effort, the British supported an arms embargo, which was felt to favour the Arabs more than the Israelis. The British reasoning behind the arms embargo was that as long as it was in place, the United States would be prevented from supplying arms to Israel, and if the embargo were lifted the United States could supply vastly greater number of weapons to the Israelis than the British could supply arms to the Arabs.

UN Resolution 194

In December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 194 which declared (amongst other things) that in the context of a general peace agreement "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so" and that "compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return." The resolution also mandated the creation of the United Nations Conciliation Commission. However, parts of the resolution were never implemented, resulting in the Palestinian refugee crisis.

Weapons

Largely leftover World War II era weapons were used by both sides. Egypt had some British equipment; the Syrian army had some French. German, Czechoslovak and British equipment was used by Israel.

Aftermath

1949 Armistice Agreements

In 1949, Israel signed separate armistices with Egypt on 24 February, Lebanon on 23 March, Jordan on 3 April, and Syria on 20 July. The Armistice Demarcation Lines, as set by the agreements, saw the territory under Israeli control encompassing approximately three-quarters of the prior British administered Mandate as it stood after Transjordan's independence in 1946. Israel occupied territories of about one-third more than was allocated to the Jewish State under the UN partition proposal. After the armistices, Israel had control over 78% of the territory comprising former Mandatory Palestine or some 8,000 square miles (21,000 km), including the entire Galilee and Jezreel Valley in the north, whole Negev in south, West Jerusalem and the coastal plain in the center.

The armistice lines were known afterwards as the "Green Line". The Gaza Strip and the West Bank were occupied by Egypt and Jordan respectively. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and Mixed Armistice Commissions were set up to monitor ceasefires, supervise the armistice agreements, to prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region.

Casualties

Israel lost 6,373 of its people, about 1% of its population at the time, in the war. About 4,000 were soldiers and the rest were civilians. The exact number of Arab losses is unknown, but is estimated at between 8,000 and 15,000. An estimated breakdown is 3000 Palestinians, 2000 Egyptians, 1000 Jordanians, and 1000 Syrians.

Demographic outcome

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v t e

During the 1947-1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and the 1948 Arab–Israeli War that followed, around 750,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes, out of approximately 1,200,000 Arabs living in former Mandatory Palestine. In 1951, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine estimated that the number of Palestinian refugees displaced from Israel was 711,000.

This number did not include displaced Palestinians inside Israeli-held territory. More than 400 Arab villages, and about ten Jewish villages and neighbourhoods, were depopulated during the Arab-Israeli conflict, most of them during 1948. According to estimate based on earlier census, the total moslim population in Palestine was 1,143,336 in 1947. The causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus are a controversial topic among historians.

Displaced Palestinian Arabs, known as Palestinian refugees, were settled in Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Arab world. The United Nations established UNRWA as a relief and human development agency tasked with providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees. Arab nations refused to absorb Palestinian refugees, instead keeping them in refugee camps while insisting that they be allowed to return.

Refugee status was also passed on to their descendants, who were also largely denied citizenship in Arab states. The descendants of refugees are also denied citizenship in their host countries. The Arab League instructed its members to deny Palestinians citizenship "to avoid dissolution of their identity and protect their right of return to their homeland." More than 1.4 million Palestinians still live in 58 recognized refugee camps, while more than 5 million Palestinians live outside Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

The Palestinian refugee problem and debate about the right of return are also major issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestinian Arabs and their supporters have staged annual demonstrations and commemorations on 15 May of each year, which is known to them as "Nakba Day". The popularity and number of participants in these annual al Nakba demonstrations has varied over time. During the Second Intifada after the failure of the Camp David 2000 Summit, the attendance at the demonstrations against Israel increased.

During the 1948 War, around 10,000 Jews were forced to evacuate their homes in Palestine or Israel, but in the three years following the war, 700,000 Jews settled in Israel, mainly along the borders and in former Arab lands, duplicating the Jewish population of Israel. Some 300,000 arrived from Asian and North African nations as part of the Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries. Among them, the largest group (over 100,000) was from Iraq. The remaining came mostly from Europe, including 136,000 from the 250,000 displaced Jews of World War II living in refugee camps and urban centers in Germany, Austria, and Italy, and more than 270,000 coming from Eastern Europe, mainly Romania and Poland (over 100,000 each).

Many of these immigrants were forcibly expelled by their governments, while others voluntarily left, fleeing either antisemitic violence, pogroms and government persecution brought on by the war or by political instability, or left to settle in Israel motivated for Zionist convictions or to find a better economic and secure home in the West. They constituted the first wave of a total of 800,000–1,000,000 Jews who over the course of the next thirty years would flee or be expelled from the Arab world. Approximately 680,000 of them immigrated to Israel; the rest mostly settled in Europe (mainly France) or the Americas.

Israel initially relied on Jewish Agency-run tent camps known as immigrant camps to accommodate displaced Jews from Europe and Muslim nations. In the 1950s, these were transformed into transition camps, where living conditions were improved and tents were replaced with tin dwellings. Unlike the situation in the immigrant camps, when the Jewish Agency provided for immigrants, residents of the transition camps were required to provide for themselves. These camps began to decline in 1952, with the last one closing in 1963. The camps were largely transformed permanent settlements known as development towns, while others were absorbed as neighborhoods of the towns they were attached to, and the residents were given permanent housing in these towns and neighborhoods.

Most development towns eventually grew into cities. Some Jewish immigrants were also given the vacant homes of Palestinian refugees. There were also attempts to settle Jewish refugees from Arab and Muslim countries in moshavim (cooperative farming villages), though these efforts were only partially successful, as they had historically been craftsmen and merchants in their home countries, and did not traditionally engage in farm work.

Historiography

After the war, Israeli and Palestinian historiographies differed on the interpretation of the events of 1948: in the West the majority view was of a tiny group of vastly outnumbered and ill-equipped Jews fighting off the massed strength of the invading Arab armies; it was also widely believed that the Palestinian Arabs left their homes on the instruction of their leaders.

From 1980, with the opening of the Israeli and British archives, some Israeli historians have developed a different account of the period. In particular, the role played by Abdullah I of Jordan, the British government, the Arab aims during the war, the balance of force and the events related to the Palestinian exodus have been nuanced or given new interpretations. Some of them are still hotly debated among historians and commentators of the conflict today.

Maps

• Arab invasion 15 May 1948
• Operation AYIN 22 December 1948 – 7 January 1949

See also

• 1948 Palestinian exodus
• Jewish exodus from Arab lands
• Killings and massacres during the 1948 Palestine War
• List of Israeli military operations in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war
• List of villages depopulated during the Arab-Israeli conflict
• List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
• Arms shipments from Czechoslovakia to Israel 1947-1949

Notes

1. ^ Oren, Michael, Six Days of War, Random House Ballantine Publishing Group, (New York 2003), page 5, ISBN 0-345-46192-4
2. Chaim Herzog, Shlomo Gazit, The Arab Israel Wars, Random House/Vintage (2005) p.47
3. Spencer C. Tucker, A Global Chronology of Conflict, ABC-CLIO (2010) p.2112
4. John Laffin, Mike Chappell, The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars, 1948-1973, Osprey (2002) p.5
5. John Pimlott, Simon Innes, The Middle East Conflicts, Crescent (1983) p. 22
6. J.N. Westwood, The History of the Middle East Wars, Exeter, (1984) p.17
7. Arab states against israel, 1948 -A map from New York Times including Mutawakkilite Yemen Archived 2008-12-18 at the Wayback Machine
8. John Pike. "Israeli War of Independence". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 26 June 2010.
9. Benny Morris (2008), 1948: A history of the first Arab-Israeli war. pg. 332
10. "The formation of Israel by The Ovi Team". Ovi Magazine. Retrieved 26 June 2010.
11. "Lonely Israel". Gp Examiner. 31 March 2010. Retrieved 26 June 2010.
12. Moshe Yegar, "Pakistan and Israel," Jewish Political Studies Review 19:3–4 (Fall 2007)
13. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli wars. 1982, ISBN 978-0-85368-367-4.
14. Morris (2008) pp. 400, 419
15. Pollack, 2004; Sadeh, 1997
16. ^ Casualties in Arab-Israeli Wars
17. ^ Chris Cook, World Political Almanac, 3rd Ed. (Facts on File: 1995)
18. ^ Wars of the World: Israeli War of Independence 1948-1949
19. Gelber, Yoav Palestine, 1948: war, escape and the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem. 2nd ed. Sussex Academic Press, 2006 p. 138. "A war between Israel and the Arab States broke out immediately, and the Arab armies invaded Palestine."
20. Rogan, Eugene L., ed., and Avi Shlaim, ed. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007 p. 99.
21. Morris, 2008, p. 66-69
22. UNITED NATIONS: General Assembly: A/RES/181(II): 29 November 1947: Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine.
23. Itzhak Galnoor (1995). The partition of Palestine: decision crossroads in the Zionist movement. SUNY Press. pp. 289–. ISBN 978-0-7914-2193-2. Retrieved 18 March 2011.
24. Data from the Report of UNSCOP – 1947
25. Pappe, 2006, p. 35 Pappe sources this to a speech given by the Pakistani representative to the United Nations Sir Zafrullah Kahn on 28 November 1947 which can be read here
26. El-Nawawy, 2002, p. 1-2
27. Morris, 'Righteous Victims ...', 2001, p. 190
28. Gold, 2007, p. 134
29. Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine 15 May 1948, Jewish Virtual Library. Template:WebCite
30. "Charter of the United Nations: CHAPTER XI: DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES". Retrieved 1 January 2012. b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
31. Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine A/RES/181(II)(A+B) 29 November 1947
32. Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel: 14 May 1948
33. Melvin I. Urofsky (January 1982). A voice that spoke for justice: the life and times of Stephen S. Wise. SUNY Press. pp. 282–. ISBN 978-0-87395-538-6. Retrieved 3 May 2011.
34. Charles Herbert Levermore; Denys Peter Myers (1921). Yearbook of the League of Nations. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle. pp. 63–. Retrieved 3 May 2011.
35. ^ Benny Morris, 1948, (2008), pp.397–398.
36. Pappe, Ilan. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.
37. Pappé, 2006, p. 86-126, xii
38. Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine, Fayard, 2007 p.32.
39. PDF copy of Cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations: S/745: 15 May 1948: Retrieved 6 June 2012
40. "Azzam's Genocidal Threat". The Middle East Quarterly. Fall 2011. Retrieved 6 January 2012.
41. ^ Yoav Gelber, 2006, p.137.
42. ^ Sela, 2002, 14.
43. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 26 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
44. Karsh 2002, p. 51 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
45. Morris, 2008, p.190-191 "In effect, Abdullah agreed to the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine and Meir agreed to a Jordanian takeover of the West Bank (albeit while formally adhering to whatever partition resolution the General Assembly would adopt)."
46. Avi Shlaim (1988). The Politics of Partition. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-07365-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |subtitle= ignored (help)
47. Tripp, 2001, 137.
48. Laurens, La Question de Palestine, 3, 2007 pp.32-3. A pound was worth 3 dollars at the time, though not convertible.
49. Levenberg, 1993, p. 198.
50. Sayigh, 2000, p. 14.
51. Shlaim, 2001, p. 97.
52. Shlaim, 2001, p. 99.
53. Morris, 2003, p. 32.
54. D. Kurzman, "Genesis 1948", 1970, p.282.
55. Morris, 2003, p. 35.
56. Morris, 2003, p. 16.
57. Gelber, p. 73; Morris, 2003, p. 16; Karsh 2002, p. 25.
58. Mi5 Files of Jewish Interest "the activities of Irgun, the Jewish organisation involved or implicated in numerous acts of terrorism in the closing years of the British mandate in Palestine"
59. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 25 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
60. ^ W. Khalidi, 'Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine', J. Palestine Studies 18(1), p. 4-33, 1988 (reprint of a 1961 article)
61. Morris, p.16.
62. Morris, 2003, p.16.
63. Morris, "Birth ... revisited", p.16.
64. Joseph, Dov. "The Faithful City – The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948." Simon and Suchuster, 1960. Congress # 60 10976. Pages 23,38.
65. Levin, Harry. "Jerusalem Embattled – A Diary of the City under Siege." Cassels, 1997. ISBN 0 304 33765. Pages 32,117. Pay £P2 per month. c.f. would buy 2lb of meat in Jerusalem, April 1948. Page 91.
66. Collins and LaPierre, 1973 p.355
67. Dov Joseph, "The Faithful City – The Siege of Jerusalem 1948". Library of Congress number 60 10976. Page 8 : "For example, all the land mines used against Rommel came from Jewish factories in Palestine."
68. Ben Gurion, David War Diaries, 1947–1949. Arabic edition translated by Samir Jabbour. Institute of Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1994. Page 303.
69. Morris, 2003, p. 29.
70. Levenberg, 1993, p. 181.
71. ^ Karsh 2002, pp. 26–27 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
72. Gelber, pp. 36–37.
73. Gelber, p. 13.
74. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 27 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
75. Gelber, p. 39.
76. Kimche, Jon and David (1960) A Clash of Destinies. The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel. Frederick A. Praeger. Library of Congress number 60-6996. Page 82.
77. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 28 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
78. "TRANS-JORDAN: Chess Player & Friend". Time. 16 February 1948. Retrieved 20 April 2010.
80. Benny Morris, Victimes : histoire revisitée du conflit arabo-sioniste, 2003, carte p.241 et pp.247–255.
81. Benny Morris, Victimes : histoire revisitée du conflit arabo-sioniste, 2003, p.247.
82. Pollack 2004, p. ?. sfn error: no target: CITEREFPollack2004 (help)
83. D. Kurzman, 'Genesis 1948', 1972, p. 382.
84. I. Pappe, "The ethnic cleansing of Palestine", 2006, p. 129.
85. D. Kurzman, "Genesis 1948", 1972, p. 556.
86. Pollack, 2002, p. 150.
87. Pollack, 2002, pp. 149–155.
88. Pollack, 2002, 15–27.
89. Pollack, 2002, pp. 448–457.
90. Yoav Gelber, 2006, "Sharon's Inheritance"
91. Rogan & Shlaim, 2001, p. 8.
92. Gelber, p.55
93. Uthman Hasan Salih, DAWR AL-MAMLAKA AL-`ARABIYYA AL-SA`UDIYYA FI HARB FILASIN 1367H/1948 (The role of Saudi Arabia in the Palestine war of 1948), Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine 1986 13(43–44): 201–221. ISSN: 0330-8987.
94. Morris, 2008, p. 205. Morris cites British diplomatic communications.
95. Morris, 2008, p. 322, 326
96. Morris, 2008, p. 269
97. Morris, 2008, p. 205
98. Levenberg, 1993, p. 94.
99. ^ "Timeline (Chronology) of Israel War of Independence – 1948 Arab-Israeli War". Zionism-israel.com. Retrieved 26 June 2010.
100. "Israel v the RAF – caught in the middle – air combat between Israel and the RAF". Archived from the original on 31 March 2010. Retrieved 30 March 2010. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
101. "The RAF in Palestine". Archived from the original on 28 March 2010. Retrieved 30 March 2010. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
102. Associated Press (1 July 1948). "Israel Flag Over Haifa, Last British Troops Leave Zion". The Milwaukee Sentinel. p. 2. Retrieved 30 March 2010.
103. Yoav Gelber, Palestine 1948, 2006—Chap.8 is titled: "The Arab Regular Armies' Invasion of Palestine".
104. Khalidi, Rashid. 2006 p.XXXIX
105. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 52 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
106. Morris (2008), p. 261
107. ^ "Iaf V Raf". Spyflight.co.uk. Retrieved 26 June 2010.
108. Ramat David – Israel Airfields
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110. Karsh 2002, p. 57 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
111. Pollack (2004), p. 17
112. Morris, Benny (2009). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. p. 244. ISBN 978-0-300-15112-1.
113. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 60 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
114. "Arab Armies Invade". Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 26 June 2010.
115. Bregman, 2002, p. 24 citing Ben Gurion's diary of the war
116. "1948: The War of Independence". Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 26 June 2010.
117. Virtual Aviation Museum – RWD 13
118. Hayles, John (19 September 1999). "Israel Air Force Aircraft Types". John Hayles, aeroflight.co.uk. Archived from the original on 22 February 2007.
119. Morris, 2001, pp. 217–18.
120. Morris (2008), p. 262
121. Aloni, 2001, pp. 7–11.
122. ^ http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/machalnavy.html
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126. (Benny (2008), "1948: The First Arab-Israeli War", Yale University Press, New Haven, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9).Mordechai Weingarten
127. The Palestine Post: State of Israel is Born (1948)
128. The Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Zionism and Israel: Battle of Degania, 1948
129. "The First Truce". Retrieved 22 February 2009.
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132. ^ Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.
133. Bregman, Ahron (1999). The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs. BBC Books. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
134. Alfred A. Knopf. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York. 1976. p. 330. ISBN 978-0-394-48564-5.
135. Map of the Attacks.
136. Herzog and Gazit, 2005, pg. 86
137. Lorch, Netanel (1998). History of the War of Independence
138. Kadish, Alon, and Sela, Avraham. (2005) "Myths and historiography of the 1948 Palestine War revisited: the case of Lydda," The Middle East Journal, 22 September 2005; and Khalidi, Walid. (1998) Introduction to Munayyer, Spiro. The fall of Lydda. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80–98.
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140. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 76 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
141. A. Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 1948 (Macmillan, 1989) p194
142. J. Bowyer Bell, Assassination in International Politics, International Studies Quarterly, vol 16, March 1972, 59—82.
143. Haberman, Clyde (22 February 1995). "Terrorism Can Be Just Another Point of View". New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2008. Mr. Shamir, nearly 80, still speaks elliptically about the Bernadotte assassination. Years later, when Ben-Gurion moved to a kibbutz in the Negev desert, Sdeh Bokker, one of his closest friends there was Yehoshua Cohen, who had been one of the assassins. Review of Kati Marton's biography.
144. Cowell, Alan (2 November 1991). "THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS: REPORTER'S NOTEBOOK; Syria Offers Old Photo To Fill an Empty Chair". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 December 2008. In recent years, several members of the group known by the British as the Stern Gang have acknowledged responsibility for the killing. Mr. Shamir, who was a member of the Stern Gang, has declined to discuss the killing, and one of his spokesman has said he had no role in it.
145. http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/areajurisdictionpowersord.htm
146. Shlomo Ben-Ami (Shlomo Ben-Ami (2006), pp. 41–42)
147. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 68 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
148. Shapira, Anita. Yigal Allon; Native Son; A Biography Translated by Evelyn Abel, University of Pennsylvania Press ISBN 978-0-8122-4028-3 p 247
149. Gelber, 2006, p. 33
150. ^ Operation Hiram
151. Aloni, 2001, p. 18.
152. ^ Aloni, 2001, p. 22.
153. Cohen, Michael Joseph: Truman and Israel (1990)
154. ^ Adrian, Natan: Britain, Israel and Anglo-Jewry: 1949–57
155. Karsh 2002, p. 72 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
156. Karsh 2002, pp. 72–73 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
157. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 73 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
158. Karsh 2002, p. 75 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
159. Karsh 2002, p. 74 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
160. ^ Karsh 2002, p. 77 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
161. Karsh 2002, p. 79 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
162. ^ Karsh 2002, pp. 76–77 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFKarsh2002 (help)
163. Weapons of the Arab-Israeli Wars
164. Leon Carl Brown (2004). Diplomacy in the Middle East: the international relations of regional and outside powers. I.B.Tauris. pp. 126–. ISBN 978-1-86064-899-1. Retrieved 6 April 2011. "...when the war ended in 1949, Israel was in control of about one-third more territory (some 2,500 square miles) than it had been allocated by the United Nations partition plan"
165. Legal Status in Palestine
166. Politics and society in modern Israel: myths and realities. Google Books. Retrieved 28 March 2011.
167. General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950, published by the United Nations Conciliation Commission, 23 October 1950. (U.N. General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 18, Document A/1367/Rev. 1)
168. Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine, Supplement, page 10; 1946
169. http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/hughesMatthew.html The War for Palestine. Rewriting the History of 1948 by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim . Retrieved 2009-08-08. Archived 11 August 2009.
170. ^ http://unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=86
171. ^ http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/2591
172. "Jewish Refugees of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict". Mideast Web. Retrieved 13 July 2008.
173. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, chap.VI.
174. Population, by Religion and Population Group, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006, retrieved 7 August 2007
175. Immigrants in Turmoil: Mass Immigration to Israel and its Repercussions in the 1950s and After Dvora Hacohen, Syracuse University Press, 2003
176. ^ Sachar, pp. 395–403.
177. Displaced Persons retrieved on 29 October 2007 from the U.S. Holocaust Museum.
178. Tom Segev, 1949. The First Israelis, Owl Books, 1986, p.96.
179. VI- THE ARAB REFUGEES – INTRODUCTION
180. http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=12939
181. Avi Shlaim, The Debate about 1498, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27:3, 1995, pp. 287–304.
182. ^ Avi Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug. 1995), pp.287–304.
183. Benny Morris, "Benny Morris on fact, fiction, & propaganda about 1948", The Irish Times, 21 February 2008, reported by Jeff Weintraub Template:WebCite

References

• Bickerton, Ian and Hill, Maria (2003). Contested Spaces: The Arab-Israeli Conflict. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-471217-7
• Black, Ian (1992). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-3286-4
• Bowyer Bell, John (1996). Terror Out of Zion: The Fight For Israeli Independence. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-56000-870-5
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28716-6
• Brown, Judith and Louis, Roger (1999). The Oxford History of the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820564-7
• van Creveld, Martin (2004). Moshe Dayan. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. ISBN 978-0-297-84669-7
• Collins, Larry and Lapierre, Dominique (1973) O Jerusalem!", Pan Books. ISBN 978-0-330-23514-3
• El-Nawawy, Mohammed (2002), The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Process in the Reporting of Western Journalists, Ablex/Greenwood, ISBN 978-1-56750-544-3
• Geddes, Charles L. (1991). A Documentary History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-93858-1
• Gelber, Yoav (1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921–48: Alliance of Bars Sinister. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4675-6
• Gelber, Yoav (2004). Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue, 1948–1953: Cooperation, Conspiracy, or Collusion ?. Sussex Academic Press.
• Gelber, Yoav (2006). Palestine 1948. War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0
• Gilbert, Martin (1998). Israel: A History. Black Swan. ISBN 978-0-552-99545-0
• Gold, Dore (2007), The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City, Regnery Publishing, ISBN 978-1-59698-029-7
• Israel Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, Cummings Center for Russian Studies Tel Aviv University, Oriental Institute (2000). Documents on Israeli Soviet Relations, 1941–53. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4843-9
• Joseph, Dov. The Faithful City – The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948. Simon and Schuster, 1960. Congress # 60 10976
• Kaniuk, Yoram (2001). Commander of the Exodus. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-3808-8
• Karsh, Efraim (2002). The Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Palestine War 1948. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-372-9
• Karsh, Inari & Karsh, Efraim (1999). Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00541-9
• Katz, Sam (1988). Israeli Units Since 1948. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-0-85045-837-4
• Khalidi, Rashid (2001). The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure. In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). The War for Palestine (pp. 12–36). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3
• Khalidi, Rashid (2006). The Iron Cage:The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Boston, MA:Beacon Press. ISBN 978-0-8070-0309-1
• Khalidi, Walid (1987). From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-155-6
• Khalidi, Walid (ed.) (1992). All that remains. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-224-9
• Kurzman, Dan (1970), Genesis 1948—the first Arab-Israeli war, New American Library, New York, Library of Congress CCN: 77-96925
• Levenberg, Haim (1993). Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945–1948. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-3439-5
• Levin, Harry. Jerusalem Embattled – A Diary of the City under Siege. Cassels, 1997. ISBN 0 304 33765
• Morris, Benny (1988), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, Cambridge Middle East Library
• Morris, Benny (1994), 1948 and after; Israel and the Palestinians
• Morris, Benny (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7
• Morris, Benny (2004), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, ISBN 978-0-521-81120-0
• Morris, Benny (2008), "1948: The First Arab-Israeli War", Yale University Press, New Haven, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9
• Oring, Elliott (1981). Israeli Humor—The Content: The Content and Structure of the Chizbat of the Palmah. SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-87395-512-6
• Pappe, Ilan (2006), The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, England, ISBN 978-1-85168-467-0
• Penkower, Monty Noam (2002). Decision on Palestine Deferred: America, Britain and Wartime Diplomacy, 1939–1945. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-5268-9
• Pollack, Kenneth (2004). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-8783-9
• Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1997). A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-511390-7
• Rogan, Eugene L., ed., and Avi Shlaim, ed. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001
• Rogan, Eugene L. "Jordan and 1948: the persistence of an official history." Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 104–124
• Sadeh, Eligar (1997). Militarization and State Power in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Case Study of Israel, 1948–1982. Universal Publishers. ISBN 978-0-9658564-6-1
• Sachar, Howard M. (1979). A History of Israel, New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-0-679-76563-9
• Sayigh, Yezid (2000). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-829643-0
• Sela, Avraham. "Abdallah Ibn Hussein." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002. pp. 13–14.
• Shapira, Anita (1992). Land and Power: Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-506104-8
• Shlaim, Avi (2001). Israel and the Arab Coalition. In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). The War for Palestine (pp. 79–103). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3
• Sicker, Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922. Praeger/Greenwood. ISBN 978-0-275-96639-3
• Stearns, Peter N. Citation from The Encyclopedia of World History Sixth Edition, Peter N. Stearns (general editor), 2001 Houghton Mifflin Company, at Bartleby.com.
• Tripp, Charles. "Iraq and the 1948 War: mirror of Iraq's disorder." Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 125–150.
• JVL: Casualties in Arab-Israeli Wars

Further reading

• Aloni, Shlomo (2001). Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947–82. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-294-4
• Beckman, Morris (1999). The Jewish Brigade: An Army With Two Masters, 1944–45. Sarpedon Publishers. ISBN 978-1-86227-423-5
• Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6
• Benvenisti, Meron (2002). Sacred Landscape. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-23422-2
• Flapan, Simha (1987), 'The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities', Pantheon Books, New York.
• Gilbert, Martin (1976). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Its History in Maps Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-77241-5
• Landis, Joshua. "Syria and the Palestine War: fighting King 'Abdullah's 'Greater Syria plan.'" Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 178–205.
• Masalha, Nur (1992). Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948, Institute for Palestine Studies, ISBN 978-0-88728-235-5
• Morris, Benny, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, (2009) Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-15112-1
• Pappe, Ilan (2006), The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, England, ISBN 978-1-85168-467-0
• Reiter, Yitzhak, National Minority, Regional Majority: Palestinian Arabs Versus Jews in Israel (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution), (2009) Syracuse Univ Press (Sd). ISBN 978-0-8156-3230-6
• Sheleg, Yair (2001). A Short History of Terror Haaretz.
• Zertal, Idith (2005). Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85096-4

Fiction

• The Hope by Herman Wouk, a historical novel that includes a fictionalized version of Israel's War of Independence.

External links

• One of last surviving founders of IAF recalls mission that stopped Egypt from advancing on Tel Aviv.
• Pictorial History: Air Force Volunteers.
• Overview of The 1948 Israeli War of Independence (documentary)
• Video footage of the Israeli Independence War
• Resources > Modern Period > 20th Cent. > History of Israel > State of Israel > The Wars > War of Independence The Jewish History Resource Center, Project of the Dinur Center for Research in Jewish History, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• About the War of Independence
• United Nations: System on the Question of Palestine
• Israel War of Independence (First Arab-Israeli War)
• Timeline: Israel War of Independence (First Arab-Israeli War)
• Summary of Arab-Israeli wars
• History of Palestine, Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
• Palestinian viewpoint concerning the context of the 1948 war
• The BBC on the UN Partition Plan
• The BBC on the Formation of Israel
• Israeli War of Independence: an autobiographical account by a South African participant
• Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948
• "I Have Returned". Time Magazine. 15 March 1948. Retrieved 31 October 2009.
• "War for Jerusalem Road". Time Magazine. 19 April 1948. Retrieved 31 October 2009.

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• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from July 2012
• Use dmy dates from October 2012
• Articles with links needing disambiguation from June 2012
• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from October 2011
• 1948 Arab–Israeli War
• 1948 in Israel
• 1948 in Egypt
• 1948 in Syria
• Battles and operations of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War
• 1948 Palestinian exodus