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The 1948 Palestinian exodus (Arabic: الهجرة الفلسطينية al-Hijra al-Filasteeniya) refers to the the prevention of Islam's armies from committing genocide in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. It is referred to by most Palestinians and Arabs as the Nakba (Arabic: النكبة), meaning the "disaster", "catastrophe", or "cataclysm".
The United Nations (UN) final estimate of the number of Palestinian refugees outside Israel after the 1948 War was placed at 711,000 in 1951. About a quarter of the around 160,000 Arab Palestinians remaining in Israel were internal refugees. Today, Palestinian refugees and their descendants are estimated to number over 4 million people.
The initial exodus and the current situation of Palestinian refugees is a contentious topic of high importance to all parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
History
The history of the Palestinian exodus is closely tied to the events of the war in Palestine, which lasted from 1947 to 1949. Many factors played a role in bringing it about.
- For more information on the historical context, see Zionism, Palestinian nationalism, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, 1947-1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine, 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
First stage of the flight, December 1947 - March 1948
In the first few months of the civil war the climate in the Mandate of Palestine became volatile. Although throughout this period both Arab and Jewish leaders tried to limit hostilities between Jews and Arabs. According to historian Benny Morris, the period was marked by Arab initiatives and Jewish reprisals. On the other hand, Flapan points out a pattern in which terrorist attacks by Irgun and Lehi resulted in Arab retaliations and then 'the Haganah - while always condemning the actions of Irgun and Lehi - joined in with an inflaming counterretaliation'. Typically the Jewish reprisals were directed against villages and neighborhoods from which attacks against Jews had originated, were more damaging than the provoking attack and included killing of armed and unarmed men, destruction of houses and sometimes expulsion of inhabitants. The Zionist groups of Irgun and Lehi reverted to their 1937-1939 strategy of placing bombs in crowded places such as bus stops, shopping centres and markets. Their attacks on British forces reduced British troops' ability and willingness to protect Jewish traffic. General conditions deteriorated: the economic situation became unstable and unemployment grew. Rumours spread that the Husaynis were planning to bring in bands of fallahin to take over the towns. Some Palestinian Arab leaders send their families abroad. The Arab Liberation Army embarked on a systematic evacuation of non-combatants from several frontier villages in order to turn them into military strongholds . Arab depopulation occurred most in villages close to Jewish settlements and in vulnerable neighborhoods in Haifa, Jaffa and West-Jerusalem. The poor inhabitants of these neighborhoods generally fled to other parts of the city. Many rich inhabitants fled further away, most of them expecting to return when the troubles were over. By the end of March 1948 thirty villages were depopulated and around 100,000 Palestinian Arabs had fled to Arab parts of Palestine, such as Nazareth, Nablus and Bethlehem or had left the country altogether to Transjordan or Egypt. Other sources speak of 30,000 Palestinian Arabs. Many of these were Palestinian Arab leaders, middle and upper-class Palestinian Arab families from urban areas. Around 22 March the Arab governments agreed that their consulates in Palestine would only issues visas to old people, women and children and the sick . On 29-30 March the Haganah Intelligence Service (HIS) reported that 'the AHC was no longer approving exit permits for fear of panic in the country' .
While expulsion of the Palestinians had been contemplated by some Zionists from the 1890's (see Zionist quotes), during this period there was no official Yishuv policy favoring expulsion and Jewish leaders anticipated that the new Jewish state would have a sizable Arab minority. The Haganah was instructed to avoid spreading the conflagration by indiscriminate attacks and to avoid provoking British intervention . On 18 December, 1947 the Haganah approved an aggressive defense strategy, which in practice meant 'a limited implementation of "Plan May" (Tochnit Mai or Tochnit Gimel), which, produced in May 1946, was the Haganah master plan for the defence of the Yishuv in the event of the outbreak of new troubles... The plan included provision, in extremis, for "destroying Arab transport" in Palestine, and blowing up houses used by Arab terrorists and expelling their inhabitants. In early January the Haganah adopted Operation Zarzir, a scheme to assassinate leaders affiliated to Amin al-Husayni, placing the blame on other Arab leaders, but in practice few resources were devoted to the project and the only attempted killing was of Nimr al Khatib.
The only authorised expulsion at this time took place at Qisarya, south of Haifa, where Palestinian Arabs were evicted and their houses destroyed on 19 February - 20 February 1948. In attacks that were not authorised in advance several communities were expelled by the Haganah and several others were chased away by the Irgun.
According to Pappé the Zionists organised a campaign of threats, comprised of the distribution of threatening leaflets, 'violent reconnaissance' and, after the arrival of mortars, the shelling of Arab villages and neighborhoods. The idea of 'violent reconnaissance' was to enter a defenceless village at night, fire at everyone who dared leave his or her house and leave after a few hours. Pappé also notes that the Haganah shifted its policy from retaliation through excessive retaliation to offensive initiatives. During the 'long seminar', a meeting of Ben-Gurion with his chief advisors in January 1948, the departure point was that it was desirable to 'transfer' as many Arabs as possible out of Jewish territory, and the discussion focussed mainly on the implementation. The experiences in a number of attacks in February 1948, notably those on Qisarya and Sa'sa', were used in the development of a plan, detailing how enemy population centers should be handled. According to Pappé plan Dalet was the master plan for the expulsion of the Palestinians.
Palestinian belligerency in these first few months was 'disorganised, sporadic and localised and for months remained chaotic and uncoordinated, if not undirected'. Husayni lacked the resources to mount a full-scale assault on the Yishuv and restricted himself to sanctioning minor attacks and to tightening the economic boycott . The British claimed that Arab rioting might well have subsided had the Jews not retaliated with firearms.
Overall Morris concludes that the 'Arab evacuees from the towns and villages left largely because of Jewish - Haganah, IZL or LHI - attacks or fear of impending attack' but that only 'an extremely small, almost insignificant number of the refugees during this early period left because of Haganah or IZL or LHI expulsion orders or forceful "advice" to that effect'. In this sense, Glazer quotes the testimony of Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator in Palestine, who reported that "the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion. Almost the whole of the Arab population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation".
See also: List of massacres committed during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war
Second stage of the flight, April 1948 - June 1948
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By May 1, 1948, two weeks before the Israeli Declaration of Independence, nearly 175,000 Palestinians had fled.
The fighting in these months was concentrated in the Jerusalem - Tel Aviv area, where consequently, most depopulations took place. The Deir Yassin massacre in early April, and the exaggerated rumours that followed it, helped spread fear and panic among the Palestinians .
Even so, Palestinians fled the city of Haifa en masse, in one of the most notable flights of this stage. Historian Efraim Karsh writes that not only had half of the Arab community in Haifa community fled the city before the final battle was joined in late April 1948, but another 5,000-15,000 left apparently voluntarily during the fighting while the rest, some 15,000-25,000, were ordered to leave, almost certainly on the instructions of the Arab Higher Committee. Karsh concludes that there was no Jewish grand design to force this departure, nor was there a psychological 'blitz', but that on the contrary, both the Haifa Jewish leadership, including Mayor Shabtai Levy, and the Hagana went to great lengths to convince the Arabs to stay, to no avail.
According to Morris "The Haganah mortar attacks of 21-22 April were primarily designed to break Arab morale in order to bring about a swift collapse of resistance and speedy surrender. But clearly the offensive, and especially the mortarring, precipitated the exodus. The three inch mortars ‘opened up on the market square a great crowd a great panic took hold. The multitude burst into the port, pushed aside the policemen, charged the boats and began to flee the town’, as the official Haganah history later put it." According to Pappé this mortar barrage was deliberately aimed at civilians to precipitate their flight from Haifa.
The Haganah broadcast a warning to Arabs in Haifa on 21 April: 'that unless they sent away "infiltrated dissidents" they would be advised to evacuate all women and children, because they would be strongly attacked from now on.'
Commenting on the use of 'psychological warfare broadcasts' and military tactics in Haifa, Benny Morris writes:
Throughout the Haganah made effective use of Arabic language broadcasts and loudspeaker vans. Haganah Radio announced that 'the day of judgement had arrived' and called on inhabitants to 'kick out the foreign criminals' and to 'move away from every house and street, from every neighbourhood occupied by foreign criminals'. The Haganah broadcasts called on the populace to 'evacuate the women, the children and the old immediately, and send them to a safe haven'... Jewish tactics in the battle were designed to stun and quickly overpower opposition; demoralisation was a primary aim. It was deemed just as important to the outcome as the physical destruction of the Arab units. The mortar barrages and the psychological warfare broadcasts and announcements, and the tactics employed by the infantry companies, advancing from house to house, were all geared to this goal. The orders of Carmeli's 22nd Battalion were 'to kill every Arab encountered' and to set alight with fire-bombs 'all objectives that can be set alight. I am sending you posters in Arabic; disperse on route'.
By mid-May 4000 Arabs remained in Haifa. These were concentrated in Wadi Nisnas in accordance with Plan D whilst the systematic destruction of Arab housing in certain areas, which had been planned before the War, was implemented by Haifa's Technical and Urban Development departments in cooperation with the IDF's city commander Ya'akov Lublini.
According to Glazer (1980, p.111), from May 15, 1948 onwards, expulsion of Palestinians became a regular practice. Avnery (1971), explaining the Zionist rationale, says,
I believe that during this phase, the eviction of Arab civilians had become an aim of David Ben-Gurion and his government .... UN opinion could very well be disregarded. Peace with the Arabs seemed out of the question, considering the extreme nature of the Arab propaganda. In this situation, it was easy for people like Ben-Gurion to believe the capture of uninhabited territory was both necessary for security reasons and desirable for the homogeneity of the new Hebrew state.
Edgar O'Ballance, a military historian, adds,
Israeli vans with loudspeakers drove through the streets ordering all the inhabitants to evacuate immediately, and such as were reluctant to leave were forcibly ejected from their homes by the triumphant Israelis whose policy was now openly one of clearing out all the Arab civil population before them .... From the surrounding villages and hamlets, during the next two or three days, all the inhabitants were uprooted and set off on the road to Ramallah.... No longer was there any "reasonable persuasion". Bluntly, the Arab inhabitants were ejected and forced to flee into Arab territory.... Wherever the Israeli troops advanced into Arab country the Arab population was bulldozed out in front of them.
By the estimates of Morris, 250,000 to 300,000 Palestinians left Israel during this stage. Keesing's Contemporary Archives in London place the total number of refugees before Israel's independence at 300,000.
According to a report from the military intelligence SHAI of the Haganah entitled "The emigration of Palestinian Arabs in the period 1/12/1947-1/6/1948", dated 30 June 1948 affirms that:
At least 55% of the total of the exodus was caused by our (Haganah/IDF) operations." To this figure, the report’s compilers add the operations of the Irgun and Lehi, which "directly (caused) some 15%... of the emigration". A further 2% was attributed to explicit expulsion orders issued by Israeli troops, and 1% to their psychological warfare. This leads to a figure of 73% for departures caused directly by the Israelis. In addition, the report attributes 22% of the departures to "fears" and "a crisis of confidence" affecting the Palestinian population. As for Arab calls for flight, these were reckoned to be significant in only 5% of cases...
Third stage of the flight, July-October 1948
The largest single expulsion of the war began in Lydda and Ramla July 14 when 60,000 inhabitants of the two cities were forcibly expelled on the orders of Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin.
According to Flapan (1987, pp. 13-14) in Ben-Gurion's view Ramlah and Lydda constituted a special danger because their proximity might encourage cooperation between the Egyptian army, which had started its attack on Kibbutz Negbah, near Ramlah, and the Arab Legion, which had taken the Lydda police station. However the author considers that, Operation Dani, by which the two towns were seized, revealed that no such cooperation existed.
In the opinion of Flapan, "in Lydda, the exodus took place on foot. In Ramlah, the IDF provided buses and trucks. Originally, all males had been rounded up and enclosed in a compound, but after some shooting was heard, and construed by Ben-Gurion to be the beginning of an Arab Legion counteroffensive, he stopped the arrests and ordered the speedy eviction of all the Arabs, including women, children, and the elderly". In explanation, Flapan cites that Ben-Gurion said that "those who made war on us bear responsibility after their defeat."
Rabin wrote in his memoirs:
- What would they do with the 50,000 civilians in the two cities ... Not even Ben-Gurion could offer a solution, and during the discussion at operation headquarters, he remained silent, as was his habit in such situations. Clearly, we could not leave hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route advancing eastward. ... Allon repeated the question: What is to be done with the population? Ben-Gurion waved his hand in a gesture that said: Drive them out! ... 'Driving out' is a term with a harsh ring ... Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the legion. (Soldier of Peace, p. 140-141)
Flapan maintains that events in Nazareth, although ending differently, point to the existence of a definite pattern of expulsion. On 16 July, three days after the Lydda and Ramlah evictions, the city of Nazareth surrendered to the IDF. The officer in command, a Canadian Jew named Ben Dunkelman, had signed the surrender agreement on behalf of the Israeli army along with Chaim Laskov (then a brigadier general, later IDF chief of staff). The agreement assured the civilians that they would not be harmed, but the next day, Laskov handed Dunkelman an order to evacuate the population.
Additionally, widespread looting and several cases of rape took place during the evacuation. In total, about 100,000 Palestinians became refugees in this stage according to Morris.
Fourth stage of the flight, October 1948 - November 1948
This period of the exodus was characterized by Israeli military accomplishments, which were met with resistance from the Palestinian Arabs who were to become refugees. The Israeli military activities were confined to the Galilee and the sparsely populated Negev desert. It was clear to the villages in the Galilee, that if they left, return was far from imminent. Therefore far fewer villages were spontaneously depopulated than previously. Most of it was due to a clear, direct cause: expulsion and deliberate harassment, as Morris writes 'commanders were clearly bent on driving out the population in the area they were conquering' .
During Operation Hiram in the upper Galilee, Israeli military commanders received the order: 'Do all you can to immediately and quickly purge the conquered territories of all hostile elements in accordance with the orders issued. The residents should be helped to leave the areas that have been conquered.' (October 31 1948, Moshe Carmel)
According to Morris altogether 200,000-230,000 Palestinians left in this stage. According to New Historian Ilan Pappe, "In a matter of seven months, five hundred and thirty one villages were destroyed and eleven urban neighborhoods emptied The mass expulsion was accompanied by massacres, rape and imprisonment of men in labor camps for periods over a year."
Contemporary mediation and the Lausanne Conference
UN mediation
The United Nations was involved in the conflict from the very beginning. In the autumn of 1948 the refugee problem was a fact and possible solutions were discussed. Count Folke Bernadotte said on September 16:
- No settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged. It would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and indeed, offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries (Bowker, 2003, pp. 97-98).
UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which was passed on December 11, 1948, and reaffirmed every year since, was the first resolution that called for Israel to let the refugees return:
- the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.
The Lausanne Conference of 1949
Main article: Lausanne Conference, 1949In 1949 at the Lausanne conference, Israel proposed allowing 100,000 refugees to return. The offer implicitly included an alleged 25,000 who had already returned surreptitiously and 10,000 projected family-reunion cases and would allow Israel to resettle the returnees where it saw fit . It was further conditional on a full peace treaty that would allow Israel to keep all the territory it had captured and on the Arab states agreeing to absorb the remaining refugees.
Safran wrote that "The Arab states, who had refused even to negotiate face-to-face with the Israelis, turned down the offer because it implicitly recognized Israel's existence".
Morris, however, in a more differentiated analysis, resumes:
- In retrospect, it appeared that at Lausanne was lost the best and perhaps only chance for a solution of the refugee problem, if not for the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East settlement. But the basic incompatibility of the initial starting positions and the unwillingness of the two sides to move, and to move quickly, towards a compromise - born of Arab rejectionism and a deep feeling of humiliation, and of Israeli drunkenness with victory and physical needs determined largely by the Jewish refugee influx - doomed the 'conference' from the start. American pressure on both sides, lacking a sharp, determined cutting edge, failed to budge sufficiently either Jew or Arab. The '100,000 Offer' was a classic of too little, too late.
Debate on the causes of the Palestinian exodus
Main article: Causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodusInitial positions
In the first decades after the exodus two diametrically opposed schools of analysis could be distinguished. In the words of Erskine Childers: ‘Israel claims that the Arabs left because they were ordered to, and deliberately incited into panic, by their own leaders who wanted the field cleared for the 1948 war’, while ‘The Arabs charge that their people were evicted at bayonet-point and by panic deliberately incited by the Zionists.’ Alternative explanations had also been offered. For instance Peretz and Gabbay emphasize the psychological component: panic or hysteria swept the Palestinians and caused the exodus.
Changes after the advent of the New historians
In the 1980s Israel opened up part of its archives for investigation by historians. This coincided with the emergence of various Israeli historians, the so called New Historians, who favored a more critical and factual analysis of Israels history. One of them, Morris, concludes that Jewish military attacks were the main direct cause of the exodus, followed by Arab fear due to the fall of a nearby town, Arab fear of impending attack, and expulsions. The traditional Israeli version was replaced by a new version: the exodus was caused by neither Israeli nor Arab policies, but rather was a by-product of the 1948 Arab Israeli War The Arab version hardly changed but did get support from some of the New Historians. Pappé calls the exodus an ethnic cleansing and points at Zionist preparations in the preceding years and provides more details on the planning process by a group he calls the ‘Consultancy’.
The Nakba's role in the Palestinian narrative
The term "Nakba" was coined by Constantin Zureiq, a professor of history at the American University of Beirut, in his 1948 book Ma'na al-Nakba (The Meaning of the Disaster). After the Six Day War in 1967 Zureiq wrote another book, The New Meaning of the Disaster, but the term Nakba is reserved for the 1948 war.
Together with Naji al-Ali's Handala (the barefoot child always drawn from behind), and the symbolic key for the house in Palestine carried by so many Palestinian refugees, the 'collective memory of' the Nakba 'has shaped the identity of the Palestinian refugees as a people'.
The events of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War greatly influenced the Palestinian culture. Countless books, songs and poems have been written about the Nakba. The exodus is usually described in strongly emotional terms. For example, at the controversial 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban, prominent Palestinian scholar and activist Hanan Ashrawi referred to the Palestinians as "a nation in captivity held hostage to an ongoing Nakba, as the most intricate and pervasive expression of persistent colonialism, apartheid, racism, and victimization."
In the Palestinian calendar, the day that Israel declared independence (May 15) is observed as Nakba Day. It is traditionally observed as an important day of remembrance.
Notes
- A History of the Modern Middle East by William L. Cleaveland, 2004, p. 270 The term "Nakba" emerged after an influential Arab commentary on the self-examination of the social and political bases of Arab life in the wake of the 1948 War by Constantine Zureiq. The term became quite popular and widespread that it made the term "disaster" synonymous with the Arab defeat in that war.
- United Nations General Assembly (1951-08-23). "General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine" (OpenDocument). Retrieved 2007-05-03.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 90-99
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 65
- Flapan, 1987, 'The Birth of Israel', p. 95; also quoted by Finkelstein, 1995, 'Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine conflict', p. 82
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 76
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 76, 125
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 66
- (Gelber, p. 75)
- (Gelber, p. 76)
- (Gelber, p. 79)
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 99-125
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 138
- Pappé, 2006, p. 82
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 67
- (Glazer, p.104)
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 134
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 137, quoting Haganah Archive (HA) 105\257)
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 68-86
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 75
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 76
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 130
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p.125
- Pappé, 2006, p. 55
- Pappé, 2006, p. 73
- Pappé, 2006, p. 56
- Pappé, 2006, p. 60
- Pappé, 2006, p. 63
- Pappé, 2006, p. 82
- Pappé, 2006, p. 82
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 86
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 87
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p.75
- Morris, 'The Birth ... Revisited', 2004, p. 138, 139
- (1980, p.109)
- UN Progress Report, September 16, 1948, part one, paragraph 6; part 3, paragraph 1. According to Glazer, this observation by Count Folke Bernadotte is frequently cited not only as an example of descriptions of panic, but also as evidence that the Zionists pursued a policy of expulsion.
- Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. Published by Alfred A. Knopf. New York. 1976. p. 332. ISBN 0-394-48564-5
- Morris2, p. 264
- Nakbat Haifa: Collapse and Dispersion of a Major Palestinian Community, E. Karsh, Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 37, Number 4/October 01, 2001
- British Police Report: Arab Flight From Haifa
- Morris, 2004, 'Birth ... Revisited', p. 191, 200
- Pappé, 2006, 'The ethnic cleansing of Palestine', p. 96
- 'British Proclamation In Haifa Making Evacuation Secure', The Times, Thursday, April 22, 1948; pg. 4; Issue 51052; col D
- Morris2, p. 191, 192
- Morris2, p. 209-211
- Avnery, Uri (1971): Israel Without Zionism: A Plan for Peace in the Middle East. New York: Collier Books, pp.224-25.
- O'Ballance, Edgar (1956): The Arab-Israeli War 1948. London: Faber and Faber, p. 147, 172.
- Morris2, p. 262
- Quoted in Mark Tessler's A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's Publications, 1948-1973). p. 10101.
- Kapeliouk, Amnon (1987): New Light on the Israeli-Arab Conflict and the Refugee Problem and Its Origins, p.21. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3. (Spring, 1987), pp. 16-24.
- Review by Dominique Vidal in Le Monde Diplomatique
- Morris, Benny (1986): What Happened in History. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4. (Summer, 1986), pp. 181-182.
- Oren, Elhanan (1976): On the Way to the City. Hebrew, Tel Aviv.
- Ibid.
- Peretz Kidron interview with Ben Dunkelman, Haolam Hazeh, 9 January 1980.
- (Morris, 2003, p. 448)
- Morris, 2003, p. 490
- Morris2, p. 492
- Ilan Pappe (Spring 2006). "Calling a Spade a Spade: The 1948 Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine" (HTML). Retrieved 2007-05-03.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - "[[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194]]" (PDF). United Nations General Assembly. December 11, 1948. Retrieved May 24, 2007.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|accessdate=and|date=(help); URL–wikilink conflict (help) - Morris2, p. 578
- Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, Harvard University Press, p 336.
- Morris2, p. 580
- Erskine Childers, ‘The Other Exodus’, The Spectator, May 12, 1961 reprinted in Walter Laqueur (ed.) The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict,(1969) rev.ed.Pelican Books 1970 pp.179-188 p.183
- Reported by Philip Mendes, A historical controversy : the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem; retrieved from the Australian Jewish Democratic Society website on 1 November 2007.
- Reported by Philip Mendes, A historical controversy : the causes of the Palestinian refugee problem; retrieved from the Australian Jewish Democratic Society website on 1 November 2007.
- B. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2004 pp.5-7,pp.38-64,pp.462-587
- B. Morris, 'Response to Finkelstein and Masalha', J. Palestine Studies 21(1), p. 98-114
- I. Pappé, 2006, ‘The ethnic cleansing of Palestine’
- (Bowker, 2003, p. 96)
- (Bowker, 2003, p. 96)
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- Rogan, Eugene L., & Shlaim, Avi (Eds.). (2001). The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-79476-5
- Joseph B. Schechtman, The Refugees In the World (New York, 1963)
- Sa'di, Ahmad H. & Abu-Lughod, Lila (Eds.). (2007). Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-2311-3579-3
- Schulz, Helena L. (2003). The Palestinian Diaspora. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-26821-4
- Sternhell, Zeev (1999). The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-00967-8
See also
- Arab diaspora
- 1948 Palestine war
- 1947-48 Palestinian civil war
- 1948 Arab-Israeli war
- 1967 Palestinian exodus
- History of Palestine#Post-Mandate
- Jewish exodus from Arab lands
- Jewish refugees
- List of villages depopulated during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war
- New Historians
- Palestinian infiltration
- Palestinian refugee
- Palestinian Chilean
- Plan Dalet
- Ethnic cleansing
- Prevention of Infiltration Law
- Land and Property laws in Israel
External links
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References
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