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1948 Arab-Israeli War
Part of the Arab-Israeli conflict
Captain Avraham ("Bren") Adan raising the Ink Flag at Umm Rashrash (a site now in Eilat), marking the end of the war.
Date 15 May 1948 – 7 January 1949 Armistice agreements ended on July 20, 1949 Location Israel (former British Mandate of Palestine) Result Israeli victory, tactical and strategic Arab failure, Armistice Agreements Territorial changes State of Israel gains additional captured territories, Jordanian occupation of West Bank, Egyptian occupation of the Gaza Strip
Belligerents
Israel (IDF). Before 26 May 1948: Jewish paramilitary organizations (Haganah, Irgun, Lehi, Palmach, Foreign Volunteers)	Egypt Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Syria Transjordan  Lebanon Iraq Saudi Arabia Yemen Holy War Army Arab Liberation Army Muslim Brotherhood
Commanders and leaders
David Ben-Gurion Chaim Weizmann Yigael Yadin Yaakov Dori David Shaltiel Isser Be'eri Moshe Dayan Yisrael Galili Yigal Allon Shimon Avidan Yitzhak Pundak Yisrael Amir	John Bagot Glubb Norman Lash Habis al-Majali Hasan Salama † Fawzi Al-Qawuqji Ahmed Ali al-Mwawi Haj Amin Al-Husseini King Farouk I Ahmad Ali al-Mwawi Muhammad Naguib Abdul Rahman Hassan Azzam
Strength
Israel: 29,677 initially rising to 115,000 by March 1949. This includes the entire military personnel count—both combat units and logistical units.	Egypt: 10,000 initially, rising to 20,000 Iraq: 3,000 initially, rising to 15,000–18,000 Syria: 2,500–5,000 Jordan: 8,000–12,000 Lebanon: 1,000 Saudi Arabia: 800–1,200 Yemen: 300 Arab Liberation Army: 3,500–6,000 These numbers include only the combat units sent to the former British Mandate of Palestine, not the entire military strength.
Casualties and losses
6,373 KIA (about 4,000 troops and 2,400 civilians)	8,000–15,000 KIA

The 1948 Arab–Israeli War, known by Israelis as the War of Independence (Template:Lang-he, Milhemet HaAtzma'ut) or War of Liberation (Template:Lang-he, Milhemet HaShihrur) was the first in a series of wars fought between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbours in the long-running Arab-Israeli conflict.

The war commenced upon the termination of the British Mandate of Palestine and the Israeli declaration of independence on 15 May 1948, following a period of civil war in 1947–1948.The fighting took place mostly on the former territory of the British Mandate and for a short time also in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Lebanon. Much of what Arabs refer to as the Catastrophe (Template:Lang-ar, al-Nakba) occurred amidst this war.

The war concluded with the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

Background

After World War II, the British Mandate of Palestine came to an end. The surrounding Arab nations were also emerging from colonial rule. Transjordan, under the Hashemite ruler Abdullah I, gained independence from Britain in 1946 and was called Jordan, but it remained under heavy British influence. Egypt, while nominally independent, signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that included provisions by which Britain would maintain a garrison of troops on the Suez Canal. From 1945 on, Egypt attempted to renegotiate the terms of this treaty, which was viewed as a humiliating vestige of colonialism. Lebanon became an independent state in 1943, but French troops would not withdraw until 1946, the same year that Syria won its independence from France.

In 1945, at British prompting, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen formed the Arab League to coordinate policy between the Arab states. Iraq and Transjordan coordinated policies closely, signing a mutual defence treaty, while Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia feared that Transjordan would annex part or all of Palestine, and use it as a basis to attack or undermine Syria, Lebanon, and the Hijaz.

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly approved a plan to resolve the Arab-Jewish conflict by partitioning Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. Each state would comprise three major sections, linked by extraterritorial crossroads; the Arab state would also have an enclave at Jaffa. With about 32% of the population, the Jews would get 56% of the land, though this did not add significantly to the amount of arable land, and was considered insufficient to feed the expected immigrant Jewish population. The Jewish area would contain 499,000 Jews and 438,000 Arabs, and most of this territory was in the inhospitable Negev Desert in the south. The Palestinian Arabs would get 42% of the land, which had a population of 818,000 Palestinian Arabs and 10,000 Jews. In consideration of its religious significance, the Jerusalem area, including Bethlehem, with 100,000 Jews and an equal number of Palestinian Arabs, was to become a Corpus separatum, to be administered by the UN. The Jewish leadership accepted the partition plan, without reservation, as "the indispensable minimum," glad to gain international recognition but sorry that they did not receive more and on May 14, 1948 Israel was declared a State, with a provisional government taking charge from the moment of the termination of the Mandate on May 15.

Arguing that the partition plan was unfair to the Arabs with regard to the population balance at that time, the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab League firmly opposed the UN action and even rejected its authority to involve itself in the entire matter. They upheld "that the rule of Palestine should revert to its inhabitants, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.".

1947–1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine

Part of a series on the
Nakba
Precipitating events Background Mandatory Palestine 1947 partition plan Jewish insurgency in Mandatory Palestine 1948 Palestine war Civil war in Palestine Plan Dalet Deir Yassin massacre Battle of Haifa Israeli Declaration of Independence Arab–Israeli War Timeline Expulsion from Lydda and Ramle Transfer Committee
1948 expulsion and flight Palestinian refugees Camps Palestinian return to Israel Right of return Present absentee UN Resolution 194 UNRWA Hebraization of Palestinian place names Paraguay plan
Discourse Causes New Historians Nakba denial Nakba Law
Notable writers Aref al-Aref Yoav Gelber Efraim Karsh Rashid Khalidi Walid Khalidi Nur Masalha Benny Morris Ilan Pappé Edward Said Tom Segev Avraham Sela Avi Shlaim Constantin Zureiq
Symbols and memory Palestinian key Handala Nakba Day Land Day Great March of Return March of Return (Israel)
Ongoing Ongoing Nakba Palestinian genocide accusation Gaza genocide
Lists List of depopulated towns and villages Estimates of the number of Palestinians who fled
v t e

In the immediate aftermath of the United Nations' approval of the Partition plan, the explosions of joy amongst the Jewish community were counterbalanced by the expressions of discontent amongst the Arab community. Soon thereafter, violence broke out and became more prevalent. Murders, reprisals, and counter-reprisals killed dozens on both sides.

In December 1947 and January 1948 an estimated nearly 1000 people were killed and 2000 injured. By the end of March, the figure had risen to 2,000 dead and 4,000 wounded. These figures correspond to an average of more than 100 deaths and 200 casualties per week in a population of 2,000,000.

From January onwards, operations became more militaristic, with the intervention into Palestine of a number of Arab Liberation Army regiments which divided up around the different coastal towns and reinforced Galilee and Samaria. Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni came from Egypt with several hundred men of the Army of the Holy War. At the time, military assessments were that the Palestinian Arabs were incapable of beating the Zionists.

Having recruited a few thousand volunteers, al-Husayni organized the blockade of the 100,000 Jewish residents of Jerusalem. To counter this, the Yishuv authorities tried to supply the city with convoys of up to 100 armoured vehicles, but the operation became more and more impractical, and more and more died in this process. By March, Al-Hussayni's tactic had paid off. Almost all of Haganah's armoured vehicles had been destroyed, the blockade remained in full operation, and hundreds of Haganah members who tried to bring supplies to the city had been killed. The situation for those in the Jewish settlements in the highly isolated Negev and northern Galilee was even more critical.

Since the Jewish population was under strict orders to hold their dominions at all costs, the insecurity across the country affected the Arab population more visibly. Up to 100,000 Palestinian Arabs, chiefly those from the upper classes, left the country to seek refuge abroad or in Samaria.

This situation caused the U.S. to retract its support for the partition plan, thus encouraging the Arab League to believe that the Palestinian Arabs, reinforced by the Arab Liberation Army, could put an end to the partition plan. The British, on the other hand, decided on 7 February 1948 to support the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Jordan.

Although a certain level of doubt took hold amongst Yishuv supporters, their apparent defeats were caused more by their wait-and-see policy than by weakness. Ben-Gurion reorganized the Haganah and made conscription obligatory. Every Jewish man and woman in the country had to receive military training. Funds were gathered by Golda Meir from sympathizers in the United States, and Joseph Stalin supported the Zionist cause at the time, so Jewish representatives of Palestine were able to sign very important armament contracts in the East. Other Haganah agents retrieved stockpiles from World War II, which helped equip the army further. Operation Balak allowed arms and other equipment to be transported for the first time by the end of March.

Ben-Gurion assigned Yigael Yadin the responsibility to come up with a plan in preparation for the announced intervention of the Arab states. The result of his analysis was Plan Dalet, which was put in place from the start of April onwards. The adoption of Plan Dalet marked the second stage of the war, in which Haganah passed from the defensive to the offensive.

The first operation, named Operation Nachshon, consisted of lifting the blockade on Jerusalem. Fifteen hundred men from the Haganah's Givati Brigade and the Palmach's Harel brigade went about clearing the route to the city between 5 and 20 April.

The operation was successful, and enough foodstuffs to last two months were shipped to Jerusalem and distributed to the Jewish population. The success of the operation was added to by the death of al-Hussayni in combat. During this time, and beyond the command of Haganah or the framework of Plan Dalet, troops from Irgun and Lehi massacred more than 100 Arabs, mostly civilians, at Deir Yassin, a move that had an important impact on the Palestinian Arab population, and one that was criticised and lamented by all the principal Jewish authorities of the day.

At the same time, the first large-scale operation of the Arab Liberation Army ended in a debacle, with it being roundly defeated at Mishmar Ha'emek and losing its Druze allies through defection.

Within the framework for the expansion of Jewish territory foreseen by the preemptive Plan Dalet, prior to declaration, the forces of Haganah, Palmach, and Irgun intended to conquer mixed zones. Tiberias, Haifa, Safed, Beisan, Jaffa, and Acre fell, resulting in the flight of more than 250,000 Palestinian Arabs.

The British had essentially withdrawn their troops. The situation pushed the leaders of the neighboring Arab states to intervene, but their preparation was not finalized, and they could not assemble forces capable of turning the tide of the war. The majority of Palestinian Arab hopes lay with the Arab Legion of Jordan's monarch, Abdullah I, but he had no intention of creating a Palestinian Arab-run state, instead hoping to annex as much of the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine as he could. He was playing a double game, being just as much in contact with the Jewish authorities as with the Arab League.

In preparation for the offensive, Haganah successfully launched Operations Yiftah and Ben Ami to secure the Jewish settlements of Galilee, and Operation Kilshon, which created a united front around Jerusalem.

Golda Meir and Abdullah I met on 10 May to discuss the situation, but the meeting was inconclusive and their former agreements were not confirmed. On 13 May, the Arab Legion, backed by irregulars, attacked and took Kfar Etzion, killing 127 of the 131 Jewish defenders and massacring the prisoners.

On 14 May 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the independence of the state of Israel, notifying the International Community and the war entered its second phase, with the intervention of several Arab states' armies the following day.

Political objectives

Yishuv

Benny Morris points out that the Yishuv's aims evolved during the war.

Initially, the aim was "simple and modest": to survive the assaults of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states. "The Zionist leaders deeply, genuinely, feared a Middle Eastern reenactment of the Holocaust, which had just ended; the Arabs' public rhetoric reinforced these fears". As the war progressed, the aim of expanding the Jewish state beyond the UN partition borders appeared: first to incorporate clusters of isolated Jewish settlements and later to add more territories to the state and give it defensible borders. A third and further aim that emerged among the political and military leaders after four or five months was to "reduce the size of Israel's prospective large and hostile Arab minority, seen as a potential powerful fifth column, by belligerency and expulsion."

King Abdullah I of Jordan

King Abdullah was the commander of the Arab Legion, the strongest Arab army involved in the war. The Arab Legion had about 10,000 soldiers, trained and commanded by British officers.

In 1946–1947, Abdullah said that he had no intention to "resist or impede the partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish state." He supported the partition, intending that the West Bank area of the British Mandate allocated for Palestine be annexed to Jordan. Abdullah had secret meetings with the Jewish Agency (at which the future Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was among the delegates) that reached an agreement of Jewish non-interference of Jordanian annexation of the West Bank (although Abdullah failed in his goal of acquiring an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea through the Negev desert) and of Jordanian agreement not to attack the area of the Jewish state contained in the United Nations partition resolution (in which Jerusalem was given neither to the Arab nor the Jewish state, but was to be an internationally administered area.) In one stunning diplomatic coup, the strongest Arab army agreed not to attack the Jewish state. However, by 1948, the neighbouring Arab states pressured Abdullah into joining them in an "all-Arab military intervention" against the newly created State of Israel, which he used to restore his prestige in the Arab world, which had grown suspicious of his relatively good relationship with Western and Jewish leaders.

Abdullah's role in this war became substantial. He saw himself as the "supreme commander of the Arab forces" and "persuaded the Arab League to appoint him" to this position. Through his leadership, the Arabs fought the 1948 war to meet Abdullah's political goals.

Arab Higher Committee of Amin al-Husayni

Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, had collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II.

At the beginning of 1948, al-Husayni was in exile in Egypt. He was involved in some of the high level negotiations between Arab leaders at a meeting held in Damascus in February 1948 to organize Palestinian Field Commands; however, the commanders of his Holy War Army, Hasan Salama and Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, were allocated only the Lydda district and Jerusalem. This decision

paved the way for an undermining of the Mufti's position among the Arab States. On 9 February, only four days after the Damascus meeting, a severe blow was suffered by the Mufti at the Arab League session in Cairo the appointment of a Palestinian to the General Staff of the League, the formation of a Palestinian Provisional Government, the transfer of authority to local National Committees in areas evacuated by the British, a loan for administration in Palestine and appropriation of large sums to the Arab Higher Executive for Palestinians entitled to war damages .

The Arab League blocked recruitment to al-Husayni's forces, which collapsed following the death of his most charismatic commander, his cousin Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, on 8 April.

Following rumours that King Abdullah was re-opening the bilateral negotiations with Israel that he had previously conducted in secret with the Jewish Agency, the Arab League, led by Egypt, decided to set up the All-Palestine Government in Gaza on 8 September under the nominal leadership of the Mufti. Historian Avi Shlaim wrote:

The decision to form the Government of All-Palestine in Gaza, and the feeble attempt to create armed forces under its control, furnished the members of the Arab League with the means of divesting themselves of direct responsibility for the prosecution of the war and of withdrawing their armies from Palestine with some protection against popular outcry. Whatever the long-term future of the Arab government of Palestine, its immediate purpose, as conceived by its Egyptian sponsors, was to provide a focal point of opposition to Abdullah and serve as an instrument for frustrating his ambition to federate the Arab regions with Jordan.

Abdullah regarded the attempt to revive al-Husayni's Holy War Army as a challenge to his authority and on 3 October his Minister of Defence ordered all armed bodies operating in the areas controlled by the Arab Legion to be disbanded. Glubb Pasha carried out the order ruthlessly and efficiently.

Initial line-up of forces

Military assessments

Benny Morris has argued that although, by the end of 1947, the Palestinians "had a healthy and demoralising respect for the Yishuv's military power", they believed that in decades or centuries "the Jews, like the medieval crusader kingdoms, would ultimately be overcome by the Arab world".

On the eve of the war, the number of Arab troops likely to be committed to the war was about 23,000 (10,000 Egyptians, 4,500 Jordanians, 3,000 Iraqis, 3,000 Syrians, 2,000 ALA volunteers, 1,000 Lebanese and some Saudi Arabians), in addition to the irregular Palestinians already present. The Yishuv had 35,000 troops of the Haganah, 3,000 of Stern and Irgun and a few thousand armed settlers.

On 12 May, David Ben-Gurion was told by his chief military advisers, "who over-estimated the size of the Arab armies and the numbers and efficiency of the troops who would be committed", that Israel's chances of winning a war against the Arab states were only about even.

Yishuv forces

In November 1947, the Haganah was an underground paramilitary force that had existed as a highly organized, national force, since the riots of 1920–21, and throughout the riots of 1929, and Great Uprising of 1936–39 It had a mobile force, the HISH, which had 2,000 full time fighters (men and women) and 10,000 reservists (all aged between 18 and 25) and an elite unit, the Palmach composed of 2,100 fighters and 1,000 reservists. The reservists trained 3–4 days a month and went back to civilian life the rest of the time. These mobile forces could rely on a garrison force, the HIM (Heil Mishmar, lit. Guard Corps), composed of people aged over 25. The Yishuv's total strength was around 35,000 with 15,000 to 18,000 fighters and a garrison force of roughly 20,000. The two clandestine groups had 2,000–4,000 and 500–800 members, respectively. Irgun, who had been monitored by the British and whose activities were considered by Mi5 to be terrorism and Lehi. There were also several thousand men and women who had served in the British Army in World War II who did not serve in any of the underground militias but would provide valuable military experience during the war. Walid Khalidi says the Yishuv had the additional forces of the Jewish Settlement Police, numbering some 12,000, the Gadna Youth Battalions, and the armed settlers. Few of the units had been trained by December 1947.

In 1946, Ben-Gurion decided that the Yishuv would probably have to defend itself against both the Palestinian Arabs and neighbouring Arab states and accordingly began a "massive, covert arms acquisition campaign in the West". By September 1947 the Haganah had "10,489 rifles, 702 light machine-guns, 2,666 submachine guns, 186 medium machine-guns, 672 two-inch mortars and 92 three-inch (76 mm) mortars" and acquired many more during the first few months of hostilities. The Yishuv also had "a relatively advanced arms producing capacity", that between October 1947 and July 1948 "produced 3 million 9 mm bullets, 150,000 Mills grenades, 16,000 submachine guns (Sten Guns) and 210 three-inch (76 mm) mortars", along with a few "Davidka" homemade mortars that were highly inaccurate but had a spectacularly loud explosion that demoralized the enemy. Initially, the Haganah had no heavy machine guns, artillery, armored vehicles, anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, nor military aircraft or tanks.

On 5 December 1947, obligatory conscription was instituted for all men and women aged between 17 and 25. By end of March, 21,000 had been conscripted. On 30 March, the call-up was extended to men and single women aged between 26 to 35. Five days later, a General Mobilization order was issued for all men under 40.

Sources disagree about the amount of arms at the Yishuv's disposal at the end of the Mandate. According to Karsh before the arrival of arms shipments from Czechoslovakia as part of Operation Balak, there was roughly one weapon for every three fighters, and even the Palmach could arm only two out of every three of its active members. According to Collins and LaPierre, by April 1948, the Haganah had managed to accumulate only about 20,000 rifles and Sten guns for the 35,000 soldiers who existed on paper. According to Walid Khalidi "the arms at the disposal of these forces were plentiful". The one weapon of which there was no shortage was locally produced explosives.

Arab forces

There was no national military organization in the Arab Palestinian community. There were two paramilitary youth organizations, the pro-Husayni Futuwa and the anti-Husayni Najjada ("auxiliary corps"). According to Karsh, these groups had 11,000–12,000 members, but according to Morris, the Najjada, which was based in Jaffa and had 2,000–3,000 members, was destroyed in the run-up to the 1948 war, during Husayni's attempt to seize control of it, and the Futuwa never numbered more than a few hundred. At the outbreak of the war, new local militia groups, the National Guard, mushroomed in towns and cities. Each was answerable to its local Arab National Committee.

In December, Abd al-Qadir Husseini arrived in Jerusalem with one hundred combatants who had trained in Syria and that would form the cadre of the Holy War Army. His forces were joined by a few hundred young villagers and veterans of the British army.

The equipment of the Palestinian forces was very poor. The British confiscated most of their arsenal during the 1936–39 rebellion and World War II. A report of 1942 by the Haganah intelligence service assessed the number of firearms at the disposal of the Palestinian at 50,000 this was probably an overestimate or even "highly exaggerated".

The Arab Liberation Army (Jaysh al-Inqadh al-Arabi) had been set up by the Arab League. It was made up of around 6,000 volunteers, largely from Arab countries, and was led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji. Its officially allotted area was northern Palestine, including Samaria.

Jordan's Arab Legion was considered the most effective Arab force. Armed, trained and commanded by British officers, this 8,000–12,000 strong force was organised in four infantry/mechanised regiments supported by some 40 artillery pieces and 75 armoured cars. Until January 1948, it was reinforced by the 3,000-strong Transjordan Frontier Force. As many as 48 British officers served in the Arab Legion. Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Legion, organized his forces into four brigades as follows:

The Arab Legion joined the war in May 1948, but fought only in the areas that King Abdullah wanted to secure for Jordan: the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The Jordanian forces were probably the best trained of all combatants. Other combatant forces lacked the ability to make strategic decisions and tactical maneuvers, as evidenced by positioning the fourth regiment at Latrun, which was abandoned by other combatants before the arrival of the Jordanian forces. In the later stages of the war, Latrun proved to be of extreme importance, and a decisive factor for Jerusalem's fate.

In 1948, Iraq had an army of 21,000 men in 12 brigades and the Iraqi Air Force had 100 planes, mostly British. Initially the Iraqis committed around 3,000 men to the war effort, including four infantry brigades, one armoured battalion and support personnel. These forces were to operate under Jordanian guidance During the first truce, the Iraqis increased their force to about 10,000. Ultimately, the Iraqi expeditionary force numbered around 15,000 to 18,000 men.

The first Iraqi forces to be deployed reached Jordan in April 1948 under the command of Gen. Nur ad-Din Mahmud. On 15 May, Iraqi engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Jordan River and attacked the Israeli settlement of Gesher with little success. Following this defeat, Iraqi forces moved into the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm strategic triangle, where they suffered heavy casualties in the Israeli attack on Jenin which began on 3 June, but they managed to hold on to their positions. Active Iraqi involvement in the war effectively ended at this point.

In 1948, Egypt was able to put a maximum of around 40,000 men into the field, 80% of its military-age male population being unfit for military service and its embryonic logistics system being limited in its ability to support ground forces deployed beyond its borders. Initially, an expeditionary force of 10,000 men was sent to Palestine under the command of Maj. Gen. Ahmed Ali al-Mwawi. This force consisted of five infantry battalions, one armoured battalion equipped with British Light Tank Mk VI and Matilda tanks, one battalion of sixteen 25-pounder guns, a battalion of eight 6-pounder guns and one medium-machine-gun battalion with supporting troops.

The Egyptian Air Force had over 30 Spitfires, 4 Hawker Hurricanes and 20 C47s modified into crude bombers.

By the time of the second truce, the Egyptians had 20,000 men in the field in thirteen battalions equipped with 135 tanks and 90 artillery pieces.

Syria had 12,000 soldiers at the beginning of the 1948 War, grouped into three infantry brigades and an armoured force of approximately battalion size. The Syrian Air Force had fifty planes, the 10 newest of which were World War II–generation models.

On 14 May Syria invaded Palestine with the 1st Infantry Brigade supported by a battalion of armoured cars, a company of French R 35 and R 37 tanks, an artillery battalion and other units. On 15–16 May they attacked the Israeli village Tzemah, which they captured, following a renewed offensive, on 18 May. The village was abandoned following the Syrian forces' defeat at the Deganias a few days later. Subsequently, the Syrians scored a victory at Mishmar HaYarden on 10 June, after which they reverted to a defensive posture, conducting only a few minor attacks on small, exposed Israeli settlements. The Lebanese army was the smallest of the Arab armies, consisting of only 3,500 soldiers. According to Gelber, in June 1947, Ben-Gurion "arrived at an agreement with the Maronite religious leadership in Lebanon that cost a few thousand pounds and kept Lebanon's army out of the War of Independence and the military Arab coalition." According to Rogan and Shlaim, a token force of 1,000 was committed to the invasion. It crossed into the northern Galilee and was repulsed by Israeli forces. Israel then invaded and occupied southern Lebanon until the end of the war.

Saudi Arabia sent a contingent of 800 men–1,200 to fight with Egyptian and Jordanian forces.

Yemen also committed a small expeditionary force to the war effort.

British forces in Palestine

There were 100,000 British troops deployed in Palestine "in two ground forces divisions, two independent infantry brigades, two mechanized regiments, some artillery units and a number of RAF squadrons". The peak deployment was in July 1947, when 70,200 British troops were stationed in Palestine, supported by 1,277 civilian drivers and 28,155 civilian employees. British forces, however, were gradually withdrawn in 1948. British High Commissioner Cunningham left Palestine on May 14, 1948 yet British forces overseeing the withdrawal remained in Palestine for several weeks thereafter, maintaining an enclave in and around Haifa and its port. Four Royal Air Force airmen were killed on May 22 when the Royal Egyptian Air Force struck RAF Ramat David, mistaking the airfield for one occupied by the Israeli Air Force. The last British soldiers left Palestine on June 30, 1948.

Intervention by Arab League countries

Five of the seven countries of the Arab League at that time, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, backed by Saudi Arabian and Yemenite contingents invaded territory in the former British Mandate of Palestine on the night of 14–15 May 1948. The forces of Syria and Egypt launched attacks outside of the proposed Arab section of the Partition Plan. Jordan invaded the proposed "Corpus Separatum", which had yet to be instituted, including the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. The official motives for their intervention were set out in a statement of 15 May 1948 :

the only solution of the Palestine problem is the establishment of a unitary Palestinian State, in accordance with democratic principles, whereby its inhabitants will enjoy complete equality before the law, minorities will be assured of all the guarantees recognised in democratic constitutional countries ....

The main legal objection the Arab League had to the division of Palestine in UN Resolution 181 was that it did not respect the rights of its Arab inhabitants

in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations.

(...)

Security and order in Palestine have become disrupted. The Zionist aggression resulted in the exodus of more than a quarter of a million of its Arab inhabitants from their homes and in their taking refuge in the neighbouring Arab countries.

Nevertheless, some un-official speeches were more aggressive. Azzam Pasha, the Arab League Secretary, is said to have declared, "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades". However, Joffe and Romirowsky report that this "cannot be confirmed from cited sources". Six days later, Azzam told reporters "We are fighting for an Arab Palestine. Whatever the outcome the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy."

According to Yoav Gelber, the Arab countries were "drawn into the war by the collapse of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab Liberation Army the Arab governments' primary goal was preventing the Palestinian Arabs' total ruin and the flooding of their own countries by more refugees. According to their own perception, had the invasion not taken place, there was no Arab force in Palestine capable of checking the Haganah's offensive".

" perceived the peril of an Arab invasion as threatening its very existence. Having no real knowledge of the Arabs's true military capabilities, the Jews took Arab propaganda literally, preparing for the worst and reacting accordingly."

1948 Arab–Israeli War

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First phase: 14 May–11 June 1948

The British Mandate over Palestine was due to expire on 15 May, but Jewish leadership led by Ben-Gurion declared independence on 14 May (because 15 May was a Shabbat). The State of Israel declared itself as an independent nation, and was quickly recognized by the United States, Iran, the Soviet Union, and many other countries. Within hours, Arab forces invaded Palestine. In an official cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the UN Secretary-General on 15 May 1948, the Arab states publicly proclaimed their aim of creating a "United State of Palestine", in place of the Jewish and Arab, two-state, UN Plan. In the Arab League's official declaration, they announced their intention to fulfill their responsibilities to restore order in Palestine and establish a single democratic state, which they proclaimed as being the only solution to the conflict, proclaimed Palestine to be an Arab country, and subsequently recognized the independence of the State of Palestine. They claimed that partition was illegitimate, as it was opposed by Palestine's Arab majority, and maintained that the absence of legal authority made it necessary to intervene to protect Arab lives and property. The Israelis maintain that the plan was not illegitimate, since Jews were a majority in areas assigned to the Jewish state.

Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union called the Arab states' entry into Israel illegal aggression. China, meanwhile, broadly backed the Arab claims.

Two Egyptian Air Force Spitfires bombed Tel Aviv. One of them was shot down and its pilot taken prisoner. However, the Egyptian Air Force continued its bombing raids over the city, and efforts were later made to shell the city from the ground. The fledgling Israeli Air Force responded by bombing military installations inside and near Damascus and Amman.

Two Egyptian columns with air, armored, and artillery cover entered southern Israel, but were met with fierce resistance from numerous settlements defended by their armed inhabitants and Haganah troopers. The Egyptians were stalled and took heavy casualties, while Israeli losses were comparatively light. These battles were delaying actions, designed to give the Haganah time to prepare for the Egyptian attack. The most notable of these engagements was the Battle of Yad Mordechai, where an inferior force of 130 Israelis armed with nothing more than rifles, a medium machinegun and a PIAT anti-tank weapon, held up a column of 2,500 Egyptians, well-supported by armor, artillery and air units, for five days. The Egyptians suffered some 300-400 dead and wounded while Israeli casualties were 26 killed and 49 wounded. The Haganah stopped the Egyptian offensive at Ad Halom, near Ashdod, on May 29, after Israel's fledgeling air force performed its first combat mission, when four Avia S-199s attacked Egyptian armored column of 500 vehicles on its way to Ashdod. The Israeli planes dropped 70 kilogram bombs and strafed the column, although their machine guns jammed quickly. Two of the planes crashed, killing a pilot. The Egyptians scattered, and had lost the initiative by the time they had regrouped. Israeli Givati Brigade troops then counterattacked and halted the Egyptian offensive.

Numerous isolated Israeli settlement outposts in the Galilee were exposed to Arab attack on all sides, and had to rely on their own armories for defense. The hastily mobilized Israeli Army engaged in offensive actions to push Arab forces out of key positions, block the advance of Arab columns, and rush to seal gaps in Israel's defenses.

Over the next few days, approximately 1,000 Lebanese, 5,000 Syrian, 5,000 Iraqi, and 10,000 Egyptian troops (initial numbers) invaded the newly established state. Four thousand Jordanian troops invaded the Corpus separatum region encompassing Jerusalem and its environs, as well as areas designated as part of the Arab state by the UN partition plan. They were aided by corps of volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Yemen. The Arab nations gradually increased the number of troops by the thousands as the war later progressed (see table of "strength" near top of page). Both sides increased their manpower over the following months, but the Israeli advantage grew steadily as a result of the progressive mobilization of Israeli society and the influx of an average of 10,300 immigrants each month.

On 26 May 1948, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was officially established, and the Haganah, Palmach and Irgun were incorporated into the army of the new Jewish state.

As the war progressed, the IDF managed to field more troops than the Arab forces. By July 1948, the IDF had 63,000 troops; by early spring 1949, they had 115,000. The Arab armies had an estimated 40,000 troops in July 1948, rising to 55,000 in October 1948, and slightly more by the spring of 1949.

All Jewish aviation assets were placed under the control of the Sherut Avir (Air Service, known as the SA) in November 1947 and flying operations began in the following month from a small civil airport on the outskirts of Tel Aviv called Sde Dov, with the first ground support operation (in an RWD-13) taking place on 17 December. The Galilee Squadron was formed at Yavne'el in March 1948, and the Negev Squadron was formed at Nir-Am in April. By May 10, when the SA suffered its first combat loss, there were three flying units, an air staff, maintenance facilities and logistics support. At the outbreak of the war on 15 May, the SA became the Israeli Air Force. With its fleet of light planes it was no match for Arab forces during the first few weeks of the war with their T-6s, Spitfires, C-47s and Avro Ansons. The main Arab losses were the result of RAF action in response to Egyptian raids on the British air base at Ramat David near Haifa on 22 May during which five Egyptian Spitfires were shot down. It was also during this time that the balance of air power began to swing in favor of the Israeli Air Force following the purchase of 25 Avia S-199s from Czechoslovakia, the first of which arrived in Israel on 20 May. This created the ironic situation of the young Jewish state using derivatives of the Bf-109 designed in Nazi Germany to help counter the British-designed Spitfires flown by Egypt. The first raid on an Arab capital followed on the night of 31 May/June 1 when three Israeli planes bombed Amman. By the fall of 1948, the IDF had achieved air superiority and had superior firepower and more knowledgeable personnel, many of whom had seen action in World War II. Israeli planes also bombed Arish, Gaza, Damascus, and Cairo. Israeli B-17 bombers coming to Israel from Czechoslovakia bombed Egypt on their way to Israel.

The first mission of the Jewish paramilitary organizations and later the IDF was to hold on against the Arab armies and stop them from destroying major Jewish settlements, until reinforcements and weapons arrived.

The heaviest fighting occurred in Jerusalem and on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road, between Jordan's Arab Legion and the Israeli forces. Abdullah ordered Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Jordanian-led Arab Legion, to enter Jerusalem on 17 May, and heavy house-to-house fighting occurred between 19 May and 28 May, with the Arab Legion eventually succeeding in pushing Israeli forces from the Arab quarters of Jerusalem as well as the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. All the Jewish inhabitants of the Old City were expelled by the Jordanians. Iraqi troops failed in attacks on Jewish settlements (the most notable battle was at Mishmar HaEmek), and instead took defensive positions around Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm. Israeli forces then captured two Arab villages and the city of Acre. Both sides took significant losses, but Iraqi losses were greater than those of the Israelis.

On 21 May, the Syrian army was stopped at Kibbutz Degania Alef in the north, where local militia reinforced by elements of the Carmeli Brigade halted Syrian armored forces with Molotov cocktails and a single PIAT. One tank that was disabled by Molotov cocktails and hand grenades still remains at the kibbutz. The remaining Syrian forces were driven off the next day with four "Napoleonchik" mountain guns—Israel's first use of artillery during the war.

On 22 May, Arab forces attacked kibbutz Ramat Rachel south of Jerusalem. After a fierce battle in which 31 Arabs and 13 Israelis were killed, the defenders of Ramat Rachel withdrew, only to partially retake the kibbutz the following day. Fighting continued until May 26, until the entire kibbutz was recaptured.

On 23 May, Thomas C. Wasson, the Consul General for the US and a member of the UN Truce Commission was assassinated in West Jerusalem.

On 24 May, IDF forces at Latrun, consisting of the newly formed 7th Armoured Brigade (Israel) and a battalion of the Alexandroni Brigade, attacked the Arab Legion forces in Operation "Bin-Nun A", which was repulsed.The Israelis lost 72 dead, 140 wounded, and 6 captured, while the Jordanians lost 5 dead and 6 wounded. On 1 June 1948 the same IDF forces again attacked Arab Legion forces at Latrun in Operation Bin-Nun B. The attack was also repulsed with a loss of 44 men. The Arab Legion forces lost between 12 and 20 dead, including the lieutenant commanding the fort, while the Jordanians claimed to have lost 2 men and killed 161 Israelis. On May 26, the Jordanians retook Radar Hill, with 19 Israelis and 2 Jordanians killed.

On 1 June, the Israeli Carmeli and Golani Brigades captured Jenin from Iraqi forces. They were pushed out by an Iraqi counterattack, and lost 34 dead and 100 wounded. On 2 June 1948, Palestinian Arab commander Hasan Salama was killed in a battle at Ras al-Ein, north of Jaffa. The Israeli Air Force won its first aerial victory the day after. Egyptian planes had repeatedly bombed Tel Aviv with almost complete impunity, but Israeli Air Force pilot Modi Alon shot down two Egyptian planes over Tel Aviv on June 3.

Throughout the following days, the Arabs were only able to make limited gains due to fierce Israeli resistance, and were quickly driven off their new holdings by Israeli counterattacks, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. However, Operation Yoram, launched by the Israelis in an attempt to take Latrun, which failed, with the Israeli Harel Battalion losing a handful of dead and the Yiftach Brigade losing 16 dead and 79 wounded, and the Jordanian Arab Legion losing several dozen soldiers. The Jordanians launched two counterattacks, temporarily taking Beit Susin before being forced back, and capturing Gezer after a fierce battle in which 2 Jordanians and 39 Israelis were killed.

First truce: 11 June–8 July 1948

The UN declared a truce on 29 May, which came into effect on 11 June and lasted 28 days. The ceasefire was overseen by UN mediator Folke Bernadotte and a team of UN Observers made up of army officers from Belgium, United States, Sweden and France. Bernadotte was voted in by the General Assembly to "assure the safety of the holy places, to safeguard the well being of the population, and to promote 'a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine'". The truce was designed to last 28 days and an arms embargo was declared with the intention that neither side would make any gains from the truce. Neither side respected the truce; both found ways around the restrictions placed on them. Both the Israelis and the Arabs used this time to improve their positions, a direct violation of the terms of the ceasefire. "The Arabs violated the truce by reinforcing their lines with fresh units and by preventing supplies from reaching isolated Israeli settlements; occasionally, they opened fire along the lines". The Israeli Defense Forces were able to acquire weapons from communist Czechoslovakia as well as improve training of forces and reorganization of the army during this time. Yitzhak Rabin, an IDF commander at the time of the war and later Israel's fifth Prime Minister, stated "ithout the arms from Czechoslovakia... it is very doubtful whether we would have been able to conduct the war". As well as violating the arms and personnel embargo, they also sent fresh units to the front lines like the Arabs. The Israel army increased its manpower from approximately 30,000 or 35,000 men to almost 65,000 during the truce. They were also able to increase their arms supply to "more than twenty-five thousand rifles, five thousand machine guns, and more than fifty million bullets". As the truce commenced, a British officer stationed in Haifa stated that the four-week-long truce "would certainly be exploited by the Jews to continue military training and reorganization while the Arabs would waste feuding over the future divisions of the spoils". This officer was correct for the Jews were able to reorganize and reequip while the Arabs became unprepared to return to combat.

After the truce was in place, Bernadotte began to address the issue of achieving a political settlement. The main obstacles in his opinion were "the Arab world's continued rejection of the existence of a Jewish state, whatever its borders; Israel's new 'philosophy', based on its increasing military strength, of ignoring the partition boundaries and conquering what additional territory it could; and the emerging Palestinian Arab refugee problem". Taking all the issues into account, Bernadotte presented a new partition plan. He proposed there be a Palestinian Arab state alongside Israel and that a "Union" "be established between the two sovereign states of Israel and Jordan (which now included the West Bank); that the Negev, or part of it, be included in the Arab state and that Western Galilee, or part of it, be included in Israel; that the whole of Jerusalem be part of the Arab state, with the Jewish areas enjoying municipal autonomy and that Lydda Airport and Haifa be 'free ports'—presumably free of Israeli or Arab sovereignty". Israel rejected the proposal, in particular the aspect of losing control of Jerusalem, but they did agree to extend the truce for another month. The Arabs rejected both the extension of the truce and the proposal.

On 8 July, the day before the expiration of the truce, Egyptian General Naguib renewed the war by attacking the Negba position of Israel. As a result of this attack, Israel responded on 9 July by attacking on all three fronts. The fighting continued for ten days until the UN Security Council issued the Second Truce on 18 July.

Second phase: 8–18 July 1948

The fighting that followed was dominated by large scale Israeli offensives and a defensive posture from the Arab side. Operation Danny was the most important Israeli offensive, aimed at securing and enlarging the corridor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by capturing the roadside cities Lod (Lydda) and Ramle.

In a second planned stage of the operation the fortified positions of Latrun—overlooking the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway—and the city of Ramallah were also to be captured. Hadita, near Latrun, was captured by the Israelis at a cost of 9 dead.

The second plan was Operation Dekel, which was aimed at capturing the lower Galilee including Nazareth. The third plan, to which fewer resources were allocated, Operation Kedem, was to secure the Old City of Jerusalem, but failed. To the north, Operation Brosh was launched in an attempt to dislodge Syrian forces from the Eastern Galilee and the Benot Yaakov Bridge. The operation failed, and 200 Syrians and 100 Israelis were killed. The Israeli Air Force also bombed Damascus for the first time.

In the south, several offensives were launched, including Operation An-Far. On July 12, the Egyptians launched an offensive action, and again attacked Negba, which they had previously failed to capture, using three infantry battalions, an armored battalion, and an artillery regiment. In the battle that followed, the Egyptians were repulsed, suffering 200-300 casualties, while the Israelis lost 5 dead and 16 wounded.

Operation Danny

The objectives of Operation Danny were to capture territory east of Tel Aviv and then to push inland and relieve the Jewish population and forces in Jerusalem. Lydda had become an important military center in the region, lending support to Arab military activities elsewhere, and Ramle was one of the main obstacles blocking Jewish transportation. Lydda was defended by a local militia of around 1,000 residents, with an Arab Legion contingent of 125-300. The IDF forces gathered to attack the city numbered around 8,000. It was the first operation where several brigades were involved. The city was attacked from the north via Majdal al-Sadiq and al-Muzayri'a and from the east via Khulda, al-Qubab, Jimzu and Daniyal. Bombers were also used for the first time in the conflict to bombard the city. The IDF captured the city on 11 July. The next day, Ramle also fell. The civilian populations of Lydda and Ramle fled or were expelled to the Arab front lines, and following resistance in Lydda, the population there was expelled without provision of transport vehicles; some of the evictees died on the long walk under the hot July sun.

On 15–16 July, an attack on Latrun took place but did not manage to occupy the fort. A desperate second attempt occurred on 18 July by units from the Yiftach Brigade equipped with armored vehicles, including two Cromwell tanks, but that attack also failed. Despite the second truce, which began on 18 July, the Israeli efforts to conquer Latrun continued until 20 July.

Operation Dekel

While Operation Danny proceeded in the centre, Operation Dekel was carried out in the north. Nazareth was captured on 16 July, and by the time the second truce took effect at 19:00 18 July, the whole lower Galilee from Haifa Bay to the Sea of Galilee was captured by Israel.

Operation Kedem

Originally Operation Kedem was to begin on 8 July, immediately after the first truce, by Irgun and Lehi forces. However, it was delayed by David Shaltiel, possibly because he did not trust their ability after their failure to capture Deir Yassin without Haganah assistance.

The Irgun forces commanded by Yehuda Lapidot were to break through at The New Gate, Lehi was to break through the wall stretching from the New Gate to the Jaffa Gate, and the Beit Horon Battalion was to strike from Mount Zion.

On July 14, 1948, Irgun occupied the Arab village of Malha after a fierce battle. Several hours later, the Arabs launched a counterattack, but Israeli reinforcements arrived, and the village was retaken at a cost of 17 dead.

The battle was planned to begin on the Sabbath, at 20:00 on 16 July, two days before the second ceasefire of the war. The plan went wrong from the beginning and was postponed first to 23:00 and then to midnight. It was not until 02:30 that the battle actually began. The Irgun managed to break through at the New Gate, but the other forces failed in their missions. At 05:45 on 17 July, Shaltiel ordered a retreat and to cease hostilities.

Second truce: 18 July–15 October 1948

At 19:00 on 18 July, the second truce of the conflict went into effect after intense diplomatic efforts by the UN.

On 16 September, Folke Bernadotte proposed a new partition for Palestine in which Jordan would annex Arab areas including the Negev, Lydda and Ramla. There would be a Jewish state in the whole of Galilee, internationalization of Jerusalem, and return or compensation for refugees. The plan was once again rejected by both sides. On the next day, 17 September, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by the militant Zionist group Lehi because of fears that the Jewish government would accept the plan, but unbeknownst to Lehi, the government had already decided to reject it and resume combat in a month. Bernadotte's deputy, American Ralph Bunche, replaced him.

Operation Shoter

The Arabs had blocked Israeli traffic along the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway. Assaults on 18 June and 8 July failed due to poor planning and stiff resistance by Arab militia in superior positions.

Operation Shoter was launched a week after the truce came into effect in response to the killing of two Israeli civilians. It targeted an area known as the Little Triangle outside Haifa. Israeli assaults on 24 and 25 July were beaten back by stiff resistance. The Israelis launched an infantry and armour assault backed by heavy artillery shelling and aerial bombing. The Arab defenses broke, and the three Arab villages surrendered. Israeli soldiers and aircraft struck at one of the Arab retreat routes, killing 60 Arab soldiers. The Arabs claimed that the Israelis had massacred Arab civilians, but the Israelis rejected the claims. A United Nations investigation found no evidence of a massacre.

Third phase: 15 October 1948–7 January 1949

Israeli operations

Israel launched a series of military operations in order to drive out the Arab armies and secure the borders of Israel.

On 15 October, the IDF launched Operation Yoav in the northern Negev. Its goal was to drive a wedge between the Egyptian forces along the coast and the Beersheba-Hebron-Jerusalem road and ultimately to conquer the whole Negev. Yoav was headed by the Southern Front commander Yigal Allon. The operation was a huge success, shattering the Egyptian army ranks and forcing the Egyptian forces to retreat from the northern Negev, Beersheba and Ashdod. On October 19, a naval battle took place between three Israeli warships near Majdal, and an Egyptian corvette with air support. An Israeli sailor was killed and four wounded, and two of the ships were damaged. One Egyptian plane was shot down, but the corvette escaped. Israeli naval vessels also shelled Majdal on October 17, and Gaza on October 21, with air support from the Israeli Air Force. On 22 October, Israeli naval commandos using explosive boats sank the Egyptian flagship Emir Farouk, and damaged an Egyptian minesweeper.

On 22 October, the third truce went into effect. That same day, the Arab Liberation Army violated the truce by attacking Manara, capturing the strongpoint of Sheikh Abed, repulsing counterattacks by local Israeli units, and ambushed Israeli forces attempting to relieve Manara. The IDF's Carmeli Brigade lost 33 dead and 40 wounded. Manara and Misgav Am were totally cut off, and Israel's protests at the UN failed to change the situation.

On 24 October, the IDF launched Operation Hiram and captured the entire upper Galilee, driving the ALA, and Lebanese army back to Lebanon, and successfully ambushing and destroying an entire Syrian battalion. The entire operation lasted just 60 hours, during which numerous villages were captured, often after locals or Arab forces put up resistance. An estimated 400 Arabs were killed and 550 taken prisoner, with low Israeli casualties. Some prisoners were reportedly executed by the Israeli forces. An estimated 50,000 Palestinian refugees fled into Lebanon, some of them fleeing ahead of the advancing forces, and some expelled from villages which had resisted, while the Arab inhabitants of those villages which had remained at peace were allowed to remain and eventually became Israeli citizens. The villagers of Ikrit and Birim were persuaded to leave their homes by Israeli authorities, who promised them that they would be allowed to return. Israel eventually decided not to allow them to return, and offered them financial compensation, which they refused to accept. At the end of the month, Israel had captured the whole Galilee and had advanced 5 miles (8.0 km) into Lebanon to the Litani River. Israeli forces captured the Lebanese village of Hula without resistance. Under the orders of two officers, they executed 35-58 prisoners. Both officers were later arrested and tried in an Israeli court.

From December 5 to December 7, Israel launched Operation Asaf to take control of the Western Negev. The main assaults were spearheaded by mechanized forces, while Golani Brigade infantry covered the rear. An Egyptian counterattack was repulsed. The Egyptians planned another counterattack, but it failed after Israeli aerial reconnaissance revealed Egyptian preparations, and the Israelis launched a pre-emptive strike. About 100 Egyptians were killed, and 5 tanks were destroyed, with the Israelis losing 5 killed and 30 wounded.

On 22 December, the IDF drove the remaining Egyptian forces out of Israel with Operation Horev (also called Operation Ayin). The goal of the operation was to secure the entire Negev from Egyptian presence, destroying the Egyptian threat on Israel's southern communities and forcing the Egyptians into a ceasefire. The operation was a decisive Israeli victory, and Israeli raids into the Nitzana area and the Sinai peninsula forced the Egyptian army, which was encircled in the Gaza Strip, to withdraw and accept a ceasefire. On 7 January 1949, a truce was achieved. Israeli forces withdrew from Sinai and Gaza under international pressure.

On 5 March, Operation Uvda was launched, with the IDF capturing the southern Negev from Arab forces. On 10 March, the Israelis reached Umm Rashrash (where Eilat was built later) and took it without a battle. The Negev Brigade and Golani Brigade took part in the operation. They raised a hand-made flag ("The Ink Flag") and claimed Umm Rashrash for Israel.

British aircraft

Israeli raids into Egyptian territory were concerning to the British, who feared that the Israelis might reach the Suez Canal, and sent aircraft on reconnaissance missions. On 20 November 1948, an unarmed RAF photo-reconnaissance De Havilland Mosquito of No. 13 Squadron RAF on an intelligence sortie was shot down by an Israeli P-51 Mustang flown by American volunteer Wayne Peake. Just before noon on 7 January 1949, four Spitfire FR. 18s from No. 208 Squadron RAF on routine reconnaissance in the Deir al-Balah area inadvertently flew over an Israeli convoy that had just been attacked by the Royal Egyptian Air Force. Israeli soldiers in the convoy opened fire with machine guns, and shot down one of the British planes. The remaining three planes were then shot down by patrolling Israeli Air Force Spitfires flown by Slick Goodlin and John McElroy, volunteers from the United States and Canada respectively. One pilot was killed. Later that day, four RAF Spitfires from the same squadron escorted by seven No. 213 Squadron RAF Tempests and eight Tempests from No. 6 Squadron RAF, searching for the lost planes from No. 208 Squadron were attacked by four Israeli Air Force Spitfires. The Tempests found they could not jettison their external fuel tanks, and some had non-operational guns. One of the Tempests was shot down, killing pilot David Tattersfield. Another Tempest was damaged by an Israeli Spitfire flown by Ezer Weizman.

UN Resolution 194

In December 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194 which declared (amongst other things) that in the context of a general peace agreement "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so" and that "compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return." The resolution also mandated the creation of the United Nations Conciliation Commission. However, parts of the resolution were never implemented, resulting in the Palestinian refugee crisis.

Weapons

Largely leftover World War II era weapons were used by both sides. Egypt had some British equipment; the Syrian army had some French. German and British equipment was used by Israel.

Aftermath

1949 Armistice Agreements

In 1949, Israel signed separate armistices with Egypt on 24 February, Lebanon on 23 March, Jordan on 3 April, and Syria on 20 July. The new borders of Israel, as set by the agreements, encompassed about 78% of Mandatory Palestine as it stood after the independence of Jordan in 1946. This was about 18% more than the UN partition proposal allotted it. These armistice lines were known afterwards as the "Green Line". The Gaza Strip and the West Bank were occupied by Egypt and Jordan respectively. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and Mixed Armistice Commissions were set up to monitor ceasefires, supervise the armistice agreements, to prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region.

Casualties

Israel lost 6,373 of its people, about 1% of its population in the war. About 4,000 were soldiers and the rest were civilians. The exact number of Arab losses is unknown but is estimated at between 8,000 and 15,000.

Demographic outcome

During the 1947-1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and the 1948 Arab–Israeli War that followed, around 750,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes. In 1951, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine estimated that the number of Palestinian refugees displaced from Israel was 711,000. This number did not include displaced Palestinians inside Israeli-held territory. The list of villages depopulated during the Arab-Israeli conflict includes more than 400 Arab villages. It also includes about ten Jewish villages and neighbourhoods.

However, the British census in 1946 had listed only 467,000 Muslim Palestinians in the entire British Mandate (although there was some controversy as to how thorough that census was). In any event, the claims by Arab forces regarding virtually everything during the war period, including victories, defeats and numbers involved on each side, were grossly exaggerated, and no neutral observers were allowed, to make a definitive count, in any of the refugee camps.

The Causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus are a controversial topic among historians.

The Palestinian refugee problem and the debate around the right of their return are also major issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab Palestinians have staged annual demonstrations and protests on 15 May of each year. The popularity and number of participants in these annual al Nakba demonstrations has varied over time. During the al-Aqsa Intifada after the failure of the Camp David 2000 Summit, the attendance at the demonstrations against Israel increased.

During the 1948 War, around 10,000 Jews were forced to evacuate their homes in Palestine or Israel, but in the three years following the war, 700,000 Jews settled in Israel, mainly along the borders and in former Arab lands. Around 136,000 came from the 250,000 displaced Jews of World War II. About another 270,000 came from Eastern Europe. The bulk of the rest—around 300,000 people—constituted the first wave of a total of 750,000 or more Jews who over the course of the next thirty years would flee an increasingly hostile Arab world.

Historiography

After the war, Israeli and Palestinian historiographies differed on the interpretation of the events of 1948. In the West the majority view was of a tiny group of vastly outnumbered and ill-equipped Jews fighting off the massed strength of the invading Arab armies. It was also widely believed that the Palestinian Arabs left their homes on the instruction of their leaders. In 1980, and the opening of the Israeli and British archives, Israeli historians started giving new insights on them. Particularly, the role played by Abdullah I of Jordan, the British government, the Arab aims during the war, the balance of force and the events related to the Palestinian exodus have been nuanced or given new interpretations. Some of them are still hotly debated among historians and commentators of the conflict today.

Maps

• Arab invasion 15 May 1948
• Operation AYIN 22 December 1948-7 January 1949

See also

• Israeli-Arab conflict
• Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Wars of Israel
• 1948 Palestinian exodus
• Jewish exodus from Arab lands
• Killings and massacres during the 1948 Palestine War
• List of Israeli military operations in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war
• List of villages depopulated during the Arab-Israeli conflict

Notes

1. Benny Morris (2008), 1948: A history of the first Arab-Israeli war. pg. 332
2. "The formation of Israel by The Ovi Team". Ovi Magazine. Retrieved 2010-06-26.
3. "Lonely Israel". Gp Examiner. 2010-03-31. Retrieved 2010-06-26.
4. "Background Note: Lebanon". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved October 16, 2010.
5. Arab states against israel, 1948 -A map from New York Times including Mutawakkilite Yemen
6. John Pike. "Israeli War of Independence". Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2010-06-26.
7. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli wars. 1982, ISBN 978-0-85368-367-4.
8. Pollack, 2004; Sadeh, 1997
9. ^ Casualties in Arab-Israeli Wars
10. ^ Chris Cook, World Political Almanac, 3rd Ed. (Facts on File: 1995)
11. Rogan, Eugene L., ed., and Avi Shlaim, ed. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007 p. 99.
12. Itzhak Galnoor (1995). The partition of Palestine: decision crossroads in the Zionist movement. SUNY Press. pp. 289–. ISBN 978-0-7914-2193-2. Retrieved 18 March 2011.
13. Pappe, 2006, p. 35 Pappe sources this to a speech given by the Pakistani representative to the United Nations Sir Zafrullah Kahn on November 28, 1947 which can be read here
14. El-Nawawy, 2002, p. 1-2
15. Morris, 'Righteous Victims ...', 2001, p. 190
16. "Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel". www.mfa.gov.il. Retrieved 2011-03-17.
17. Gold, 2007, p. 134
18. Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine 15 May 1948, Jewish Virtual Library. Template:WebCite
19. b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
20. Special UN commission (16 April 1948), § II.5
21. Yoav Gelber (2006), p.85
22. Benny Morris, "The Birth of the Palestinain Refugee Problem". ISBN 978-0-521-33028-2. page 115.
23. Chaim Herzog, "The Arab-Israeli Wars". ISBN 978-0-85368-367-4. Pages 27,28.
24. Yoav Gelber (2006), pp.51–56
25. Morris, 2003, p. 33.
26. Dominique Lapierre et Larry Collins (1971), chap.7, pp.131–153
27. Morris (2003), p.163
28. Dominique Lapierre et Larry Collins (1971), p.163
29. Morris (2003), p.67
30. Henry Laurens (2005), p.83
31. Dominique Lapierre et Larry Collins (1971), pp.369–381
32. Morris (2003), pp.242–243
33. Morris (2003), p.242
34. Henry Laurens (2005), pp.85–86
35. Morris (2003), pp.248–252
36. Morris (2003), pp.252–254
37. an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947
38. ^ Benny Morris, 1948, (2008), pp.397–398.
39. ^ Sela, 2002, 14.
40. Avi Shlaim (1988). The Politics of Partition. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-07365-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |subtitle= ignored (help)
41. Tripp, 2001, 137.
42. Levenberg, 1993, p. 198.
43. Sayigh, 2000, p. 14.
44. Shlaim, 2001, p. 97.
45. Shlaim, 2001, p. 99.
46. Morris, 2003, p. 32.
47. D. Kurzman, "Genesis 1948", 1970, p.282.
48. Morris, 2003, p. 35.
49. Morris, 2003, p. 16.
50. Gelber, p. 73; Morris, 2003, p. 16; Karsh, p. 25.
51. Mi5 Files of Jewish Interest "the activities of Irgun, the Jewish organisation involved or implicated in numerous acts of terrorism in the closing years of the British mandate in Palestine"
52. Karsh, p. 25.
53. ^ W. Khalidi, 'Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine', J. Palestine Studies 18(1), p. 4-33, 1988 (reprint of a 1961 article)
54. Morris, p.16.
55. Morris, 2003, p.16.
56. Karsh, p.25.
57. Morris, "Birth ... revisited", p.16.
58. Joseph, Dov. "The Faithful City - The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948." Simon and Suchuster, 1960. Congress # 60 10976. Pages 23,38.
59. Levin, Harry. "Jerusalem Embattled - A Diary of the City under Siege." Cassels, 1997. ISBN 0 304 33765. Pages 32,117. Pay £P2 per month. c.f. would buy 2lb of meat in Jerusalem, April 1948. Page 91.
60. is this also according to "Karsh, p.25."?
61. Collins and LaPierre, 1973 p.355
62. Dov Joseph, "The Faithful City - The Siege of Jerusalem 1948". Library of Congress number 60 10976. Page 8 : "For example, all the land mines used against Rommel came from Jewish factories in Palestine."
63. Karsh, 2002, p. 26.
64. Morris, 2003, p. 29.
65. Levenberg, 1993, p. 181.
66. Gelber, pp. 36–37.
67. Gelber, p. 13.
68. ^ Karsh, p. 27.
69. Gelber, p. 39.
70. "TRANS-JORDAN: Chess Player & Friend". Time. 16 February 1948. Retrieved 20 April 2010.
72. Benny Morris, Victimes : histoire revisitée du conflit arabo-sioniste, 2003, carte p.241 et pp.247-255.
73. Benny Morris, Victimes : histoire revisitée du conflit arabo-sioniste, 2003, p.247.
74. Pollack 2004, p. ?. sfn error: no target: CITEREFPollack2004 (help)
75. D. Kurzman, 'Genesis 1948', 1972, p. 382.
76. I. Pappe, "The ethnic cleansing of Palestine", 2006, p. 129.
77. D. Kurzman, "Genesis 1948", 1972, p. 556.
78. Pollack, 2002, p. 150.
79. Pollack, 2002, pp. 149–155.
80. Pollack, 2002, 15–27.
81. Pollack, 2002, pp. 448–457.
82. Yoav Gelber, 2006, "Sharon's Inheritance"
83. Rogan & Shlaim, 2001, p. 8.
84. Gelber, p.55
85. Uthman Hasan Salih, DAWR AL-MAMLAKA AL-`ARABIYYA AL-SA`UDIYYA FI HARB FILASIN 1367H/1948 (The role of Saudi Arabia in the Palestine war of 1948), Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine 1986 13(43–44): 201-221. ISSN: 0330-8987.
86. a map on jewishvirtuallibrary.org
87. Karsh, p. 28
88. Levenberg, 1993, p. 94.
89. ^ "Timeline (Chronology) of Israel War of Independence - 1948 Arab-Israeli War". Zionism-israel.com. Retrieved 2010-06-26.
90. "Israel v the RAF - caught in the middle - air combat between Israel and the RAF". Retrieved 30 March 2010.
91. "The RAF in Palestine". Retrieved 30 March 2010.
92. Associated Press (July 1, 1948). "Israel Flag Over Haifa, Last British Troops Leave Zion". The Milwaukee Sentinel. p. 2. Retrieved 30 March 2010.
93. Yoav Gelber, Palestine 1948, 2006—Chap.8 is titled: "The Arab Regular Armies' Invasion of Palestine".
94. Khalidi, Rashid. 2006 p.XXXIX
95. Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine Template:WebCite
96. Morris, 2001, p. 219, also Sachar, 1979, p. 333
97. A. H. Joffe and A. Romirowsky. "A Tale of Two Galloways: Notes on the Early History of UNRWA and Zionist Historiography". Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 46, no. 5. pp. 655?675.
98. Palestine Post, May 21, 1948, p. 3.
99. ^ Yoav Gelber, 2006, p.137.
100. "The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917–1988. Part II, 1947–1977".
101. Dershowitz, Alan, The Case For Israel (2003)
102. "1948: The War of Independence". Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 2010-06-26.
103. "Arab Armies Invade". Jewishvirtuallibrary.org. Retrieved 2010-06-26.
104. Bregman, 2002, p. 24 citing Ben Gurion's diary of the war
105. Virtual Aviation Museum - RWD 13
106. Hayles, John (1999-09-19). "Israel Air Force Aircraft Types". John Hayles, aeroflight.co.uk. Archived from the original on 2007-02-22.
107. Ramat David - Israel Airfields
108. Aloni, 2001, pp. 7–11.
109. Morris, 2001, pp. 217–18.
110. Mordechai Weingarten
111. The Palestine Post: State of Israel is Born (1948)
112. The Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Zionism and Israel: Battle of Degania, 1948
113. "The First Truce". Retrieved 2009-02-22.
114. Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9.
115. ^ Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.
116. Bregman, Ahron (1999). The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs. BBC Books. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |co-author= ignored (help)
117. Alfred A. Knopf. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York. 1976. p. 330. ISBN 978-0-394-48564-5.
118. Map of the Attacks.
119. Herzog and Gazit, 2005, pg. 86
120. Kadish, Alon, and Sela, Avraham. (2005) "Myths and historiography of the 1948 Palestine War revisited: the case of Lydda," The Middle East Journal, September 22, 2005; and Khalidi, Walid. (1998) Introduction to Munayyer, Spiro. The fall of Lydda. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 80–98.
121. Benny Morris (1987). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949. Cambridge University Press. pp. 203–11. ISBN 978-0-521-33889-9.
122. A. Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 1948 (Macmillan, 1989) p194
123. J. Bowyer Bell, Assassination in International Politics, International Studies Quarterly, vol 16, March 1972, 59--82.
124. Haberman, Clyde (February 22, 1995). "Terrorism Can Be Just Another Point of View". Books of the Times. New York Times. Retrieved 2008-12-28. Mr. Shamir, nearly 80, still speaks elliptically about the Bernadotte assassination. Years later, when Ben-Gurion moved to a kibbutz in the Negev desert, Sdeh Bokker, one of his closest friends there was Yehoshua Cohen, who had been one of the assassins. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help) Review of Kati Marton's biography.
125. Cowell, Alan (November 2, 1991). "THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS: REPORTER'S NOTEBOOK; Syria Offers Old Photo To Fill an Empty Chair". The New York Times. Retrieved 2008-12-28. In recent years, several members of the group known by the British as the Stern Gang have acknowledged responsibility for the killing. Mr. Shamir, who was a member of the Stern Gang, has declined to discuss the killing, and one of his spokesman has said he had no role in it. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
126. Shapira, Anita. Yigal Allon; Native Son; A Biography Translated by Evelyn Abel, University of Pennsylvania Press ISBN 978-0-8122-4028-3 p 247
127. Gelber, 2006, p. 33
128. Operation Hiram
129. Aloni, 2001, p. 18.
130. "Iaf V Raf". Spyflight.co.uk. Retrieved 2010-06-26.
131. Aloni, 2001, p. 22.
132. Weapons of the Arab-Israeli Wars
133. Politics and society in modern Israel: myths and realities. books.google.com. Retrieved 2011-03-28.
134. General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950, published by the United Nations Conciliation Commission, 23 October 1950. (U.N. General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 18, Document A/1367/Rev. 1)
135. http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/hughesMatthew.html The War for Palestine. Rewriting the History of 1948 by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim . Accessed 2009-08-08. Archived 2009-08-11.
136. "Jewish Refugees of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict". Mideast Web. Retrieved 2008-07-13.
137. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, chap.VI.
138. Displaced Persons retrieved on 29 October 2007 from the US Holocaust Museum.
139. Sachar, pp. 395–403.
140. Avi Shlaim, The Debate about 1948, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp.287-304.
141. Benny Morris, Benny Morris on fact, fiction, & propaganda about 1948, The Irish Times, 21 February 2008, reported by Jeff Weintraub Template:WebCite

References

• Bickerton, Ian and Hill, Maria (2003). Contested Spaces: The Arab-Israeli Conflict. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-471217-7
• Black, Ian (1992). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-3286-4
• Bowyer Bell, John (1996). Terror Out of Zion: The Fight For Israeli Independence. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-56000-870-5
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28716-6
• Brown, Judith and Louis, Roger (1999). The Oxford History of the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820564-7
• van Creveld, Martin (2004). Moshe Dayan. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. ISBN 978-0-297-84669-7
• Collins, Larry and Lapierre, Dominique (1973) O Jerusalem!", Pan Books. ISBN 978-0-330-23514-3
• El-Nawawy, Mohammed (2002), The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Process in the Reporting of Western Journalists, Ablex/Greenwood, ISBN 978-1-56750-544-3
• Geddes, Charles L. (1991). A Documentary History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-93858-1
• Gelber, Yoav (1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921-48: Alliance of Bars Sinister. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4675-6
• Gelber, Yoav (2006). Palestine 1948. War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0
• Gilbert, Martin (1998). Israel: A History. Black Swan. ISBN 978-0-552-99545-0
• Gold, Dore (2007), The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City, Regnery Publishing, ISBN 978-1-59698-029-7
• Israel Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, Cummings Center for Russian Studies Tel Aviv University, Oriental Institute (2000). Documents on Israeli Soviet Relations, 1941-53. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4843-9
• Joseph, Dov. The Faithful City - The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948. Simon and Schuster, 1960. Congress # 60 10976
• Kaniuk, Yoram (2001). Commander of the Exodus. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-3808-8
• Karsh, Efraim (2002). The Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Palestine War 1948. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-372-9
• Karsh, Inari & Karsh, Efraim (1999). Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00541-9
• Katz, Sam (1988). Israeli Units Since 1948. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-0-85045-837-4
• Khalidi, Rashid (2001). The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure. In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). The War for Palestine (pp. 12–36). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3
• Khalidi, Rashid (2006). The Iron Cage:The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Boston, MA:Beacon Press. ISBN 978-0-8070-0309-1
• Khalidi, Walid (1987). From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-155-6
• Khalidi, Walid (ed.) (1992). All that remains. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-224-9
• Kurzman, Dan (1970), Genesis 1948—the first Arab-Israeli war, New American Library, New York, Library of Congress CCN: 77-96925
• Levenberg, Haim (1993). Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945–1948. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-3439-5
• Levin, Harry. Jerusalem Embattled - A Diary of the City under Siege. Cassels, 1997. ISBN 0 304 33765
• Morris, Benny (1988), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, Cambridge Middle East Library
• Morris, Benny (1994), 1948 and after; Israel and the Palestinians
• Morris, Benny (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7
• Morris, Benny (2004), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, ISBN 978-0-521-81120-0
• Oring, Elliott (1981). Israeli Humor—The Content: The Content and Structure of the Chizbat of the Palmah. SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-87395-512-6
• Pappe, Ilan (2006), The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, England, ISBN 978-1-85168-467-0
• Penkower, Monty Noam (2002). Decision on Palestine Deferred: America, Britain and Wartime Diplomacy, 1939–1945. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-5268-9
• Pollack, Kenneth (2004). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-8783-9
• Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1997). A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-511390-7
• Rogan, Eugene L., ed., and Avi Shlaim, ed. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001
• Rogan, Eugene L. "Jordan and 1948: the persistence of an official history." Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 104-124
• Sadeh, Eligar (1997). Militarization and State Power in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Case Study of Israel, 1948–1982. Universal Publishers. ISBN 978-0-9658564-6-1
• Sachar, Howard M. (1979). A History of Israel, New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-0-679-76563-9
• Sayigh, Yezid (2000). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-829643-0
• Sela, Avraham. "Abdallah Ibn Hussein." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002. pp. 13–14.
• Shapira, Anita (1992). Land and Power: Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-506104-8
• Shlaim, Avi (2001). Israel and the Arab Coalition. In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). The War for Palestine (pp. 79–103). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3
• Sicker, Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922. Praeger/Greenwood. ISBN 978-0-275-96639-3
• Stearns, Peter N. Citation from The Encyclopedia of World History Sixth Edition, Peter N. Stearns (general editor), © 2001 Houghton Mifflin Company, at Bartleby.com.
• Tripp, Charles. "Iraq and the 1948 War: mirror of Iraq's disorder." Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 125-150.
• JVL: Casualties in Arab-Israeli Wars

Further reading

• Aloni, Shlomo (2001). Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947-82. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-294-4
• Beckman, Morris (1999). The Jewish Brigade: An Army With Two Masters, 1944-45. Sarpedon Publishers. ISBN 978-1-86227-423-5
• Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6
• Benvenisti, Meron (2002). Sacred Landscape. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-23422-2
• Flapan, Simha (1987), 'The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities', Pantheon Books, New York.
• Gilbert, Martin (1976). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Its History in Maps Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-77241-5
• Landis, Joshua. "Syria and the Palestine War: fighting King 'Abdullah's 'Greater Syria plan.'" Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 178-205.
• Masalha, Nur (1992). Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948, Institute for Palestine Studies, ISBN 978-0-88728-235-5
• Sheleg, Yair (2001). A Short History of Terror Haaretz.
• Zertal, Idith (2005). Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85096-4

Fiction

• The Hope by Herman Wouk, a historical novel that includes a fictionalized version of Israel's War of Independence.

External links

• Overview of The 1948 Israeli War of Independence (documentary)
• Resources > Modern Period > 20th Cent. > History of Israel > State of Israel > The Wars > War of Independence The Jewish History Resource Center, Project of the Dinur Center for Research in Jewish History, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• About the War of Independence
• United Nations: System on the Question of Palestine
• Israel War of Independence (First Arab-Israeli War)
• Timeline: Israel War of Independence (First Arab-Israeli War)
• History of Palestine, Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
• Palestinian viewpoint concerning the context of the 1948 war
• The BBC on the UN Partition Plan
• The BBC on the Formation of Israel
• Israeli War of Independence: an autobiographical account by a South African participant
• Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948
• "I Have Returned". Time Magazine. 15 March 1948. Retrieved October 31, 2009.
• "War for Jerusalem Road". Time Magazine. 19 April 1948. Retrieved October 31, 2009.

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• 1948 Arab–Israeli War
• 1948 in Israel
• 1948 in Egypt
• 1948 in Syria
• Battles and operations of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War
• 1948 Palestinian exodus