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Battle of Peleliu

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(Redirected from Bloody Nose Ridge) World War II battle in the Pacific theater

Battle of Peleliu
Part of the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign of the Pacific Theater (World War II)

The first wave of U.S. Marines in LVTs during the invasion of Peleliu on 15 September 1944.
Date15 September – 27 November 1944
(2 months, 1 week and 5 days)
LocationPeleliu, Palau Islands7°00′N 134°15′E / 7.000°N 134.250°E / 7.000; 134.250
Result American victory
Belligerents
 United States  Japan
Commanders and leaders
William H. Rupertus
Paul J. Mueller
Roy Geiger
Herman H. Hanneken
Harold D. Harris
Lewis B. Puller		 Kunio Nakagawa †
Sadae Inoue
Units involved

III Amphibious Corps

Additional support units

Peleliu garrison

Additional support units
Strength
47,561 10,900
17 tanks
Casualties and losses

Total Palau Group

  • 1,989-2,143 battle deaths
  • 8,514 wounded and injured
Breakdown by locations
  • Peleliu and Ngesebus Islands
    • 1,573+ battle deaths
    • 6,531+ wounded and injured
    Angaur Island
    • 260+ battle deaths
    • 1,354+ wounded and injured
    Navy (excluding Peleliu Island)
    • 134 battle deaths
    • 255 wounded
Breakdown by service
  • Marines
    • 1,252-1,336 killed, died of wounds, missing presumed dead
    • ~5,200-5,274 wounded
    Army
    • 542-612 killed, died of wounds, missing
    • 2,736 wounded and injured
    Navy
    • 195 killed and died of wounds
    • 504 wounded

Total Palau Group

  • 12,033 dead (excluding stragglers)
  • 360 prisoners (excluding stragglers)
Breakdown by locations
  • Peleliu and Ngesebus Islands
    • 10,695 dead
    • 301 prisoners
    Angaur Island
    • 1,338 dead
    • 59 prisoners
Battle of Peleliu is located in PalauBattle of Peleliuclass=notpageimage| Location within PalauShow map of PalauBattle of Peleliu is located in AsiaBattle of PeleliuBattle of Peleliu (Asia)Show map of AsiaBattle of Peleliu is located in Pacific OceanBattle of PeleliuBattle of Peleliu (Pacific Ocean)Show map of Pacific Ocean
Mariana and Palau Islands campaign

The Battle of Peleliu, codenamed Operation Stalemate II by the US military, was fought between the United States and Japan during the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign of World War II, from 15 September to 27 November 1944, on the island of Peleliu.

US Marines of the 1st Marine Division and then soldiers of the US Army's 81st Infantry Division fought to capture an airfield on the small coral island of Peleliu. The battle was part of a larger offensive campaign known as Operation Forager, which ran from June to November 1944 in the Pacific Theater.

Major General William Rupertus, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, predicted that the island would be secured within four days. However, after repeated Imperial Japanese Army defeats in previous island campaigns, Japan had developed new island-defense tactics and well-crafted fortifications, which allowed them to offer stiff resistance and extended the battle to more than two months. The heavily outnumbered Japanese defenders put up such staunch resistance, often fighting to the death in the name of the Japanese Emperor, that the island became known in Japanese as the "Emperor's Island."

In the US, the battle was controversial because of the island's negligible strategic value and the high casualty rate incurred by American troops during the fighting, which exceeded that of all other amphibious operations during the Pacific War. The National Museum of the Marine Corps called it "the bitterest battle of the war for the Marines".

Background

By 1944, American victories in the Southwest and Central Pacific had brought the war closer to Japan, with American bombers able to strike at the Japanese main islands from air bases secured during the Mariana Islands campaign (June–August 1944). There was disagreement among the U.S. Joint Chiefs over two proposed strategies to defeat the Japanese Empire. The strategy proposed by General Douglas MacArthur called for the recapture of the Philippines, followed by the capture of Okinawa, then an attack on the Japanese home islands. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz favored a more direct strategy of bypassing the Philippines but seizing Okinawa and Taiwan as staging areas to an attack on the Japanese mainland, followed by the future invasion of Japan's southernmost islands. Both strategies included the invasion of Peleliu, but for different reasons.

The 1st Marine Division had already been chosen to make the assault. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt traveled to Pearl Harbor to personally meet both MacArthur and Nimitz and hear their arguments. In the end, MacArthur's strategy was chosen. However, before MacArthur could retake the Philippines, the Palau Islands, specifically Peleliu and Angaur, were to be neutralized and an airfield built to protect the southern flank of MacArthur's planned landings on the Philippines.

Preparations

Japanese

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By 1944, Peleliu was occupied by about 11,000 Japanese troops of the 14th Infantry Division, along with a handful of Korean laborers. Considered a crack unit, the division had been detached from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria to garrison Peleliu after the fall of the Marshall Islands earlier in 1944, and had arrived on the island in May. Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, commander of the division's 2nd Regiment, led the preparations for the island's defense.

After their losses in the Solomons, Gilberts, Marshalls and Marianas, the Imperial Japanese Army assembled a research team to develop new island-defense tactics. Previously, Japanese island garrisons had heavily contested enemy landings on the beach itself, which rendered them highly vulnerable to naval bombardment. Abandoning this model, the Japanese formulated new tactics that envisioned only a token defense of the landing beaches, and instead hinged upon waging a protracted struggle utilizing more defensible terrain in the island interior. Peleliu's steep, twisting coral ridges were ideally suited for such a defense in depth. Colonel Nakagawa utilized this rough terrain to his advantage by ordering the construction of a system of heavily fortified bunkers, caves, and other subterranean positions, all interlocked in a "honeycomb" system. Traditional "banzai charge" attacks were to be discontinued, as they were both wasteful of manpower and ineffective. These changes in tactics were designed to force the Americans into a war of attrition, compelling them to spend more troops, materiel and time to secure Japanese island garrisons.

Japanese fortifications

Nakagawa's defenses were centered on Peleliu's highest point, Umurbrogol Mountain, a collection of hills and steep ridges located at the center of Peleliu and overlooking a large portion of the island, including the crucial airfield. The Umurbrogol contained some 500 limestone caves, connected via tunnel by Japanese engineers. Many of these caves were former mine shafts developed by Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha (South Seas Development Company), a Japanese firm established in 1921 primarily to develop the sugar industry in Saipan, where its headquarters were located. However, the company also owned and worked the phospate deposits on Peleliu. The phosphate material was mined with native labor and transported via narrow gauge railcars operated by manpower to a phosphate refinery located at the wharf on Peleliu.

The mines and caves were turned into defensive positions. Engineers added sliding armored steel doors with multiple openings to many cave entrances, providing extra protection and concealment for both artillery and machine guns. Cave entrances were opened or altered to be slanted as a defense against grenade and flamethrower attacks. The caves and bunkers were connected to a vast tunnel and trench system throughout central Peleliu, which allowed the Japanese to evacuate or reoccupy positions as needed, and to take advantage of shrinking interior lines.

The Japanese garrison was well armed with 81 mm (3.19 in) and 150 mm (5.9 in) mortars and 20 mm (0.79 in) anti-aircraft cannons, backed by a light tank unit and an anti-aircraft detachment. The Japanese also used the beach terrain to their advantage. The northern end of the landing beaches faced a 30-foot (9.1 m) coral promontory that overlooked the beaches from a small peninsula, a spot later known to the Marines who assaulted it simply as "The Point". Holes were blasted into the Point to accommodate a 47 mm (1.85 in) gun and six 20 mm cannons. The positions were then sealed shut, leaving only a thin slit to fire on the beaches. The Japanese constructed similar positions along the 2-mile (3.2 km) stretch of landing beaches on the western shore of Peleliu.

The beaches were also filled with thousands of obstacles for the landing craft, principally mines and a large number of heavy artillery shells buried with the fuses exposed, designed to explode when they were run over. Nakagawa placed a battalion along the beach to defend against the landing, but this unit was meant to merely delay the inevitable American advance inland. Neither Nakagawa nor his superior officers expected the garrison to survive if Peleliu was attacked, and Japanese military planners made no contingencies to evacuate any survivors.

American

Unlike the Japanese, who drastically altered their tactics for the upcoming battle, the American invasion plan was unchanged from that of previous amphibious landings, even after suffering 3,000 casualties and enduring two months of delaying tactics while overcoming entrenched Japanese defenders at the Battle of Biak. On Peleliu, American planners chose to land on the southwest beaches because of their proximity to the airfield on south Peleliu. The 1st Marine Regiment, commanded by Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, was to land on the northern end of the beaches. The 5th Marine Regiment, under Colonel Harold Harris, would land in the center, and the 7th Marine Regiment, under Colonel Herman Hanneken, would land at the southern end.

The division's artillery regiment, the 11th Marines under Colonel William Harrison, would land after the infantry regiments. The plan was for the 1st and 7th Marines to push inland, guarding the 5th Marines' flanks and allowing them to capture the airfield located directly to the center of the landing beaches. The 5th Marines were to push across to the eastern shore of Peleliu, cutting the island in half. The 1st Marines would push north into the Umurbrogol, while the 7th Marines would clear the southern end of the island. Only one battalion was held in reserve, with the U.S. Army's 81st Infantry Division available for support from Angaur, just south of Peleliu.

On 4 September the Marines shipped off from their station on Pavuvu, north of Guadalcanal, a 2,100-mile (3,400 km) trip across the Pacific to Peleliu. A Navy Underwater Demolition Team cleared the beaches of some obstacles, while warships began their pre-invasion bombardment of Peleliu on 12 September.

The battleships Pennsylvania, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee and Idaho, heavy cruisers Indianapolis, Louisville, Minneapolis and Portland, and light cruisers Cleveland, Denver and Honolulu, led by the command ship Mount McKinley, subjected the 6 sq mi (16 km) island to a massive three-day bombardment, pausing only to permit air strikes from the three aircraft carriers, five light aircraft carriers, and eleven escort carriers that sailed with the attack force. A total of 519 rounds of 16 in (410 mm) shells, 1,845 rounds of 14 in (360 mm) shells and 1,793 500 lb (230 kg) bombs pounded Peleliu during this period.

The Americans believed the bombardment to be successful, as Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf claimed that the Navy had run out of targets. In reality, the majority of Japanese positions were unharmed; even the battalion left to defend the beaches was virtually unscathed. During the initial American assault, the island's defenders exercised unusual firing discipline to avoid giving away their positions. The bombardment managed only to destroy Japan's aircraft on the island, as well as the buildings surrounding the airfield. The Japanese remained in their fortified positions, waiting to attack the American landing troops.

Opposing forces

Naval command structure for Operation Stalemate IIAdmiral Chester W. NimitzAdmiral William F. Halsey Jr.Vice Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson Expeditionary Troops and III Amphibious Corps commandersMaj. Gen. Julian C. SmithMaj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger Marine ground commanders on PeleliuMaj. Gen. William H. RupertusOliver P. Smith as a major generalLewis B. Puller as a major general

American order of battle

United States Pacific Fleet
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
US Third Fleet
Admiral William F. Halsey Jr.

Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 31)
Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson

Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 36)
III Amphibious Corps
Major General Julian C. Smith, USMC

Western Landing Force (TG 36.1)
Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC

1st Marine Division

Beach assignments

Japanese order of battle

Lt. Col. Kunio NakagawaMarine with captured Japanese 141 mm mortar

Palau District Group
Lieutenant General Inoue Sadae (HQ on Koror Island)
Vice Admiral Yoshioka Ito
Maj. Gen. Kenjiro Murai

14th Division (Lt. Gen. Sadae)
Peleliu Sector Unit (Lt. Col. Kunio Nakagawa)

  • 2nd Infantry Regiment, Reinforced
    • 2nd Bttn. / 2nd Infantry Regiment
    • 3rd Bttn. / 2nd Infantry Regiment
    • 3rd Bttn. / 15th Infantry Regiment
    • 346th Bttn. / 53rd Independent Mixed Brigade

Battle

Landing

Routes of Allied landings on Peleliu, 15 September 1944

US Marines began landing on Peleliu at 08:32 on 15 September. The 1st Marines landed to the north on White Beach 1 and 2, while the 5th and 7th Marines landed to the center and south on Orange Beach 1, 2, and 3. As the additional landing craft approached the beaches, the Marines on shore were caught in a crossfire when the Japanese opened the steel doors guarding their positions and began firing artillery. The positions on the coral promontories guarding each flank fired on the Marines with 47 mm guns and 20 mm cannons. By 09:30 the Japanese had destroyed 60 LVTs and DUKWs.

5th Marines on Orange Beach

The 1st Marines were quickly bogged down by heavy fire from the 30-foot (9 m) high coral ridge on their left flank, "The Point". Puller's LVT was hit by a dud high velocity artillery round, and his communications section was destroyed on its way to the beach by a hit from a 47 mm round. The 7th Marines faced a cluttered Orange Beach 3, with natural and man-made obstacles forcing the LVTs to bunch together and approach in column.

The 5th Marines made the most progress on the first day, aided by cover provided by coconut groves. As they approached the airfield they were met with Nakagawa's first counterattack. His armored tank company attacked across the airfield, attempting to push the Marines back to the beach, but was swiftly engaged by tanks, howitzers, naval guns, and dive bombers. Nakagawa's tanks and escorting infantrymen were quickly destroyed.

At the end of the first day, the Americans held their 2-mile (3.2 km) stretch of landing beaches but little else. Their biggest push in the south moved 1 mile (1.6 km) inland, but the 1st Marines to the north made very little progress in the face of extremely heavy Japanese resistance. The Marines had suffered 200 dead and 900 wounded on the first day. Rupertus, still unaware of his enemy's change of tactics, believed the Japanese defenses would quickly crumble since their perimeter had been broken.

Airfield/South Peleliu

A wounded Marine receives a drink from a Navy corpsman.

On 16 September the 5th Marines moved to capture the airfield and push toward Peleliu's eastern shore. The entire regiment crossed the airfield simultaneously, enduring heavy artillery fire from the highlands to the north, and suffered heavy casualties in the process. After capturing the airfield, they rapidly advanced to the eastern end of Peleliu, leaving the island's southern defenders to be destroyed by the 7th Marines.

This area was hotly contested by the Japanese, who still occupied numerous pillboxes. Heat indices were around 115 °F (46 °C), and the Marines suffered high casualties from heat exhaustion. Further complicating the situation, the Marines' drinking water was distributed in empty oil drums, which contaminated the water with the oil residue. Regardless, by 23 September the 5th and 7th Marines had accomplished their objectives, holding the airfield and the southern portion of the island, although the airfield remained under threat of sustained Japanese fire from the heights of Umurbrogol Mountain until the end of the battle.

American forces began using the airfield on 17 September. Stinson OY-1 Sentinels from VMO-3 began aerial spotting missions for Marine artillery and naval gunfire support. On 26 September Marine F4U Corsairs from VMF-114 landed on the airstrip. The Corsairs began dive-bombing missions across Peleliu, firing rockets into open cave entrances in support of infantry attacks, and dropping napalm. This was only the second time that napalm had been used in the Pacific theater, and it proved effective at burning away vegetation hiding spider holes, usually killing their occupants. The time from takeoff to the target area for the Corsairs operating from Peleliu Airfield was very short, sometimes only 10 to 15 seconds. Most pilots did not bother to raise their landing gear, leaving them down during the strike. After a strike was completed, the Corsair simply turned back into the landing pattern again.

The Point

Frontline warning sign on Peleliu, October 1944

"The Point" at the end of the northern landing beaches continued to cause heavy Marine casualties from the enfilading fire of Japanese heavy machine guns and anti-tank artillery across the landing beaches. Puller ordered Captain George P. Hunt, commander of K Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, to capture the position. Hunt's company approached "The Point" short on supplies, having lost most of its machine guns while approaching the beaches. Hunt's second platoon was pinned down for nearly a day in an anti-tank trench between fortifications. The rest of his company was threatened when the Japanese cut a hole in their line, surrounding his unit and leaving his right flank cut off.

A rifle platoon then began knocking out the Japanese gun positions one by one. Using smoke grenades for concealment, the platoon swept through each hole, destroying the positions via a combination of rifle grenades and close-quarters combat. After knocking out six machine gun positions, the Marines faced a cave housing the 47 mm gun. A lieutenant blinded the gun crew with a smoke grenade, allowing Corporal Henry W. Hahn to launch a grenade through the cave's aperture. The grenade detonated the 47 mm's shells, forcing the Japanese defenders out with their bodies alight and their ammunition belts exploding around their waists. A Marine fire team was positioned on the flank of the cave, where the emerging occupants were gunned down.

K Company had captured "The Point", but Nakagawa again counterattacked. Over the next 30 hours the Japanese counterattacked four times against a single company, critically low on supplies, out of water and virtually surrounded. The Marines had to resort to hand-to-hand combat to fend off the Japanese attackers. By the time reinforcements arrived, the company had successfully repulsed all the Japanese attacks, but had been reduced to 18 men, suffering 157 casualties during the battle for The Point. Hunt and Hahn were both awarded the Navy Cross for their actions.

Ngesebus Island

U.S. Marine in combat at Peleliu Island, September 1944

The 5th Marines—after securing the airfield—were sent to capture Ngesebus Island, just north of Peleliu. Ngesebus was occupied by multiple Japanese artillery positions and was the site of an airfield still under construction. The tiny island was connected to Peleliu by a narrow causeway, but 5th Marines commander Harris opted instead to make a shore-to-shore amphibious landing, predicting the causeway to be an obvious target for the island's defenders.

Harris coordinated a pre-landing bombardment of the island on 28 September, carried out by Army 155 mm (6.1 in) guns, naval guns, howitzers from the 11th Marines, strafing runs from VMF-114's Corsairs and 75 mm (2.95 in) fire from the approaching LVTs. Unlike the Navy's bombardment of Peleliu, Harris' assault on Ngesebus successfully killed most of the Japanese defenders. The Marines still faced opposition in the ridges and caves, but the island fell quickly, with relatively light casualties for the 5th Marines. They had suffered 15 killed and 33 wounded and inflicted 470 casualties on the Japanese.

Bloody Nose Ridge

Marines waiting in their fighting holes

After capturing "The Point", the 1st Marines moved north into the Umurbrogol pocket, nicknamed "Bloody Nose Ridge" by the Marines. Puller led his men in numerous assaults, but each incurred severe casualties from Japanese fire. The 1st Marines' movement was constrained by the narrow paths between the ridges, with each ridge fortification able to support the others with direct and indirect fires.

A F4U Corsair drops napalm on Japanese positions atop Umurbrogol.

The Marines took increasingly heavy casualties as they slowly advanced through the ridges. The Japanese again showed unusual fire discipline, striking only when they could inflict maximum casualties. As casualties mounted, Japanese snipers began to take aim at stretcher bearers, knowing that if stretcher bearers were injured or killed, more would have to return to replace them, providing more targets. In small groups, Japanese soldiers also frequently attempted to infiltrate the American lines at night. The Marines built two-man fighting holes, so one Marine could sleep while the other kept watch for infiltrators.

A particularly intense engagement occurred on Bloody Nose Ridge, when the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines—under the command of Major Raymond Davis—attacked Hill 100. Over six days of fighting, the battalion suffered 71% casualties. Captain Everett P. Pope and his company penetrated deep into the ridges, leading his remaining 90 men to seize what he thought was Hill 100. It took a day's fighting to reach what he thought was the crest of the hill, which was in fact another ridge occupied by more Japanese defenders.

Marine Pfc. Douglas Lightheart (right) cradles his .30 caliber (7.62×63mm) M1919 Browning machine gun in his lap, while he and Pfc. Gerald Thursby Sr. take a cigarette break, during mopping up operations on Peleliu on September 15, 1944.

Trapped at the base of the ridge, Pope set up a small defensive perimeter, which was attacked relentlessly by the Japanese throughout the night. The Marines ran out of ammunition and had to fight the attackers with knives and fists, even resorting to throwing coral rock and empty ammunition boxes at the Japanese. Pope and his men managed to hold out until dawn, which brought on more deadly fire. When they evacuated the position, only nine men remained. Pope later received the Medal of Honor for the action.

The Japanese inflicted 70% casualties on Puller's 1st Marines, or 1,749 men. After six days of fighting in the ridges of the Umurbrogol, Geiger sent elements of the U.S. Army's 81st Infantry Division to Peleliu to relieve the regiment. The 321st Regiment Combat Team landed on the western beaches of Peleliu—at the northern end of Umurbrogol mountain—on 23 September. The warren of ridges still occupied by Japanese troops became colloquially known as "the Pocket" by American forces on Peleliu. The 321st and the 7th Marines had fully encircled this "Pocket" by 24 September, D+9.

By 15 October the 7th Marines had suffered 46% casualties, and Geiger relieved them with the 5th Marines. Col. Harris adopted siege tactics, using bulldozers and flamethrower tanks to methodically destroy Japanese positions, and pushed into the ridges from the north. On 30 October the 81st Infantry Division took over command of Peleliu. It would take another six weeks, using the same tactics as the Marines, to finally reduce "The Pocket".

After emerging victorious in the Battle of Angaur, the 81st Infantry Division was ordered to assist the 1st Marine Division in their efforts to seize Peleliu. The 81st Infantry Division eventually relieved the 1st Marine Division, and assumed command of combat operations on Peleliu. The 81st Infantry Division remained engaged on the island until the end of organized Japanese resistance on 18 January 1945.

On 24 November Nakagawa proclaimed, "Our sword is broken and we have run out of spears". He then burnt his regimental colors and performed ritual suicide. He was posthumously promoted to lieutenant general for his concerted defensive campaign on Peleliu. On 27 November the island was declared secure, ending the 73-day-long battle.

A Japanese lieutenant with twenty-six 2nd Infantry soldiers and eight 45th Guard Force sailors held out in the caves on Peleliu until 22 April 1947, only surrendering after a former Japanese admiral convinced them the war was over.

Aftermath

Marines in a hospital on Guadalcanal after being wounded in the Battle of Peleliu

The reduction of the Japanese positions in "the Pocket" around Umurbrogol mountain has been called the most difficult fight that the U.S. military encountered during the entire war. The 1st Marine Division was severely mauled, and remained out of action until the invasion of Okinawa on 1 April 1945. In total, the 1st Marine Division suffered over 6,500 casualties during a month of combat on Peleliu, over one third of the entire division. The 81st Infantry Division also suffered heavy losses, incurring 3,300 casualties during its tenure on the island.

Postwar statisticians calculated that it took U.S. forces over 1,500 rounds of ammunition to kill each individual Japanese defender, and that the Americans expended 13.32 million rounds of .30-calibre, 1.52 million rounds of .45-calibre, 693,657 rounds of .50-calibre bullets, 118,262 hand grenades, and 150,000 mortar rounds over the course of the battle.

The battle was controversial in the United States. Many felt that too many American lives had been lost for an island that had little strategic value. The Japanese defenders lacked the means to interfere with potential US operations in the Philippines, and the airfield captured on Peleliu did not play a key role in any subsequent operations. Instead, Ulithi Atoll in the Caroline Islands was used as a staging base for the invasion of Okinawa. The high casualty rate exceeded all other amphibious operations during the Pacific War.

In addition, few news reports were published about the battle because Rupertus' prediction of a "three days" victory motivated only six war reporters to report from shore. The battle was also overshadowed by MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the Allies' push towards Germany in Europe.

The battles for Angaur and Peleliu offered the Americans a preview of future Japanese island defense, but American planners made few adjustments to their tactics before the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Naval bombardment prior to amphibious assault at Iwo Jima was only slightly more effective than at Peleliu, but at Okinawa the preliminary shelling was greatly improved. Frogmen performing underwater demolition at Iwo Jima confused the enemy by sweeping both coasts, but later alerted Japanese defenders to the exact assault beaches at Okinawa. American ground forces at Peleliu gained experience in assaulting heavily fortified positions, which they would encounter again on both Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

At the recommendation of Admiral William Halsey Jr., the planned occupation of Yap Island in the Caroline Islands was canceled. Halsey actually recommended that the landings on Peleliu and Angaur be canceled, too, and their Marines and soldiers be sent to Leyte Island instead, but this plan was overruled by Nimitz.

In his book With the Old Breed, Eugene Sledge describes his experiences in the Battle for Peleliu. One of the final scenes in Parer's War, a 2014 Australian television film, shows the Battle of Peleliu recorded by Damien Parer with his camera at the time of his death.

Individual honors

Japan

Posthumous promotions

For heroism:

  • Colonel Kunio Nakagawa – lieutenant general
  • Major General Kenjiro Murai – lieutenant general

United States

Pfc. Richard Kraus, USMC (age 18), killed in action

Medal of Honor recipients

Unit citations

D-day Peleliu, African Americans of one of the two segregated units that supported the 7th Marines – the 16th Marine Field Depot or the 17th Naval Construction Battalion Special take a break in the 115 degree heat, 09-15-1944 – NARA – 532535
  • Presidential Unit Citation:
    • 1st Marine Division, 15–29 September 1944
    • 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF
    • U. S. Navy Flame Thrower Unit Attached
    • 6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Provisional), FMF
    • 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion (Provisional), FMF
    • Detachment Eighth Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF
    • 454th Amphibian Truck Company, U. S. Army
    • 456th Amphibian Truck Company, U. S. Army
    • 4th Joint Assault Signal Company, FMF
    • 5th Separate Wire Platoon, FMF
    • 6th Separate Wire Platoon, FMF
    • Detachment 33rd Naval Construction Battalion (202 Personnel)
    • Detachment 73rd Naval Construction Battalion's Shore Party (241 Personnel)
  • USMC Commendatory Letter:
    • 11th Marine Depot Company (segregated)
    • 7th Marine Ammunition Company (segregated)
    • 17th Special Naval Construction Battalion (segregated)

See also

Notes

  1. Marines: at least 1,252 killed, DOW, missing presumed dead, and 5,274 wounded. Army: at least 260 killed/DOW and 1,008 wounded/injured. Navy: 50 killed, 11 DOW, 249 wounded. Navy medical records report a higher figure of 1,273 battle deaths for the Marines, while Appendix H of "History of the USMC in World War II vol. IV" gives 1,336 killed, died of wounds, missing presumed dead, and 5,450 wounded, though a substantial part of those who died of wounds are also recorded as WIAs.
  2. All Army casualties
  3. Also included the Army's 81st Infantry Division (assigned to the capture of Angaur), the 77th Infantry Division, and the 5th Marine Division
  4. Because the III Amph. Corps was still struggling with the capture of Guam, Marine Corps planning for Stalemate II was assigned to Gen. Smith; operational command for the invasion was turned over to Gen. Geiger.
  5. Rupertus was not at peak effectiveness, having broken an ankle at Guadalcanal during landing practice for Stalemate II, but Smith learned of this too late to make a change in divisional command.
  6. While commanding the 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War, Smith announced, "Retreat, hell ... we're just advancing in a different direction."
  7. Became the most decorated Marine in the history of the Corps.
  8. "...stern-voice and strict disciplinarian;" served 10-year sentence on Guam for war crimes.
  9. Sadae sent Murai to Peleliu to provide sufficiently high Army rank to balance the command authority of Vice Adm. Ito, who was nominally in charge of Navy forces in the lower Palaus.
  10. Committed suicide along with Murai as the struggle for the Umurbrogol Pocket neared its end.
  11. Before the battle was even over, Major General Rupertus USMC wrote: "THE NEGRO RACE CAN WELL BE PROUD OF THE WORK PREFORMED . THE WHOLEHEARTED CO-OPERATION AND UNTIRING EFFORTS WHICH DEMONSTRATED IN EVERY RESPECT THAT THEY APPRECIATED THE PRIVILEGE OF WEARING A MARINE UNIFORM AND SERVING WITH THE MARINES IN COMBAT. PLEASE CONVEY TO YOUR COMMAND THESE SENTIMENTS AND INFORM THEM THAT IN THE EYES OF THE ENTIRE DIVISION THEY HAVE EARNED A "WELL DONE"." The Department of the Navy made an official news release of the 17th CBs "Well Done" letter on November 28, 1944.
    • On D-day the 7th Marines had a situation. They did not have enough men to man the line and get the wounded to safety. Three men were sent to find help and found two segregated units, the 16th Marine Field Depot (11th Marine Depot Co. & 7th Marine Ammunition Co.) and 17th Special CB. The Marines were not certain what their officers would think of them bringing African Americans but, they knew they needed help. The 17th Special Seabees were assigned to the 1st Pioneers as shore party. Together with the 16th Depot Marines they helped with the wounded that day. At 0200 that night the Japanese mounted a counterattack. By the time it was over nearly the entire 17th had volunteered to hump ammo to the line on the stretchers they were bringing the wounded back on, fill in where the wounded had been, man 37mm guns that had lost their crews, and volunteer for anything. The record for the 16th Depot says they were carrying ammo and wounded back the same as the Seabees and had picked up rifles and become infantry where needed also. The 17th Seabees remained with the 7th through D-plus 3. Before the battle was over and the island secured Maj. General Rupertus wrote three letters saying "Well Done" to the two Marine Companies and the CB . According to the Military History Encyclopedia on the Web, were it not for the "Black Marine shore party personal" the counterattack on the 7th Marines would not have been repulsed.

References

  1. ^ Moran, J. and Rottman, G.L., 2002, Peleliu 1944, Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., ISBN 1841765120
  2. Taki. "The History of Batlles of Imperial Japanese Tanks". Plala (in Japanese). Retrieved 4 March 2018.
  3. Naval History and Heritage Command, "World War II casualties," citing "The Statistics of Diseases and Injuries. vol.3. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950." Retrieved 2/10/23. "Invasion of Palau Islands: 1171 killed, 101 died of wounds, 1 died as a prisoner."
  4. "History of the USMC in World War II vol. IV: Western Pacific Operations p. 285, 797. Retrieved 2/10/23. Total for Peleliu island is 1,252 killed, DOW, MIAPD, and 5,274 wounded. Appendix H lists 1,050 killed, 250 died of wounds, 36 missing presumed dead, and 5,450 wounded, including many of those who later died.
  5. "History of the USMC in World War II vol. IV: Western Pacific Operations p. 285. Retrieved 2/10/23. Total Palau Group: 542 killed and 2,736 wounded or injured in action.
  6. "Casualty Report Number II" 8 May 1945, p. 65. Retrieved 2/10/23. 424 killed, 179 died of wounds, 9 missing in action, 2,313 wounded and injured in action
  7. Naval History and Heritage Command, "World War II casualties," citing "The Statistics of Diseases and Injuries. vol.3. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950." Retrieved 2/10/23. "Invasion of Palau Islands, 185 killed, 10 died of wounds.
  8. "The History of the Medical Department of the United States Navy in World War II: The Statistics of Diseases and Injuries, Volume 3" p. 84. Retrieved 2/10/23. 699 total battle casualties - 185 killed and 10 died of wounds = 504 wounded and survived. The Marine Corps source linked above references 11, not 10, who died of wounds.
  9. <ref>"History of the USMC in World War II vol. IV: Western Pacific Operations p. 179, 253. Retrieved 2/10/23. According to American records, the Japanese lost more than 12,000 dead and 300 prisoners on the 3 main islands, excluding several dozen more who survived the initial battle and were captured or killed later.
  10. Dean, Mack (9 May 2014). "Battle of Peleliu Facts". World War 2 Facts. Retrieved 14 January 2014.
  11. Third Army blasts Nazi Strongholds. Universal Newsreel. 2 November 1944. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
  12. Fackler, Martin (9 April 2015). "Ahead of World War II Anniversary, Questions Linger Over Stance of Japan's Premier". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 1 January 2022. Retrieved 8 August 2019.
  13. ^ Gypton, Jeremy (2004). "Bloody Peleliu: Unavoidable Yet Unnecessary". Military History Online. Military History Online, LLC. Archived from the original on 21 April 2021. Retrieved 4 March 2018.
  14. "World War II: Central Pacific Campaigns: Peleliu". National Museum of the Marine Corps. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 7 February 2012.
  15. "Battle of Peleliu". History Channel. Retrieved 14 January 2014.
  16. "Peleliu 1944: Social Archaeologies of World War II in Palau, Micronesia". University of Aberdeen. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
  17. ^ "The Bones of Nakagawa". U.S. Naval Institute. February 2003. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
  18. United States. (1944). West Caroline Islands. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept. p. 166.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  19. United States (1944). West Caroline Islands. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept. p. 206.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  20. United States. (1944). West Caroline Islands. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept. p. 136.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  21. Alexander, Storm Landings, p. 110.
  22. ^ Hastings, Retribution, pp. 236–244.
  23. Moran & Rottman 2004, pp. 7–8, 17–18
  24. Moran & Rottman 2004, p. 18
  25. ^ Moran & Rottman 2004, p. 24
  26. Moran & Rottman 2004, pp. 26–28, 38
  27. Moran & Rottman 2004, p. 27
  28. Moran & Rottman 2004, p. 28
  29. ^ "Western Pacific". United States Army. Archived from the original on 3 February 2012. Retrieved 14 January 2014.
  30. "Reference at www.srh.noaa.gov".
  31. Weather2Travel.com. "Peleliu Climate Guide: Monthly Weather, Palau". Weather2Travel.com. Retrieved 18 February 2018.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  32. ^ Hough, Major Frank O., USMC. "Chapter V: A Horrible Place". The Seizure of Peleliu. USMC Historical Monograph. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. p. 94. Retrieved 7 February 2012.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  33. Morison 1958, p. 46
  34. ^ Alexander, Storm Landings, p. 95.
  35. Morison 1958, p. 47
  36. Hough, Major Frank O., USMC. "Appendix B – Stalemate II and the Philippines Campaign". The Seizure of Peleliu. USMC Historical Monograph. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  37. "Australia's War 1939–1945: Parer's Last Reel". Australian Government Department of Veterans' Affairs. Archived from the original on 10 April 2010. Retrieved 11 April 2010.
  38. "HyperWar: USMC Monograph—The Assault on Peleliu". www.ibiblio.org. Retrieved 18 February 2018.
  39. ^ Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual NAVPERS 15,790(REV.1953), Part II, Unit Awards, September 15–29, 1944 – Assault and seizure of Peleliu and Ngesebus, Palau Islands, p.15 "HyperWar: Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual—1953, Part II".
  40. The Right to Fight:African American Marines in WWII, Peleliu and Iwo Jima, Bernard C. Nalty, Marine Corps Historical Center, Building 58, Washington Navy Yard, Washington D.C. 20374, 1974, PCN 190-003132-00 "The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II (Peleliu and Iwo Jima)".
  41. African Americans at War: an Encyclopedia, Volume I, Jonathan D. Sutherland, ABC, CLIO, Santa Barbara, Ca, 2004, p. 480, ISBN 1-57607-746-2
  42. "17th Special NCB cruisebook" (PDF). Naval History and Heritage Command. p. 29. Retrieved 18 October 2017.
  43. ^ "The Right to Fight: African American Marine in World War II, Bernard C. Nalty, Marine Corps Historical Center, Bldg 58, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 1995 "The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II (Peleliu and Iwo Jima)".
  44. Seabee Museum Archives, Port Hueneme, CA. 93043. 17th Special; NCB p. 29-30 "Reference at www.history.navy.mil" (PDF).
  45. World War II Database "World War II Database". Archived from the original on 15 August 2017. Retrieved 30 April 2017.
  46. "African-American Marines of 16th Field Depot Rest on Peleliu – The World War II Multimedia Database". worldwar2database.com. Archived from the original on 15 March 2018. Retrieved 18 February 2018.
  47. "17th Special, Seabee Museum" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 June 2018. Retrieved 18 February 2018.
  48. "Peleliu Shore Party". www.thomas5.com. Retrieved 18 February 2018.
  49. Peleliu, battle for (Operation Stalemate II) – The Pacific War's Forgotten Battle, September–November 1944, (section: Hitting the Beach, 3rd paragraph), Military History Encyclopedia on the Web, by: Peter D Antill, Tristan Dugdale-Pointon, and Dr John Rickard, "Peleliu, battle for (Operation Stalemate II) – The Pacific War's Forgotten Battle, September–November 1944".
  50. Staff (13 March 2009). "National Register Information System". National Register of Historic Places. National Park Service. Archived from the original on 4 December 2010. Retrieved 8 March 2016.

Bibliography

Further reading

  • Camp, Dick (2009). Last Man Standing: The 1st Marine Regiment on Peleliu, September 15–21, 1944. Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0760334935.

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