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The 14th Five-Year Plan, officially the 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 of the People's Republic of China, is a set of Chinese economic development goals designed to strengthen the national economy between 2021 and 2025. It was drafted during the fifth plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held from 26 to 29 October 2020.

The 14th Five-Year Plan was drafted against the backdrop of worsening China–United States relations and the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused China's economy to shrink in the first quarter of 2020 – the first time in 44 years. Continuing themes from the prior two five-year plans, the 14th Five-Year Plan seeks to boost the services sector, increase urbanization and expand the social safety net to reduce precautionary savings, and also emphasizes high-tech innovation and hard science researches. To address the issue of an aging population, the 14th Five-Year Plan seeks to expand healthcare and retirement system initiatives.

Drafting

On 25 November 2019, Premier Li Keqiang chaired a special meeting on the preparation of the 14th Five-Year plan. In March 2020, the drafting panel for the plan was established, with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping as its leader and Politburo Standing Committee members Li Keqiang, Wang Huning and Han Zheng as deputy leaders.

The plan was drafted during the fifth plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP held from 26 to 29 October 2020. Han Wenxiu, the deputy director of the Office of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, said Xi Jinping had personally led the drafting process through multiple meetings of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the drafting panel that he headed.

Goals

Economy

Broadly outlined in late October 2020, the new plan aims at China becoming a "moderately developed" economy by 2035. It anticipates future growth as largely based on domestic consumption of goods and services, and aims to reduce disparities between urban and rural living standards. The plan includes the "peaceful development" of relations with Taiwan, considered "a rebel province and part of Chinese territory." The Chinese Government also wishes to continue opening up the economy, furthering the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The trade war between the United States and China caused Xi to roll out dual circulation, with "internal circulation" and "external circulation" servicing domestic and foreign trade respectively. The strategy is designed to keep China open to the world economy while increasing its self-reliance.

Environment

Economists expect the plan's target growth rate for the period to exceed five percent annually. The 2021–2025 plan is anticipated to have aggressive goals on sustainable energy to reach China's announced goals of carbon neutrality by no later than 2060.

• New Energy Technologies: Xi Jinping has announced that new energy technologies such as car batteries from state-owned enterprises will make it so that half of the vehicles in China be electric or fuel-cell powered, and half hybrid by 2035.
• Develop a plan to achieve peak carbon emissions by the end of the 2020s.
• Increase the proportion of non-fossil fuel energy use to 20% by 2025, compared to 15% at the end of 2019.
• Improve water conservation infrastructure.

Energy

Recommendations regarding the development of up to 60 gigawatts hydropower capacity on the Yarlung Tsangbo.

Transport

• Improve civil aviation, including the construction of 30 new airports.
• Completion of the "Eight Vertical and Eight Horizontal" high-speed rail network.
• Focus on improving transportation to Xinjiang and Tibet and improve international border connections.

Research and development

The plan aims to increase China's scientific and technical capabilities. China aims to make "major breakthroughs in core technologies" and to prioritize technological self-sufficiency.

The plan aims to increase R&D spending every year by 7%, with the proportion of that going to basic research increasing from 6% to more than 8%. and aid the development of real-world applications by fostering closer links between business, industry, and academia – historically such links have been weak. Businesses will be encouraged to invest in R&D through tax incentives.

The plan aims to boost quantum information and computing, brain science, semiconductors, seed industry, genetic research, regenerative medicine, biotechnology, clinical medicine and health, and deep space, deep sea and polar exploration. The plan prioritizes development towards an integrated communications system, including earth observation and navigation satellites.

The plan set the goal of building four comprehensive national science centers, to be located in Huairou, Zhangjiang, the Greater Bay Area, and Hefei.

China still is unable to independently develop advanced semiconductors that match the performance of those made in Taiwan or South Korea. Acknowledging the challenges that lay ahead, influential officials, entrepreneurs, and academics have evoked the "patriotic spirit of scientists" and called on Chinese students and entrepreneurs to "gnaw on the hard bones" to help China build an independent, controllable semiconductor supply chain.

China has more than 7,200 licensed seed companies but few have the capability for innovation. Tang Renjian, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, said the ministry is studying a plan to help its animal and plant breeding sector close the gap with foreign countries.

About a trillion dollars of government funding have been set aside under the technology initiative, part of which will be used by central and local governments to jointly invest in a series of third-generation chip projects, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

“For our country, technology and innovation is not just a matter of growth," Liu He told a three-story auditorium packed with China's top scientists in a separate meeting in May 2021. "It's also a matter of survival."

Urbanization

The Fourteenth Five-Year Plan sets a target urbanization rate of 65%, as measured by permanent population living in cities (i.e., as opposed to hukou status).

• Lifting of restrictions on Hukou system for cities under 3 million urban residents and relax it for larger cities. All urban residents will obtain full access to basic urban public services, and rural migrants will be able to get urban residency.
• Development of clusters of large, medium-sized, and small cities.

The plan directs the development of more centralized cities and avoiding urban sprawl. The plan calls for acceleration of urban renewal to develop "human-centric cities." The plan's related Climate Change Special Plan emphasizes ecologically oriented urban planning, including through means like urban green rings, public transportation, and bicycle lanes and walking paths.

External links

• Translation: 14th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization – Dec. 2021

References

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