Misplaced Pages

Intermittent discussions are held by various parties and proposals put forward in an attempt to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through a peace process. Since the 1970s, there has been a parallel effort made to find terms upon which peace can be agreed to in both this conflict and the wider Arab–Israeli conflict. Notably, the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel included discussions on plans for "Palestinian autonomy", but did not include any Palestinian representatives. The autonomy plan would later not be implemented, but its stipulations would to a large extent be represented in the Oslo Accords.

Despite the failure of the peace process to produce a final agreement, the international consensus has for decades supported a two-state solution to the conflict, based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. This includes the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the pre-1967 borders including East Jerusalem and a just resolution to the refugee question based on the Palestinian right of return (in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194). This is in contrast to the current situation under the interim agreement of the Oslo Accords in which the Palestinian territories are fragmented under Israeli military control and the Palestinian National Authority has only partial self-rule in Area A of the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. A final settlement as stipulated by the Oslo Accords has yet to be reached.

Background

For the United States and Israel, the PLO's participation in diplomatic negotiations was dependent on its complete disavowal of political violence and full recognition of Israel's "right to exist." This stipulation required the PLO to abandon its objective of reclaiming all of historic Palestine and instead focus on the 22 percent which came under Israeli military control in 1967. By the late 1970s, Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories and most Arab states supported a two-state settlement. In 1981, Saudi Arabia put forward a plan based on a two-state settlement to the conflict with support from the Arab League. Israeli analyst Avner Yaniv describes Arafat as ready to make a historic compromise at this time, while the Israeli cabinet continued to oppose the existence of a Palestinian state. Yaniv described Arafat's willingness to compromise as a "peace offensive" which Israel responded to by planning to remove the PLO as a potential negotiating partner in order to evade international diplomatic pressure. Israel would invade Lebanon the following year in an attempt to undermine the PLO as a political organization, weakening Palestinian nationalism and facilitating the annexation of the West Bank into Greater Israel.

While the PLO had adopted a program of pursuing a Palestinian state alongside Israel since the mid-1970s, the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence formally consecrated this objective. This declaration, which was based on resolutions from the Palestine National Council sessions in the late 1970s and 1980s, advocated for the creation of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, within the borders set by the 1949 armistice lines prior to June 5, 1967. Following the declaration, Arafat explicitly denounced all forms of terrorism and affirmed the PLO's acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the recognition of Israel's right to exist. All the conditions defined by Henry Kissinger for US negotiations with the PLO had now been met.

Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir stood behind the stance that the PLO was a terrorist organization and would not accept it as a negotiating partner. He maintained a strict stance against any concessions, including withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories, recognition of or negotiations with the PLO, and especially the establishment of a Palestinian state. Shamir viewed the U.S. decision to engage in dialogue with the PLO as a mistake that threatened the existing territorial status quo. He argued that negotiating with the PLO meant accepting the existence of a Palestinian state and hence was unacceptable.

The term "peace-process" refers to the step-by-step approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Having originally entered into usage to describe the US mediated negotiations between Israel and surrounding Arab countries, notably Egypt, the term "peace-process" has grown to be associated with an emphasis on the negotiation process rather than on presenting a comprehensive solution to the conflict. As part of this process, fundamental issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict such as borders, access to resources, and the Palestinian right of return, have been left to "final status" talks. Such "final status" negotiations along the lines discussed in Madrid in 1991 have never taken place.

Peace efforts with confrontation states

This section needs expansion with: Efforts with Egypt, Jordan, Syria post 1973. You can help by adding to itadding to it or making an edit request. (September 2014)

There were parallel efforts for peace treaties between Israel and other "confrontation states": Egypt, Jordan and Syria after the Six-Day war, and Lebanon afterwards. UN resolution 242 was accepted by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, but rejected by Syria until 1972–1973.

In 1970, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers proposed the Rogers Plan, which called for a 90-day cease-fire, a military standstill zone on each side of the Suez Canal, and an effort to reach agreement in the framework of UN Resolution 242. Israel rejected the plan on 10 December 1969, calling it "an attempt to appease at the expense of Israel." The Soviets dismissed it as "one-sided" and "pro-Israeli." President Nasser rejected it because it was a separate deal with Israel even if Egypt recovered all of Sinai.

No breakthrough occurred even after President Sadat in 1972 surprised most observers by suddenly expelling Soviet military advisers from Egypt and again signaled to the United States government his willingness to negotiate based on the Rogers plan.

Timeline

1949 Armistice Agreements

The 1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine followed by the 1948–1949 Arab–Israeli War all ended with the February–July 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Those Arab countries insisted explicitly in the agreement texts that the agreed Armistice Demarcation Lines ('Green Lines') should not be construed as political or territorial boundaries, thus aiming to safeguard the right of return of those Palestinians that had fled their homes during the war, and the illegitimacy of Israel's use or appropriation of abandoned Palestinian property.

After the 1967 Six-Day War though, in which Israel had conquered, among more, the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip in a pre-emptive surprise-strike against overtly hostile Arab neighbouring countries, top Israeli leaders like Golda Meir, Menachem Begin and Abba Eban have emphasized that returning to the pre-1967 borders would be extremely dangerous for Israel, bordering on "national suicide".

Geneva, December 1973

After the ceasefire on 25 October 1973 ending the Yom Kippur War (surprise attack on Israel on 6 October by Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq assisted by more countries), the U.S. and U.S.S.R. gathered the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt and Jordan in Geneva in December 1973 to pursue "peace", firstly disengagement of armed forces, towards fulfilling UNSC Resolution 242 dating from 1967 ("…the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security"). Syria had refused to show up, because Israel and the US refused to also invite the PLO. The short conference facilitated a reconciliation between Israel, Egypt and Syria, but achieved nothing for the Palestinians.

Camp David, 1978

A political agreement was signed between Israel and Egypt (notably excluding representatives from the PLO) in 1978, aiming at the establishment of a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza and autonomy for the inhabitants of those lands, as attempt towards "Peace in the Middle East". "Autonomy" in this case would not mean "self-determination"; Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin however specifically insisted that "on no condition will there be a Palestinian state".

Meanwhile, Egypt's status as the strongest Arab nation capable of challenging Israel militarily meant that its parallel withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Egypt–Israel peace treaty (March 1979) significantly weakened the collective military and diplomatic power of the other Arab countries. It has been argued that this shift essentially eliminated Israel's motivation to make concessions in the West Bank, Gaza, or other areas.

Madrid (1991–93)

Delegations of Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan accepted the invitation from U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet Union's President Mikhail Gorbachev to attend the peace conference in Madrid, late 1991, after the First Gulf War; a team of Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza was also invited and present. Their team included no overt PLO representatives because Israel had vetoed the presence of PLO associates or Palestinians from outside West Bank or Gaza Strip; nevertheless, PLO figures backstage instructed the Palestinian delegation. The agenda was stated as: achieve "peace throughout the region" through direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the Palestinians, all along the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. More specifically: "interim self-government arrangements" for the Palestinians. This was the first peace effort with all these countries and also 'Palestinians' gathered face-to-face.

Oslo (1993-2001)

While the slow moving Madrid talks were taking place, a series of secret meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were taking place in Oslo, Norway, which resulted in the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Palestinians and Israel, a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338". The agreement, officially titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), was signed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993. The stipulations of the Oslo agreements ran contrary to the international consensus for resolving the conflict; the agreements did not uphold Palestinian self-determination or statehood and repealed the internationally accepted interpretation of UN Resolution 242 that land cannot be acquired by war. With respect to access to land and resources, Noam Chomsky described the Oslo agreements as allowing "Israel to do virtually what it likes."

Various "transfers of power and responsibilities" in the Gaza Strip and West Bank from Israel to the Palestinians took place in the mid-1990s. The Palestinians achieved self-governance of major cities in the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip. Israel maintained and continues to maintain a presence in the West Bank for what it describes as security reasons. In 2013 Israel still had control of 61% of the West Bank, while the Palestinians had control of civic functions for most of the Palestinian population. Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami described the Oslo Accords as legitimizing "the transformation of the West Bank into what has been called a 'cartographic cheeseboard'." Indeed, Oslo legitimated the fragmentation of Palestinian population centers by Jewish-only settlements and bypass roads, Israeli checkpoints and military installations. Core to the Oslo Accords was the creation of the Palestinian Authority and the security cooperation it would enter into with the Israeli military authorities in what has been described as the "outsourcing" of the occupation to the PA. Ben-Ami, who participated in the Camp David 2000 talks, described this process: "One of the meanings of Oslo was that the PLO was eventually Israel’s collaborator in the task of stifling the Intifada and cutting short what was clearly an authentically democratic struggle for Palestinian independence."

After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the peace process eventually ground to a halt. The settlements' population almost doubled in the West Bank. Later suicide bombing attacks from Palestinian militant groups and the subsequent retaliatory actions from the Israeli military made conditions for peace negotiations untenable.

1996–99 agreements

Newly elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a new policy following the many suicide attacks by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad since 1993, including a wave of suicide attacks prior to the Israeli elections of May 1996. Netanyahu declared a tit-for-tat policy which he termed "reciprocity," whereby Israel would not engage in the peace process if Arafat continued with what Netanyahu defined as the Palestinian revolving door policy, i.e., incitement and direct or indirect support of terrorism. The Hebron and Wye Agreements were signed during this period, after Israel considered that its conditions were partially met.

Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, also known as the Hebron Protocol or Hebron Agreement, began 7 January and was concluded from 15 to 17 January 1997 between Israel and the PLO. The agreement dealt with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with the Oslo Accords, security issues and other concerns.

The Wye River Memorandum was a political agreement negotiated to implement the Oslo Accords, completed on 23 October 1998. It was signed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It was negotiated at Wye River, Maryland (at the Wye River Conference Center) and signed at the White House with President Bill Clinton as the official witness. On 17 November 1998, Israel's 120-member parliament, the Knesset, approved the Memorandum by a vote of 75–19. The agreement dealt with further redeployments in the West Bank, security issues and other concerns. The memorandum was criticized by major international human rights organizations for its "encouragement" of human rights abuses.

Camp David 2000 Summit, Clinton's "Parameters," and the Taba talks

In 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In May of that year, according to Nathan Thrall, Israel had offered Palestinians 66% of the West Bank, with 17% annexed to Israel, and a further 17% not annexed but under Israeli control, and no compensating swap of Israeli territory. The Israeli prime minister offered the Palestinian leader between 91% and 95% (sources differ on the exact percentage) of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip if 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) be ceded to Israel. East Jerusalem would have fallen for the most part under Israeli sovereignty, with the exception of most suburbs with heavy non-Jewish populations surrounded by areas annexed to Israel. The issue of the Palestinian right of return would be solved through significant monetary reparations.

Arafat rejected this offer and did not propose a counter-offer. No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense U.S. pressure. Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Summit. In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee that later published the Mitchell Report.

Proposed in the fall of 2000 following the collapse of the Camp David talks, The Clinton Parameters included a plan on which the Palestinian State was to include 94-96% of the West Bank, and around 80% of the settlers were to become under Israeli sovereignty, and in exchange for that, Israel would concede some territory (so called 'Territory Exchange' or 'Land Swap') within the Green Line (1967 borders). The swap would consist of 1–3% of Israeli territory, such that the final borders of the West Bank part of the Palestinian state would include 97% of the land of the original borders.

At the Taba summit (at Taba) in January 2001 talks continued based on the Clinton Parameters. The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas from the West Bank and offered a few thousand more refugees than they offered at Camp David to settle into Israel and hoped that this would be considered "implementation" of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194. The Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. However, Barak did not conduct further negotiations at that time; the talks ended without an agreement and the following month the right-wing Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon was elected Israeli prime minister in February 2001.

The Arab peace initiative and the Roadmap (2002/3)

The Beirut summit of Arab government leaders took place in March 2002 under the aegis of the Arab League. The summit concluded by presenting a plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed it and said, "... the details of every peace plan must be discussed directly between Israel and the Palestinians, and to make this possible, the Palestinian Authority must put an end to terror, the horrifying expression of which we witnessed just last night in Netanya", referring to the Netanya suicide attack perpetrated on the previous evening which the Beirut Summit failed to address. Israel was not prepared to enter negotiations as called for by the Arab League plan on the grounds that it did not wish for "full withdrawal to 1967 borders and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees".

In July 2002, the "quartet" of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, outlined the principles of a "road map" for peace, including an independent Palestinian state. The road map was released in April 2003 after the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (AKA Abu Mazen) as the first-ever Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Both the US and Israel called for a new Prime Minister position, as both refused to work with Arafat anymore.

The plan called for independent actions by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with disputed issues put off until a rapport can be established. In the first step, the Palestinian Authority must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure." Israel was then required to dismantle settlements established after March 2001, freeze all settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after 28 September 2000, end curfews and ease restrictions on movement of persons and goods.

Israeli–Palestinian talks in 2007 and 2008

From December 2006 to mid-September 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority met 36 times; there were also lower-level talks. In 2007 Olmert welcomed the Arab League's re-endorsement of the Arab Peace Initiative. In his bid to negotiate a peace accord and establish a Palestinian state, Olmert proposed a plan to the Palestinians. The centerpiece of Olmert's detailed proposal is the suggested permanent border, which would be based on an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank. Olmert proposed annexing at least 6.3% of Palestinian territory, in exchange for 5.8% of Israeli land, with Palestinians receiving alternative land in the Negev, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, as well as territorial link, under Israeli sovereignty, for free passage between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel insisted on retaining an armed presence in the future Palestinian state. Under Abbas's offer, more than 60 percent of settlers would stay in place. Olmert, for his part, was presenting a plan in which the most sparsely populated settlements would be evacuated. Olmert and Abbas both acknowledged that reciprocal relations would be necessary, not hermetic separation. They also acknowledged the need to share a single business ecosystem, while cooperating intensively on water, security, bandwidth, banking, tourism and much more. Regarding Jerusalem the leaders agreed that Jewish neighborhoods should remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Arab neighborhoods would revert to Palestinian sovereignty. The Palestinians asked for clarifications of the territorial land swap since they were unable to ascertain what land his percentages affected, since Israeli and Palestinian calculations of the West Bank differ by several hundred square kilometres. For them, in lieu of such clarifications, Olmert's 6.3–6.8% annexation might work out closer to 8.5%, 4 times the 1.9% limit the Palestinians argued a swap should not exceed. The talks ended with both sides claiming the other side dropped follow-up contacts.

Following the conflict that erupted between the two main Palestinian parties, Fatah and Hamas, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, splintering the Palestinian Authority into two polities, each claiming to be the true representatives of the Palestinian people. Fatah controlled the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Hamas governed in Gaza. Hostilities between Gaza and Israel increased. Egypt brokered the 2008 Israel–Hamas ceasefire, which lasted half a year beginning on 19 June 2008 and lasted until 19 December 2008. The collapse of the ceasefire led to the Gaza War on 27 December 2008.

2010 direct talks

In June 2009, reacting to US President Barack Obama's Cairo Address, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared for the first time conditional support for a future Palestinian state but insisted that the Palestinians would need to make reciprocal gestures and accept several principles: recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people; demilitarization of a future Palestinian state, along with additional security guarantees, including defensible borders for Israel; Palestinians would also have to accept that Jerusalem would remain the united capital of Israel, and renounce their claim to a right of return. He also claimed that Israeli settlements retain a right to growth and expansion in the West Bank. Palestinians rejected the proposals immediately. In September 2010, the Obama administration pushed to revive the stalled peace process by getting the parties involved to agree to direct talks for the first time in about two years. While U.S. President Barack Obama was the orchestrator of the movement, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went through months of cajoling just to get the parties to the table, and helped convince the reluctant Palestinians by getting support for direct talks from Egypt and Jordan. The aim of the talks was to forge the framework of a final agreement within one year, although general expectations of a success were fairly low. The talks aimed to put the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to an official end by forming a two-state solution for the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, promoting the idea of everlasting peace and putting an official halt to any further land claims, as well as accepting the rejection of any forceful retribution if violence should reoccur. Hamas and Hezbollah, however threatened violence, especially if either side seemed likely to compromise in order to reach an agreement. As a result, the Israeli government publicly stated that peace couldn't exist even if both sides signed the agreement, due to the stance taken by Hamas and Hezbollah. The US was therefore compelled to re-focus on eliminating the threat posed by the stance of Hamas and Hezbollah as part of the direct talk progress. Israel for its part, was skeptical that a final agreement was reached that the situation would change, as Hamas and Hezbollah would still get support to fuel new violence. In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s. The mainstream within the PLO have taken the concept of territorial and diplomatic compromise seriously and have showed serious interest in this. During the 2010 talks, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said that the Palestinians and Israel have agreed on the principle of a land swap, but Israel has yet to confirm. The issue of the ratio of land Israel would give to the Palestinians in exchange for keeping settlement blocs is an issue of dispute, with the Palestinians demanding that the ratio be 1:1, and Israel offering less. In April 2012, Mahmoud Abbas sent a letter to Benjamin Netanyahu reiterating that for peace talks to resume, Israel must stop settlement building in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and accept the 1967 borders as a basis for a two-state solution. In May 2012, Abbas reiterated his readiness to engage with the Israelis if they propose "anything promising or positive". Netanyahu replied to Abbas' April letter less than a week later and, for the first time, officially recognised the right for Palestinians to have their own state, though as before he declared it would have to be demilitarised, and said his new national unity government furnished a new opportunity to renew negotiations and move forward.

2013–14 talks

Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians began on 29 July 2013 following an attempt by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to restart the peace process.

Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. was appointed by the US to oversee the negotiations. Indyk served as U.S. ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs during the Clinton administration. Hamas, the Palestinian government in Gaza, rejected Kerry's announcement, stating that Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has no legitimacy to negotiate in the name of the Palestinian people.

The negotiations were scheduled to last up to nine months to reach a final status to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by mid-2014. The Israeli negotiating team was led by veteran negotiator Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, while the Palestinian delegation was led by Saeb Erekat, also a former negotiator. Negotiations started in Washington, DC and were slated to move to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and finally to Hebron. A deadline was set for establishing a broad outline for an agreement by 29 April 2014. On the expiry of the deadline, negotiations collapsed, with the US Special Envoy Indyk reportedly assigning blame mainly to Israel, while the US State Department insisting no one side was to blame but that "both sides did things that were incredibly unhelpful."

Israel reacted angrily to the Fatah–Hamas Gaza Agreement of 23 April 2014 whose main purpose was reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, the formation of a Palestinian unity government and the holding of new elections. Israel halted peace talks with the Palestinians, saying it "will not negotiate with a Palestinian government backed by Hamas, a terrorist organization that calls for Israel's destruction", and threatened sanctions against the Palestinian Authority, including a previously announced Israeli plan to unilaterally deduct Palestinian debts to Israeli companies from the tax revenue Israel collects for the PA. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Abbas of sabotaging peace efforts. He said that Abbas cannot have peace with both Hamas and Israel and has to choose. Abbas said the deal did not contradict their commitment to peace with Israel on the basis of a two-state solution and assured reporters that any unity government would recognize Israel, be non-violent, and bound to previous PLO agreements. Shortly after, Israel began implementing economic sanctions against Palestinians and canceled plans to build housing for Palestinians in Area C of the West Bank. Abbas also threatened to dissolve the PA, leaving Israel fully responsible for both the West Bank and Gaza, a threat that the PA has not put into effect.

Notwithstanding Israeli objections and actions, the new Palestinian Unity Government was formed on 2 June 2014.

Abbas' 2014 peace plan

On 3 September 2014, Abbas presented a new proposal for the peace process to John Kerry. The plan called for nine months of direct talks followed by a three-year plan for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines, leaving East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital. The resumption of talks was contingent on an Israeli freeze on construction in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, as well as the release of the final batch of prisoners from the previous talks. The first three months of the plan would revolve around the borders and potential land swaps for the 1967 lines. The following six months would focus on issues including refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, security and water. The US administration rejected the initiative, saying it was opposed to any unilateral move that could negatively impact the Israeli–Palestinian peace process.

Abbas stated that if Israel rejected the claim he would push for charges against Israel in the International Criminal Court over the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. Additionally, if rejected, Abbas stated he would turn to the UN Security Council for a unilateral measure for a Palestinian State. On 1 October 2014, Abbas stated he would be presenting his plan to the UNSC within two to three weeks, with an application to the ICC to follow if it failed to pass the UNSC. In December 2014, Jordan submitted the proposal to the UNSC, which failed when voted on later that month. Later that month as previously threatened, Abbas signed the treaty to join the ICC. Israel responded by freezing NIS 500 million (US$127 million) in Palestinian tax revenues, in response to which, the PA banned the sale in the Palestinian territories of products of six major Israeli companies.

Trump plan

Following the inauguration of US President Donald Trump in January 2017, a period of uncertainty regarding a new peace initiative began. In early 2018, some media sources reported the new administration was preparing a new peace initiative for an Israeli-Palestinian deal. The White House unveiled the economic part of the Trump initiative, titled Peace to Prosperity: The Economic Plan, in June 2019, and the political portion of the plan in January 2020. Palestinian leaders boycotted and condemned the Bahrain conference in late June 2019 at which the economic plan was unveiled.

In December 2017, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas cut ties with the Trump administration after United States recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel. The Trump administration further raised Palestinians' ire when it moved the US embassy to Jerusalem in May 2018, and cut hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid to the Palestinians, citing the PA's refusal to take part in the administration's peace initiative.

Munich group

In February 2020, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, the foreign ministers of Egypt, France, Germany and Jordan, the Munich Group, together discussed peace efforts. In July, the same quartet issued a statement declaring that "any annexation of Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 would be a violation of international law" and "would have serious consequences for the security and stability of the region and would constitute a major obstacle to efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive and just peace",. The foreign ministers said they "discussed how to restart a fruitful engagement between the Israeli and the Palestinian side, and offer our support in facilitating a path to negotiations".

Meeting in Jordan on 24 September the four again called for a resumption of negotiations between the two sides. There will be "no comprehensive and lasting peace without solving the conflict on the basis of the two-state solution", Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi told reporters following the meeting. The four also praised recent deals establishing ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Egypt's Sameh Shoukry said the deals are an "important development that would lead to more support and interaction in order to reach a comprehensive peace". However Palestinians see the two accords as a betrayal.

On 11 January 2021, the group met in Cairo to discuss "possible steps to advance the peace process in the Middle East and create an environment conducive to the resumption of dialogue between the Palestinians and the Israelis." A joint statement of the quartet confirmed its intention to work with the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden. A further meeting is set to be held in Paris.

The four met in Paris on 11 March 2021, with United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor Wennesland and the European Union Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, Susanna Terstal. Their statement emphasized the importance of confidence-building measures to promote dialogue, support for the two-state solution and stated that settlement activities violate international law.

On 19 February 2021, at the Munich Security Conference, as well as reaffirming support for a two state solution, the group condemned the expansion of Israeli settlements and the ongoing Palestinian displacement in East Jerusalem, in particular in Sheikh Jarrah.

On 22 September 2022, the group met with Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Tor Wennesland, and in a statement said "with a view to advancing the Middle East Peace Process towards a just, comprehensive and lasting peace on the basis of the two-state solution".

Quartet developments

This article appears to be slanted towards recent events. Please try to keep recent events in historical perspective and add more content related to non-recent events. (March 2021)

In July 2016, the Quartet reported:

The continuing policy of settlement construction and expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, designation of land for exclusive Israeli use, and denial of Palestinian development, including the recent high rate of demolitions, is steadily eroding the viability of the two-state solution. This raises legitimate questions about Israel's long-term intentions, which are compounded by the statements of some Israeli ministers that there should never be a Palestinian state. In fact, the transfer of greater powers and responsibilities to Palestinian civil authority...has effectively been stopped.

It was within this context that the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 2334 in December 2016 in another bid to address the settlement question. The report was significantly altered to appease Israel and as well as urging Israel to stop its settlement policy, urged Palestine to end incitement to violence.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly in September, 2018, Mahmoud Abbas called Donald Trump's policies towards Palestinians an "assault on international law". He said the US is "too biased towards Israel" indicating that others could broker talks and that the US could participate as a member of the Middle East peace Quartet. Abbas reiterated this position at a UN Security Council meeting on 11 February 2020.

As of 16 September 2020, the UN has not been able to gather the consensus necessary for the Quartet or a group of countries linked to the Quartet to meet. On 25 September 2020, at the UN, Abbas called for an international conference early in 2021 to "launch a genuine peace process."

On 15 February 2021, the quartet envoys met virtually and agreed to meet on a regular basis to continue their engagement. On 23 March 2021, the Quartet discussed the reviving of "meaningful negotiations" between Israel and the Palestinians who both need "to refrain from unilateral actions that make a two-state solution more difficult to achieve."

Views of the peace process

The neutrality of this section is disputed. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until conditions to do so are met. (February 2024) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Palestinian views on the peace process

By the late 1970s, Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories and most Arab states supported a two-state settlement. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe's perspective of the Palestinian point of view is that the conflict dates back to 1948 with the creation of Israel, and that the conflict has been a fight to uphold the Palestinian right of return as recognized by the UN. Pappe depicts the American and Israeli point of view on the conflict as starting in 1967 with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; this point of view considers peace contingent only on a (possibly partial) withdrawal from these areas. Therefore, this for some was the ultimate aim of the peace process, and for groups such as Hamas still is. Slater says acceptance of a two-state solution by the PLO and its leadership developed as early as the 1960s following from a more "maximalist" view which he describes as the "destruction" of Israel and the "liberation" of Palestine. However, there are recurrent themes prevalent throughout peace process negotiations including a feeling that Israel offers too little and a mistrust of its actions and motives. Yet, the demand for a right of return by the Palestinian refugees to Israel has remained a cornerstone of the Palestinian view and has been repeatedly enunciated by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas who is leading the Palestinian peace effort.

The Palestinians point out to the extensive and continuing Israeli settlement effort in the West Bank restricting the area available to the Palestinian state.

Israeli views on the peace process

There are several Israeli views of the peace process. Israel's position is that the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, ought to be the negotiating partner in the peace talks, and not Hamas, which has at times engaged with Israel in escalations of the conflict and attacks Israel's civilian population.

The violence of the second intifada and the political success of Hamas had convinced many Israelis that peace and negotiation are not possible and that a two-state system is not the answer. Since the break down of negotiations, security has played a less important role in Israeli concerns, trailing behind employment, corruption, housing and other pressing issues. Israeli policy had reoriented to focus on managing the conflict and the associated occupation of Palestinian territory, rather than reaching a negotiated solution. Hardliners believe that Israel should annex all Palestinian territory, or at least all minus the Gaza Strip. Israelis view the peace process as hindered and near impossible due to terrorism on the part of Palestinians and do not trust Palestinian leadership to maintain control. According to Slater, during the time when Yitzhak Rabin was in office, the Palestinian Authority largely fulfilled its commitment to combat terrorism. Palestinian security forces, led by Yasser Arafat, collaborated closely with Israeli security forces. This cooperation included joint patrols and efforts to identify and detain extremists and suspected terrorists, often based on lists provided by the Israelis. Pedahzur describes suicide terrorism as influencing the Israeli public's view of the value of maintaining forces on the ground in the occupied Gaza Strip. A common theme throughout the peace process has been a feeling that the Palestinians give too little in their peace offers.

Some Israelis believe that the Gaza Strip is fully controlled by the Hamas who do not want peace with Israel. According to the Israeli view, this limits the ability of the Palestinians to make peace with Israel and enforce it over the long term. Furthermore, in the Israeli view, a violent overtake of the West Bank by the Hamas as a result of the creation of an unstable new state is likely. Lastly, rhetoric from high-ranking Fatah officials promising a full, literal Palestinian right of return into Israel (a position no Israeli government can accept without destroying the Jewish character of Israel) makes peace negotiations more difficult.

US views on the peace process

US officials, citizens and lobbying groups hold divergent views on the peace process. All recent US Presidents have maintained a policy that Israel must give up some of the land that it conquered in the 1967 War in order to achieve peace; that the Palestinians must actively prevent terrorism; and that Israel has an unconditional right to exist. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush publicly supported the creation of a new Palestinian state out of most of the current Palestinian territories, based on the idea of self-determination for the Palestinian people, and President Obama continued that policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton thought that peace can only be achieved through direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Obama outlined the pursuit of the two-state solution as American policy for achieving Palestinian aspirations, Israeli security, and a measure of stability in the Middle East.

According to the sociologist Mervin Verbit, American Jews are "more right than left" on peace process issues. Verbit found that surveys of American Jews often reflect the view of the poll's sponsors. Often it is the wording of the survey questions that bias the outcome (a headline illustrating this point reads "ADL poll shows higher support for Israel than did survey by dovish J Street"). Using survey data from the American Jewish Committee where findings could not be attributed to wording biases, Verbit found American Jews took a rightward shift following the collapse of the Camp David talks in 2000, and the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

The Jordanian-American journalist Rami George Khouri opines that United States is not willing to mediate a just Israeli-Palestinian peace, Instead, to protect Israel, it sends military equipment to the country, which prevents any attempt to address the root causes of tension in the region. This has generated popular resistance groups across the Middle East that routinely attack both US and Israeli targets.

Major current issues between the two sides

The core issues of the conflict are borders, the status of settlements in the West Bank, the status of east Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee right of return, and security. With the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist in 1982, the international community with the main exception of the United States and Israel has been in consensus on a framework for resolving the conflict on the basis of international law. Various UN bodies and the ICJ have supported this position; every year, the UN General Assembly votes almost unanimously in favor of a resolution titled "Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine." This resolution consistently affirms the illegality of the Israeli settlements, the annexation of East Jerusalem, and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It also emphasizes the need for an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 and the need for a just resolution to the refugee question on the basis of UN resolution 194.

There remain some activists on the Palestinian side who claim that there are still some positive signs on the Palestinian side, and that Israel should use these to cultivate some positive interactions with the Palestinians, even in spite of Hamas's basic opposition to the existence of the Jewish State. Since mid-June 2007, Israel has cooperated with Palestinian security forces in the West Bank at unprecedented levels, thanks in part to United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding of the Palestinian National Security Forces and Presidential Guard.

A further concern is whether, as a result of this security argument, Israel will in fact allow the Palestinian community to emerge as a viable and sovereign political unit, a viable and contiguous state. There are also various economic and political restrictions placed on Palestinian people, activities, and institutions which have had a detrimental effect on the Palestinian economy and quality of life. Israel has said repeatedly that these restrictions are necessary due to security concerns, and in order to counteract ongoing efforts which promote terrorism which incite opposition to Israel's existence and rights as a country. The key obstacle therefore remains the Israeli demand for security versus Palestinian claims for rights and statehood.

Furthermore, the identification of 'Palestinian' with 'terrorist' can be construed as problematic, and Sayigh argues that this association is used as a rationale for maintaining the status quo, and that only by recognising the status of Jewish immigrants as 'settlers' can we conceptually move forwards.

Nevertheless, there is a range of ulterior motives for Israel's denial of Palestinian statehood. If Palestine were declared a state, then immediately, Israel, by its present occupation of the West Bank will be in breach of the United Nations Charter. Palestine, as a state, could legitimately call upon the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter to remove Israel from the occupied territories. Palestine, as a state, would be able to accede to international conventions and bring legal action against Israel on various matters. Palestine could accede to various international human rights instruments, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It could even join the International Criminal Court and file cases against Israel for war crimes. It would be a tinderbox of a situation that is highly likely to precipitate conflict in the Middle East.

There is a lively debate around the shape that a lasting peace settlement would take (see for example the One-state solution and Two-state solution). Authors like Cook have argued that the one-state solution is opposed by Israel because the very nature of Zionism and Jewish nationalism calls for a Jewish majority state, whilst the two-state solution would require the difficult relocation of half a million Jewish settlers living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Palestinian leaders such as Salam Fayyad have rejected calls for a binational state or unilateral declaration of statehood. As of 2010, only a minority of Palestinians and Israelis support the one-state solution. Interest in a one-state solution is growing, however, as the two-state approach fails to accomplish a final agreement.

Alternative peace proposals

Another approach was taken by a team of negotiators led by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo following two and a half years of secret negotiations. On 1 December 2003, the two parties signed an unofficial suggested plan for peace in Geneva (dubbed the Geneva Accord). In sharp contrast to the road map, it is not a plan for a temporary ceasefire but a comprehensive and detailed solution aiming at all the issues at stake, in particular, Jerusalem, the settlements and the refugee problem. It was met with bitter denunciation by the Israeli government and many Palestinians, with the Palestinian Authority staying non-committal, but it was warmly welcomed by many European governments and some significant elements of the Bush Administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Yet another approach was proposed by a number of parties inside and outside Israel: a "binational solution" whereby Israel would formally annex the Palestinian territories but would make the Palestinian Arabs citizens in a unitary secular state. Championed by Edward Said and New York University professor Tony Judt, the suggestion aroused both interest and condemnation. It was not actually a new idea, dating back as far as the 1920s, but it was given extra prominence by the growing demographic issues raised by a rapidly expanding Arab population in Israel and the territories.

The Elon Peace Plan is a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict proposed in 2002 by former minister Binyamin Elon. The plan advocates the formal annexation of West Bank and Gaza by Israel and that Palestinians will become either Jordanian citizens or permanent residents in Israel so long as they remained peaceful and law-abiding residents. All these actions should be done in agreement with Jordan and the Palestinian population. This solution is tied to the demographics of Jordan where it is claimed that Jordan is essentially already the Palestinian state, as it has so many Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

An attempt to change the rules was made by Condoleezza Rice and Tzipi Livni when they brought forth the concept of a shelf agreement. The idea was to disengage the linkage between negotiations and actions on the ground. In theory this would allow negotiations until a "shelf agreement" defining peace would be obtained. Such an agreement would not entail implementation. It would just describe what peace is. It would stay on the shelf but eventually will guide the implementation. The difficulty with this notion is that it creates a dis-incentive for Israel to reach such an agreement. The lack of clarity about what happens after agreement is reached will result in insurmountable pressures on Abbas to demand immediate implementation. However, from the Israeli point of view, the Palestinians are not ready to create a stable state, such an implementation process will almost guarantee instability in the Palestinian areas with a possible Hamas takeover as happened in Gaza.

As things stand now this brings the process to another impasse. To avoid it some definition of what happens after a shelf agreement is needed. One possible idea by this essay is to agree ahead of time that following attainment of a final status agreement there will be a negotiated detailed and staged implementation agreement which would define a process which would allow the creation of a stable functional Palestinian state in stages and over time. In August 2013, an indication that such an idea can be acceptable to the Palestinians was given by Mahmud Abbas in a meeting with Meretz MK-s. In the meeting Abbas stated "that there cannot be an interim agreement but only a final status deal that can be implemented in stages".

Joint economic effort and development

Despite the long history of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, a number of peace initiatives that respect the rights of both peoples have been undertaken by people on both sides.

In March 2007, Japan proposed a plan for peace based on common economic development and effort, rather than on continuous wrangling over land. Both sides stated their support. This became the Peace Valley plan, a joint effort of the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian governments to promote economic cooperation, and new business initiatives which can help both sides work together, and create a better diplomatic atmosphere and better economic conditions. It is mainly designed to foster efforts in the private sector, once governments provide the initial investment and facilities.

See also

• Israel–Palestine relations
• Cold peace
• Israeli transfer of Palestinian militant bodies (2012)
• The Land of the Settlers
• Peace Now
• OneVoice Movement
• Women Wage Peace Movement
• Tolerance Monument
• Arab League and the Arab–Israeli conflict
• Americans for Peace Now
• Seeds of Peace
• The Case for Peace
• PeaceMaker (computer game)
• Projects working for peace among Arabs and Israelis
• List of Middle East peace proposals
• The Environmental Provisions of Oslo II Accords
• Israeli–Palestinian economic peace efforts
• History of the State of Palestine
• Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)
• Faisal–Weizmann Agreement (1919)
• Peel Commission
• International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict
• Western Sahara peace process

Notes

1. The 91% land offer was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, but this differs by approximately 5 percentage points from the Palestinian definition. Palestinians use a total area of 5,854 square kilometers. Israel, however, omits the area known as No Man's Land (50 sq. km near Latrun), post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 sq. km), and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 sq. km), which reduces the total to 5,538 sq. km. Thus, an Israeli offer of 91% (of 5,538 sq. km) of the West Bank translates into only 86% from the Palestinian perspective.
   Jeremy Pressman, International Security, vol 28, no. 2, Fall 2003, "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine. On Archived 22 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine. See pp. 16–17

References

1. Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 121.
2. Rashid Khalidi (2013). Brokers of Deceit. Beacon Press. ISBN 978-0-8070-4476-6.
3. Norman G. Finkelstein (2018). Gaza. University of California Press. p. 27. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1. The international community has consistently supported a settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict that calls for two states based on a full Israeli withdrawal to its pre-June 1967 borders, and a just resolution of the refugee question based on the right of return and compensation.
4. Noura Erakat (2019). Justice for Some. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0883-2.
5. ^ Baconi 2018, Politicide, Containment, and Pacification
6. ^ Shaul Mishal, Avraham Sela (2000). The Palestinian Hamas. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-11674-9.
7. Yehuda Lukacs, ed., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A documentary record, 1967–1990 (Cambridge: 1992), pp. 477–79.
8. Yaniv, Avner (1987). Dilemmas of Security. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-504122-4.
9. Shlaim 2015: "The real driving force behind Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, however, was Ariel Sharon, whose aims were much more ambitious and far-reaching. From his first day at the Defense Ministry, Sharon started planning the invasion of Lebanon. He developed what came to be known as the “big plan” for using Israel’s military power to establish political hegemony in the Middle East. The first aim of Sharon’s plan was to destroy the PLO’s military infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organization. The second aim was to establish a new political order in Lebanon by helping Israel’s Maronite friends, headed by Bashir Gemayel, to form a government that would proceed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. For this to be possible, it was necessary, third, to expel the Syrian forces from Lebanon or at least to weaken seriously the Syrian presence there. In Sharon’s big plan, the war in Lebanon was intended to transform the situation not only in Lebanon but in the whole Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Greater Israel. The resulting influx of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank into Jordan would eventually sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and transform the East Bank into a Palestinian state. Sharon reasoned that Jordan’s conversion into a Palestinian state would end international pressures on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. Begin was not privy to all aspects of Sharon’s ambitious geopolitical scenario, but the two men were united by their desire to act against the PLO in Lebanon.15"
10. Shlaim 2015: "The PLO followed the Algiers resolutions with a concerted attempt to project a more moderate image. It made a special effort to gain respectability by dissociating the PLO from terrorism. Arafat issued a series of statements on the subject, which failed to satisfy the United States, so in the end the State Department virtually dictated the text that Arafat read at the opening of his press conference in Geneva on 14 December. “I repeat for the record,” stated Arafat, “that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism. Between Geneva and Algiers we have made our position crystal clear.” The statement unconditionally accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 and clearly recognized Israel’s right to exist. All the conditions that Henry Kissinger had laid down in 1975 for dealing with the PLO had now been met. One of the last major foreign policy acts of the outgoing Reagan administration was to recognize the PLO and to open a substantive dialogue with it. This dialogue was conducted by the American ambassador in Tunis. President Reagan stated publicly that the special commitment of the United States to Israel’s security and well-being remained unshakable."}}
11. Shlaim 2015: "To Shamir it was crystal clear, once again, that the PLO had not abandoned the path of terror. For him the PLO had always been and would forever remain a terrorist organization. His response to the momentous changes taking place in the Palestinian camp was a reaffirmation of his previous position: no to withdrawal from the occupied territories, no to recognition of the PLO, no to negotiation with the PLO, no to a Palestinian state. Shamir called the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO a “grave error.” He saw it as a threat to the long-standing American-Israeli collaboration in support of the territorial status quo. “For the PLO,” explained Shamir, “a Palestinian state is a minimum. Therefore, anyone who engages in negotiations with it in effect accepts this principle. What else can one talk about with the PLO, if not about a Palestinian state?” Vice-Premier Peres described the opening of the U.S.-PLO dialogue as “a sad day for all of us.” But he felt that Israel had to come up with its own peace initiative, since it was impossible to preserve the status quo."}}
12. Pappé 2022.
13. Quandt, William B. (2005). Peace Process. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24631-7.
14. ^ Khalidi 2020.
15. Pearson Education (1 October 2006). The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East [Two Volumes]. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 66–. ISBN 978-0-313-08364-8.
16. Yezid Sayigh; Avi Shlaim (22 May 1997). The Cold War and the Middle East. Clarendon Press. pp. 4–. ISBN 978-0-19-157151-0.
17. Sela, Avraham, "Arab-Israeli Conflict," The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002. pp. 58–121.
18. Benny Morris (25 May 2011). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist–Arab Conflict, 1881–1998. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 354. ISBN 978-0-307-78805-4. The Israeli cabinet publicly rejected the plan in communiques issued on December 10 and 22, calling it "an attempt to appease at the expense of Israel." ...But it was Egypt and the USSR who in fact definitively shot down the plan. The Soviets dismissed it as "one-sided" and "pro-Israeli." Nasser rejected a separate deal with Israel (even if he recovered all of Sinai) as well as demilitarization of the peninsula after Israeli withdrawal, freedom of maritime passage for Israeli vessels, and various security arrangements—all stipulated in the Rogers Plan as part of the quid pro quo.
19. "Report of the Secretary-General Under Security Council Resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973". United Nations, Security Council. 18 May 1973. Archived from the original on 7 April 2014. The Search for a Settlement from 1967 to date
20. Rashid Khalidi. Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East. Beacon Press, 2013. ISBN 978-0-8070-4475-9. Even though Yitzhak Rabin was the first Israeli prime minister to accept formally the idea that the Palestinians were a people, he never officially conceded that this people had the right of national self-determination and statehood. These terms consequently occur nowhere in the 1993 agreements. Thus, although they nominally accepted that the Palestinians were a people, the Oslo accords in fact did no more than formally consecrate Begin's scheme: we have seen that the canny Polish-born lawyer understood that the terms he had obdurately insisted on at Camp David in 1978 "'guarantee that under no condition' can a Palestinian state be created."
21. Jean-Pierre Filiu. Gaza: A History - Jean-Pierre Filiu. Oxford University Press, 2014. ISBN 978-0-19-020189-0.
22. Kathleen Christison. Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy. University of California Press, 2000. ISBN 978-0-520-21718-8. Because Egypt was the strongest Arab country and the only one able to pose a significant military threat to Israel, its removal as a factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict seriously reduced the military and diplomatic leverage of all the other Arab parties and removed virtually all incentive for Israel to make concessions in the West Bank and Gaza or on any other front.
23. The Madrid Peace Conference Archived 30 March 2018 at the Wayback Machine. MidEastWeb, 30 October 1991
24. Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 137.
25. Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 138.
26. Christison, Kathleen (2000). Perceptions of Palestine. University of California Press. p. 290. ISBN 978-0-520-21718-8.
27. Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. pp. Chapter 10. ISBN 978-0-7453-1530-0.
28. Facts About Israel. Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010. p. 53.
29. ^ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2007). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. p. 241. ISBN 978-0-19-532542-3.
30. Human Rights Watch, An Analysis of the Wye River Memorandum
31. Amnesty International, The United States, Israel and the Palestinian Authority: Human Rights Neglected in the Theory and Practice by All Involved in "Peacemaking"
32. ^ Nathan Thrall, 'What Future for Israel?,' Archived 21 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine New York Review of Books 15 August 2013 pp. 64–67.
33. "Mr. Clinton's Mideast Peace Plan." Archived 11 December 2019 at the Wayback Machine The New York Times. 27 December 2000. 10 December 2019.
34. "Camp David Summit 2000." Archived 11 December 2019 at the Wayback Machine ADL. 10 December 2019.
35. History of failed peace talks (BBC, 26 November 2007) Archived 5 February 2019 at the Wayback Machine.
36. Gold, Dore. The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2007. p. 1.
37. Oren, Michael B. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: American in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007. p. 579.
38. ^ Ross, Dennis. Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship From Truman to Obama. New York: Farrar, Starus and Giroux, 2015. p. 293.
39. Ben-Meir, Alon. "The Palestinian Refugees: A Reassessment and a Solution." Palestine – Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture, vol. 15/16, no. 4, 2009, pp. 65-71. ProQuest.
40. ^ Hirsh, Michael. "Clinton To Arafat: it's All Your ...." Archived 11 December 2020 at the Wayback Machine Newsweek. 26 June 2001. 17 November 2020.
41. Clinton Parameters Archived 17 January 2015 at the Wayback Machine, The Jewish Peace Lobby website, full text (English).
42. Beilin, Yossi. "What really happened at Taba." Archived 13 March 2022 at the Wayback Machine Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet. 16 July 2002. 10 December 2020.
43. Salem, Tanja. "Palestinian Refugees." Archived 24 June 2021 at the Wayback Machine Centre for European Policy Studies. July 2003.
44. "Response of FM Peres to the decisions of the Arab Summit in Beirut – 28-Mar-2002". Archived from the original on 10 January 2006.
45. Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002, p. 147.
46. ^ A Plan for Peace That Still Could Be Archived 17 August 2019 at the Wayback Machine, New York Times Magazine, 13 February 2011.
47. ^ PA rejects Olmert's offer to withdraw from 93% of West Bank (Haaretz, 12 August 2008) Archived 2 January 2018 at the Wayback Machine.
48. Israel Agrees to Truce with Hamas on Gaza Archived 28 February 2019 at the Wayback Machine, The New York Times, 18 June 2008.
49. Mark Tessler, "The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict," in Ellen Lust (ed.),The Middle East, SAGE Publications, 2013 pp. 287–366, p. 364.
50. Netanyahu's revolution Archived 24 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine, Haaretz, 18 June 2009
51. Full text of Netanyahu's foreign policy speech at Bar Ilan Archived 1 January 2018 at the Wayback Machine, Haaretz, 14 June 2009.
52. Dan Cohn-Sherbok, Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine–Israeli Conflict: A Beginner's Guide, Oneworld Publications 2015 p. 87.
53. ^ Burns, Robert (1 September 2010). "Obama Opens Long-Shot Talks on Mideast Peace". ABC News. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 10 November 2010. Retrieved 16 April 2020.
54. Landler, Mark (5 September 2010). "In Middle East Peace Talks, Clinton Faces a Crucial Test". The New York Times. p. A1. Archived from the original on 23 March 2019. Retrieved 22 February 2017.
55. Tessler, Mark A. A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict Google Books. Originally published in 1994. 1 January 2011. p. 718. "Inhabitants of the occupied territories and other Palestinians had shown interest in a two-state solution since the mid-1970s, and the mainstream of the PLO had since the 1982 Arab summit."
56. Abu Toameh, Khaled. "Abbas: Land swap principle reached". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 26 November 2012. Retrieved 23 June 2010.
57. Bronner, Ethan (17 April 2012). "Palestinians Restate Demands to Netanyahu". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 28 February 2019. Retrieved 18 April 2012.
58. Mahmoud Abbas (15 April 2012). "Text of Abbas's letter to Netanyahu". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 18 April 2012. Retrieved 18 April 2012.
59. Stott, Michael; Nakhoul, Samia (9 May 2012). "Abbas ready to engage with Israel but says settlement building 'destroying hope'". Al Arabiya News. Reuters. Archived from the original on 9 May 2012. Retrieved 9 May 2012.
60. "Netanyahu backs demilitarized Palestinian state". Haaretz. 14 June 2009. Archived from the original on 31 May 2011. Retrieved 14 May 2012.
61. Winer, Stuart; Ahren, Raphael (14 May 2012). "PM promises Abbas a demilitarized Palestinian state". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 17 May 2012. Retrieved 14 May 2012.
62. Ravid, Barak (14 May 2012). "Netanyahu to Abbas: Israeli unity cabinet is a new opportunity for Mideast peace". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 14 May 2012. Retrieved 14 May 2012.
63. Ravid, Barak (29 July 2013). "Obama welcomes renewal of Israeli-Palestinian talks, but says 'hard choices' lie ahead". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 12 May 2015. Retrieved 7 February 2014.
64. "Hamas rejects Kerry's announcement: Abbas has no authority to negotiate". Ynetnews. Ynet. 20 July 2013. Archived from the original on 19 August 2019. Retrieved 23 July 2013.
65. Booth, William (29 July 2013). "Peace talks set to begin after Israel agrees to free 104 Palestinian prisoners". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 7 July 2019. Retrieved 6 October 2019.
66. Berman, Lazar. (7 August 2013) US peace envoy to come to Israel next week Archived 2 November 2017 at the Wayback Machine. The Times of Israel. Retrieved 14 August 2013.
67. AFP, 'US denies dismantling peace negotiators team,' Archived 2 November 2017 at the Wayback Machine Ynet, 6 May 2014.
68. "Hamas and Fatah unveil Palestinian reconciliation deal". BBC. 23 April 2014. Archived from the original on 18 July 2015. Retrieved 6 October 2019.
69. Sanctions and suspended talks – Israel responds to Palestinian reconciliation Archived 3 November 2017 at the Wayback Machine Ynet News 24 April 2014
70. Israel suspends peace talks with Palestinians after Fatah-Hamas deal Archived 6 October 2019 at the Wayback Machine. The Guardian, 24 April 2014
71. Israel suspends peace talks with Palestinians Archived 6 October 2019 at the Wayback Machine. Batsheva Sobelman, Los Angeles Times, 24 April 2014
72. Fatah and Hamas agree landmark pact after seven-year rift. Peter Beaumont and Paul Lewis, The Guardian, 24 April 2014
73. The rival Palestinian leaderships of Fatah and Hamas made a fresh attempt ... Archived 24 April 2014 at the Wayback Machine. France 24/AP, 23 April 2014
74. "Hamas and Fatah unveil Palestinian reconciliation deal". 23 April 2014. Archived from the original on 6 October 2019. Retrieved 6 October 2019.
75. "PLO, Hamas unity constitute reuniting West Bank and Gaza: Ban Ki-moon". 29 April 2014. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 1 May 2014.
76. Israel begins implementing economic sanctions against Palestinians Archived 3 November 2017 at the Wayback Machine Ynet News 29 April 2014
77. New York Times, 22 April 2014,Abbas Renews Threat to Dissolve Palestinian Authority if Peace Talks Fail Archived 6 October 2019 at the Wayback Machine
78. Rasgon, Adam. "Palestinian Leadership Considers ...." Archived 4 November 2019 at the Wayback Machine The Jerusalem Post. 23 August 2017. 4 November 2019.
79. Sanctions and suspended talks – Israel responds to Palestinian reconciliation Archived 3 November 2017 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 4 September 2014
80. Abbas to Submit 'Surprising' Proposal to Kerry Archived 8 January 2019 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 4 September 2014
81. ^ US rejected Abbas's peace plan, PA says Archived 1 July 2019 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 4 September 2014
82. Abbas Peace Plan Calls for Israeli Withdrawal Within 3 Years Archived 10 January 2015 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 4 September 2014
83. ^ Report: Abbas peace plan calls for Israeli withdrawal from West Bank Archived 31 May 2019 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 4 September 2014
84. Abbas' peace plan: Israeli withdrawal from West Bank within three years Archived 12 May 2015 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 4 September 2014
85. Abu Mazen's Three-Year Peace Plan for Israel Archived 11 July 2019 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 4 September 2014
86. Abbas: If Security Council bid fails, we may end security cooperation with Israel Archived 11 June 2019 at the Wayback Machine – Retrieved 1 October 2014
87. "Palestinians sign up to join ICC". BBC News. 31 December 2014. Archived from the original on 28 November 2018. Retrieved 19 March 2018.
88. Staff. "Israel freezes Palestinian funds in response to ICC bid". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 7 February 2015.
89. "Palestinians to ban sale of products from 6 major Israeli companies". The Jerusalem Post. 9 February 2015. Archived from the original on 20 March 2018. Retrieved 19 March 2018.
90. "Peace to Prosperity: The Economic Plan" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 June 2021. Retrieved 28 February 2021.
91. Times of Israel, 26 September 2019, At UN, Abbas threatens to nix agreements with Israel if West Bank land annexed Archived 2 October 2019 at the Wayback Machine
92. "Participation of Jean-Yves Le Drian in the Munich Security Conference – Declaration by the Spokesperson of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (15-16 Feb.20)". France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 13 January 2021. Retrieved 11 January 2021.
93. ^ "A New 'Quartet' for Israeli-Palestinian Peace". 20 July 2020. Archived from the original on 27 September 2020. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
94. "Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Egypt and Jordan (7 Jul. 20)". France Diplomatie – Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères. Archived from the original on 20 February 2022. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
95. "Arab, European states call Israel and Palestine to restart talks". Al Jazeera. 24 September 2020. Archived from the original on 24 September 2020. Retrieved 24 September 2020.
96. "Amman's closing statement on the Middle East Peace Process". Roya news. 24 September 2020. Archived from the original on 16 January 2021. Retrieved 24 September 2020.
97. "Egypt, Germany, France, Jordan meet to revive Mideast talks". WAPO. 11 January 2021. Retrieved 11 January 2021.
98. "Arab, European foreign ministers discuss Palestinian, Israeli Occupation peace process in Cairo". RoyaNews. 11 January 2021. Archived from the original on 15 January 2021. Retrieved 11 January 2021.
99. "The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question: Briefing and Consultations". SecurityCouncilReport. 24 March 2021. Archived from the original on 25 March 2021. Retrieved 24 March 2021.
100. "Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan FMs condemn Israel settlement expansion, evictions". english.alaraby.co.uk/. 20 February 2022. Archived from the original on 20 February 2022. Retrieved 20 February 2022.
101. "Foreign ministers of Egypt, France, Germany and Jordan reiterate commitment to a just peace in the Middle East". WAFA. 22 September 2022. Archived from the original on 26 September 2022. Retrieved 25 September 2022.
102. Shahram Akbarzadeh; Kylie Baxter (13 June 2018). Middle East Politics and International Relations. Taylor & Francis. pp. 77–78. ISBN 978-1-351-67715-8.
103. "Report of the Middle East Quartet". United Nations. 1 July 2016. Archived from the original on 24 March 2021. Retrieved 25 March 2021.
104. "Israel/Palestine: Parameters for a Two-State Settlement". International Crisis Group. 28 November 2016. Archived from the original on 21 March 2021. Retrieved 25 March 2021.
105. "Diplomatic Quartet releases report on advancing two-state solution to Israel-Palestine conflict". United Nations. 1 July 2016. Archived from the original on 18 April 2021. Retrieved 25 March 2021.
106. "Rejecting Trump, Abbas at UN says US is too biased to mediate peace talks". 27 September 2018. Archived from the original on 30 September 2020. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
107. "Security Council Report" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 January 2021. Retrieved 25 September 2020.
108. "UN unable to convene Quartet to discuss annexation". MEMO. 27 June 2020. Archived from the original on 29 September 2020. Retrieved 25 September 2020.
109. "Abraham Accord, Quartet – Press Conference by Secretary-General António Guterres at UN Headquarters (SG/SM/20258) (Excerpts)". United Nations. 25 September 2020. Archived from the original on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 25 September 2020.
110. "Palestinian leader calls for new peace process in UN speech". WAPO. 25 September 2020. Archived from the original on 27 September 2020. Retrieved 25 September 2020.
111. "A New Tune From The Middle East Quartet – OpEd". Eurasia review. 26 February 2021. Archived from the original on 28 February 2021. Retrieved 24 March 2021.
112. "Mideast Quartet Discusses Reviving 'Meaningful' Israel, Palestinian Peace Talks". Haaretz. 24 March 2021. Archived from the original on 23 March 2021. Retrieved 24 March 2021.
113. "Statement by the Middle East Quartet Envoys". UNSCO. 23 March 2021. Archived from the original on 26 March 2021. Retrieved 24 March 2021.
114. ^ Pappe, I., 2004, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. "These efforts were orchestrated by American mediators who usually adopted the Israeli, not the Palestinian, point of view. According to the former view, the conflict in Palestine began in 1967 with the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; hence, peace meant an Israeli withdrawal from these areas. The Camp David Accords, and then the Oslo process, tried to persuade the Palestinian leadership that the best they could expect would be limited sovereignty in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with neither territorial integrity nor a capital. Additionally, the Palestinian leaders were asked to forsake the only reason for their struggle since 1948: the right of return of the refugees expelled by Israel in 1948, a right recognized by the UN in December 1948."
115. Slater, J., 2001, "What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process", Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, pp. 171–199, p. 176.
116. Bregman, A. & El-Tahri, J., 1998, The Sixty Year War: Israel and the Arabs, London, Penguin Books.
117. LeVine, Mark (23 September 2011). "Why Palestinians have a right to return home". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 21 June 2015. Retrieved 21 June 2015.
118. "Palestinian official: We're ready for talks with U.S., but not Israel - Haaretz - Israel News". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 22 October 2009. Retrieved 11 January 2022.
119. Saletan, William (9 July 2014). "Gaza civilian casualties: While Hamas targets innocent people, Israel tries to spare them". Slate. Archived from the original on 3 January 2016. Retrieved 4 January 2016. It has been firing the new missiles at cities anyway. Hamas has also flatly rejected the principle of sparing civilians. According to a Hamas spokesman, 'All Israelis have now become legitimate targets.'
120. Azulay, Moran. "Peres to Ynet: Abbas, not Hamas, is the partner." Archived 14 May 2019 at the Wayback Machine Ynetnews. 23 November 2012. 23 November 2012.
121. ^ Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, pp. 171–199.
122. ^ Roy, Sara M. (2016). "Preface to the Third Edition". The Gaza Strip extended 3rd edition. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-260-7.
123. Baconi 2018.
124. Cleveland, William L.; Bunton, Martin (2010). A History of the Modern Middle East. ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited. ISBN 978-1-4587-8155-0.
125. Scheindlin (November 2017). "The shrinking Two-State Constituency". Moment of Truth. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-114-9.
126. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). "The Occupation's Traits of Permanence". Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. But the abject submission of the Palestinians and the ever deepening system of occupation and discrimination in the territories are Israel's sole and exclusive responsibility. As brilliantly explained by Michael Sfard, this is a system built on three pillars: the gun, the settlements, and the law that formalizes the network of colonization.1 Under the mantle of security claims, the Jewish state has created in the Palestinian territories one of the most efficient occupation regimes in history, which is, moreover, also cost-effective, for it is the international community's donor money to the Palestinian Authority that saves the occupier the burden of having to directly administer the territories. This leaves Israel free to cater to its insatiable security needs with draconic measures, such as limiting the Palestinians' freedom of movement, erecting walls that separate communities, dotting roads with checkpoints where innocent people are manhandled, activating sophisticated intelligence mechanisms that control the lives of an ever growing number of suspects, conducting surprise searches of private houses in the middle of the night, and carrying out arbitrary administrative detentions. If this were not enough, vigilantes among the settlers, some known as "the Youth of the Hills," constantly harass Palestinian communities, destroy orchard trees, and arbitrarily apply a "price tag" of punishments to innocent civilians for whatever terrorist attack might have been perpetrated by a Palestinian squad. Underlying this very serious problem of the unpardonable depravity of settlers' extremism is the even more serious problem that has to do with the involvement of the entire Israeli body politic in maintaining and continuously expanding a regime of dominance in the territories. For too long, the peace process has served as a curtain behind which the policy of practical annexation has flourished.
127. Slater, J., 2001, What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, Political Science, Volume 116, Issue 2, pp. 171–199. "Yet, throughout the Rabin period the PA complied with its obligation to do its best to end terrorism, perhaps excepting a brief period following the Hebron massacre. And it did so with great (though not total) success, as the Palestinian security forces under Arafat worked hand in hand with Israeli security forces, often in joint patrols, to identify and jail extremists and suspected terrorists, some of them from lists drawn up by the Israelis."
128. Pedahzur, A., 2005, Suicide Terrorism, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 65.
129. "Hamas." Archived 25 November 2020 at the Wayback Machine Encyclopædia Britannica. 17 January 2019. 6 December 2020.
130. al-Mughrabi, Nidal (9 November 2007). "Hamas leader sees W.Bank takeover if Israel leaves". Reuters. Archived from the original on 8 March 2021. Retrieved 1 July 2017.
131. Schwartz, Adi; Wilf, Einat (2020). The War of Return: How Western Indulgence of the Palestinian Dream Has Obstructed the Path to Peace. Translated by Levy, Eylon. New York: All Point Books. ISBN 978-1-250-25276-0. LCCN 2019045867. OCLC 1140380543.
132. How much aid does the US give to Israel? USAFacts. Updated on October 12, 2023.
133. Levy, Elior. "PA challenges Netanyahu to accept 1967 lines." Archived 22 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine Ynetnews. 22 May 2011. 22 May 2011.
134. Kessler, Glenn (5 October 2005). "Talking Points Aside, Bush Stance on Palestinian State Is Not a First". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 20 December 2016. Retrieved 1 September 2017.
135. Nasaw, Daniel (18 May 2009). "Obama restates support for Palestinian state during Netanyahu visit". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 27 September 2016. Retrieved 11 December 2016.
136. "Clinton laments ‘counter-productive’ U.N. vote on Palestine." Archived 18 September 2016 at the Wayback Machine Jewish Journal. 29 November 2012. 29 November 2012.
137. Kaplan, Rebecca. "Obama: Differences with Netanyahu are not personality clashes." Archived 1 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine CBS News. 24 March 2015. 25 March 2015.
138. F. Verbit, Mervin. "American Jews – More Right than Left on the Peace Process". Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA). Berman Jewish Policy Archive. Archived from the original on 5 January 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
139. Khouri, Rami G (3 October 2024). "US military action in the Middle East is not making Israel safer". Al-Jazeera.
140. Stern-Weiner, Jamie (November 2017). "Introduction". Moment of Truth. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-114-9.
141. ^ William B. Quandt. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. University of California Press, 2005. ISBN 978-0-520-24631-7.
142. Avineri, Shlomo (2017). "Introduction". The Making of Modern Zionism. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-09479-0.
143. Noam Chomsky (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-1530-0.
144. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on 'international legitimacy' and 'all UN relevant resolutions.'
145. Finkelstein, Norman G. (2018). "Appendix". Gaza. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1. I was the Minister of Justice. I am a lawyer," Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told her Palestinian interlocutors during a critical round of the peace process in 2007, "but I am against law—international law in particular.
146. ^ Louwerse, Colter (16 April 2024). "3". Deluge. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9.
147. Finkelstein, Norman G. (2012). "Notes". Knowing Too Much. New York: London: OR Books. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5. OCLC 794273633.
148. Nathan Thrall (14 October 2010). "Our Man in Palestine". The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on 16 October 2015. Retrieved 30 September 2010.
149. Senker, C, 'the ArAb-Israeli Conflict', (UK, 2004) pp. 4–9.
150. Halliday, F., 'The Middle East in International Relations', (Cambridge, 2005), p. 307.
151. Sayigh, R., 'The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries' (New York, 2007) p. 200.
152. Chakrabarti, Ran. "Palestine and International Law." Archived 21 November 2013 at the Wayback Machine, Fair Observer. 30 January 2013.
153. Cook, J., 'Disappearing Palestine', (London, 2008), pp. 244–246.
154. "Middle East News – The Jerusalem Post". The Jerusalem Post. 4 February 2011. Archived from the original on 20 October 2012. Retrieved 19 March 2018.
155. Rachel Shabi, "The death of the Israel-Palestine two-state solution brings fresh hope", Archived 4 June 2019 at the Wayback Machine The Guardian (23 October 2012). Retrieved 17 December 2013.
156. David Poort, "The threat of a one-state solution", Archived 22 August 2019 at the Wayback Machine Al Jazeera (26 January 2011). Retrieved 17 December 2013.
157. Brynen, Rex. "The 'Geneva Accord' and the Palestinian Refugee Issue." ResearchGate. 29 February 2004.
158. Amishav Medved, Yael. "Jordan as the Palestinian Arab state". Israel Science and Technology. Archived from the original on 22 May 2016. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
159. Al Tamimi, Jumana (26 August 2008). "Rice discusses 'shelf agreement'". Gulf News. Archived from the original on 4 January 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
160. "Shelf Agreement: Attempt to Anchor the Two State Solution may Bury" (PDF). Reut Institute. Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
161. "A better route to Israeli-Palestinian peace?". MideastWeb Middle East Web Log. Archived from the original on 14 April 2015. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
162. "Abbas tells Meretz MKs: No progress in peace talks with Israel". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 4 January 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2014.
163. Israelis, Palestinians applaud Japanese development plan Archived 12 November 2007 at the Wayback Machine Associated Press via Haaretz.com, 15 March 2007.

Sources

• Baconi, Tareq (2018). Hamas Contained. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0581-7.
• Khalidi, Rashid (2020). The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017. Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 978-1-62779-854-9.
• Pappé, Ilan (2022). A History of Modern Palestine. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-24416-9.
• Shlaim, Avi (2015). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-103322-8.

External links

• Israel-Palestinian Negotiations, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• The Reut Institute Archived 9 July 2017 at the Wayback Machine
• BBC News – History of Mid-East peace talks, 29 July 2013
• Palestinian-Israeli Relations, MyJewishLearning.com
• "Netanyahu's two-state mask has slipped" by Henry Siegman
• "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process Is Over. Enter the Era of Chaos" by Lee Smith
• "Netanyahu lowers expectations for Israeli-Palestinian peace" by Lahav Harkov
• A presentation of the Lubavitcher Rebbe's views on the Jewish people's connection with the Holy Land, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the so-called "Land for Peace" issue
• The Israel Project: Timeline of Israeli-Arab Peace Initiatives since 1977
• The History of the Peace Process in the Context of the 2013 John Kerry Peace Efforts Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Palestinian Territories August 2013
• Beyond Intractability: A Free Knowledge Base on More Constructive Approaches to Destructive Conflict
• The Jerusalem Fund Resources

• Israeli–Palestinian peace process