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(Redirected from Pakistani Muslims) Role and impact of Islam in Pakistan

Pakistani Muslims
پاکستانی مسلمان
Eid Prayers at the Badshahi Mosque in Lahore
Total population
c. 231.6 million (2023)
(98% of the population)
Regions with significant populations
Throughout Pakistan
Religions
Majority: 90% Sunni Muslims, Minority: 10% Shia Muslims
Languages
Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi

Islam in Pakistan

  Sunni Muslims (90%)  Shia Muslims (10%)
Islam in Pakistan
Badshahi Mosque, Lahore
History
Major figures
Schools of thought
Schools of law
Mosques
Political organisations / movements
Culture
Architecture
Literature
Music
Other topics
Islam by country
World percentage of Muslims by country
Africa
Asia
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Islam portal

Islam is the largest and the state religion of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan has over 231.6 Million adherents of Islam (excluding the administrative territory of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan ). As much as 90% of the population follows Sunni Islam and around 97% of Pakistanis follow Islam. Most Pakistani Sunni Muslims belong to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which is represented by the Barelvi and Deobandi traditions.

About 97% of Pakistanis are Muslims. The majority are Sunni (85-90%) while Shias make up between 10% and 15%. The Hanbali school has gained popularity recently due to Ahl-i Hadith and also Wahabbi influence from the Middle East. Smaller minority Muslim populations in Pakistan include Quranists, nondenominational Muslims. There are also two Mahdi'ist based creeds practised in Pakistan, namely Mahdavia and Ahmadiyya, the latter of whom are considered by the constitution of Pakistan to be non-Muslims; they jointly constitute around 1% of the Muslim population. Pakistan has the world's largest Muslim majority city (Karachi).

History

Before independence

See also: Pakistan Movement

Islam had reached the Indian subcontinent during the lifetime of Muhammad. According to a tradition, Baba Ratan Hindi was a trader from Punjab who was one of the non-Arab companions of Muhammad. In 644 AD, the Rashidun caliphate conquered Makran after defeating the kingdom of Sindh in the battle of Rasil. According to Derryl N. Maclean, a link between Sindh and early partisans of Ali or proto-Shi'ites can be traced to Hakim ibn Jabalah al-Abdi who traveled across Sind to Makran in the year 649 AD and presented a report on the area to the Caliph. During the Caliphate of Ali, many Hindus of Sindh had come under influence of Islam and some even participated in the Battle of Camel. In 712 CE, a young Arab general Muhammad bin Qasim conquered most of the Indus region for the Caliphal empire, to be made the "As-Sindh" province with its capital at Al-Mansurah. The Pakistan government's official chronology claims this as the time when the foundation of Pakistan was laid. By the end of the 10th century CE, the region was ruled by several Hindu Shahi kings who would be subdued by the Ghaznavids.

Shah Jahan Mosque, Thatta was patronized by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan.

The Early Medieval period (642–1219 CE) witnessed the spread of Islam in the region. During this period, Sufi missionaries played a pivotal role in converting a majority of the regional Buddhist and Hindu population to Islam. These developments set the stage for the rule of several successive Muslim empires in the region, including the Ghaznavid Empire (975–1187 CE), the Ghorid Kingdom, and the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526 CE). The Lodi dynasty, the last of the Delhi Sultanate, was replaced by the Mughal Empire (1526–1857 CE).

A painting by Edwin Lord Weeks c. 1889 of the marketplace near Wazir Khan Mosque

In independent Pakistan

Nature of state

The Muslim League leadership, ulama (Islamic clergy) and Jinnah had articulated their vision of Pakistan in terms of an Islamic state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah had developed a close association with the ulama. When Jinnah died, Islamic scholar Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani described Jinnah as the greatest Muslim after the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb and also compared Jinnah's death to the Muhammad's passing. Usmani asked Pakistanis to remember Jinnah's message of Unity, Faith and Discipline and work to fulfil his dream:

to create a solid bloc of all Muslim states from Karachi to Ankara, from Pakistan to Morocco. He wanted to see the Muslims of the world united under the banner of Islam as an effective check against the aggressive designs of their enemies.

The first formal step taken to transform Pakistan into an ideological Islamic state was in March 1949 when the country's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, introduced the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly. The Objectives Resolution declared that sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God. The president of the Muslim League, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, announced that Pakistan would bring together all Muslim countries into Islamistan-a pan-Islamic entity. Khaliq believed that Pakistan was only a Muslim state and was not yet an Islamic state, but that it could certainly become an Islamic state after bringing all believers of Islam into a single political unit. Keith Callard, one of the earliest scholars on Pakistani politics, observed that Pakistanis believed in the essential unity of purpose and outlook in the Muslim world:

Pakistan was founded to advance the cause of Muslims. Other Muslims might have been expected to be sympathetic, even enthusiastic. But this assumed that other Muslim states would take the same view of the relation between religion and nationality.

However, Pakistan's pan-Islamist sentiments were not shared by other Muslim governments at the time. Nationalism in other parts of the Muslim world was based on ethnicity, language and culture. Although Muslim governments were unsympathetic with Pakistan's pan-Islamic aspirations, Islamists from all over the world were drawn to Pakistan. Figures such as the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, and leaders of Islamist political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, became frequent visitors to the country. After General Zia-ul-Haq took power in a military coup, Hizb ut-Tahrir (an Islamist group calling for the establishment of a Caliphate) expanded its organisational network and activities in Pakistan. Its founder, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, would maintain regular correspondence with Abul A’la Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and he also urged Dr. Israr Ahmed to continue his work in Pakistan for the establishment of a global caliphate.

Social scientist Nasim Ahmad Jawed conducted a survey in 1969 in pre-divided Pakistan on the type of national identity that was used by educated professional people. He found that over 60% of people in East Pakistan (modern day Bangladesh) professed to have a secular national identity. However, in West Pakistan (current day Pakistan) the same figure professed to have an Islamic and not a secular identity. Furthermore, the same figure in East Pakistan defined their identity in terms of their ethnicity and not Islam. It was the opposite in West Pakistan, where Islam was stated to be more important than ethnicity.

After Pakistan's first ever general elections the 1973 Constitution was created by an elected Parliament. The Constitution declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic and Islam as the state religion. It also stated that all laws would have to be brought into accordance with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah and that no law repugnant to such injunctions could be enacted. The 1973 Constitution also created certain institutions such as the Shariat Court and the Council of Islamic Ideology to channel the interpretation and application of Islam.

Zia ul Haq's Islamization

Main article: Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization

On 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq led a coup d'état. In the year or two before Zia-ul-Haq's coup, his predecessor, leftist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had faced vigorous opposition which was united under the revivalist banner of Nizam-e-Mustafa ("Rule of the prophet"). According to supporters of the movement, establishing an Islamic state based on sharia law would mean a return to the justice and success of the early days of Islam when Muhammad ruled the Muslims. In an effort to stem the tide of street Islamisation, Bhutto had also called for it and banned the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims, nightclubs and horse racing.

Many diverse Islamic denominations are practised within Pakistan.

"Islamisation" was the "primary" policy, or "centerpiece" of his government. Zia-ul-Haq committed himself to establishing an Islamic state and enforcing sharia law. Zia established separate Shariat judicial courts and court benches to judge legal cases using Islamic doctrine. New criminal offences (of adultery, fornication, and types of blasphemy), and new punishments (of whipping, amputation, and stoning to death), were added to Pakistani law. Interest payments for bank accounts were replaced by "profit and loss" payments. Zakat charitable donations became a 2.5% annual tax. School textbooks and libraries were overhauled to remove un-Islamic material. Offices, schools, and factories were required to offer praying space. Zia bolstered the influence of the ulama (Islamic clergy) and the Islamic parties, whilst conservative scholars became fixtures on television. 10,000s of activists from the Jamaat-e-Islami party were appointed to government posts to ensure the continuation of his agenda after his passing. Conservative ulama (Islamic scholars) were added to the Council of Islamic Ideology. Separate electorates for Hindus and Christians were established in 1985 even though Christian and Hindu leaders complained that they felt excluded from the county's political process.

Zia's state sponsored Islamization increased sectarian divisions in Pakistan between Sunnis and Shias and between Deobandis and Barelvis. A solid majority of Barelvis had supported the creation of Pakistan, and Barelvi ulama had also issued fatwas in support of the Pakistan Movement during the 1946 elections, but ironically Islamic state politics in Pakistan was mostly in favour of Deobandi (and later Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi) institutions. This was despite the fact that only a few (although influential) Deobandi clerics had supported the Pakistan Movement. Zia-ul-Haq forged a strong alliance between the military and Deobandi institutions. In Pakistan, actors who have been identified by the state as moderate Sufis—such as the Barelwis, a movement founded in the 19th century in response to conservative reformers such as the Deobandis—mobilized after the government's call from 2009 onwards to save the soul of Pakistan from creeping “Talibanization.”

Possible motivations for the Islamization programme included Zia's personal piety (most accounts agree that he came from a religious family), desire to gain political allies, to "fulfill Pakistan's raison d'être" as a Muslim state, and/or the political need to legitimise what was seen by some Pakistanis as his "repressive, un-representative martial law regime".

Until the government of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, "Islamic activists" were frustrated by the lack of "teeth" to enforce Islamic law in Pakistan's constitution. For example, in the 1956 constitution, the state did not enforce "Islamic moral standards" but "endeavor" to make them compulsory and to "prevent" prostitution, gambling, consumption of alcoholic liquor, etc. Interest was to be eliminated "as soon as possible".

According to Shajeel Zaidi a million people attended Zia ul Haq's funeral because he had given them what they wanted: more religion. A PEW opinion poll found that 84% of Pakistanis favoured making Sharia the official law of the land. According to the 2013 Pew Research Center report, the majority of Pakistani Muslims also support the death penalty for those who leave Islam (62%). In contrast, support for the death penalty for those who leave Islam was only 36% in fellow South Asian Muslim country Bangladesh (which shared heritage with Pakistan). A 2010 opinion poll by PEW Research Centre also found that 87% of Pakistanis considered themselves 'Muslims first' rather than a member of their nationality. This was the highest figure amongst all Muslim populations surveyed. In contrast only 67% in Jordan, 59% in Egypt, 51% in Turkey, 36% in Indonesia and 71% in Nigeria considered themselves as 'Muslim first' rather than a member of their own nationality.

"Islamic activists" such as much or the ulama (Islamic clerics) and Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamist party), support the expansion of "Islamic law and Islamic practices". "Islamic Modernists" are lukewarm to this expansion and "some may even advocate development along the secularist lines of the West."

Islamic way of life

The mosque is an important religious as well as social institution in Pakistan. Many rituals and ceremonies are celebrated according to Islamic calendar.

Denominations

Growth in the number of religious madrassahs in Pakistan from 1988 to 2002
The famed Data Durbar shrine of Sufi saint Ali Hujweiri in Lahore is known for devotees from over the world.

According to the CIA World Factbook and Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, 96–97% of the total population of Pakistan is Muslim.

Sunni

The majority of the Pakistani Muslims belong to Sunni Islam. Muslims belong to different schools which are called Madhahib (singular: Madhhab) i.e., schools of jurisprudence (also 'Maktab-e-Fikr' (School of Thought) in Urdu).) Estimates on the Sunni population in Pakistan range from 85% to 90%.

Barelvi and Deobandi Sunni Muslims

The two major Sunni sects in Pakistan are the Barelvi movement and Deobandi movement. Statistics regarding Pakistan's sects and sub-sects have been called "tenuous", but estimates of the sizes of the two groups give a slight majority of Pakistan's population to 50% the Barelvi school, while 50% are thought to follow the Deobandi school of jurisprudence.

Shia

Main article: Shia Islam in Pakistan

Shias are estimated to constitute about 10-15 percent of the country's population. Major traditions of Shia Islam found in Pakistan include the Twelver Shias (or Ithna Ashariyyah) and the Ismaili Shias (or Seveners); most notably the Dawoodi Bohras and the Khoja Ismailis—known for their prominence in commerce and industry.

Many prominent Shia Muslim politicians were known to play a decisive role in the creation of Pakistan for decades during the Pakistan Movement. The role as the first president of the Muslim League and its main financial backer during its earlier years was undertaken by Sir Aga Khan III, an Ismaili by faith. Other politicians that held prominent roles in the initial decades of the Muslim League include Raja Sahib, Syed Ameer Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan, among others.

A 2012 study found 50% of surveyed Pakistanis considered Shia as Muslims while 41% rejected (Shia as muslims). Shias allege discrimination by the Pakistani government since 1948, claiming that Sunnis are given preference in business, official positions and administration of justice. Attacks on Shias increased under the presidency of Zia-ul-Haq, with the first major sectarian riots in Pakistan breaking out in 1983 in Karachi and later spreading to other parts of the country. Shias have long been a target of Sunni radical groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the country. Sectarian violence became a recurring feature of the Muharram month every year, with sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias taking place on multiple occasions. Since 2008 thousands of Shia have been killed by Sunni extremists according to Human Rights Watch (HRW) and violent clashes between the two sects are common.

A subset of Shia in Pakistan are the Hazara ethnic group—which are distinct from other Shi’a due to their language and facial features. Most Hazaras live in Afghanistan, but Pakistan also hosts between 650,000 and 900,000 – and around 500,000 live in the city of Quetta.

Sufism

Main article: Sufism in Pakistan
The shrine of Rukn-e-Alam is one of southern Punjab's most important Sufi shrines

Sufism is a vast term and many Sufi orders exist within Pakistan where the philosophy has a strong tradition. Historically, the Sufi missionaries had played a pivotal role in converting the native peoples of Punjab and Sindh to Islam. The most notable Muslim Sufi orders in Pakistan are the Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiya, Chishtiya and Suhrawardiyya silsas (Muslim Orders) and they have a large amount of devotees in Pakistan. The tradition of visiting dargahs is still practiced today. Sufis whose shrines receive much national attention are Data Ganj Baksh (Ali Hajweri) in Lahore (ca. 11th century), Sultan Bahoo in Shorkot Jhang, Baha-ud-din Zakariya in Multan, and Shahbaz Qalander in Sehwan (ca. 12th century) and Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai in Bhit, Sindh and Rehman Baba in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The Urs (death anniversary) of Sufi saints accounts for the largest gathering upon their shrines held annually by the devotees.

Although, popular Sufi culture is centered on Thursday night gatherings at shrines and annual festivals which feature Sufi music and dance, certain tariqas such as Sarwari Qadri Order, refrain from such traditions and believe in paying visit to the shrines, making prayers or reciting manqabat. Moreover, contemporary Islamic fundamentalists also criticize the popular tradition of singing, dance and music, which in their view, does not accurately reflect the teachings and practice of Mohammad and his companions. There have been terrorist attacks directed at Sufi shrines and festivals, five in 2010 that killed 64 people. Presently, the known tariqas in Pakistan have maintained their organisations usually known as tehreeks and have their khanqahs for the dhikr of Allah, as per the old age Sufi tradition.

Quranists

Muslims who reject the authority of hadith, known as Quranist, Quraniyoon, or Ahle Quran, are also present in Pakistan. The largest Quranist organization in Pakistan is Ahle Quran, followed by Bazm-e-Tolu-e-Islam. Another Quranist movement in Pakistan is Ahlu Zikr.

Nondenominational

Roughly twelve per cent of Pakistani Muslims self-describe or have beliefs overlapping with non-denominational Muslims. These Muslims have beliefs that by and large overlap with those of the majority of Muslims and the difference in their prayers are usually non-existent or negligible. Nonetheless, in censuses asking for a clarification on which strand or rite of Muslim faith they most closely align, they usually answer "just a Muslim".

Contemporary issues

Blasphemy

Main article: Blasphemy in Pakistan

The Pakistan Penal Code, the main criminal code of Pakistan, punishes blasphemy (Urdu: قانون توہین رسالت) against any recognized religion, providing penalties ranging from a fine to death. Pakistan inherited blasphemy laws enacted by British colonial authorities and made them more severe between 1980 and 1986, when a number of clauses were added by the military government of General Zia-ul Haq, in order to "Islamicise" the laws and deny the Muslim character of the Ahmadi minority. Parliament through the Second Amendment to the Constitution on 7 September 1974, under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, declared Ahmadi Muslims as non-Muslims. In 1986 it was supplemented by a new blasphemy provision also applied to Ahmadi Muslims (See Persecution of Ahmadis). In 2020, the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS) in a report entitled, Guilty until proven innocent: The sacrilegious nature of blasphemy laws Pakistan, recommended wide-ranging changes to Pakistan's laws and legal systems.

Conversions

See also: Coerced religious conversion in Pakistan

There have been conversions to Islam from the religious minorities of Pakistan. Baba Deen Mohammad Shaikh, a former Hindu, is a Muslim missionary from Matli in Badin District of Sindh province who claims that he has converted over 110,000 Hindus to Islam. The Human Rights Council of Pakistan has reported that cases of forced conversion to Islam are increasing. According to victims' families and activists, Mian Abdul Haq, who is a local political and religious leader in Sindh, has been accused of being responsible for forced conversions of girls within the province.

See also

References

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  64. Long, Roger D.; Singh, Gurharpal; Samad, Yunas; Talbot, Ian (2015). State and Nation-Building in Pakistan: Beyond Islam and Security. Routledge. p. 167. ISBN 9781317448204. In the 1940s a solid majority of the Barelvis were supporters of the Pakistan Movement and played a supporting role in its final phase (1940-7), mostly under the banner of the All-India Sunni Conference which had been founded in 1925.
  65. Cesari, Jocelyne (2014). The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity, and the State. Cambridge University Press. p. 135. ISBN 9781107513297. For example, the Barelvi ulama supported the formation of the state of Pakistan and thought that any alliance with Hindus (such as that between the Indian National Congress and the Jamiat ulama-I-Hind ) was counterproductive.
  66. John, Wilson (2009). Pakistan: The Struggle Within. Pearson Education India. p. 87. ISBN 9788131725047. During the 1946 election, Barelvi Ulama issued fatwas in favour of the Muslim League.
  67. ^ Syed, Jawad; Pio, Edwina; Kamran, Tahir; Zaidi, Abbas (2016). Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan. Springer. p. 379. ISBN 9781349949663. Ironically, Islamic state politics in Pakistan was mostly in favour of Deobandi, and more recently Ahl-e Hadith/Salafi, institutions. Only a few Deobandi clerics decided to support the Pakistan Movement, but they were highly influential.
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  83. Pike, John (5 July 2011). "Barelvi Islam". GlobalSecurity.org. Archived from the original on 8 December 2003. Retrieved 25 September 2020. By one estimate, in Pakistan, the Shias are 18%, Ismailis 2%, Ahmediyas 2%, Barelvis 50%, Deobandis 20%, Ahle Hadith 4%, and other minorities 4%. By another estimate some 15% of Pakistan's Sunni Muslims would consider themselves Deobandi, and some 60% are in the Barelvi tradition based mostly in the province of Punjab. But some 64% of the total seminaries are run by Deobandis, 25% by the Barelvis, 6% by the Ahle Hadith and 3% by various Shiite organisations.
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  92. Jones, Brian H. (2010). Around Rakaposhi. Brian H Jones. ISBN 9780980810721. Many Shias in the region feel that they have been discriminated against since 1948. They claim that the Pakistani government continually gives preferences to Sunnis in business, in official positions, and in the administration of justice...The situation deteriorated sharply during the 1980s under the presidency of the tyrannical Zia-ul Haq when there were many attacks on the Shia population. In one of the most notorious incidents, during May 1988 Sunni assailants destroyed Shia villages, forcing thousands of people to flee to Gilgit for refuge. Shia mosques were razed and about 100 people were killed
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