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Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Part of the Arab–Israeli conflict
Situation in the Israeli-occupied territories, as of December 2011, per the United Nations OCHA. See here for a more detailed and updated map.
Date Late 19th / early 20th century – present Location Israel Occupied Palestinian territories Status Ongoing Israeli–Palestinian peace process (halted) Gaza–Israel conflict (intermittent) Territorial changes 1948–1967: Egypt occupies the Gaza Strip Establishment of the All-Palestine Protectorate (until 1959) Jordan annexes the West Bank Since 1967: Israel occupies the Gaza Strip Unilateral disengagement (2005) Israel occupies the West Bank Establishment of Israeli settlements Division of Israeli control and Palestinian control by the Oslo II Accord (1995)
Belligerents
Israel	Palestinians: 1948: Arab Higher Committee All-Palestine Protectorate Army of the Holy War 1949–1956: Palestinian fedayeen 1964–2005: Fatah (1959–2005) PLO (1964–2005) UNLU (1987–1993) Palestinian Authority (1994–2005) 2006–present: Hamas Palestinian Joint Operations Room (2018–present)
Casualties and losses
9,901–9,922 killed	84,638–90,824 killed
More than 700,000 Palestinians displaced with a further 413,000 Palestinians displaced in the Six-Day War; 2,000+ Jews displaced in 1948 6,373 Israeli and 13,000–16,000 Palestinian deaths in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. 654 Israeli and 19,085 Palestinian and Lebanese deaths in the 1982 Lebanon War in addition to 800–3,500 in the Sabra-Shatila massacre. 1,962 Palestinians and 179–200 Israeli deaths in the First Intifada. 1,010 Israelis and up to 3,354 Palestinian deaths in the Second Intifada. 402 Palestinians were killed in the 2006 Gaza–Israel conflict. 1,116–1,417 Palestinian deaths in the Gaza War (2008–2009). 2,125–2,310 Palestinian deaths in the 2014 Gaza War. 285 Palestinian and 17 Israeli deaths in the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis. As of 10 December 2024, at least 44,786 Palestinians and 1,668+ Israelis killed in the Israel–Hamas war with a further 1,900,000 Palestinians displaced within Gaza and 135,000 Israeli evacuees. Indirect deaths likely to be several times higher than those killed by violence, with estimates for total Palestinian deaths in the Israel–Hamas war are between 186,000– 335,500

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is an ongoing military and political conflict about land and self-determination within the territory of the former Mandatory Palestine. Key aspects of the conflict include the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, security, water rights, the permit regime, Palestinian freedom of movement, and the Palestinian right of return.

The conflict has its origins in the rise of Zionism in Europe, a movement which aimed to establish a Jewish state through the colonization of Palestine, and the consequent first arrival of Jewish settlers to Ottoman Palestine in 1882. The local Arab population increasingly began to oppose Zionism, primarily out of the fear of territorial displacement and dispossession. The Zionist movement garnered the support of an imperial power in the 1917 Balfour Declaration issued by Britain, which promised to support the creation of a "Jewish homeland" in Palestine. Following British occupation of the formerly Ottoman region during World War I, Mandatory Palestine was established as a British mandate. Increasing Jewish immigration led to tensions between Jews and Arabs which grew into intercommunal conflict. In 1936, an Arab revolt erupted demanding independence and an end to British support for Zionism, which was suppressed by the British. Eventually tensions led to the UN adopting a partition plan in 1947, triggering a civil war.

During the ensuing 1948 Palestine war, more than half of the mandate's predominantly Palestinian Arab population fled or were expelled by Israeli forces. By the end of the war, Israel was established on most of the former mandate's territory, and the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were controlled by Egypt and Jordan respectively. Since the 1967 Six Day War, Israel has been occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, known collectively as the Palestinian territories. Two Palestinian uprisings against Israel and its occupation erupted in 1987 and 2000, the first and second intifadas respectively. Israel's occupation, which is now considered to be the longest military occupation in modern history, has seen it constructing illegal settlements there, creating a system of institutionalized discrimination against Palestinians under its occupation called Israeli apartheid. Israel has drawn international condemnation for violating the human rights of the Palestinians.

The international community, with the exception of the US and Israel, has been in consensus since the 1980s regarding a settlement of the conflict on the basis of a two-state solution along the 1967 borders and a just resolution for Palestinian refugees. The US and Israel have instead preferred bilateral negotiations rather than a resolution of the conflict on the basis of international law. In recent years, public support for a two-state solution has decreased, with Israeli policy reflecting an interest in maintaining the occupation rather than seeking a permanent resolution to the conflict. In 2007, Israel tightened its blockade of the Gaza Strip and made official its policy of isolating it from the West Bank. Since then, Israel has framed its relationship with Gaza in terms of the laws of war rather than in terms of its status as an occupying power. In a July 2024 ruling, the International Court of Justice rebuffed Israel's stance, determining that the Palestinian territories constitute one political unit and that Israel continues to illegally occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The ICJ also determined that Israeli policies violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Since 2006, Hamas and Israel have fought five wars, the most recent of which began in 2023 and is ongoing.

History

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the development of political Zionism and the arrival of Zionist settlers to Palestine. The modern political Zionist movement, with the goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, grew out of the last two decades of the 19th century, largely in response to antisemitism in Europe. While Jewish colonization began during this period, it was not until the arrival of more ideologically Zionist immigrants in the decade preceding the First World War that the landscape of Ottoman Palestine would start to significantly change. Land purchases, the eviction of tenant Arab peasants and armed confrontation with Jewish para-military units would all contribute to the Palestinian population's growing fear of territorial displacement and dispossession. This fear would gradually be replaced by a broader sense of Palestinian national expression which included the rejection of the Zionist goal of turning the mostly Arab populated land into a Jewish homeland. From early on, the leadership of the Zionist movement had the idea of "transferring" (a euphemism for ethnic cleansing) the Arab Palestinian population out of the land for the purpose of establishing a Jewish demographic majority. According to the Israeli historian Benny Morris the idea of transfer was "inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism". The Arab population felt this threat as early as the 1880s with the arrival of the first aliyah.

Chaim Weizmann's efforts to build British support for the Zionist movement would eventually secure the Balfour Declaration, a public statement issued by the British government in 1917 during the First World War announcing support for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine. Weizmann would take on a maximalist interpretation of the declaration, in which negotiations on the future of the country were to happen directly between Britain and the Jews, excluding Arab representation. At the Paris Peace Conference, he would later famously share his interpretation of the declaration in his announcement of the goal "o make Palestine as Jewish as England is English." Partially in response to the Zionist movement, a Palestinian national movement would develop more concretely in the interwar period. The years that followed would see Jewish-Palestinian relations deteriorate dramatically.

1920s

With the commitment to establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, the creation of the British Mandate in Palestine after the end of the first world war would allow for large-scale Jewish immigration. This would be accompanied by the development of a separate Jewish controlled sector of the economy which was supported with large amounts of capital from abroad. The more ardent Zionist ideologues of the Second Aliyah would become the leaders of the Yishuv starting in the 1920s and believed in the separation of Jewish and Arab economies and societies. During this period, the exclusionary nationalist ethos would grow to overpower the socialist ideals that the Second Aliyah had arrived with.

Amin al-Husseini, the leader of the Palestinian Arab national movement, immediately marked Jewish national movement and Jewish immigration to Palestine as the sole enemy to his cause, initiating large-scale riots against the Jews as early as 1920 in Jerusalem and in 1921 in Jaffa. Among the results of the violence was the establishment of the Jewish paramilitary force Haganah. In 1929, a series of violent riots resulted in the deaths of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs, with significant Jewish casualties in Hebron and Safed, and the evacuation of Jews from Hebron and Gaza.

1936–1939 Arab revolt

In the early 1930s, the Arab national struggle in Palestine had drawn many Arab nationalist militants from across the Middle East, such as Sheikh Izaddin al-Qassam from Syria, who established the Black Hand militant group and had prepared the grounds for the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine. Following the death of al-Qassam at the hands of the British in late 1935, tensions erupted in 1936 into the Arab general strike and general boycott. The strike soon deteriorated into violence, and the Arab revolt was bloodily repressed by the British assisted by the British armed forces of the Jewish Settlement Police, the Jewish Supernumerary Police, and Special Night Squads. The suppression of the revolt would leave at least 10% of the adult male population killed, wounded, imprisoned or exiled. In the first wave of organized violence, lasting until early 1937, most of the Arab groups were defeated by the British, and forced expulsion of much of the Arab leadership ensued. With much of the leadership in exile and the economy severely weakened, the Palestinians would struggle to confront the Zionist movement which was growing in strength, with the support of the British.

The cost and risks associated with the revolt and the ongoing inter-communal conflict led to a shift in British policies in the region and the appointment of the Peel Commission which recommended the partitioning of Palestine. The two main Zionist leaders, Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, accepted the recommendations on the basis that it would allow for further expansion, but some secondary Zionist leaders disapproved of it. The subsequent publication of the White Paper of 1939, which sought to limit Jewish immigration to the region, was the breaking point in relations between British authorities and the Zionist movement.

1940s

The renewed violence, which continued sporadically until the beginning of World War II, ended with around 5,000 causualties on the Arab side and 700 combined on the British and Jewish side total. With the eruption of World War II, the situation in Mandatory Palestine calmed down. It allowed a shift towards a more moderate stance among Palestinian Arabs under the leadership of the Nashashibi clan and even the establishment of the Jewish–Arab Palestine Regiment under British command, fighting Germans in North Africa. The more radical exiled faction of al-Husseini, however, tended to cooperate with Nazi Germany, and participated in the establishment of a pro-Nazi propaganda machine throughout the Arab world. The defeat of Arab nationalists in Iraq and subsequent relocation of al-Husseini to Nazi-occupied Europe tied his hands regarding field operations in Palestine, though he regularly demanded that the Italians and the Germans bomb Tel Aviv. By the end of World War II, a crisis over the fate of Holocaust survivors from Europe led to renewed tensions between the Yishuv and Mandate authorities. Increased illegal immigration from Jewish refugees, along with a paramilitary campaign of resistance against British authorities by Zionist militias, would effectively overturn the White Paper and eventually lead to the withdrawal of the British.

1947 United Nations partition plan

On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 181(II) recommending the adoption and implementation of a plan to partition Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state and the City of Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs were opposed to the partition. Zionists accepted the partition but planned to expand Israel's borders beyond what was allocated to it by the UN. On the next day, Palestine was swept by violence. For four months, under continuous Arab provocation and attack, the Yishuv was usually on the defensive while occasionally retaliating. The Arab League supported the Arab struggle by forming the volunteer-based Arab Liberation Army, supporting the Palestinian Arab Army of the Holy War, under the leadership of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and Hasan Salama. On the Jewish side, the civil war was managed by the major underground militias – the Haganah, Irgun and Lehi – strengthened by numerous Jewish veterans of World War II and foreign volunteers. By spring 1948, it was already clear that the Arab forces were nearing a total collapse, while Yishuv forces gained more and more territory, creating a large scale refugee problem of Palestinian Arabs.

1948 Arab–Israeli War

Following the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, the Arab League decided to intervene on behalf of Palestinian Arabs, marching their forces into former British Palestine, beginning the main phase of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. The overall fighting, leading to around 15,000 casualties, resulted in cease-fire and armistice agreements of 1949, with Israel holding much of the former Mandate territory, Jordan occupying and later annexing the West Bank and Egypt taking over the Gaza Strip, where the All-Palestine Government was declared by the Arab League on 22 September 1948.

1956 Suez Crisis

Through the 1950s, Jordan and Egypt supported the Palestinian Fedayeen militants' cross-border attacks into Israel, while Israel carried out its own reprisal operations in the host countries. The 1956 Suez Crisis resulted in a short-term Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and exile of the All-Palestine Government, which was later restored with Israeli withdrawal. The All-Palestine Government was completely abandoned by Egypt in 1959 and was officially merged into the United Arab Republic, to the detriment of the Palestinian national movement. Gaza Strip then was put under the authority of the Egyptian military administrator, making it a de facto military occupation. In 1964, however, a new organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was established by Yasser Arafat. It immediately won the support of most Arab League governments and was granted a seat in the Arab League.

1967 Six-Day War

In the 1967 Arab-Israel War, Israel occupied the Palestinian West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights, and two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba. By the mid-1970s, the international community had converged on a framework to resolve the conflict. This included Israel's full withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for recognition by the Palestinians and other Arab nations, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and a "just resolution" of the Palestinian refugee question. These principles, known as "land for peace" and Palestinian self-determination through a two-state settlement, were endorsed by the International Court of Justice, the United Nations, and international human rights organizations.

The June 1967 war exerted a significant effect upon Palestinian nationalism, as Israel gained military control of the West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt. Consequently, the PLO was unable to establish any control on the ground and established its headquarters in Jordan, home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and supported the Jordanian army during the War of Attrition, which included the Battle of Karameh. However, the Palestinian base in Jordan collapsed with the Jordanian–Palestinian civil war in 1970. The PLO defeat by the Jordanians caused most of the Palestinian militants to relocate to South Lebanon, where they soon took over large areas, creating the so-called "Fatahland".

1973 Yom Kippur War

On 6 October 1973, a coalition of Arab forces consisting of mainly Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Egyptian and Syria had crossed over the ceasefire lines that were agreed upon prior to 1973. Egypt had in particular tried to reoccupy much of the area surrounding the Suez Canal, whilst the frontline with Syria was mainly situated around the north in the Golan Heights. The war concluded with an Israeli victory, with both sides suffering tremendous casualties.

Following the end of the war, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, which confirmed the land-for-peace principle established in Resolution 242, initiating the Middle East peace process. The Arab defeat would play an important role in the PLO's willingness to pursue a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Additionally, many Israelis began to believe that the area under Israeli occupation could not be held indefinitely by force.

The Camp David Accords, agreed upon by Israel and Egypt in 1978, primarily aimed to establish a peace treaty between the two countries. The accords also proposed the creation of a "Self-Governing Authority" for the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, excluding Jerusalem. While it promised "full autonomy for the inhabitants," the land was to remain under Israeli control. A peace treaty based on these accords was signed in 1979, leading to Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Egyptian Sinai Peninsula by 1982. However, the specifics of the Palestinian-autonomy accords were disputed among the signatories and other Arab groups, and were never implemented.

1982 Lebanon War

Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon peaked in the early 1970s, as Lebanon was used as a base to launch attacks on northern Israel and airplane hijacking campaigns worldwide, which drew Israeli retaliation. During the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian militants continued to launch attacks against Israel while also battling opponents within Lebanon. In 1978, the Coastal Road massacre led to the Israeli full-scale invasion known as Operation Litani. This operation sought to dislodge the PLO from Lebanon while expanding the area under the control of the Israeli allied Christian militias in southern Lebanon. The operation succeeded in leaving a large portion of the south in control of the Israeli proxy which would eventually form the South Lebanon Army. Under United States pressure, Israeli forces would eventually withdraw from Lebanon.

In 1982, Israel, having secured its southern border with Egypt, sought to resolve the Palestinian issue by attempting to dismantle the military and political power of the PLO in Lebanon. The goal was to establish a friendly regime in Lebanon and continue its policy of settlement and annexation in occupied Palestine. The PLO had observed the latest ceasefire with Israel and shown a preference for negotiations over military operations. As a result, Israel sought to remove the PLO as a potential negotiating partner. Most Palestinian militants were defeated within several weeks, Beirut was captured, and the PLO headquarters were evacuated to Tunisia in June by Yasser Arafat's decision.

First Intifada (1987–1993)

The first Palestinian uprising began in 1987 as a response to escalating attacks and the endless occupation. By the early 1990s, the conflict, termed the First Intifada, was the focus of international settlement efforts, in part motivated by the success of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1982. Eventually the Israeli–Palestinian peace process led to the Oslo Accords of 1993, allowing the PLO to relocate from Tunisia and take ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, establishing the Palestinian National Authority. The peace process also had significant opposition among elements of Palestinian society, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who immediately initiated a campaign of attacks targeting Israelis. Following hundreds of casualties and a wave of anti-government propaganda, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli far-right extremist who objected to the peace initiative. This struck a serious blow to the peace process, which in 1996 led to the newly elected government of Israel backing off from the process, to some degree.

Second Intifada (2000–2005)

Following several years of unsuccessful negotiations, the conflict re-erupted as the Second Intifada in September 2000. The violence, escalating into an open conflict between the Palestinian National Security Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, lasted until 2004/2005 and led to approximately 130 fatalities. In 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon ordered the removal of Israeli settlers and soldiers from Gaza. Israel and its Supreme Court formally declared an end to occupation, saying it "had no effective control over what occurred" in Gaza. However, the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and many other international bodies and NGOs continue to consider Israel to be the occupying power of the Gaza Strip as Israel controls Gaza Strip's airspace, territorial waters and controls the movement of people or goods in or out of Gaza by air or sea.

Fatah–Hamas split (2006–2007)

In 2006, Hamas won a plurality of 44% in the Palestinian parliamentary election. Israel responded it would begin economic sanctions unless Hamas agreed to accept prior Israeli–Palestinian agreements, forswear violence, and recognize Israel's right to exist, all of which Hamas rejected. After internal Palestinian political struggle between Fatah and Hamas erupted into the Battle of Gaza (2007), Hamas took full control of the area. In 2007, Israel imposed a naval blockade on the Gaza Strip, and cooperation with Egypt allowed a ground blockade of the Egyptian border.

The tensions between Israel and Hamas escalated until late 2008, when Israel launched operation Cast Lead upon Gaza, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties and billions of dollars in damage. By February 2009, a ceasefire was signed with international mediation between the parties, though the occupation and small and sporadic eruptions of violence continued.

In 2011, a Palestinian Authority attempt to gain UN membership as a fully sovereign state failed. In Hamas-controlled Gaza, sporadic rocket attacks on Israel and Israeli air raids continued to occur. In November 2012, Palestinian representation in the UN was upgraded to a non-member observer state, and its mission title was changed from "Palestine (represented by PLO)" to "State of Palestine". In 2014, another war broke out between Israel and Gaza, resulting in over 70 Israeli and over 2,000 Palestinian casualties.

Israel–Hamas war (2023–present)

After the 2014 war and 2021 crisis, Hamas began planning an attack on Israel. In 2022, Netanyahu returned to power while headlining a hardline far-right government, which led to greater political strife in Israel and clashes in the Palestinian territories. This culminated in the 2023 Israel–Hamas war, when Hamas-led militant groups launched a surprise attack on southern Israel from the Gaza Strip, killing more than 1,200 Israeli civilians and military personnel and taking hostages. The Israeli military retaliated by conducting an extensive aerial bombardment campaign on Gaza, followed by a large-scale ground invasion with the stated goal of destroying Hamas and controlling security in Gaza afterwards. Israel killed tens of thousands of Palestinians, including civilians and combatants and displaced almost two million people. South Africa accused Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice and called for an immediate ceasefire. The Court issued an order requiring Israel to take all measures to prevent any acts contrary to the 1948 Genocide Convention, but did not order Israel to suspend its military campaign.

The war spilled over, with Israel engaging in clashes with local militias in the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon and northern Israel, and other Iranian-backed militias in Syria. Iranian-backed militias also engaged in clashes with the United States, while the Houthis blockaded the Red Sea in protest, to which the United States responded with airstrikes in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.

Attempts to reach a peaceful settlement

The PLO's participation in diplomatic negotiations was dependent on its complete disavowal of terrorism and recognition of Israel's "right to exist." This stipulation required the PLO to abandon its objective of reclaiming all of historic Palestine and instead focus on the 22 percent which came under Israeli military control in 1967. By the late 1970s, Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories and most Arab states supported a two-state settlement. In 1981, Saudi Arabia put forward a plan based on a two-state settlement to the conflict with support from the Arab League. Israeli analyst Avner Yaniv describes Arafat as ready to make a historic compromise at this time, while the Israeli cabinet continued to oppose the existence of a Palestinian state. Yaniv described Arafat's willingness to compromise as a "peace offensive" which Israel responded to by planning to remove the PLO as a potential negotiating partner in order to evade international diplomatic pressure. Israel would invade Lebanon the following year in an attempt to undermine the PLO as a political organization, weakening Palestinian nationalism and facilitating the annexation of the West Bank into Greater Israel.

While the PLO had adopted a program of pursuing a Palestinian state alongside Israel since the mid-1970s, the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence formally consecrated this objective. This declaration, which was based on resolutions from the Palestine National Council sessions in the late 1970s and 1980s, advocated for the creation of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, within the borders set by the 1949 armistice lines prior to 5 June 1967. Following the declaration, Arafat explicitly denounced all forms of terrorism and affirmed the PLO's acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the recognition of Israel's right to exist. All the conditions defined by Henry Kissinger for US negotiations with the PLO had now been met.

Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir stood behind the stance that the PLO was a terrorist organization. He maintained a strict stance against any concessions, including withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories, recognition of or negotiations with the PLO, and especially the establishment of a Palestinian state. Shamir viewed the U.S. decision to engage in dialogue with the PLO as a mistake that threatened the existing territorial status quo. He argued that negotiating with the PLO meant accepting the existence of a Palestinian state and hence was unacceptable.

The peace process

The term "peace process" refers to the step-by-step approach to resolving the conflict. Having originally entered into usage to describe the US mediated negotiations between Israel and surrounding Arab countries, notably Egypt, the term "peace-process" has grown to be associated with an emphasis on the negotiation process rather than on presenting a comprehensive solution to the conflict. As part of this process, fundamental issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict such as borders, access to resources, and the Palestinian right of return, have been left to "final status" talks. Such "final status" negotiations along the lines discussed in Madrid in 1991 have never taken place.

The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 built on the incremental framework put in place by the 1978 Camp David negotiations and the 1991 Madrid and Washington talks. The motivation behind the incremental approach towards a settlement was that it would "build confidence", but the eventual outcome was instead a dramatic decline in mutual confidence. At each incremental stage, Israel further entrenched its occupation of the Palestinian territories, despite the PA upholding its obligation to curbing violent attacks from extremist groups, in part by cooperating with Israeli forces.

Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, observed that life became harsher for Palestinians during this period as state violence increased and Palestinian land continued to be expropriated as settlements expanded. Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami described the Oslo Accords as legitimizing "the transformation of the West Bank into what has been called a 'cartographic cheeseboard'."

Creation of the Palestinian Authority and security cooperation

Core to the Oslo Accords was the creation of the Palestinian Authority and the security cooperation it would enter into with the Israeli military authorities in what has been described as the "outsourcing" of the occupation to the PA. Just before signing the Oslo accord, Rabin described the expectation that the "Palestinians will be better at establishing internal security than we were, because they will allow no appeals to the Sepreme Court and will prevent from criticizing the conditions there." Along these lines, Ben-Ami, who participated in the Camp David 2000 talks, described this process: "One of the meanings of Oslo was that the PLO was eventually Israel's collaborator in the task of stifling the Intifada and cutting short what was clearly an authentically democratic struggle for Palestinian independence."

The Wye River Memorandum agreed on by the PA and Israel introduced a "zero tolerance" policy for "terror and violence." This policy was uniformly criticised by human rights organizations for its "encouragement" of human rights abuses. Dennis Ross describes the Wye as having successfully reduced both violent and non-violent protests, both of which he considers to be "inconsistent with the spirit of Wye." Watson claims that the PA frequently violated its obligations to curb incitement and its record on curbing terrorism and other security obligations under the Wye River Memorandum was, at best, mixed.

Oslo Accords (1993, 1995)

In 1993, Israeli officials led by Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leaders from the Palestine Liberation Organization led by Yasser Arafat strove to find a peaceful solution through what became known as the Oslo peace process. A crucial milestone in this process was Arafat's letter of recognition of Israel's right to exist. Emblematic of the asymmetry in the Oslo process, Israel was not required to, and did not, recognize the right of a Palestinian state to exist. In 1993, the Declaration of Principles (or Oslo I) was signed and set forward a framework for future Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, in which key issues would be left to "final status" talks. The stipulations of the Oslo agreements ran contrary to the international consensus for resolving the conflict; the agreements did not uphold Palestinian self-determination or statehood and repealed the internationally accepted interpretation of UN Resolution 242 that land cannot be acquired by war. With respect to access to land and resources, Noam Chomsky described the Oslo agreements as allowing "Israel to do virtually what it likes." The Oslo process was delicate and progressed in fits and starts.

The process took a turning point at the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 and the election of Netanyahu in 1996, finally unraveling when Arafat and Ehud Barak failed to reach an agreement at Camp David in July 2000 and later at Taba in 2001. The interim period specified by Oslo had not built confidence between the two parties; Barak had failed to implement additional stages of the interim agreements and settlements expanded by 10% during his short term. The disagreement between the two parties at Camp David was primarily on the acceptance (or rejection) of international consensus. For Palestinian negotiators, the international consensus, as represented by the yearly vote in the UN General Assembly which passes almost unanimously, was the starting point for negotiations. The Israeli negotiators, supported by the American participants, did not accept the international consensus as the basis for a settlement. Both sides eventually accepted the Clinton parameters "with reservations" but the talks at Taba were "called to a halt" by Barak, and the peace process itself came to a stand-still. Ben-Ami, who participated in the talks at Camp David as Israel's foreign minister, would later describe the proposal on the table: "The Clinton parameters... are the best proof that Arafat was right to turn down the summit's offers".

Camp David Summit (2000)

In July 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Barak reportedly put forward the following as "bases for negotiation", via the US to the Palestinian President: a non-militarized Palestinian state split into 3–4 parts containing 87–92% of the West Bank after having already given up 78% of historic Palestine. Thus, an Israeli offer of 91 percent of the West Bank (5,538 km of the West Bank translates into only 86 percent from the Palestinian perspective), including Arab parts of East Jerusalem and the entire Gaza Strip, as well as a stipulation that 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) would be ceded to Israel, no right of return to Israel, no sovereignty over the Temple Mount or any core East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, and continued Israel control over the Jordan Valley.

Arafat rejected this offer, which Palestinian negotiators, Israeli analysts and Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami described as "unacceptable". According to the Palestinian negotiators the offer did not remove many of the elements of the Israeli occupation regarding land, security, settlements, and Jerusalem.

After the Camp David summit, a narrative emerged, supported by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, as well as US officials including Dennis Ross and Madeleine Albright, that Yasser Arafat had rejected a generous peace offer from Israel and instead incited a violent uprising. This narrative suggested that Arafat was not interested in a two-state solution, but rather aimed to destroy Israel and take over all of Palestine. This view was widely accepted in US and Israeli public opinion. Nearly all scholars and most Israeli and US officials involved in the negotiations have rejected this narrative. These individuals include prominent Israeli negotiators, the IDF chief of staff, the head of the IDF's intelligence bureau, the head of the Shin Bet as well as their advisors.

No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense US pressure. Clinton has long blamed Arafat for the collapse of the summit. In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee aiming to identify strategies for restoring the peace process. The committee's findings were published in 2001 with the dismantlement of existing Israeli settlements and Palestinian crackdown on militant activity being one strategy.

Developments following Camp David

Following the failed summit Palestinian and Israeli negotiators continued to meet in small groups through August and September 2000 to try to bridge the gaps between their respective positions. The United States prepared its own plan to resolve the outstanding issues. Clinton's presentation of the US proposals was delayed by the advent of the Second Intifada at the end of September.

Clinton's plan, eventually presented on 23 December 2000, proposed the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and 94–96 percent of the West Bank plus the equivalent of 1–3 percent of the West Bank in land swaps from pre-1967 Israel. On Jerusalem, the plan stated that "the general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and that Jewish areas are Israeli." The holy sites were to be split on the basis that Palestinians would have sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Noble sanctuary, while the Israelis would have sovereignty over the Western Wall. On refugees the plan suggested a number of proposals including financial compensation, the right of return to the Palestinian state, and Israeli acknowledgment of suffering caused to the Palestinians in 1948. Security proposals referred to a "non-militarized" Palestinian state, and an international force for border security. Both sides accepted Clinton's plan and it became the basis for the negotiations at the Taba Peace summit the following January.

Taba Summit (2001)

The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map at the Taba Summit in Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. With Israeli elections looming the talks ended without an agreement but the two sides issued a joint statement attesting to the progress they had made: "The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections." The following month the Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 7 February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks.

Road map for peace (2002–2003)

One peace proposal, presented by the Quartet of the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States on 17 September 2002, was the Road Map for Peace. This plan did not attempt to resolve difficult questions such as the fate of Jerusalem or Israeli settlements, but left that to be negotiated in later phases of the process. The proposal never made it beyond the first phase, whose goals called for a halt to both Israeli settlement construction and Israeli–Palestinian violence. Neither goal has been achieved as of November 2015.

The Annapolis Conference was a Middle East peace conference held on 27 November 2007, at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, United States. The conference aimed to revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and implement the "Roadmap for peace". The conference ended with the issuing of a joint statement from all parties. After the Annapolis Conference, the negotiations were continued. Both Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert presented each other with competing peace proposals. Ultimately no agreement was reached.

Arab Peace Initiative (2002, 2007, 2017)

The Arab Peace Initiative (Arabic: مبادرة السلام العربية Mubādirat as-Salām al-ʿArabīyyah), also known as the Saudi Initiative, was first proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia at the 2002 Beirut summit . The peace initiative is a proposed solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict as a whole, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular. The initiative was initially published on 28 March 2002, at the Beirut summit, and agreed upon again at the 2007 Riyadh summit. Unlike the Road Map for Peace, it spelled out "final solution" borders based on the UN borders established before the 1967 Six-Day War. It offered full normalization of relations with Israel, in exchange for the withdrawal of its forces from all the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, to recognize "an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.

The Palestinian Authority led by Yasser Arafat immediately embraced the initiative. His successor Mahmoud Abbas also supported the plan and officially asked U.S. President Barack Obama to adopt it as part of his Middle East policy. Islamist political party Hamas, the elected government of the Gaza Strip, was deeply divided, with most factions rejecting the plan. Palestinians have criticised the Israel–United Arab Emirates normalization agreement and another with Bahrain signed in September 2020, fearing the moves weaken the Arab Peace Initiative, regarding the UAE's move as "a betrayal."

The Israeli government under Ariel Sharon rejected the initiative as a "non-starter" because it required Israel to withdraw to pre-June 1967 borders. After the renewed Arab League endorsement in 2007, then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert gave a cautious welcome to the plan. In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed tentative support for the Initiative, but in 2018, he rejected it as a basis for future negotiations with the Palestinians.

Current status

Apartheid

In July 2024, the International Court of Justice determined that Israeli policies violate the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. As of 2022, all the major Israeli and international human rights organizations were in agreement that Israeli actions constituted the crime of apartheid. In April 2021, Human Rights Watch released its report A Threshold Crossed, describing the policies of Israel towards Palestinians living in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza constituted the crime of apartheid. A further report titled Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity was released by Amnesty International on 1 February 2022.

In 2018, the Knesset passed the Nation-State law which the Israeli legal group Adalah nicknamed the "Apartheid law." Adalah described the Nation-State law as "constitutionally enshrining Jewish supremacy and the identity of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people." The Nation-State law is a Basic Law, meaning that it has "quasi-constitutional status," and states that the right to exercise national self-determination in Israel is "unique to the Jewish people".

Occupied Palestinian territory

Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories, which comprise the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, since the 1967 Six-Day War, making it the longest military occupation in modern history. In 2024, the International Court of Justice determined that the Palestinian territories constitute one political unit and that Israel's occupation since 1967, and the subsequent creation of Israeli settlements and exploitation of natural resources, are illegal under international law. The court also ruled that Israel should pay full reparations to the Palestinian people for the damage the occupation has caused.

Some Palestinians say they are entitled to all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Israel says it is justified in not ceding all this land, because of security concerns, and also because the lack of any valid diplomatic agreement at the time means that ownership and boundaries of this land is open for discussion. Palestinians claim any reduction of this claim is a severe deprivation of their rights. In negotiations, they claim that any moves to reduce the boundaries of this land is a hostile move against their key interests. Israel considers this land to be in dispute and feels the purpose of negotiations is to define what the final borders will be. In 2017 Hamas announced that it was ready to support a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders "without recognising Israel or ceding any rights".

Israeli settlements

The international community considers Israeli settlements to be illegal under international law, but Israel disputes this. Those who justify the legality of the settlements use arguments based upon Articles 2 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as UN Security Council Resolution 242. The expansion of settlements often involves the confiscation of Palestinian land and resources, leading to displacement of Palestinian communities and creating a source of tension and conflict. Settlements are often protected by the Israeli military and are frequently flashpoints for violence against Palestinians. Furthermore, the presence of settlements and Jewish-only bypass roads creates a fragmented Palestinian territory, seriously hindering economic development and freedom of movement for Palestinians. Amnesty International reports that Israeli settlements divert resources needed by Palestinian towns, such as arable land, water, and other resources; and, that settlements reduce Palestinians' ability to travel freely via local roads, owing to security considerations.

As of 2023, there were about 500,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank, with another 200,000 living in East Jerusalem. In February 2023, Israel's Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich took charge of most of the Civil Administration, obtaining broad authority over civilian issues in the West Bank. In the first six months of 2023, 13,000 housing units were built in settlements, which is almost three times more than in the whole of 2022.

Israeli military police

In a report published in February 2014 covering incidents over the three-year period of 2011–2013, Amnesty International stated that Israeli forces employed reckless violence in the West Bank, and in some instances appeared to engage in wilful killings which would be tantamount to war crimes. Besides the numerous fatalities, Amnesty said at least 261 Palestinians, including 67 children, had been gravely injured by Israeli use of live ammunition. In this same period, 45 Palestinians, including 6 children had been killed. Amnesty's review of 25 civilians deaths concluded that in no case was there evidence of the Palestinians posing an imminent threat. At the same time, over 8,000 Palestinians suffered serious injuries from other means, including rubber-coated metal bullets. Only one IDF soldier was convicted, killing a Palestinian attempting to enter Israel illegally. The soldier was demoted and given a 1-year sentence with a five-month suspension. The IDF answered the charges stating that its army held itself "to the highest of professional standards", adding that when there was suspicion of wrongdoing, it investigated and took action "where appropriate".

Separation of the Gaza Strip

Since 2006, Israel has enforced an official and explicit policy of enforcing "separation" between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This separation policy has involved strict restrictions on imports, exports and travel to and from the Gaza Strip. This policy began to develop as early as the 1950s, but was further formalized with the implementation of an Israeli closure regime in 1991, where Israel began requiring Gazans to obtain permits to exit the Gaza Strip and to enter the West Bank (cancelling the "general exit permit"). By treating the Gaza Strip as a separate entity, Israel has aimed to increase it's control over the West Bank while avoiding a political resolution to the conflict. The lack of territorial contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank and the absence of any "safe passage" explain the success of Israel's policy of separation. Harvard political economist Sara Roy describes the separation policy as motivated by Israeli rejection of territorial compromise, fundamentally undermining Palestinian political and economic cohesion and weakening national unity among Palestinians.

The severing of Gaza from the West Bank hinterland reflects a paradigm shift in the framing of the conflict. After Hamas assumed power in 2007, Israel declared Gaza a "hostile territory," preferring to frame its obligations towards Gaza in terms of the law of armed conflict, over what it presented as a border dispute, as opposed to those of military occupation (this framing was rebuffed by the ICJ in 2024 when the court stated that Israel continued to occupy the Gaza Strip even after the 2005 disengagement). Indeed, the intensified blockade policy was presented by Israeli officials as "economic warfare" intended to "keep the Gazan economy on the brink of collapse" at the "lowest possible level." Roy cites an Israeli Supreme Court's decision approving fuel cuts to Gaza as emblematic of the disabling of Gaza; the court deemed the fuel cuts permissible on the basis that they would not harm the population's "essential humanitarian needs."

The executive director of the Israeli human rights organization Gisha described Israeli policy towards Gaza between 2007 and 2010 as "explicitly punitive," controlling the entry of food based on calculated calorie needs to limit economic activity and enforce "economic warfare." These restrictions included allowing only small packets of margarine to prevent local food production. Gaza's GDP dramatically declined during this period as a result of these measures. Indeed, by April 2010 Israel restricted the entry of commercial items to Gaza to a list of 73 products, compared with 4,000 products which had previously been approved. The result was the virtual collapse of Gaza's private sector, which Roy describes as largely completed after the 2008 Israeli Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. According to Gisha, travel restrictions from the Gaza Strip are not based on individual security concerns, rather, the general rule is that travel to Israel or the West Bank from Gaza is not permitted other than in "exceptional" cases. Israeli imposed travel restrictions aim in particular to prevent Gazans from living in the West Bank. Indeed, Israeli policy treats the Gaza Strip as a "terminus" station, with family reunification between the West Bank and Gaza Strip only possible if the family agrees to permanently relocate to the Gaza Strip. The Israeli officials described the blockade as serving limited security value, instead referring to these restrictions as motivated by "political-security."

Blockade of the Gaza Strip

Although closure has a long history in Gaza dating back to 1991 when it was first imposed, it was made more acute after 2000 with the start of the second intifada. Closure was tightened further after the 2005 disengagement and then again in 2006, after Hamas's electoral victory. Heightened restrictions were imposed on imports and exports as well as on the movement of people, including Gaza's labor force. The total siege of Gaza that was imposed following the Hamas led attack on Israel during 7 October 2023, was part of that same policy of separation and closure, characterized by the destruction of Gaza's infrastructure (especially housing) and the denial of food, water, electricity, and fuel to its population. On 9 October 2023, Israel declared war on Hamas and tightened its blockade of the Gaza Strip. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared, "There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed. We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly."

Since its initiation, blockade has had a detrimental impact on the private sector in Gaza, the primary driver of economic growth in Gaza. Prior to the blockade, Gaza imported 95% of its inputs for manufacturing and exported 85% of the finished products (primarily to Israel and the West Bank). Employment in this sector dropped to 4% by 2010, with an overall unemployment rate of 40% at this time and 80% of the population living on less than 2 dollars a day. Fewer than 40 commercial items were allowed in to the Gaza Strip by 2009, compared to a list of 4,000 items before the start of the blockade. Fuel imports were restricted such that 95% of Gaza's industrial operations were forced to close, with the rest operating far below capacity. In aggregate, 100,000 out of the 120,000 employed in the private sector lost their jobs as a result of the blockade. Most critically for the economy has been the near complete ban on exports from the Gaza Strip. The number of truckloads carrying exports fell to 2% their pre-blockade numbers. Only exports to the European market were allowed, a far less profitable market for Gazans than Israel and the West Bank. The products approved for export were primarily flowers and strawberries. The first export to the West Bank or Israel did not happen until 2012 and only in very limited quantities: up to four truckloads of furniture manufactured in Gaza were allowed through Israel for an exhibition in Amman.

Even in the early years of Israeli imposed closure, the associated increased cost of doing business had a detrimental impact on trade. Goods transferred between the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel were required to be loaded onto Palestinian trucks initially and then off loaded onto Israeli trucks at the border even for distances of 50–100 miles. These increased costs include the costs for security checks, clearance, storage, and spoilage, as well as increased transportation costs.

The Military Advocate General of Israel said that Israel is justified under international law to impose a blockade on an enemy for security reasons as Hamas "turned the territory under its de facto control into a launching pad of mortar and rocket attacks against Israeli towns and villages in southern Israel." Media headlines have described a United Nations commission as ruling that Israel's blockade is "both legal and appropriate." However, Amnesty International has stated that this is "completely false," and that the cited UN report made no such claim. The Israeli Government's continued land, sea and air blockage is tantamount to collective punishment of the population, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In January 2008, the Israeli government calculated how many calories per person were needed to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, and then subtracted eight percent to adjust for the "culture and experience" of the Gazans. Details of the calculations were released following Israeli human rights organization Gisha's application to the high court. Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, who drafted the plan, stated that the scheme was never formally adopted, this was not accepted by Gisha.

On 20 June 2010, in response to the Gaza flotilla raid, Israel's Security Cabinet approved a new system governing the blockade that would allow practically all non-military or dual-use items to enter the Gaza Strip. According to a cabinet statement, Israel would "expand the transfer of construction materials designated for projects that have been approved by the Palestinian Authority, including schools, health institutions, water, sanitation and more—as well as (projects) that are under international supervision." Despite the easing of the land blockade, Israel will continue to inspect all goods bound for Gaza by sea at the port of Ashdod. Despite these announcements, the economic situation did not substantially change and the virtual complete ban on exports remained in place. Only some consumer products and material for donor-sponsored projects was allowed in.

United Nations and Recognition of Palestinian statehood

The PLO have campaigned for full member status for the state of Palestine at the UN and for recognition on the 1967 borders. This campaign has received widespread support. The UN General Assembly votes every year almost unanimously in favor of a resolution calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. The US and Israel instead prefer to pursue bilateral negotiation rather than resolving the conflict on the basis of international law. Netanyahu has criticized the Palestinians of purportedly trying to bypass direct talks, whereas Abbas has argued that the continued construction of Israeli-Jewish settlements is "undermining the realistic potential" for the two-state solution. Although Palestine has been denied full member status by the UN Security Council, in late 2012 the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the de facto recognition of sovereign Palestine by granting non-member state status.

Incitement

Following the Oslo Accords, which was to set up regulative bodies to rein in frictions, Palestinian incitement against Israel, Jews, and Zionism continued, parallel with Israel's pursuance of settlements in the Palestinian territories, though under Abu Mazen it has reportedly dwindled significantly. Charges of incitement have been reciprocal, both sides interpreting media statements in the Palestinian and Israeli press as constituting incitement. Schoolbooks published for both Israeli and Palestinian schools have been found to have encouraged one-sided narrative and even hatred of the other side. Perpetrators of murderous attacks, whether against Israelis or Palestinians, often find strong vocal support from sections of their communities despite varying levels of condemnation from politicians.

Both parties to the conflict have been criticized by third-parties for teaching incitement to their children by downplaying each side's historical ties to the area, teaching propagandist maps, or indoctrinate their children to one day join the armed forces.

Issues in dispute

The core issues of the conflict are borders, the status of settlements in the West Bank, the status of east Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee right of return, and security. With the PLO's recognition of Israel's "right to exist" in 1982, the international community with the main exception of the United States and Israel has been in consensus on a framework for resolving the conflict on the basis of international law. Various UN bodies and the ICJ have supported this position; every year, the UN General Assembly votes almost unanimously in favor of a resolution titled "Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine." This resolution consistently affirms the illegality of the Israeli settlements, the annexation of East Jerusalem, and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It also emphasizes the need for an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 and the need for a just resolution to the refugee question on the basis of UN resolution 194.

Unilateral strategies and the rhetoric of hardline political factions, coupled with violence, have fostered mutual embitterment and hostility and a loss of faith in the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement. Since the break down of negotiations, security has played a less important role in Israeli concerns, trailing behind employment, corruption, housing and other pressing issues. Israeli policy had reoriented to focus on managing the conflict and the associated occupation of Palestinian territory, rather than reaching a negotiated solution. The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has led the majority of Palestinians to believe that Israel is not committed to reaching an agreement, but rather to a pursuit of establishing permanent control over this territory in order to provide that security.

Status of Jerusalem

In 1967, Israel unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem, in violation of international law. Israel seized a significant area further east of the city, eventually creating a barrier of Israeli settlements around the city, isolating Jerusalem's Palestinian population from the West Bank. Israel's policy of constructing sprawling Jewish neighborhoods surrounding the Palestinian sections of the city were aimed at making a repartition of the city almost impossible. In a further effort to change the demography of Jerusalem in favor of a Jewish majority, Israel discouraged Palestinian presence in the city while encouraging Jewish presence, as a matter of policy. Specifically, Israel introduced policies restricting the space available for the construction of Palestinian neighborhoods, delaying or denying building permits and raising housing demolition orders. Tensions in Jerusalem are primarily driven by provocations by Israeli authorities and Jewish extremists against Arabs in the city.

The Israeli government, including the Knesset and Supreme Court, is located in the "new city" of West Jerusalem and has been since Israel's founding in 1948. After Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, it assumed complete administrative control of East Jerusalem. Since then, various UN bodies have consistently denounced Israel's control over East Jerusalem as invalid. In 1980, Israel passed the Jerusalem Law declaring "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel."

Many countries do not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, with exceptions being the United States, and Russia. The majority of UN member states and most international organisations do not recognise Israel's claims to East Jerusalem which occurred after the 1967 Six-Day War, nor its 1980 Jerusalem Law proclamation. The International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory opinion on the "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory" described East Jerusalem as "occupied Palestinian territory".

The three largest Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—hold Jerusalem as an important setting for their religious and historical narratives. Jerusalem is the holiest city in Judaism, being the former location of the Jewish temples on the Temple Mount and the capital of the ancient Israelite kingdom. For Muslims, Jerusalem is the third holiest site, being the location of the Isra' and Mi'raj event, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. For Christians, Jerusalem is the site of Jesus' crucifixion and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

Holy sites and the Temple Mount

Since the early 20th century, the issue of holy places and particularly the sacred places in Jerusalem has been employed by nationalist politicians.

Israelis did not have access to the holy places in East Jerusalem during the period of Jordanian occupation. Since 1975, Israel has banned Muslims from worshiping at Joseph's Tomb, a shrine considered sacred by both Jews and Muslims. Settlers established a yeshiva, installed a Torah scroll and covered the mihrab. During the Second Intifada Palestinian protesters looted and burned the site. Israeli security agencies routinely monitor and arrest Jewish extremists that plan attacks, though many serious incidents have still occurred. Israel has allowed almost complete autonomy to the Muslim trust (Waqf) over the Temple Mount.

Palestinians have voiced concerns regarding the welfare of Christian and Muslim holy places under Israeli control. Additionally, some Palestinian advocates have made statements alleging that the Western Wall Tunnel was re-opened with the intent of causing the mosque's collapse.

Palestinian refugees

Palestinian refugees are people who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict and the 1967 Six-Day War. The number of Palestinians who were expelled or fled from Israel was estimated at 711,000 in 1949. The descendants of all refugees (not just Palestinian refugees) are considered by the UN to also be refugees. As of 2010 there are 4.7 million Palestinian refugees. Between 350,000 and 400,000 Palestinians were displaced during the 1967 Arab–Israeli war. A third of the refugees live in recognized refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The remainder live in and around the cities and towns of these host countries. Most Palestinian refugees were born outside Israel and are not allowed to live in any part of historic Palestine.

Israel has since 1948 prevented the return of Palestinian refugees and refused any settlement permitting their return except in limited cases. On the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN General Assembly Resolution 194, Palestinians claim the right of refugees to return to the lands, homes and villages where they lived before being driven into exile in 1948 and 1967. Arafat himself repeatedly assured his American and Israeli interlocutors at Camp David that he primarily sought the principle of the right of return to be accepted, rather than the full right of return, in practice.

Palestinian and international authors have justified the right of return of the Palestinian refugees on several grounds: Several scholars included in the broader New Historians argue that the Palestinian refugees fled or were chased out or expelled by the actions of the Haganah, Lehi and Irgun, Zionist paramilitary groups. A number have also characterized this as an ethnic cleansing. The New Historians cite indications of Arab leaders' desire for the Palestinian Arab population to stay put.

The Israeli Law of Return that grants citizenship to people of Jewish descent has been described as discriminatory against other ethnic groups, especially Palestinians that cannot apply for such citizenship under the law of return, to the territory which they were expelled from or fled during the course of the 1948 war.

According to the UN Resolution 194, adopted in 1948, "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." UN Resolution 3236 "reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return". Resolution 242 from the UN affirms the necessity for "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem"; however, Resolution 242 does not specify that the "just settlement" must or should be in the form of a literal Palestinian right of return.

Historically, there has been debate over the relative impact of the causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus, although there is a wide consensus that violent expulsions by Zionist and Israeli forces were the main factor. Other factors include psychological warfare and Arab sense of vulnerability. Notably, historian Benny Morris states that most of Palestine's 700,000 refugees fled because of the "flail of war" and expected to return home shortly after a successful Arab invasion. He documents instances in which Arab leaders advised the evacuation of entire communities as happened in Haifa although recognizes that these were isolated events. In his later work, Morris considers the displacement the result of a national conflict initiated by the Arabs themselves. In a 2004 interview with Haaretz, he described the exodus as largely resulting from an atmosphere of transfer that was promoted by Ben-Gurion and understood by the military leadership. He also claimed that there "are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing". He has been criticized by political scientist Norman Finkelstein for having seemingly changed his views for political, rather than historical, reasons.

Although Israel accepts the right of the Palestinian Diaspora to return into a new Palestinian state, Israel insists that the return of this population into the current state of Israel would threaten the stability of the Jewish state; an influx of Palestinian refugees would lead to the end of the state of Israel as a Jewish state since a demographic majority of Jews would not be maintained.

Israeli security concerns

Throughout the conflict, Palestinian violence has been a concern for Israelis. Security concerns have historically been a key driver in Israeli political decision making, often expanding in scope and taking precedence over other considerations such as international law and Palestinian human rights. The occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the continued expansion of settlements in those areas have been justified on security grounds.

Israel, along with the United States and the European Union, refer to any use of force by Palestinian groups as terroristic and criminal. The United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/45/130 reflects an international consensus (113 out of 159 voting nations voted in favor, 13 voted against) affirming Palestinians' legitimacy, as a people under foreign occupation, to use armed struggle to resist said occupation.

In Israel, Palestinian suicide bombers have targeted civilian buses, restaurants, shopping malls, hotels and marketplaces. From 1993 to 2003, 303 Palestinian suicide bombers attacked Israel. In 1994, Hamas initiated their first lethal suicide attack in response to the cave of the Patriarchs massacre where American-Israeli physician Baruch Goldstein opened fire in a mosque, killing 29 people and injuring 125.

The Israeli government initiated the construction of a security barrier following scores of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks in July 2003. Israel's coalition government approved the security barrier in the northern part of the green line between Israel and the West Bank. According to the IDF, since the erection of the fence, terrorist acts have declined by approximately 90%. The decline in attacks can also be attributed to the permanent presence of Israeli troops inside and around Palestinian cities and increasing security cooperation between the IDF and the Palestinian Authority during this period. The barrier followed a route that ran almost entirely through land occupied by Israel in June 1967, unilaterally seizing more than 10% of the West Bank, including whole neighborhoods and settlement blocs, while splitting Palestinian villages in half with immediate effects on Palestinian's freedom of movement. The barrier, in some areas, isolated farmers from their fields and children from their schools, while also restricting Palestinians from moving within the West Bank or pursuing employment in Israel.

In 2004 the International Court of Justice ruled that the construction of the barrier violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense. The ICJ further expressed that the construction of the wall by Israel could become a permanent fixture, altering the status quo. Israel's High Court, however, disagreed with the ICJ's conclusions, stating that they lacked a factual basis. Several human rights organizations, including B'Tselem, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, echoed the ICJ's concerns. They suggested that the wall's route was designed to perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel, and that the wall was a means for Israel to consolidate control over land used for illegal settlements. The sophisticated structure of the wall also indicated its likely permanence.

Since 2001, the threat of Qassam rockets fired from Palestinian territories into Israel continues to be of great concern for Israeli defense officials. In 2006—the year following Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip—the Israeli government claimed to have recorded 1,726 such launches, more than four times the total rockets fired in 2005. As of January 2009, over 8,600 rockets have been launched, causing widespread psychological trauma and disruption of daily life. As a result of these attacks, Israelis living in southern Israel have had to spend long periods in bomb shelters. The relatively small payload carried on these rockets, Israel's advanced early warning system, American-supplied anti-missile capabilities, and network of shelters made the rockets rarely lethal. In 2014, out of 4,000 rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, only six Israeli civilians were killed. For comparison, the payload carried on these rockets is smaller than Israeli tank shells, of which 49,000 were fired in Gaza in 2014.

There is significant debate within Israel about how to deal with the country's security concerns. Options have included military action (including targeted killings and house demolitions of terrorist operatives), diplomacy, unilateral gestures toward peace, and increased security measures such as checkpoints, roadblocks and security barriers. The legality and the wisdom of all of the above tactics have been called into question by various commentators.

Since mid-June 2007, Israel's primary means of dealing with security concerns in the West Bank has been to cooperate with and permit United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding of the Palestinian Authority's security forces, which with Israeli help have largely succeeded in quelling West Bank supporters of Hamas.

Water resources

In the Middle East, water resources are of great political concern. Since Israel receives much of its water from two large underground aquifers which continue under the Green Line, the use of this water has been contentious in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Israel withdraws most water from these areas, but it also supplies the West Bank with approximately 40 million cubic metres annually, contributing to 77% of Palestinians' water supply in the West Bank, which is to be shared for a population of about 2.6 million.

While Israel's consumption of this water has decreased since it began its occupation of the West Bank, it still consumes the majority of it: in the 1950s, Israel consumed 95% of the water output of the Western Aquifer, and 82% of that produced by the Northeastern Aquifer. Although this water was drawn entirely on Israel's own side of the pre-1967 border, the sources of the water are nevertheless from the shared groundwater basins located under both West Bank and Israel.

In the Oslo II Accord, both sides agreed to maintain "existing quantities of utilization from the resources." In so doing, the Palestinian Authority established the legality of Israeli water production in the West Bank, subject to a Joint Water Committee (JWC). Moreover, Israel obligated itself in this agreement to provide water to supplement Palestinian production, and further agreed to allow additional Palestinian drilling in the Eastern Aquifer, also subject to the Joint Water Committee. The water that Israel receives comes mainly from the Jordan River system, the Sea of Galilee and two underground sources. According to a 2003 BBC article the Palestinians lack access to the Jordan River system.

According to a report of 2008 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, water resources were confiscated for the benefit of the Israeli settlements in the Ghor. Palestinian irrigation pumps on the Jordan River were destroyed or confiscated after the 1967 war and Palestinians were not allowed to use water from the Jordan River system. Furthermore, the authorities did not allow any new irrigation wells to be drilled by Palestinian farmers, while it provided fresh water and allowed drilling wells for irrigation purposes at the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

A report was released by the UN in August 2012 and Max Gaylard, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in the occupied Palestinian territory, explained at the launch of the publication: "Gaza will have half a million more people by 2020 while its economy will grow only slowly. In consequence, the people of Gaza will have an even harder time getting enough drinking water and electricity, or sending their children to school". Gaylard present alongside Jean Gough, of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and Robert Turner, of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The report projects that Gaza's population will increase from 1.6 million people to 2.1 million people in 2020, leading to a density of more than 5,800 people per square kilometre.

Future and financing

Numerous foreign nations and international organizations have established bilateral agreements with the Palestinian and Israeli water authorities. It was estimated that a future investment of about US$1.1bn for the West Bank and $0.8bn for the Gaza Strip Southern Governorates was needed for the planning period from 2003 to 2015.

In late 2012, a donation of $21.6 million was announced by the Government of the Netherlands—the Dutch government stated that the funds would be provided to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), for the specific benefit of Palestinian children. An article, published by the UN News website, stated that: "Of the $21.6 million, $5.7 will be allocated to UNRWA's 2012 Emergency Appeal for the occupied Palestinian territory, which will support programmes in the West Bank and Gaza aiming to mitigate the effects on refugees of the deteriorating situation they face."

Agricultural rights

The conflict has been about land since its inception. When Israel became a state after the war in 1948, 77% of Palestine's land was used for the creation on the state. The majority of those living in Palestine at the time became refugees in other countries and this first land crisis became the root of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Because the root of the conflict is with land, the disputes between Israel and Palestine are well-manifested in the agriculture of Palestine.

In Palestine, agriculture is a mainstay in the economy. The production of agricultural goods supports the population's sustenance needs and fuels Palestine's export economy. According to the Council for European Palestinian Relations, the agricultural sector formally employs 13.4% of the population and informally employs 90% of the population. Over the past 10 years, unemployment rates in Palestine have increased and the agricultural sector became the most impoverished sector in Palestine. Unemployment rates peaked in 2008 when they reached 41% in Gaza.

Palestinian agriculture suffers from numerous problems including Israeli military and civilian attacks on farms and farmers, blockades to exportation of produce and importation of necessary inputs, widespread confiscation of land for nature reserves as well as military and settler use, confiscation and destruction of wells, and physical barriers within the West Bank.

Israel's West Bank barrier

With the construction of the separation barrier, the Israeli state promised free movement across regions. However, border closures, curfews, and checkpoints has significantly restricted Palestinian movement. In 2012, there were 99 fixed check points and 310 flying checkpoints. The border restrictions impacted the imports and exports in Palestine and weakened the industrial and agricultural sectors because of the constant Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza. In order for the Palestinian economy to be prosperous, the restrictions on Palestinian land must be removed. According to The Guardian and a report for World Bank, the Palestinian economy lost $3.4bn (%35 of the annual GDP) to Israeli restrictions in the West Bank alone.

Palestinian violence outside of Israel

Some Palestinians have committed violent acts over the globe on the pretext of a struggle against Israel.

During the late 1960s, groups affiliated with the PLO became increasingly infamous for its use of international terror. In 1969 alone, these groups were responsible for hijacking 82 planes. El Al Airlines became a regular hijacking target. The hijacking of Air France Flight 139 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine culminated during a hostage-rescue mission, where Israeli special forces successfully rescued the majority of the hostages.

One of the most well-known and notorious terrorist acts was the capture and eventual murder of 11 Israeli athletes by the Black September Organization during the 1972 Summer Olympics.

Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence

Fighting among rival Palestinian and Arab movements has played a crucial role in shaping Israel's security policy towards Palestinian militants, as well as in the Palestinian leadership's own policies. As early as the 1930s revolts in Palestine, Arab forces fought each other while also skirmishing with Zionist and British forces, and internal conflicts continue to the present day.

In the First Intifada, more than a thousand Palestinians were killed in a campaign initiated by the Palestine Liberation Organization to crack down on suspected Israeli security service informers and collaborators. The Palestinian Authority was strongly criticized for its treatment of alleged collaborators, rights groups complaining that those labeled collaborators were denied fair trials. According to a report released by the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, less than 45 percent of those killed were actually guilty of informing for Israel.

Overriding authority and international status

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As far as Israel is concerned, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority is derived from the Oslo Accords, signed with the PLO, under which it acquired control over cities in the Palestinian territories (Area A) while the surrounding countryside came either under Israeli security and Palestinian civil administration (Area B) or complete Israeli civil administration (Area C). Israel has built additional highways to allow Israelis to traverse the area without entering Palestinian cities in Area A. The initial areas under Palestinian Authority control are diverse and non-contiguous. The areas have changed over time by subsequent negotiations, including Oslo II, Wye River and Sharm el-Sheik. According to Palestinians, the separated areas make it impossible to create a viable nation and fails to address Palestinian security needs; Israel has expressed no agreement to withdrawal from some Areas B, resulting in no reduction in the division of the Palestinian areas, and the institution of a safe pass system, without Israeli checkpoints, between these parts.

Under the Oslo Accords, as a security measure, Israel has insisted on its control over all land, sea and air border crossings into the Palestinian territories, and the right to set import and export controls. This is to enable Israel to control the entry into the territories of materials of military significance and of potentially dangerous persons.

The PLO's objective for international recognition of the State of Palestine is considered by Israel as a provocative "unilateral" act that is inconsistent with the Oslo Accords.

Economic disputes and boycotts

This section needs to be updated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (October 2024)

In Gaza, the agricultural market suffers from economic boycotts and border closures and restrictions placed by Israel. The PA's Minister of Agriculture estimates that around US$1.2 billion were lost in September 2006 because of these security measures. This embargo was brought on by Hamas' refusal to recognize Israel's right to statehood. As a result, as of 2007, the PA's 160,000 employees had not received their salaries in over one year.

Fatalities

This article needs to be updated. The reason given is: more deaths due to the war beginning in 2023. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. (February 2024)

Studies provide aggregated casualty data for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 13,000 Israelis and Palestinians were killed in the conflict between 1948 and 1997. Other estimates give 14,500 killed between 1948 and 2009. During the 1982 Lebanon War, Israel killed an estimated 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese, not including the 800–3,500 Palestinians killed in the Sabra-Shatila Massacre.

According to B'tselem, during the first intifada from 1987 until 2000, 1,551 Palestinians and 421 Israelis lost their lives. According to the database of the UNOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory (OCHAoPt), 6,407 Palestinians and 308 Israelis were killed in the conflict from 2008 to September 2023, before the Israel–Hamas war.

Figures include both Israeli civilians and security forces casualties in West Bank, Gaza and Israel. All numbers refer to casualties of direct conflict between Israelis and Palestinians including in IDF military operations, artillery shelling, search and arrest campaigns, barrier demonstrations, targeted killings, settler violence etc. The figures do not include events indirectly related to the conflict such as casualties from unexploded ordnance, etc., or events when the circumstances remain unclear or are in dispute. The figures include all reported casualties of all ages and both genders.

As reported by the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, from 29 September 2000 to the year 2010, a total of 7,454 Palestinian and Israeli individuals were killed due to the conflict. According to the report, 1,317 of the 6,371 Palestinians were minors, and at least 2,996 did not participate in fighting at the time of death. Palestinians killed 1,083 Israelis, including 741 civilians, of whom 124 were minors.

Criticism of casualty statistics

The Israeli-based International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) claimed that Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups overestimated the percentage of civilians killed since the IDF suspected many of those killed to be possible militants.

During Operation Cast Lead, Israeli figures reported the number of Palestinians killed at 1,166 Palestinian, 60 percent were classified as "terrorists" by Israeli officials. This discrepancy is partially due to Israel's classification of Gazan police, who did not take part in hostilities, as combatants. The broad consensus among human rights organizations is that these police were primarily civilians, as they did not actively participate in hostilities nor were they part of armed groups. The accuracy of Israeli casualty figures was further questioned based on the number of children killed. Israel reported 89 Palestinian minors killed, whereas the human rights organization B'Tselem reported 252, substantiating their figures with birth and death certificates and other documents in almost all cases. The Israeli figures also stand out against the figures published by the US Department of State, which reported the number killed "at close to 1,400 Palestinians, including more than 1,000 civilians."

Landmines and unexploded ordnance

A comprehensive collection mechanism to gather land mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty data does not exist for the Palestinian territories. In 2009, the United Nations Mine Action Centre reported that more than 2,500 mine and explosive remnants of war casualties occurred between 1967 and 1998, at least 794 casualties (127 killed, 654 injured and 13 unknown) occurred between 1999 and 2008 and that 12 people had been killed and 27 injured since the Gaza War. The UN Mine Action Centre identified the main risks as coming from "ERW left behind by Israeli aerial and artillery weapon systems, or from militant caches targeted by the Israeli forces." There are at least 15 confirmed minefields in the West Bank on the border with Jordan. The Palestinian National Security Forces do not have maps or records of the minefields.

See also

• Palestinian genocide accusation
• Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
• Outline of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war
• Bibliography of the Arab–Israeli conflict
• Israeli–Palestinian conflict in video games
• 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis
• Allon Plan, post-1967 peace plan
• Children in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
• Allegations of war crimes against Israel
• Gaza–Israel conflict
• History of the State of Palestine
• International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict
• Israel–Palestine relations
• Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
• Israeli–Lebanese conflict
• Israeli–Palestinian conflict in Hebron
• List of Middle East peace proposals
• List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
• OneVoice Movement
• Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel
• Pan-Arabism
• Peace Now
• Seeds of Peace

Notes

1. The 1949–1956 Palestinian fedayeen insurgency culminated in the 1956 Suez Crisis.
2. Under the administration of Mahmoud Abbas (2005–present) the PA has been widely perceived as subservient to Israel, but has continued to clash with Israel on occasion.
3. The Palestinian Authority was created by and is ultimately accountable to the PLO (see Palestinian Authority#Politics and internal structure). Under the administration of Mahmoud Abbas (2005–present) the PA has been widely perceived as subservient to Israel, but has continued to clash with Israel on occasion.
4. During the First Intifada.
5. Under the administration of Mahmoud Abbas (2005–present) the PA has been widely perceived as subservient to Israel, but has continued to clash with Israel on occasion.
6. Consists of the armed wings of Hamas and its Palestinian allies
7. In addition to direct deaths, armed conflicts result in indirect deaths "attributable to the conflict". Mortality due to indirect deaths could be due to a variety of causes, such as infectious diseases.
8. estimate for year end 2024
9. Three factors made Israel's territorial offer less forthcoming than it initially appeared. First, the 91 percent land offer was based on the Israeli definition of the West Bank, but this differs by approximately 5 percentage points from the Palestinian definition. Palestinians use a total area of 5,854 square kilometers. Israel, however, omits the area known as No Man's Land (50 km near Latrun), post-1967 East Jerusalem (71 km), and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 km), which reduces the total to 5,538 km

References

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3. Morris 2004, pp. 602–604
4. Brown, Jeremy (2003). Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East. Simon & Schuster, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4711-1475-5. UNRWA put the figure at 413000
5. Dumper, Michael (1997). The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967. Columbia University Press. p. 67. ISBN 9780585388717.
6. Garfinkle, Adam M. (2000). Politics and Society in Modern Israel: Myths and Realities. M. E. Sharpe. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-7656-0514-6.
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8. Uri Ben-Eliezer, War over Peace: One Hundred Years of Israel's Militaristic Nationalism, University of California Press (2019)
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17. "2021 was the deadliest year since 2014, Israel killed 319 Palestinians in oPt 5-year record in house demolitions: 895 Palestinians lost their homes". B'Tselem. Archived from the original on 4 January 2022. Retrieved 4 January 2022.
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19. McCluskey, Mitchell (6 December 2023). "Israel military says 2 civilians killed for every Hamas militant is a 'tremendously positive' ratio given combat challenges". Archived from the original on 13 February 2024. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
20. Tétrault-Farber, Gabrielle (6 December 2023). "UN rights chief warns of heightened risk of 'atrocity crimes' in Gaza". Reuters. Retrieved 3 January 2024.
21. Lev, Gid'on (27 February 2024). "The Tragedy of Israel's 135,000 Displaced Citizens". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 8 October 2024. Retrieved 18 July 2024.
22. Garry, S.; Checchi, F. (2020), "Armed conflict and public health: Into the 21st century", Journal of Public Health, 42 (3): e287–e298, doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdz095, PMID 31822891
23. Khatib, McKee & Yusuf 2024, p. 237
24. Sridhar, Devi (5 September 2024). "Scientists are closing in on the true, horrifying scale of death and disease in Gaza". The Guardian. Retrieved 13 September 2024.
25. Waxman, Dov (2019). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0190625337.
26. Gelvin, James L. (2021). The Israel-Palestine Conflict: A History (4th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 6. ISBN 9781108771634.
27. "A History of Conflict: Introduction". A History of Conflict. BBC News. Archived from the original on 20 April 2011. Retrieved 17 December 2008.
28. "Canadian Policy on Key Issues in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict". Government of Canada. Archived from the original on 18 February 2018. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
29. "Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy" (PDF). World Bank. 9 May 2007. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 April 2010. Retrieved 29 March 2010. Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions
30. Khalidi 2020.
31. Shafir 1996: "The goal of Zionism, however, was to successfully colonize Palestine while at the same time justifying the creation of a homogeneous Jewish settlement through an intensifying denial of Palestinian national aspirations."
32. ^ Morris 2008, p. 1.
33. "The Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 1882–1914". Archived from the original on 23 August 2017. Retrieved 22 August 2017.
34. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (26 October 2020). "Balfour Declaration | History & Impact". Encyclopædia Britannica. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Archived from the original on 4 May 2015. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
35. Khalidi 2024, p. 108: "The repression of the revolt had an impact not only on the populace, but also on the Palestinians' ability to fight thereafter, and on the already fractured capabilities of their national leadership. A high proportion of the Arab casualties included the most experienced military cadres and enterprising fighters.6 By the end of the revolt, most of the top Arab political leaders and thousands of other cadres, militants, and fighters were imprisoned, interned by the British in the Seychelles, in exile, or dead. The British also confiscated large quantities of arms and ammunition from the Arabs during the revolt, and continued to do so during later years. By the end of the revolt, existing political divisions within the Palestinian polity had become envenomed, leading to profound rifts between the majority supporting the revolt and a minority that had become alienated from the leadership: the consequence was assassinations, infighting, and further weakening of the Palestinian position. The impact of the revolt on the Palestinian economy was also severe, although some of that damage was self-inflicted, as a boycott of British and Jewish goods and of the mandatory government during the strike and the revolt simply opened up opportunities for the already larger Jewish-controlled sector of the economy of Palestine to expand further."
36. Khalidi 2020, p. 44
37. Pappé, Ilan (2007). The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oneworld Publications. ISBN 978-1-78074-056-0.
38. ^ Morris 1999
39. Totten, S. (2017). Last Lectures on the Prevention and Intervention of Genocide. Routledge Studies in Genocide and Crimes against Humanity. Taylor & Francis. p. 64. ISBN 978-1-315-40976-4. Archived from the original on 31 March 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2023.
40. Sufian, Sandy (1 January 2008). "Anatomy of the 1936–39 Revolt: Images of the Body in Political Cartoons of Mandatory Palestine". Journal of Palestine Studies. 37 (2). University of California Press: 23–42. doi:10.1525/jps.2008.37.2.23. eISSN 1533-8614. ISSN 0377-919X. JSTOR 10.1525/jps.2008.37.2.23. S2CID 154107901. Archived from the original on 20 June 2022. Retrieved 14 January 2008.
41. Masalha, Nur (2012). "1". The Palestine Nakba. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84813-972-5.
42. Pappé 2022, The Arrival of Zionism
43. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6. Probably the most appealing article in there commendation of the Commission was that about the 'forced transfer' of Arabs from the future Jewish state. To Ben-Gurion this was an 'unparalleled achievement'. It was 'the best of all solutions', according to Berl Katznelson. 'A distant neighbour', he said, 'is better than a close enemy.' Transfer was such an ideal solution that 'it must happen someday', he concluded. A strategy of phases, admittedly always vague and anything but an articulate plan of action, could only prevail if a solution could be found to the demographic problem. 'Transfer' was the magic formula. The idea of transfer for the Arabs had a long pedigree in Zionist thought.
44. Masalha, Nur (2012). The Palestine Nakba. Zed Books. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-84813-973-2. Thus the wishful and rather naive belief in Zionism's early years that the Palestinians could be 'spirited across the border', in Herzl's words, or that they would simply 'fold their tents and slip away', to use Zangwill's formulation, soon gave way to more realistic assessments. Between 1937 and 1948 extensive secret discussions of transfer were held in the Zionist movement's highest bodies, including the Zionist Agency Executive, the Twentieth Zionist Congress, the World Convention of Ihud Po'alei Tzion (the top forum of the dominant Zionist world labour movement), and various official and semi-official transfer committees.
45. Slater 2020, p. 348: "After reviewing Zionism and its consequences, I examined the onset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 1917–47 period, and argued that because the Zionists wanted to ensure a large Jewish majority in the coming state of Israel, their leaders repeatedly discussed the means by which most of the Palestinians could be expelled or induced to flee; the euphemism they employed was "transfer." The scholarship on "transfer"—especially by Israeli historians—leaves no doubt about its importance in the thinking of every major Zionist leader before and after the creation of Israel."
46. Flapan, Simha (1979). Zionism and the Palestinians. Croom Helm. p. 259. ISBN 978-0-06-492104-6. The concept of population transfer, as a facile solution to the twin problems of the Arab landless peasants and the creation of land reserves for Jewish settlement was for some time in the back of the minds of the 2ionist leadership. In fact, in private discussions with the British, the Zionist leadership put forward population transfer as a tentative suggestion but stopped short of formulating it into a proposal for action.
47. Finkelstein, Norman G. (2016). "'Born of War, Not By Design'". Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-78478-458-4. 'The idea of transfer had accompanied the Zionist movement from its very beginnings', Tom Segev reports.
48. Morris 2004, p. 60
49. Gelvin, James (2014) . The Israel–Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85289-0. Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 9 November 2020.
50. Shlaim 2015, Prologue: The Zionist Foundation
51. Khalidi 2020, Introduction: "Additionally, a separate Jewish-controlled sector of the economy was created through the exclusion of Arab labor from Jewish-owned firms under the slogan of "Avoda ivrit," Hebrew labor, and the injection of truly massive amounts of capital from abroad."
52. Sela 2002, p. 361, "al-Husseini, Hajj (Muhammad) Amin"

    He incited and headed anti-Jewish riots in April 1920. ... He promoted the Muslim character of Jerusalem and ... injected a religious character into the struggle against Zionism. This was the backdrop to his agitation concerning Jewish rights at the Western (Wailing) Wall that led to the bloody riots of August 1929...e was the chief organizer of the riots of 1936 and the rebellion from 1937, as well as of the mounting internal terror against Arab opponents.

53. ^ Sela 2002, pp. 58–121, "Arab-Israel Conflict"
54. ^ "History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" (PDF). PBS. December 2001. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 December 2012. Retrieved 14 March 2013.
55. Khalidi 2020, Chapter 1: "Of all the services Britain provided to the Zionist movement before 1939, perhaps the most valuable was the armed suppression of Palestinian resistance in the form of the revolt. The bloody war waged against the country's majority, which left 10 percent of the adult male Arab population killed, wounded, imprisoned, or exiled,55 was the best illustration of the unvarnished truths uttered by Jabotinsky about the necessity of the use of force for the Zionist project to succeed. To quash the uprising, the British Empire brought in two additional divisions of troops, squadrons of bombers, and all the paraphernalia of repression that it had perfected over many decades of colonial wars."
56. Khalidi 2020, Chapter 1: "IN SPITE OF the sacrifices made—which can be gauged from the very large numbers of Palestinians who were killed, wounded, jailed, or exiled—and the revolt's momentary success, the consequences for the Palestinians were almost entirely negative. The savage British repression, the death and exile of so many leaders, and the conflict within their ranks left the Palestinians divided, without direction, and with their economy debilitated by the time the revolt was crushed in the summer of 1939. This put the Palestinians in a very weak position to confront the now invigorated Zionist movement, which had gone from strength to strength during the revolt, obtaining lavish amounts of arms and extensive training from the British to help them suppress the uprising."
57. Louis, William Roger (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I. B. Tauris. p. 391. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6.
58. Morris, Benny (2009). One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict. Yale University Press. p. 66. ISBN 978-0-300-15604-1. Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 27 September 2020.
59. Morris 2004, p. 48
60. Shlaim 2015, Prologue: The Zionist Foundation: "A white paper of 17 May 1939 abruptly reversed British support for Zionism and for a Jewish state."
61. Hughes, Matthew (2009a). "The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39" (PDF). English Historical Review. CXXIV (507): 314–354. doi:10.1093/ehr/cep002. ISSN 0013-8266. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 February 2016.
62. A Survey of Palestine (PDF). Jerusalem: Government of Palestine. 1946. pp. 38–49. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 May 2021. Retrieved 28 January 2024.
63. Levenberg, Haim (1993). Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945–1948. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-3439-5.
64. "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. Archived from the original on 24 May 2012. Retrieved 28 May 2013.
65. ^ Baum, Noa. "Historical Time Line for Israel/Palestine." Archived 19 December 2013 at the Wayback Machine UMass Amherst. 5 April 2005. 14 March 2013.
66. Morris 2008, pp. 63–64, "The Zionists and their supporters rejoiced; the Arab delegations walked out of the plenum after declaring the resolution invalid. The Arabs failed to understand why the international community was awarding the Jews any part of Palestine. Further, as one Palestinian historian later put it, they could not fathom why 37 percent of the population had been given 55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent). Moreover, the Jews had been given the best agricultural lands (the Coastal Plain and Jezreel and Jordan Valleys) while the Arabs had received the 'bare and hilly' parts, as one Palestinian politician, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, told a Zionist agent. 162 More generally, 'the Palestinians failed to see why they should be made to pay for the Holocaust. ... they failed to see why it was not fair for the Jews to be a minority in a unitary Palestinian state, while it was fair for almost half of the Palestinian population—the indigenous majority on its own ancestral soil—to be converted overnight into a minority under alien rule.'"
67. Morris 2008, p. 101, "... mainstream Zionist leaders, from the first, began to think of expanding the Jewish state beyond the 29 November partition resolution borders."
68. Morris 2008, p. 79
69. Louwerse, Colter (2024). Stern-Weiner, Jamie (ed.). Deluge. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9. During the June 1967 Arab-Israel War, Israel came into military occupation of the Palestinian West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. (Israel also occupied the Egyptian Sinai, Syrian Golan Heights, and two islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.) Already by the mid-1970s, the international community converged on a framework for resolving the festering conflict. This framework comprised two elements rooted in fundamental principles of international law. The first called for Israel's full withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories in exchange for Palestinian-Arab recognition of Israel. The second called for establishing an independent State of Palestine on the Palestinian territories from which Israel would withdraw, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza, as well as a "just resolution" of the Palestinian refugee question.10 Land for peace and Palestinian self-determination secured through a two-state settlement: these principles for a reasonable if imperfect resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict were eventually endorsed by an overwhelming consensus at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the political organs of the United Nations (UN), and of respected human rights organizations.
70. Erakat, Noura (2019). Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0883-2. The 1973 War demonstrated that Arabs could work together when needed and that Israel was not as invincible as it had believed. The war left its scars on Israel, which suffered over 2,500 dead, US$4 billion in direct monetary losses, and deflated confidence. Although the Arabs technically lost the war, they won psychologically and diplomatically as the world once again focused on the ongoing conflict.156 In 1973, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, affirming the land-for-peace framework enshrined in Resolution 242 and setting into motion what was to become known as the Middle East peace process. Palestinian control of the PLO and the rise of guerilla warfare, together with the shift ushered in by the 1973 War, would lay the groundwork for the PLO's political agenda and aggressive legal strategy throughout the decade that followed.
71. Slater 2020, p. 216: "The disastrous defeat of the Arab states in the 1973 war also played a major role in convincing Arafat of the need for a compromise peace settlement. Arafat's decision to start peace negotiations with Israel led to the June 1974 PLO agreement to adopt a new strategy that called for a struggle for "every part of Palestine that is liberated" (emphasis added). Anziska writes that this constituted "an acceptance of a political solution on a limited piece of territory," the first step, however vague, that opened the door for a Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution... In a recent major work, historian Seth Anziska writes that the 1973 war "launched a new phase in the PLO's struggle, oriented toward partition and the acknowledgment of Israel's presence. In the aftermath of the October War, the PLO sought a place within the comprehensive diplomatic negotiations, which required political compromise and the eventual embrace of a state on far less territory than historic Palestine" (Anziska, Preventing Palestine, Kindle 25). Similarly, Bird writes: "By mid-1974 the PLO was rapidly moving away from a strategy of armed struggle and morphing into a political movement seeking international legitimacy" based on a two-state solution (Bird, The Good Spy, Kindle location 2560–75). For similar assessments of the importance of the 1974 PLO program, see Hart, Arafat, 10–11; Weinberger, "The Palestinian National Security Debate"; Nofal, "Yasir Arafat: A Mixed Legacy"; Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Kindle 483–84; and Elgindy, Blind Spot, Kindle 88."
72. Morris 1999, The Politics of War and Afterffects: "On the other hand, the war had given Israel a stinging slap in the face. The 1948, 1956, and 1967 wars had conditioned them to stunning victories over the Arabs and to Arab military (and political) incompetence; 1973 proved to be something else altogether. Many Israelis were now persuaded that the territories could not be held indefinitely by force and that continued occupation would necessarily lead to further bouts of painful warfare. At last, and for the first time since June 1967, most people were willing to contemplate giving up large chunks of land for peace."
73. Pappé 2022, pp. 287: "The 1973 war was a traumatic event that promoted the disintegration of Israeli politics and culture. The myth of Israeli invincibility was shattered, and while some saw this as a good reason to become more insistent in the search for peace, others turned to God, toughening their positions on peace and territorial compromise. What added to the confusion and the erosion of self-confidence was the high number of deaths, about 3,000, compared with the few hundred in the 1967 war. A general sense of grief fell on the country and affected the government's prestige."
74. Khalidi 2013, The First Moment: Begin and Palestinian Autonomy in 1982: "In addition to their central provision, for a peace treaty between the two countries, the Camp David Accords, agreed upon by Israel and Egypt under the aegis of the United States in 1978, called for negotiations for the establishment of a "Self-Governing Authority" (SGA) for the Arab population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Jerusalem was to be excluded from its provisions. The accords stipulated "full autonomy for the inhabitants," but crucially, this did not apply to the land, which was to remain under full Israeli control. A bilateral peace treaty based on these accords was signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979, and Israel thereafter began a withdrawal of its forces from the occupied Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, which was completed in the spring of 1982. However, the modalities of the Palestinian-autonomy accords were a continuing source of dispute between the three signatories to the Camp David Accords, as well as with the Palestinians and other Arabs, and in the end they were never implemented."
75. Shlaim 2015, The Camp David Accords: "The Camp David Accords were signed in an impressive ceremony in the White House on 17 September 1978. The two accords were entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt." The former stated in its preamble, "The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is UN Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts." The framework dealt with the West Bank and Gaza and envisaged nothing less than "the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects." Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people were to participate in the negotiations, which were to proceed in three stages. In the first, the ground rules would be laid for electing a "self-governing authority" for the territories, and the powers of this authority would be defined. In the second stage, once the self-governing authority had been established, a transitional period would begin. Israel's military government and its civilian administration would be withdrawn; Israel's armed forces would also be withdrawn and the remaining forces redeployed into specified security locations. In the third stage, not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations would take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. These negotiations had to recognize "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."
76. Morris 1999, The Lebanon War: "The aim of "Operation Litani" was to kill as many guerrillas as possible and to destroy the military infrastructure—camps, munitions dumps, artillery pieces. A secondary aim was to expand, and create continuity between, the existing Christian-held enclaves on the Lebanese side of the border. By March 21, the IDF had taken all of the area south of the Litani (except for Tyre and its environs).
77. Kimmerling, Baruch (2003). Politicide. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-85984-517-2. The collaboration was solidified and made public during Begin's first term. Begin was impressed by the pleas and the aristocratic manner of the Maronite leaders and several times declared "Israel will not allow genocide in Lebanon." In March 1978, Israeli forces temporarily occupied southern Lebanon, in an attempt to neutralize Palestinian guerilla groups and enlarge the territory controlled by Major Haddad, in an undertaking called Operation Litani (the river that more or less marked the boundary of the Israeli influence).
78. Khalidi 2020, The Third Declaration of War: "Nevertheless, after all this and despite an Israeli incursion in 1978—the Litani Operation—which left a swath of south Lebanon under the control of its proxy, the South Lebanese Army, the PLO was still standing. Indeed, it remained the strongest force in large parts of Lebanon, those that were not in the hands of foreign armies or their proxies, including West Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, the Shouf Mountains, and much of the south. It would take one more military campaign to dislodge the PLO, and in 1982, American Secretary of State General Alexander Haig agreed to Ariel Sharon's plans for Israel to finish off the organization and with it Palestinian nationalism."
79. Cleveland & Bunton 2010: "This was that belt the Israeli government wished to destroy. Its first concerted effort to do so occurred in 1978, when 25,000 Israeli troops invaded Lebanon as far north as the Litani River. The operation failed to dislodge the PLO from its strongholds, although it did cause large-scale demographic disruptions in southern Lebanon as thousands of villagers, mainly Shi'as, fled their homelands for the area of Beirut. Pressure from the United States and the UN eventually compelled Israel to withdraw its troops."
80. Hourani, Albert Habib (2002). A history of the Arab peoples. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-05819-4. In 1982 the situation acquired a more dangerous dimension. The nationalist government in Israel, having secured its southern frontier by the peace treaty with Egypt, now tried to impose its own solution of the problem of the Palestinians. This involved an attempt to destroy both the military and the political power of the PLO in Lebanon, to install a friendly regime there, and then, freed from effective Palestinian resistance, to pursue its policy of settlement and annexation of occupied Palestine. With some degree of acquiescence from the USA, Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982. The invasion culminated in a long siege of the western part of Beirut, mainly inhabited by Muslims and dominated by the PLO. The siege ended with an agreement, negotiated through the US government, by which the PLO would evacuate west Beirut, with guarantees for the safety of Palestinian civilians given by the Lebanese and US governments. At the same time, a presidential election resulted in the military head of the Kata'ib, Bashir Jumayyil, becoming president; he was assassinated soon afterwards and his brother Amin was then elected. The assassination was taken by Israel as an opportunity to occupy west Beirut, and this allowed the Kata'ib to carry out a massacre of Palestinians on a large scale in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.
81. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6. Destroying the PLO's infrastructure in Lebanon as well as dismantling the last remaining Palestinian springboard in an Arab country for the military struggle against Israel, was the immediate operational objective of the war. But the architects of the invasion had far wider ambitions. They believed that the defeat of the Palestinians in Lebanon would trigger a mass exodus of Palestinians to the East Bank of the River Jordan, which in turn would bring about the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty and the Palestinisation of the kingdom in a way that would allow Israel a free hand to assert her rule in Judaea and Samaria. Israel also believed that her victory in Lebanon would create a new political order in that country with an undisputed Christian hegemony.
82. ^ Shlaim 2015, The Lebanese Quagmire 1981 –1984: "The real driving force behind Israel's invasion of Lebanon, however, was Ariel Sharon, whose aims were much more ambitious and far-reaching. From his first day at the Defense Ministry, Sharon started planning the invasion of Lebanon. He developed what came to be known as the "big plan" for using Israel's military power to establish political hegemony in the Middle East. The first aim of Sharon's plan was to destroy the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organization. The second aim was to establish a new political order in Lebanon by helping Israel's Maronite friends, headed by Bashir Gemayel, to form a government that would proceed to sign a peace treaty with Israel. For this to be possible, it was necessary, third, to expel the Syrian forces from Lebanon or at least to weaken seriously the Syrian presence there. In Sharon's big plan, the war in Lebanon was intended to transform the situation not only in Lebanon but in the whole Middle East. The destruction of the PLO would break the backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Greater Israel. The resulting influx of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank into Jordan would eventually sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and transform the East Bank into a Palestinian state. Sharon reasoned that Jordan's conversion into a Palestinian state would end international pressures on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. Begin was not privy to all aspects of Sharon's ambitious geopolitical scenario, but the two men were united by their desire to act against the PLO in Lebanon."
83. Morris 1999: "On September 1 an IDF helicopter flew Gemayel to Nahariya, in northern Israel, where he met Begin, who had just been informed of the "Reagan Plan," the new American initiative for Israeli withdrawal from most of the occupied territories in exchange for Arab recognition and peace. By invading Lebanon, Begin had hoped to neutralize Palestinian nationalism and facilitate Israeli annexation, at least de facto, of the West Bank. But the invasion had brought home to the Americans the plight of the Palestinians and the imperative of resolving their problem, with Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank among the necessary preconditions. The Reagan initiative ruled out a final settlement that would involve either Israeli annexation of the territories or full-fledged Palestinian statehood."
84. Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-89608-601-2. was that "Operation Peace for Galilee"—the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982—was undertaken to protect the civilian population from Palestinian gunners, and that "the rocket and shelling attacks on Israel's northern border" were ended by the operation, though "If rockets again rain down on Israel's northern border after all that has been expended on Lebanon, the Israeli public will be outraged.19 This cannot be correct, given the history which is not challenged (even if unreported, for the most part). When it came to be recognized that the rockets still "rain down," the story was modified: "Israel's two military forays into Lebanon were military disasters that failed to provide long-term security for Israel's northern border."20 Security had indeed been at risk, as a result of Israel's unprovoked attacks from 1981, and to a large extent before. The phrase "military disaster" does not refer to the killing of some 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians in 1982, overwhelmingly civilians, the destruction of much of southern Lebanon and the capital city of Beirut, or the terrible atrocities carried out by Israeli troops through the mid-1980s; rather, to Israel's failure to impose the "new order" it had proclaimed for Lebanon and its inability to maintain its occupation in full because of the casualties caused by unanticipated resistance ("terror"), forcing it back to its "security zone." The actual reasons for the 1982 invasion have never been concealed in Israel, though they are rated "X" here.21 A few weeks after the invasion began, Israel's leading academic specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath, pointed out that the decision to invade "flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed" by the PLO, a "veritable catastrophe" for the Israeli government because it endangered the policy of evading a political settlement. The PLO was gaining respectability thanks to its preference for negotiations over terror. The Israeli government's hope, therefore, was to compel "the stricken PLO" to "return to its earlier terrorism," thus "undercutting the danger" of negotiations. As Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir later stated, Israel went to war because there was "a terrible danger... Not so much a military one as a political one." The invasion was intended to "undermine the position of the moderates within ranks" and thus to block "the PLO 'peace offensive"' and "to halt rise to political respectability" (strategic analyst Avner Yaniv); it should be called "the war to safeguard the occupation of the West Bank," having been motivated by Begin's "fear of the momentum of the peace process," according to Israeli Arabist and former head of military intelligence General Yehoshaphat Harkabi. U.S. backing for Israel's aggression, including the vetoing of Security Council efforts to stop the slaughter, was presumably based on the same reasoning. After its failure to impose the intended "New Order" in Lebanon in 1982, Israel attempted to hold on to as much of Lebanon as possible, though it was forced to withdraw to its "security zone" as resistance caused too many Israeli casualties. Meanwhile Israel conducted violent terror operations, notably the "iron fist" operations of 1985 under the direction of Prime Minister Shimon Peres. These went on through the 1980s.2
85. Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9. As a result, the PLO did not attack Israel from mid-I98r to mid-I982.16 But in June 1982 Israel again invaded Lebanon, and it used aerial bombardment to destroy entire camps of Palestine Arab refugees.17 By these means Israel killed 20,000 persons, mostly civilians,18 and while it occupied southern Lebanon it incarcerated 15,000 persons, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The IDF continued north to Beirut, where it forced the PLO out of Lebanon. Israel claimed self-defense for its invasion, but the lack of PLO attacks into Israel during the previous year made that claim dubious. By invading Lebanon, Israel evidently sought to destroy the extensive Palestinian military and administrative infrastructure in Lebanon19 and, by removing the PLO, to convince the Arabs of the Gaza Strip and West Bank that they would get no help from the PLO.20 In the United States Harold Saunders, a former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, said that Israel aimed,
86. Slater 2020, p. 354: "For just that reason, though, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon worried that the growing PLO moderation would increase the pressure on Israel to accept the creation of a Palestinian state. To prevent that, in 1982 they seized upon a pretext to again invade Lebanon and attack the PLO, this time on a far larger scale than in previous conflicts. The attacks resulted in tens of thousands of Lebanese civilian casualties; however, the PLO forces in southern Lebanon, still led by Arafat, who escaped Israeli efforts to kill him, were soon reconstituted."
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118. ^ Baconi 2018, Politicide, Containment, and Pacification
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121. Yaniv, Avner (1987). Dilemmas of Security. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-504122-4.
122. Shlaim 2015: "The PLO followed the Algiers resolutions with a concerted attempt to project a more moderate image. It made a special effort to gain respectability by dissociating the PLO from terrorism. Arafat issued a series of statements on the subject, which failed to satisfy the United States, so in the end the State Department virtually dictated the text that Arafat read at the opening of his press conference in Geneva on 14 December. "I repeat for the record," stated Arafat, "that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism. Between Geneva and Algiers we have made our position crystal clear." The statement unconditionally accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 and clearly recognized Israel's right to exist. All the conditions that Henry Kissinger had laid down in 1975 for dealing with the PLO had now been met. One of the last major foreign policy acts of the outgoing Reagan administration was to recognize the PLO and to open a substantive dialogue with it. This dialogue was conducted by the American ambassador in Tunis. President Reagan stated publicly that the special commitment of the United States to Israel's security and well-being remained unshakable."
123. Shlaim 2015: "To Shamir it was crystal clear, once again, that the PLO had not abandoned the path of terror. For him the PLO had always been and would forever remain a terrorist organization. His response to the momentous changes taking place in the Palestinian camp was a reaffirmation of his previous position: no to withdrawal from the occupied territories, no to recognition of the PLO, no to negotiation with the PLO, no to a Palestinian state. Shamir called the U.S. decision to enter into a dialogue with the PLO a "grave error." He saw it as a threat to the long-standing American-Israeli collaboration in support of the territorial status quo. "For the PLO," explained Shamir, "a Palestinian state is a minimum. Therefore, anyone who engages in negotiations with it in effect accepts this principle. What else can one talk about with the PLO, if not about a Palestinian state?" Vice-Premier Peres described the opening of the U.S.-PLO dialogue as "a sad day for all of us." But he felt that Israel had to come up with its own peace initiative, since it was impossible to preserve the status quo."
124. ^ Pappé 2022
125. ^ Quandt, William B. (2005). Peace Process. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24631-7.
126. ^ Khalidi 2020
127. Slater 2020, Chapter 14: "On the contrary, in August 1996 the PLO honored its commitment to revoke its original charter, which had denied the legitimacy of Israel and called for the armed liberation of all of Palestine. As well, by 1996 the PA and its police forces had become increasingly successful in their efforts to end the terrorism of Hamas and other Islamic extremists, even cooperating with the Israeli forces. As a result, there were now far fewer terrorist attacks than in the preceding few years."
128. Shlaim 2015, Stonewalling 1988 –1992
129. ^ Christison, Kathleen (2000). Perceptions of Palestine. University of California Press. p. 290. ISBN 978-0-520-21718-8.
130. ^ Cleveland, William L.; Bunton, Martin (2010). A History of the Modern Middle East. ReadHowYouWant.com, Limited. ISBN 978-1-4587-8155-0.
131. Slater 2020
132. ^ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2007). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. p. 241. ISBN 978-0-19-532542-3.
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136. Dennis Ross (2005). The Missing Peace. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-52980-2.
137. Watson 2000, pp. 211–236: "The Palestinian side has repeatedly run afoul of its obligation to refrain from incitement and hostile propaganda."
138. Watson 2000, pp. 211–236: "the Palestinian record of compliance with these obligations is at best mixed...the PA's record on security cooperation has been mixed... The PA has a mixed record on fighting terror group."
139. ^ Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. pp. Chapter 10. ISBN 978-0-7453-1530-0.
140. ^ Finkelstein, Norman G. (2018). Gaza. University of California Press. pp. Chapter 2. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1.
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142. ^ Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. pp. e-book section 38. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. Camp David failed because of the two sides' conflicting interpretations of the terms of reference of the peace process. The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on "international legitimacy" and "all UN relevant resolutions."
143. Finkelstein 2007, p. 352
144. Finkelstein 2007, p. 352: "In a letter to President Clinton, who presided over the proceedings, Palestinian representatives stated that their aim was implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 and that "e are willing to accept adjustments of the border between the two countries, on condition that they be equivalent in value and importance." Repeatedly the Palestinian negotiators asked: "Will you accept the June 4border ? Will you accept the principle of the exchange of territories?" The Israeli position was that "e can't accept the demand for a return to the borders of June 1967as a pre-condition for the negotiation," while Clinton "literally yells," in response to the Palestinian view that "international legitimacy means Israeli retreat to the border of 4 June 1967," that "his isn't the Security Council here. This isn't the U.N. General Assembly."
145. Pressman 2003, pp. 16–17
146. ^ Karsh, Efraim (2003). Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest. New York: Grove Press. p. 168. Arafat rejected the proposal
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152. Slater 2020: "After Camp David, a new mythology emerged perpetrated by Barak and his foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, with the support of Dennis Ross, Clinton's secretary of state Madeleine Albright, and to a considerable extent Clinton himself. The mythology holds that at Camp David, Barak made a generous and unprecedented offer to the Palestinians, only to be met by a shocking if not perverse rejection by Arafat who then ordered a violent uprising at just the moment when the chances for peace had never been greater. For example, shortly after the conclusion of Camp David, Ben-Ami gave a long interview with Haaretz, claiming that Arafat did not go to Camp David to reach a compromise settlement but rather treated the negotiations as "a huge camouflage net behind which he sought to undermine the very idea of two states for two nations. ... Camp David collapsed over the fact that refused to get in the game. They refused to make a counterproposal ... and didn't succeed in conveying ... that at some point the demands would have an end." The implied premise of Barak and Ben-Ami was that Arafat thought the Palestinians held all the cards, so that if he held out long enough, he would eventually reach his goal: the destruction of Israel in stages and the takeover of all of historic Palestine. This view became widely accepted in US and Israeli public opinion... This and other Camp David mythologies have been rejected, both at the time and in retrospect, by nearly all scholars and knowledgeable journalists and by most Israeli and US officials who participated in the negotiations. In particular, they were challenged in interviews and memoirs by the leading Israeli negotiators, among them Ron Pundak, Yossi Beilin, Oden Era, Shaul Arieli, Yossi Ginosser, Moshe Amirav, and General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, chief of staff of the IDF in 1995–1998. As well, the mythologies were strongly—and subsequently, publicly—rejected by Israel's leading military intelligence officials, including Ami Ayalon, the 2000 head of Shin Bet, and Matti Steinberg, his chief advisor—and by Amos Malka, head of the IDF's military intelligence bureau, and his second in command, Ephraim Lavie."
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187. Pertile, Marco (2005). "'Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory': A Missed Opportunity for International Humanitarian Law?". In Conforti, Benedetto; Bravo, Luigi (eds.). The Italian Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 14. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 141. ISBN 978-90-04-15027-0. the establishment of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has been considered illegal by the international community and by the majority of legal scholars.
188. Barak-Erez, Daphne (2006). "Israel: The security barrier—between international law, constitutional law, and domestic judicial review". International Journal of Constitutional Law. 4 (3): 548. doi:10.1093/icon/mol021. The real controversy hovering over all the litigation on the security barrier concerns the fate of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Since 1967, Israel has allowed and even encouraged its citizens to live in the new settlements established in the territories, motivated by religious and national sentiments attached to the history of the Jewish nation in the land of Israel. This policy has also been justified in terms of security interests, taking into consideration the dangerous geographic circumstances of Israel before 1967 (where Israeli areas on the Mediterranean coast were potentially threatened by Jordanian control of the West Bank ridge). The international community, for its part, has viewed this policy as patently illegal, based on the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that prohibit moving populations to or from territories under occupation.
189. Drew, Catriona (1997). "Self-determination and population transfer". In Bowen, Stephen (ed.). Human rights, self-determination and political change in the occupied Palestinian territories. International studies in human rights. Vol. 52. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 151–152. ISBN 978-90-411-0502-8. It can thus clearly be concluded that the transfer of Israeli settlers into the occupied territories violates not only the laws of belligerent occupation but the Palestinian right of self-determination under international law. The question remains, however, whether this is of any practical value. In other words, given the view of the international community that the Israeli settlements are illegal under the law if belligerent occupation, what purpose does it serve to establish that an additional breach of international law has occurred?
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259. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. The Israelis came to the negotiations with the conviction inherent in the letter of the Oslo Accords that this was an open-ended process where no preconceived solutions existed and where every one of the core issues would be open to negotiation so that a reasonable point of equilibrium between the needs of the parties could be found. The Palestinians saw the negotiations as a step in a journey where they would get their rights as if this were a clear-cut process of decolonization based on 'international legitimacy' and 'all UN relevant resolutions.'
260. Finkelstein, Norman G. (2018). "Appendix". Gaza. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-29571-1. I was the Minister of Justice. I am a lawyer," Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told her Palestinian interlocutors during a critical round of the peace process in 2007, "but I am against law—international law in particular.
261. ^ Louwerse, Colter (16 April 2024). "3". Deluge. OR Books. ISBN 978-1-68219-619-9.
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265. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). "The Occupation's Traits of Permanence". Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. But the abject submission of the Palestinians and the ever deepening system of occupation and discrimination in the territories are Israel's sole and exclusive responsibility. As brilliantly explained by Michael Sfard, this is a system built on three pillars: the gun, the settlements, and the law that formalizes the network of colonization.1 Under the mantle of security claims, the Jewish state has created in the Palestinian territories one of the most efficient occupation regimes in history, which is, moreover, also cost-effective, for it is the international community's donor money to the Palestinian Authority that saves the occupier the burden of having to directly administer the territories. This leaves Israel free to cater to its insatiable security needs with draconic measures, such as limiting the Palestinians' freedom of movement, erecting walls that separate communities, dotting roads with checkpoints where innocent people are manhandled, activating sophisticated intelligence mechanisms that control the lives of an ever growing number of suspects, conducting surprise searches of private houses in the middle of the night, and carrying out arbitrary administrative detentions. If this were not enough, vigilantes among the settlers, some known as "the Youth of the Hills," constantly harass Palestinian communities, destroy orchard trees, and arbitrarily apply a "price tag" of punishments to innocent civilians for whatever terrorist attack might have been perpetrated by a Palestinian squad. Underlying this very serious problem of the unpardonable depravity of settlers' extremism is the even more serious problem that has to do with the involvement of the entire Israeli body politic in maintaining and continuously expanding a regime of dominance in the territories. For too long, the peace process has served as a curtain behind which the policy of practical annexation has flourished.
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267. Scott-Baumann 2023: "The Israeli government proceeded to annex East Jerusalem. This act violated international law, and the United Nations General Assembly condemned it... Furthermore, Israel confiscated a large swath of land to the east of the city that would, in time, form a barrier of Israeli settlements surrounding the city, thus cutting off the Palestinian population of Jerusalem from its West Bank hinterland."
268. ^ Sela 2002, pp. 491–498
269. Avraham Sela (2002). Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 495. ISBN 978-0-8264-1413-7.: "Arab-Jewish tensions stemmed from incidents in and around the Temple Mount (al-haram al-sharif) and provocative actions by Jewish extremists against Arabs. Particularly frustrating from a Palestinian viewpoint were the constant efforts made by the Israeli authorities to settle Jews in purely Arab neighborhoods by purchasing Arab or church property, or to appropriate inhabited Arab property by legal means on the grounds that it had been originally owned by Jews."
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271. Diamond, Jeremy; Labott, Elise (6 December 2017). "Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital". CNN. Archived from the original on 26 January 2018. Retrieved 7 December 2017.
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275. Reiter, Yitzhak (2017). Contested Holy Places in Israel–Palestine: Sharing and Conflict Resolution. Routledge. p. xiii. ISBN 9781351998857.
276. Breger, Marshall J.; Reiter, Yitzhak; Hammer, Leonard (2010). "Regulation of holy places in the West Bank and Gaza". Holy Places in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Confrontation and Co-Existence. Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9780203867457. these sites saw simultaneous worship by Jews and Muslims, with the exception of the period of Jordanian rule in the West Bank, between 1948–67, when Jews had no access to these sites
277. Gold, Dore (2007). The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing. pp. 5–6.
278. Golden, Jonathan (2004). "Targeting Heritage: The Abuse of Symbolic Sites in Modern Conflicts". In Rowan, Yorke M.; Baram, Uzi (eds.). Marketing heritage: archaeology and the consumption of the past. Rowman Altamira. pp. 183–202. ISBN 978-0-7591-0342-9. Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 29 October 2015.
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288. Slater 2020, p. 265: "Refugees. Israel agreed that the refugee problem was a regrettable humanitarian issue, Barak stated, and would recognize the right of the Palestinians to return to their own state, but that "no right of return to Israeli territory would prevail." However, he continued, Israel was prepared to admit several hundred refugees annually for a ten- to fifteen-year period, under a family unification program. In a later interview, Barak made it clear that the "family unification program" was not based on any Palestinian rights: "No Israeli prime minister will accept even one refugee on the basis of the right of return."
289. Scott-Baumann 2023
290. Slater 2020, p. 251: "The Palestinian Position. Since 1948 the official or public position of Arafat, the PLO, Arafat's successor Mahmoud Abbas, and the Palestinian Authority has been—and, rhetorically at least, still is—that the Palestinian refugees as well as their descendants have the right to return to their lands, homes, and villages. Arafat reiterated that "demand" at Camp David, though he and other Palestinian leaders repeatedly assured the Americans and the Israelis that their real goal was Israeli acceptance only of the "principle" of refugee return, as distinct from implementing that "right" in practice."
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300. See for example, Masalha, Nur-eldeen (1988). "On Recent Hebrew and Israeli Sources for the Palestinian Exodus, 1947–49". Journal of Palestine Studies. 18 (1): 121–137. doi:10.2307/2537599. JSTOR 2537599. And Childers, Irskine (12 May 1961). "The Other Exodus". The Spectator. London.
301. Honig-Parnass, Tikva (2011). The False Prophets of Peace: Liberal Zionism and the Struggle for Palestine. Haymarket Books. p. 5. ISBN 978-1-60846-130-1. Makdisi rightly argues that almost every law of South African Apartheid has its equivalent in Israel today.18 A significant example is the Law of Return (1950), which even Kretzmer claims is explicitly discriminatory against Palestinian citizens.... The Law of Return, which determines the second-class citizenship of Palestinians, is recognized as a fundamental principle in Israel and "is possibly even its very raison d'etre as a Jewish state."19
302. Schmidt, Yvonne (2008). Foundations of Civil and Political Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories. GRIN Verlag oHG. pp. 245–246. ISBN 978-3-638-94450-2. In any case has the Law of Return, 1950 discriminatory effect for Palestinian Arab people since it allows any Jew to immigrate to Israel, while—at the same time—it deprives all native Palestinian Arab refugees residing outside the borders of the state of Israel of their fundamental right to return to their homes and villages from which they were expelled or took flight in the course of the 1948 war that broke out because of the establishment of Israel.
303. Kassim, Anis F. (2002). The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 2001–2002: Vol. 11. Brill. p. 150. ISBN 978-3-638-94450-2. Under the heading of "Discrimination", the Committee cited Israel's Law of Return as discriminatory against Palestinian refugees because of Israel's refusal to readmit them. The committee said: "The Committee notes with concern that the Law of Return which permits any Jew from anywhere in the world to immigrate and thereby virtually automatically enjoy residence and obtain citizenship in Israel, discriminates against Palestinians in the Diaspora upon whom the Government of Israel has imposed restrictive requirements that make it almost impossible to return to their land of birth."
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306. Radley, K. René (1978). "The Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International Law". American Journal of International Law. 72 (3): 586–614. doi:10.2307/2200460. JSTOR 2200460. S2CID 147111254.
307. Morris, Benny (2001). Righteous victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–2001 (1st Vintage Books ed.). New York: Vintage Books. pp. 252–258. ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7.
308. ^ "Israel and the Palestinians". The Irish Times. 2 February 2008. Archived from the original on 21 October 2012. Retrieved 5 August 2012.
309. Shavit, Ari (8 January 2004). "Survival of the Fittest". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 30 October 2017. Retrieved 7 January 2015.
310. Finkelstein, Norman G. (2012). Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish Romance with Israel is Coming to an End. New York: OR Books. pp. Chapter 10. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5.
311. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2007). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. Oxford University Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-0-19-532542-3. A massive repatriation of Palestinian refugees would have clashed irreconcilably with the most vital and fundamental ethos of the new State of Israel, indeed with its very raison d'être, namely the consolidation of a Jewish state through the mass immigration of the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust in Europe and the uprooted and dispossessed Jews of North Africa and the Arab Middle East... No Israeli statesman, either in 1948 or in 2005, would conceive of peace based on the massive repatriation of Palestinian refugees as an offer the Jewish state could accept and yet survive. The ethos of Zionism was twofold; it was about demography—ingathering the exiles in a viable Jewish state with as small an Arab minority as possible—and land.
312. Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel said that returning Palestinians might be a fifth column and a demographic threat to Israel as a Jewish state.
313. Erlanger, Steven (31 March 2007). "Olmert Rejects Right of Return for Palestinians". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 22 March 2017. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
314. Chomsky, Noam (1999). Fateful Triangle. Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-89608-601-2. Evidently, the indigenous population also has a 'security problem'; in fact, the Palestinians have already suffered the catastrophe that Israelis justly fear.
315. Khalidi 2013, Introduction: "Similarly, in this lexicon, "security" is an absolute priority of Israel's, the need for which is invariably described as rooted in genuine, deep-seated existential fears. "Israeli security" therefore takes precedence over virtually everything else, including international law and the human rights of others. It is an endlessly expansive concept that includes a remarkable multitude of things, such as whether pasta or generator parts can be brought into the Gaza Strip, or whether miserably poor Palestinian villagers can be allowed water cisterns.1 By contrast, in spite of the precarious nature of their situation, Palestinians are presumed not to have any significant concerns about their security. This is the case even though nearly half the Palestinian population have lived for more than two generations under a grinding military occupation without the most basic human, civil, or political rights, and the rest have for many decades been dispersed from their ancestral homeland, many of them living under harsh, authoritarian Arab governments."
316. Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2022). "The Occupation's Traits of Permanence". Prophets Without Honor. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-006047-3. The Israeli debate over the occupied territories is, then, not just an ideological divide between right and left; it is also overwhelmingly influenced by the all-encompassing "security network" that injects a security rationale into every political move.
317. Slater 2020, p. 221: "In any event, there was no legitimate security argument at all for the Israeli seizure of Arab East Jerusalem immediately after the 1967 war and for subsequently settling religious fanatics in the West Bank. The real motivating forces for most of the postwar Israeli expansionism into the West Bank and East Jerusalem were clearly "Greater Israel" nationalism and religious messianism. If anything, as many Israeli security experts pointed out at the time, the "need" to defend the settlers was a security liability... Israeli governments have long cited "security" as the reason they need to maintain occupation of Arab territories—but when Israel withdrew from Lebanon and Egyptian territory, the attacks against it ended. It is unlikely that an Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories would have a different result—and if it did, there would be little to prevent Israel from reinvading and occupying those territories. Moreover, in those circumstances repression of any continuing Palestinian violence would have a legitimacy that it currently lacks. For these reasons, Israel has a security problem with the Palestinians only in the same way that colonial powers had "security problems" with nationalist uprisings that eventually forced them to withdraw."
318. ^ "Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000". Israeli Ministry of Internal Affairs. Archived from the original on 3 April 2007. Retrieved 10 April 2007.
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320. Erakat, Noura (2019). "From Occupation to Warfare". Justice for Some. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-1357-7.
321. Quigley, John B. (2005). The Case for Palestine. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-3539-9.
322. "Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights :: resolution /: adopted by the General Assembly". 14 December 1990.
323. "Right of peoples to self-determination/Struggle by all available means – GA resolution". Question of Palestine. Retrieved 23 October 2024. 1. Calls upon all States to implement fully and faithfully all the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence by peoples under colonial and foreign domination; 2. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial domination, apartheid and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle; 3. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Namibian people, the Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign occupation and colonial domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without foreign interference...
324. "Analysis: Palestinian suicide attacks". BBC News. 29 January 2007. Archived from the original on 15 January 2010. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
325. Baconi 2018, Military Resistance Comes Undone: "On February 25, 1994, an American Jewish settler named Baruch Goldstein walked into the Ibrahimi Mosque in the West Bank city of Hebron during prayer time. Standing behind the rows of kneeling figures in front of him, Goldstein opened fire. Within minutes, twenty-nine Muslim worshippers had been killed and close to one hundred injured. The atrocity jolted the nascent Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations that had gathered pace in the wake of the First Intifada, prompted by the PLO's strategic redirection in 1988. Less than six months before the Hebron attack, in September 1993, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin had awkwardly shaken hands in a widely publicized event on the South Lawn of the White House. The leaders had assembled in the American capital to sign the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, popularly known as the Oslo Accords, referring to the capital city where the secretive talks leading to the agreement had taken place. Following the signing, negotiations between Israel and the PLO in the form of a "peace process" were launched.1 Goldstein's attack served as a reminder of the bloody challenges this process faced. Forty-one days after the shooting, once the time allotted for Muslim ritual mourning had been respected, a member of Hamas approached a bus stop in Afula, a city in northern Israel. Standing next to fellow passengers, the man detonated a suicide vest, killing seven Israelis. This was on April 6, 1994, a day that marked Hamas's first lethal suicide bombing in Israel."
326. "The Security Barrier (Fence)". IDF Military Advocate General. Archived from the original on 12 October 2017. Retrieved 5 October 2014.
327. Scott-Baumann 2023: "Far fewer Israelis were killed in Palestinian suicide bombs after the construction of the barrier (130 in 2003 and fewer than 25 in 2005), convincing most Israelis that it saved the lives of fellow Israelis and was necessary for their security. However, the decline in bombings can also be attributed to the permanent presence of Israeli troops inside and around Palestinian cities and increasing security cooperation between the IDF and the PA, particularly after the Second Intifada ended in 2005."
328. Hourani, Albert Habib (2010). A History of the Arab Peoples. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-01017-8. In places the barrier separated farmers from their lands, even children from their schools, while preventing Palestinians from travelling within the West Bank or seeking work in Israel.
329. Shlaim 2015, The Road Map to Nowhere 2003–2006: "The barrier followed a route that ran almost entirely through land occupied by Israel in June 1967."
330. Baconi 2018, Chapter 3: "Rather than building the wall on Israeli land or along the 1967 borders, however, the structure snaked through Palestinian territories, unilaterally seizing more than 10 percent of the West Bank, including whole neighborhoods around East Jerusalem as well as major settlement blocs that were integrated into this de facto border. The structure split whole Palestinian villages in half and had an immediate effect on the freedom of movement for Palestinians within the occupied territories. Jewish settlers living illegally within the same land continued to be linked into Israel through exclusive Jewish-only highways and bypass roads. On July 20, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion ruling that the wall was illegal, to no effect.4 With Israel's planned disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the construction of advanced "security" infrastructure, Sharon was actively restructuring the framework of Israel's occupation."
331. Erakat, Noura (2019). "Notes". Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-0883-2. Its 2004 decision held that the construction of the wall in the West Bank, as opposed to along the 1949 armistice line, violated the Palestinian right to self-determination, contravened the Fourth Geneva Convention, and could not be justified as a measure of Israeli self-defense. It advised Israel to "terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated." The court also observed that all states had an obligation "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction."
332. Finkelstein, Norman G. (2012). "Appendix". Knowing Too Much. New York: OR Books. ISBN 978-1-935928-77-5. In its advisory opinion the ICJ voiced concern that "the construction of the wall and its associated régime create a 'fait accompli' on the ground that could well become permanent."115 Taking note of this ICJ concern, Israel's High Court rejoined that the ICJ lacked a "factual basis" for reaching definite conclusions.116 Not just the ICJ, however, but also many respected human rights organizations expressed such worries. B'Tselem concluded that the "underlying reason" of the wall's route was "to establish facts on the ground that would perpetuate the existence of settlements and facilitate their future annexation into Israel." Likewise, Human Rights Watch concluded that the "existing and planned route of the barrier appears to be designed chiefly to incorporate and make contiguous with Israel illegal civilian settlements." Likewise, Amnesty International concluded that Israel was building the wall to "consolidate its control over land which is being used for illegal Israeli settlements," and that "the very expensive and sophisticated structure of the fence/wall indicates that it is likely intended as a permanent structure."117
333. Harel, Amos (7 December 2007). "Defense officials concerned as Hamas upgrades Qassam arsenal". Haaretz. Retrieved 30 March 2009.
334. Esveld, Bill Van (6 August 2009). Rockets from Gaza (Report). Human Rights Watch. Archived from the original on 18 June 2017. Retrieved 15 November 2023.
335. "Q&A: Gaza conflict". BBC News. 18 January 2009. Archived from the original on 5 July 2014. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
336. "Gaza's rocket threat to Israel". BBC News. 21 January 2008. Archived from the original on 23 September 2011. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
337. "Playing cat and mouse with Gaza rockets". BBC News. 28 February 2008. Archived from the original on 6 March 2008. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
338. Khalidi 2020, Chapter 6: "However, none of the rockets had a warhead of the size or lethality of the over 49,000 tank and artillery shells fired by Israel in 2014. The Soviet-designed 122mm Grad or Katyusha rocket commonly used by Hamas and its allies normally carried either a 44- or 66-pound warhead (compared with the 96-pound 155mm shells), although many were fitted with smaller warheads to increase their range. Most of the homemade Qassam rockets that were used had considerably smaller warheads. Together, the 4,000 Qassam, Katyusha, Grad, and other missiles that were fired from the Gaza Strip, and that reached Israel (many were so imprecise and poorly manufactured that they fell short and landed within the strip), would have likely had less explosive power in total than a dozen 2,000-pound bombs."
339. Thrall, Nathan (14 October 2010). "Our Man in Palestine". The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on 16 October 2015. Retrieved 30 September 2010.
340. Hasson, Nir (30 June 2013). "How many Palestinians actually live in the West Bank?". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 1 November 2014. Retrieved 18 October 2014.
341. Messerschmid, Clemens (2002). "Till the Last Drop: The Palestinian Water Crisis in the West Bank, Hydrogeology and Hydropolitics of a Regional Conflict" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 17 December 2008. Retrieved 29 November 2008.
342. "Annex III: Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs". Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Archived from the original on 25 November 2002. Retrieved 5 March 2022 – via www.knesset.gov.il.
343. "Oslo+21 and Water Problems in Palestine: A Story of Failure". Archived from the original on 25 November 2023. Retrieved 25 November 2023.
344. "Water war leaves Palestinians thirsty". BBC News. 16 June 2003. Archived from the original on 5 November 2012. Retrieved 2 January 2012.
345. "Israel". Aquastat. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2008. Archived from the original on 16 January 2013. Retrieved 25 February 2013.
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347. Assaf, Karen; Attia, Bayoumi; Darwish, Ali; Wardam, Batir; Klawitter, Simone (2004), Water as a human right: The understanding of water in the Arab countries of the Middle East – A four country analysis, Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, p. 229, archived from the original on 4 March 2016, retrieved 23 April 2014
348. Gelvin, James L. (2005). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 100 Years of War. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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350. Sa'id, Ahmad; Abu-Lughod, Lila (2007). Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory. New York: Columbia University Press.
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352. "Poverty and the Labor Market: A Sheer Lack of Jobs?" (PDF). Coping with Conflict: Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza. pp. 37–61. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 September 2012. Retrieved 28 April 2014.
353. ^ "Palestinians lose billions to Israeli land bans, says World Bank report". The National. 8 October 2013. Archived from the original on 28 June 2017. Retrieved 13 April 2014.
354. Stein, Rebecca (2008). Itineraries in Conflict. Durham: Duke University Press. p. 9.
355. Hammad, Suzanne Hassan (2023). Emplaced Resistances in Occupied Palestine: Stories of a Village, Its People, and Their Land. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 20–72. ISBN 978-1-78661-204-5.
356. Davis, Rochelle (2013). Palestine and the Palestinians in the 21st century. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
357. "Palestinian Economic Recovery Plan Takes Shape". The National. Agence France-Presse. 12 July 2013. Archived from the original on 28 June 2017. Retrieved 14 April 2014.
358. Chalabi, Mona (14 October 2013). "How Does Palestine's Economy Work?". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 12 May 2014. Retrieved 30 April 2014.
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360. "Attempt to carry explosives device on El Al flight foiled". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
361. Encyclopedia of the Developing World, Vol. 3. p. 1228.
362. Encyclopedia of the Developing World, Vol. 3. M. Leonard, Thomas.
363. "How Israel builds its fifth column". Christian Science Monitor. 22 May 2002. ISSN 0882-7729. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
364. "From 1947 to 2023: Retracing the complex, tragic Israeli-Palestinian conflict". Archived from the original on 15 November 2023. Retrieved 15 November 2023.
365. Patience, Martin (19 June 2007). "Q&A: Palestinian Embargo". BBC Jerusalem. Archived from the original on 12 May 2014. Retrieved 30 April 2014.
366. ^ "Data on casualties". United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory (OCHAoPt). United Nations. Archived from the original on 12 October 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2023.
367. ^ Alfonseca, Kiara (11 October 2023). "Palestinian civilians suffer in Israel-Gaza crossfire as death toll rises". ABC News. Archived from the original on 12 October 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2023. roughly 6,400 Palestinians and 300 Israelis
368. ^ "Twentieth Century Atlas – Death Tolls". users.erols.com. Archived from the original on 19 July 2017. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
369. "All wars in the 20th century, since 1900 | the Polynational War Memorial". www.war-memorial.net. Archived from the original on 20 December 2012. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
370. "Fatalities in the first Intifada". B'Tselem. Archived from the original on 29 April 2020. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
371. "The Humanitarian Monitor." Archived 16 February 2008 at the Wayback Machine United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. December 2007. PDF. Tables on pages 5 and 7, all numbers refer to casualties of the direct conflict as defined therein (p. 23).
372. "B'Tselem: Since 2000, 7,454 Israelis, Palestinians killed". The Jerusalem Post. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
373. Mor, Avi, et al. "Casualties in Operation Cast Lead: A closer look." Archived 1 January 2011 at the Wayback Machine Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. 2009. PDF.
374. "B'Tselem: 773 of Palestinians killed in Cast Lead were civilians". Ynet News. 9 September 2009. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
375. Norman Finkelstein (2018). Gaza: An Inquest into Its Martyrdom. Univ of California Pres8. ISBN 978-0-520-96838-7. Israeli officials alleged that total Palestinian deaths came to 1,166, of whom at least 60 percent were "terrorists." The discrepancy in the ratio of Palestinian combatant to civilian deaths partly resulted from disagreement on the proper classification of Gazan police. See Shay Fogelman, "Shock and Awe," Haaretz (31 December 2010). The broad consensus among human rights organizations was that these police should overwhelmingly be classified as civilians because they did not take a direct part in hostilities and were not members of Palestinian armed groups. The veracity of Israeli figures could be tested by scrutinizing the "under 16" subclassification. Whereas Israel alleged that 89 Palestinians under age 16 were killed, B'Tselem reported that 252 Palestinians under 16 were killed and that it had "copies of birth certificates and death certificates along with other documents regarding the vast majority of the minors who were killed." For critical analysis of Israeli casualty figures, see Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI), No Second Thoughts: The changes in the Israeli Defense Forces' combat doctrine in light of "Operation Cast Lead" (2009), pp. 9–11. This study showed that Israel abruptly altered the figures it tabulated for Palestinian deaths, and concluded that "the casualty estimates provided by other sources (around 1,400 killed) are more credible than those provided by the IDF Spokesperson." Even the largely apologetic US Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report put the number of dead "at close to 1,400 Palestinians, including more than 1,000 civilians."
376. ^ "Country Overviews – Occupied Palestinian Territory". United Nations Mine Action Service. 2009. Archived from the original on 26 September 2010. Retrieved 2 February 2010.

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• Bashi, Sari (2018). Stern-Weiner, Jamie (ed.). Moment of truth: tackling Israel-Palestine's toughest questions. London ; New York: OR Books. ISBN 978-1-944869-69-4.
• Finkelstein, Norman G. (2007). Beyond chutzpah: on the misuse of anti-semitism and the abuse of history. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24989-9.
• Gross, Aeyal M. (2017). The writing on the wall: rethinking the international law of occupation. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-14596-2.
• Khalidi, Rashid (2013). Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East. Beacon Press. ISBN 978-0-8070-4476-6.
• Khalidi, Rashid (2020). The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017. Henry Holt and Company. ISBN 978-1-62779-854-9.
• Khalidi, Rashid (2024). The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-86154-899-6.
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• Morris, Benny (2004). The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited. Cambridge Middle East studies (2. ed., 6. print ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. ISBN 978-0-521-00967-6.
• Morris, Benny (2008). 1948: A history of the first Arab–Israeli war. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-14524-3.
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External links

United Nations

• Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – occupied Palestinian territory
• United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

Academic, news, and similar sites (excluding Israeli or Palestinian sources)

• U.S. Attempts at Peace between Israel and Palestine from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
• Gaza\Sderot : Life in spite of everything – a web documentary produced by arte.tv, in which daily video-chronicles (2 min. each) show the life of 5 people (men, women, children) in Gaza and Sderot, on both sides of the border.
• Global Politician – Middle-East Section
• Middle East Policy Council
• Aix Group – Joint Palestinian-Israeli-international economic working group.
• Crash Course World History 223: Conflict in Israel and Palestine – author and YouTube educator John Green gives a brief history lesson (13 minutes) on the conflict.
• The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict—An overview of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians from 1948 through the present day. From the History Guy Website.
• The Media Line – A non-profit news agency which provides credible, unbiased content, background and context from across the Middle East.

Conflict resolution groups

• OneVoice Movement – One Million Voices to End the Conflict
• Seeking Common Ground

Human rights groups

• Human Rights Watch: Israel/Palestine
• B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories
• Al-Haq: Palestinian Human Rights Group Archived 15 October 2006 at the Wayback Machine: West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists
• Palestinian Centre for Human Rights PCHR: Gaza affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists
• Gush-Shalom: Gush-Shalom Israeli Peace Movement

Jewish and Israeli academic, news, and similar sites

• A history of Israel, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
• Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
• Honest Reporting monitoring mideast media
• True Peace Archived 17 March 2019 at the Wayback Machine – Chabad-Lubavitch site
• What the Fight in Israel Is All About – The Media Line

Jewish and Israeli "peace movement" news and advocacy sites

• The Origin of the Palestine – Israel Conflict, Published by Jews for Justice in the Middle East

Other sites

• Arabs and Israelis held hostage by a common enemy Salom Now! and METalks are two experimental initiatives which sought to rewrite the script of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. However, such popular, grassroots action is held hostage by some common enemies: despair, hatred, antipathy and distrust. (Jan 2007)
• Exchange of friendly fire Anat el-Hashahar, an Israeli and founder of METalks, debates the Arab–Israeli conflict – from Oslo to Lebanon – with Khaled Diab, an Egyptian journalist and writer.
• Website with information (articles, reports, maps, books, links, etc.) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Map of Palestinian Refugee Camps 1993 (UNRWA/C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
• Map of Israel 2008 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
• Map of Israeli Settlements in the West Bank Dec. 1993 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
• Map of Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip Dec. 1993 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
• Map of Jerusalem Mar. 1993 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
• Map of Jericho and Vicinity Jan. 1994 (C.I.A./Univ. of Texas, Austin)
• Pew Global Research – worldwide public opinion
• Policy publications on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the Berman Jewish Policy Archive

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insurgency West Abkhazia conflict Georgian–Ossetian conflict Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency Iraq conflict Islamic State insurgency in Iraq Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict Qatif conflict Yemeni crisis Saudi–led intervention Yemeni Civil war Iran–Israel proxy conflict Gaza–Israel conflict Hezbollah–Israel conflict Iran–Israel conflict in Syria Kurdish separatism in Iran Iran–PJAK conflict Western Iran clashes Kurdistan Workers' Party insurgency 2015–present Maoist insurgency in Turkey DHKP/C insurgency in Turkey Syrian civil war Desert campaign Inter-rebel conflict Rojava conflict Russian intervention Europe East Abkhazia conflict Georgian–Ossetian conflict Islamic State insurgency in the North Caucasus Russo-Ukrainian War Russian invasion of Ukraine West Dissident Irish republican campaign Loyalist feud v t e Arab–Israeli conflict v t e Countries Authorities Organizations Primary countries and authorities All-Palestine Egyptian Kingdom and Republic Hamas Gaza Iraqi Kingdom and Ba'athist Iraq Israel Jordan Palestinian Authority Saudi Arabia Syrian Republic and Ba'athist Syria Organizations Active Amal al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades Arab League Arab Liberation Front Army of Islam DFLP Fatah Guardians of the Cedars Hamas Hezbollah Kataeb Lebanese Forces al-Mourabitoun Muslim Brotherhood PIJ PLF PLO Palestinian Popular Struggle Front PFLP PFLP-GC Popular Resistance Committees as-Sa'iqa Syrian Social Nationalist Party Former Abu Nidal Organization Arab Higher Committee Arab Liberation Army Black September Organization Haganah Holy War Army Irgun Japanese Red Army Lehi Palmach Revolutionary Cells South Lebanon Army Other countries France Kuwait Libya Morocco North Korea United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Yemen Transnational European Union United Nations Former states Soviet Union United Arab Republic v t e Armed engagements 1947–1959 1948 Palestine war Arab–Israeli War (1948–1949) Palestinian Fedayeen insurgency (1949–1956) Suez Crisis (1956) 1960–1979 Samu incident (1966) Six-Day War (1967) War of Attrition (1967–1970) Battle of Karameh (1968) Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon (1968–1982) Gift (1968) Yom Kippur War (1973) Sabena Flight 571 (1972) Lod Airport massacre (1972) Munich massacre (1972) Bayonet (1972–1979) Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 (1973) Ma'alot massacre (1974) Savoy Hotel attack (1975) Entebbe (1976) Coastal Road massacre (1978) Litani (1978) 1980–1999 Misgav Am hostage crisis (1980) Opera (1981) Lebanon War (1982) Bus 300 affair (1984) South Lebanon conflict (1985) Wooden Leg (1985) First Intifada (1987–1993) Mothers' Bus attack (1988) Tunis raid (1988) Iraqi missile attacks against Israel (1991) Bramble Bush (1992) Palestinian suicide attacks (1993–2008; list) Accountability (1993) Grapes of Wrath (1996) 2000–2021 Second Intifada (2000–2005) Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel (2001–) Ain es Saheb airstrike (2003) Bringing Home the Goods (2006) Summer Rains (2006) Autumn Clouds (2006) Lebanon War (2006) Gaza–Israel conflict (2006–) Hot Winter (2007–2008) Gaza War (2008–2009) Palestinian militancy campaign (2010) Southern Israel cross-border attacks (2011) Returning Echo (2012) Pillar of Defense (2012) Gaza War (2014) Wave of violence (2015–2016) Gaza border protests (2018) Gaza–Israel clashes (2018) Gaza–Israel clashes (2019) Black Belt (2019) Israel–Palestine crisis (2021) Breaking Dawn (2022) Shield and Arrow (2023) Israel–Hamas war (2023–2024) v t e Diplomacy and peace proposals Background 1914 Damascus Protocol 1915 McMahon–Hussein Correspondence 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement 1917 Balfour Declaration 1918 Declaration to the Seven / Anglo-French Declaration 1919 Faisal–Weizmann agreement 1920 San Remo conference 1922 Churchill White Paper 1937 Peel Commission 1939 White Paper 1939 London Conference 1946 Morrison–Grady Plan 1947 Bevin Plan 1946–47 London Conference 1947 UN Partition Plan 1948 American trusteeship proposal 1948–1983 1948 UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 194 1949 Armistice agreements / Lausanne Conference 1950 Tripartite Declaration 1967 Khartoum Resolution / UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242 1973 UNSC Resolution 338 / UNSC Resolution 339 1974 Israel–Syria disengagement agreement / UNSC Resolution 350 1978 UNSC Resolution 425 / Camp David Accords 1979 UNSC Resolution 446 / Egypt–Israel peace treaty Palestinian autonomy talks / UNSC Resolution 452 1980 UNSC Resolution 478 1981 UNSC Resolution 497 1981–1982 Fahd Plan 1982 Reagan peace plan 1983 Israel–Lebanon agreement 1991–2016 1991 Madrid Conference 1993 Oslo Accords 1994 Gaza–Jericho Agreement / Israel–Jordan peace treaty 1995 Beilin–Abu Mazen agreement 1998 Wye River Memorandum 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum 2000 Camp David Summit / Clinton Parameters 2000 Isratin 2001 Taba Summit 2002 Beirut Summit and peace initiative / Road map 2003 Geneva Initiative 2004 UNSC Resolution 1559 / UNSC Resolution 1566 2005 UNSC Resolution 1583 / Sharm El Sheikh Summit / Israeli disengagement from Gaza / Agreement on Movement and Access 2006 UNSC Resolution 1850 / Quartet Principles 2006 UNSC Resolution 1701 2007 Annapolis Conference 2010 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks 2013 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks 2016 John Kerry Parameters 2019–present 2019 Trump peace plan 2020 Abraham Accords Israel–UAE normalization agreement Bahrain–Israel normalization agreement Israel–Sudan normalization agreement Israel–Morocco normalization agreement 2022 Israeli–Lebanese maritime border agreement v t e Zionism and the Land of Israel Land of Israel Independent Israel Modern Israel History Prehistory / History of the Levant History of ancient Israel and Judah Laws and customs of the Land of Israel in Judaism The Jewish people Timeline of Jewish history History of the Jews and Judaism in the Land of Israel (leaders) Modern Jewish settlement History of Israel, Israeli Jews, Culture of Israel, Law of Return History to 1948 Zionism (history, timeline), Aliyah, Balfour Declaration, Mandate document, Mandatory Palestine History UN Partition Plan, Declaration of Independence Politics Arab–Israeli conflict, Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Peace process, Iran–Israel conflict, Arab–Israeli alliance Society and economy Kibbutzim and Moshavim, Exodus from the Muslim world, Development towns, Austerity, Agriculture technology Green Line Israeli settlements Timeline, International law West Bank Judea and Samaria Area Gaza Strip Hof Aza Regional Council East Jerusalem Status of Jerusalem v t e Palestinian nationalism and the Occupied Palestinian Territory Palestine (British Mandate borders) State of Palestine Palestinian Authority Name Timeline of the name "Palestine" History Time periods Demographics Nakba Israeli–Palestinian conflict Palestinians Culture Refugees Diaspora Right of return Political status History Palestine Liberation Organization Green Line Palestinian territories West Bank Enclaves Gaza Strip East Jerusalem Status of Jerusalem Jerusalem Governorate Oslo Accords Oslo II Accord Politics Cities (PNA–administered) Governorates Foreign relations Law Legislative Council Political parties Fatah Hamas v t e Foreign relations of Israel Africa Algeria Angola Botswana Cameroon Chad Democratic Republic of the Congo Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Ghana Guinea Kenya Liberia Libya Malawi Mauritania Mauritius Morocco Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Seychelles Sierra Leone Somaliland South Africa South Sudan Sudan Tunisia Uganda Zimbabwe Americas Argentina Barbados Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile Colombia Cuba Haiti Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru United States military Uruguay Venezuela Asia Afghanistan Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Bangladesh Bhutan Cambodia China Hong Kong East Timor Georgia India Indonesia Iran Iraq Kurdistan Region Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kuwait Lebanon Malaysia Maldives Myanmar Nepal North Korea Oman Pakistan Palestine Philippines Qatar Saudi Arabia Singapore South Korea Sri Lanka Syria Taiwan Thailand Turkey United Arab Emirates Vietnam Yemen Europe Albania Austria Belarus Belgium Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Kosovo Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Monaco Netherlands North Macedonia Norway Poland Romania Russia San Marino Serbia Spain Sweden Switzerland Ukraine United Kingdom Oceania Australia Fiji Marshall Islands Micronesia Nauru New Zealand Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Tonga Former states East Germany Soviet Union Yugoslavia Multilateral Arab world Arab League Arab–Israeli conflict Arab–Israeli alliance European Union United Nations Diplomacy Alliance of the periphery Camp David Accords Egypt Jordan Oslo Accords Abraham Accords United Arab Emirates Bahrain Sudan Morocco Diplomatic missions of Israel in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs International recognition Legitimacy Free trade agreements of Israel v t e Foreign relations of the State of Palestine Africa Algeria Burkina Faso Comoros Djibouti Egypt Ethiopia Kenya Libya Morocco Namibia Nigeria Sahrawi Republic Somalia South Africa Sudan Tanzania Tunisia Zimbabwe Americas Argentina Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile Cuba El Salvador Ecuador Honduras Mexico Peru United States Uruguay Venezuela Asia Afghanistan Armenia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Bahrain Brunei China Georgia India Indonesia Iran Iraq Kurdistan Region Israel Japan Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Maldives North Korea Oman Pakistan Philippines Qatar Saudi Arabia South Korea Sri Lanka Syria Thailand Turkey United Arab Emirates Vietnam Yemen Europe Albania Austria Belarus Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Cyprus Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Luxembourg Malta Montenegro Norway Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Spain Sweden Switzerland Ukraine United Kingdom Oceania Australia New Zealand Former East Germany Soviet Union Disputes Israeli–Palestinian conflict Palestinian political violence Fatah–Hamas conflict Multilateral relations Arab League European Union Non-Aligned Movement United Nations (Security Council resolutions) Related topics Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates Diplomatic missions of / in Palestine Recognition of statehood Legal status Palestine 194 Foreign relations of Hamas v t e Iran–Israel proxy conflict Background Iranian revolution Iran–Iraq war 1999 arrest of Iranian Jews 2024 Iran–Israel conflict Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus reactions Iranian seizure of the MSC Aries Iranian strikes on Israel April 2024 October 2024 Israeli strikes on Iran April 2024 October 2024 intelligence leak Hezbollah–Israel conflict Israeli–Lebanese conflict South Lebanon conflict 1982 kidnapping of Iranian diplomats Assassination of Abbas al-Musawi 1992 Buenos Aires Israeli embassy bombing AMIA bombing 2000–2006 Shebaa Farms conflict 2000 Hezbollah cross-border raid 2005 Hezbollah cross-border raid 2006 Lebanon War Assassination of Imad Mughniyeh 2008 Israel–Hezbollah prisoner exchange 2009 Hezbollah plot in Egypt Francop Affair January 2015 Shebaa Farms incident Operation Northern Shield 2019 Beirut drone crash 2023 Israel–Lebanon shellings Israel–Hezbollah conflict (2023–present) Assassination of Fuad Shukr 2024 Lebanon electronic device attacks 20 September 2024 Beirut attack September 2024 Israeli attacks against Lebanon 2024 Hezbollah headquarters strike Assassination of Hashem Safieddine 2024 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire agreement Projectile attacks from Lebanon Israeli–Palestinian conflict Karine A affair Victoria Affair Operation Full Disclosure Gaza–Israel conflict Gaza War (2008–2009) 2014 Gaza War Israel–Hamas war Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh Syrian civil war January 2013 Rif Dimashq airstrike May 2013 Rif Dimashq airstrikes December 2014 Rif Dimashq airstrikes January 2015 Mazraat Amal incident Qalamoun offensive (May–June 2015) March 2017 Israel–Syria incident February 2018 Israel–Syria incident Operation House of Cards September 2018 Syria missile strikes August 2019 Syria missile strikes November 2019 Syria missile strikes January 2021 Syria airstrikes 2023 Damascus airstrike Israeli–Syrian ceasefire line incidents Hezbollah involvement International incidents Operation Outside the Box 2009 Sudan airstrikes 2011 alleged Iran assassination plot 2012 attacks on Israeli diplomats 2012 Bangkok bombings 2012 Cyprus terrorist plot 2012 Burgas bus bombing Yarmouk munitions factory explosion 2019 Israeli airstrikes in Iraq 2022 Erbil missile attacks 2022 Istanbul terror plot 2024 Iranian missile strikes in Iraq and Syria 20 July 2024 Israeli attack on Yemen Nuclear program of Iran Assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists Ardeshir Hosseinpour Massoud Ali-Mohammadi Majid Shahriari Fereydoon Abbasi Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan Mohsen Fakhrizadeh AMAD Project Mossad infiltration of Iranian nuclear archive Bid Kaneh explosion Stuxnet 2020 Iran explosions 2021 Natanz incident 2023 Iran drone attacks Related Russia and the Iran–Israel proxy conflict Russia–Hamas relations Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict Ahmad Reza Djalali Axis of Resistance Arab–Israeli alliance Abraham Accords Warsaw Middle East conference People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran Little Satan Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Israel Views on military action against Iran Iran and state-sponsored terrorism Iranian support for Hamas Israel and state-sponsored terrorism Quds Day Prisoner X2 Tehran Category:Iran–Israel proxy conflict v t e Israel–Hamas war Timeline Outline Engage- ments Hamas-led attack on Israel Attacks on civilians Netiv HaAsara Alumim Be'eri Elhanan Team Holit Kfar Aza Kissufim Nir Oz Nir Yitzhak Nahal Oz Nirim Nova music festival Death Shelters Psyduck music festival Battles Re'im Sderot Sufa Zikim Israeli female tank crew fight General topics Allegations of genocide Allegations of involvement of UNRWA employees Death Shelters Denial Sexual and gender-based violence "Screams Without Words" Bearing Witness Screams Before Silence Israeli invasion of Gaza Beit Hanoun Gaza City Khan Yunis Rafah Background Attacks on refugee camps Jabalia 31 October Al-Shati Al-Shati and Tuffah dual airstrikes Al-Maghazi Tel al-Sultan attack Al-Mawasi (May) Nuseirat refugee camp massacre Al-Mawasi (June) Al-Shati (July) Deir el-Balah (August) Al-Mawasi (September) Al-Mawasi (December) Nuseirat (December) Attacks on schools Al-Fakhoora Shadia Abu Ghazala Al-Sardi Al-Awda Khadija Hamama Al-Tabaeen Al-Jawni Rufaida Abu Hussein Attacks on health facilities Al-Ahli Arab Hospital explosion Al-Shifa Hospital siege alleged military use ambulance airstrike Gaza Strip mass graves Kamal Adwan Hospital sieges Killing of health workers Nasser Hospital siege Nasser Hospital mass graves 14 October 2024 Al-Aqsa Hospital attack Other attacks Airstrikes on municipal services in Gaza Attacks on religious sites Engineer's Building airstrike Rafah strikes Flour massacre Kuwait Roundabout mass killings Palestinians evacuating Gaza City World Central Kitchen aid convoy attack 9 July 2024 attacks 13 July 2024 al-Mawasi attack Khan Yunis Deir al-Balah mosque Beit Lahia attacks Beit Lahia airstrike Kerem Shalom aid convoy looting General topics AI-assisted targeting Bombing of the Gaza Strip Destruction of cultural heritage during the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip Environmental impact of the Israel–Hamas war Gaza genocide Israeli generals' plan Torture Other theaters Israeli incursions in the West Bank 2024 Israeli military operation Killing of Benjamin Achimeir April 2024 Israeli settler rampages Lehi Street bombing Givat Shaul shooting Majdal Shams attack Tower 22 drone attack Israeli incursions in Tulkarm 2024 Masyaf raid 2024 Jaffa shooting 2024 Tulkarm Camp airstrike Iran–Israel conflict Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus Iranian strikes in Israel April 2024 October 2024 Israeli strikes on Iran April 2024 October 2024 Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh Israel–Hezbollah conflict (Timeline) Attacks on journalists Lebanese displacement Assassinations Hezbollah headquarters Fuad Shukr Ibrahim Aqil Saleh al-Arouri August 2024 Nabatieh attack August 2024 Israel–Lebanon strikes 2024 Lebanon electronic device attacks September 2024 Israeli attacks against Lebanon Israeli invasion of Lebanon ceasefire Israeli attacks on the Lebanese health sector Destruction of cultural heritage during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon Red Sea crisis (Timeline) Operation Prosperity Guardian Attacks on the MV Maersk Hangzhou 2024 missile strikes in Yemen Marlin Luanda missile strike 2024 Houthi drone attack on Israel Israeli attack on Yemen (July 2024) Attacks on the Sounion Israeli attacks on Yemen (September 2024) Hostages Hostage–prisoner exchange Kidnapped from Israel Hostages and Missing Families Forum Hostages Square Captive Bibas family Oded Lifshitz Naama Levy Rescued Operation Golden Hand Ori Megidish Nuseirat operation Noa Argamani Rescue of Qaid Farhan Al-Qadi Released Rachel Edry Yarden Roman-Gat Mia Schem Deceased Alex Dancyg Hersh Goldberg-Polin Alon Shamriz, Yotam Haim, and Samer Talalka General topics Ceasefire COGAT Dahiya doctrine Effect on children in Gaza Hannibal Directive Humanitarian aid International recognition of the State of Palestine Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip (2023–present) Israeli interrogations Queer advocacy in the Israel–Hamas war Women Misplaced Pages Historical context Arab–Israeli conflict International law Background to the Israel–Hamas war Blockade of the Gaza Strip Palestinian freedom of movement Gaza–Israel conflict Casualties of Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip Human rights violations Human shields Israeli demolition of Palestinian property Israeli settlement Legality of Israeli settlements Israeli outpost Israeli settler violence Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip Palestinian rocket attacks Palestinian tunnel warfare anti-tunnel barrier Israeli assassinations Women Effects Calls for the destruction of Israel Israeli government response Israeli war cabinet Mass detentions Economic impact Environment impact in Gaza Evacuations Gaza Strip evacuations Humanitarian crisis Gaza floating pier Healthcare collapse Premature baby crisis Famine Societal breakdown Israeli public diplomacy Media coverage Violence against journalists Misinformation Pallywood Palestinian genocide accusation United States complicity Sexual violence against Palestinians War crimes Hamas Israeli Cemetery destruction and necroviolence Israeli torture in the occupied territories Proposed Israeli resettlement of Gaza Reactions Calls for a ceasefire Three-phase proposal September 2024 Israel hostage deal protests Diplomatic impact University donors European Union Islamic Summit Conference Arab–Islamic extraordinary summit Hurmat-e-Masjid Aqsa Conference Cancellation of the 2023 MTV EMA Proposed Israeli resettlement of the Gaza Strip 2024 Beijing Declaration Military aid US support for Israel UK support for Israel Discrimination Antisemitism Riots in the North Caucasus Anti-Palestinianism Islamophobia Violent incidents Killing of Wadea al-Fayoume Death of Paul Kessler Vermont student shooting Protests University campuses Columbia Sciences Po UCLA France March for the Republic and Against Antisemitism Indonesia 2023 Bitung clashes Israel Humanitarian aid blockade Spain 2024 pro-Palestinian strike United Kingdom United States Artists4Ceasefire DNC protests March on Washington for Gaza March for Israel National March on Washington: Free Palestine Protest votes Self-immolation of Aaron Bushnell Pakistan D-Chowk Dharna 2024 Faizabad sit-in UN resolutions A/RES/ES-10/21 S/RES/2712 A/RES/ES-10/22 S/RES/2720 S/RES/2728 A/RES/ES-10/23 S/RES/2735 A/RES/ES-10/24 UN inquiry Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory War crimes and crimes against humanity report Global courts South Africa v. Israel (Genocide Convention) Nicaragua v. Germany Legal Consequences of Israeli Policies and Practices ICC investigation in Palestine Arrest warrants Courts Defense for Children International – Palestine v. Biden Casualties Israel Security forces Alim Abdallah Yitzhak Ben-Bashat Jayar Davidov Eli Ginsberg Salman Habaka Asaf Hamami Yitzhar Hofman Roi Levy Izhar Peled Yonatan Steinberg Ehsan Daxa Civilians Lior Asulin Yuval Castleman Hayim Katsman Ofir Libstein Shani Louk Aner Shapira Vivian Silver Yahav Winner Palestine Hamas Ismail Haniyeh Yahya Sinwar Saleh al-Arouri Abdul Fatah Dukhan Mohammed Dababish Wissam Farhat Ahmed Ghandour Mohammed Deif Marwan Issa Fursan Khalifa Rafa Salama Osama Mazini Ayman Nofal Jamila al-Shanti Ali Al Qadi Alaa Shreiteh Faiq Al-Mabhouh Other militants Fouad Abu Butihan Jihad Shehadeh Civilians Tawfic Abdel Jabbar Majed Abu Maraheel Hiba Abu Nada Refaat Alareer Hammam Alloh Nahida and Samar Anton Ibrahim al-Astal Ahmad Bahar Mohammed Barakat Mohammad Bhar David Ben Avraham Adnan al-Bursh Rashid Dabour Mohamed al-Dalou Awni El-Dous Omar Ferwana Fathi Ghaben Ihab al-Ghussein Medo Halimy Sidra Hassouna Yazan al-Kafarneh Mohammad Khdour Hani Al-Masdar Ibrahim Qusaya Hind Rajab Mohammed Shabir Rashad Abu Sakhila Omar Abu Shawish Sufian Tayeh Wael Al Zard Talal Abu Zarifa Shaban al-Dalou Mahasen al-Khateeb Nagham Abu Samra Spillover Saleh al-Arouri Ali Hussein Barji Waibhav Anil Kale Razi Mousavi Wissam al-Tawil Sadegh Omidzadeh Mushtaq Talib Al-Saeedi Mohammad Reza Zahedi Fuad Shukr Ibrahim Aqil Hassan Nasrallah Ali Karaki Nabil Qaouk Abbas Nilforoushan Fatah Sharif Hashem Safieddine Mohammad Afif Journalists Issam Abdallah Samer Abu Daqqa Ismail al-Ghoul Belal Jadallah General topics Children in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict Friendly fire Related people Israelis Nimrod Aloni Rachel Goldberg-Polin Eitan Okun Yagel Oshri Inbal Rabin-Lieberman Amir Tibon Palestinians Wael Al-Dahdouh Plestia Alaqad Motaz Azaiza Bisan Owda Mustafa Moien Ayyash Other topics 2024 Israeli secret document leak scandal Ahmed Abdel Khalek Al-Saqqa House Al Qarara Cultural Museum "All Eyes on Rafah" Attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria during the Israel–Hamas war Blockout 2024 Central Archives of Gaza City Bearing Witness "From the river to the sea" Gaza Daily "Harbu Darbu" "Hind's Hall" "Hurricane" Israeli demolition of Palestinian property "Leve Palestina" Palestine exception Palestinian sports during the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip "Options for a policy regarding Gaza's civilian population" Project Nimbus "Rajieen" Category v t e Arab nationalism Ideology Arab socialism Ba'athism Nasserism Pan-Arabism Third International Theory History Arab Revolt Intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine Iraqi Revolt Arab separatism in Khuzestan 1979 Khuzestan insurgency Great Syrian Revolt 1941 Iraqi coup d'état Anglo-Iraqi War Arab–Israeli conflict Suez Crisis Six-Day War War of Attrition Yom Kippur War Israeli–Palestinian conflict 1952 Egyptian revolution Iraqi Intifada Algerian War 14 July Revolution 1959 Mosul uprising 1961 Syrian coup d'état Arab Cold War North Yemen Civil War Ramadan Revolution 1963 Syrian coup d'état Dhofar War November 1963 Iraqi coup d'état Aden Emergency 1966 Syrian coup d'état 17 July Revolution 1969 Sudanese coup d'état 1969 Libyan revolution Black September Lebanese Civil War Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict Yemeni unification Concepts Arab identity Arab Union Arab world Arabization Personalities Butrus al-Bustani Michel Aflaq Jassem Alwan Yasser Arafat Abdul Rahman Arif Abdul Salam Arif Zaki al-Arsuzi Bashar al-Assad Hafez al-Assad Jamal al-Atassi Mansur al-Atrash Sultan al-Atrash Tariq Aziz Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr Ahmed Ben Bella Salah al-Din al-Bitar Izzat Darwaza Faisal I of Iraq Muammar Gaddafi Rashid Ali al-Gaylani George Habash Sati' al-Husri Hussein bin Ali, King of Hejaz Saddam Hussein Amin al-Husseini Salah Jadid Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi Mostéfa Merarda Gamal Abdel Nasser Adnan Pachachi Ameen Rihani Fuad al-Rikabi Abdullah Rimawi Hamdeen Sabahi Constantin Zureiq Organizations Al-Awda Al-Fatat Al-Mourabitoun Arab Ba'ath Arab Ba'ath Movement Arab Federation Arab Higher Committee Arab Islamic Republic Arab Liberation Army Arab Nationalist Movement Arab Socialist Action Party Arab Socialist Union (Egypt) Arab Socialist Union (Iraq) Arab Socialist Union (Libya) Arab Socialist Union Party (Syria) Arabian Peninsula People's Union Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order Ba'ath Party Ba'ath Party (Iraqi-dominated faction) Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction) Fatah Federation of Arab Republics General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries Independence Party (Mandatory Palestine) Islamic Legion Lebanese National Movement National Liberation Front (Algeria) Palestine Liberation Organization Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Rejectionist Front Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation Unified Political Command Union of Arab Republics (1972) United Arab Republic United Arab States Literature The Arab Awakening The Battle for One Destiny On the Way of Resurrection Symbolism Coat of arms of the United Arab Republic Eagle of Saladin Flag of the Arab Federation Flag of the Arab Revolt Hawk of Quraish Arab Liberation Flag Pan-Arab colors Related topics Algerian nationalism Egyptian nationalism Greater Mauritania Greater Morocco Greater Syria Greater Yemen Iraqi nationalism Islamism Jordanian nationalism Lebanese nationalism Libyan nationalism Palestinian nationalism Pan-Islamism Sahrawi nationalism Syrian nationalism Tunisian nationalism Category

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