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Chinese–Israeli relations

China	Israel
Diplomatic mission
Embassy of China, Tel Aviv	Embassy of Israel, Beijing
Envoy
Ambassador Cai Run	Ambassador Irit Ben-Abba

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the State of Israel formally established diplomatic relations in 1992. While the Republic of China had de jure recognized Israeli sovereignty in 1949, it eventually lost the Chinese Civil War, bringing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to power across mainland China. In 1950, Israel became the first country in the Middle East to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China, but the CCP did not reciprocate by establishing diplomatic ties due to Israel's alignment with the Western Bloc during the Cold War. This discontent persisted until the Cold War came to a close with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

China has been Israel's third largest trading partner globally and its largest trading partner in East Asia. Bilateral trade volume increased from $50 million in 1992 to over $10 billion in 2013. Israel has traded significantly with China in technology and arms. Some commentators note similarities between the culture and values of the two nations, as well as their shared economic interests. In the United Nations, China has long voted in support of the State of Palestine and against Israel. In 2024, public opinion polling showed a majority of Israelis consider China to be unfriendly or hostile toward Israel.

Israel maintains an embassy in Beijing and consulates-general in Guangzhou, Chengdu, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, while China maintains an embassy in Tel Aviv.

History

In the 1930s, David Ben-Gurion, then leader of the Yishuv in Palestine, proclaimed that China would be one of the great world powers of the future. For some time after the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was diplomatically isolated, because the United States and its allies, including Israel, recognized the Republic of China (ROC, commonly known as Taiwan after 1949) as the sole legitimate government of China. The Nationalist government of the ROC had been historically sympathetic to the Zionist cause, while ROC founder Sun Yat-sen affirmed his support for the creation of a Jewish state.

In 1947, however, the ROC abstained from voting in the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine. During the 1955 Bandung Conference, China (under the PRC) expressed support for the Palestinian right of return, but refrained from denying Israel's right to exist and secretly pursued trade ties with the Israelis. In 1975, the PRC supported United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 that stated that Zionism was a form of racism. Until the 1980s, China refused to grant visas to Israelis unless they held dual citizenship and carried a passport of a country other than Israel. However, following the Sino-Soviet split and China's 1979 establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, China began to develop a series of secret, non-official ties with Israel.

Establishment of relations

China and Israel secretly began building military ties in the 1980s during the Soviet–Afghan War, which both Israel and China opposed. They both supplied weapons to the Afghan mujahideen (Israel sending captured Palestine Liberation Organization weapons via the United States and Pakistan), and military cooperation between the two began in order to assist the Islamic resistance against the Soviets. China and Israel subsequently started exchanging visits of delegations of academics, experts, businessmen and industrialists. Reportedly, a large number of the heavy tanks used in China's 1984 National Day parades were retrofitted by Israel from captured Six-Day War equipment.

China eased travel restrictions, while Israel reopened its consulate in Hong Kong (then under British administration), which would serve as the main point for diplomatic and economic contact between the two nations. In 1987 Israel's Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, appointed Amos Yudan to set up the first official Government owned company (Copeco Ltd) to establish and foster commercial activities between companies in China and Israel. The company was active until 1992, when official diplomatic relationships were announced between Israel and China. In the early 1990s, China joined a number of nations who established ties with Israel after the initiation of a peace process between Israel and the PLO in the early 1990s; it also desired to play a role in the peace process.

Prior to the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1992, Israel and China established representative offices in Beijing and Tel Aviv, which functioned as de facto embassies. The Israeli office was formally known as the Liaison Office of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. This was opened in June 1990. China was similarly represented by a branch of the China International Travel Service, which also opened in 1990.

Zev Sufott, who had served in the liaison office of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Beijing beginning in 1991, was appointed as Israel's first Ambassador to China upon the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.

Relations in the 21st century

In 2009, China Radio International (CRI) began broadcasting in Hebrew. In addition, the Chinese established Chinese institutes in Israel, to public and media activities of Israel-based Chinese diplomats.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited China in May 2013 and five agreements were signed during his visit. A government-to-government mechanism was established and five task forces were set up in high tech, environmental protection, energy, agriculture and financing. Netanyahu visited China again in 2017 amid celebrations taking place to commemorate 25 years of ties between the two countries.

During the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, it was reported that Israel was winning the public opinion battle in China with most Chinese social media users siding with Israel.

In May 2020, the Chinese ambassador to Israel, Du Wei, was found dead at his home in Herzliya. While the exact cause of his death is unknown, it is believed he died of natural causes.

In November 2021, Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Chinese leader, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping held the first-ever phone call between heads of state of Israel and China. According to the read-out from the Israeli President's Office, Herzog and Xi discussed opportunities to enhance Israeli-Chinese bilateral ties ahead of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, in honor of which Herzog and Xi invited each other to visit their respective countries.

Military relations

Israel and China began military-to-military relations as early as the 1980s, even though no formal diplomatic relations existed. Before diplomatic relations were established in 1992 Israel had been selling arms to China. The use of military sales as a means of achieving foreign-policy goals was neither new nor unprecedented in Israeli foreign policy to promote its interests. Israel sold technology to upgrade Chinese tanks and planes in the 1980s. IAI Lavi and unmanned aerial vehicle technology seems to have been sold to China. Expertise in fitting western equipment in Soviet made hardware helped in modernization of Chinese army and air force, this way Chinese defense modernization complemented Israel's need of cash to fund its domestic made high-tech weapons programs.

The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre offered an additional incentive for military relations. Sanctions imposed by Western countries almost froze Chinese access to advanced military and dual-use technologies. Israel then sought to benefit from the situation and became China's backdoor for acquiring Western technology.

Israel was ready to sell China the EL/M-2075 Phalcon, an Israeli airborne early-warning radar system (AWACS), until the United States forced it to cancel the deal. Some estimate that Israel sold arms worth US$4 billion to China in this period.

China had looked to Israel for the arms and military technology it could not acquire from the United States, Europe and Russia. Israel is now China's second-largest foreign supplier of arms after Russia with China having purchased a wide array of military equipment and technology, including communications satellites. China is a vital market for Israel's aerospace and defense industry.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency compiled evidence that Israel had transferred missile, laser and aircraft technology to China in the 1990s. On 19 October 1999, the Defense Minister of China, Chi Haotian, flew to Israel and met with Ehud Barak, then-Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Israel. They reached several high-level agreements, including a $1 billion Israeli-Russian sale of military aircraft to China. On 25 May 2011, the Commander of the People's Liberation Army Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli, made an official visit to Israel, meeting with Barak and Rear Admiral Eliezer Marom.

On 14 August 2011, General Chen Bingde, Chief of the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department, made an official visit to Israel. He came a guest of the Israeli Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, who received him with an honor guard at the Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv. The visit came after Defense Minister Ehud Barak's visit to China in June, the first visit of a defense minister to the country in a decade. Bingde's visit was part of a tour that included stops in Russia and Ukraine.

On 13 August 2012, vessels from the People's Liberation Army Navy's 11th escort fleet, led by Rear Admiral Yang Jun-fei, anchored at Israel's Haifa naval base for a four-day goodwill visit to mark 20 years of cooperation between the Israel Defense Forces and the PLA. The vessels and crewmen were welcomed by the Haifa base commander, Brigadier General Eli Sharvit, and Chinese embassy officials. In July 2018, 180 acres of the Northern port in Haifa were transferred to Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) for a 25-year period of management. This sparked a heated discussion in the Israeli press and the academy, as well as a special discussion by the Israeli cabinet. It also came up in discussions between US National Security Advisor John Bolton and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu when they met on January 7, 2019. However, economically insignificant it may be for both China and the US, the Haifa port could become a critical battleground in a new Cold War between the two superpowers.

Economic ties

China is Israel's largest East Asian trading partner and has sought Israel's expertise in solar energy, manufacturing robotics, irrigation, construction, agricultural and water management and desalination technologies to combat drought and water shortages.

Since the 2010s, China and Israel enhanced bilateral economic ties with China connecting both Chinese and Israeli businessmen and investors to invest in each other's economies respectively. Chinese economic cooperation with Israel has seen substantial Chinese investment of more than US$15 billion in the Israeli economy, spawning seed capital in Israeli startup companies, as well as the acquisition of Israeli companies by major Chinese corporations that incorporate Israel's know how to help invigorate the development of the modern Chinese economy more efficiently. China ranked second in 2015 after the United States on collaboration with Israeli high-tech firms that are backed by Israel's Office of the Chief Scientist. Major Chinese firms such as Fosun, ChemChina, Brightfood, Horizons Ventures and China Everbright have invested significant amounts of financial capital and resources across numerous Israeli industries.

Investment from China in Israeli technology reached an aggregate of $15 billion from 2011 to 2017 with the surplus of Chinese investment capital finding its way through Israel's high technology sector, including agriculture, pharmaceutical, medical devices, artificial intelligence and autonomous driving.

On 3 July 2011, Israel and the People's Republic of China signed an economic cooperation agreement to boost trade between the two countries. According to Eliran Elimelech, Israel's commercial attaché in Beijing, the agreement was expected to deepen ties between Israeli and Chinese businessmen in the short term, and in the medium to long term to improve trade conditions between the countries. In January 2011, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics stated that Israeli exports to China had grown by an annual 95 percent in 2010 to $2 billion. In September 2011, the Israeli Minister of Transport, Israel Katz, stated that China and Israel were discussing the construction of a high-speed rail link joining the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. This joint project would permit the mass overland transport of Chinese goods to Israel and Eastern Europe, and would involve both Chinese and Israeli railway developers. The following month, the Chinese and Israeli governments signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the joint construction of a 180-km (112-mile) railway linking the Israeli city of Eilat with the Negev Desert's Zin Valley, Beersheba, and Tel Aviv.

In August 2012, with Chinese-Israeli trade growing, the Beijing University of International Business and Economics in Beijing set up a department dedicated to studying Israeli economics and Judaism, while some Chinese universities began offering Hebrew courses. The group SIGNAL has established an exchange network of Chinese and Israeli scholars and academics to help them collaborate with each other on various academic projects.

In 2013, China and Israel began to boost the economic relations with respect to agriculture. The two countries decided to set up an agriculture technology incubator in Anhui Province, China enabling joint development of agriculture technologies and solutions in keeping with requirements on the ground. Israeli agriculture trade fairs such as Agrivest and AgriTech have witnessed large Chinese delegations and greater participation from Chinese state-owned enterprises and private companies as Chinese's growing middle class and increasing consumer demand as well as increased pressure on agricultural land has prompted the East Asian giant to increasingly look at Israeli agriculture technology to boost crop yields and dairy production. Horizons Ventures, a venture capital firm established by Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka-shing, led a US$10.8 million strategic investment in Windward, an Israeli maritime data and analytics company. MarInt, Windward's satellite maritime analytics system, is widely used by many security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies across the world. In 2013, Li donated US$130 million to Technion. A large part of the money came from the profits he made from the IPO of Waze, an Israeli GPS-based map software company, in which he held an 11 percent stake that eventually acquired by Google. His was the largest donation ever made to Technion and one of the biggest to any Israeli academic institution. Li has been the pioneer of Chinese investment in Israel.

Bilateral trade between the two nations increased from $50 million to $10 billion in 2013. Since 2013, Chinese investors have begun to show a growing interest in Israeli firms. Recent high end deals include Beijing winning a $2 billion tender to build the "Med-Red" railway linking Ashdod port with Eilat as well as a $1 billion Israeli port tender, a $300 million joint research center between Tel Aviv University and Tsinghua University, HK billionaire Li Ka-shing donating $130 million to Technion in return for building a technology school in Guangdong, and Chinese acquisition of a controlling stake in Israel's Tnuva dairy company for more than US$1 billion. The acquisition of Tnuva was the biggest Chinese buyout of an Israeli company since 2011 when state-owned ChemChina bought Adama, the pesticides and crop protection company then known as Makhteshim Agan, for US$2.4 billion. In 2014, Chinese-Israeli tech deals totaled $300 million, up from $50 million in 2013, according to Israel's National Economic Council.

Bilateral between the two countries reached in excess of $10 billion in trade since the start of 2015. In January 2015, a number of Chinese information technology companies began to make investments in Israel, Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba invested an undisclosed sum in Visualead, an Israeli company specializing in QR code technology. Alibaba has also invested in Israel-based venture fund Jerusalem Venture Partners, becoming a limited partner joining Qihoo 360, another Chinese web company to have invested in the Jerusalem-based fund. Baidu, China's largest search engine, has put US$3 million into Pixellot, an Israeli video capture start-up and provided funds to Carmel Ventures, an Israeli venture capital firm as well as lead a $5 million investment round in the Israeli music education firm Tonara. In addition, leading Chinese technology firms such as Huawei, Legend and Xiaomi have set up R&D centers in Israel. In March 2015, Israel joined China's newly constituted Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Israel and China began negotiating a free trade agreement in 2019. The discussions coincided with China's beginning of free trade agreement negotiations with Palestine. According to academic Dawn C. Murphy, China likely proceeded concurrently with both countries in order to avoid perceptions of favoritism.

Bilateral issues and disputes

Israel's increasing defense cooperation with China has caused concern in Western nations, particularly the United States, which is the largest foreign supplier of military equipment to Israel. Owing to strategic Chinese rivalry with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India and Vietnam, as well as concerns over the security of Taiwan, the United States has pressured Israel against selling sophisticated equipment and technology to China. In 1992, The Washington Times alleged that exported American Patriot missiles and Israel's indigenous Lavi jet aircraft technology had been shared with China, although official U.S. investigations did not substantiate these charges. In 2000, Israel cancelled the sale to China of the Israeli-built Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in the wake of pressure from the U.S., which threatened to cut off US$2.8 billion in yearly aid if the deal went through. Israel's decision drew condemnation from China, which stated that the cancellation would hurt bilateral ties. China's record of proliferating arms and weapons systems has also concerned U.S. planners, as the U.S. worries that China may repackage advanced Israeli defense technologies for resale to America's rivals and nations hostile to it throughout the world.

Chinese involvement in the Israeli technology sector has also generated security concerns. The former head of Mossad, Efraim Halevy, is one of the major critics in Israel who believes that the country should examine the geopolitical considerations with China and has consistently warned the Israeli government against involving the Chinese in the Red-Med project, arguing that it could lead to a crisis in strategic relations with the United States. Other critics argue that growing Chinese involvement will endanger Israeli security and lead to theft of Israeli technology to be utilized in Chinese espionage further arguing that Israel should balance its burgeoning relations with China with maintaining a balance of relations with the United States at the same time.

In 2010, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1929, imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran for its nuclear enrichment program. China ultimately supported this resolution, although initially, due to the strong bilateral relations and nuclear cooperation between the China and Iran, China opposed the sanctions. According to The New York Times, Israel lobbied for the sanctions by explaining to China the impact of any pre-emptive strike on Iran would have on the world oil supply, and hence on the Chinese economy.

In August 2022, Liu Jianchao warned the Israeli ambassador to China, Irit Ben-Abba, against taking the U.S. position on the persecution of Uyghurs in China.

Israel–Palestine conflict

Though relations are close and generally good with no particular bilateral problems between the two nations, China and Israel continue to remain divided on the issue of Palestine, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, economic blockade of Gaza, and the Israeli West Bank barrier wall. China has criticized Israel's construction of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. China's then Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing called the Israeli West Bank barrier wall an obstacle to peace in a September 2006 statement during a UN Security Council meeting on the Middle East. In November 2008, then China Ambassador to the United States Yesui Zhang stated that the "continued construction of settlements on the West Bank is not only in violation of Israel's obligations under international law, but is also detrimental to guaranteeing Israel's own security." According to analysis from the Jamestown Foundation, China's policy on Israel and Palestine is based on soft power diplomacy, and maintain a balancing act between its Israeli and Arab world ties. On June 8, 2015, China demanded Israel to refrain from utilizing Chinese migrant construction workers in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. China sought this ban out of concern for the Chinese workers' safety in areas beyond the Green Line, which marks Israel's pre-1967 borders. The government of Israel has been eager to negotiate a deal with China completed in the hope that an influx of foreign workers will increase the rate of housing construction in Israel and reduce the costs of new homes.

After the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections in Gaza, China acknowledged Hamas as the legitimately elected political entity in the Gaza Strip despite Israeli and U.S. opposition. The Chinese government met with senior Hamas representative Mahmoud al-Zahar, who previously served as Palestinian foreign minister, during the June 2006 China-Arab Cooperation Forum in Beijing which held direct bilateral talks despite protests from Israel and the United States. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that "the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected." Besides the Chinese recognition of Hamas, China also does not designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

After the May 31, 2010 Gaza flotilla raid the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu condemned Israel. On April 28, 2011, after the rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas formed a national unity government, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that China welcomed the internal reconciliation. During the November 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China urged all sides to display restraint.

In 2012, the families of eight Israeli terror victims of the 2008 Mercaz HaRav massacre in Jerusalem filed a $1 billion lawsuit against the Bank of China. The suit asserted that in 2003 the bank's New York branch wired millions of dollars to Hamas from its leadership in Syria and Iran. The Bank of China subsequently denied providing banking services to terrorist groups: "The Bank of China has always strictly followed the UN's anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing requirements and regulations in China and other judicial areas where we operate." The case was dismissed in 2015.

On July 23, 2014, China was among the 29 nations who voted in favor of the investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Council of war crimes committed by Israel during Operation Protective Edge, with the United States being the only nation in dissent. In addition, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei earlier on 9 July 2014 issued a statement in response to the violence during the military operation, stating: "We believe that to resort to force and to counter violence with violence will not help resolve problems other than pile up more hatred. We urge relevant parties to bear in mind the broader picture of peace and the lives of the people, immediately realize a ceasefire, stick to the strategic choice of peace talks and strive for an early resumption of talks." In July 2017, Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a formalization of China's positions in his "Four Points" on the "issue of Israel-Palestine conflict", the first of which was that China supported the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestine within the framework of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

In May 2021, Israel's embassy in Beijing accused Chinese state media outlet China Global Television Network of "blatant antisemitism" when host Zheng Junfeng broadcast a segment accusing US policy on Israel of being influenced by wealthy Jews, during the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis.

Israel–Hamas war

Following the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, an Israeli embassy official said Israel expected to see a "stronger condemnation" of Hamas and that it was "not the time to call for a two-state solution" when people were "being murdered, slaughtered in the streets." The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs later expressed "deep disappointment" over China not condemning Hamas. Commentary in Chinese state media blamed the U.S. for the conflict and spread antisemitic tropes against Israel. Some people equated Israel's actions to Nazism by accusing them of committing genocide on Palestinians, prompting a rebuke from the German embassy in Beijing. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that in Gaza, "Israel’s actions have gone beyond self-defense." In January 2024, Israel reported that it discovered a "massive" stockpile of Chinese weaponry used by Hamas.

Chinese suppliers as of December 2023 have created bureaucratic obstacles for Israeli tech factories, delaying shipments of electronic components to Israel for civilian and military use. The Chinese government, according to Israeli officials, has refused to send workers to Israel during the war. Chinese shipping companies COSCO and OOCL have suspended trade with Israel as early as 18 December 2023, sparking concerns by Israeli analysts that the Chinese-run Port of Haifa in Israel is a security risk.

On the first anniversary of the 7 October Hamas-led attack on Israel, Xinhua News Agency criticized U.S. diplomatic and military support for Israel. The Ministry of Public Security's Spamouflage influence operation has also criticized U.S. support for Israel and spread antisemitic tropes online.

See also

• Antisemitism in China
• A Jewish Girl in Shanghai, a 2010 Chinese animated film
• China–Palestine relations
• Chinese people in Israel
• Dates of establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China
• History of the Jews in China
• Hong Kong–Israel relations
• International recognition of Israel
• Israelis in China
• Kaifeng Jews

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