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Oreshnik (Russian: Орешник, lit. 'Hazel tree'), is a Russian intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) characterized by its reported speed exceeding Mach 10 (12,300 km/h; 7,610 mph; 3.40 km/s), according to the Ukrainian military. The missile is equipped with six warheads, each reportedly containing submunitions, and has been described as highly difficult to intercept, though modern ballistic missile interceptors are designed to counter this type of system. Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh has identified the Oreshnik as a variant of the RS-26 Rubezh IRBM.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has emphasized the strategic importance of the Oreshnik, claiming on 28 November 2024 that its mass production had started.

History

Development

Oreshnik is believed to be derived from the RS-26 Rubezh IRBM, which has been test-fired five times but never entered service. According to experts, the Oreshnik likely removed a booster stage from the RS-26, reducing its range.

First operational use

The Oreshnik saw its first confirmed operational use on 21 November 2024, during the Russo-Ukrainian War. The missile was employed in an attack on Ukraine's PA Pivdenmash facility in Dnipro. Initially, Ukrainian reports speculated that the attack involved an intercontinental ballistic missile; however, subsequent assessments identified the Oreshnik as the weapon used. The missile was launched from Astrakhan Oblast, likely the Kapustin Yar training ground. It reportedly carried a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload, as suggested by unverified footage. Later analyses indicated the strike may not have involved explosives and was potentially intended as a political demonstration. According to senior Ukrainian officials, the missile was equipped with "dummy" warheads that lacked explosives, prompting U.S. experts to describe the method as an "expensive way to deliver not that much destruction". The launch appears to have been conducted with a lofted trajectory. Eyewitnesses reported that 21 November attack on Dnipro, which included Oreshnik strike, triggered explosions lasting up to three hours. A director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said that Oreshnik's warheads, even inert, can cause "a lot of damage" because of the kinetic energy created by their hypersonic speed. Satellite images later revealed minimal damage to the roofs of Pivdenmash buildings and to the nearby private sector.

Capabilities and challenges

Interception difficulties

The missile's MIRV payload distinguishes it from other nuclear-capable missiles used against Ukraine, making it exceptionally challenging for Ukraine to intercept with its current defenses, according to a director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ukrainian military analysts stated that the Oreshnik travels through the upper atmosphere, undetectable by Ukraine's air defense systems. This capability renders interception effectively impossible by Ukraine's missile defense systems; though modern interceptors not present in Ukraine, such as Israel's Arrow 3 and the U.S. SM-3 Block 2A are specifically designed to defeat this type of threat.

Experimental nature

U.S. officials have noted that the Oreshnik remains experimental despite its advanced features. Though Putin has emphasized claims of the experimental nature of the system and its hypersonic capability, according to several military experts, the weapon is actually an application of old technology used for many years in ICBMs. According to nonproliferation expert Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, none of the technology in Oreshnik is novel or represents a dramatic change in the way that conventional weapons are developed; rather, it was "a series of old technologies that have been put together in a new way." A defense expert at the University of Oslo suggested that it likely incorporates no more than 10% new components. Russia is believed to possess only a limited number of units, making regular deployment against Ukraine improbable.

Accuracy challenges

Experts have noted that the accuracy of Oreshnik, as demonstrated in the footage from the Dnipro strike, is sufficient for delivering a nuclear payload but not for a conventional one. According to William Alberque of the Henry L. Stimson Center, "If Russia is working on a MIRV with a conventional CEP, we’ve never seen it." Other experts have noted that the accuracy concerns from Oreshnik's warheads could be mitigated by using submunitions.

Intimidation campaign

Experts suggest that Putin launched a missile at the Dnipro as a form of nuclear intimidation, following an unsuccessful attempt to establish "red lines" aimed at deterring U.S.-supplied missile strikes on Russian territory. Several media outlets and public figures have interpreted the 21 November strike with a new missile as a form of nuclear blackmail. For instance, The Economist published an article entitled "Vladimir Putin fires a new missile to amplify his nuclear threats", Similarly, the Institute for the Study of War argues that Putin rhetorically linked the 21 November Oreshnik strike to Russia’s nuclear capabilities to dissuade Western nations from continuing their support for Ukraine.

Russian nuclear policy expert Maksim Starchak suggested that the primary purpose of the missile’s use was not military damage but psychological pressure. He believes the strike was intended to frighten European residents into pressuring their governments to comply with Russia’s demands. According to Meduza, the Kremlin's intent might have been to instill fear of conflict escalation with Russia in the incoming U.S. administration, thereby influencing its policies.

According to The Moscow Times, the medium-range missile strike was part of a propaganda campaign orchestrated by the Russian military and intelligence services to intimidate Western leadership and populations. The operation was reportedly a response to Ukraine being permitted to use long-range missiles against Russian targets, with the ultimate aim of coercing the West into yielding to Moscow's demands.

Military expert Mathieu Boulegue of Chatham House (UK) stated that while the "Oreshnik" missile does not alter the dynamics on the battlefield, it effectively serves the Kremlin’s purpose of intimidating Western audiences. Similarly, James J. Townsend, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, interpreted the missile's deployment as Russia's expression of dissatisfaction with the use of Western-produced long-range missiles by Ukraine. Townsend also described it as a message to Ukraine and the incoming U.S. President, Donald Trump, signaling that Russia remains committed to pursuing its objectives regardless of Western support for Ukraine.

See also

• Avangard (hypersonic glide vehicle)
• 53T6
• Agni-V
• DF-41
• RS-28 Sarmat
• RSM-56 Bulava
• UGM-73 Poseidon

References

1. "Russian missile reached speed of more than 8,000 miles per hour, Ukraine says". Reuters. 22 November 2024. Retrieved 22 November 2024.
2. Faulconbridge, Guy; Bobrova, Marina; Rodionov, Maxim (21 November 2024). "Putin says Russia fired High-hypersonic ballistic missile at Ukraine in warning to the West". Reuters. Retrieved 21 November 2024.
3. ^ "Putin touts Russia's new missile and delivers a menacing warning to NATO". Associated Press. 21 November 2024. Retrieved 22 November 2024.
4. ^ Santora, Marc; Jakes, Lara; Hopkins, Valerie; Kramer, Andrew E.; Schmitt, Eric (21 November 2024). "With Use of New Missile, Russia Sends a Threatening Message to the West". The New York Times. Retrieved 22 November 2024.
5. ^ Doyle, Gerry; Balmforth, Tom; Zafra, Mariano (28 November 2024). "Enter 'Oreshnik'". Reuters. Retrieved 9 December 2024.
6. Cailler, Adam (28 November 2024). "Putin's mass production of Russia's new Oreshnik missile has started as WW3 fears rise". MSN. Archived from the original on 30 November 2024. Retrieved 30 November 2024.
7. "Russia Fired ICBM for First Time in War, Ukraine's Military Claims". The Moscow Times. 21 November 2024. Retrieved 21 November 2024.
8. Petrenko, Roman (23 November 2024). "New ballistic missile used by Russia to strike Dnipro on 21 November had no explosives and caused no destruction – Bild". Ukrainska Pravda.
9. Balmforth, Tom; Doyle, Gerry. "New Russian missile fired at Ukraine carried warheads without explosives, sources say". Reuters.
10. Comerford, Ruth (22 November 2024). "Ukraine war: Putin says Russia will use new Oreshnik missile again in 'combat conditions'". BBC Home. Retrieved 24 November 2024.
11. Jakes, Lara (27 November 2024). "What Is Russia's Oreshnik Ballistic Missile?". The New York Times. Retrieved 2 December 2024.
12. "Путин упорно запугивает Украину и Запад «Орешником». Что важно знать о новой российской ракете? Это и правда грозное оружие? И стали ли мы ближе к ядерной войне? Большой разбор угроз Кремля — и рисков, порожденных этими угрозами". Meduza (in Russian). Retrieved 4 December 2024.
13. Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, and George Barros. "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2024". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 10 December 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
14. Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, William Runkel, and George Barros. "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 27, 2024". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 10 December 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
15. York, Chris; Fornusek, Martin (22 November 2024). "'Don't overreact' — Oreshnik missile isn't as new as Russia claims, experts say". Kyiv Independent.
16. "Russia's Hypersonic Missile Attack on Ukraine Was an Attempt at Blackmail". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 20 December 2024.
17. "What Is Russia's Oreshnik Ballistic Missile?". The New York Times. 27 November 2024.
18. "Vladimir Putin fires a new missile to amplify his nuclear threats". The Economist. 21 November 2024.
19. "Russian offensive campaign assessment, 21 november 2024". ISW. 21 November 2024.
20. Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, William Runkel, and George Barros (29 November 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024". Институт изучения войны. Retrieved 30 November 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
21. "Приглашение к гонке. Зачем Москва атаковала Днепр «Орешником»". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (in Russian). Retrieved 30 November 2024.
22. "Путин упорно запугивает Украину и Запад «Орешником». Что важно знать о новой российской ракете? Это и правда грозное оружие? И стали ли мы ближе к ядерной войне? Большой разбор угроз Кремля — и рисков, порожденных этими угрозами". Meduza (in Russian). Retrieved 4 December 2024.
23. Reporter, Moscow Times (3 December 2024). "Exclusive: Kremlin Stages Oreshnik Propaganda Blitz as Nuclear Threats Lose Their Potency". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 4 December 2024.
24. ^ "Russia has used its hypersonic Oreshnik missile for the first time. What are its capabilities?". AP News. 9 December 2024. Retrieved 9 December 2024.

• Intermediate-range ballistic missiles of Russia
• MIRV capable missiles
• Nuclear weapons of Russia
• Post–Cold War weapons of Russia
• Weapons and ammunition introduced in 2024
• Military equipment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine